Author: Murphy, W. E.
Date: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00
Keywords: New Zealand World War II History
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2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

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2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Author:

Murphy, W. E.

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About the print version

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Author:

Murphy, W. E.

Historical Publications Branch, Department Of Internal Affairs, 1966
Wellington, New Zealand

Source copy consulted: VUW Library

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45

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2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Contents

- [covers]
- 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery
- [frontispiece]
- [title page]
- Preface p. v
- Contents p. ix
- List of Illustrations p. xi
- List of Maps p. xvii

CHAPTER 1 — The Early Days: New Zealand, United Kingdom and Egypt

- [section]
p. 1

- Brigadier Miles, the First CRA p. 5
- The First Echelon p. 7
- The Second Echelon p. 8
- The Third Echelon p. 11
- Maadi and the Western Desert p. 16
- Getting Ready for Greece p. 19

CHAPTER 2 — Greece: The Gunners' Campaign

- [section]
p. 24

- The Aliakmon Line p. 25
- Back to the Olympus Line p. 28
- Rearguard on the Aliakmon p. 34
- Desperate Fighting at Platamon p. 37

- Crest Clearance on the Cloudy Slopes of Olympus p. 41

- A Dominant Position above Servia p. 45

- 26 Battery at Kalabaka p. 48

- ‘Action Front: Tanks!’
p. 50

- Action Overlooking Elasson
- Tempe: A Crucial Rearguard p. 57
- Retreat to Thermopylae p. 67
- The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka p. 71

CHAPTER 3 — The Molos Battle and then the Beaches

- [section]
p. 74

- Evacuation Plans and Moves p. 79
- Molos: The Gunners' Battle p. 84
- Retreat to the Beaches p. 95

CHAPTER 4 — Gunners and ‘Infantillery’ in Crete

- [section]
p. 102

- Armed and Unarmed Parties p. 105
- An Odd Assortment of Guns p. 109
- The Gun Positions p. 112
- The Airborne Assault on 5 Brigade p. 117
- The Landing in the Prison Valley p. 124
- The Second Day at Maleme p. 129
- Minor Fighting at Galatas p. 133

- The Counter-attack on the Airfield Fails p. 134

- A Paratroop Attack on Galatas is Repulsed p. 137

- 5 Brigade Withdraws p. 139
- The Composite Battalion is Relieved p. 142
- Difficult Gunnery at Galatas p. 144

- Desperate Fighting by Gunners and ‘Infantillery’
p. 147

- Retreat from Galatas p. 155
- Snadden's Gunner Platoon p. 159
- A Cruel Ending to the Campaign p. 162

CHAPTER 5 — Recuperation, Training and Reinforcement p. 167

- [section]
p. 167

- The 14th Light Ack-Ack Arrives p. 168
- Lessons of Greece p. 170
- New Equipment but No Medium Guns p. 171
- Action for the Bofors Gunners p. 174
- Preparing for Desert Operations p. 176

- Field and Anti-Tank Batteries are Reorganised p. 177

- The Battle Plan p. 180

- The Move to the Libyan Frontier p. 182

CHAPTER 6 — CRUSADER: Retrieving a Disastrous Start

- [section]
p. 185

- The Division Moves North p. 187
- The Attack on Bir Ghirba p. 191
- Bad News of the Tank Battle p. 194

- 6 Brigade Overruns Africa Corps Headquarters p. 196

- Hard Fighting at Point 175 p. 198

- L Troop's Anti-Tank Action p. 205

- Major Sawyers recaptures a Dozen Tanks p. 208

- An Anti-Tank Advanced Guard p. 210
- 4 Brigade Captures Gambut
- The Blockhouse p. 216
- The First Attack on Sidi Rezegh p. 222
- Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda p. 229

CHAPTER 7 — crusader: A Hard-won Victory

- [section]
p. 235

- The Enemy Armour Approaches Bardia p. 236

- The Guns Fail to Save 5 Brigade Headquarters p. 240

- The Garrisons of Menastir and Capuzzo Repel Attacks p. 246

- Mopping Up Near Sidi Rezegh p. 249
- Pressure on 6 Brigade p. 253
- Divisional Headquarters under Attack p. 256
- Point 175 is Lost p. 258
- Panzers Overwhelm Most of 6 Brigade p. 260

- A Merciless Bombardment of 25 Battery p. 265

- The CRA Fails to Clear Up High-level Misunderstandings p. 267

- The 6th Field is Overrun p. 269

- Belhamed is Also Lost p. 275

- The Remnants of the Division Gather at Zaafran p. 278

- Duff's Gun Group Beats Back All Attacks p. 281

- The Maori Victory at Menastir p. 285
- Gunners in Tobruk Fortress p. 286
- The Sinking of the Chakdina p. 289
- The Gazala Battle p. 291

CHAPTER 8 — Interlude in Syria p. 297

- [section]
p. 297

- Training in Combined Operations p. 298
- 5 Brigade Mans the El Adem Box p. 300
- Springtime in Syria p. 302
- Increased Anti-Tank Strength p. 307

- Key Men Leave for Service in the Pacific p. 308

CHAPTER 9 — Minqar Qaim: Another Gunners' Battle

- [section]
p. 312

- The Minqar Qaim Position p. 315
- More 6-Pounders Arrive p. 318
- Vulnerable Transport p. 320
- Threats from All Quarters p. 321
- The Break-out After Dark p. 326

CHAPTER 10 — Summer in the Alamein Line

- [section]
p. 333

- The Jock Column Policy Continues p. 334
- Plenty of Work for the Bofors p. 338
- The Attack on Ruweisat p. 341
- El Mreir: Another Costly Failure p. 348
- Stalemate in August p. 353
- The Battle of Alam Halfa p. 357
- The Counter-attack Southwards p. 363

CHAPTER 11 — The Alamein Offensive

- [section]
p. 372

- Moving Up to the Front p. 375
- The Artillery Plan p. 376
- A Shortage of Gunners p. 380
- The Barrage

- The 4th Field Moves Up Behind the Armour p. 385

- OPs Under Fire p. 388
- Anti-Tankers on Miteiriya Ridge p. 389
- The Enemy Gun Line Is Not Broken p. 393
- The End of Operation Lightfoot p. 395

CHAPTER 12 — Operation SUPERCHARGE

- [section]
p. 398

- Planning supercharge p. 401
- The 192-Gun Creeping Barrage p. 405
- Trouble for the Anti-Tankers p. 406
- Breaking the Enemy Gun Line p. 410
- Another Big Barrage p. 414
- The End of the Alamein Line p. 415
- The Pursuit p. 417

CHAPTER 13 — The Surveyors p. 423

CHAPTER 14 — The Conquest of Libya

- [section]
p. 437

- Crossing Cyrenaica p. 438
- The First Left Hook p. 439
- The Action at Wadi Matratin
- The Second Left Hook: To Nofilia p. 445
- Lobs and Others on the Coast Route p. 448

- Christmas and the New Year by the Gulf of Sirte p. 449

- The Development of the Stonk p. 451
- Moving on towards Tripoli p. 452
- Beni Ulid p. 457
- The Difficult Approaches to Azizia p. 458
- Suani Ben Adem p. 461
- Tripoli p. 462

- The Parade for Mr Churchill and Other Events p. 463

- The Bofors Gunners Defend Tripoli Harbour p. 464

- Preparing for a Divisional Artillery Exercise p. 466

CHAPTER 15 — Tunisia: The End of a Long Road

- [section]
p. 468

- Field Regiments under CRA's Command p. 470
- Enemy Attack is Repulsed p. 474
- Air Attacks p. 476
- Outflanking the Mareth Line p. 477
- The Tebaga Gap p. 480
- New Zealand Corps Reinforced p. 483
- The Advance to Gabes p. 486
- Wadi Akarit p. 490
- The Pursuit Continues p. 492
- Takrouna p. 497
- Operations around Djebibina p. 507
- Return to Maadi p. 513

CHAPTER 16 — Italy: The Sangro and Orsogna

- [section]
p. 515

- Burg el Arab p. 516
- The Move to Italy p. 518
- Marking Time at Taranto p. 519
- A New Kind of War in Italy p. 520
- The Journey to the Adriatic Front p. 521
- Edging Towards the Sangro River p. 523
- The Crossing of the Sangro p. 526
- Guardiagrele and Orsogna p. 529
- The Second Attack on Orsogna p. 532
- The Third Attack p. 536
- The Final Attack p. 537
- The Casa War
- Guns Firing Short p. 544
- Famous Landmarks p. 545
- The Ack-Ack Record p. 546
- Survey Work
- Withdrawing from the Orsogna Front p. 547

CHAPTER 17 — The New Zealand Attacks at Cassino

- [section]
p. 550

- The Maoris Attack the Railway Station p. 557

- Operation dickens p. 567

CHAPTER 18 — The Mountains above Cassino and the Action at Sora—Balsorano

- [section]
p. 581

- Anti-Tankers Form 39 Mortar Battery p. 590

- The Pursuit Begins p. 592

CHAPTER 19 — Arezzo and Florence

- [section]
p. 607

- Infantry and M10 Training for Anti-Tankers p. 608

- A Hasty Move to the Arezzo Front p. 609

- Infantry Complaints about Short-shooting p. 612

- Taupo Furlough Scheme p. 617
- Committed to Florence Battle
- M10s in Action p. 620
- San Michele p. 623
- Tragedy at La Romola p. 625
- The Final Attacks p. 627
- The Fall of Florence p. 632
- The Montelupo–Empoli Front p. 634
- A Brief Rest near Siena p. 637

CHAPTER 20 — Back to the Adriatic

- [section]
p. 638

- Attack on the Gothic Line
- The Coriano Ridge p. 641
- The Rimini Front p. 643

- Rivers, Canals and Ditches of the Romagna p. 647

- Viserba and Bellaria

- Rain Delays the Offensive p. 654

- Anti-Tankers Support the Greek Brigade p. 656

- Thrusting Along the Foothills p. 658

- Across the Savio River p. 660

CHAPTER 21 — Winter in the Romagna p. 664

- [section]
p. 664

- Some Units are Disbanded
- Return to the Front
- Surprise Attack West of Faenza p. 673
- A White Christmas on the Senio p. 678
- Manning a Winter Line p. 680
- Departures and Replacements p. 685

CHAPTER 22 — The Senio to Trieste: the Triumphant Advance

- [section]
p. 688

- A Sudden Move to the Front p. 690
- The Forthcoming Offensive p. 692
- Changes in Equipment and Methods p. 694
- Changes in Personnel p. 695
- The Artillery Plan p. 696
- The Senio Crossing p. 699
- Pushing on to the Santerno p. 703
- Near Massa Lombarda p. 708
- The Sillaro p. 709

- Spaniel: a Masterpiece of Planning and Administration p. 711

- Gruesome Effects of Artillery Fire p. 714
- The Gaiana Canal p. 716
- Across the Idice p. 718
- A Rapid Advance towards the Po p. 720
- Crossing the Po and the Adige p. 721
- The Race to Padua p. 724
- From Venice to the Piave p. 727
- On to Trieste p. 728
- Tension after VE Day p. 729
- General Freyberg Sums Up p. 730

CHAPTER 23 — The End of the Story p. 734

- [section]
p. 734

- The Disbandment p. 735
- Jayforce p. 738
- The End and the Continuation p. 739

Appendix I p. 740

Appendix II p. 743

Roll of Honour p. 749

- HQ 2 NZ Divisional Artillery p. 749
- 4 Field Regiment
- 5 Field Regiment p. 753
- 6 Field Regiment p. 756
- 7 Anti-Tank Regiment p. 760
- 14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment p. 764
- 36 Survey Battery p. 766
- I Survey Troop

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES — (ALL REGIMENTS)
p. 767

Honours and Awards p. 768

Index p. 773

[backmatter]
p. 797

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Contents

- [covers]
- 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery
- [frontispiece]
- [title page]
- Preface p. v
- Contents p. ix
- List of Illustrations p. xi
- List of Maps p. xvii

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[covers]

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The authors of the volumes in this series of histories prepared under the supervision of the Historical Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs have been given full access to official documents. They and the Editor-in-Chief are responsible for the statements made and the views expressed by them.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[frontispiece]

F Troop, 6th Field, in action at Ruweisat Ridge

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[title page]

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45
2nd NEW ZEALAND DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

W. E. MURPHY

HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND1966
SET UP, PRINTED AND BOUND IN NEW ZEALAND
BY
COULLS SOMERVILLE WILKIE LTD.
DUNEDIN

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Preface

Preface

WHAT A PLEASURE it is to write this preface! As my last contribution to a project I began back in 1942 it affords me, if not a sense of accomplishment, at least a wonderful feeling of relief. No longer will gunner after gunner accost me in the street asking when their history will be out. Here it is, at long last—the last of a long and unique series of unit histories of the 2nd NZEF.

Reasons for the delay are legion. There were to be separate regimental histories and three were well advanced when Cabinet in the early fifties decided otherwise. Then I was caught up in other war history work. Research into a mountain of artillery documents and consequent interviews and correspondence took more time. Then came a pause, like a diver standing trembling on the high board, building up courage for the plunge. Scarcely had I begun the actual writing, however, when I left War History Branch in 1962. So the history had to fit in to whatever time I had left from teaching and editing an academic journal, mostly the small hours—the very small hours, when the noise of my typewriter thundered through the sleeping household. But perhaps it is some consolation that the year of publication now coincides with the 250th anniversary of the founding of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.

New Zealand gunners always thought the infantry were the salt of the earth. If this book, by a gunner for gunners, gives any other impression it is wrong. I have seen few gunners proud of what they themselves did on the field of battle; their admiration was almost always reserved for the doings of the infantry—or of gunners with other natures of guns.

All the different kinds of guns are here mixed up together, a hard tale to tell. Like all histories, it must be selective, and the historian applies his own principles of selection, some of them unwittingly. Reading through the proofs I was disturbed that many a worthy gunner of whom I know is mentioned little or not at all. But many gunners are mentioned. One principle I have tried to follow is to use terms of personal praise such as

‘popular’ only where I was sure that a consensus of opinion supported them. In many cases I went to a lot of trouble to establish this. Will readers whose own opinion in any such case happens to differ please bear this in mind?

In such a history the question of balance, of fairness to the many regiments and batteries concerned, is insoluble. I kidded myself that I had the answer, but the index proves me wrong. Genius is not required in order to work out from it that my own battery was the 34th Anti-Tank. Much must depend, however, on the material available. Even after years of work and enormous help, gaps in the evidence opened up alarmingly and some of them, years after the event, could not be filled.

Here I must interpose the usual platitude that it is impossible to acknowledge all help received. Source footnotes appear only where they seemed essential or for some reason interesting. I must, however, thank those artillery regimental historians who worked with me in northern Italy: R. J. Larkin, W. J. Fisk, C. J. Hayden, J. W. Johnston, A. E. Bird, B. Reyburn and E. H. Smith. I must mention, too, authors of particularly helpful narratives or draft histories: N. P. Webber, A. G. Protheroe, A. P. B. Watson, and again E. H. Smith.

The comments of Brigadier M. C. Fairbrother on the proofs led to significant amendments. The former and the present Director of the RNZA, Lieutenant-Colonels J. F. Spring and L. W. Wright, and their assistant, Captain C. Brown, have been helpful in many ways. Brigadiers C. S. J. Duff and J. M. Mitchell and Colonel E. T. Kensington helped to choose the illustrations. Of those maps which appear for the first time here, most were drawn by Warrant Officer Class I L. A. Skelton, RNZE, and by Mr Peter Newman of the Civil Design Office, Ministry of Works. The others were drawn by the Cartographic Branch of the Department of Lands and Survey. Mr Chris Hansen kindly made available the painting reproduced as the frontispiece. This colour reproduction, extra illustrations, the presentation form and other additions were paid for by the surviving trustees of the 2nd NZ Divisional Artillery Units' Trust Fund, Colonels G. J. O. Stewart and C. L. Walter and Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. Turner.

Above all, I must thank Mr W. A. Glue of the Historical Publications Branch for patient and skilful editing and checking and for providing, with Mrs. M. Fogarty, the biographical footnotes and index. They detected many errors and anomalies. In a work of this kind it is virtually impossible to eliminate all mistakes. At the last moment Captain G. F. Stagg pointed out a misleading caption to the photograph of the 6th Field at Molos, in the photographs following page 149. This was taken on the way north, he pointed out, and was therefore not ‘Tempting the Stukas’. In writing a caption for Russel Clark's painting of an American 155-millimetre gun, in the illustrations section following page 442, I wrongly ascribed it to the Orsogna front; the gun was similar to those used on that front, and elsewhere in Italy. If other readers detect significant errors I should like to hear from them.

W. E. Murphy

School of Political Science and Public Administration,
Victoria University of Wellington

July 1966

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Contents

Contents

| | Page
| preface | V
1 | the early days: new zealand, united kingdom, egypt | 1
2 | greece: the gunners' campaign | 24
3 | the molos battle and then the beaches | 74
4 | gunners and ‘infantillery’ in crete | 102
5 | recuperation, training and reinforcement | 167
6 | CRUSADER: retrieving a disastrous start | 185
7 | CRUSADER: a hard-won victory | 235
8 | interlude in syria | 297
9 | minqar qaim: another gunners' battle | 312
10 | summer in the alamein line | 333
11 | the alamein offensive | 372
12 | operation SUPERCHARGE | 398
13 | the surveyors | 423
14 | the conquest of libya | 437
15 | tunisia: the end of a long road | 468
16 | italy: the sangro and orsogna | 515
17 | the new zealand attacks at cassino | 550
18 | the mountains above cassino and the action at sora–balsorano | 581
19 | arezzo and florence | 607
20 | back to the adriatic | 638
21 | winter in the romagna | 664
22 | the senio to trieste: the triumphant advance | 688
23 | the end of the story | 734
| Appendix I: training directive of 2 nz divisional artillery, 8–31 august 1943 | 740
| Appendix II: 2 nz divisional artillery operation order no. 15, 6 april 1945 | 743
| roll of honour | 749
| summary of casualties | 767
| honours and awards | 768
| index | 772

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

List of Illustrations

List of Illustrations

| Frontispiece
F Troop, 6th Field, in action at Ruweisat Ridge—from a painting by C. Hansen |
| Following page 149
The 7th Anti-Tank on Queen Street, Auckland, 27 April 1940 | L. Clark collection
The New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery on the range at Lydd, Kent, March 1940 | Keystone View photograph, London
A 4th Field 18-pounder at Maadi Camp, early 1940 | British official
W. F. McCarthy and his E1 crew fire a French 75 at Larkhill, August 1940 | J. F. Spring
A 60-pounder in Libya, early 1941 | British official
A 4.5 medium gun in Libya, 1941 | British official
A 4.5 howitzer of the 6th Field, Helwan, January 1941 | B. C. Mills
B1 of the 6th Field driving through Athens, March 1941 | S. Wilson
The 4th Field in the Olympus Pass | R. H. Dyson
The highest 25-pounder in Europe— Olympus Pass | J. C. White
A spectacular 4th Field gun position at Olympus | D. A. Hawkins
Driving past Thermopylae | D. H. Robertson collection
The 6th Field at Molos | R. S. Wait
4th Field shells bursting among Germans at Kriekouki | S. N. S. Crump
Paratroops over Maleme | R. H. Dyson
The Askifou Plain from the north | NZ Army
Bill Carson near Galatas in Crete |
The embarkation beach at Sfakia |
The 4th Field moves back into the desert, September 1941 | F. T. Allan
4th Field RHQ at Baggush | R. H. Dyson
A 14th Light Ack-Ack Bofors ready for action, 22 November 1941 | J. B. Hardcastle
A 6th Field conference in Libya | J. B. Hardcastle
A 2-pounder portée in Libya with Bren gun on ack-ack mounting | NZ Army
Portée action in Libya, November 1941 | G. Silk (AIF)
An L Troop portée firing near Point 175, 1 December 1941 | A. B. Gordon
Maffey's Halo rises as A1 portée burns, 25 November 1941 | F. T. Allan
The few surviving 6th Field guns prepare to withdraw from Belhamed | J. C. White
Jack Spring (GPO of D Troop, 6th Field) and his staff have just withdrawn from Belhamed | T. P. Foster collection
The 4th Field looks towards Belhamed | C. S. J. Duff
E Troop, 4th Field, with captured 105 in background | F. T. Allan
Monstrous 210s shell Belhamed | F. T. Allan
4th Field RHQ near Belhamed | C. S. J. Duff
4th Field Signals Office near Belhamed | N. W. Laugesen
| Following page 309
Manhandling Bofors into position on the way to Gazala | G. Silk (AIF)
A 5th Field gun in the Gazala battle | G. Silk (AIF)
2-pounder portée at Gazala | G. Silk (AIF)
5th Field on Combined Operations training in the Gulf of Suez | British official
A 33 Battery portée below the Aleppo citadel | NZ Army (H. Paton)
Gas-mask practice on the Forqloss manoeuvres, Syria | British official
25-pounder on Forqloss plain | British official
Boys anti-tank rifle on manoeuvres | British official
The first shell lands at Minqar Qaim, 27 June 1942 | W. A. Whitlock
A 25-pounder in the Minqar Qaim action | NZ Army (H. Paton)
A makeshift OP at Minqar Qaim | NZ Army (H. Paton)
Disabled vehicles at the foot of Minqar Qaim—from a painting by Sergeant J. W. Crippen | J. W. Crippen
Minqar Qaim | J. W. Crippen
A nearby wadi | J. W. Crippen
The break-out—from a painting by Captain Peter McIntyre | NZ Army
A jeep towing a 6-pounder in the early days in the Alamein line | NZ Army (H. Paton)
The remnants of the Ariete Divisional Artillery, 3 July 1942 | British official
A 5th Field gun firing under a camouflage net, at Alam Nayil, August 1942 | J. Christensen
The 14th Light Ack-Ack engaging the Luftwaffe at Alam Nayil |
The burial of a gun crew of 43 Battery, 16 July 1942 | British official
27 Battery goes to ground in a Stuka raid, August 1942 | J. C. Pattle
‘Swordfish’ area, September 1942 | G. H. Levien
General Montgomery presents a DSO to Steve Weir, 12 October 1942 | British official
Lance-Bombardier B. W. Johnston receives the MM | British official
36 Survey Battery relaxing on the shore of the Dead Sea | NZ Army (M. D. Elias)
A survey camp in the Transjordan | NZ Army (M. D. Elias)
General Freyberg confers with senior officers before the Alamein offensive | J. C. White
A 4.5 at Alamein | J. F. Spring
A gun of A Troop, 5th Field, fires its last round on supercharge before the breakthrough, November 1942 | J. C. Pattle
A Troop gun crew, 5th Field, relaxing before the beginning of the pursuit, November 1942 | J. C. Pattle
A 7th Anti-Tank lorry bogged down near Fuka | L. Clark collection
Fuka after the deluge, November 1942 | NZ Army (H. Paton)
| Following page 442
A Bofors approaching Matruh, November 1942 | NZ Army (H. Paton)
Sidi Barrani | NZ Army (H. Paton)
B2 of the 6th Field climbs Sollum Pass | NZ Army
A Bofors on the road above Sollum | NZ Army
Winching a 4th Field gun up a slope in the course of the left hook round El Agheila | F. T. Allan
27 Battery at El Haseiat | J. C. Pattle
The parade for Mr Churchill at Tripoli | NZ Army (H. Paton)
6-pounder portées pass the saluting base | NZ Army (H. Paton)
Assembling the guns before the parade | H. R. Joll
A 6-pounder in action in the Tebaga Gap | J. F. Spring
The 5th Field fires in front of Medenine | J. Christensen
Armour attacking the Roman Wall—from a sketch by C. Hansen | C. Hansen
Plotting corrections on an artillery board near Takrouna | NZ Army (M. D. Elias)
Jack Spring observes from a camouflaged quad near Takrouna | NZ Army (M. D. Elias)
Buildings on Takrouna | J. C. Pattle
Senior officers in Tunisia | NZ Army (M. D. Elias)
A ‘Pheasant’ at Maadi Camp—a 17-pounder mounted on a 25-pounder carriage | D. Sweetzer
A class at the Artillery Training Depot (the 32nd Field), Maadi Camp | NZ Army (G. R. Bull)
A 5th Field gun firing on manoeuvres near Maadi, August 1943 | J. Christensen
Austin 6-pounder portées of 34 Battery preparing to leave Maadi, September 1943 | NZ Army (G. R. Bull)
Artillery HQ officers outside the ACV near the Sangro | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Artillery HQ in the first engagement in Italy on the way to the Sangro | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
D. McKenna oils a 5th Field gun during a lull on the Sangro front | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Operating a Bofors predictor near the Sangro | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A B Troop, 4th Field, gun firing from a muddy gun pit near the Sangro | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A Bofors crew surveys the Sangro front | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Steve Weir, Ike Parkinson and General Freyberg near the Sangro | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
An American 155 similar to those used on the Orsogna front—from a painting by Russell Clark | NZ Army
An Air OP aircraft on the Orsogna front | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Crossing the Sangro | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A 5th Field troop command post during an Air OP shoot | W. Fisk
| Following page 573
Steve Weir addresses his officers in the Volturno Valley | British official
A major repair of a 25-pounder in the Volturno Valley | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Looking north and north-east from Monte Trocchio | L. W. Wright collection
Smoke-screening 26 Battalion near the Cassino railway station |
Smoke canisters screening Route 6 as it enters Cassino | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
C Troop, 5th Field, on upper-register shooting behind Trocchio | W. Fisk
A 36 Survey Battery post on Trocchio, overlooking Route 6 | F. H. Williams
Jack Mitchell conducts the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser on an inspection after the Cassino battle | NZ Army (M. D. Elias)
K. J. Retter using a director on the Cassino front | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Field and medium guns on the Cassino front | Indian official
Montecassino abbey dominates the guns as they shell Cassino | United States official
A 6th Field artillery board near Sora | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A flash-spotting post near Sora | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
R. T. Stewart of the 6th Field hands washing to children near Sora | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A ‘stonk’ falls on the hills above San Michele in the Florence battle | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A sound-ranging microphone being sited in the Florence battle | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
Operating sound-ranging equipment in front of Florence | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
An M 10 at San Casciano | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
The Bofors which sank a German motor launch off Rimini, October 1944 | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A 5th Field jeep at Riccione | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A waterlogged 5th Field gun pit near Forli | NZ Army
Empty 25-pounder cartridge cases at Faenza | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A causeway of ammunition boxes at Faenza | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A 17-pounder in front of Faenza covers the Via Emilia | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
On the final advance: approaching the Idice River | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
A 17-pounder crossing the Po | NZ Army (G. F. Kaye)
The 4.2-inch mortar J2 in action | H. Sharples
The CRAs: Reggie Miles, Steve Weir, Ike Parkinson, Ray Queree, Bill Thornton | NZ Army

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

List of Maps

List of Maps

| Facing page
Egypt and Cyrenaica | 13
Greece | 21
Pinios Gorge | 49
Crete | 91
Belhamed and Zaafran | 277
El Alamein | 319
Central and Eastern Mediterranean | 377
Southern Italy | 515
Northern Italy | 605
In text | Page
The Aliakmon Line, 5 April 1941 | 26
4 Brigade positions at Servia Pass, 10–17 April 1941 | 29
The 5th Field and 32 Anti-Tank Battery in the Olympus Pass, 16 April 1941 | 32
E Troop, 5 Field Regiment, 12–13 April 1941 | 35
21 Battalion at Platamon, 14–16 April 1941 | 37
The Rearguard at Elevtherokhorion, morning 18 April 1941 | 51
6 Brigade rearguard action at Elasson, 18 April 1941 | 54
Holding the Dhomokos and Fourka passes | 69
Brallos Pass and Thermopylae, 24 April 1941 | 75
Guns v. Tanks, Molos, 24 April 1941 | 85
Fifth Brigade, Maleme, 20 May 1941 | 114
Parachute landings at Galatas, 20 May 1941 | 124
Composite Battalion, Galatas, 20 May 1941 | 127
Artillery positions at Galatas | 148
The Advance into Libya, 18–21 November 1941 | 188
6 Brigade positions, 1 p.m., 23 November 194 | 201
20 Battalion attacks Point 172, 24 November 1941 | 214
The capture of the Blockhouse, 25 November 1941 | 218
Linking up with Tobruk, 26–27 November 1941 | 231
The capture of 5 Brigade Headquarters, 27 November 1941 | 242
Attack on Capuzzo, 27 November 1941 | 248
Sweeping the Corridor as the Panzers return, 28 November 1941 | 250
Assault on the Gazala Line, 13–16 December 1941 | 293
The Eastern Mediterranean | 305
21 Panzer Division encircles Minqar Qaim, 27 June 1942 | 316
The Rout of Ariete Division, 3 July 1942 | 337
Ruweisat Ridge, morning 15 July 1942 | 342
El Mreir, 22 July 1942 | 349
Deir el Munassib, 3–4 September 1942 | 366
Barrage trace for the New Zealand sector, 23 October 1942 | 376
The second day of the Alamein offensive | 382
The Australian sector, 28–31 October 1942 | 399
Operation SUPERCHARGE | 404
Section of map showing 36 Survey Battery's major triangulation work north of Aqaba, November 1941 | 428
A corner of the Survey Battery's Sweime sheet in its 1: 25,000 series | 431
Left hook at El Agheila | 439
Wadi Matratin, 15–16 December 1942 | 442
Outflanking Nofilia, 17–18 December 1942 | 446
From Nofilia to Tripoli | 454
Medenine, 6 March 1943 | 469
5 Brigade positions at Medenine | 472
Plan for the Left Hook through the Tebaga Gap | 478
6 Brigade attacks Point 201, 21–22 March 1943 | 481
Operation SUPERCHARGE, the breakthrough at Tebaga Gap, 26 March 1943 | 483
Wadi Akarit, 5–6 April 1943 | 490
36 Survey Battery's flash-spotting and sound-ranging bases near Enfidaville, April 1943 | 499
The capture of Takrouna | 502
5 Brigade operations north-east of Djebibina, 4–8 May 1943 | 508
The capture of Perano, 18 November 1943 | 524
Crossing the Sangro River, 28 November 1943 | 527
Roads and landmarks north of the Sangro | 530
25 Battalion attacks Orsogna, 3 December 1943 | 531
5 and 6 Brigades attack Orsogna, 7 December 1943 | 533
Mountain sector in which Anti-Tankers supported 2 Parachute Brigade | 535
5 Brigade's attack, 24 December 1943 | 538
5 Brigade positions, 8 February 1944 | 552
The Maoris attack Cassino railway station, 17–18 February 1944 | 558
Guns on the Cassino front, 11 March 1944 | 566
Cassino | 568
A bearing picket prepared by X (Survey) Troop for the 4th Field at Cassino | 571
Mountain sector north-east of Cassino | 582
In front of Balsorano, June 1944 | 594
Action in front of Arezzo | 611
The Advance to Florence | 618
Barrage for night attack on La Romola, 30–31 July 1944 | 628
The Montelupo- Empoli sector west of Florence | 635
Breaking through the Gothic Line, September 1944 | 639
Advancing towards Rimini, 11–24 September 1944 | 642
The Advance to the Fontanaccia, 23–24 September 1944 | 647
From the Fontanaccia to the Uso, 24–26 September 1944 | 649
The Advance to the Savio, October 1944 | 658
The Forli- Faenza sector, 18 November-16 December 1944 | 668
The Faenza front, 14–17 December 1944 | 672
Night attack north of Faenza, 19–20 December 1944 | 676
The Winter Line as at 21 January 1945 | 681
The opening attack across the Senio, 9–10 April 1945 | 700
From the Senio to the Gaiana, 9–17 April 1945 | 704
The Division's route from the Senio to the Adige, 9–27 April 1945 | 710
From Padua to the Piave | 725

The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 1 — The Early Days: New Zealand, United Kingdom and Egypt

Contents

- [section]
p. 1

- Brigadier Miles, the First CRA p. 5
- The First Echelon p. 7
- The Second Echelon p. 8
- The Third Echelon p. 11
- Maadi and the Western Desert p. 16
- Getting Ready for Greece p. 19

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE GUNNERS have a long history and are proud of it. Their ‘colours’ are their guns and their guns, as their motto proclaims, have served ‘Everywhere’. In its first few centuries, to be sure, the artillery was not much loved, even by its servants. These were civilians—chemists and mathematicians—preferring gentler disputes than war and forced to rely on farm labourers who, with their horses, had the unsought and unwelcome task of towing the guns. Gunners gained popularity as weapons and methods improved; but the process was extremely slow. Four centuries of coaxing failed to rid the guns of all their cantankerous traits and those they were supposed to support were nervous of them. Smouldering wicks of matchlocks near open barrels of gunpowder made the men near the guns fidgety. Indeed it was not unknown for the forced labour at the wagon lines to try to run away. But from the earliest days gunners have served their guns to the last in many a bitter contest.

The Royal Regiment of Artillery, formed in 1716, became in due course a powerful and indispensable partner of the cavalry and infantry. On the Western Front in 1914–18 the guns bickered incessantly and flew into violent rages which dominated the battlefield for weeks on end. ‘Of those still living who went with the guns through Longueval that day, and down the tortured road that led to Flers’, says the New Zealand artillery historian about the Battle of the Somme in 1916, ‘assuredly none will forget it…. Battery after battery wound through the tumbled ruins of the village, and down past the ragged remnants of Delville Wood, a ghastly place where the big high-explosive shells were sending up great gouts of black earth and pieces of wood, and Heaven only knew what else’. [1]

Beneath the massive ramparts of Le Quesnoy British soldiers first tasted cannon fire—in the year of Crécy, 1336. Nearly 600 years later the New Zealand Division found this same fortress barring its way through Belgium to Germany. The heavy walls and outlying defence works in late 1918 were sprinkled with trees and shrubs and garnished with grassy banks, a picturesque survival of an earlier mode of warfare. But they were not altogether outdated. The New Zealanders had somehow to overcome the German garrison without harming the French civilians crowding the town. They therefore could not use heavy guns to crumble the walls into the moats below. They might try to deluge the defences with shrapnel and high-explosive from their light field guns and howitzers; but they could not let shells fall among the houses beyond. Furthermore, they had to make an exceptionally long advance, 10,000 yards or more, and their guns could reach no more than 6600 yards, [2] so batteries would have to leapfrog forward in the course of the attack. It was a tricky project.

The assault began at 5.30 in the misty morning of 4 November and soon gained ground. A complicated set of artillery barrages led some infantry round the northern side of the town and others round the south to link up in the east and carry on towards the Mormal Forest. Cavalry, gunners (including many attached from the Royal Field Artillery), engineers, infantry and machine-gunners played their various parts in the intricate scheme with admirable precision. Some guns kept hard on the heels of the infantry to guard against German tanks and machine-gun fire poured down from the walls of the fortress on these gunners as they passed. Other batteries were heavily shelled. The wagon lines of one battery were churned up and 52 horses were hit. The advanced guard of horse-drawn 18-pounders and limbers in the leapfrog movement attracted fierce fire, but pushed on regardless of it and installed itself in positions a mile and a half beyond the town. When these guns resumed their role in the barrage programme other guns ceased fire and moved forward. Thus the curtain of bursting shells continued to screen the advancing infantry until they reached the forest in the afternoon.

The struggle for the ramparts meanwhile continued. The artillery, massed Lewis guns, and light mortars concentrated on the few possible approaches. With this support the infantry made many a determined attack which was beaten back. In the end a sudden rush carried a 60-foot wall, the breach was quickly widened and exploited, and in the late afternoon the defence collapsed. Four neighbouring villages also fell, nearly 2000 prisoners were taken and with them 60 field guns and hundreds of machine guns, and the civilians were delirious with joy. Not one shell had fallen in the town. It was a fitting climax to the history of the New Zealand Division in the First World War. Particularly it was so to artillery operations which had begun under desperate circumstances at Plugge's Plateau and Russell's Top at Gallipoli in April 1915. The gunners claimed no special credit, however, for this ‘memorable and striking success’ [3]; the Division had worked as a team and thereby lived up to its tradition. Armistice Day came just one week later and the guns along the Western Front fell silent.

Thus the ‘war to end war’ ended; but on 1 September 1939 another and greater one began, and two days later the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand joined in. New Zealand soon made up her mind to form another expeditionary force to serve overseas, a more or less self-contained force as before of an army division with ancillary services. This was more easily said than done. The tradition of the 1st NZEF had survived; but the fighting machine had long since been dismantled. Compulsory military training had ceased in 1930. When war broke out the Regular Force had 100 officers and fewer than 500 other ranks. A three-month recruiting drive had brought Territorial volunteer numbers up to nearly 17,000 and there was a special reserve of about 10,000. These were slender foundations for an expeditionary force plus a Territorial division for home service. Equipment was scarce and most of it out of date.

The 2nd New Zealand Division, [4] the core of 2 NZEF, was of course to have its own Divisional Artillery—and a ponderous organisation it must have seemed to a gunner of the First World War. In place of the Divisional Artillery Headquarters, the three ‘brigades’ of field artillery, each of sixteen 18-pounders, the ‘brigade’ of twelve 4.5-inch howitzers, and the Divisional Ammunition Column, all horse-drawn, of 1916, what was proposed in 1939 was this:

Divisional Artillery Headquarters.

Three field regiments each of twenty-four 25-pounders, a Signals section, and a light aid detachment of Ordnance.

One anti-tank regiment of forty-eight 2-pounders, a Signals section, and a light aid detachment.

One light anti-aircraft regiment of (at first) thirty-six 40-millimetre Bofors guns, a Signals section, a transport section (NZASC), and a workshops section of Ordnance.

One survey troop.

There was also to be a Divisional Ammunition Company, NZASC, not under artillery command (unlike its counterpart of the First World War). The total allotment of assorted motor vehicles including this company would be nearly 950, a generous amount for a Divisional Artillery strength of just over 4000 men. Such a body of men and such a mass of equipment could not materialise overnight, and in the event it took nearly two years to complete the Divisional Artillery of 2 NZEF.

On 27 September 1939, when the first of the 4000 entered camp at Hopu Hopu, near Ngaruawahia and down river from Hamilton, it was impossible to envisage such a force. Certainly it would have been out of the question to recruit and train it as one body. There were too few instructors, too little accommodation, and hardly any training equipment. The field regiments, the anti-tank regiment, and the survey troop were therefore raised in three stages, to conform with the three successive contingents or echelons of 2 NZEF. The anti-aircraft regiment would have to be raised later and would sail with a reinforcement contingent.

Even this programme, however, strained the resources of the small Royal New Zealand Artillery (the Regular force). Royal New Zealand Artillery officers and NCOs had somehow to be found for key positions in all units, others would be needed as instructors for later contingents, and some would have to administer artillery affairs at home, with the help of Territorials.

The raising of an expeditionary force at once presents problems of nomenclature. The First, Second and Third Echelons were each to be built around an infantry brigade, 4, 5 and 6 Brigades respectively. The field artillery regiments were by chance given the same numbers as the brigades to which they were related, so the men training at Hopu Hopu formed 4 Field Regiment, part of 4 Infantry Brigade. They were to be followed by 5 Field Regiment of 5 Brigade and then by 6 Field Regiment of 6 Brigade. The anti-tank regiment therefore became the 2nd, soon renumbered the 7th, and the light anti-aircraft regiment, taking numerical precedence behind other units formed after 7 Anti-Tank Regiment for service at home, became the 14th. The survey troop was the 1st and the battery that was eventually formed (at first non-divisional) became the 36th. These facts can mean little enough to readers who were not involved; but to the men concerned the numbers of their regiments, of the batteries within their regiments, and of the units with which they were associated in action became indelibly part of their lives and laden with emotion. To a man from 25 Battery another from the same battery was a brother, a man from 26 Battery was a cousin, and anyone else from 4 Field Regiment was still within the family. Among themselves the gunners used the names 4th Field, 5th Field, 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank, and this history will conform to this practice.

The father of the family at first was Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. (‘Ike’) Parkinson, [5] Commanding Officer of the 4th Field and formerly commander of the RNZA, and he was a fatherly figure of a man. Gruff and heavily built, with a sandy moustache, he was an experienced and dedicated gunner. A graduate of Duntroon, he had served in France in 1917–18 and later in Fiji and had attended Staff College in England. His Regimental Sergeant-Major was another experienced Regular, Warrant-Officer Class I Fitzgerald, [6] an efficient supervisor of drill and elementary training. Under him, according to one of his senior NCOs, ‘the spit and polish was terrific’.

[1]
J. R. Byrne, New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914–18 (Whitcombe and Tombs, 1922), p.132.

[2] A few with new-type recuperators had a range of 9600 yards.

[3] Byrne, p.292.

[4] As it came to be called at the end of June 1942. Until then it was officially The New Zealand Division.

[5]
Maj-Gen G. B. Parkinson, CBE, DSO and bar, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); Christchurch; born Wellington, 5 Nov 1896; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty 1917–19; CO 4 Fd Regt Jan 1940-Aug 1941; comd 1 NZ Army Tank Bde and 7 Inf Bde Gp (in NZ) 1941–42; 6 Bde Apr 1943-Jun 1944; GOC 2 NZ Div 3–27 Mar 1944; CRA 2 NZ Div Jun-Aug 1944; comd 6 Bde Aug 1944-Jun 1945; QMG, Army HQ, Jan-Sep 1946; NZ Military Liaison Officer, London, 1946–49; Commander, Southern Military District, 1949–51.

[6]
Capt W. J. Fitzgerald; born Hastings, 23 Jun 1893; Regular soldier; served in 1 Fd Bty, 1 NZEF, 1914–18 (twice wounded); Camp Commandant, Linton Military Camp, 1947–48; died Palmerston North, 28 Sep 1951.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Brigadier Miles, the First CRA

Brigadier Miles, the First CRA

The highest appointments in 2 NZEF were still under earnest discussion and it was not until January 1940 that Colonel Miles
[7] was designated to command the Divisional Artillery. He had been made Quartermaster-General of the New Zealand Army shortly after the outbreak of war; but his qualifications to command the artillery were outstanding. The son of an upcountry Canterbury farmer, he had gone to the Royal Military College, Duntroon (from Rangiora High School), in 1911, studied there with distinction, and was released just before his term was completed in August 1914 to join the 1st NZEF. Then there came a great stroke of luck for the artillery. Miles enlisted in the Canterbury Battalion and was to have sailed as an infantry officer when he was taken ill. He recovered in October and re-enlisted, this time in the artillery, joining the Howitzer Battery. With it he fought as a captain at Gallipoli and in July 1915 was badly wounded, returning from hospital just before the evacuation. Back in Egypt he became adjutant of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade and then transferred to 15 Battery of the 2nd Brigade, with which he served in France. In December 1916 he won an MC, and in March 1918 he was again badly wounded. Again his great physical strength conquered and he returned to his unit in time to take part in the final advance from the Somme. As a major in July 1918 he gained a DSO that was both brilliant and prophetic. The enemy was attacking and he fought his guns until they were within 500 yards and his ammunition was exhausted. He then rallied infantry stragglers and manned a fire trench. After halting the enemy, he reconnoitred forward and brought back valuable information. Finally he was wounded by rifle fire at close range. The last action he ever fought, in 1941, bears a striking resemblance to this. [8] From August 1918 onwards he served as Brigade Major of the Divisional Artillery and Haig's despatch of 8 November 1918 specially mentions him.

Miles's peacetime service between the wars was particularly varied and valuable. After two years at the Staff College, Camberley, he was attached to 5 Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment for the 1925 army manoeuvres, as well as studying War Office Intelligence work and attending an artillery refresher course. At home he held several commands, including the Harbour Defences of Wellington. As a colonel in 1938 he attended the Imperial Defence College and was afterwards New Zealand Military Liaison Officer in London for three months, in which he again explored the workings of the War Office. Back in Wellington he was given a high staff appointment and became Third Member of the Army Board.

When the Second World War started, therefore, he was familiar with the latest artillery methods and procedures and was well acquainted with the latest thinking on strategy and imperial defence. His record in war and in peace was first-class in every respect.

Miles was in no hurry to form a headquarters and in January 1940 it existed on paper only, its other members being Major

Duff, [9] who was then in England, and Lieutenant Sellers [10] of 4 Field Regiment. In March Miles travelled to Sydney in the Wanganella and flew from there to Egypt to join 2 NZEF.

[7]
Brig R. Miles, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d.; born Springston, 10 Dec 1892; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty 1914–19; CRA 2 NZ Div 1940–41; comd 2 NZEF ( UK) 1940; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941; escaped, Italy, Mar 1943; died, Spain, 20 Oct 1943.

[8] See pp. 272– 4 and 296.

[9]
Brig C. S. J. Duff, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1898; Regular soldier; comd 34 A-Tk Bty 1939–40; CO 7 A-Tk Regt Oct 1940-May 1941; 4 Fd Regt Aug 1941-Apr 1942; CRA 3 NZ Div Aug 1942-Oct 1944; NZLO Melbourne, 1947–48.

[10] Capt R. D. Sellers; born Auckland, 18 Nov 1910; shepherd; killed in action 25 Nov 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The First Echelon

The First Echelon

It had already been decided to assemble the Division in Egypt, where the New Zealand Division of the First World War had been formed after the Dardanelles campaign, and the First Echelon sent off advanced parties in December, a dozen gunners among them. The rest of the 4th Field hastened through its training programme. By November it had a full complement of guns: two four-gun troops of pneumatic-tyred 18-pounders and one troop of iron-shod 4.5-inch howitzers. With them the unit carried out a ‘live shoot’ at Whata Whata, near Frankton, which greatly increased the confidence of the gunners in the skills they had acquired.

After a ceremonial parade in the Auckland Domain on 3 January 1940, the First Echelon sailed from Wellington on the 6th in a convoy of six large ships, heavily escorted. ‘Ike’ Parkinson was Officer Commanding Troops in the luxurious Empress of Canada which carried his regiment and his bulky figure and inevitable pipe were prominent on board, making the gunners feel at home. The Empress was diverted to Sydney, where Major-General B. C. Freyberg, [11] GOC 2 NZEF, left it to fly to Egypt, and then rejoined the convoy, now enlarged with ships carrying the first Australian contingent. Australians and New Zealanders alike enjoyed the warm hospitality of the Western Australians at Perth on the 18th. Then, at the end of the month, there came the excitement of a crowded Asian port and city, Colombo. A breeze from the north tempered the heat of the Red Sea, but it was hot all the same and the men were glad to disembark at Port Tewfik on 11 February. There they were met by General Freyberg, Sir Anthony Eden, General Sir Archibald Wavell (GOC-in-C, Middle East Forces), Lieutenant-General H. Maitland Wilson (GOC-in-C, British

Troops in Egypt), the British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, and the Governor of the Canal Zone. It was an auspicious and historic occasion. The artillery were met at Maadi Camp, near Cairo, by men of 1 Field Regiment, RA, who had done much to make them feel welcome.

The first instalment of the 7th Anti-Tank enlisted in England. As in the First World War, New Zealanders there were allowed, if they wished, to join the NZEF. Since no anti-tank guns had reached New Zealand and no anti-tank gunners could be properly trained there, it proved convenient to accept the volunteers in England for training as such. They were therefore formed into the New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery, later numbered the 34th, under Major C. S. J. Duff. After a very thorough training at Aldershot, this battery of individualists with remarkably varied backgrounds and experiences, attracting much attention and gaining much publicity for New Zealand, sent an advanced party to Egypt early in April and arrived there itself on Anzac Day. The journey across the English Channel to Cherbourg, then across France by train (three weeks before the Wehrmacht struck), then from Marseilles through the Mediterranean in HMT Devonshire, calling at Malta, was brief but interesting and might have been much more so had it been delayed a few weeks. Joining the 4th Field at Maadi Camp, the newcomers attracted interest because of their low army numbers: the 146 other ranks were numbered from 501 upwards and the handful of officers from 999 downwards. [12]

[11]
Lt-Gen Lord Freyberg, VC, GCMG. KCB, KBE, DSO and 3 bars, m.i.d., Order of Valour and MC (Greek); born Richmond, Surrey, 21 Mar 1889; CO Hood Bn 1915–17; comd 173 Bde, 58 Div, and 88 Bde, 29 Div, 1917–19; GOC 2 NZEF Nov 1939-Nov 1945; twice wounded; Governor-General of New Zealand, Jun 1946-Aug 1952; died Windsor, England, 4 Jul 1963.

[12] Unusual talents or interests soon took many members of this battery to other units or services. Four of them became foundation members of the Kiwi Entertainment Unit (the Kiwi Concert Party), which survived the war unofficially by many years. Four more joined the first Long Range Patrol, which blossomed into the Long Range Desert Group. One became Freyberg's draughtsman; another became his cook. One, Peter McIntyre, became the official New Zealand war artist. One was soon supervising a large engineering project in the Sudan, and so on; but an earnest core of anti-tankers remained.

Theirs were not the only three-figure numbers in the 2 NZEF. A few more New Zealanders enlisted later in England and most of them joined the Second Echelon. Their army numbers were in the 900s and 800s.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Second Echelon

The Second Echelon

The artillery of the 2nd Echelon comprised the 5th Field and Headquarters and two batteries (the 31st and 32nd) of the 7th Anti-Tank, with a few more details for NZA Headquarters. Some officers and NCOs destined for these units had entered camp before 4 Field Regiment departed. The remainder came in somewhat spasmodically in the next few weeks, starting with a large draft of recruits on 12 January. The respective Commanding Officers were Major Sleigh, [13] a Territorial, and Major C. E. Weir, [14] a Regular. The RSMs were WOI Langevad
[15] and WOI Gilberd. [16]

The field gunners trained as before, but the anti-tank gunners had to make do with 18-pounders on Beach platforms, since 2-pounder anti-tank guns, extremely hard to get even in England, were unlikely to reach New Zealand for many months. The weather deteriorated and the low-lying camp with its makeshift facilities was neither comfortable nor healthy. Towards the end of February 5 Field Regiment carried out a live shoot at Waiouru, after only sketchy training. Observation of fire was poor and communications were uncertain, while several vehicles were damaged because of inexperience. It was nevertheless valuable training. The anti-tank batteries carried out an antitank shoot at the end of the month with rather more success.

On 1 May 1940 the artillery of the Second Echelon left camp for Wellington and next day embarked in the Aquitania. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser
[17] now commanded the 5th Field and Major Queree [18] temporarily commanded the 7th Anti-Tank. Besides these two units and the handful of Divisional Artillery Headquarters staff, the group included a first draft of reinforcements for the 4th Field, but these were destined not to join their intended unit, for the convoy (even larger than that of the First Echelon) was diverted in the Indian Ocean. The Admiralty feared Italian interference at the entrance to the Red Sea, so the Second Echelon travelled by way of the Cape of Good Hope (pausing at Cape Town and Simonstown) to Freetown, Sierra Leone, and then to Greenock on the Clyde, where the Aquitania dropped anchor on 16 June.

This was a time of crisis. The evacuation of Dunkirk was just over, France was collapsing, and invasion was beginning to threaten. The New Zealanders were warmly welcomed along the route in the course of the train journey from Scotland through England to Aldershot, and the gunners soon settled in comfortably in a belt of pines at Bourley, a few miles away. The 50th Anti-Tank Training Regiment, RA, had prepared the camps and had a hot meal waiting.

After two days' leave in London, the gunners settled down to training. By the end of the month a few vehicles and six guns and howitzers arrived (minus dial sights and sight clinometers and therefore useful only for firing over open sights). Brigadier Miles arrived from Egypt to command what became known as 2 NZEF ( UK) and the force was quickly reorganised to take up an emergency role in case the threatened invasion eventuated. B Troop with 18-pounders and F Troop with 4.5-inch howitzers became G Battery under Major Oakes
[19] and the rest of the gunners were turned into ‘infantillery’. Towards the end of July, by which time the preliminaries to the Battle of Britain were warming up, sixteen 75-millimetre French guns (made in 1917) arrived and the ‘infantillery’ role of the 5th Field was dropped. The anti-tank gunners had to continue their infantry training schemes until August, when they collected brand-new 2-pounders from Woolwich Arsenal. At the same time G Battery exchanged its old guns for new 25-pounders, Mark II—the first guns of this type to reach the Aldershot Command and therefore objects of immense interest and respect. Except for dial sights and clinometers, this battery, with two-thirds of its full complement of guns, was ready for war. Field and anti-tank gunners carried out live shoots, and when the invasion crisis reached its peak early in September they moved to take up positions covering in depth part of the Kentish coast. [20] Air raids in the neighbourhood became very frequent; but gunners on leave in London had seen far worse. From their Kentish billets they could see the awe-inspiring glow of the flames caused by the great night attacks. By early November the invasion danger had passed, the Battle of Britain had dwindled to occasional air skirmishes, and the gunners moved back to the Aldershot and Guildford areas. New guns and equipment had been arriving steadily and before the month was out the 25-pounders had been calibrated and the field gunners carried out a live shoot. A similar programme by the anti-tank gunners, however, was cancelled at the last moment. The New Zealand force was to pack up and sail for Egypt to complete the Division there. Advanced parties (including Brigadier Miles) had already sailed in the Oronsay, only to be turned back after two days at sea because of bomb damage. Guns and equipment were therefore despatched, the field guns to Newport, Monmouthshire, and the anti-tank guns to Dumfries. At the last minute the anti-tank gunners managed to carry out a live shoot at Larkhill, near Stonehenge, with borrowed guns.

The anti-tank guns and transport sailed in the Benrinnes, the field guns in the Costa Rica; most of the field gunners sailed in the City of London from Liverpool and the anti-tank gunners in the Rangitiki from the Bristol Channel in mid-December. The weather in the Atlantic was heavy and the City of London steamed alone at first in a storm-tossed sea; but the convoy grew by degrees to a huge gathering of more than thirty ships, heavily escorted. Four days at Durban were more than adequate compensation for the discomforts of the voyage, however, and the Valley of a Thousand Hills, the Snake Park, and the brilliant Athlone Gardens made a memorable setting for hospitality that was almost overwhelming. At Port Tewfik on 16 February 1941, General Freyberg and Brigadier Miles welcomed the troops and they soon settled in at Helwan Camp, some 10 miles farther away from Cairo than Maadi Camp. It was a far less comfortable camp, with few of the amenities which made Maadi relatively attractive; but the gunners were not destined to stay there long.

[13]
Lt-Col R. E. Sleigh; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 11 Nov 1902; seed salesman.

[14] Maj-Gen Sir Stephen Weir, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d.; Bangkok; born NZ 5 Oct 1905; Regular soldier; CO 6 Fd Regt Sep 1939-Dec 1941; CRA 2 NZ Div Dec 1941-Jun 1944; GOC 2 NZ Div 4 Sep-17 Oct 1944; 46 (Brit) Div Nov 1944-Sep 1946; Commander, Southern Military District, 1948–49; QMG, Army HQ, 1951–55; Chief of the General Staff, 1955–60; Military Adviser to NZ Govt, 1960–61; NZ Ambassador to Thailand, Oct 1961-.

[15]
Maj W. Langevad, MBE, MM, Wellington; born Wellington, 7 Apr 1898; Regular soldier; served in 1 NZEF, 1915–19; wounded Sep 1916; Bty Comd, 25 Fd Bty ( Japan), 1947.

[16]
Capt J. G. Gilberd; Wellington; born Napier, 2 Apr 1910; Regular soldier.

[17]
Lt-Col K. W. Fraser, CMG, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Edinburgh, 1 Nov 1905; asst advertising manager; CO 5 Fd Regt 1940–41; wounded and p.w. 27 Nov 1941; Dominion President, NZRSA, 1957–62.

[18]
Brig R. C. Queree, CBE, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Christchurch, 28 Jun 1909; Regular soldier; Brigade Major, NZ Arty, Oct 1940-Jun 1941; GSO II 2 NZ Div Jun-Aug 1941, Jan-Jun 1942; CO 4 Fd Regt Jun-Aug 1942; GSO I 2 NZ Div Sep 1942-Jun 1944; BGS NZ Corps 9 Feb-27 Mar 1944; CO 5 Fd Regt Jun-Aug 1944; CRA 2 NZ Div Aug 1944-Jun 1945; QMG, Army HQ, 1948–50; Adjutant-General, 1954–56; Vice-Chief of the General Staff, 1956–60; Senior Army Liaison Officer, London, 1960–64; Director of Civil Defence, 1964–.

[19]
Lt-Col T. H. E. Oakes, MC and bar, m.i.d.; born England, 24 Mar 1895; RA (retd); CO 7 A-Tk Regt May-Nov 1941; killed in action 30 Nov 1941.

[20] Miles briefly commanded an armoured force at this stage known as Milforce.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Third Echelon

The Third Echelon

Back at Hopu Hopu the 6th Field had begun to assemble on 31 January 1940, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. (‘Steve’) Weir, with WOI Mossong
[21] as RSM. Wet weather in the next three months made the camp increasingly unpleasant and the gunners were glad to pack up early in May and move to a new camp at Papakura. This was well appointed and comfortable, with asphalt paths and parade-ground, rainproof huts, and good recreational facilities. Training progressed rapidly.

This unit was to complete the field artillery of the Division and its composition may be taken as typical of the gunner units. Only a novelist could attempt to estimate the character and quality of the men; but the historian can offer some factual information and perhaps correct some misconceptions. For one thing, the men were predominantly from the North Island. Of the 661 original members of 6 Field Regiment, only 157 came from the South Island, the main contributors there being Christchurch (80), Dunedin (20), Invercargill (12) and Ashburton (10). The main North Island contributors were Auckland (253), Wellington (116), Napier (17), Palmerston North (13) and Gisborne (11). As these figures suggest, far more recruits came from the cities than from the country districts. Two-thirds of the men were unmarried. In religious affiliation 353 were Anglicans, 141 Presbyterians, 80 Roman Catholic, 43 Methodist and 5 Jewish. In age they were grouped as follows:

Age in years | 20 | Numbers | 13
| 21 | | 116
| 22 | | 66
| 23 | | 70
| 24 | | 47
| 25 | | 47
| 26 | | 48
| 27 | | 31
| 28 | | 34
| 29 | | 35
| 30 | | 18
| 31 | | 28
| 32 | | 19
| 33 | | 27
| 34 | | 14
| 35 | | 26
| 36 | | 6
| 37 | | 6
| 38 | | 2
| 39 | | 1
| 40 | | 2
| 41 | | 2
| 42 | | 1
| 45 | | 1
| 47 | | 1

Thus, while youth was well to the fore, there was a good sprinkling of experience. Average heights might seem at first glance disappointingly low; but alongside contingents abroad they were seldom overshadowed:

Height | Numbers
5 ft to 5 ft 3 in. | 21
5 ft 4 in. | 21
5 ft 5 in. | 41
5 ft 6 in. | 71
5 ft 7 in. | 98
5 ft 8 in. | 122
5 ft 9 in. | 99
5 ft 10 in. | 77
5 ft 11 in. | 60
6 ft | 31
6 ft 1 in. | 13
6 ft 2 in. | 6

The range of civilian occupations represented was extremely wide. There were 98 labourers, 97 drivers and mechanics, and 53 salesmen. The only other occupational groups that reached double figures were grocers (10), farmers (17), engineers (14) and carpenters (11). The professions were lightly represented: one medical practitioner, six bank officers, three schoolteachers, and no lawyers or solicitors (in this, perhaps, the 6th Field was not typical). Apart from tradesmen there were only seven public servants. Of the 661 gunners, 428 had had previous military service, 59 as cadets only and 342 as Territorials. Another 13 were Regulars and 11 more had served in regular units of the United Kingdom or Australian army. Five had served in the Royal Navy, one in the RANVR, and six in the RAF or RNZAF. One had served in the White Russian Army.

Alongside the 6th Field at Papakura the fourth battery—officially the 33rd—of the 7th Anti-Tank trained under Major R. E. Sleigh. The field gunners conducted a live shoot at Whata Whata in mid-August and the anti-tankers with their 18-pounders on Beach platforms did likewise at Tuakau. A draft of artillery reinforcements included 20 men under Captain Kensington
[22] who were later to form 1 Survey Troop. All marched through Auckland on 26 August 1940, paraded before the Governor-General, and then entrained for Wellington. Next day they boarded the Mauretania and sailed, with the rest of the Third Echelon, for Egypt, calling at Fremantle and then at Bombay.

There the troops left the comfortable Mauretania for HMT Ormonde, a cheerless troopship in a filthy state. Gunners set about cleaning up their quarters, including lavatories, and removed large quantities of evil-smelling grease from the galleys. On a nearby wharf lay piles of uncovered meat in the blazing sun, and when the gunners saw this being loaded into the Ormonde they were disgusted. Complaints about the food effected no improvement and dissatisfaction increased. In the afternoon of 19 September some 20 angry gunners took possession of the bridge to prevent the ship from sailing. Their action was tantamount to mutiny; but it was warmly supported by other troops on board, including infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Weir was Officer Commanding Troops and he had already done his best to remedy grievances and improve conditions, asking for New Zealand beef from the Mauretania to replace the tainted meat aboard and for 400 men to be disembarked to relieve overcrowding. The co-operation he received from the authorities on the ship and ashore was disappointing. Little was done to improve matters. But he had no doubt that the men chiefly responsible would quickly respond when they learned of the efforts already being made on their behalf.

Weir went up to the wheelhouse and spoke to the men. He told them to appoint a small deputation to see him in his cabin and the bridge was promptly vacated. The master of the ship was not content with this, however, and insisted that he would not sail until the troops were under control. The ship was placed under arrest and a gunboat circled it. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilder
[23] of 25 Battalion, which was also aboard, refused an offer of naval assistance to restore order. Had the naval, embarkation, and ship's authorities acted as promptly and with as much determination to rectify the appalling conditions which led to the disturbance it would never have happened.

The convoy sailed without the Ormonde and Weir and Wilder took up the matter with authorities ashore, who took a very serious view of the affair. They had largely brought it on themselves, however, by tolerating inefficiency and filth which were more than the New Zealanders were prepared to put up with. In hot, humid conditions with periodic downpours of rain which drove the men down into the stifling and smelly quarters below decks, feelings had got out of control. The particular circumstances of a wartime convoy with its careful time-tabling gave the affair an importance which accentuated what became apparent in many a less serious situation: that New Zealanders would not accept living, cooking and sanitary conditions which British troops, especially regulars, seemed to accept all too often without demur. [24]

Weir, though aware of the serious implications, was sympathetic to the complaints of the men. He knew that good sense and discipline would quickly conquer the momentary belligerence. There was no cure for the overcrowding, though conditions improved when the Ormonde sailed, eight hours late, and a sea breeze tempered the oppressive heat. As many men as could be accommodated there slept on deck, which made things easier for all. The tainted meat was tipped overboard and replaced by tinned rations drawn from the reserve on board. For the time being guards were posted on the fo'c'sle, bridge, auxiliary steering gear and engine room; but they were not needed. The men accepted Weir's assurances that everything possible had been done; but they remained far from pleased with the Ormonde for the rest of the voyage. If the episode reflected unfavourably on ‘Steve’ Weir in official circles in Bombay, this was more than counterbalanced by the renewal and strengthening of the high esteem in which his men held him. And it was with his gunners and not with the Bombay port officials that he would in due course have to face the enemy.

An inquiry was held in the course of the voyage to Egypt; but no disciplinary action was taken against any of the men concerned. [25] The New Zealand Government, when it heard, was not averse to taking the matter up with the British authorities; but General Freyberg thought it best to let things rest. The

‘Bombay Mutiny’ therefore ended without recriminations. There is nothing on record to suggest that the gunners regretted their action. A New Zealand embarkation staff was afterwards stationed at Bombay.

The Admiralty had regained confidence in its ability to pass convoys through the straits of Bab el-Mandeb and the Third Echelon and its Australian colleagues passed through without incident and steamed on to Port Tewfik, where the much-disliked Ormonde dropped anchor on 29 September.

At Maadi Camp the 6th Field, 33 Anti-Tank Battery, and 1 Survey Troop, following in the footsteps of the 4th Field and 34 Anti-Tank Battery, took up occupation of the artillery lines. They were met by a party from 2/2 Australian Field Regiment, which had prepared tents and had a meal ready.

[21]
Capt L. Mossong, MBE; Auckland; born NZ 14 May 1898; Regular soldier.

[22]
Lt-Col E. T. Kensington, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Auckland, 11 Apr 1903; PWD engineer's assistant; OC 1 Svy Tp Dec 1940-Jun 1941; 36 Svy Bty Jun-Sep 1942; CO 14 Lt AA Regt Jun-Dec 1943; CO 5 Fd Regt Dec 1943-Apr 1944; CO 6 Fd Regt Apr-Aug 1944.

[23]
Maj-Gen A. S. Wilder, DSO, MC, m.i.d., Order of the White Eagle (Serb); Te Hau, Waipukurau; born NZ 24 May 1890; sheep farmer; Wgtn Mtd Rifles (Maj) 1914-19; CO 25 Bn May 1940-Sep 1941; comd NZ Trg Group, Maadi Camp, Sep-Dec 1941, Jan-Feb 1942; 5 Bde 6 Dec 1941-17 Jan 1942; 5 Div (in NZ) Apr 1942-Jan 1943; 1 Div Jan-Nov 1943.

[24] A furlough detachment, including many New Zealand gunners, going to England in February 1944, for example, bluntly refused to accept accommodation offered them in a transit camp at Port Said until it had been cleaned up. The New Zealand officer in charge fully supported them; but he had to take his case up to the GOC of the Area before getting a sympathetic hearing. The GOC ordered the local authorities to put the camp in good order at once.

[25] The finding of the court was that junior officers should have kept control and prevented the demonstration at the wheelhouse; but this was strongly resented. These officers had done everything in their power to alleviate conditions on board and, but for their good work, the outbreak would certainly have been more difficult to deal with.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Maadi and the Western Desert

Maadi and the Western Desert

The arrival of the 4th Field at Maadi on 11 February 1940 had been more memorable. They had marched with their personal gear from the railway a mile away, led by the band of the Durham Light Infantry and watched by a sprinkling of local residents, English, French and Egyptian. The 4th Field was the first New Zealand unit to arrive; hence this special treatment. The artillery lines had been prepared beforehand by 1 Field Regiment, RA, and a party from this unit welcomed the newcomers and had a meal ready for them, as well as giving them a week's ‘mothering’ which was especially helpful in administration and quartermastering.

Gunners of the First Echelon could only do elementary training until their equipment arrived and therefore made the most of their leisure hours. No leave passes were needed to visit Cairo and this city showed a brighter and kindlier face than later arrivals were to see. The Egyptian Museum was still open, the lights of the city blazed, and the New Zealanders, the largest and wealthiest of the contingents of troops stationed nearby, were made most welcome. The residents of Maadi erected a huge tent among trees at the edge of the desert a mile from the camp and staffed it as a recreation centre which became very popular. In the camp there were several recreation huts and the ramshackle Shafto's Cinema.

Training proceeded rapidly with guns which arrived on 1 March and with the help of other artillery units, particularly the 4th Royal Horse Artillery. In April ‘Milesia’ under Briga- dier Miles fought ‘Puttagonia’ under Brigadier Puttick, [26] and 4 Field Regiment supplied two batteries each of two troops and a party representing an anti-tank battery. This exercise, carried out in the desert up to 30 miles south of Maadi Camp, concluded on Anzac Day. After a service in the desert to commemorate the day, the gunners returned to camp and there met 34 Anti-Tank Battery when it arrived in the late afternoon from England via France and the Mediterranean.

The anti-tankers brought with them nine of their full complement of twelve 2-pounders and in almost all other respects were fully equipped for war, a unique distinction which aroused considerable interest. They possessed anti-gas capes, machettes, camouflage nets, field dressings, Horlick's emergency rations and many other items that attracted attention.

When the Wehrmacht attacked first Norway and then the Lowlands and France and it seemed likely that Italy might enter the war on the German side, Brigadier Miles redoubled his efforts to obtain the guns, transport and other equipment that his units urgently needed. The Italian declaration of war on 10 June caused the gunners much hard work in dispersing their tents and ‘digging them in’ in case of air raids. But it also meant the closing of the Mediterranean to British shipping and further delay in equipping the Army of the Nile. Dismounted artillery detachments also went to Helwan and Heliopolis to protect airfields, while other gunners made dummy tanks which were in due course sent to the Western Desert to deceive the Italians there.

A force of 120 guners laboured in the torrid July heat to dig a deep anti-tank trench at Garawla, 14 miles south-east of Matruh. A similar detachment relieved them after three weeks. A field battery received full war equipment early in August and by the end of the month the whole of the 4th Field moved to Maaten Baggush, where 4 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Group (to give it its full title) prepared a ‘box’ of a few square miles with all-round defences. Some men still laboured at Garawla, while 34 Anti-Tank Battery (now under the command of Major Jenkins, [27] since Lieutenant-Colonel Duff commanded the 7th Anti-Tank) conducted a school in- struction for British, Australian and Indian anti-tank units at Maadi. The New Zealand battery was the only one in the Middle East trained in the use of the 2-pounder.

The Western Desert was still an empty wilderness in the autumn of 1940 and in it a force of little more than a division faced a large Italian army under General Graziani at Sidi Barrani. The New Zealand brigade guarded the lines of communication from Alexandria to a point west of Baggush. The single-track railway and narrow coast road traversed 160 miles of scrub-covered sand, baked earth and limestone rock which in placed formed steep escarpments. Occasional Arab homes, a few Bedouin encampments, a line of telegraph poles which sometimes sent out a branch to the south, and the ramshackle buildings near the railway stations of El Alamein, Ghazal, El Daba, Fuka and Sidi Haneish, with rare coastguard or light-house buildings, were almost the only evidences of man in this wasteland and on them were thinly superimposed the marks of the Western Desert Force with its RAF supporters. The sea for the most part was empty, too, and in the heat the land seemed to wobble like jelly. It was a lonely place in those early days to fight a war.

At Baggush the 4th Field occupied an area of scrub mounds laced with tracks knee-deep in soft white dust and the anti-tank battery lines reached down a gentle hollow towards the date palms and water wells of Burbeita. By September the regiment had 22 assorted field guns in five troops, two in a field role and three in an anti-tank role, while another troop was on special duty in Alexandria with four 4.5-inch howitzers. None of the troops had up-to-date equipment; but they prepared to do battle with what they could get. Battalion and brigade manoeuvres were carried out in the rough-country to the south of the Box, and gunners learned to navigate by sun compass [28] and drive across steep-sided wadis and to play their various roles in a war of movement. They experienced their first bad sandstrom at the end of October. Early next month four troops were delighted to be re-equipped with 25-pounders, Mark I, as well as trucks and ammunition trailers. Parties from the 6th Field and 33 Anti-Tank Battery coming from Maadi for instruction gave the First Echelon gunners a sense, previously absent, of belonging to a larger family. Some of the newcomers were still attached when a rainstorm of great violence late in November changed dry wadis overnight into raging torrents, flooded most of the oasis, and turned much of the surrounding desert into impassable mud. Tent excavations flooded and their walls collapsed, and unhappy gunners had to salvage what they could of their belongings and dig new homes. Then, a mere four days later, they suffered a dust-storm. Such was life in the desert.

Western Desert Force struck against the Italian desert army early in December; but few of the New Zealanders had an active role at the beginning. It was only when success exceeded expectation that New Zealand drivers (gunners and infantry among them) were demanded with their lorries to carry supplies forward and prisoners back. Captain Sprosen
[29] took 55 4th Field vehicles on the first of these missions on 12 December. His party made three journeys forward with petrol and ammunition and one back with prisoners, covering 1000 miles of rough desert in eight days. Meanwhile more drivers were needed to collect captured diesel lorries and 55 went on the 16th, took over the huge and troublesome Fiats and Lancias, and shuttled supplies forward. Both groups of drivers passed through the battlefield south of Sidi Barrani and saw for themselves the sometimes pathetic relics of the fighting. After Christmas Sprosen took another group of 58 vehicles to Burg el Arab (between El Alamein and Alexandria) to help carry 19 Australian Infantry Brigade into Libya for its attack on Bardia. The gunners drove up Halfaya Pass on the frontier and put the Australians down near the recently captured Fort Capuzzo. The ubiquitous Sprosen then led an advanced party back to the Cairo area, to Helwan Camp (where 6 NZ Brigade was then established [30]) and on 10 January 1941 the rest of the 4th Field followed, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson behind at Baggush as acting brigade commander. The gunners' first long sojourn in the desert was over and new tasks were being planned for them. The union of 4 and 6 Brigades was an important step towards the assembling of the whole of the New Zealand Division.

[26] Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Timaru, 26 Jun 1890; Regular soldier; NZ Rifle Bde 1914-19 (CO 3 Bn); comd 4 Bde Jan 1940-Aug 1941; 2 NZ Div ( Crete) 29 Apr-27 May 1941; CGS and GOC NZ Military Forces, Aug 1941-Dec 1945.

[27]
Maj A. V. Jenkins; born NZ 30 May 1903; civil servant; died of wounds 26 Apr 1941.

[28] Navigators had to take oil compasses away from vehicles to diminish the inaccuracy caused by the mass of iron and steel. This was not only time-consuming: in a large, dispersed group it was hard to find anywhere within a reasonable distance that allowed fairly accurate readings.

[29]
Lt-Col J. F. R. Sprosen, DSO, ED; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 20 Jan 1908; schoolteacher; CO 4 Fd Regt Apr-Jun 1942, Sep-Oct 1942; 5 Fd Regt Oct-Nov 1942; 14 Lt AA Regt Nov 1942-Jun 1943, Dec 1943-Nov 1944; 7 A-Tk Regt Nov-Dec 1944; wounded 24 May 1941.

[30] In the second week of December 33 A-Tk Bty had reluctantly moved from Maadi to Helwan.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Getting Ready for Greece

Getting Ready for Greece

The reunion of the two contingents of gunners was heart-warming, though the new camp made a disagreeable setting for it and a strong wind whipped up the sand and dust. Attention soon centred on new equipment which began to arrive. The field gunners were excited about the first of their 25-pounders, Mark II: the 25-pounder proper. In the 4th Field Colonel Parkinson supervised a hand of draw-and-show poker to decide which battery was to have the first four and 26 Battery won. By 16 January 25 Battery was fully equipped with the Mark I variety and 26 Battery with Mark II. Manoeuvres in the surrounding desert with live shell were marked for the gunners by the realisation of a gunner's perpetual nightmare: a premature burst of a shell in the barrel of a gun. Fortunately it was a smoke shell and only one member of the gun crew was wounded; but it was a sobering event.

The days at Helwan passed quickly with training schemes, course shooting [31] for the field gunners and calibration of the new guns, and a rush of preparations for putting the units on a war footing. The 25-pounder shoots were mostly controlled by junior officers, to give them experience and confidence, and 1 Survey Troop worked under the wing of a Royal Artillery survey regiment.

The tempo increased in February and Divisional Artillery Headquarters, which had been taking shape at Maadi and had been reinforced from England in December, was particularly busy. The union of the Divisional Artillery was close at hand and full equipment and an active role were also promised. There was therefore a last-minute rush to complete preparations. On the 18th the 5th Field and 7th Anti-Tank reached Helwan—the Cook's Tourists, as they were called. None were more delighted than the anti-tank gunners, stationed at Mahfouz Camp, between Helwan Camp and the town of Helwan. The 31st and 32nd Batteries, with Regimental Headquarters, met for the first time 33 Battery from New Zealand and 34 Battery which had preceded them in England (having enlisted there). Within a few days the first combined church parade of the whole Divisional Artillery was held and Brigadier Miles proudly took the salute at a march past.

Miles knew something of what was in store for the men who marched past him, though he could not yet disclose it to all. It was not until the 17th that General Freyberg had been told that the Division was to go to Greece, and the wheels of diplomacy were still turning as furiously at an inter-government level as the wheels of administration were in the formations [32] concerned. Makeshift was the order of the day in both spheres; but the administrators emerged in the end with more credit. The strategy behind the move to Greece was fundamentally unsound.

The gunners were for the most part confused by the welter of preparations and rumours, by the issue of mosquito nets and pith helmets, and by the official obfuscations. The wise ones got their information from Cairo bootblacks and Greek restaurateurs, who proved remarkably accurate.

The Divisional Artillery left Helwan and Mahfouz in the first half of March, Headquarters and the 4th Field first, other units later. In road convoys they drove through Cairo, past the Pyramids, and on along the road to Alexandria to halt overnight at the Wadi Natrun. A short drive then took them to Amiriya transit camp, a few miles outside the city. The camp was on a stretch of desert much afflicted with dust-storms and gunners worked there in considerable discomfort repacking loads on vehicles to decrease their height for a sea voyage. When the transport parties arrived at the docks and saw the vessels they were destined to sail in they realised that the precaution was fully warranted. The class of ship involved was much below what the three echelons had come to expect—especially the newly-arrived Second Echelon gunners. The Brattdal, which took the first lot of guns and transport, was small and awkward, and the motor vessel Devis, which took the next lot, was no better. The dockside labour, moreover, was clumsy and careless in the extreme and the embarkation staff seemed undismayed—scarcely even concerned—when guns or vehicles were damaged.

The 4th Field sailed in a rough sea in a grubby little Greek government steam yacht called the Hellas on the 9th, with men packed tightly into every conceivable space. For a day they were hove to in the storm. Brigadier Miles and his brigade major, Queree, sailed in HMAS Perth on the 17th. The motor vessel Cameronia which carried the 5th and 6th Field gunners was larger and tidier than most, but like the others was greatly overcrowded. The survey troop sailed among strangers in the Ulster Prince. Last of all, the 7th Anti-Tank embarked in the 2625-ton Korinthia, which was in a shocking condition. Lieutenant-Colonel Duff made many representations to the embarkation staff about this and kept asking for the Officer Commanding Troops on board until he learned that he himself had been given this appointment, in charge of 1900 men including his own. While the Korinthia was at sea the Battle of Cape Matapan took place, causing some delay to the convoy, much damage to the Italian navy, and sheer delight to the Greeks, as the gunners soon learned.

The Divisional Artillery needed only the light anti-aircraft regiment to complete its establishment as then authorised. There were few serious deficiencies of equipment, though a slight shortage of men in the field regiments and a considerable shortage in the anti-tank unit. Headquarters was a small band of six officers and 22 other ranks, with seven cars and trucks and two motor-cycles. It included a Counter-Battery Officer, but no Counter-Battery organisation. With such a small staff it could only hope to supervise in a very general way the work of the units, and the intention evidently was that control of these should be largely decentralised to infantry brigade level. The field regiments each numbered roughly 45 officers and 590 other ranks, including those attached from other corps (Signals, Ordnance and Medical), and they each had 112 cars and trucks (of which 36 were 25-pounder ‘quads’, the odd-looking towing vehicles for guns and limbers), 48 ammunition trailers, and 29 motor-cycles. Each regiment had two batteries, numbered as follows:

4th Field | 25 and 26 Batteries
5th Field | 27 and 28 Batteries
6th Field | 29 and 30 Batteries

Each battery in turn had three troops (A, B and C Troops for the first battery in the regiment and D, E and F Troops for the second). One troop per battery, however, was a ‘swinging’ troop, dependent on one of the other two (or both of them) for certain facilities and work. All had either Mark I or Mark II 25-pounders. The anti-tank regiment had 122 cars and trucks and 37 motor-cycles. It had, of course, four batteries and each of them had three four-gun troops of 2-pounders. All but those of 34 Battery were towed behind trucks; the 34th had ‘portées’, which were 30-cwt (later 3-ton) trucks converted to carry 2-pounders ready for instant use (though with restricted traverse) in emergency action, though the guns would normally be lowered to the ground and dug in before action. The troops were lettered A, B and C (31 Battery), E, F and G (32 Battery), J, K, and L (33 Battery), and N, O and P (34 Battery). The missing letters (excepting I, which was not to be used) were reserved for the fourth troop eventually intended for each battery. The survey troop was trained and equipped to carry out flash-spotting (to locate hostile batteries) and for surveying regiments or batteries in on a grid, providing bearing pickets, and suchlike tasks. Each regiment had a section of Divisional Signals to provide and maintain communications, a Light Aid Detachment of Ordnance to maintain vehicles and guns, a medical officer and a padre. The grand total for the Divisional Artillery was therefore some 185 officers and 2500 other ranks with 475 cars and trucks (among them 108 ‘quads’), 130 motor-cycles, 144 ammunition trailers, 72 field guns and 48 anti-tank guns. [33]

[31] Course shooting was a training programme to teach junior officers in particular the routines associated with directing the fire of the guns.

[32] A formation is an army organisation larger than a unit.

[33] The main appointments were:—Commander, RA (CRA): Brig R. Miles, DSO, MC, RNZA; BM: Maj R. C. Queree, RNZA; Staff Captain: Capt L. N. McKay, RNZA. 4th Field: CO: Lt-Col G. B. Parkinson, RNZA; Second-in-Command (2 i/c): Maj A. Ainslie; E Sec Div Sigs: Lt N. W. Laugesen; 9 LAD: 2 Lt H. A. Bauchop; Medical Officer (RMO): Maj G. H. Thomson. 5th Field: CO: Lt-Col K. W. Fraser; 2 i/c: Maj M. A. Bull; F Sec Div Sigs: Lt H. W. Robins; 16 LAD: 2 Lt E. F. Cooper; RMO: Lt J. M. Tyler. 6th Field: CO: Lt-Col C. E. Weir, RNZA; 2 i/c: Maj C. L. Walter; G Sec Div Sigs: Lt A. S. D. Rose; 18 LAD: 2 Lt B. A. McConnell; RMO: Lt B. M. Hay. 7th Anti-Tank: CO: Lt-Col C. S. J. Duff; 2 i/c: Maj T. H. E. Oakes; H Sec Div Sigs: Lt T. M. Paterson; 15 LAD: 2 Lt J. W. Neale: RMO: Lt W. G. Cook. I Survey Troop: OC: Capt E. T. Kensington.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 2 — Greece: The Gunners' Campaign

Contents

- [section]
p. 24

- The Aliakmon Line p. 25
- Back to the Olympus Line p. 28
- Rearguard on the Aliakmon p. 34
- Desperate Fighting at Platamon p. 37

- Crest Clearance on the Cloudy Slopes of Olympus p. 41

- A Dominant Position above Servia p. 45

- 26 Battery at Kalabaka p. 48

- ‘Action Front: Tanks!’
p. 50

- Action Overlooking Elasson
- Tempe: A Crucial Rearguard p. 57
- Retreat to Thermopylae p. 67
- The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka p. 71

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

AS A 4TH FIELD gunner leaned over the rails of the Hellas and watched Egypt fade into the night he bade a heartfelt farewell to the land of the Pharaohs in strong language. ‘Don't say that, son’, the gruff voice of ‘Ike’ Parkinson interposed. ‘Some day you may be very glad indeed to see Egypt again.’ But a message from General Freyberg read out to troops on the voyage reminded each shipload that it would be fighting

‘in the defence of Greece, the birthplace of culture and learning …. meeting our real enemy the Germans …. not only for Greece but also in defence of our own homes.’

Such talk was scarcely needed: the mission was in the crusading tradition of Anzac and had overwhelming appeal to all but the few who reflected on the chances of successfully challenging the Wehrmacht on the mainland of Europe. Regardless of the chances it was at least an escape from filth, poverty and disease to a thrillingly beautiful land and a brave people. The approach to the Piraeus, the port of Athens, through the blue Saronic Gulf, speckled with tiny isles and boats, was an adventure in itself. Advanced parties and drivers met contingents on the wharf and the people of Athens, by day or night, gave them a rousing reception.

Most of the gunners camped among pinewoods near Kifisia, six miles beyond the city, while the survey troop settled in at Hymettus, a little nearer. While the gunners who had so far arrived explored the city, the CRA and Major Queree reported to Lustre Force Headquarters [1] at the Hotel Acropole and then left by car for the north, reaching Larisa on 20 March and Katerini, north of the Olympus Pass, next day, to reconnoitre the positions the Division was to occupy. Later arrivals were not given leave; but most of them took it. It is hard to find words for the warmth of their reception by the Greeks, though the city was very much at war. By this time poorly equipped and maintained Greek forces had fought their way over mountain passes into Albania, rolling back more numerous and better-equipped Italian forces; but in so doing they had drained off the strength of the armies of Macedonia and Thrace, facing Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey. To the New Zealanders they seemed worthy friends and allies.

To the Greeks, in turn, it seemed that their new friends were wealthy beyond belief and enormously strong. They were not used to army transport on the scale of the New Zealand Division. The road convoys that wound their way northwards over roads barely capable of carrying them in the second half of March and the first day or two of April 1941 were warmly applauded. The Headquarters convoy travelled first, starting on the 22nd, and the 4th Field left two days later. [2] The Brallos Pass south of Lamia was still under the winter snows, and these two groups therefore had to take the longer coast route by way of Molos and Thermopylae. Later convoys used the pass and all but the drivers found the scenery enchanting. From Brallos trucks seemed to twist and turn in all directions and at all levels in the descent to Lamia. To the north the hills grew more barren and the villages poorer. Larisa on the Plain of Thessaly had suffered a bad earthquake and then Italian bombing. North of it the road deteriorated and groups of women picked and shovelled to keep it open. It wound convulsively through the Olympus or Petras Pass, among stunted firs close to the snowline, and then broke away from the mountains and into the hilly countryside around Katerini. The portees of 34 Anti-Tank Battery made this journey; but the towed guns of the other three anti-tank batteries were thought too likely to suffer damage on the way and went by train, together with their crews—another unforgettable journey through a scenic wonderland thickly interspersed with tunnels. This was wise, since 26 Field Battery had abandoned two damaged trailers on the journey north and 25 Battery a third.

[1] The expeditionary force sent to Greece was called Lustre Force, changed later to W Force. Lt-Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson commanded it.

[2] Before leaving the Athens area, gunners handed in their pith helmets and their kitbags containing personal possessions. They did not see either again.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Aliakmon Line

The Aliakmon Line

Brigadier Miles and his BM, in reconnoitring the allotted front, were soon aware of the dangers of a strategy which committed the small W Force to such a large task. The Division was to hold a front of 25,000 yards with 6 Brigade (7000 yards) on the right and 4 Brigade (18,000 yards) on the left, facing north. The ground was broken and heavily wooded and the front ran mostly along a crest line. A further extension of the line, moreover, was contemplated and the Division had also to make some provisions to defend three passes: the Olympus Pass, another between Mount Olympus and the sea, and a third overlooking Servia to the south-west. If the forward line broke these passes must be held.

the aliakmon line
the new zealand division's sector, 5 april 1941

Adequate artillery coverage of even the forward line was quite beyond Miles's resources. He therefore had to make assumptions that he would not care to have tested: that certain parts of the front were more or less tank-proof, for example, and that counter-attack and shellfire could conceivably beat back penetrations between rather widely separated infantry positions. An elaborate scheme was designed to make the most of the available artillery. Calling regimental commanders forward, he outlined this to them; but before they could work out details and site their guns and observation posts, Miles was back at the Olympus Pass devising another scheme. He had little faith in the forward positions. The official New Zealand campaign history [3] says that ‘too much reliance had been placed on the supposedly anti-tank nature of the country’; but the real trouble was that the front was too long and the guns too few.

Another trouble was the scarcity of lateral communications. To get from one part of the front to another involved long detours over primitive tracks, capable of carrying one-way traffic only. To cover the assembly of the Division on this line, the 4th Field dug in along the whole front, starting on the 29th. Regimental Headquarters moved to Sfendhami, a large village a mile or two back, and gun teams lived mostly under canvas. Within a day or two the 4th and 5th Field were grouped under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson in support of 6 Brigade on the right, while the 6th Field supported 4 Brigade on the left. The Divisional Cavalry Regiment went forward to guard the crossings of the Aliakmon River, which flowed obliquely down from the north a few miles in front of the line. E Troop of the 5th Field and O Troop of the 7th Anti-Tank were sent forward to support this advanced guard. The 32nd and 33rd Batteries, plus B Troop, came under the command of Brigadier Barrowclough [4] of 6 Brigade, the 31st (less B Troop) came under the command of Brigadier Puttick of 4 Brigade, while the 34th (less O Troop) joined Divisional Reserve.

These dispositions entailed much work in siting and digging in guns, constructing command and observation posts, laying telephone lines, planning and preparing alternative positions, and dumping ammunition on the scale of 150 rounds per field gun. Besides this, the gunners had to labour ceaselessly to keep the tracks open for traffic.

The main ridge gave fairly good observation and two OPs per field battery were sited, dug, camouflaged and equipped with cable and wireless communications. Each battery also maintained another OP in depth, connected by short lines with its command post, from which possible areas of enemy penetration between strongpoints might be observed and shelled. The view from high ground on the right of the line, across the Gulf of Salonika, was of breath-taking beauty; but the deficiencies of the line itself were only too evident to many officers and detracted from their enjoyment of the scene. A few days of warm weather with only occasional showers of rain allowed the gunners to complete their arrangements, and the defences of the front were co-ordinated and largely ready when Germany declared war on Yugoslavia and Greece in the night 5–6 April 1941. But neither gunners nor infantry were happy about the position.

[3]
W. G. McClymont, To Greece ( War History Branch, 1959), p.138.

[4] Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir Harold Barrowclough, PC, KCMG, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr); Wellington; born Masterton, 23 Jun 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (CO 4 Bn); comd 7 NZ Inf Bde in UK, 1940; 6 Bde, May 1940–Feb 1942; GOC 2 NZEF in Pacific and 3 NZ Div, Aug 1942–Oct 1944; Chief Justice of New Zealand, Nov 1953–Jan 1966.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Back to the Olympus Line

Back to the Olympus Line

Two days later the situation changed dramatically. The Germans had advanced swiftly through Yugoslavia, important parts of W Force had still not reached the forward area, and little help could be expected from the hard-pressed Greek forces. The Luftwaffe reconnoitred overhead freely and the enemy could readily assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Aliakmon line. The Division was therefore ordered back, as Freyberg and Miles had foreseen, to a line based in the east on the Olympus Pass. The New Zealand portion of this had three main components: the Platamon tunnel area between Olympus and the sea, the Olympus Pass itself, and another to the south-west, the Servia Pass. By channelling attack through these three defiles, the new line offered far greater defensive strength for the limited forces available.

The Platamon tunnel area seemed immensely strong. It formed a narrow defile indeed as the little plain surrounding Katerini dwindled south-eastwards towards the coast and the tracks petered out altogether in rocky country. The railway line continued southwards, but had to burrow through a rocky spur which ran out to the sea to get through to the delta of the Pinios River, south-east of the Olympus massif. The railway tunnel therefore formed a complete bottleneck for motor transport and the hinterland was a wilderness of steep rock faces and abysses which even mountain troops might find it hard to traverse—though their prowess in the event proved greater than expected.

4 brigade positions at servia pass, 10–17 april 1941

The Olympus Pass seemed almost as strong. The road, mostly single-tracked, from Katerini climbed it in a south-westerly direction over a succession of bridges and culverts—some of them feats of engineering—and round many a hairpin bend to a height of 3000 feet above sea level. On either side the mountains rose to almost double that height, with stunted conifers and scrub and above them bare rock and snow. Only the road itself was passable for motor transport and it seemed easy to block with demolitions of bridges over deep chasms. The village of Ay Dhimitrios sat at the top of the pass and the southern exit opened on to a small plain nursing the little town of Elasson. Flat areas in the pass suitable for field guns were almost non-existent and there would clearly be much trouble siting guns and providing communications and control; but observation from some points was spectacular in the extreme. Miles and his staff had already studied the ground, and since 30 March 5 Brigade had been constructing defences in the pass.

The Servia Pass was a precipitous route up a rugged face of the Olympus massif. The heights looked across the little plain of Servia, through which the Aliakmon River curled north-eastwards, and beyond it towards the town of Kozani. The road from Kozani, joined by another from Veroia before reaching the river, veered south-westwards on its way to Karperon; but it sent a branch zigzagging up the mountainside after passing through Servia, and this branch road gradually descended from the top of the Servia Pass to the plain of Elasson, where it joined the road from Katerini. It was this branch road, by-passing the main route from the north, which had to be defended, a task which seemed to offer few serious difficulties other than the expected one of finding suitable battery and troop positions in the mountains. Observation over the plain and the crossings of the Aliakmon was superb and the advantage was clearly with the defence. But rain could make it hard to negotiate the pass road and get guns and limbers off it and into position in the heights overlooking Servia; and before the move took place the rain came.

A heavy downpour badly affected the tracks behind the Aliakmon line, and when the 6th Field and 31 Anti-Tank Battery were ordered to withdraw with 4 Brigade into Corps Reserve on 8 April, they found it extremely hard to do so. The progress of the tractors, guns and limbers was painfully slow. It took all day to get on to the road to Katerini and it was midnight before the gun group halted for the night in the Olympus Pass. It was still raining when 4 Brigade moved into the Servia Pass next day. The struggle on the 10th to get the guns into position was exhausting for all concerned. The infantry deployed with 18 Battalion just south of Servia, 19 Battalion at the mouth of the pass, and 20 Battalion in reserve. The field guns were sited in a steep-sided valley south and west of the hamlet of Lava and the observation parties mounted the cliff south of Servia and the lofty Borsana feature. B Troop under Captain Sawyers
[5] was sited well forward to be within range of the main bridge over the Aliakmon River. Perhaps the hardest work here was done by G Section, Divisional Signals, which had to connect the gun positions and OPs by telephone. None of the Signals vehicles (called ‘monkey trucks’) could be used and the men had to carry 68-pound reels of wire up slippery slopes, through scrub, and over jagged rocks. Some 30 of these heavy reels were needed to cover 10 miles and it took five days to complete this work. Meanwhile other guns arrived. The 7th Medium Regiment, RA, with only one battery (of 60-pounders) came under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Weir on the 11th and dug in behind the field guns. This was a most valuable addition to the defence; for these guns could easily range up to the Aliakmon bridge and beyond and would be most useful for counter-battery fire. To get them into position, however, was a formidable task and sappers and Palestinian labour had to be called in to build a track. The next arrival was what is variously described as a Yugoslav troop of 88-millimetre anti-aircraft guns, a Greek troop of the same guns, a Bulgarian troop (according to the 7th Medium history) and two troops, one Yugoslav and one Greek. At all events Weir gave a troop of 88-millimetre guns an anti-tank role in the pass. He was also given command of 1 Survey Troop, sent across from the Olympus Pass, and for flash-spotting it gained wonderful observation over the ground the enemy must use.

After the 6th Field left the Aliakmon line, parties of the 4th and 5th Field carted ammunition from the vacated gun pits back to the foot of the Olympus Pass, a precaution which was to prove wise indeed. At the same time the surveyors, before they moved to the Servia front, did what they could to survey gun positions in this pass. They established bearing pickets with great difficulty because of poor observation. Then they were called away to Servia.

Part of the artillery withdrew from the Aliakmon line as early as 6 April: RHQ and 25 Battery of the 4th Field and RHQ and 28 Battery (less E Troop) of the 5th Field. In the evening Brigadier Miles sent his headquarters back through the Olympus Pass to Dholikhi, keeping only a skeleton staff with him at Sfendhami. The rest of the guns stayed to cover the withdrawal of 6 Brigade, though all spare ammunition was sent back to the railhead at Katerini. The move continued on 9 April and carried on throughout the night, covered by a rearguard under Lieutenant-Colonel Duff which consisted of the 6 Brigade carrier platoons, a machine-gun company, and his own 34 Battery, the portées of which brought up the rear. A Troop of the 5th Field had been sent on the 9th to join 21 Battalion in guarding the Platamon tunnel area.

the 5th field and 32 anti-tank battery in the olympus pass, 16 april 1941

The rest of the field guns were to take up positions in the Olympus Pass, with the 5th Field forward. The pass, however, presented extraordinary difficulty for an artillery defence. For the first five miles from the Katerini end there were practically no flat areas at all. The first possibility was a tiny ledge high above the road and only 3000 yards from the projected front line, and D Troop of the 5th Field was hauled up to it. The only other feasible position was a knife-edge ridge some 2000 yards farther back, which had room for eight guns, but which first needed an approach to be built, a task on which the infantry laboured without machinery and completed in eight hours. This track, rising 450 feet, proved most serviceable. B and C Troops used it and got their guns into position with surprising ease. A patch of ground a little farther back and just off the road proved adequate for F Troop, though rather far back, and a further location behind it was earmarked for E Troop when it withdrew from the Aliakmon. Yet another position had to be found, however, for D Troop, which was discovered, when the infantry fully occupied their positions, to be dangerously exposed. Back it came, therefore, and managed to squeeze in alongside the E Troop position. Observation posts for B and C Troops were well forward, the former with 22 Battalion guarding the road and the latter with 23 Battalion extending to the south-east and overlooking the Petras Sanatorium.

The 28 (Maori) Battalion positions to the left (or west) of the road were to be covered by the 4th Field; but this was an even harder task. D Troop's guns were dragged up an extremely rough track to a little ridge 900 feet above the road. The rest of 26 Battery was to follow; but Brigadier Miles intervened. Already he had in mind the possibility of further withdrawal and he ordered E and F Troops to be sited with 25 Battery in more accessible positions farther back. In the end they were emplaced just off the road near Ay Dhimitrios in the middle of the pass. In their mountain aerie the shivering gunners of D Troop under Captain Nolan
[6] became snowbound.

The anti-tank defence of the pass was easier, because the terrain itself gave considerable protection. There were few places off the road where tanks could possibly operate and the road itself was expected to be effectively blocked by demolitions. The only approach to the right of 22 Battalion and the whole of the extensive 23 Battalion position was by means of a track which branched off the pass road due southwards to the Sanatorium. It branched off, however, in front of the infantry positions and would therefore not be available for a withdrawal. The engineers thought that, given time, a withdrawal route might be constructed over the hills southwards to the village of Kokkinoplos. Accepting this risk, 32 Battery sited eight of its 2-pounders with 23 Battalion and the remaining four (one of which had to come in by the Sanatorium road) with 22 Battalion. [7] The ground on the left, guarded by the Maoris, was too rough for tanks.

[5]
Lt-Col C. H. Sawyers, DSO, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Aust., 17 Feb 1905; sales manager; CO 14 Lt AA Regt Dec 1943; CO 5 Fd Regt 15 Aug-12 Oct 1944, 30 Nov 1944–1 May 1945.

[6]
Capt S. T. Nolan, m.i.d.; Hamilton; born Onehunga, 14 Aug 1905; motor trimmer; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[7] The official historian comments ( To Greece, p.259) that the anti-tank guns ‘were not well forward covering the approaches to the infantry, but were more to the rear in counter-penetration positions according to theories developed “after the French and Belgian campaigns”’. The ‘theories’ he presumably means were the tactics whereby anti-tank guns were sited so as to give each other support. These tactics were adopted by all armies at that time, including the German, and expert opinion was unanimous as to their soundness. They were developed long before the German invasion of the Lowlands and France and experience in that fighting gave no grounds for modifying them. It is true that infantry officers sometimes wanted anti-tank guns to fire straight ahead from the forward infantry posts and were disappointed when the guns were sited differently. But guns sited as they wished would have disclosed their positions with their first round (if not sooner) and would easily have been eliminated by the enemy. Only with the advent of far more powerful guns which could engage tanks at ranges upwards of 2000 yards was it wise to site anti-tank guns firing straight ahead. Even then, if they were to be sited well forward, they needed strong armoured protection, as the Germans demonstrated later in Italy with their Panther turrets fixed into ground emplacements. With the limited performance of the 2-pounders defilade positions were generally preferable.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Rearguard on the Aliakmon

Rearguard on the Aliakmon

The Divisional Cavalry rearguard facing across the Aliakmon to the north had meanwhile been waiting patiently. On the 8th it heard explosions from the direction of Salonika and saw columns of smoke rise from the city. Three 25-pounders of E Troop of the 5th Field under Captain Bevan
[8] were sited back near Paliambela and the fourth was well forward so as to be able to shell the town of Yidha beyond the river. To get this single gun into position, a road had to be made over the crest of a ridge in rough country.

Bevan eagerly studied the ground ahead, aware that the distinction of firing the first rounds in earnest was to be his and being doubly anxious, therefore, to make them effective. He first saw the enemy in the afternoon of 12 April: a long convoy of vehicles with flashing windscreens about 10 miles beyond the river. Just before dusk some 30 vehicles broke away from the convoy and headed towards the bridge. Bevan decided to open fire on them when they debouched from the nearest village on the way to the bridge. The nearest of Divisional Cavalry were not far from this point and so Bevan added 1000 yards to the range. The first round was, as Bevan says, ‘right for range’. Correcting the line, the next fell on the road. Divisional Cavalry stated afterwards that it fell among the vehicles, but from farther back and in the failing light Bevan could not be sure. The column withdrew and he ceased fire. The gun sergeant was McCarthy
[9] and the layer Bombardier Tebbutt. [10]

e troop, 5 field regiment, 12–13 april

Next morning, after a quiet start, a detachment of mortars took up position in an open field. Bevan waited a quarter of an hour and then opened fire, damaging one of the lorries there for certain and possibly another. A general attack against the rearguard at once began. The Divisional Cavalry, well covered by the stopbanks of the Aliakmon, held its fire; but Bevan engaged mortars and transport freely and effectively. Every time the enemy mortars opened fire he silenced them quickly, a splendid performance at ranges up to well over 10,000 yards. When troops came up to the river near the demolished road and tried to cross on floats, both the Cavalry and the field gunners engaged them, causing heavy loss. For E Troop it was a difficult target indeed, as the river was no wider than 100 yards and the Cavalry were close up to the southern bank. Only a gunner with the skill and confidence of Tom Bevan would have ordered fire under these circumstances at a range of 10,000 yards with the mean point of impact on the far bank. Yet not one round fell among the Cavalry. Bevan's OP was shelled throughout the morning; but the main gun position seemed beyond the enemy's range and the three guns were therefore undisturbed by return fire.

At 1.30 p.m. Bevan was ordered to withdraw. The guns were able to do so without incident; but the Bren carrier of the OP party shed a track while on the skyline in full view of the enemy and the party had a lively time getting it back on. As they left a reconnaissance aircraft fired a few parting shots at them. Back at Sfendhami, Bevan learned that E Troop had destroyed two armoured cars at a range of 9100 yards. There the rearguard stayed until the morning, when the enemy attacked again, having bridged the river and got tanks across. E Troop fired a five-minute concentration on the advancing enemy while the OP party raced back a few hundred yards ahead of the tanks. A withdrawal was again ordered, the guns were quickly hooked on to their tractors, and the rearguard made off along the road to Katerini. There it halted and E Troop got its guns into action with an OP nearly a mile ahead and prepared to fire. At the last moment the order came to move back; Bevan switched the guns to fire on an open field and ‘emptied guns’. By night E Troop was back in the Olympus Pass, to take up the positions prepared for it. No casualties had occurred among the gunners in this their first action of the war.

[8]
Maj T. H. Bevan, DSO, m.i.d.; Onehunga; born London, 27 May 1909; builder; wounded 17 Dec 1942.

[9]
Sgt W. F. McCarthy; born Te Kuiti, 13 Mar 1916; labourer; died of wounds 21 May 1941.

[10]
Sgt R. H. Tebbutt; Auckland; born Towai, 5 Dec 1899; railway shunter; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Desperate Fighting at Platamon

Desperate Fighting at Platamon

The Division now prepared to do battle on the Olympus line. At Platamon on the right 21 Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel

Macky
[11]) and A Troop of the 5th Field under Lieutenant Williams
[12] had been led to expect only a light attack and perhaps none at all. The approach from the north was thought to be too difficult for a large force, though A Troop had used it without great difficulty. The guns were sited in Headquarters Company area, just south-east of the tunnel and the old Venetian fortress that capped the rock above it. Inland was the large village of Pandeleimon and to the north-west Skotina. Between them the infantry companies stretched in an arc up into the thickly wooded foothills of Mount Olympus. The OP was by the ruined fortress.

21 battalion at platamon, 14–16 april 1941

The attack that developed was far stronger than anything that had been envisaged and stronger than 21 Battalion could expect to hold. The first sign of it was a little before 7 p.m. on 14 April, when the OP spotted a German patrol quite close to the tunnel. ‘How they managed to get so close without being seen by us or the infantry will always be a mystery’, says Lieutenant Paterson
[13] of A Troop. The guns at once opened fire and drove the enemy back out of sight among the olive trees below. Then A Troop engaged vehicles, with tanks apparently among them, which could now be seen farther off. ‘The men behaved very well and the drivers and spare men did extremely good work carrying ammunition’, Paterson adds. A German report mentions ‘heavy, accurate shell fire’ at this stage; but too much must not be read into this and similar reports, as the Germans were inclined to magnify the opposition so as to play up their own achievements when reporting to higher authority. There can be no denying, however, that the fire of A Troop was effective.

The Germans thought even next morning that the position was only lightly held. They therefore attacked with only a motor-cycle battalion and it was soon pinned down by infantry fire and by the guns. A Troop was busy. One shoot was conducted on targets that could only be seen by the infantry on the left flank, and an infantry officer corrected the fall of shot in rough-and-ready fashion, though to good effect. By the afternoon a tank battalion had reached the front and tried to attack; but the going was bad and it made slow progress. The guns harassed all movement below, including that of the tanks, and they were joined in this by the battalion mortars, anti-tank rifles and machine guns. At dusk, however, a medium troop or battery opened fire on the OP and guns, killing one gunner and wounding four others. [14] A Troop returned this fire until shellbursts cut communications with the OP.

Defensive fire by night had been provided for and when enemy tanks passed through the ‘SOS night lines’, as they were called, A Troop brought down fire on the prearranged plan. Had the gunners been more certain that their targets were armoured they would have left the cap on their HE 117 fuses, thereby imposing a delay which, though very slight, would have made penetration of armour more likely. As it was they took the cap off; but even so the infantry reported next morning that several tanks and armoured cars had been put out of action. They caught the German force moving out towards the left flank and again when it returned.

A heavier attack started up soon after dawn on the 16th, above the tunnel and away to the left on the mountainside. A Troop was soon in difficulties. It was heavily outgunned and enemy tanks, mortars and artillery brought heavy fire to bear on the hill from which the OP was trying to operate, wreathing the ruined castle in smoke. Tanks came up the rough mule-track which ascended the hill, but several shed tracks or suffered other damage from the rocks, and others ran on to mines laid by the sappers (whose demolition of the tunnel itself had created less of an obstruction than had been hoped). Ammunition for the 25-pounders was running low and many tempting targets had to be neglected. Derelict tanks blocked the approach of others behind them; but the situation was deteriorating because of infiltration through the infantry positions and an outflanking movement on the left. In case the tanks did overcome their difficulties (there was in fact a mistaken report that they had broken through), the Gun Position Officer of A Troop (Paterson) reconnoitred emergency anti-tank positions for the guns. His communications with the OP were highly uncertain. The telephone line kept getting broken, the wireless was out of order, and the lamp station was shelled heavily. With little time to spare, Colonel Macky had ordered a general withdrawal through the Pinios Pass to the south—the Vale of Tempe of ancient times—and the OP party came racing back to the gun position, then under accurate shellfire. The enemy had reached the ruins and was clearing the anti-tank mines; but the going was too bad for immediate exploitation of this success. The guns came out under fire, but without harm: ‘every man behaved with great coolness’, Paterson remarks, ‘and there were no casualties’. Fortunately, although many enemy aircraft passed overhead, A Troop was not bombed.

The great surprise of the fighting at Platamon—apart from the size of the enemy force committed there—had been the skill and ingenuity of the German alpine troops in making their way through what had been considered practically impassable country and outflanking the defence, and this at once raised the problem of where to attempt to fight another rearguard action to hold them up. Though the Vale of Tempe itself was narrow and steep and might be defended against tanks, the alpine troops would surely work their way over the lower slopes of Mount Olympus to cut off the rearguard. The corps in which the New Zealand Division was fighting had been renamed Anzac Corps on 12 April—a sentimental gesture—and the Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA), Brigadier C. A. Clowes, had come forward to see for himself how serious the situation was. Anzac Corps Headquarters was worried about the unexpectedly heavy pressure along the coast, which threatened to outflank the whole corps position. Clowes and Macky discussed the matter and decided to try to hold the western or upstream end of the Pinios Gorge.

The gunners meanwhile had to get their guns across the river. A bridge near the mouth had already been demolished and a pontoon that was the only alternative was too light to carry the guns, though it could take 15-cwt trucks. These were therefore ferried across and the guns manhandled through the river. The only road through the gorge ran along the southern bank and the light trucks towed the guns along it. The quads and gun-limbers and the Bren carriers could not get across either way and had to venture along the single-track railway, running five miles along the sleepers, through two tunnels, and over the railway bridge at Tempe at the other end of the gorge. This bridge was then demolished.

By the evening of 16 April 21 Battalion and A Troop were at Tempe and began to prepare a defence of the western end of the gorge. Clowes had pointed out how vital it was to hold up the enemy here until the 19th and steps had been taken to reinforce this rearguard; but the situation remained critical.

[11]
Lt-Col N. L. Macky, MC, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 20 Feb 1891; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (Capt, 1918); CO 21 Bn Jan 1940-May 1941.

[12]
Maj L. G. Williams, m.i.d.; Upper Hutt; born Christchurch, 2 Jun 1909; draughtsman; wounded and p.w. 21 May 1941; repatriated 1943.

[13]
Capt N. Paterson; Auckland; born Dunedin, 27 May 1914; insurance agent.

[14]
Gnr A. K. Worthington killed and Gnrs W. T. Channings, R. L. Gaskin, R. Rennie and R. A. Wade wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Crest Clearance on the Cloudy Slopes of Olympus

Crest Clearance on the Cloudy Slopes of Olympus

In the Olympus Pass fighting had been going on since 11 o'clock at night on 14 April, when the first adventurous thrust by German motor-cyclists was repulsed by the infantry. The battle that developed was very different, from the artillery point of view, from that which had been planned. Instead of a solid defence by two field regiments, the 4th and 5th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson, with the 4th Field covering the Maoris on the left, only the 5th Field (less A Troop) under Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser remained to meet the assault. The tremendous labours of 26 Battery to get Nolan's D Troop up to its mountain aerie proved to be wasted. At short notice on the 14th 25 Battery was ordered to pull out its guns and hasten southwards and then round to the west to reinforce an Australian brigade— Savige Force—on the way to Kalabaka, and meet a German advance from Florina which menaced the left flank of Anzac Corps. A few hours later RHQ of the 4th Field and 26 Battery were ordered back to join 6 Brigade at Elasson in Force Reserve. After Parkinson left, the 5th Field collected as many vehicles as it could and loaded them with ammunition left behind by the 4th Field, carrying it over 25 rough miles to Elasson. The men concerned were expected to make only one journey; but by a misunderstanding they carried on right through the night, making two and in some cases three round trips and clearing the whole of the ammunition. They were worn out by the time they finished; but their zeal provided an invaluable supply for a rearguard action a few days later on which the safety of Anzac Corps depended.

The weather in the pass had been bad: days of drenching rain and some snow, with bitter cold in the higher positions. Wisps of white mist curled everywhere among the spurs and often reached down below the pass road, so that visibility was poor and played many tricks on the FOOs of the 5th Field. Observation posts had been selected with great care; but when the weather cleared on the 14th, and particularly on the 15th, defects became uncomfortably obvious. Several ‘dead areas’ of vision were disclosed only by the sudden emergence of enemy parties from them, some of them unpleasantly close. The mists, moreover, had prevented the prior measurement of crest clearances—always the bugbear of gunnery in mountain country—and there were awkward and sometimes dangerous revelations of the inability of some guns to clear crests in front of them.

The front the 5th Field now had to cover unaided was under the circumstances long and difficult. It was easy to engage the enemy thrusting along the road in the morning of 15 April, and D and F Troops registered zones of fire and were soon landing effective concentrations of shellfire on infantry and vehicles; 27 Battery was even better placed for this, but could not join in because its lines to OPs were cut (by Fifth Columnists, some gunners believed). But the ground in front of 23 Battalion was so tortuous and so frequently veiled with mist that it was hard to bring down useful fire. The gunners were very grateful, however, for two blessings: no counter-battery fire was directed at them and none of the many bombers that passed overhead paid them any attention. The worst troubles this day were in clearing the crests in front of B and C Troops on the knife-edge ridge. B Troop fired three rounds at one stage which hit the hilltop and the base of one of them rebounded, narrowly missing Lieutenant Stanford, [15] GPO of C Troop, in his command post. German artillery opened fire late in the afternoon; but none of the rounds fell anywhere near the guns. Perhaps the crest-clearance troubles were compensated for by a parallel difficulty on the enemy side of locating and engaging the New Zealand guns.

Before it was fully light on the 16th a very much heavier action began. A thrust against 22 Battalion was halted well short of the infantry by machine guns and shellfire; but it served to cover the setting up of mortars which could not at first be located from the OPs. A party under Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser himself therefore went out to set up a forward OP, and by wireless it brought down fire from 28 Battery which silenced the mortars. Tanks hitherto hidden among the trees below then advanced unexpectedly. Fraser, controlling the fire of E Troop, ordered a quick switch of line, boldly reduced the range, and ordered 10 rounds of gun fire. The results were most satisfactory. The shells and tanks met and the attack broke up. One wrecked tank remained behind. Other targets on this front—tanks, troop-carriers, staff cars, mortars, and infantry guns, with occasional bodies of infantry—were engaged throughout the day. But the main effort of the enemy in the afternoon was by infantry on both flanks. On the left the Maoris had been greatly handicapped by swirling mist; but this cleared in midafternoon to give them a clear view of the advancing enemy and the 5th Field guns soon came to their support. It was not until dusk, when the Germans made a most determined attack on a Maori platoon, that there was any real danger to the left; and this was soon overcome.

On the right 23 Battalion suffered a thickening of the mists in the afternoon when the danger was greatest and it was hard to find out what was happening and to provide support. Whenever the enemy tried to concentrate his strength for a decisive thrust, however, the guns found him and put paid to his scheme.

On the knife-edge ridge the eight gun teams of 27 Battery (under Sergeants Penk, [16]
Clark, [17] Gunn, [18]
McIntyre, [19] Dolamore, [20]
Nicholass, [21]
Ames
[22] and Tavendale
[23]), crowded together, worked until their backs ached. By the end of the day the 5th Field had fired more than 3000 rounds—not a great amount by later standards, but for the type of action and under the circumstances it represented much hard work. Support for 5 Brigade had not been powerful in terms of weight of fire; but it had been incontestably effective, as the German battle reports amply confirm. The gunnery had been flexible, well-timed and accurate.

Orders had been issued during the day for 5 Brigade to withdraw as soon as it got dark. As the two troops on the knife-edge ridge did so they were mortared and shelled; but the ridges which had hampered them during the day now protected them and they emerged unharmed. Driving through a pitch-black night, the gunners of 27 Battery passed through the lines of 28 Battery (which had F Troop dangerously far forward at this stage, almost in the new front line) and on to Kokkinoplos, a village off the main road near the south-western end of the Olympus Pass. F Troop in due course retired; but the other two troops of 28 Battery stayed in position near Ay Dhimitrios until 3 a.m. on the 17th, by which time all the infantry using the pass road had gone through.

The three 2-pounders of 32 Anti-Tank Battery which had been sited in the 22 Battalion area beside the pass road had no difficulty in getting back when the infantry withdrew; but the fourth one which was on the right of the area and the eight guns with 23 Battalion were all dependent on the construction of a so-called Back Road which was far from completion when the time came to withdraw. None of these guns had had occasion to fire a shot in the course of the action and the prospect of losing nine out of twelve of the complement of a battery under such circumstances appalled all the anti-tankers, including the second-in-command of the regiment, Major Oakes, a man of exceptional energy and determination. Oakes therefore decided that the seemingly impossible task of getting the nine guns away should be attempted. It meant manhandling them through a stream and over a steep shoulder to Kokkinoplos in the black of night. Oakes came forward before dark with a party from his own RHQ, Lieutenant Neale
[24] and the men of 15 LAD with ropes and tackle, and when the time came he mustered all possible help from 32 Battery. No progress at all could be made, however, except with three guns, which were dragged, carried, pushed and in other ways struggled with until they were got to a point about halfway to Kokkinoplos. Beyond this it was humanly impossible to move them. The effort failed. All the gunners had managed to salvage were the telescopes and they could do no more than scramble up the rocks and then down to the village. Some of them joined A Company of 23 Battalion for the time being and served as infantry. Others were so exhausted when they reached the village that they fell fast asleep. But Oakes would not rest until he had replaced essential clothing and equipment (other than the irreplaceable guns) and he occupied himself with this task for three further days, working himself to such a point of exhaustion that at the end of it he sat down on a rock in pouring rain and fell asleep.

F Troop of the 5th Field remained, with the three guns of 32 Anti-Tank Battery which had withdrawn from the 22 Battalion area, at Ay Dhimitrios with two companies of infantry as a little rearguard covering the additional demolitions made after 5 Brigade withdrew, while 23 Battalion held the ridge above Kokkinoplos. They were to stay there until dark on 17 April; but Freyberg decided not to wait so long and sent lorries to pick up the infantry in the afternoon. In the middle of the afternoon enemy infantry began to advance in neat order along the road towards the rearguard; but shells from F Troop struck them accurately and they did not persist in their advance. Covered by mists, the last of the rearguard on the pass road withdrew, the field guns last of all. The 23 Battalion rearguard, however, had a sharp skirmish above Kokkinoplos before withdrawing and some of the 32 Battery ‘infantillery’ were involved, though they suffered no harm.

[15]
Maj R. J. Stanford
London; born Palmerston North, 10 Jul 1917; continuity writer.

[16]
Lt B. A. Penk; Auckland; born Auckland, 25 May 1919; clerk.

[17]
Sgt W. J. Clark; Auckland; born Auckland, 22 Nov 1916; wood turner.

[18] 2 Lt A. D. J. Gunn; born NZ 11 May 1910; mental nurse.

[19]
Sgt H. K. McIntyre; born NZ 8 Jun 1917; labourer; wounded and p.w. Apr 1941.

[20] Sgt J. B. Dolamore; born Gore, 1 Feb 1915; Regular soldier; twice wounded; killed in action (drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina), 5 Dec 1941.

[21]
WO II C. W. Nicholass, MBE; Henderson; born England, 10 Apr 1911; motor assembler.

[22]
Sgt K. S. Ames; Otaki; born Wellington, 8 Jun 1908; accountant; wounded May 1941.

[23]
Capt W. J. S. Tavendale; Palmerston North; born Palmerston Nth, 2 Jan 1914; Regular soldier; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[24]
Lt J. W. Neale; Wellington; born New Plymouth, 3 Aug 1909; salesman.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Dominant Position above Servia

A Dominant Position above Servia

The action in the Servia Pass, concurrent with that in the Olympus Pass, was different in two vital respects: the Germans there were better supplied with guns and used them vigorously and they were strongly supported by the Luftwaffe. The first sign of the enemy there had been in the morning of 11 April, when three Yugoslav aircraft flying over attracted anti-aircraft fire from somewhere near Kozani. In the same direction next day OPs reported signs of bombing. In the afternoon of the 12th snow began to fall in the pass, and that night and next morning withdrawing Australians crossed the Aliakmon and came up through 4 Brigade, looking as though they had had a hard time. Enemy transport was seen in the distance in the afternoon and the Aliakmon bridge was demolished. The Servia positions began to be attacked from the air, but with little effect at first. Soon the 60-pounders of 7 Medium Regiment, RA, were firing at transport in the distance. Both medium and field guns took the opportunity to register targets and prepare range cards. After dark they fired intermittently on the bridge and on the road past it to the town of Servia. The brilliant flashes, each lighting for an instant the tense crew, and the echoing and re-echoing among the hills of the gun fire and of the distant burst of shell, building up at times until the air seemed to tremble, made this a dramatic experience for gunners in their first action.

This firing proved to be well placed and timed; for a pontoon bridge was seen near the site of the demolished bridge at day-light and was soon destroyed by B Troop of the 6th Field from its forward position. The enemy then opened systematic counter-battery fire, probably with 150-millimetre medium field howitzers. For more than an hour he bombarded the forward troop of the medium regiment, then each troop of the 6th Field in turn was given 20 minutes of concentrated attention, though it did no harm. The history of 7 Medium Regiment does not mention this, but it records that one man was killed and three wounded by bombing on the 14th. Positions had been chosen with care and were well-protected. Small parties of infantry and groups of vehicles were seen at various times and shelled with obvious effect; for observation was excellent. At one stage C Troop under Captain Lambourn
[25] was asked to fire ‘off the map’ in support of 19 Battalion and did so with good results.

The guns of 31 Anti-Tank Battery had so far been distributed between the two forward battalions, the 18th and 19th. In the afternoon C Troop was detached to support 20 Battalion in positions on the left overlooking the village of Rimnion and the higher reaches of the Aliakmon River.

After another active night, with the enemy guns this time also taking part, the morning of the 15th started with a sensational incident in the 19 Battalion area when two German companies, with two captured Greeks on horseback, sauntered through the lines and up the pass road for some distance before they were recognised as Germans and not, as had first been thought, refugees. Almost all were killed or captured, with many of the latter wounded.

The day became one of almost incessant attack from the air by diving Stukas or low-flying Messerschmitts. Each big raid was taken to be the prelude to an attack on the Servia defences; but none came. The only moves on the ground were small and easily repulsed. Several attempts to replace the bridge over the Aliakmon were frustrated by shellfire. Though the field and medium guns seemed to be engaged on tasks of small consequence, their fire created a deep impression on the German command. What had at first been taken to be a lightly-held position was now regarded as almost impregnable, and the main effort was therefore diverted away from Servia to an outflanking movement far to the west. The field gunners suffered only one minor casualty this day; but the anti-tank gunners, shelled and bombed mercilessly, suffered the loss of a sergeant and two gunners killed and a lance-bombardier wounded [26] in the crew of one of the C Troop guns which was supporting 20 Battalion.

Heavy mists on the 16th kept the Luftwaffe quiet, but did nothing to silence the German guns. This day, more than any other, they plastered a certain road bend in the 19 Battalion area which inevitably earned the nickname of Hellfire Corner. Lieutenant-Colonel Weir's command increased for the space of a few hours almost to the strength of a divisional artillery by the arrival in the morning of 2/3 Australian Field Regiment and 64 Medium Regiment, RA, from Vevi. The extremely rugged ground behind the field guns, however, permitted little scope for deploying medium guns and only one battery went into position: a 4-5-inch troop and a 6-inch howitzer troop. Brigadier Miles arrived in the afternoon, however, and sent the Australian regiment back that night to Elasson, and the 6-inch howitzer troop, which was short of ammunition, he sent to Dhomokos Pass, far to the south. It was at least as hard to get these weighty weapons out as it had been to get them into action and it was 3 a.m. on the 17th before they got away. The other troop of 64 Medium Regiment moved, on Miles's instructions, to Dhomenikon, a few miles past Elasson.

The plan at this stage was to withdraw the 6th Field after dark on the 17th; but the day dawned so mistily and enemy observation was so restricted that Brigadier Puttick of 4 Brigade suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel Weir that an earlier start might be made. Rain had set in, the ground was getting muddier all the time, and Weir was not looking forward to the task of getting the guns out in the black of night. So E Troop began to move at 1 p.m. Three tractors had to be winched to each gun and it took more than two hours to get the four guns on to firm land. Rain on top of the melting snow had turned the gun position into a morass. Each troop in turn of anti-tank, field and medium guns was thus laboriously withdrawn in the course of the afternoon until only A Troop of the 6th Field was left. All but the anti-tank guns continued to fire until the last moment and the enemy responded. By the time A Troop's turn came the clouds were lifting. The four guns were near a good track and little trouble had been expected. The first two came out under fire and the other two stayed with reduced crews. Hurrying to get these last two out before the clouds deserted them entirely, the gunners managed to get them out of their pits and into the open. Then the sky cleared with dramatic suddenness, fully exposing the two guns to the enemy observers. Gun fire was concentrated on them and they were in imminent danger of destruction. Two drivers, Gunners

Tombleson
[27] and Bunton, [28] took their quads over the ridge, with shells splashing around them, and ‘with great skill and coolness manoeuvred their tractors under heavy fire … and succeeded in bringing both guns and detachments out safely’. [29]

Concurrently with this arduous work by the gunners, the signalmen undid five days' hard labour by reeling in telephone wires, which meant more scrambling over slippery rocks under fire. The anti-tank gunners, too, had had to get some of their guns out under fire, in some cases small-arms and mortar fire; and at the end of it they had to drive round Hellfire Corner in full view of the enemy. All but the last of the anti-tank guns had got on to the pass road by 8 p.m. and started on a long journey south which took them as far as Pharsala by daybreak.

[25]
Lt-Col A. E. Lambourn, DSO, ED; Petone; born Aust., 7 May 1906; clerk; 2 i/c 6 Fd Regt Sep 1942–Jun 1943; CO 32 Fd Regt Jun 1943–Mar 1944; 7 A-Tk Regt Mar-May 1944.

[26]
Sgt L. C. Clews and Gnrs J. H. Cosson and L. J. Petersen killed and L-Bdr N. Dougan wounded.

[27]
Gnr T. W. J. Tombleson, MM; Matawai, Gisborne; born Gisborne, 21 May 1917; sheep farmer.

[28]
Gnr R. W. Bunton, MM; Ashburton; born Tasmania, 9 Aug 1916; tractor driver; wounded 23 Nov 1942.

[29] Extract from the joint citation for the award of a Military Medal to each of the drivers.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

26 Battery at Kalabaka

26 Battery at Kalabaka

As 5 Brigade withdrew from the Olympus Pass and 4 Brigade from the Servia Pass, and as a critical rearguard action developed at the Tempe end of the Pinios Gorge, the front to the west was reported to be crumbling and it was there, to yet another rearguard force, that 25 Battery of the 4th Field had been sent post-haste from the Olympus area late on 14 April. This battery, under Major Lewis, [30] had departed at such short notice that one OP party, that of Captain Nicholson
[31] of B Troop, had been left behind. Lewis was to travel by way of Elasson and Trikkala to Kalabaka and link up there with 17 Australian Brigade which, with 1 British Armoured Brigade, had to guard the vulnerable left flank of Anzac Corps. He took the western of the two roads south from Elasson to Tirnavos, and halfway branched off westwards again along a rough track to a little wooden bridge over the Pinios River and then to Sin Thomai on the Larisa- Trikkala road. On the way he joined up with the reconnaissance party of the battery of 64 Medium Regiment, including the regimental commander, under whose command Lewis placed himself. The CO took Lewis and his troop commanders ahead to reconnoitre gun positions, and Captain Veale
[32] was left in charge of 25 Battery with orders to meet Lewis a mile south-east of Kalabaka.

The Pinios Gorge Action. 17–18 April 1941

Away from the clouded hills it was a night of bright moonlight and 25 Battery was bombed several times by single aircraft patrolling the road to Trikkala. A motor-cyclist travelling with his tail light on was machine-gunned for his folly and was lucky to escape injury. These were rare incidents; for the Luftwaffe was seldom active by night over the New Zealand Division in Greece. The only damage was a few shattered windscreens. The road was well-surfaced at first; but after Trikkala it was flanked by swampland, so that vehicles could not pull off the road to pass the crowds of refugees moving along it in the opposite direction. Progress therefore became slow. Several times Captain Veale had to take firm action, to the point of threatening with his revolver, to clear the road and keep his column moving.

The guns went into position in the morning of the 15th around a church in the village of Aimnades, just south-east of Kalabaka. Unessential vehicles and men went back under an Australian officer to an area in the rear. Gun tractors and other troop vehicles were hidden in orchards and scrub within a quarter of a mile of the guns and about half a dozen other trucks containing food, ammunition and other stores were left with the battery captain at the rendezvous.

So far the gunners were very much in the dark about the move. Now they learned that the threat to the left flank of Anzac Corps was not as great as had been feared. On the Venetikos, a tributary of the Aliakmon, 1 British Armoured Brigade was stationed south-west of Grevena and 20 miles from Kalabaka, attacked from the air, hampered by refugees, but out of touch with enemy ground forces, which were still being delayed by Greek forces far to the north-west. Only part of 17 Australian Brigade, known as Savige Force, was in position at Kalabaka, and the medium battery and New Zealand field battery came under the command of the Australian, Brigadier S. Savige. There was no immediate threat except of air attack.

The valley of the Pinios narrowed just north of Kalabaka and the infantry of Savige Force was disposed across this steep-walled defile with the guns in support. Observation posts for the field guns were on the steep hills north of the town and ammunition was plentiful. An effort to get a truck across the river to equip an OP for better observation of the left flank failed, a wireless set was dropped in the water, and the men got thoroughly soaked.

The scene was like a fairyland. The cliffs looked like pipe organs and several monasteries topped them at dizzy heights. The river seemed to climb steeply into the hills to the west. Refugees still streamed through, many of them in uniform. Rain fell in a steady downpour and vehicles had to be moved frequently to stop from sinking into the ground. There was no dodging air attack when it came; but the gunners suffered no harm from it. On the contrary, when a German aircraft crashed nearby the New Zealanders captured the pilot and handed him over to the medium regiment.

The 1st Armoured Brigade began to retreat through Savige Force on 16 April and most of it had gone by 4 p.m. on the 17th, when Major Lewis was ordered to withdraw at 7.30 p.m. These orders were suddenly changed, however, because of an experiment by New Zealand sappers on the bridge over the Pinios which was to be used for the withdrawal. A whole span fell as a result and Savige Force could not use this bridge.

The first reaction was that the force must stay and fight, since there was no alternative route. The 4th Field men therefore camped for the night. Lewis, who had not used this bridge to get to Kalabaka, took the matter further and returned at 1.30 a.m. on the 18th with the news that Savige Force was to try to cross the little wooden bridge that 25 Battery had used on the way up. A and B Troops and what was left of Battery HQ accordingly set off, losing a limber bogged in the mud but retrieving a tractor which slipped into a ditch on the way. In due course they crossed the bridge. But shortly afterwards German bombers destroyed it and C Troop, following in the rearguard of Savige Force, had to make a still longer detour by way of Larisa to the rendezvous at Sin Thomai, where the guns took up an emergency anti-tank role. But this was not needed and 25 Battery moved with Savige Force through Larisa either late on the 18th or in the very early hours of the 19th and along the road to Pharsala.

[30]
Maj H. M. Lewis; London; born Wanganui, 27 Dec 1908; company secretary.

[31]
Lt-Col S. W. Nicholson, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 22 Feb 1914; customs agent; CO 5 Fd Regt Oct-Nov 1944; 7 A-Tk Regt Dec 1944-Mar 1945; 6 Fd Regt Mar-May 1945.

[32]
Maj L. H. Veale, ED; Wellington; born Christchurch, 1 Nov 1911; insurance clerk; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

‘Action Front: Tanks!’

‘Action Front: Tanks!’

Two more rearguards still existed and both had had fighting to do, some of it difficult: 6 Brigade at Elasson and the force at Tempe. The action at Elasson, however, had been preceded by a quick, sharp engagement at the crossroads of Elevtherokhorion in the hills just to the north. Another Duff Force had been formed to cover the withdrawals from the Olympus and Servia passes and its operations were co-ordinated with rearguard operations by the Divisional Cavalry in close co-operation with 34 Anti-Tank Battery with its 2-pounder portées.

the rearguard at elevtherokhorion, morning 18 april

N Troop portées had gone to Dheskati, south-west of Servia, with B Squadron on the 15th and covered the retreat of 26 Battalion and many Australians. They returned in the night 17–18 April and were some miles short of Elasson at dawn. The second Duff Force consisted of Duff's RHQ, 34 Anti-Tank Battery less N Troop, a machine-gun company and the three carrier platoons of 6 Brigade. It assembled at Elevtherokhorion in the night 16–17 April, covering the junction of the Olympus and Servia Pass roads, and was reinforced next day by Divisional Cavalry less B Squadron. The Cavalry armoured-car troop, however, was rushed away to Tempe. Duff Force then disbanded, leaving O Troop of 34 Anti-Tank Battery with C Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, north of the crossroad and P Troop with A Squadron at the road junction.

O Troop under Second-Lieutenant Harding
[33] clashed with the enemy, led by motor-cyclists and tanks, from the Olympus Pass, while breakfast was cooking on the 18th. The gun O4 under Bombardier Titley
[34] backed up a crest and with its second shot sent a tank plunging into a ditch. [35] The Brengunner of the gun team and a Cavalry Bren carrier drove the motor-cyclists back. A moment later Titley was badly wounded. Harding ordered the gun to withdraw and it was followed by heavy but inaccurate fire. The gun O3 commanded by Sergeant Stobie
[36] then took up the fight at 1400 yards' range and Stobie kept raising his sights until he hit a tank at an estimated 2100 yards, a remarkable performance with the little 2-pounder. The portée then got bogged in mud and had to be abandoned, the gun-crew getting back on foot.

C Squadron and the other three portées then withdrew to the road junction and a bridge near it was demolished when tanks were within 50 yards. P Troop with A Squadron then took up the fight. Three of its four guns fired and between them they inflicted considerable loss on the enemy vanguard. Exact figures are now unobtainable, since no adequate enemy record has been found and many of the crews concerned were killed or captured. Bombardier Bellringer's [37] gun fired first and the survivors of his crew (all of whom were captured) later claimed two tanks disabled for certain and a third damaged. Sergeant Fowler's [38] gun, with Lance-Bombardier Pavey [39] as layer, was credited with four tanks, two armoured cars and a heavy lorry; it got out safely. Sergeant Cutbush's [40] gun fired with obviously good effect, but could not be withdrawn because its coupling hook broke. Seeing this and realising that the gun was in danger of being captured in working order, Gunner Schultz
[41] dashed back on foot under heavy fire and removed the firing mechanism—an act which gained him an MM. In this brief but hot exchange of fire two anti-tank gunners were killed (one of them Bellringer) and five captured, three of them wounded. Their efforts were well rewarded in terms of losses inflicted on the enemy; but they could not impose much delay, for there was a passable ford to the flank which the enemy soon discovered and used.

Divisional Cavalry ordered a retreat and the little rearguard quickly moved back to Elasson. There it was soon joined by B Squadron and N Troop from Dheskati, who arrived unaware of the excitement, but in time to experience a sharp divebombing attack on the town. The first Stuka to come down at them with siren blaring met fire from the Lewis guns of Divisional Cavalry and the Bren guns of the anti-tankers and it failed to pull out of its dive. The commander of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, Major Jenkins, and Second-Lieutenant ‘Toby’ Lewis
[42] of N Troop were wounded in the bombing, though they stayed in action, two gunners were killed outright, and a third gunner died on the journey to hospital, gallantly joking to the last about his terrible wounds. [43] Major Jenkins's car was destroyed. Shortly afterwards the bridge at Elasson was demolished and the troops there raced across the little valley to the south and up into the area of the 6 Brigade rearguard which had been waiting overnight.

6 brigade rearguard action at elasson, 18 april 1941

[33]
Maj A. F. Harding, MC; Wellington; born Wanganui, 27 Nov 1916; accountant; wounded 25 Nov 1941.

[34]
Bdr K. Titley; born Awatoto, 22 Dec 1916; mechanic; wounded and p.w. Apr 1941; safe in EgyptNov 1943; died in England, 9 Feb 1961.

[35] The first tank knocked out by 7 A-Tk Regt. The shot was fired by Gnr H. C. Stoddart.

[36]
WO II R. Stobie; born Kirkcaldy, Scotland, 20 Dec 1900; labourer; wounded 5 Dec 1941.

[37]
Bdr T. C. Bellringer; born NZ 19 Jun 1909; journalist; killed in action 18 Apr 1941.

[38]
Lt A. C. Fowler; Tauranga; born Teddington, England, 28 Jun 1909; builder's foreman.

[39] 2 Lt J. Pavey; born England, 18 Jul 1911; farm manager; died Timaru, 9 Sep 1953.

[40]
Sgt W. J. Cutbush; Christchurch; born Ross, 6 Feb 1909; clerk; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

[41]
Sgt C. N. Schultz, MM; Christchurch; born Dunedin, 19 Jan 1916; bootmaker; wounded 20 Apr 1941.

[42]
Lt-Col E. G. Lewis, MBE, m.i.d.; Nigeria; born NZ 26 Sep 1918; clerk; wounded 18 Apr 1941; ADOS 2 NZEF and 2 NZ Div, 1945.

[43] Gnrs R. A. Fromenton and J. McMillan were killed; Gnr N. Mackay died of wounds.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Action Overlooking Elasson

Action Overlooking Elasson

Two roads led south from Elasson, one up the steep Meneksos Pass to the south-east and the other across the valley into gentler hills. Both met later at Tirnavos on the way to Larisa. Brigadier Miles, in the course of three days of continual and exhausting travel arranging the complicated programmes for the withdrawal from the northern passes, had had to decide which of the two routes presented the greater danger to the defence and to concentrate his limited resources on that one, leaving the other more lightly defended. He rightly concluded that to hold the Meneksos Pass route needed smaller effort. In support of 25 Battalion on the other road, therefore, Miles put all available guns. Foremost was 33 Anti-Tank Battery less L Troop, and behind it 2/3 Australian Field Regiment with a 4.5-inch troop of 64 Medium Regiment under its command. The 5th Field was disposed with 27 Battery less A Troop in an anti-tank role a mile behind the front and 28 Battery in mobile reserve. The forward anti-tank strength was increased by the portées of N Troop, when these arrived from Elasson, and they took up positions on the slopes in front of the infantry. Observing parties of 1 Survey Troop had established three bearing pickets in the field gun areas.

The Australian guns started to range on the front as soon as Elasson was clear of troops. They had the use of the rounds dumped in the gun area by the 5th Field, at least 3400 rounds. With the 3000-odd rounds the Australians already possessed, they were well supplied. The 4.5-inch guns, invaluable because of their long range and weighty shells, had relatively little ammunition. They, too, fired ranging shots and then waited for targets to appear.

Both field and medium guns could bring down fairly long-range fire on the Meneksos Pass road in support of 24 Battalion there; but no close artillery support for this front could be provided and the infantry there had to rely for anti-tank support on the deterrent effect of heavy concentrations by the field guns and on a few disappointing demolitions of the road up the pass. These proved just sufficient to save them; but it was a close thing. More might have been done had Miles not received an alarming report in the morning about the Tempe battle, which suggested that 6 Brigade might be cut off by a thrust from Gonnos (south of Olympus) to Tirnavos. In consultation with Brigadier Barrowclough, he therefore despatched F Troop of the 5th Field with a carrier platoon to Tirnavos and RHQ and the rest of 28 Battery to guard the southern approaches to Larisa airfield.

Germans appeared in the defile north of Elasson at 11 a.m. and the medium guns shelled them effectively. When they reached the demolished bridge and started to work on it, the field guns engaged them. The volume of fire was impressive and it clearly delayed the enemy. Observation was excellent until late in the afternoon, when the enemy began working along the foothills towards Meneksos. Brigadier Miles personally assumed control of the artillery from the headquarters of 2/3 Regiment and ordered the Australians to keep the bridge site under fire and engage with heavy concentrations any forces that came within range. This they did splendidly, shooting with great accuracy. Lieutenant-Colonel Kippenberger
[44] of 20 Battalion, with a party of his men, had been cut off before reaching the road junction north of Elasson and had to walk back. From no-man's land he observed some of this firing. At one stage he saw 10 tanks moving until the guns engaged them and scored several direct hits at what must have been a range of more than 10,000 yards. Only six of these tanks withdrew and the crews of four were seen to climb out. Until late in the afternoon the Australian gunners gained a remarkable mastery of the battlefield.

At this stage the medium guns ran out of ammunition and withdrew. The enemy then began persistent efforts to advance towards the Meneksos Pass. The Australians offered strong opposition, but could not halt the advance, though they certainly slowed it down. German gun fire weakened towards evening and for a brief period the beautiful valley was strangely quiet. Then the enemy attacked up towards 24 Battalion at dusk. The field gunners at once sent a heavy concentration into the midst of the attacking force, compelling the lorried infantry to take cover. But the tanks came on despite the shells bursting about them like twinkling stars—as it seemed from the 25 Battalion area. The foremost of them passed the advanced platoon of infantry, but halted at the demolitions, firing wildly. Under cover of darkness the infantry got away safely.

This made it look as though Brigadier Miles was mistaken in deciding to concentrate his artillery in defence of the other road; but that approach was nevertheless over far better ‘tank country’ and the enemy would certainly have used it had he not been deterred by the strength of its defence. It offered a much quicker route to Tirnavos than the difficult one through the Meneksos Pass. Had Miles disposed his guns differently the enemy would almost certainly have broken through.

Troop by troop the Australian guns withdrew after dark, with detachments of infantry, until by about 8 p.m. none were left. They had performed splendidly and fired off 6500 rounds, a feat to which the blistered paint on their gun barrels bore witness. The portées of N Troop slowly drew back, as the force withdrew, until they reached the position of C Troop of the 5th Field, which had gone into action in a field role and taken over the defensive fire tasks of the Australian unit. Armoured cars and Bren carriers of the Divisional Cavalry waited in the rear to cover the drive to Larisa. To the anti-tank gunners the delay in moving off seemed interminable. The field guns still sent out long flashes and after long pauses the sound of the bursting shells rumbled back from the hills. Flares sent up by the advancing enemy came closer until they lit the scene with a scintillating brilliance. Then, with great agility, the gunners of C Troop ceased fire and withdrew and the portées followed, picking up the Divisional Cavalry along the road and bringing up the rear on the long drive to Larisa.

[44]
Maj-Gen Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, ED, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); born Ladbrooks, 28 Jan 1897; barrister and solicitor; 1 NZEF 1916–17; CO 20 Bn Sep 1942-Apr 1941, Jun-Dec 1941; comd 10 Bde, Crete, May 1941; 5 Bde Jan 1942-Jun 1943, Nov 1943-Feb 1944; GOC 2 NZ Div, 30 Apr-14 May 1943, 9 Feb-2 Mar 1944; comd 2 NZEF Prisoner-of-War Reception Group ( UK) Oct 1944-Sep 1945; twice wounded; Editor-in-Chief, NZ War Histories, 1946–57; died Wellington, 5 May 1957.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Tempe: A Crucial Rearguard

Tempe: A Crucial Rearguard

Lieutenant-General Blamey, commanding Anzac Corps, had been greatly perturbed by reports from Platamon on the 15th and hastened to reinforce 21 Battalion and A Troop of the 5th Field who withdrew to Tempe next day. He had not heard from his CCRA, Brigadier Clowes, when on the 16th he committed 2/2 Battalion of 16 Australian Brigade, weary from a fruitless sojourn in the mountains above Servia and many long marches associated with it. Three 2-pounders of 1 Australian Anti-Tank Regiment were also to go. Later most of the brigade was committed.

Brigadier Miles was asked to help and sent 26 Battery and L Troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson decided to go, too, with a handful of his RHQ and 9 LAD. He went on ahead with the battery captain, L. W. Thornton, [45]

and the Battery Commander, Major Stewart, [46] also made haste to get to Tempe. Parkinson, Stewart, Macky of 21 Battalion and the Australian battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F. O. Chilton, conferred after dark on the 16th. Early next morning, with Lieutenant Williams of A Troop, 5th Field, and Lieutenant Longmore
[47] of L Troop, 7th Anti-Tank, they studied the ground.

The Pinios River, flowing generally north from Larisa in a series of bends, turned eastwards to pass south of the large village of Gonnos, nestling in the craggy foothills of the Olympus massif. The road and railway from Larisa linked up with it before it plunged into the deep three-mile gorge, banked by hills rising above 2000 feet to the south and somewhat lower to the immediate north (though the hills there were backed to the north-west by Olympus itself). The narrow road ran along the southern bank and the railway was on the other side. Both had been blocked in the gorge, though not very securely. The railway bridge at Tempe at the western end was destroyed. South of Gonnos (and west of Tempe) the valley was two or three miles wide and five miles long, and if the alpine troops traversed the foothills they could extend the front dangerously far westwards for the force available, now called Allen's Force (from the name of the Australian brigadier, A. S. Allen). But possibilities like this could not weigh heavily on the minds of those who had to make the immediate decisions; for they expected the enemy to appear at any moment in the gorge itself.

The Australian unit had begun to arrive soon after dark on the 16th and 26 Battery turned up at midnight. Williams of A Troop came under Stewart's command. Between them they would have to support 21 Battalion in positions from Ambelakia in the hills on the southern side of the gorge to Tempe, and 2/2 Australian Battalion extending the line south-westwards from Tempe along the road and river and facing Gonnos.

The field guns went into action a mile south of the village of Evangelismos and three miles south of Tempe. Their location, in ploughed fields sheltered by trees and bushes and overlooked from Gonnos, was dictated by the peculiar lie of the land, which made it impossible to bring down fire on the main demolition in the gorge from any other likely position. Even so, it proved extremely hard to establish communications with observers in the gorge and elsewhere. Captain Nolan of D Troop set up an OP linked by telephone in the hills above the gorge, off the Tempe-Ambelakia road. Captain Bliss
[48] installed E Troop's OP with wireless communication due south of Tempe. Captain Richardson
[49] of F Troop went to the left flank to establish observation over the plain south of Gonnos. But none of these observers could bring down fire on a German tank that moved along the railway line in the late afternoon and drew level with the road demolition just outside the 21 Battalion area. The tank opened fire at a New Zealand platoon across the narrow gorge and the platoon withdrew to a better position higher up, after having checked German infantry at the demolished tunnel. An Australian patrol was also in the area and kept up vigorous fire.

It was essential to stop the enemy from clearing obstructions on the railway line and prevent tanks from intervening in the battle; but the field guns could do nothing until communications were working. Nolan could not see from his OP and in the end it was Major Stewart himself who brought down fire on the tank, after an exasperating delay of an hour and a half, by which time it was beginning to get dark. Little did the defenders know that the enemy had already found a place down-stream where the tanks could drive across the river. Five got safely across, though three became bogged in an unavailing effort to get past the first of the road demolitions. Infantry also got across to guard them overnight.

Alpine troops moved boldly in the hills above Tempe during the night, showing many lights, and 26 Battery challenged their audacity with gun fire. The main task fired during the night, however, was on the road block and tunnel demolition. The block was shelled every quarter-hour until 2 a.m., discouraging clearance work and causing 20 casualties among German tank crews and supporting infantry.

The next day, 18 April, was a day of crisis. Allen's Force had at all costs to delay the enemy until 6 Brigade and Savige Force passed through Larisa, and there was no knowing at this stage when they would come through. The obvious danger was from the infantry in the hills above the river and at

Gonnos and both gunners and infantry engaged them whenever possible. But there was a dangerous blind spot in the defences: the road demolition. Infantry could either cover it at close range or not at all; and at close range they would be open to heavy fire from across the narrow gorge. An artillery observer might have maintained observation without attracting such attention; but the danger was not fully realised.

What was realised, however, was that the great danger to the defence was tank attack, and the ability of the Germans to produce tanks in places considered inaccessible to them had been demonstrated at Platamon. As a general precaution, therefore, Second-Lieutenant Brown [50] of A Troop, 5th Field, and Sergeant Gunn
[51] of F Troop, 4th Field, each took a 25-pounder forward in the night north of Evangelismos to guard the straight stretch of road from there to Tempe against tank attack.

An hour after dawn Nolan directed D Troop against infantry and machine guns north of the river a mile below Tempe and Bliss directed E Troop against similar targets above Gonnos. The enemy, for his part, succeeded in making several of the 21 Battalion positions on the rather bare hillsides south of the gorge untenable and thereby partly disorganising the defence of the entrance. Later in the morning alpine troops were threatening the left flank by the village of Parapotamos, south of Gonnos; but Captain Richardson was still unable to get in touch with his guns. Eventually a Captain Porter of 2/2 Australian Battalion on this flank got through by means of a devious telephone circuit to Lieutenant Hanna
[52] at the guns and gave a layman's instructions for bringing down fire; for all the deficiencies of procedure, it was highly effective. At this, Lieutenant Clark, [53] GPO of D Troop, left his guns in the care of Second-Lieutenant Carson
[54] and went over to Porter's position, where he gained excellent observation over the left flank beyond Parapotamos and could study the development of the enemy attack southwards from Gonnos toward the river. He directed D Troop on to mortars, machine guns and groups of infantry at ranges below 5000 yards. The gunners responded excellently, hitting many snap targets without previous registration. German accounts speak of heavy artillery fire here, though only D Troop and later E Troop were engaged. Far to the west and largely out of sight of 2/2 Battalion, the enemy had crossed the river and was developing an encircling movement; but it was not strong enough to contain 2/2 Battalion and 2/3 Australian Battalion, which had arrived and was in reserve south of Evangelismos.

Something more was needed to effect a breakthrough and in the early afternoon the enemy produced it: six tanks, with infantry support, moved on past the road demolition and along the front of 21 Battalion, the companies of which were in largely self-contained pockets on the hillsides, out of touch with each other because very little communications equipment survived the retreat from Platamon.

The four 2-pounders of L Troop, 7th Anti-Tank, were all disposed between the demolished railway bridge at Tempe and a shallow demolition in the road a short distance down the gorge (though accounts naturally confuse this and the main demolition farther down-stream). The demolition was not much of an obstacle to tanks and only the 2-pounders could prevent these from reaching Tempe and moving into the good tank country beyond.

The anti-tank gunners, however, had been led to believe that tanks would appear, if at all, only on the other side, along the railway line, and were taken by surprise when the tanks suddenly appeared on their side of the river at very close range. L4 under Sergeant Cavanagh
[55] was enfiladed from the approaching tanks behind a steep spur running down to the river and was no more than 30 yards from them when they rounded the spur. But Cavanagh's gun was well hidden and, like a good anti-tanker, he held his fire so as to bring more targets within his reach. The tanks and infantry across the river then knocked out the second L Troop gun, L1 under Sergeant Quinn. [56] The tanks halted and their crews climbed out, waiting for the other tanks to arrive. When the third appeared, Cavanagh's crew went into action, after a nerve-racking wait, and fired 28 shots in quick succession at a range of about 100 yards. Two tanks burst into flames and the third was hit and believed to be disabled, though there is no confirmation of this. The gun crew was then called on to surrender; but the enemy infantry was evidently in doubt as to their exact location in the thick scrub. Realising that he could fire the 2-pounder no more with infantry so close, Cavanagh decided to make a dash for his towing truck 100 yards to the rear, and the crew reached it safely and drove to the road out of sight of the enemy. Other trucks blocked the way, however, and the anti-tankers left their own vehicle and drove the rearmost truck back into the lines of 2/2 Battalion, picking up their troop subaltern, Second-Lieutenant Paterson, [57] on the way. They were destined not to escape, however, and ended up in enemy hands, their only consolation being the sight of the two wrecked tanks at Tempe as they were taken by their captors down the gorge.

The other two L Troop guns had no such luck. Mortars and machine guns from across the river supported the oncoming tanks and infantry on the south side. Neither gun managed to fire. But a German lieutenant gained a Ritterkreuz for bravery in tackling with hand grenades an anti-tank position (perhaps meaning both guns) which fought to the last. [58] The way beyond Tempe was now open to the remaining tanks.

Nolan had managed, however, to bring down fire on them and perhaps delayed them; for they were slow to develop their attack—so slow, in fact, that the commander of the alpine troops south of Gonnos, who had not intended to make a frontal attack (being true to the old military adage, much admired by the alpine corps, that ‘Sweat saves blood’), felt constrained to do so.

The attack which started in the early afternoon was intended to open the way through Tempe for the armoured force by crossing the river and pushing on southwards. The river here was no more than 70 feet wide and five feet deep; but it was fast-flowing and treacherous to ford. As the alpine troops approached it they came under heavy fire, to which D and E

Troops of the 4th Field made a substantial contribution. Lieutenant Clark's OP with 2/2 Battalion provided a grandstand view and Captain Bliss also brought down fire until his position in the hills became threatened by the advance along the gorge road. Before he broke off and made his way back to the guns, his batteries were fading and his wireless signals hard to understand. Lieutenant Hanna then carried on with both E and F Troops, observing from a perch in a treetop by his command post. Bliss had been much impressed by the way the alpine troops formed up under fire and kept coming on through it regardless of losses.

Clark found the Australian infantry around him were thinning out alarmingly. They had every reason to do so, for the fire was thickening all the time and the enemy, having entered Parapotamos, developed covering fire from there for a further advance. Messages had been getting through to Clark for some time that 26 Battery was to move back, and finally he heard as much from Carson himself, so he made his own way back, with his OPA, Gunner Crompton. [59] They had to crawl through long grass, across an area swept by bullets, to do so.

Major Stewart made his way back to the guns some time after 4 p.m., cool and seemingly unaware that the situation was critical. The tanks were past Tempe and coming along the road to Evangelismos. He gave orders to engage them and then passed on Colonel Parkinson's order that D Troop was to move back a mile or two to support a Divisional Cavalry rearguard. Hanna, who had been directing two troops against the river crossing and then against the infantry advancing towards him until ranges were below 1000 yards, had asked for permission to withdraw to a gun position not obscured by trees so that he could take up an anti-tank role; but he did not get it. Clark arrived just as D Troop was moving back and in time to experience a sharp Stuka raid on the gun position. He took his troop back as directed, meeting Brigadier Allen on the way and finding him unsympathetic to the move. F Troop was then moved back about 200 yards in a covering position. Then Stewart went forward again and began to direct E Troop against infantry crossing the river.

The two guns which had been sent forward in an anti-tank role had held their fire. But Warrant-Officer Tasker
[60] who was with them engaged many targets with his Boys anti-tank rifle and did some effective sniping. [61] Tanks finally broke through from Tempe at about 5.30 p.m. and Second-Lieutenant Brown's two guns went into action. Franklin's [62] 5th Field gun set the leading tank on fire and then the next. The third tank then scored a lucky hit on a lorry carrying petrol and ammunition and made the vicinity of the gun so dangerous that Brown ordered the crew to withdraw. Then Gunn's 4th Field gun took up the fight and also knocked out two tanks. The third one, as Gunn's men counted them, was not so careless, and from a hull-down position fought a duel in which it had every advantage. Gunn had to move and soon ran out of armour-piercing shot. Gunner Kelly
[63] therefore went back to the original gun position to collect some HE rounds. Tasker held off infantry with a Bren gun; but a shell wounded three of Gunn's crew. [64] Those who remained could not get the gun out and in the end they had to leave it, making their way back on the F Troop tractor. What happened at this stage to the three anti-tank guns with the forward Australian battalion is not clear; but it seems likely that they suffered much the same kind of disability as the guns of L Troop: two were in re-entrants which gave them only a limited field of fire, and once detected there the enemy infantry could easily cope with them. A third withdrew and no doubt had good reason to do so.

General Freyberg had come up to see for himself what the situation was in the early afternoon and had given orders for Allen's force to effect a fighting withdrawal to Larisa, buying as much time as possible to cover 6 Brigade and Savige Force. His orders did not get through to Lieutenant-Colonel Chilton by Evangelismos, however, and much misunderstanding and some recrimination resulted.

There now began a field artillery action as skilful and thrilling as any recorded. Stewart had ordered his troops to effect a fighting retreat and they did so. They thought—wrongly it would seem from Australian records—that all of Chilton's men had withdrawn; and Chilton's remaining men, seeing them go, drew the wrong conclusions. The retreat, however, was not before time. Tanks were coming along the road towards them, with enemy infantry fanning out behind. F Troop withdrew about 2000 yards to cover E Troop, going into an anti-tank position for this purpose. Then two guns of E Troop moved 1000 yards past F, while the other two guns stayed to fight tanks at close range. Then these guns withdrew, leapfrogging back behind the others and quickly turning to face the enemy again. F Troop and the other two guns engaged tanks over open sights and gun sections broke off the action individually. They knocked out three tanks and caused many casualties among the enemy infantry; but they did not come through unscathed. Four gunners were wounded and one of them, Gunner Drinkwater
[65] of F Troop, though painfully injured, regained control of himself and drove on regardless of it, knowing that if he halted he would block the route for those following; for this he won an MM.

D Troop had gone back as ordered to join a Divisional Cavalry rearguard consisting of B Squadron under the dauntless Major Russell, [66] who had arrived in the early afternoon. Captain Thornton had taken over from Nolan when D Troop arrived and quickly registered target areas. When the Cavalry carriers scattered before the oncoming armour near Makrikhorion, Thornton called for gun fire and the gunners responded superbly, halting the advance. Some tanks received direct hits and the infantry with them reeled back. F Troop joined in and so did the Cavalry machine guns. Lieutenant Clark had picked up a useful supply of ammunition on the way back and this was decisive at this stage, when the issue was still in doubt. When the enemy finally turned back in the gathering dusk he was dangerously close to Thornton's OP.

Though the plight of 21 Battalion and most of 2/2 Australian Battalion was serious, for they were mostly scattered among the hills and greatly disorganised, their losses in terms of killed and wounded were not very heavy. With the support of their carriers, the Divisional Cavalry, and 2/3 Battalion, and of course the guns, they had achieved a purpose which, though vital, had seemed at certain stages of the afternoon to be unattainable. Enemy tank losses, not counting those lost in the river, numbered 15 and 14 more were damaged. The supporting artillery undoubtedly accounted for the bulk of these and

German accounts are most respectful of it. Though an enemy detachment had managed to block the road behind Allen's Force and was to cause much trouble during the night, Larisa had been kept clear for Savige Force and 6 Brigade, the last elements of which did not pass through until just before dawn on the 19th. The Battle of Tempe was not, perhaps, as successful as it might have been had the danger of tank attack through the gorge been more accurately assessed; but the circumstances were always difficult. Moreover, the battle certainly provided some remarkable feats of gunnery and the leapfrog withdrawal of E and F Troops will rank with anything in the long record of the Royal Regiment.

After nightfall white flares rose on three sides of Thornton's rearguard and tracers whipped across from both flanks. The OP ridge was shelled; but the guns had begun to move back and no harm was done. Alpine troops had trudged round the left flank and were far behind D Troop, their luminous bullets and pistol flares, fired in great profusion, looking like a distant firework display.

Part of this display was provided by a road-block on the way to Larisa at which several wounded gunners were captured, some of the vehicles of 9 LAD were lost, and the popular OME [67] of the 4th Field, ‘Harry’ Bauchop, [68] was killed. Things might have been much worse for the gunners had Captain Nicholson of the 4th Field not reconnoitred beforehand another way out and shepherded the vehicles along it. Most of them travelled either on tracks or cross-country to the Larisa- Volos road and then headed for Volos.

The retreating gunners learned at one stage that Colonel Parkinson was missing and were saddened by the news; for ‘Ike’ was like a father to them. But he found his way back after guiding infantry to safety and, unrecognised in the darkness, had been directing traffic.

Of its 12 guns, 26 Battery had lost two in action, another bogged in the dark on the way out, and two more before reaching Thermopylae, the present goal of the retreat. A Troop of the 5th Field had lost one in action and the other three all developed defects (in two cases a faulty tell-tale valve) and had to withdraw. The 4th Field gun lines had been shelled frequently during the day and many concentrated bombing and aerial strafing attacks were directed at them. From all this the sole casualty was one man killed by shellfire. [69] This is all the more remarkable because the guns kept firing regardless of attack, as is evident from their expenditure of ammunition: 3350 rounds (including 100 armour-piercing and 50 smoke). [70] This total was fired by a gun group which for most of the day numbered only 11 guns and therefore represents an even higher average per gun than the exceptional rate of fire maintained this day by 2/3 Australian Field Regiment overlooking Elasson.

[45]
Lt-Gen L. W. Thornton, CB, CBE, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Christ-church, 15 Oct 1916; Regular soldier; BM 6 Bde Feb-Sep 1942; GSO II 2 NZ Div Oct 1942-Jun 1943; CO 5 Fd Regt Jun-Dec 1943, Apr-Jun 1944; GSO I 2 NZ Div 1944; CRA 2 NZ Div 1945; DCGS Apr 1948-Jan 1949; QMG, Army HQ, 1955–56; Adjutant-General 1956–58; Chief of SEATO Military Planning Office, 1958–60; Chief of the General Staff, Sep 1960-Mar 1965; Chief of Defence Staff, Jul 1965–.

[46]
Col G. J. O. Stewart, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 22 Nov 1908; importer; CO 4 Fd Regt Aug 1942-Mar 1943, Dec 1943-Mar 1945; CRA 2 NZ Div 22 Feb-16 Mar 1945; wounded 3 Mar 1943.

[47]
Capt K. A. Longmore; Wellington; born NZ 15 May 1918; clerk; p.w. 23 Jul 1942.

[48]
Maj H. C. Bliss, m.i.d.; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 22 Sep 1914; dairy farmer; p.w. 22 Jul 1942.

[49]
Capt J. Richardson, ED; Auckland; born Auckland, 26 Jan 1913; salesman; wounded and p.w. 23 Nov 1941.

[50] Lt J. C. Brown; Auckland; born NZ 15 Dec 1913; departmental manager; wounded 30 Nov 1941.

[51]
Capt J. R. A. Gunn; Wellington; born Durban, Sth Africa, 20 Dec 1914; clerk; wounded 18 Apr 1941.

[52]
Lt-Col G. P. Hanna, OBE, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 21 Apr 1916; solicitor; BM 2 NZ Div Arty May-Nov 1942; GSO II 2 NZ Div Nov 1943-Jun 1944, Oct 1944-Feb 1945; GSO I (Ops) NZ Corps 9 Feb-27 Mar 1944; CO 5 Fd Regt May-Sep 1945.

[53]
Capt J. S. Clark; Auckland; born Glasgow, 27 Aug 1917; bank clerk; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[54]
Maj W. N. Carson, MC, m.i.d.; born NZ 16 Jul 1916; warehouseman; wounded May 1941; died of wounds 8 Oct 1944.

[55]
Sgt D. E. Cavanagh; Auckland; born Hamilton, 15 May 1917; commercial traveller; wounded and p.w. 18 Apr 1941.

[56]
Sgt A. Quinn; Te Awamutu; born NZ 3 May 1908; truck driver and mechanic; wounded 18 Apr 1941.

[57]
Capt T. M. Paterson, m.i.d.; born NZ 24 Dec 1912; farmer; died of wounds 16 Jul 1942.

[58] An Australian account says that one anti-tank crew here deserted its gun; but many such critical references to New Zealand operations at Tempe are found in Australian reports and they may be offset against similar criticisms of Australians by New Zealanders who fought there. Several such references from either side that can be checked are clearly misunderstandings of what actually happened. The paucity of communications between Australian and New Zealand forces at Tempe explains much. Macky, thinking the Australians had been outflanked, ordered his men to take to the hills.

[59]
Gnr B. D. Crompton; Wellington; born Patea, 13 Jul 1917; civil servant; wounded 27 May 1941; p.w. 28 May 1941.

[60]
WO II N. C. Tasker, MM; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 17 Aug 1918; letterpress apprentice; p.w. Apr 1941.

[61] Tasker's MM was partly for what he did here and partly for what he did in Crete.

[62]
Lt J. H. Franklin, MM; Napier; born Levin, 11 Oct 1918; clerk.

[63]
Gnr J. Kelly; Petone; born Auckland, 13 Mar 1910; insurance agent.

[64] Bdr ‘Tom’ Hitchings lost a foot, Gnr G. D. Stuart was also wounded in the foot, and Gnr J. W. Lichtwark was hit in the shoulder.

[65]
Sgt H. R. Drinkwater, MM; born NZ 25 Jul 1917; labourer; wounded 18 Apr 1941.

[66]
Lt-Col J. T. Russell, DSO, m.i.d.; born Hastings, 11 Nov 1904; farmer; 2 i/c Div Cav 1941; CO 22 Bn Feb-Sep 1942; wounded May 1941; killed in action 6 Sep 1942.

[67] OME = Ordnance Mechanical Engineer.

[68]
Lt H. A. Bauchop; born London, 16 Jul 1918; motor-vehicle engineer; died of wounds 20 Apr 1941.

[69]
L-Sgt J. D. W. Cardno.

[70] It was Capt Nicholson's energy and resourcefulness that made so much ammunition available. He went back to Larisa, found some in a railway siding, more in an abandoned dump, and on the way back reconnoitred the route to Volos.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Retreat to Thermopylae

Retreat to Thermopylae

The retreat to Thermopylae from the northern passes used two main routes: the main one was from Larisa through Pharsala, the Dhomokos Pass, the Fourka Pass and Lamia; the secondary one was from Larisa (or Tempe) by way of Velestinon to Volos, and then down the coast through Nea Ankhialos, Almiros and Stilis to Lamia. The Pharsala route was overtaxed and in daylight became the happy hunting ground of the Luftwaffe, which was able to range up and down it at will, bombing and strafing the vehicles, causing no great loss for the tremendous air effort involved, but displaying an insolence that was infuriating to the men of Anzac Corps and made them bitterly regret the slenderness of their anti-aircraft resources, as well as the paucity of their own air support.

The timetable of the retreat of the Divisional Artillery is roughly as follows:

Headquarters (less Brigadier Miles, who was here, there and everywhere) left Tirnavos at 9.30 on the 18th, took the Pharsala route, and reached Longos, 18 miles south-east of Molos (the focal point of New Zealand operations on the Thermopylae front), at 11.45 a.m. on the 19th. A reconnaissance group and some B Echelon transport moved independently.

4th Field: RHQ (less Parkinson and others) left Tirnavos in the morning of the 18th, drove through the night between Pharsala and Lamia, and reached Molos in the afternoon of the 19th.

25 Battery left Sin Thomai in the evening of the 18th, had a relatively quick night drive by way of Pharsala, and reached Lamia next morning.

26 Battery sent some B Echelon vehicles back before the road to Larisa was blocked and these travelled through Pharsala; the rest, including the guns, traversed swampy land to the Larisa- Volos road and reached Molos by the coast route in the afternoon of the 19th.

5th Field: RHQ, starting from 10 miles south of Larisa at 8.30 p.m. on the 18th, reached Thermopylae by way of Pharsala next afternoon.

27 Battery: A Troop sent three damaged guns back from Tempe during the 18th and the remaining men either drove to Volos, or escaped on foot through the hills, or were captured early on the 19th.

B Troop moved with leading elements of 6 Brigade from the Elasson rearguard to Volos in the evening of the 18th and reached Thermopylae next afternoon.

C Troop was last to withdraw from the Elasson action and spent part of the 19th protecting 6 Brigade on the coast road, reaching Thermopylae in the night 19–20 April.

28 Battery: BHQ and D and E Troops, given conflicting orders by Freyberg and Miles, compromised by travelling with RHQ by way of Pharsala.

F Troop left its position north-east of Tirnavos (where it was sent from the Elasson rearguard) in the evening of the 18th, reached Volos before B Troop, and Thermopylae in the afternoon of the 19th.

6th Field travelled as a unit from Servia on the 17th by way of Larisa and Pharsala and began to reach Thermopylae in the evening of the 18th. It completed its assembly there during the night 18–19 April.

7th Anti-Tank: RHQ, 32 Battery (three guns) and BHQ of 34 Battery left Tirnavos at 10 a.m. on the 18th and passed Thermopylae at 3.30 a.m. on the 19th. (Since 32 Battery had lost most of its transport at Olympus, some men travelled south by train and most of these fell into enemy hands; others rode in vehicles of 33 Battery and arrived safely.)

31 Battery travelled south with 4 Brigade from Servia. At Dhomokos A and C Troops were detached to join Lee Force
[71] and BHQ stayed with them until late on the 19th, when it drove on to Thermopylae, arriving early on the 20th. The two troops were misdirected on the 21st (when Lee Force withdrew) to the Brallos Pass and took a long detour by way of Atalandi to Molos, arriving late on the 21st with five guns (having lost two at Dhomokos and a third on the journey).

33 Battery (less L Troop lost at Tempe) travelled with 6 Brigade, BHQ going through Pharsala and J and K Troops through Volos, reassembling at Molos on the 19th.

34 Battery: Part of BHQ and the B Echelon vehicles travelled with RHQ. Three portées (of O and P Troops) which survived the Elevtherokhorion engagement went by way of Pharsala on the 18th. The rest of the portées (mainly N Troop) travelled with Divisional Cavalry rearguards by way of Volos, moving south from Almiros in the night 19–20 April and reaching Molos about 9 a.m. on the 20th.

1 Survey Troop left Elasson at 11 a.m., 17 April, passed through Pharsala at 4.30 p.m., and camped at Dhomokos at 11 p.m. Setting out from there at 5.30 a.m. on the 18th, it reached Thermopylae at 11.30 a.m. and was therefore the first to arrive.

holding the dhomokos and fourka passes

These are bald facts about a journey that was for all concerned an unforgettable experience. Most of those who went by way of Volos were lucky. Those who drove by daylight between Larisa and Lamia on the 18th or 19th will remember skies that seemed never to be free of Stukas and Messerschmitts and twin-engined Dorniers. They will remember eyes searching the skies and ears keyed to detect among the noises of motor transport warning of the torment from above. For most of them the journey was a succession of scrambles off and on vehicles and of jumping in and out of ditches or of racing across paddocks scarred with the fresh brown earth of bomb craters. The wrecked vehicles which lined the route and the equipment and personal possessions strewn everywhere—the evidence that always betrays an army in retreat and some of which even for the victor is sad to see—became for those who took part the hallmarks of this campaign. It offered no more exasperating experience than that of lorry-loads of men waiting and waiting for hours on end in full view of the Luftwaffe while engineers toiled to overcome obstacles or open diversions round them.

This was a phase of the campaign in which headquarters men and those in the B Echelons suffered more than the front-line troops; for the guns travelled mostly by night or by way of Volos. The recollections of an NCO of the 6th Field are typical:

‘… Elasson, with bomb craters down the main street. Shops bore a dishevelled appearance and overturned cafe chairs and tables were strewn around. The poor Greek army was marching by in single file in small but endless groups. Some still had horses. Some were walking in their bare feet and carrying … boots.

‘At Larissa we drove into the Australian canteen and hurriedly ransacked the place for beer and canned fruits…. We drove on and had only just left the place when German bombers gave it a good doing-over. The going was good until we got to Farsala where we were halted by forty planes trying to destroy the bridge. The others went up and down the road … with machine guns while we lay in a blue funk until it was all over. There was not one casualty…. We halted just short of Lamia for the night but got no sleep owing to the endless stream of traffic passing through all night.’

The material damage caused by these air attacks was not great in terms of transport and equipment lost, and among the gunners very few men were hit. The worst hit was the convoy of vehicles of the 7th Anti-Tank which left Larisa in the afternoon of the 18th, in which several vehicles of 33 Battery were disabled and 34 Battery had Lance-Bombardier Luks
[72] and Gunner Smith
[73] wounded; and then in a later air raid Luks was again hit, this time fatally, and Gunner Richardson
[74] was killed. [75]

Night brought relief from the strain of air attacks; but the long journeys in darkness over roads still smarting from the bombing of the day were filled with strange experiences. Greeks of the country are individualists to a man and the countryside by night had an eerie quality. Sheep-bells would tinkle and bonfires would suddenly blaze on the hillsides. On the roadside smouldering wrecks would sometimes burst into flame. Men whose nerves were stretched taut by the events of the day were ready to believe the wildest rumours and to disbelieve the best-authenticated facts. A Canadian corps had reached Athens, so it was said; the retreat was luring the Germans into a trap. At one place villagers broke up even their own furniture to provide a footing for lorries to mount the slippery clay bank of a stream beside a broken bridge. Many a group of trucks on its way through narrow village streets unwittingly entered a cul-de-sac, creating a knot of traffic that somehow had to be unravelled. The portées of 34 Battery with Divisional Cavalry in the final rearguard on the Volos route made a fast journey by night; but in the course of it several overworked armoured cars broke down and were pushed off the road and set on fire—actions which seemed strangely in conflict with the orders which caused them to drive over perilous mountain roads with no lights.

[71] See pp. 72– 3.

[72]
L-Bdr E. A. Luks; born Auckland, 7 Oct 1905; garage manager; killed in action 18 Apr 1941.

[73]
Gnr G. E. Smith; born Auckland, 19 Aug 1918; tractor driver; wounded 18 Apr 1941.

[74]
Gnr J. N. Richardson; born Opitiki, 23 Mar 1910; production manager; killed in action 18 Apr 1941.

[75] The 4th Field lost an officer wounded and a Signals truck destroyed in the bombing of the road convoys. The 6th Field lost two quads and a pick-up truck. The 7th Anti-Tank lost four men killed and at least five vehicles destroyed. Headquarters NZA, the 5th Field and 1 Survey Troop suffered no loss.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka

The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka

The road south from Pharsala followed foothills for 10 miles and then climbed a steep pass to the town of Dhomokos. From there it led to a flat east of Lake Xinia and then rose again to cross a larger and higher range of hills before Lamia. The hamlet of Fourka in this second range gave its name to the pass just north of Lamia. Rearguard actions were fought at both the Dhomokos and the Fourka Passes.

Lee Force defended Dhomokos and began to take up position on 17 April north of the town: two Australian battalions plus a company and 2/1 Field Regiment. There were no anti-tank guns, and when most of 31 Anti-Tank Battery under Captain Sweetzer
[76] reached Dhomokos about 7.30 p.m. on the 18th, Brigadier E. A. Lee stopped Sweetzer and told him to get his guns off the road and attend a tactical conference at once. Sweetzer had with him eight 2-pounders and these went into position under heavy air attack. Next day air attacks were almost incessant. The rearguard was expected to stay there until the night 21–22 April; but the Australian Major-General I. G. Mackay decided that there was no need to stay so long and ordered Lee to withdraw after dark on the 19th. Demolitions were blown at 7 p.m. Then the Australian field guns engaged an approaching convoy until it was discovered to be friendly. Lee Force then withdrew; but nobody told Captain Sweetzer. Two of his guns were ahead of the demolition and could not be brought out. Next morning the 31 Battery detachment found itself in sole occupation of the Dhomokos position. The crews of the two isolated guns came back on foot and the whole detachment made off along the road to Lamia.

Lee had left another rearguard at Fourka, however, and this, too, had no anti-tank guns. So Sweetzer's six remaining guns went into action in defence of the Fourka Pass. Here they suffered more than air attack; for the enemy brought up artillery and made liberal use of mortars. Tanks also appeared and were engaged by tanks with Lee Force. As the engagement was warming up word came that all other troops were safely past Lamia and this final rearguard could withdraw. The injudicious dissemination of these orders to men engaged with the enemy (though not, again, to Sweetzer) caused something of a panic as infantry raced to their vehicles. In the midst of the storm the six guns of 33 Battery attracted much fire and could not reply to it. The anti-tankers responded splendidly and two of them were decorated later for what they did here: Lance-

Sergeant Harper [77] (MM) and Second-Lieutenant Hill [78] (MC). One gunner was not decorated but rebuked for indifference to danger that amounted to foolhardiness. [79] Harper's citation reads in part that his gun position,

‘owing to the sudden retirement of the infantry and MG platoon, was exposed to accurate observed fire of enemy 5-9-inch infantry guns. In withdrawing his gun L/Sgt Harper showed the utmost coolness and parade precision in giving his orders and seeing them carried out, with the result that his gun and detachment were enabled to get out from what appeared to be an impossible position. On reaching the position of assembly, to which the shelling had switched, this NCO again showed marked coolness in holding his men together in spite of a general panic of infantry and tanks….’

And Hill, according to his citation,

‘supervised the embussing of Australian infantry on such vehicles and tanks as were available under considerable and accurate shelling of the road … and … was largely responsible for the safe withdrawal of the infantry and anti-tank guns and preventing the incipient panic from spreading….’

Both citations actually speak of the Dhomokos Pass; but the Fourka Pass was the scene of the actions for which Hill and Harper were decorated. The anti-tankers were not sorry to leave it. As they passed through Lamia the Stukas were sleeping, but the town still cringed from their blows and fires were alive in many places among the shattered buildings.

[76]
Maj D. J. Sweetzer, ED; Levin; born Grass Valley, W. Aust., 18 Jan 1910; insurance assessor; Bty Comd 7 A-Tk Regt, Nov 1941-Jul 1943.

[77]
Sgt C. H. Harper, MM; born Auckland, 8 Apr 1918; ship repairer; died of wounds 30 Nov 1941.

[78]
2 Lt M. C. Hill, MC; born Wellington, 11 Jul 1913; assurance clerk; killed in action 25 Nov 1941.

[79]
Gnr C. L. Louisson.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 3 — The Molos Battle and then the Beaches

Contents

- [section]
p. 74

- Evacuation Plans and Moves p. 79
- Molos: The Gunners' Battle p. 84
- Retreat to the Beaches p. 95

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE NEW ZEALAND ARTILLERY reached Thermopylae with the following guns:

4th Field | 25 Battery | 12 |
| 26 Battery | 7 |
| | —— |
| | 19 |
5th Field | 27 Battery | 11 |
| 28 Battery | 12 |
| | —— |
| | 23 |
6th Field | 29 Battery | 12 |
| 30 Battery | 12 |
| | —— |
| | 24 | Total 25-pounders 66
7th Anti-Tank | 31 Battery | 7 |
| 32 Battery | 3 |
| 33 Battery | 6 |
| 34 Battery | 9 |
| | —— |
| | 25 | 2-pounders

Two of the 25-pounders, however, were unserviceable through faulty tell-tale valves. For the crucial battle that was impending, therefore, it was short of eight field guns and 11 anti-tank guns. The front the gunners were to cover, moreover, was a long one, from the coast by Molos to the right flank of the Australians in the Brallos Pass, and presented many difficulties for the artillery. They were therefore fortunate to receive considerable artillery strength from the resources of W Force before the battle opened.

This famous battlefield had changed greatly since the time of Xerxes and Leonidas, the Sperkhios River having brought down in the intervening years such a quantity of silt that the narrow gap between the cliffs at Thermopylae and the sea had widened by a matter of miles. The scene, however, retained its beauty, marred only by the pillars of smoke rising from the ruins of Lamia. North of this town and across the Maliaic Gulf the wall of hills was still flecked with snow and the bay stretched out to the east in a purple haze, broken here and there with tiny isles and backed by the large island of Euboea, capped with white.

The front was to stretch past Brallos to the Gulf of Corinth at Eratini, more than 50 miles in all; but the greater part was so precipitous as to be impassable for motor transport. It was nevertheless the only position from which Attica could be defended, and those responsible for its defence could afford to make no mistakes.

brallos pass and thermopylae, 24 april 1941

Two roads ran south from Lamia, one to Brallos and the other curling round the foot of the cliffs at Thermopylae on its way to the bottleneck at Molos. The left of the New Zealand front faced north from a mass of rocky crags and cliffs crowned to the south by the Kallidromon Mountain, an impassable barrier. The coast road came straight for seven miles from Lamia, by-passing the large village of Imir Bei in the middle of the flat, swampy estuary of the Sperkhios, which it crossed by the Alamanas Bridge before branching along the hills and cliffs for another nine miles to Molos. From the bridge the river split into two distributaries, one of which broke out by the hot springs of Thermopylae to run almost parallel to the road at a distance of less than a mile, and then northwestwards along a promontory to the Gulf. A small village, Ayias Trias, lay a mile or so east of this final leg of the Sperkhios. The other distributary flowed north-west from near the bridge to reach the sea east of Imir Bei. The triangle of land between these streams and the strip between the main one and the hills was marshy and overgrown in places with tall grasses, brushwood and scrub. The distance from the road to the sea narrowed to a mile at Ay Trias and then opened out beyond Molos into a little plain of olive groves three or four miles across. After this the road closed on the coast until it ran at the foot of cliffs which almost reached the sea at Cape Knimis. A re-entrant south-west of Molos was a possible, though difficult, route for outflanking the Brallos Pass.

The front taken up by the New Zealand Division was from the mouth of the stream east of Imir Bei to a spur south-west of Alamanas Bridge, near the tiny village of Koutseki. The obvious tank obstacles were the two streams; but most of the adjoining swampland was unsuitable for infantry defence, and the front was in effect thrown back to the high ground south of the road and the ground in front of Ay Trias.

The main gun positions therefore had to be in the foothills west and south of Molos where most would be in full view of the enemy across the Gulf. Some field guns had to be sited almost in the front line to be within reach of the Alamanas Bridge. ‘The country in the hills in the rear of the New Zealand position was very difficult and it was almost impossible to find positions for medium artillery from which it could compete with the enemy on anything like equal terms.’ [1]

The chief danger was thought to be tank attack breaking through at Molos and then swinging round to isolate the Australians at Brallos. The role of the New Zealand Artillery was therefore chiefly the anti-tank defence of the coast road. The Sperkhios had also to be covered by the field guns. Bridges were prepared for demolition and fords mined. The line along the hills seemed strong, its weakness being that communications ran across the front. The weak part was thought to be the right of the front, between the road and the coast by Ay Trias.

Men of 1 Survey Troop took a luxurious hot bath in an aqueduct by Thermopylae for an hour or two in the middle of the 18th, while Captain Kensington sought and found a suitable camp site, well-covered from aerial observation. From there they watched the Luftwaffe begin the bombing of Lamia. Next morning they set out a measured base and took astronomical observations at each end.

By this time 5 Brigade was deploying across the front with 30 Battery of the 6th Field in support. Brigadier Miles reached Thermopylae at midday and set about collecting all the guns he could find—a difficult task, for the first thought of the gunners on arrival was to service their guns and vehicles after their long drive. Most were in urgent need of attention. Guns were taken to bits as soon as their owners settled down off the road and many of them could not go straight into action. All Miles could do at first was to organise an emergency anti-tank defence in depth with groups of 2-pounders and field guns. All of the 6th Field soon went forward to guard the whole front. They were deployed in a narrow area astride the road just east of the hot springs, with OPs in depth and along the heights. Troop wagon lines were set up near the guns. The 5th Field (less C Troop) and some guns of the 7th Anti-Tank were also in temporary positions in support of 5 Brigade by dark on the 19th. The 4th Field arrived in so many different groups that it first had to sort itself out. Orders nevertheless arrived from Miles at 7 p.m. for Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson to deploy all his guns in an anti-tank role from the coast across the road and up a little valley to a hospital at Kamena Voula at the foot of the cliffs.

Two units of 1 Armoured Brigade came under Miles's command during the day and they were welcome indeed: 102 Anti-Tank Regiment, Northumberland Hussars, equipped with 2-pounders, and 2 Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery ( 2 RHA), with 25-pounders. Then he was given command of 64 Medium Regiment, RA, of which one troop was 15 miles back and the rest of the troops were in front of the infantry at Ay Trias. Surveying was started on the 20th on the measured base set out by 1 Survey Troop the day before; but it was greatly expedited by the arrival in the area of 4 Durham Survey Regiment, RA, which left the surveying of the field guns to the New Zealanders and began the difficult task of surveying in the medium guns. Anti-aircraft strength, which hitherto had been almost completely lacking, was provided on paper by 155 Battery of 13 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, with Bofors guns; but these had gone into position at Khalkis, miles behind the front. The 106th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RHA, however, with seven Breda heavy machine guns, also came under Miles's command. On the 20th, too, the Luftwaffe began to take an interest in the Molos area and kept up bombing and strafing attacks, often by single aircraft, almost all day. Worse was to come.

In the morning artillery positions were divided into forward and rear zones, with the accent in both on anti-tank defence. The anti-tank defence of the forward zone was to be co-ordinated by Lieutenant-Colonel Duff of the 7th Anti-Tank, and of the rear zone by Lieutenant-Colonel Waller of 102 Anti-Tank Regiment, NH. Duff had to site his own 2-pounders and twenty 25-pounders of the 5th Field, all of them well forward. Waller had C Troop of the 5th Field and B Battery of his own regiment in front of Ay Trias. He found it hard to persuade infantry commanders to place their men in the open ground in front of the village and therefore had to site some of his guns in front of the infantry. Carrier patrols were consequently provided to screen the guns, especially by night.

A final series of rearguards operating between Molos and Stilis during the 20th included two field guns and four anti-tank guns. They saw no action and the field guns retired to Imir Bei and the rest to Molos. Next day 6 Brigade took over the right of the line in front of Ay Trias. On the 21st, too, the ground between the two arms of the Sperkhios proved on closer inspection to be less of a tank obstacle than had been assumed, causing a revision of defence plans. This, in turn, caused friction between artillery and infantry officers. The latter had not, at this early stage of the war, come to realise the critical importance of a sound anti-tank layout and were reluctant to dispose their troops in the light of any other considerations than those imposed by the weapons the infantry possessed. The artillery, in their view, would simply have to conform by supporting these positions as best they could. Infantry struck water two inches below the surface in front of Ay Trias and could not dig in as they wished. But guns simply had to go into action there in anti-tank roles, and it seemed to many infantry officers that it was putting the cart before the horse to plan infantry defences to fit artillery arrange- ments. Even so, gunner officers complained of inadequate infantry protection. It was a matter on which experience would draw the two closer together.

[1]
Lt-Col E. E. Rich, ‘The Campaign in Greece’, an official British narrative (unpublished).

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Evacuation Plans and Moves

Evacuation Plans and Moves

For the first time the Divisional Artillery was to fight as such and its plan was expressed in its Operation Order No. 4, dated 20 April but not issued until the 21st. This noted that the line of the Sperkhios was being patrolled by night by infantry and observed by day by the artillery. The 4th Field had a zone from the mouth of the northern stream halfway to Alamanas Bridge and the 6th Field covered the left half of the front, the 2nd RHA being superimposed (when it arrived) across the whole front from positions behind Molos. The 64th Medium was to cover a huge front from the island of Euboea, across the northern shores of the Maliaic Gulf to the limits of range and round to the left almost as far as the bridge, from positions south-east of Molos and as far back as Longos.

Preparations to put this order into effect went on steadily throughout the 21st. The 6th Field fired from time to time at odd parties of enemy and groups of vehicles seen mostly in the Imir Bei area. All towed 2-pounders of the 7th Anti-Tank were sited well forward, the portées of 34 Battery being held in mobile reserve. The survey troop set up a bearing picket in the 4th Field area. Two light anti-aircraft guns offered some slight opposition to the Luftwaffe in front of Molos and the rest of 155 Battery, RA, a handful of Bofors guns, tried to cover the long stretch of road from Molos to Longos. It was a day of hard thinking and hard work.

It was a day, also, of bad news from other fronts. The Greek Army of the Epirus, essential for the defence of the southwestern part of the Thermopylae line, had been outflanked by the Germans and had signed an armistice. Even before W Force could complete its occupation of the line, therefore, it had to plan for a further withdrawal and an evacuation from Greece. News of this reached General Freyberg next day, 22 April, and was quickly passed on to brigades.

The news was bewildering and to many gunners disappointing. It took all the zest out of the preparations for meeting the Wehrmacht. The gunners were not, by and large, fire-eaters; but they had not so far been worsted in action by the German Army and were conscious of inferiority only with regard to the Luftwaffe. Some of them had become hypersensitive to the sight or sound of enemy aircraft; but others were filled with an urge to hit back, if not at the Stukas and Messerschmitts then at the enemy on the ground. A common impulse was to have at least one good crack at the enemy before getting out of the country.

Brigadier Miles was told that the withdrawal would start that very evening and that all equipment except signalling and optical stores would be destroyed before leaving Thermopylae. Though 5 Brigade would move back in the night 22–23 April, all guns but the Bredas of 106 Battery, RHA, would remain to support 6 Brigade. Miles himself expected to be busy arranging details of the new plan and therefore put Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson temporarily in command of the Divisional Artillery.

The new scheme made nonsense of existing dispositions, which presupposed an almost continuous front from Molos to the Brallos Pass. Except for a temporary stopgap called Hart Detachment, 5 Brigade was to depart. The left of 6 Brigade was still to face northwards across the swampy land. When Hart Detachment left, an enemy advancing along the road to Molos would come upon not a whole brigade, but only the left flank of a platoon that was facing north. To cut in behind this platoon would be a relatively simple matter for determined infantry. It might therefore have seemed an elementary precaution to swing the left of 6 Brigade higher into the hills and site it facing along instead of across the road; but this was not done.

Meanwhile the gunners had much to do. The 6th Field found many targets around Imir Bei on the 22nd, including tanks, working parties, and gunners digging in medium guns, as well as infantry by the Alamanas Bridge. All were shelled with vigour. The enemy replied not only with bombers and fighters in large numbers, but with gun fire, which, despite the assistance of spotting aircraft over the New Zealand lines, was quite ineffective. One reconnaissance aircraft landed in front of the 6th Field and a party led by the adjutant went forward and set it on fire. To allay any suspicion the enemy might have of a withdrawal, the 64th Medium also registered targets. The survey troop completed its tasks by establishing a second bearing picket in the 4th Field area and a third in the area to be occupied by the 2nd RHA. Officers from all gunner units, moreover, had to reconnoitre new gun areas to which guns would move after dark.

The 5th Brigade in due course moved back by night through Molos, leaving a gap in the Anzac front which Hart Detach- ment could not hope to hold against heavy attack. A, B and D Troops of the 5th Field and 33 Battery of the 7th Anti-Tank stayed with Hart. The 6th Field moved back to an olive grove just west of Molos, excepting D and F Troops, which were already there. At the same time H/I Battery and a troop of L/N Battery of the 2nd RHA drove against the tide of 5 Brigade transport from Cape Knimis to south of Molos.

These moves took place in a tense atmosphere. Vehicle lights could plainly be seen after dark on the 22nd on the road from Stilis to Lamia across the Gulf and from Lamia to Imir Bei. A move against the Thermopylae line was imminent; but no ground attack developed on the New Zealand front on the 23rd, though air attack became a commonplace. Despite his command of the air, the enemy seemed curiously unable to pinpoint the gun areas. Air attack on traffic on the roads, however, made it extremely dangerous to travel on them in the hours of daylight. Brigadier Miles, Major Queree, and a party from Divisional Artillery Headquarters nevertheless drove forward in the morning to establish a headquarters alongside RHQ of the 6th Field at Molos, and from there Miles resumed command.

From there, too, he issued his fifth operation order, which outlined a series of complicated operations covering the retreat to the beaches and the evacuation of the Division. The intention was to support 6 Brigade until it withdrew, and then destroy most of the guns and move back to Khalkis. A rearguard from Cape Knimis (later called Clifton Force) would include the battery (less a troop) of the 2nd RHA already there, the portées of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, and one troop of 102 Anti-Tank Regiment, NH. This would cover 6 Brigade on its journey back to Thebes and 155 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA, would carry on to the evacuation beaches. All unessential men and vehicles were to withdraw in the night 23–24 April. Lights might be used south of Cape Knimis, but no halts whatsoever must be made on the road by night.

Long lines of vehicles drove along the road from Lamia to Imir Bei on the 23rd and parked out of range of the 25- pounders, much to the annoyance of the gunners. The 6th Field nevertheless found plenty of targets. When a medium battery took up position by the village, however, Miles took action, calling up three 4.5-inch guns of the 64th Medium to a position just behind Molos from which they could engage the hostile battery. [2] The medium guns did their work well and their counter-battery fire was shared in the afternoon by 29 Battery of the 6th Field, which found another hostile battery south-east of the village within reach and engaged it effectively. A third battery was located beyond the bridge and west of the road, out of reach of the field guns. Two more batteries opened fire from the other side of the Gulf.

The duels that ensued provided an interesting contrast in styles. The enemy used airburst fuses almost exclusively. This was a type of anti-personnel fire that, accurately controlled, could be most effective in flat ground, causing HE shells to explode low over gun positions and similar targets and wounding many men. In this broken country, however, this fire was largely wasted, most of the shells bursting harmlessly behind ridges in front of or behind the New Zealand guns. The 25-pounders and 4.5s, on the other hand, used percussion fuses against targets on flatter ground with far better result. Counter-battery fire took second place as evening approached, however, to concentrations against likely river crossings or strongpoints covering them, and the day ended with a crescendo of fire of this kind by the 6th Field, the 2nd RHA and the 64th Medium. Only those guns, 2-pounders and 25-pounders, in an anti-tank role remained silent; for they dared not disclose their positions. The weight of defensive fire dropped after dark, but field and medium guns kept up harassing fire at odd moments throughout the night.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the gunnery this day, however, is that it was maintained despite ceaseless air attack and almost regardless of it. Gunners jumped in and out of slit trenches all day, scampering to their guns when immediate danger passed, and demonstrating plainly the inability of even the most earnest efforts of the Luftwaffe to keep them quiet. In this they were greatly helped by the infantry, who opened fire at any low-flying aircraft with every kind of small-arm including pistols, so that the air seemed to quiver with bullets and was thick with tracers, to which the solitary Bofors gun on the roadside before Molos could make but a small addition. If all this had little observable effect on the enemy aircraft, it served at least to reassure the gunners that they were not alone in their battle. Apart from the effects on the nerves of some of the men, these air raids did little damage. No guns were hit. Only a few men were wounded and one or two vehicles were destroyed or damaged. The chief trouble to the artillery was that telephone lines kept getting broken. On the other hand, the gunners were greatly cheered by the sight of Stukas diving time and time again on the gun positions vacated the previous night by the 6th Field.

Behind the guns the B Echelons and headquarters staffs had a busy day preparing for the night journey. Everything not needed for the evacuation—documents, equipment, personal belongings, even vehicles—was destroyed. Even the treasured instruments of medical staffs were to be thrown out and Lieutenant Cook, [3] RMO of the 7th Anti-Tank, recalls that he demurred when told to get rid of his surgical equipment. The rear areas became almost chaotic in the rush to get rid of all encumbrances and yet make the most of whatever could be used. The Thermopylae line had been provisioned for a go-day battle and there was therefore a huge surplus of stores, including some rare delicacies of food. When supply depots were ‘opened to the public’ the nearby troops took what they could.

Far to the rear, at Kriekouki south of Thebes, 4 Brigade settled into a covering position supported by Australian artillery. The survey troop, with nothing more to do on the Molos front, drove through to Athens, reaching the pretty suburb of Daphni at 4 p.m. and settling in at Voula transit camp a few hours later. Another detachment that travelled this day along roads patrolled and attacked from the air was from the 7th Anti-Tank. It consisted of Major Oakes, Captain Jones
[4] and a few others detailed to help embarkation staffs at the beaches, and it rested for the night under pines by the little port of Rafina, a few miles east of Athens.

Brigadier Miles and his small staff had to provide for all the many foreseeable contingencies of the evacuation; but they also had to study with great care the implications of the many moves for the battle which must still be fought in front of Molos. Hart Detachment was to withdraw this night, 23–24 April, and an unplugged gap thus left in the Thermopylae line would give rise to many difficulties. Miles and Lieutenant-Colonel Duff both studied the forward artillery zone on the 23rd and they came to the same conclusion: that the road along the foot of the hills to Molos was easy to defend against tanks and that serious danger of tank breakthrough existed only on the narrow strip of land between the road and the sea at Ay Trias.

They therefore revised the anti-tank defences to strengthen this part of the front. This gave greater depth to the anti-tank defence there, in the sector of 24 Battalion. At the same time, with guns to spare when Hart Detachment withdrew, they strengthened the 25 Battalion sector on the left. The nine remaining 2-pounders of 32 and 33 Anti-Tank Batteries were also posted around Ay Trias and along the road to Molos.

The final dispositions on the Molos front therefore were strong in artillery and comparatively weak in infantry. The two battalions forward, the 24th on the right and the 25th on the left, were supported by most of a medium regiment, four field regiments all but one troop, two somewhat depleted anti-tank regiments, and a few light anti-aircraft guns.

The transport needed to serve the guns and in the end to withdraw the gunners was sent as far forward as possible and hidden under the trees. All other artillery transport was destroyed or driven back after dark on the 23rd in a long convoy of 170 vehicles plus 10 of Divisional Cavalry, all under Colonel Duff.

[2] This regiment suffered from a shortage of certain types of ammunition, which made some of its troops of little use for the forthcoming battle, and 234 Battery (less C Troop) therefore accompanied 5 Brigade in the night 22–23 April, leaving 211 Battery (plus C Troop) in support of 6 Brigade.

[3]
Maj W. G. Cook; Masterton; born Masterton, 15 Aug 1908; medical practitioner; RMO 7 A-Tk Regt 1939–43; 3 NZ Gen Hosp 1943–44.

[4]
Lt-Col H. S. Jones; Christchurch; born Carmarthen, Wales, 21 Nov 1896; company manager.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Molos: The Gunners' Battle

Molos: The Gunners' Battle

The enemy was certain to attack in full force on the 24th and he confirmed this by bombarding gun areas in front of Molos at 4 a.m. The shelling lasted for nearly an hour, but did no harm. Soon after dawn a carrier patrol of 24 Battalion reported that a span of the Alamanas Bridge had been replaced, that repair work was continuing, and that an enemy patrol had crossed the river. The 6th Field responded with a heavy and accurate concentration, the first of many this day on the bridge. The 64th Medium was also asked to range on it and help to destroy any completed sections. The medium guns then engaged a hostile battery near Imir Bei and reported scoring a direct hit on it, only to be contradicted shortly afterwards when the battery opened fire again, this time on the medium guns. The 64th then fought a duel which ended successfully. No hostile battery fired from that position again. Of three tanks making their way along the foothills from the direction of the Brallos Pass at 11 a.m., one was disabled and the others disappeared. For the next hour an infantry patrol operated up to the southern bank of the main stream of the Sperkhios and the field and medium guns therefore fired only beyond it.

guns v. tanks, molos, 24 april 1941

Brigadier Miles meanwhile took advantage of this slow beginning of the attack to confer with his commanding officers about details of the withdrawal, and General Freyberg arrived at the gathering. He suggested that some guns might possibly be brought out when 6 Brigade withdrew that night. Accordingly, Miles ordered that each battery must take out half its complement of guns, which greatly complicated existing arrangements.

From midday for a full hour the whole front was heavily dive-bombed and machine-gunned from the air. Grey smoke from the bursting bombs covered the gun areas and observation officers on the heights above watched keenly for signs of the long-awaited advance. No immediate danger seemed to threaten, but there was much movement in the distance. Meanwhile an officer of 25 Battalion complained that there were no anti-tank guns in his area, a matter that was hard to check and therefore worrying to Miles's headquarters. (The officer was mistaken: three troops of the 5th Field and six guns of 31 Anti-Tank Battery were all well forward.)

A rather half-hearted attempt by the enemy to get tanks across the swampy land early in the afternoon resulted in one of them getting stuck in the mud, and this deterred the German commander from any further efforts to develop the only kind of tank attack that had any hope of success. In this at least the Germans were less thorough than their reputation suggested. Their hasty dismissal of the cross-country route to Molos was a godsend to the defence. The tank attack they chose to mount in mid-afternoon was by single file along the road, a method offering such little hope of success (against what must by that time have been recognised by the Germans as a strong gun group) that Miles and Duff had not even considered this possibility. They had not counted on meeting an enemy so impatient and contemptuous of opposition as to mount such a suicidal assault.

The attack along the road, moreover, bore little relation to an infantry attack (supported by a reconnaissance unit) mounted along the road and along the rough country south of it. This was slow to develop, however, having been delayed by 6th Field concentrations in the morning and early afternoon. Motorcyclists and cyclists led the attack along the road at 4 p.m. and for the moment the 6th Field was silent, its communications having been cut by a heavy air raid. The infantry posts on the extreme left of 25 Battalion therefore went into action and quickly checked the advance along the road. For the New Zealand infantry this was the beginning of a difficult action in which the weakness of their dispositions on this flank were soon exploited. The following enemy infantry, unable to get farther along the road, pushed up into the hills and began to turn the flank of 25 Battalion, which responded rather slowly to this challenge.

In so doing, the enemy created acute difficulties for the OP parties of the 6th Field, mostly established in the area of C Company on the left of 25 Battalion. These OP parties had halted the German tanks long before they got within reach of the guns of the 5th Field, whose crews were tensely waiting to take up their anti-tank roles. Now they found themselves fired on by infantry in the hills above and even behind them. Captain Sawyers at the B Troop OP had reported that the linked fire of B and C Troops had halted the tank attack. Then Captain Levy
[5] at the A Troop OP reported that the withdrawal of C Company had caused him to come under machine-gun fire from the hills. Levy and Major Mitchell
[6] of 29 Battery then made their way back by following the telephone line to an alternative OP from which Levy resumed control of the fire of A Troop.

Despite these local setbacks, the artillery defence stiffened to the point that almost every gun on the front except those in anti-tank roles was offering strenuous opposition to the German advance. Just to the right of 25 Battalion (which faced north) were D and F Troops of the 6th Field, and a little farther back, in a large olive grove in front of Molos, the rest of the 6th Field guns were emplaced. Behind these in turn were the three guns of the 64th Medium which had been brought forward for counter-battery work. The 4th Field guns were sited in a reentrant running south-westwards from Molos, and not far behind them were H/I Battery plus a troop of the 2nd RHA. Farther back still, but well within reach of the enemy because of their long range, were A and C Troops (less the forward guns) of 64th Medium, with B Troop a long way back at Longos.

Their combined fire was a formidable obstacle to the attack and enemy accounts have much to say about the terrible artillery barrages that characterised the Molos battle. These barrages were sustained only by unremitting efforts to keep open communications and to explore alternative ways of bringing down fire when existing ones were interrupted. FOOs were often out of touch with their guns and requests for fire had to be met without their help.

The policy at first had been to conserve fire in case a heavy expenditure was needed at the last moment to help to extricate 6 Brigade. It is always hard to maintain such a policy, however, in face of repeated requests for supporting fire. So great were the demands on the forward troops of the 6th Field—the only field guns that could reach the Alamanas Bridge—that stocks of ammunition at the gun positions began to run low before the morning was finished. The 6th Field had started the day with about 180 rounds per gun, and the only way of replenishing stocks was to drive ammunition lorries forward from a dump south of Molos along a road that was subject to close and merciless air attack, as well as being shelled from Imir Bei and from the other side of the Gulf. Lieutenant-Colonel Weir of the 6th Field had ordered his battery ammunition groups to work forward from this dump as opportunity offered; but it was a nerve-racking task and at the end of it there was much hard work. Lorries could not get off the road and the heavy ammunition boxes had to be carried over rough country to the gun positions. Bombardier Scoltock
[7] was in charge of the ammunition group of 30 Battery, which this day made seven trips to the much-bombed dump and back again, carrying more than 1800 rounds to the guns. For this he was awarded an MM and the citation mentions his ‘coolness and complete disregard for hostile aircraft’. Such was the rate of expenditure, however, that even these exertions did not suffice. For two hours in the afternoon the guns of F Troop of the 6th Field were silent while their crews joined in this work of carrying ammunition from road to gun position. Then they resumed their back-breaking work of loading, ramming and firing the guns.

The field guns firing indirectly had been able to deter the German tank commanders from pressing their attack; but late in the afternoon this situation suddenly changed. At a time when the FOOs of the 6th Field, which was best placed to bring indirect fire down on the road, were facing difficulty and danger from German infantry on the hills above them, a score of tanks raced along the road in a suicidal charge. The time had come—about 6 p.m.—for the anti-tank 2-pounders and 25-pounders to play their part.

The foremost of these were the four guns of E Troop of the 5th Field, in roughly the middle of the 25 Battalion area. Next were F Troop of the 5th Field and the few remaining 2-pounders of A and B Troops, 31 Battery. All the other guns of the 5th Field and the 7th Anti-Tank (other than the portees) were north of the road, as were the 2-pounders of the 102nd Anti-Tank. The only guns north of the road which could fire along or across it, however, were a troop of B Battery of the 102nd Anti-Tank and a section (two guns) of C Troop of the 5th Field.

E Troop of the 5th Field fought by far the most important part of the action. The road, from the viewpoint of F Troop looking along it, seemed to curl in and out among the foothills and the tanks racing along it appeared and disappeared as it did so. E Troop was slightly defiladed and when it opened fire the tanks were quite close. The leading gun, under Second-Lieutenant Parkes, [8] destroyed three tanks in quick succession at ranges between 400 and 600 yards; all three burst into flames.

Others nevertheless came on and E Troop destroyed them as they did so. Parkes's gun crew worked to parade-ground precision and the gun-layer, Bombardier Santi, [9] rose magnificently to the occasion. His shooting remained deadly accurate even when tanks and surviving tank crews fired back at short range. In all Parkes's crew disabled eight medium tanks and one light one, and most of them were set on fire. Another E Troop gun collected two more victims. Still they came on, through the smoke from the blazing tanks ahead of them, somehow working their way round the derelicts and on towards Molos. F Troop joined in and claimed at least three more tanks. A gun of B Troop, 31 Anti-Tank Battery, under Sergeant Gilmer, [10] sited near a little bridge on the right of the 25 Battalion sector, opened fire at 600–800 yards and knocked out one tank and damaged a second one, which a 25-pounder at once destroyed. Across the road the foremost anti-tank guns (including the section of C Troop of the 5th Field) were among or in front of the foremost infantry. They, too, joined in when the tanks came close enough, so that the tanks which travelled farthest along the road came under a cross-fire which set the seal to their doom. No tank escaped harm. The scene at the end of their charge was desolate in the extreme.

Though the 20 tanks had no chance of breaking through, they could and did cause much trouble. For one thing, even two or three tanks advancing together could develop great fire power. Their heavy machine guns swept the slopes on which 25 Battalion was fighting its difficult action with German infantry. Moreover all did not happen at once. Though the tanks came on fast, they were spaced about fifty yards apart in the first instance and later arrivals had to pick their way past derelicts and through the clouds of smoke. Artillery farther back had time enough to bring down indirect fire astride the road. Some men of 25 Battalion, falling back, had to pass close to the tanks and came under deadly fire at close range. Some of them had to pass through the artillery fire as well. A Company of the 25th was by now in difficulties, attacked from above by infantry and from below by tank fire. The last straw was when fire from the New Zealand guns began to fall thickly in one platoon area. This in turn, by hastening the collapse of the left flank of 25 Battalion, brought OP parties and then gun crews in the area under fire from the German infantry outflanking the battalion.

Such an action breaks up on close analysis into a series of episodes each more or less complete in itself to those directly concerned, though the pieces can never be fitted as neatly together as the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Thus Parkes's gun team found themselves being stalked, in the course of their anti-tank action, by the crew of one of the tanks they had disabled. The infantry in front of them had withdrawn—perhaps shot out of their positions by close-range tank fire—and the gun team left their shallow pit and salvaged a Bren gun left behind by the infantry. They then fought a fresh duel with the tank men, killed or wounded them all, and then carried on with their anti-tank action.

Captain Sawyers had been forced to move when his OP came under machine-gun fire from the left front and he resumed control of his B Troop guns from a new position to the east. Tanks directed heavy fire at the A Troop OP and it was also attacked by infantry. Captain Levy and his telephonist, Gunner Durham, [11] managed to get away; but three other gunners were captured. [12] These are typical of the trials of OP parties of the 6th Field.

To Miles, Barrowclough and others farther back who were trying to understand what was happening, it was not immediately apparent that the enemy had avoided the front of 6 Brigade and was restricting his efforts to the road and the hills to the south. When this did become clear, Miles ordered the 4th and 6th Field and the 2nd RHA to prepare a special anti-tank defensive fire task on the road by Thermopylae, which they did with all haste. The concentration of fire thus produced by three field regiments in depth on the narrow road was terrifying and the enemy made no further effort to bring tanks forward.

Gunners had been surprised in the morning to see Germans preparing gun pits on the other side of the Gulf with no attempt at concealment. Some of them thought it must be a ruse to distract attention; but later in the day the pits were occupied and long-range shelling of the Molos positions began from across the water. When the tank attack along the road had made some progress and the possibility of a tank pene- tration as far as Molos could not be ruled out, Brigadier Miles ordered Colonel Fraser of the 5th Field to bring forward his B Troop, hitherto in a reserve anti-tank position some miles to the south-east of Molos, to an emergency position west of the town. C Battery of the 102nd Anti-Tank was also ordered forward, but could make no headway against a strong stream of road traffic. B Troop of the 5th Field got through and took up position as ordered, though by this time the tank attack had been defeated. When the guns across the Gulf became troublesome Miles ordered this troop to engage them.

Major Bull, [13] second-in-command of the 5th Field, accordingly took charge of one gun of B Troop and conducted a remarkable counter-battery shoot. Searching and sweeping with the single gun at almost extreme range, observing with binoculars at the gun position, he managed to keep the hostile batteries quiet. This was a task of a kind normally reserved for a heavier calibre of gun and later some guns of the 64th Medium joined in with the object of destroying the guns across the Gulf. In this they claimed success; at all events, no further trouble came from that source. Major Bull's shooting and that of the medium gunners were examples of unusually skilful gunnery.

The contribution this day of the 4th Field, deployed in the re-entrant south-west of Molos, was less spectacular than that of the anti-tank 25-pounders of the 5th Field and the field gunnery under difficult circumstances of the 6th Field; but the fire of this regiment became more and more valuable as the day advanced. The allotted zone—the right half of the front—was relatively quiet and the 4th Field became increasingly concerned with the attacks from the direction of Thermopylae. The targets engaged were tanks, working parties, groups of infantry—any enemy activity within reach that could be observed by the OPs in the heights north-west of the gun positions. The story of H/I Battery (plus a troop) of the 2nd RHA, to the right rear of the 4th Field, was much the same. The decisive effort of both units, however, was when Brigadier Miles brought them into concert with the 6th Field in the evening to fire the special anti-tank defensive fire task on the road by Thermopylae whenever tanks appeared.

The gun positions of the 4th Field proved to be well protected from hostile batteries at Imir Bei and across the Gulf, and no more than a few shells landed in the gun area. Even the intense bombing and strafing of the region caused only two casualties in the 4th Field. [14] A far greater danger to the gun positions seemed in the early evening to threaten from the penetration of the left flank of 25 Battalion and the outflanking movements the Germans were attempting in the hills. If this danger developed the two battalions and all the guns in front of Molos might be cut off. But the enemy attempted no such ambitious move. The 4th and 6th Field and 2nd RHA helped to check the advance in the hills, though they all found it hard to bring down effective fire in this extremely rugged country. The gunners, moreover, were only vaguely aware of the extensive rearrangements 25 and 26 Battalions were making to meet this threat. The 4th Field at one stage fired at some ruins high up a ridge, not knowing that a detachment of 25 Battalion had already climbed up to them.

As the threat to the 4th Field eased, the gunners of the forward troops of the 5th Field, B and C Troops of 31 Anti-Tank Battery, and D and F Troops of the 6th Field came under increasing danger. By about 7 p.m. E Troop of the 5th Field was all but surrounded and F Troop and the forward 2-pounder troops were in an increasingly difficult situation. The field guns nevertheless kept firing, though observation and control of fire became hard to maintain. Lieutenant Cropper
[15] of F Troop, 6th Field, unable to communicate with his OP, went forward from the gun position with one signaller, Gunner Lepine, [16] and began observing from a point 200 yards in front of his guns. As dusk approached the gunners grew anxious to fire as many rounds as they could before their guns came out of action and the rate of firing increased considerably. They knew they would be unable to destroy unexpended ammunition. All guns in a field role continued to fire at least until dusk—about 8.30 p.m.

Late in the afternoon Brigadiers Miles and Barrowclough had been worried about getting enough transport forward to carry out the infantry. Lorries of the Ammunition Company were to carry 24 Battalion; but they could not be found. In the end Miles decided to use artillery vehicles in the forward area to carry infantry and accordingly cancelled the order to bring out half the guns. There was no need for this, as it happened; the

NZASC lorries drove forward in time to take the infantry. But there was in any case no possibility of withdrawing those guns that were so far forward that their crews were under small-arms fire and virtually unprotected by infantry. Some of these were spiked; others were disabled by draining their buffer-recuperators of oil, firing them, and then removing breech blocks and firing mechanisms.

Getting the gun crews and observation parties out, however, still presented difficulties. The drivers of E Troop of the 5th Field and B and C Troops, 31 Anti-Tank Battery, had to drive against a flood of vehicles travelling away from the front after dark. By a very determined effort they managed to do so and collected their men. The enemy was fortunately unenterprising and did no more than send up flares and occasionally machine-gun the general area, causing little harm. Just after the crews of D and F Troops, 6th Field, withdrew, however, guns on the other side of the Gulf began to bombard the gun position. One 6th Field gun had been given an anti-tank role; but its crew was released from this task at this stage and this gun, too, was disabled. Lieutenant Turner, [17] who was last to leave, reported that an F Troop gun was hit shortly after its crew departed; other witnesses speak of three abandoned guns hit in this bombardment. Luck was clearly on the side of the New Zealand gunners.

When it became clear that there was no need to use artillery vehicles to carry infantry, orders were issued that C Troop of the 5th Field was to bring out its guns and join the 6 Brigade rearguard. One of the guns, however, had already been destroyed in action and the tractors for the other three could make no headway against the stream of traffic moving in the opposite direction at that late hour. They had only a mile and a half to travel; but they had still not reached the gun lines by 10 p.m. The subaltern in command at the gun position, finding that all other troops in the neighbourhood had by this time withdrawn and hearing enemy patrols approaching, decided to disable his guns and bring his men out on foot.

The 4th Field had originally been meant to cease fire at 7.30 p.m.; but the hour was put back. Targets were plentiful and so was ammunition, nobody felt like ending the party, and so it carried on for well over two more hours. When the 4th Field ammunition expenditure was totalled the figures were startling. The seven guns of 26 Battery fired (in about half the time) nearly twice the number of rounds that 11 guns had fired in the Pinios battle: almost 5000 rounds. Before the Molos battle, 25 Battery had not fired its 25-pounders in anger; but this day it kept pace with 26 Battery and brought the day's average for the regiment to about 650 rounds per gun, most of them fired in the afternoon or evening.

The last shots in the Molos battle, however, were fired by the 2nd RHA. The battery and troop of this regiment carried out their work splendidly. Although their proportionate ammunition expenditure is not known, it must have equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the 4th Field. At a late stage a New Zealand gunner overheard a memorable order at a gun position of the 2nd RHA: ‘Gun fire till I say stop’. Gunners were used to ‘One round of gun fire’, or two rounds, occasionally five rounds, rarely indeed as many as ten rounds: only in their dreams did they hear such an order as this. H/I Battery finally ceased fire about midnight and with its last shot the battle ended. These guns, too, were disabled and their crews withdrew.

All field guns were thus destroyed or disabled and most antitank guns. At the end of the day the only remaining guns were the portées of 34 Anti-Tank Battery and some of the towed 2-pounders of 33 Battery and the 102nd Anti-Tank, NH, together with six Bofors of 155 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA (by this time very short of ammunition). No gunner would call this a happy ending to the Molos battle. The guns had been the centre of attention through months of training and most gunners were sorry indeed to have to leave them behind. Guns and limbers swinging and bouncing along behind their vehicles had become a fact of life for gun crews, and many a gunner cast an instinctive glance backwards during the night journey only to be reminded that the gun which had been the object of his care and attention for many a month was no longer there. It gave him a blank feeling, almost a sense of bereavement.

The cost to the gunners of the Molos battle in human terms was fortunately small. A day in which the gun areas had been the prime target of enemy guns and aircraft had ended with remarkably few casualties among the gun crews. Since some of these had started with little or no infantry support and many more had become uncovered by infantry in the course of the fighting, this was indeed a lucky outcome. No member of a New Zealand gun crew was killed in action during the day and only one gun was destroyed while the crew was at hand to serve it. The forward gun crews of the 5th Field had charmed lives and came through unscathed. The gun positions of the 6th Field had been bombed and shelled throughout the day and one gun suffered a ‘narrow miss’ which set fire to some charges, badly burning the gun sergeant. [18] A junior officer of the same regiment was wounded by a shellburst near B Troop OP in the afternoon and in the evening a gunner was hit by a bullet and later died. [19] To these must be added the losses, if any, of the attached gunners of the RHA and RA (including the Northumberland Hussars), whose presence did much to strengthen the Molos defences and who did some excellent shooting.

There was much activity behind the front, too, and air attack made some of it extremely dangerous. Some stretches of road south of Molos were so closely watched by German fighter aircraft that it took a good deal of courage to venture along them. Major Jenkins, the popular OC of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, a mild and unassuming man, had much to do to prepare for the rearguard role of his 2-pounder portees on the march south. In so doing he made one trip too many along this road and was gravely wounded by aerial machine-gunning. The sad news later reached his battery that he had died in hospital.

[5]
Maj P. B. Levy, m.i.d.; born Wellington, 1 Aug 1906; advertising agent; died of wounds 24 Jul 1942.

[6]
Brig J. M. Mitchell, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Port Chalmers, 29 Jun 1904; public servant; CO 7 A-Tk Regt Dec 1941-Dec 1943, May-Oct 1944; OC NZ Tps in Egypt 1945–46.

[7]
Sgt G. F. Scoltock, MM; Richmond, Nelson; born NZ 29 Jul 1908; grocer.

[8]
Capt H. K. Parkes; born Dunedin, 5 May 1918; accountant; killed in action 24 Oct 1942.

[9]
Bdr E. W. Santi, DCM; born NZ 27 Dec 1917; tinsmith; killed in action 20 May 1941.

[10]
Capt B. K. Gilmer, MBE; Auckland; born Thames, 12 Dec 1914; Regular soldier.

[11]
L-Bdr J. B. Durham; Wellington; born Wellington, 31 May 1911; bank clerk; p.w. 30 Nov 1941.

[12] Gnrs F. R. Browne, J. A. Thomson and G. Barnaby.

[13]
Maj M. A. Bull, ED; Timaru; born Christchurch, 14 Oct 1907; schoolmaster; 2 i/c 5 Fd Regt Feb-May 1941; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; Rector, Timaru Boys' High School (retired 1964).

[14]
Sgt A. Scott was wounded by a bullet from an aircraft and Gnr S. U. Roberts was also wounded in an air raid.

[15]
Capt J. W. Cropper; Auckland; born NZ 25 Dec 1916; clerk; p.w. Dec 1941.

[16]
Sgt D. J. Lepine; Hamilton; born Auckland, 12 Jan 1918; clerk.

[17]
Maj T. A. Turner, ED; Wellington; born Wellington, 12 May 1912; clerk.

[18]
Sgt N. X. Fowler.

[19] 2 Lt G. A. Robinson and Gnr W. J. Dunlevy.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Retreat to the Beaches

Retreat to the Beaches

Most of the rearguard troops and B Echelons spent the day under cover and escaped harm. One section (two guns) of N Troop of 34 Battery, however, under the command of A Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, had a long drive to Khalkis in the course of which it was attacked time and time again by Stukas, Messerschmitts and low-flying Dorniers. A warning order to move had come at 1 a.m. on the 24th, but the group did not start to move until just before 8 a.m. It was a fatal delay. As the vehicles began to move they came under attack from the air, which was sustained with great intensity for two whole hours. When the armoured cars, Bren carriers and portees finally moved off the attacks continued relentlessly, an armoured car and at least one carrier were lost, and by mid-afternoon the group was forced to take cover. The Luftwaffe finally lost interest and the group moved on in the evening unmolested from the air. Four miles short of the Khalkis bridge (to the island of Euboea) it took up a position astride the road in support of C Company of 1 Rangers [20] under Major ‘Toby’ Low.

The B Echelons and most of the headquarters staffs of the Divisional Artillery had meanwhile travelled to Atalandi, halfway to Thebes, on the 23rd, and carried on towards Athens next day. Most of them ended up under trees by Marathon, where they destroyed their transport and marched after dark, with 5 Brigade, to the little beach of Porto Rafti—D Beach in the evacuation plan. There they were joined by 1 Survey Troop from Voula transit camp. The sea was calm, and in the night 24–25 April they embarked without incident by means of a variety of landing craft on the cruiser Calcutta and the Glen ship Glengyle and sailed for Crete.

The same night saw the troops from Molos driving southwards with headlights lighting their way after passing Cape Knimis. They made rapid progress; but traffic congestion made some delay inevitable and the tail end of the long column was still some 20 miles north of Thebes, in open, flat country of a kind that invited Stuka attack, at dawn on the 25th. They expected attack from the air and some men were nervous; but no attack came and by 10 a.m. the last of the rearguard passed through the covering position taken up by 4 Brigade at Krie-kouki. Many artillery vehicles pulled off the road there; but Brigadier Miles decided that they had better take advantage of the absence of the Luftwaffe to drive on towards Athens. Miles himself, realising that the route through the city would need picketing, drove on ahead to arrange this. At Force Headquarters, the Acropole Hotel, however, he found that the last two officers were in the act of leaving. He could get no orders about routes or destinations and had to make up his own mind where his men should go. Back he drove to meet the leading vehicles. From among the men in them he arranged pickets and then went on to meet Brigadier Barrowclough of 6 Brigade. While Miles and Barrowclough conferred some miles north of Athens, General Freyberg and his personal staff arrived with orders that the artillery was to drive through Athens and embark at C and D Beaches, Rafina and Porto Rafti.

Miles was doubtless, like Freyberg, sharply aware that this was Anzac Day, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli, and was not happy that his gunners should have to observe it by driving back to the beaches, for the most part without their guns. Returning on the heels of the artillery column, however, he had some consolation by sharing in one of the most exhilarating experiences of the campaign. The populace lined the streets cheering, clapping and calling out good wishes, bestrewing the dusty lorries with flowers, throwing fruit and cigarettes to the men, and generally treating them like heroes. The gunners, unhappily aware of the shortness of their stay in Greece and of the fruitlessness of their efforts to save the country from the common enemy, expected bitterness and despair, but found no trace of them. Their already high opinion of the Greek people rose higher still and they were sorry indeed to leave them.

Clifton Force, with two troops of the 2nd RHA, a six-gun battery of the 102nd Anti-Tank, and 34 Anti-Tank Battery (less the N Troop section at Khalkis), came under command of the Divisional Cavalry after passing through 4 Brigade and then joined 1 Armoured Brigade in a final rearguard a dozen miles north of Athens. This and the Kriekouki position were the only major obstacles on the 25th and 26th to the German advance on Athens and neither could be held for long, since other routes existed by which they could be outflanked.

At Kriekouki 4 Brigade was supported by the 2nd/3rd Australian Field, which had already given strong assistance to 6 Brigade at Elasson, and also by seven 2-pounders of the 1st Australian Anti-Tank and seven Bredas of 106 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RHA, some of them in dual roles, guarding against tanks as well as aircraft. All guns were well forward and two troops of the 2nd/3rd Field were ready to take up anti-tank roles.

All was quiet until, at 10 a.m. on the 26th, the long-awaited vanguard of the enemy advance appeared, led by a tank and motor-cyclists. The Australian field gunners had not been able to register targets beforehand for fear of disclosing their positions and their opening rounds seemed somewhat haphazard. The appearance, however, was deceptive. The enemy hastily withdrew, leaving behind eight blazing vehicles. From then onwards the Germans showed no desire to force the issue. The Australians fired freely and the response of the German artillery had little weight or effect. In the evening they made believe that fresh batteries had reinforced them by registering targets over the whole front.

The enemy was evidently impressed, for he made no effort to close on the Kriekouki defences and 4 Brigade was able to withdraw after dark without interference, passing through Athens and coming to rest on the roadsides leading to the beach of Porto Rafti. There was a chance that the troops would embark at once and no defensive positions were therefore taken up. The chance, however, passed and daylight on the 27th found the brigade group dangerously exposed to attack by German forces which had reached Athens and were pushing on towards Porto Rafti. Hurriedly the troops took up position astride the road from the village of Markopoulon to the beach. Before they could complete this task, however, they were heavily and accurately attacked from the air. Severe bombing at noon destroyed one 25-pounder and six 2-pounders and six Australian gunners were killed. In the ensuing pause all troops hastened to conceal their positions and get under cover. In mid-afternoon German troops appeared at Markopoulon; they were hotly engaged by the Australian gunners and infantry mortars and came no closer. When the gunners ceased fire after dark they concluded the work of the Divisional Artillery in the campaign in Greece.

None of the other rearguards had occasion to fire their guns. The 1st Armoured Brigade retired through Athens without making contact with the enemy and dispersed under cover near Rafina. The section of N Troop, 34 Anti-Tank Battery, moved back with the Rangers from Khalkis by stages, taking up defensive positions at each halt and expecting the enemy to appear from minute to minute. The demolition charges exploded along the route, however, imposed just enough delay and no enemy ground troops came in sight. When the little rearguard reached the crowded precincts of Rafina before midnight on the 26th the retreat from Molos ended.

The embarkation of troops at Porto Rafti went ahead smoothly. The 64th Medium, 4th and 5th Field, and other artillery details climbed aboard the Salween bound for Alexandria or HMS Carlisle, Devonshire or Kandahar for Crete. [21] At Rafina, however, there were many stragglers and much confusion. Most of the 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank boarded the

Glengyle and sailed for Egypt; but more than 1000 men remained, with many gunners among them.

Major Oakes of the 7th Anti-Tank found himself in a difficult situation on the 27th. There was no plan to continue the embarkation from Rafina in the coming night and there was no assurance that the 1000 men there would be taken off. He had no contact with the Royal Navy and none with the troops at Porto Rafti, a distance of 16 miles as the crow flies, but considerably farther by road. The troops at Rafina had only small arms, if anything, and little ammunition and were not disposed for defence. Oakes therefore set out for Porto Rafti, but his vehicle broke down and he finished the journey on foot. After arranging for a ship to call at Rafina he started off back; but the Germans were coming along the road to Markopoulon and he had to take to the extremely rugged country between the road and coast, dodging enemy parties that were exploring the region. Meanwhile the authorities at Rafina, hearing the action near Markopoulon and becoming increasingly anxious, had begun marching the 1000 men along the coast to Porto Rafti. The coast got progressively rougher as they marched and by the time Oakes met them and turned them back to Rafina the leading elements had broken up into small groups, not all of which could be found and redirected. The main body retraced its steps and waited tensely on the beach at Rafina until the early hours of the 28th, when Havock slipped quietly into the cove and began embarking troops. Tightly packed with men below decks, the Havock took off all the troops that could be found and sailed for Crete. All at Porto Rafti were taken off in the Ajax, Kimberley and Kingston and they, too, sailed for Crete, carrying among others the Australian gunners who had served under New Zealand command.

Many other detachments of New Zealand gunners were still in Greece or were making their various ways independently across the Aegean Sea in a variety of small vessels. The main group consisted of reinforcements who had stayed near Athens and were moved at the last moment to Kalamata in the Peloponnese. There an attempted evacuation failed, a brisk engagement with the German advanced guard achieved only temporary success, and most of the troops fell into enemy hands. Among the gunners concerned with this incident was Major Thomson, [22]

RMO of the 4th Field, who was caring for the wounded at Kalamata. Another gunner party, mainly of F Troop of the 6th Field, misdirected on the journey to Athens, prepared a Greek vessel for a sea voyage, but could not get the motor to start before dawn on the 29th, by which time the force at Kalamata had surrendered. The 6th Field party, [23] under Second-Lieutenant Reed, [24] lay low in the boat all day, towed it by dinghy out into the harbour as soon as it got dark, and then set sail for Crete. They spent an anxious time on the 30th becalmed offshore and working hard to repair the engine. A party went ashore to get more water and returned in daylight on 1 May. They spent the next six days drifting or sailing until they reached Crete. Reed in his report to his battery commander spoke highly, in particular, of Gunner McKenzie, [25] ‘whose courage, energy and determination were unfailing’ and who was largely responsible for the success of the venture.

Another bold escape was staged by a group of a dozen anti-tankers under Lieutenant Patterson
[26] of 34 Battery and another of the same size under Second-Lieutenant Harding. They were among those who failed to get orders to turn back to Rafina on the final night of the evacuation from Attica. The two parties joined forces, but the country proved too rugged and treacherous to negotiate in the dark. Harding and two or three men therefore went ahead to get help, were rowed part of the way by Greeks, and reached Porto Rafti, where they embarked in the Ajax. Patterson and the main party hid all day on the 28th and then sailed in a 40-foot boat from island to island until they reached Crete, being picked up in Suda Bay by HMS Widness when at the end of their resources.

Other gunners had similar adventures in their efforts—not always successful—to avoid capture and get back to their units. Some reached Crete, others got to Egypt, and a few, including Lance-Bombardier Marshall
[27] of 31 Anti-Tank Battery, passed through Turkey. Some of those who reached Crete by such efforts still failed to elude capture; for they ended up in enemy hands after the campaign there. Getting safely away from Greece in some such unofficial evacuation was a matter of luck; but it was also a matter of initiative and determination and often of severe hardship.

By such means the figures of ‘Missing’ were gradually reduced and the NZA casualties for the campaign in Greece eventually came to be listed as follows:

| Killed in Action and Died of Wounds | Wounded | Prisoners |
4th Field | 4 | 16 | 69 | (5 of whom were wounded and 3 died of wounds)
5th Field | 3 | 7 | 36 | (4 wounded)
6th Field | 2 | 14 | 23 | (2 wounded, 1 died of wounds)
7th Anti-Tank | 18 | 22 | 75 | (11 wounded, 1 died of wounds)
1 Survey Troop | | | 1 |
| —— | —— | —— |
| 27 | 59 | 204 |

The total was thus 290, of whom 32 died. Nearly half of them, including over half of those killed, were from the 7th Anti-Tank, as might have been expected. The bulk of the prisoners of war, however, did not serve with the units in Greece: they were with the reinforcement draft that did not get past Athens and was captured in a body at Kalamata. Apart from this unlucky loss, casualties for the campaign were relatively light.

[20] Also known as 9 Bn, King's Royal Rifle Corps.

[21] The embarkation staff at Porto Rafti, under Australian command, included three NZA officers, Capts J. L. Duigan, G. M. Beaumont and A. E. Lambourn. They did their work well. At Rafina the naval officer in charge disappeared, some senior officers of 1 Armd Bde unwisely interfered with arrangements worked out by the embarkation staff, which included Maj Oakes and other NZA officers, and many contradictory orders were issued, including some about taking or not taking the barrels of the few remaining 2-pounders aboard ship. None of the gun barrels could in fact be taken and most of them were tipped off the end of a little jetty.

[22]
Maj G. H. Thomson, OBE, ED; born Dunedin, 5 Mar 1892; obstetrician; gunner, 4 How Bty, Egypt and Gallipoli, 1914–16; RMO 4 Fd Regt Sep 1939–Apr 1941; p.w. 29 Apr 1941; repatriated Oct 1943; died New Plymouth, 14 Jul 1964.

[23] Sgts N. R. Lydster and F. T. Fenton and Gnr W. G. Hodgetts had been left to guard the boat and were captured. Another three-gunners had gone missing in the dark on the way to Kalamata.

[24]
Maj C. K. Reed, DSO, m.i.d.; Napier; born Tolaga Bay, 3 Mar 1915; bank clerk; 6 Fd Regt 1941–45; 2 i/c 4 Fd Regt Feb-Jul 1945; wounded 1 Dec 1941.

[25]
L-Bdr N. G. McKenzie; Wellington; born NZ 12 Feb 1911; commercial traveller; p.w. Dec 1941.

[26]
Lt-Col D. B. Patterson, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 30 Nov 1910; asst architect; 2 i/c 14 Lt AA Regt Apr-Nov 1944; CO 14 Lt AA Regt Jun-Jul 1944; comd Miles Wing, Prisoner-of-War Reception Gp ( UK), Jun-Sep 1945.

[27]
Bdr F. S. Marshall; born NZ 3 Nov 1914; insurance agent; wounded and p.w. Apr 1941; escaped Jul 1941; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 4 — Gunners and ‘Infantillery’ in Crete

Contents

- [section]
p. 102

- Armed and Unarmed Parties p. 105
- An Odd Assortment of Guns p. 109
- The Gun Positions p. 112
- The Airborne Assault on 5 Brigade p. 117
- The Landing in the Prison Valley p. 124
- The Second Day at Maleme p. 129
- Minor Fighting at Galatas p. 133

- The Counter-attack on the Airfield Fails p. 134

- A Paratroop Attack on Galatas is Repulsed p. 137

- 5 Brigade Withdraws p. 139
- The Composite Battalion is Relieved p. 142
- Difficult Gunnery at Galatas p. 144

- Desperate Fighting by Gunners and ‘Infantillery’
p. 147

- Retreat from Galatas p. 155
- Snadden's Gunner Platoon p. 159
- A Cruel Ending to the Campaign p. 162

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

IT was a matter of luck whether gunners from Greece reached Egypt or Crete: few knew their destination when they set sail. The first to reach Crete were Rear Headquarters and 1 Survey Troop, who had sailed in the 10,000-ton invasion ship Glengyle in the night 24–25 April, experienced a Stuka raid at sea, and were taken off in various small craft at Suda on Anzac Day. The surveyors brought valuable instruments with them and these were stored in a wharf shed and picketed before the troop moved on.

The next arrivals were those members of Forward (or Battle) Headquarters and the 4th and 5th Field who left Porto Rafti in the night 26–27 April in the Carlisle or Kandahar: the Salween and also the Glengyle from Rafina, both with gunners aboard, sailed in the same convoy but carried on to Egypt. The latter two ships, as it happened, carried most of the headquarters men of all four regiments. The faster ships of the Royal Navy remained within striking distance of Greece and put off their passengers at Suda. The Carlisle was an antiaircraft cruiser and produced a heavy volume of fire. Her record of 24 aircraft shot down was increased on the voyage by three more. A near miss on the Glengyle buckled some plates and caused a few casualties, none of them gunners. Through it all the hospitality of the sailors was memorable and all gunners, including Brigadier Miles (in the Carlisle), were deeply grateful.

The last large party was of gunners, mainly anti-tankers, who left Rafina in the Havock early on the 28th and reached Suda without incident the same morning after a fast voyage. Others who came in other ships included Major Bull, who had stayed with 4 Brigade at Kriekouki and embarked with the Australian gunners at Porto Rafti.

Contradictory orders and confusion were to be expected at Suda and on both counts gunners were not disappointed. The port was overcrowded, landing barges and other small craft hurried hither and thither, and the dockside and sheds were piled high with military stores. The first argument with army authorities ashore was usually about handing in arms and equipment brought from Greece: sometimes the gunners won and kept their possessions; sometimes they were persuaded against their better judgment to part with them.

What the gunners brought with them was remarkable. Their guns, it is true, were left behind; but despite many attempts by evacuation staffs to get them to discard their personal weapons, small-arms ammunition, and optical and other gunnery instruments and stores, they mostly kept them. The 5th Field, for example, brought out all their dial sights, sight clinometers, and optical stores: they remembered Dunkirk and the subsequent troubles of RA units in getting replacements for what they had left there. But they also brought with them an astonishing armoury of weapons picked up at various points in Greece, much of it carried for many miles before they embarked. The diary of Major Philp
[1] of 27 Battery, 5th Field, gives this startling information:

‘April 28 … Pass through the outskirts of Canea and finally arrive at another transit camp…. The equipment is collected and a guard left. Quite an imposing array. We now possess more arms (rifles, Bren guns, anti-tank rifles, and a Lewis gun) than the Regiment has ever owned. What hours of sweat and discomfort this pile has cost the people concerned! Even wireless sets have been lugged along part of the way.’

The italics have been added. The pity was that much of this equipment was taken from the gunners and stored at Canea or Suda, where without further use it fell into enemy hands. Gunners who had sweated to get it away from Greece, even endangering themselves by clambering with it up rope ladders in the dark, and in some cases had carried it for hot, dusty miles in Crete, did so in vain. Some of the valuable instruments, however, were taken to Egypt before Crete was invaded.

Rather than part with gun stores and small arms, gunners had discarded their personal possessions, spare clothing, blankets, greatcoats and eating and cooking utensils and they soon regretted doing so. It would not be easy to remedy these deficiencies. Not only was there a shortage of all such stores in Crete, but most of those trained in administration—adjutants, quartermasters, clerks, cooks and suchlike—had gone on to Egypt. The long, straggling columns of gunners who were despatched from Suda along the coast road towards Canea were therefore anything but smart. Their uniforms in many cases looked like dusty remnants of a bargain sale and their boots were much the worse for wear.

They passed sandbagged emplacements of Bofors guns among the palm trees which lined the waterfront and then cut across the base of the Akrotiri Peninsula along a powdery white lane. It was thirsty walking and a roadside refreshment centre, buffet-style, two or three miles from the docks, was welcome. Few men had even their mess-tins or knives, forks and spoons. Soon the shady lane narrowed to a footpath, passing camouflaged sheds of military stores set in vineyards and olive groves. Villagers produced barrowloads of oranges and quickly sold them. Crossing a small pool by a causeway of rocks, they found themselves in a spacious bivouac in the Perivolia olive plantation. There they were sorted out into units and representatives were sent to collect rations. After a meal cooked in benzine tins over open wood fires, they settled down under ancient olive trees and slept.

Nearly all the New Zealand gunners had reached this transit camp halfway between the large town of Canea and the village of Perivolia by the morning of 29 April and many had been sent farther west. But it was still too early to take accurate stock of the bits and pieces of regiments that had reached Crete.

Before this could be done the artillery groups moved on to the broken country south-east of the village of Ay Marina, halfway between Canea and Maleme airfield. They rested under trees in narrow, steep-sided valleys about a mile from the coast road, making the most of their few possessions. A tally indicated that about two-thirds of the 4th and 5th Field had assembled there, some 80 officers and men of the 6th Field, 90 of the 7th Anti-Tank, and almost all of Headquarters, Divisional Artillery, and 1 Survey Troop. All of the regimental commanders, Lieutenant-Colonels Parkinson, Fraser, Weir and Duff, had gone on to Egypt and there ensued a good deal of shuffling and reshuffling of temporary appointments. Once again gunners were to become ‘infantillery’, and in the last days of April and the early days of May they formed coastguard patrols, pickets, and ‘companies’ of riflemen — a role well-remembered by the Second Echelon gunners.

[1]
Lt-Col W. D. Philp, DSO, ED; Palmerston North; born Christchurch, 5 Apr 1905; PWD foreman; CO 4 Fd Regt Mar-Dec 1943; 6 Fd Regt Aug 1944-Feb 1945; wounded 23 May 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Armed and Unarmed Parties

Armed and Unarmed Parties

The first thing was to separate those with rifles from those without them, making for each unit an armed party and an unarmed party. The armed party of the 4th Field provided a detachment under Captains Kissel
[2] and S. T. Nolan on 28 April to guard 7 British General Hospital, just west of Canea, against attack from the sea or air and the surveyors did likewise. The unarmed parties ended up back at Perivolia transit camp, with the exception of some 200 men of the 5th Field who marched farther west to act as carrying parties for 5 Brigade at Maleme. Gradually the armed parties linked up with similar bodies of sappers, NZASC men, and others, to form composite units of makeshift ‘infantry’.

Brigadier Miles had taken command of all New Zealand troops on Crete on 28 April and relinquished it on the 30th, when he flew back to Egypt to command the New Zealand troops there. Freyberg commanded the whole island and its defences, forming for the purpose Creforce Headquarters, and on the 30th Major Queree became Freyberg's GSO II. This left Major Oakes of the 7th Anti-Tank as the senior artillery officer of the New Zealand Division in Crete and the composite force was therefore called Oakes Force.

What Oakes Force and the unarmed gunners were to do was a matter of much conjecture, and the continual marching backwards and forwards between Perivolia and Maleme of various gunner detachments in the next week did nothing to clarify the matter. Road transport was extremely scarce, which made it hard for the headquarters staffs (most of them temporary and inexperienced) to acquire the clothes, blankets, ground-sheets, mess-tins and other stores urgently needed. No picks and shovels could be got, which made it impossible to construct defence works or even dig the trenches badly needed for elementary camp hygiene. Unarmed gunners were mostly free to explore the countryside and they soon discovered the hamlet of Stalos, south-west of Ay Marina, wandering along its single street, in and out of the two earth-floored wineshops, the cobbler's workshop, and the smithy, and collecting to hear the BBC news from the one and only wireless set. Crude Greek propaganda posters were stuck on the walls, sadly out of date. There was almost nothing to buy.

There were cottages at intervals along the coast road, here and there a large villa, occasionally a church or chapel, and everywhere trees. Travel-worn New Zealanders or spick and span Regulars of the Welch Regiment gathered at every cluster of buildings and cooled themselves in the shade. Beyond the road the thin strip of beach along the Bay of Canea attracted hundreds of men who bathed naked and unashamed. Across the water they could see the dark rock of Theodhoroi Island and in the distance many shimmering isles.

Most gunners assumed that Crete was for them only a staging area on the way to Egypt and they took little note of talk of an invasion from the sea or air. Miles knew better. He had attended a conference with Freyberg before he left on the 30th and learned that the New Zealanders who had landed on Crete were to stay there and fight. Like Freyberg, he did not welcome the prospect. More than half the New Zealanders were unarmed: gunners without guns, drivers without trucks, engineers and medical men without their specialist equipment, and a great many small detachments of various kinds, unfit for service as infantry and unable to do any other useful work.

The island itself seemed to favour the enemy. Its meagre supplies of military stores could only be built up through the two main ports on the north side, vulnerable to air attack. The airfields at Heraklion and Maleme and the landing strip at Retimo were similarly open to attack. These and the port of Suda above all had to be defended: the mountainous core of the island, gnarled like the trunks of its countless aged olive trees, could be ignored. But only one road linked all four areas of defence, the coast road, narrow and winding, unable to bear much traffic and also exposed to attack from the air.

The New Zealand sector became the western one, from Canea to Maleme and southwards through what became known as the Prison Valley to the lake reservoir of Aghya and the village of Alikianou—a pretty triangle of hill-country speckled with vineyards and olive groves, commanded coldly and distantly by the lofty White Mountains.

Brigadier Puttick, commanding the New Zealand Division, forecast—accurately, as it happened—that the enemy would land from the air at Maleme and in the Prison Valley. To guard the former he chose 5 Brigade, deploying it along the coast from the village of Platanias to the Tavronitis River just west of the airfield. The remainder of the New Zealand troops, 4 Brigade and the various makeshift units of infantry, were to guard the Valley, the village of Galatas, and an arc of hills stretching north-westwards to the sea near Ay Marina.

The New Zealanders at first had no guns; but an independent command, the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO) of the Royal Marines, under Major-General C. E. Weston, had already deployed an assortment of artillery, mainly at Maleme. Two 4-inch coast guns were on the hillside immediately south of the airfield, together with two 3-inch heavy antiaircraft guns, and a handful of Bofors guns encircled the landing strip. None of these were under New Zealand command, a serious error of the defence, which made it impossible to co-ordinate the defence of this all-important airfield. Further confusion resulted from the presence of Fleet Air Arm and RAF ground staffs and the specialists operating a secret radar installation known as the Air Ministry Experimental Station (AMES).

Major Oakes, who had already displayed boundless energy in the retreat from Olympus, took the reins firmly. He had won an MC on the Italian front in the First World War and had later served in the Indian Army. His command appears to have dated from the 29th, and he immediately called meetings of artillery and NZASC officers at his headquarters at the Galatas turn-off (as it was called) on the coast road. By 2 May Oakes Force took over a defensive position from the coast, a mile west of the General Hospital, curving south-eastwards to Galatas. At the same time gunners undertook coastwatching tasks.

The force grew quickly almost to the strength of a brigade, with 1 Battalion under Major Philp, 2 Battalion under Major Lewis, and 3 Battalion under Major Sprosen. It so happened that the artillery officers in the force were senior to the NZASC officers. The 1st Battalion included 4 Reserve Mechanical Transport Company (4 RMT), a detachment of the 7th Anti-Tank, and the survey troop, 60 men of the 6th Field and a party of the 5th Field. Company commanders were Captains Snadden, [3] Lambourn and Veitch
[4] (NZASC). Snadden patrolled over two miles of beach and the other two guarded hill features. Though 4 RMT was the largest contingent in 1 Battalion, it had few officers, and several artillery officers, among them Lieutenants

Clark and Nathan
[5] and Second-Lieutenants Carson and Radford, [6] were therefore seconded to command its ‘platoons’. The 2nd Battalion was made up almost entirely of the 4th Field and its two companies, each of 80–100 men, were commanded by Captains Kissel and Nolan. Its line ran from the left of 1 Battalion south-westwards across Red Hill to Ruin Hill (names attached by men on the spot). The 3rd Battalion was at first mainly of the 5th Field (180 men) and the Divisional Ammunition Company (200–250 men), with Captains Cowie, [7]
Wiles
[8] and Moon
[9] (NZASC) as company commanders, and its line linked 2 Battalion with Galatas.

The current estimate was that the enemy might invade Crete 10 days or a fortnight later and Oakes decided that his men could best prepare for this by an initial course of infantry training. For a day or two, therefore, they practised using the few available weapons and studied infantry defence and patrolling. The shortage of telephone equipment prompted emphasis on semaphore training. So far as defensive positions were concerned, the troops had to make do with the wide and obvious trenches already dug in the area by the Welch Regiment, together with shallow positions scooped out with tins and other improvised tools.

After a day or two an Intelligence summary arrived which gave details of the German parachute landings in the Peloponnese and Oakes and Cowie studied this intently. It seemed to both of them that the best way to deal with parachutists was to get among them as they landed, before they could become organised. Each company therefore formed a platoon and trained it for this task, intending to leave the remaining platoons to hold the line. As part of this training, patrols thoroughly explored the tracks in the neighbourhood and became familiar with the olive groves, vineyards and areas of thickets formed by flax-like agaves in the Prison Valley.

Oakes's assessment proved to be correct; but his ideas were unfortunately not put into practice when the time came, for three reasons. The first was that many of the gunners and NZASC men, including Oakes himself, were withdrawn before the invasion and sent back to Egypt. The second was that Creforce Headquarters laid it down that troops were to do no more than try to hold their ground (because paratroops landing after the first wave might occupy vacated infantry positions). The third was lack of confidence on the part of senior infantry commanders in the area in the ability of the ‘infantillery’ to carry out operations of the kind Oakes envisaged. Senior artillery officers, including Major Bull, maintained then and later that in this the infantry commanders were mistaken and the details of the fighting lend their views much support.

A tentative order of priority for evacuation to Egypt had been drawn up and on 7 or 8 May all members of Artillery Headquarters, the 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank, and the survey troop withdrew to the Perivolia transit camp. On the 9th they embarked on the Rodi, a bomb-damaged Italian ship, and the Bylray and sailed in a large and painfully slow convoy, in an evening luckily clouded with mist which kept the Luftwaffe away. The salvaged instruments and other equipment guarded by the survey troop, including 18 wireless sets, were taken aboard. Air attack next day seemed certain, but none came and the convoy safely reached Alexandria on the 11th. Thus 25 members of Artillery Headquarters, 201 of the 4th Field, 76 of the 6th Field, 92 of the 7th Anti-Tank and 39 of the survey troop returned to Egypt. Gunners left on Crete included the armed parties of the 4th and 5th Field and some 200 unarmed men of the latter, as well as small detachments from other artillery units.

[2]
Capt L. M. Kissel; Christchurch; born Auckland, 2 Apr 1906; schoolmaster; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[3]
Maj J. P. Snadden, MC; Wellington; born Te Kuiti, 24 May 1913; salesman; 2 i/c 5 Fd Regt Mar-Oct 1944; twice wounded.

[4]
Capt J. Veitch; born Scotland, 2 Feb 1901; bus driver; died of wounds while p.w. 3 Jun 1941.

[5]
Capt M. J. Nathan; Wellington; born Wellington, 1 Oct 1917; clerk; twice wounded.

[6]
Capt H. J. Radford; Wellington; born Hamilton, 26 May 1914; motor insurance assessor; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[7]
Capt G. R. Cowie, ED; Wellington; born Petone, 26 Aug 1896; clerk; Wgtn Regt (Lt) 1916–20; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[8]
Maj O. G. Wiles; Auckland; born Palmerston North, 17 Jan 1914; pharmacy assistant; wounded 2 Nov 1942.

[9]
Maj N. C. Moon, m.i.d.; Auckland, born Auckland, 8 Feb 1912; commercial traveller.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

An Odd Assortment of Guns

An Odd Assortment of Guns

The 200 unarmed men of the 5th Field, working in the 5 Brigade area, were suddenly recalled to Ay Marina on about 10 May to form two troops to take over three Italian 75-millimetre howitzers and two British 3.7-inch howitzers, the first instalment of what was hoped would become a complete field regiment. (A party from 16 LAD under Second-Lieutenant Cooper
[10] had gone back towards Suda earlier in the month to overhaul guns of various calibres and makes which were parked under the trees.) Captain Beaumont, [11] newly arrived after escaping from Greece by way of Kea Island and then in the caique used by Patterson's party of the 7th Anti-Tank, took a group through Canea on 11 May and collected the guns. The same day, 27 Field Battery (reconstituted with these two troops) came under the command of 5 Brigade and next day Major Philp left Oakes Force to command it. In the neighbourhood of Galatas 28 Battery under Major Sprosen was preparing to revive itself in its proper role, but only one troop came into existence, F Troop under Captain Duigan, [12] with three 75- or 77-millimetre howitzers which were to support 4 Brigade facing the Prison Valley.

Philp's task called for much ingenuity, for the characteristics of the howitzers were unknown and had to be found out in a hurry, as his diary relates:

‘… we set out to decide if these guns will fire, what range they have, and as they have four charges we must compile a range table in lieu of the gun rule. We select a trig. point on our left and a high feature on our right, both in line with our guns and giving good conditions to produce at intersection out at sea. Signal communications are arranged, 23 Bn warned, and bang goes our first round. Leaves our end all right and arrives well out at sea, the time of flight being recorded. About 60 blokes are seen hurriedly to leave the water down on the beach.

‘Making up the ammunition is quite a job of work. Quite a collection of cases around the place. Shell must be fuzed, charge arranged, and if the case has been fired a new primer is inserted and the case is used again. Shooting consistent, results good. We have the data for our range table, which Capt. Beaumont compiles the next day.’

The howitzers went into position on the 13th and 14th, the 3.75 in the area of 21 Battalion, south-east of the airfield, and the 75s with 23 Battalion east of it. Yet another troop was on the way and Captain Snadden, who was to command it, arrived in the 5 Brigade area to reconnoitre positions for four French 75-millimetre guns which were to become the property of C Troop. Already 1 Light Troop, RA, under Captain J. Dawnay, had taken up position south of F Troop to support

4 Brigade with four 3.7-inch howitzers. These were all the guns or howitzers that could be spared at that time for the New Zealand Division. Only 49 usable guns had reached the island and these had to be deployed among all sectors of the defence, a task undertaken by the CRA, Creforce, Colonel J. H. Frowen of the 7th Medium (though Philp dissented strongly and successfully from Frowen's proposal to site Snadden's guns on the beach).

The battalions of Oakes Force had dwindled in strength and from the 15th it became known as the Composite Battalion under Major Lewis, part of Colonel Kippenberger's 10 Infantry Brigade. Captain Veale commanded the 275-strong RMT Group, Captain Bliss the 200-odd of the 4th Field Group, and there were also 150 of the 5th Field under Major Sprosen, 250 of the Divisional Petrol Company under Captain McDonagh
[13] and 140 of the Divisional Supply Company under Captain Boyce. [14]

Though Oakes's training programme was still in force, Oakes himself had gone back to Egypt. This was a serious loss. It needed someone of his experience and dominant personality to maintain an aggressive policy and ensure that the infantillery were used to good effect. In the end the idea of sending out fighting platoons to deal with parachutists was dropped and the Composite Battalion was expected to do no more than hold the line in the event of invasion, leaving the counter-attack role to trained infantry. Parachute attack was still, of course, a novelty and it was hard to know how to meet it. Looking back, it seems that senior infantry officers failed to appreciate how keen the gunners were on their mission of ‘getting stuck into’ the paratroops before they could organise themselves, how well they had prepared for this, and how hard it would be to sustain morale in a completely passive role. Paratroops are never more vulnerable than when in course of landing. Some gunners and drivers, moreover, who did undertake aggressive operations after the landing, did so with great success—notably Carson's RMT patrol. The passive policy was doubtless reinforced by the Creforce instruction, which had the effect of undermining the defence of the Prison Valley.

Equipment of various kinds was slowly coming to hand. Digging tools never became plentiful and men had to make do with what they could get. Wire was used extensively, however, to strengthen positions. Two Lewis guns became available for the Composite Battalion on the 15th. Three days later another detachment of the Supply Column, organised as three platoons, came under the command of Captain Bliss, bringing the battalion strength to about 760.

[10]
Capt E. F. Cooper, m.i.d.; Auckland; born England, 4 Jan 1911; consulting auto-engineer; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; escaped, Greece, 19 Jul 1941; safe in Egypt, 8 Oct 1941.

[11]
Capt G. M. Beaumont; Greymouth; born Dunedin, 19 Sep 1908; civil engineer; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[12]
Maj J. L. Duigan, ED; Gisborne; born Wellington, 8 Jun 1910; insurance inspector; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[13]
Capt W. G. McDonagh, m.i.d.; born Ireland, 13 Oct 1897; motor engineer; killed in action 20 May 1941.

[14]
Capt A. H. Boyce, ED; Seddon; born Blenheim, 8 May 1905; farmer; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Gun Positions

The Gun Positions

The gun groups at Maleme and Galatas had meanwhile been extremely busy. Major Bull had personally chosen a commanding position on the hillside above the positions of sapper-infantry in the eastern end of the 5 Brigade area for Snadden's four French 75s. Getting the guns there, however, was far from easy. A working party constructed a track up a steep hill and over several terraces, with materials supplied by the nearby sappers. With a borrowed Bren carrier the gunners then towed and manhandled the guns up the hillside.

When the guns were in position, however, there was no mistaking that the effort was worth it. The whole brigade area below lay in full view. The airfield was two miles north-northwest. In front of it was Maleme village, surmounted by the dome of the Orthodox church, among vineyards and gardens looking so near and clear in the sunshine that they seemed within an arm's reach. The ground occupied by the sappers (19 Army Troops Company on the right, 7 Field Company to the left or west) was plain in every detail of its cornfields, vineyards and vegetable patches, with the sea rising behind it like a blue wall. Just beyond the airfield was the 600–800 yard wide mouth of the Tavronitis River, mostly dry shingle, with a gravel bed 200 yards across and a strip of ‘dead’ ground to the west of it. Farther west the massive hills of the Titiros Peninsula filled in an impressive background. The village of Modhion lay half a mile to the south, with Kondomari a mile to the south-west.

Some such position was essential; for the French guns would have to fire over open sights, since they had no instruments and could engage only such targets as were visible from the guns. Indeed they did not even have sights until the gunners improvised them. Efforts to get gun sights made in army workshops failed. The final solution was to fix a piece of wood firmly in the sight bracket, cut a groove in it to form the back sight, and stick a suitably moulded piece of chewing gum into the sight aperture in the gun shield to act as a fore sight. The barrel of the gun was lined up by means of cross threads on to a distant object and the chewing-gum fore sight then adjusted to coincide with the groove in the wood. The guns had range drums and a separate angle of sight. Once the fire was correct for line the range could be corrected by manipulating the elevating gear. Sights were made this way for all four guns and proved to be quite accurate. It was nevertheless primitive gunnery. The 75s were to be used, in effect, like oversized rifles, with the layer looking along the sights direct to his target.

He could not, of course, do this from a position that was not in full view of the enemy. All four guns were sited in the open, with no protection from enemy fire. The ground rose in a series of rock terraces and it was impossible to dig in. Four limbers of the old horse-drawn type had been delivered and Snadden thought at first to use them for protecting the gun crews; but this could not be done and they stayed at the foot of the terraces. Camouflage nets were flung across low olive trees in front of the guns to give some concealment from ground observation; but there was no way of hiding them from the air. All the same, the position had been skilfully chosen and enemy aircraft, though they could plainly see C Troop, found it extremely hard to attack the gun position.

Most of Snadden's men had already trained on French 75s in England and had no trouble operating them. With official permission they fired several proofing rounds out to sea with good results. C Troop, with 200 rounds per gun on hand, was then deemed ready for battle.

The Italian 75s of B Troop and the 3.75 of A Troop had by this time become well established. They were hidden in folds of the ground and were hard to locate from ground or air (though the Luftwaffe searched endlessly for them it never found them). A Troop was half a mile south-west of Kondomari in the eastern bank of a little stream in a tiny valley, hidden from the airfield by a series of ridges. The gun position was a hundred yards or so from a side road at a point a mile and a half from the coast road at Maleme and 4000 yards from the airfield. B Troop was on the edge of an olive grove three-quarters of a mile south of Maleme and 300 yards west of the side road to Kondomari. Olive trees gave excellent cover from aerial observation and the right-hand gun was hidden effectively from the front by a large bush.

The Italian howitzers had a thin shield and short barrel with a recoil of about four feet. The breech was easy to open: press a button or just touch the LBM (Lever, Breech Mechanism). They were therefore simple to load and fire; but sighting was tricky. Ammunition came in five parts: shell (high-explosive), fuse, cartridge case, primer and propellant charge. All had to be assembled before a round could be fired. Then the case had to be charged and primed again. Such a complicated process took time and manpower and each gun therefore had a crew of 11 men, half of them to load and fire and the remainder to prepare ammunition. There were 350 rounds per gun at hand, but only 40 cartridge cases all told. The British 3.7-inch howitzers, with 300 rounds each, presented no special problems.

fifth brigade, maleme, 20 may 1941

A and B Troops were sited for indirect fire and this naturally depended on a system of communications between guns and OPs. No hope was held out that telephone equipment would be forthcoming and wireless sets were quite unobtainable. A visual signalling station was therefore planned for the hill in front of the guns, though it was bound to be spotted from ground and air and put out of action. Observation was essential, nevertheless, for controlling the fire of A and B Troops, and Captain Williams and Lieutenant Cade
[15] selected a position for an OP. It was on Point 107, a few hundred yards south of the airfield, giving good command of the landing strip and of the coast beyond the Tavronitis River. When complete it was well covered and hard to detect from the ground. While gunners worked on it, others tackled the vital matter of communications. Brigade Signals co-operated and in the end Major Bull got some telephone cable from a unit near Suda. Two Italian telephones, fitted with torch batteries, served faintly and reluctantly; but they were better than nothing. Two wireless sets arrived on 18 May, but they would not work. [16]

Major Philp set up his headquarters with Captain Beaumont and 20 other ranks in the village of Dhaskaliana, half a mile south-east of Maleme and not far from Headquarters of 23 Battalion, so that he could keep in touch by means of a roundabout telephone circuit with his guns. A Troop had 36 men and B Troop 40.

Captain Duigan's F Troop at Galatas had a mixture of howitzers: two Italian 75s and one German one of either 75 or 77 millimetres. Ammunition for them arrived in the form of 1000 primers, 600 charges, 600 shells, 750 fuses and 200 cartridge cases. They were sited south-east of the village of Karatsos with the intention of firing to the north and northwest towards the beach in support of 10 Brigade, but their zone of fire was later increased to include the Prison Valley. Enough telephone cable arrived to establish an OP in Karatsos church to observe the beach and another on Cemetery Hill overlooking the valley, while another line ran to the 10 Brigade exchange in Galatas.

The four 3.7-inch howitzers of 1 Light Troop, RA, were emplaced on the flat just south of the Canea- Alikianou road, outside the defended localities of 4 Brigade. An OP was set up near the guns of F Troop and a telephone line connected the troop to 19 Battalion. It was a good position for shelling the beaches; but Captain Dawnay, who commanded the troop, was strangely reluctant to accept infantry protection. When he did ask for it, it was too late.

Busy though they were with their artillery or infantillery work, gunners still had time to look around and to feel the tightness of the situation. Each new day brought an increased sense of expectancy. Intelligence reports contributed something to this, but the chief cause was what everyone could see for himself: the gathering momentum of air attack. The Luftwaffe early in May had concentrated on shipping and installations at Suda and was persistently opposed by the few Hurricanes and Gladiators at Maleme and the anti-aircraft guns defending the harbour. Canea had only a slight taste of bombing and the enemy aircraft usually passed over the divisional area at considerable height. Gradually the raids came closer, were more frequent, and became more personal. Maleme airfield had its first dose one evening at dusk when six Messerschmitts pounced down: a brief firework display, and then they were gone. The succeeding raids became increasingly severe and one of them delayed the proofing of Snadden's guns. An unexploded 3-inch anti-aircraft shell landed beside Captain Williams's bivouac, but it could not have been meant for him, as Major Philp noted, as it had four kisses on it'.

[15]
Brig G. P. Cade, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Hawera, 10 May 1909; Regular soldier; 5 Fd Regt 1941–43; CO 6 Fd Regt 1945; Director RNZA, 1948–54; comd Malaya Force 1957–59; Commander, Central Military District, 1960–64.

[16] The only other instruments possessed by 27 Bty were: one Italian director, slightly damaged; a No. 7 director head; and two remote controls, one of which was used to link the gun positions with HQ 5 Bde and 21 and 23 Bns.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Airborne Assault on 5 Brigade

The Airborne Assault on 5 Brigade

Gunners were told that the landing was expected on 19 May, they were ready for it, and when nothing happened they relaxed. They put it down to the usual faulty Intelligence. The Intelligence, however, were not far wrong. That night there was tremendous activity throughout southern Greece and at various other places as far north as Salonika, in the Dodecanese Islands, and on several of the larger islands of the Aegean, as two great German air corps, the components of 4 Air Fleet under General Loehr, jockeyed for position. The first heavy plane-loads of troops were in the air soon after midnight. The troops on Crete slept as well as usual and woke to another morning of bright sunshine, blue skies, and hardly a breath of wind. Bombers and fighters were over the airfield at Maleme almost at once, harried the Bofors guns there (which were ‘Exactly on the perimeter’, as Major Bull comments, ‘just like a child of ten would set out his toy soldiers’), and departed. The men on the ground got ready for breakfast. Before the dust from the explosions had settled back on to the red earth, while food simmered in petrol tins and troops began to line up for their meal, aircraft vividly marked with the German cross came over again, dropped their bombs, and the dust rose higher still. Bomb after bomb added to it and the dust rose into a fog which marked the airfield for watchers as far away as Canea.

The anti-aircraft defence of the airfield flickered briefly and then died down, though one or two Bofors fired in fits and starts for an hour or two with little apparent effect. The 3-inch guns fired one round each and that was all. The tracers of the Bofors were spasmodic and ineffectual. There were only 10 Bofors: a troop and a half of 156 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA, and a troop of 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RAA, and local command of all anti-aircraft guns was vested in a Major Kay of the former battery. The gun positions were obvious from the air and poorly protected. At least one Australian gun crew fired on and off for several hours, was then forced to withdraw, and later fought on as infantry. Orders for some guns to remain silent so as not to disclose their positions caused much confusion. The anti-aircraft side of the Maleme battle is not a happy story.

Bombing and strafing attacks carried on for an hour and a half and their weight and fury warned the defenders that the threatened landing was imminent. Captain Williams, Lieutenant

Cade and their OP parties on Point 107 overlooking the airfield had a grandstand view and were among the first to glimpse the invading air corps. Bombs stopped falling on the airfield, but not on the hillsides. The air throbbed with the noise of the three-engined Junkers and in a few minutes the sky seemed full of planes. Then the gliders came in, strangely quiet, slipping through the smoke and dust to touch down, some on the hillsides, some on the beaches, a few on the landing strip, and many in the dried-up bed of the Tavronitis to the west. There the crews assembled under cover in the ‘dead’ ground and built up a considerable volume of small-arms fire in the 22 Battalion area. The parachutists began to float down everywhere.

Major Philp could not get through by telephone to A and B Troops and therefore dashed across country to warn them. A load of paratroops came down just as he reached B Troop and a few minutes of wildly exciting action ensued, as he tells in his diary:

‘Lieuts Gibson
[17] and Francis
[18] go to work with a rifle each and I frantically try to tell Lieut Gibson he is firing too high and also that there are three blokes under one tree just where he is firing. The troop riflemen are still below ground and so we raise them and organize them along the front edge of our position. After the first excitement … they settled down to a little duck shooting, another load of parachutists having toppled out. The troop Bren gun is back at the cookhouse and so I go back and send Bdr Tyler
[19] and the gunners up. We return to BHQ and send Gnrs Cantlon
[20] and Marshall
[21] off with our Bren and they do excellent work. BHQ now receives a carrier load right in our front garden and we get into the fun. One Hun is about 25 yards away in grape vines. A few rounds are fired away but he may be lying doggo. Gnr McDonald
[22] sets our anxiety at rest by coming up from the opposite direction, walking straight up to the Hun, and saying: “You'd look at me like that, you ba …, would you?”, with appropriate action. Another poor devil gets his on the wing, his chute catches in an olive-tree, and he finishes up by leaning on a rock wall, head in hands almost as though he had been meditating by the wall when death caught up with him.’

Where paratroops landed this sort of personal view was all that was possible. Men were too taken up with what was happening within a few yards to see farther. For a few minutes Captain Snadden's men on the spur above the engineers had a panoramic view and they gazed in awe and wonderment. Then they were taken up with snap shooting at paratroops drifting obliquely down in front of them to land in the area of 7 Field Company. They could almost reach out and touch the Ju52s as they thundered past from the south-west. Below them the sappers carried out a terrible execution of parachute and glider troops. Then paratroops began to land all round C Troop and were fiercely engaged by a group of gunners Snadden had stationed on the hillside above the guns. They fired rifles and Brens and then captured enemy weapons at the paratroops and the aircraft. Parachutes were still opening up and drifting down when C Troop opened fire. Targets were plentiful and Snadden picked out a glider and two Ju52s which had landed on the beach. Almost at once a cloud of smoke rolled upwards from one of the Junkers and the gunners cheered.

Williams, Cade and the OP parties of A and B Troops soon found themselves in the thick of an infantry engagement. Enemy landing close at hand were quickly dealt with by gunners and infantry; but for a few minutes bullets were flying in all directions and men wished they had eyes in the backs of their heads. The FOOs were impatient to take up their proper work of directing the fire of the guns. They found it hard to see over the airfield because of the smoke and dust; but they found it harder still to report back to the gun positions. Not only had the bombing interrupted telephone lines: the paratroops had been trained to cut them and did so in many places. In the gun positions at the other end of the line there was the same anxiety to get the telephones working. Sergeant McLeay, [23] who was NCO in charge of the signals at B Troop gun position, at once took a party forward to repair the breaks. He carried on, mending the cable as he went, until stopped by infantry who said that the enemy was just ahead. With his rifle he stayed and fought until the pocket was overcome and then went on along the line until stopped again, this time by machine-gun fire. Again he fought; but enemy strength ahead increased and it became clear that the line could not be restored unless the defending infantry applied considerable pressure, which they evidently did not intend to do. Realising this, McLeay reluctantly returned to the guns.

The line between A and B Troops, however, remained intact and it was decided to engage targets by map reference, since no orders were coming through from the OP. It was easy to tell by the sound of firing that the enemy had become established in some strength beyond the river, and the target chosen was therefore the village of Tavronitis, on the coast road just beyond the riverbed. The fire was accurate and the gunners were pleased to learn later that the first few rounds, landing among the cottages, flushed out a large number of Germans. But the men at the guns were very much in the dark as to what was happening and what effect their fire had.

The scene around the guns and BHQ was like a surrealistic painting. Dead Germans were everywhere and parachutes draping the trees and bushes fluttered in the wind. One or two parachutes—mostly attached to canisters of equipment—had failed to open. Philp describes it vividly:

‘Most chutes are green; a few red appear to be the officer blokes, white for equipment. A prisoner is brought into BHQ, slightly wounded. Quite young, he can speak English reasonably well. Has a sketch—all NCOs had excellent maps [Philp was mistaken here, for many NCOs had never seen a map of Crete] and every chutist a sketch. Has the usual rubbish expected in the paybook of a soldier including a picture of a beautiful Fraulein…. Everyone without arms now obtains a Luger pistol, a rifle, or a tommy gun and grenades from dead Huns and we are reasonably well armed.’

Turning these events over in his mind years later Philp remembered most vividly of all the first moment of the landing. He looked at the men around him and saw them speechless and motionless, stricken with awe. For an unforgettable moment or two he feared for them. Then they sprang into action and ‘Presto! the weight was lifted from my heart.’

Those at the OP could see from their vantage point the development of the landing and the building up of an attack from beyond the riverbed, and they were feverishly impatient to get word back to the guns. Cade put a message through 22 Battalion and brigade headquarters; but it did not reach the guns until 10 p.m., garbled and useless. He and Williams sent another by means of the walkie-talkie wireless set carried on the back of an operator who followed the battalion commander on his rounds. This gave no more than a general indication of target areas; but it, too, failed to reach the guns before dark. Beyond the airfield for some miles to the west parachutists landed, formed up, and marched towards the river. Williams saw two anti-tank guns brought forward, one by a motor-cycle and the other towed by a car. Paratroops crossed the riverbed and took cover, some of them throwing flags like handkerchiefs over their shoulders as signals to the Luftwaffe. Fighters and bombers worked closely with them, attacking centres of resistance. In this way pressure against the western positions of 22 Battalion steadily increased.

Before long the OP party was directly threatened. Just below the OP were the positions of the two 4-inch coast guns and they had been heavily bombed. Williams saw men literally blown from their stations. All officers except a second-lieutenant seemed to have been killed and some of the gun crews were captured. It looked at one stage as though the enemy was using these prisoners as a shield for his advance. As an attack developed against the lower slopes of Point 107 the OP party found itself in the front line. Williams thereupon moved to the left flank and quickly got together a mixed group of Marines, Fleet Air Arm and RAF men, anti-aircraft gunners, and other stragglers and laid out a defensive position north-west of the OP, mainly along a stone wall. The OP party split up, Cade and one or two men going to the right of this position and Williams and the rest to the left. They sent a runner back to the battalion commander asking for help and got word back to hold on as help was coming. Then someone suggested a bayonet charge. Few men had bayonets, but others stuck knives or anything sharp they could find on the end of their rifles and sallied forth. They found it astonishingly easy to drive back the paratroops. Then Major Leggat
[24] of 22 Battalion arrived with a handful of men and this part of the hill was quickly cleared. Dead and dying Germans lay in front and Williams went forward to make sure they were not shamming, and in so doing he was wounded.

What made it all the harder for 27 Battery was that it had been formed from the unarmed party of the 5th Field and deficiencies of small arms had not been made up. Some seven plane-loads of paratroops dropped in the immediate vicinity of A and B Troops and for the first few desperate minutes there had been an agonising shortage of weapons with which to engage them. On Sergeant Tavendale's B Troop gun, for example, there was only one rifle among the 11 men and Tavendale himself used this while his men rammed rounds (with a pick helve) and fired the gun. A parachutist hit the ground about nine feet from the gun with his tommy gun blazing and attracted fire from all sides which killed him instantly. Then two supply canisters dropped nearby and their contents provided ample small arms and ammunition for the gunners who could spare the time to use them. In these confused minutes after the landing started those who had initiative and could lead men soon became obvious. One of them was Second-Lieutenant Francis, who was active stalking paratroops and investigating any source of trouble. His cheerfulness throughout was a source of inspiration for those around him.

The problem of observing and controlling the fire of the guns was not solved throughout the day; but it was slightly eased by requests which came from the infantry in mid-morning for searching fire on the area between Tavronitis and the riverbed. Word somehow reached the gun positions that this fire was accurate and the guns continued regardless of severe machine-gunning from the air of their general area. Then the gunners heard that the enemy was concentrating farther west and they extended their ranges.

The C Troop gunners were far better off. They could see what they were doing (and indeed had to see, or they could do nothing). They shelled a car which appeared just south of the airfield and it disappeared at once. Then they shelled the passengers of a troop-carrier which had landed on the beach to the north-east. They were forming up at an old olive press by the water's edge not far from 19 Army Troops Company and made a sitting target at a range of 1000 yards. C Troop hit the building with its first shot and sent the enemy scuttling in all directions. With this taste of power the gunners began to enjoy themselves. They engaged aircraft, gliders and troops on the airfield and foreshore and at noon were offered another prize. An enemy platoon had the audacity to march in formation along the road by the landing strip where the car had previously appeared. The point was doubtlessly hidden from the New Zealand troops nearby, but from C Troop's hillside it was in full view at little more than 2000 yards. The first round of gun fire landed squarely in the middle of the platoon. Another party came up, possibly to help, and a well-aimed shell sent it back hurriedly. No further efforts were made to help the wounded and they and the dead lay there until dark. A house on the shore had been turned into a strongpoint and No. 2 gun was detailed to destroy it. The usual delayed-action fuse made no impression after several direct hits at 1000 yards, so Snadden ordered ‘plugged shell’—no fuse, so that the round had the effect of solid shot. The first round went through the walls and the other three guns followed up with high-explosive, demolishing the building. The same technique proved similarly effective in dealing with a house which was causing the Maori Battalion to the east much trouble. Several such hits drove the enemy out. Meanwhile those gunners not needed to fire the guns were organised into squads which co-operated with the staff and prisoners of a field punishment centre just to the south, and between them they almost cleared the neighbourhood of paratroops and kept the surviving ones quiet.

So far so good; but C Troop could plainly be seen by enemy around Maleme village and by the airfield. It was attacked first by shellfire from one of the Bofors guns from the perimeter of the landing strip; but this was soon silenced. Either this or another Bofors, however, was soon in action from Maleme village, shelling the gun position persistently and eventually wounding Captain Snadden in four places (though he stayed with his guns). This Bofors was evidently well-protected and its fire could not be subdued. Then fighter aircraft began a series of machine-gun attacks on the unprotected gun position. These attacks were so persistent that had the gunners taken cover from them they would not have been able to fire at all, so they carried on almost regardless of them. At the end of the day C Troop had fired 350 rounds, B Troop had done likewise, and A Troop got away 200 rounds.

By the middle of the afternoon 21 and 23 Battalions, respectively south-east and east of 22 Battalion at Maleme, had largely cleared their areas of parachute and glider troops and were well placed to put into effect their role of immediate counter-attack to clear the airfield. But they did not do so. Partly this was because of poor communications, which as Philp says had a demoralising influence. Partly, perhaps, the Creforce instruction to hold positions was working like a poison in the minds of those who might have helped. Infantry companies by the airfield were still fighting splendidly and the gunners did their best to help; but the situation went from bad to worse and nothing was done at a higher level to reverse this trend, though the enemy had suffered catastrophic losses and the advantage still lay with the defence.

[17]
Capt N. McK. F. Gibson; Auckland; born Auckland, 16 Jul 1916; public accountant; wounded 20 Jul 1942.

[18]
Capt B. W. Francis; England; born Brockley, England, 29 May 1913; farm manager; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[19]
Bdr S. C. Tyler; born England, 24 Feb 1902; mechanic; killed in action 18 Apr 1943.

[20]
L-Sgt W. F. Cantlon; born Warkworth, 2 Feb 1901; electrical inspector; wounded 5 Nov 1942; died on active service 20 Aug 1943.

[21]
Gnr H. Marshall; Christchurch; born Wellington, 2 Sep 1917; service station manager.

[22]
Gnr I. H. McDonald; Christchurch; born NZ 30 May 1914; truck driver; wounded and p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[23]
Sgt K. A. McLeay, MM; born Napier, 22 May 1918; clerk; wounded Nov 1941; killed in action (sinking of Chakdina) 5 Dec 1941.

[24]
Lt-Col J. Leggat, ED; Christchurch; born Glasgow, 19 Dec 1900; schoolteacher; NZLO GHQ MEF, 1941–42; headmaster, Christchurch Boys' High School, 1951–58 died Christchurch, 16 Oct 1965.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Landing in the Prison Valley

The Landing in the Prison Valley

The day at Galatas had started in much the same way. The difference there was that the troops in the neighbourhood had not become used to fierce air attack on the immediate locality: the enemy was almost entirely ignorant of the defensive dispositions there. Composite Battalion on the right flank did not suffer at all from the preliminary bombing and strafing. Galatas and the ground to the south-west, occupied by 6 Greek Regiment (poorly trained and almost unequipped), received a little attention. The unoccupied ground by the prison and reservoir was heavily attacked. Major Sprosen reported from Wheat Hill that there was heavy bombing, but ‘not on us’. Everyone saw the gliders and was impressed by their uncanny quietness, but it was not clear where they landed. The mass of paratroops falling thickly around the prison, east of it near the village of Pirgos, and in the area of 19 Battalion around Karatsos, however, was in full view of the infantillery. They had heard the heavy throbbing of the invasion aircraft and the ringing of the church bells and then they saw the clumsy-looking Junkers fly in low from over Theodhoroi Island, passing Ay Marina and flying in a deep arc inland and round towards them, getting bigger and bigger until they filled the sky with their bulk and thunder as they passed overhead. As the noise of the planes decreased it was replaced by the jerky crackling of rifles and machine guns in the valley and among the trees around Karatsos.

parachute landings at galatas, 20 may 1941

Men of the 4th Field had ended their early-morning stand-to at 7.30 a.m. and only pickets were left on Red Hill when the alarm went. Captain Nolan ordered his men to take cover while he observed from the crest. When the paratroops began to fall the men were called to man their positions. None landed in the neighbourhood and the only firing was against aircraft. A few paratroops and a number of supply canisters drifted down towards the RMT lines just to the north. At least one parachutist was shot in the air by Second-Lieutenant Carson, another three were hit when they reached the ground, and three more were rounded up next day. The small arms and ammunition in the canisters was quickly put to good use. The left-hand part of the 4th Field position consisted of 2 Echelon of the Supply Column on Ruin Hill, and these men began to engage paratroops around the prison at a range of some 1200 yards. A handful who landed closer were killed or driven off, a task the NZASC men shared with others of the 5th Field on Wheat Hill. After this these gunners, under Major Sprosen, could do no more than watch the landing in the prison area. They had been forbidden to leave their positions and attack. For Sprosen, who was itching to put into effect the training instigated by Oakes, it was exasperating in the extreme. He had been told, however, that if Galatas was lost he was to counter-attack and recapture it and in the late afternoon it seemed that he would have to do this.

To Sprosen's left front the Petrol Company held Pink Hill overlooking the road that led past the prison. Paratroops attacked along this road towards Galatas early in the afternoon supported by mortar fire and much small-arms fire. Captain McDonagh was killed, the only other officer wounded, and the NZASC men fell back, taking their wounded with them. A runner reached Sprosen with orders from Colonel Kippenberger to regain the town. The infantillery around Wheat Hill were warned accordingly and were on the point of moving when Kippenberger himself arrived and cancelled the order. He had decided to abandon the town in the meantime. But he had no need: the situation had righted itself. Greeks charged across to Cemetery Hill, fire from Wheat Hill picked off one parachutist after another, and the Germans who had tentatively stationed themselves on Pink Hill withdrew by mistake after dark. But the chance of decisive action had passed. The enemy had suffered heavy loss and the survivors assembled around the prison expecting a counter-attack. Overwhelming strength was available for this; but it was not used. Too many reasons were adduced, at Divisional level and below, for doing nothing. The Germans near the prison congratulated themselves on their good fortune. The infantillery on Wheat Hill and Red Hill, on the other hand, felt emotionally flattened and their eagerness began to drain away.

A platoon under Second-Lieutenant Dill
[25] in Kissel's company came under fire from a gun beside the prison in the afternoon and two gunners were wounded before they could take cover. [26] Later a platoon under Lieutenant MacLean
[27] of about 35 men was withdrawn from Nolan's company to act as brigade reserve, together with 26 RMT drivers under Carson. Both undertook their tasks with great zeal. The rest of the Composite Battalion was capable of the same kind of effort; but nothing was asked of them.

F Troop of the 5th Field with its three light howitzers was south-east of Galatas in the area of 19 Battalion and across the valley, outside the battalion area, was 1 Light Troop, RA. Captain Dawnay, RA, had asked at the last moment for infantry support and an infantry section reached him at first light to prepare a platoon position. The landing prevented the rest of the platoon from coming, however, enemy appeared on the scene in great strength, and the howitzers were overrun, though not before an English gunner bravely carried out under fire the vital task of disabling three of them. The fourth, which he could not possibly reach, was later used against 19 Battalion. Dawnay and about 15 RA gunners eventually reached F Troop and some other RA gunners made their way to headquarters of 19 Battalion.

composite battalion, galatas, 20 may 1941

This left only the mixed lot of howitzers under Captain Duigan to support 4 and 10 Brigades. The only OP which could cover the landing was the one on Cemetery Hill, 300 yards south of Galatas; but this, too, had no infantry cover after 6 Greek Regiment dissolved, which it soon did, and the OP could not be occupied. There was no shortage of action at the gun position, however, for paratroops landed close at hand in all directions. The howitzers opened fire at short range over open sights on houses occupied by the enemy. Shortly afterwards the gunners had to fight off an attack on the gun position, which they managed to repel, capturing a German officer and 10 other ranks.

Towards evening Major Sprosen was ordered to send out fighting patrols towards Galatas and he quickly did so. His gunners, though inexperienced, were keen and they advanced readily. At Pink Hill they ran into considerable fire, however, and suffered some loss. Bombardier Santi, who had won a magnificent DCM at Thermopylae for his gun-laying, was mortally wounded. Sergeant McCarthy, whose gun had fired the first NZA rounds of the war over the Aliakmon, was hit in the stomach and later died. Second-Lieutenant Caughley
[28] was slightly wounded and later WO II Bissett
[29] was also wounded.

Another patrol in the afternoon led by Second-Lieutenant Brown of the 4th Field went out to find the Divisional Cavalry detachment under Major Russell in the reservoir area and bring it back. But Russell had already decided to withdraw and Brown met him. Russell moved through Bliss's company on Red Hill and then round into Galatas, which was then noman's land. By degrees a line was established with the Cavalry between Pink Hill and Cemetery Hill, the Petrol Company behind Pink Hill, and the 5th Field on Wheat Hill. The few Boys anti-tank rifles—not very effective against tanks, but useful for long-range sniping—were withdrawn and handed to the Cavalry. But by this time it was the morning of the 21st.

[25]
Lt J. P. Dill, m.i.d.; born England, 30 Aug 1915; fur merchant; wounded 25 May 1941; died of wounds 2 Jun 1941.

[26] Gnrs R. F. Sheargold and T. N. Ellis.

[27]
Maj G. MacLean; Wanganui; born Wellington, 13 Nov 1915; farmer; twice wounded.

[28]
Maj A. M. Caughley, MC, ED, m.i.d.; New Plymouth; born Christchurch, 9 Apr 1916; bank officer; twice wounded.

[29]
WO I A. H. Bissett; Christchurch; born NZ 30 Jul 1913; Regular soldier; twice wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Second Day at Maleme

The Second Day at Maleme

The night 20–21 May at Maleme had been a time of crisis for both sides; but in the course of it the enemy gained an advantage which was to prove in the end decisive: the battalion guarding the airfield withdrew. This move, ordered by the CO, seemed at company level incomprehensible. Certainly it appeared thus to Williams and Cade and their OP party on Point 107 and their band of sailors, soldiers and airmen who were still full of fight. Williams had to leave this group during the night because he had been wounded and was losing a good deal of blood. When he reported to a nearby RAP for a dressing he was persuaded to stay, travelling back with the RAP as it withdrew. In the confusions of the night the RAP group met several parachutists and Williams got the impression that they were not dangerous opponents unless organised. They fired wildly and panicked easily. In daylight on the 21st the RAP came under fire from both sides and later in the day was captured. Williams was taken to the German headquarters across the river, and there he learned that the Germans had not expected to survive the counter-attack which they all expected to strike them with overwhelming force in the night 20–21 May.

To Major Philp at the headquarters of 27 Battery the events of the night were extremely puzzling. Captain Beaumont had been in conference at 5 Brigade Headquarters and returned at 1 a.m. on the 21st. At 2.30 a.m. the telephone rang and Philp learned that the battalion guarding the airfield had withdrawn. He at once went to another conference at the headquarters of 23 Battalion. Emergency arrangements had to be made to bring down fire on the airfield during the coming day, since there was no OP. Waking Lieutenant Gibson, he discussed with him the possibilities that seemed open. Later Gibson arranged with Captain McElroy
[30] of 21 Battalion that the infantry would send a signal whenever an aircraft landed on the runway and the guns would then fire.

As soon as it was light Major Philp climbed the ridge behind 23 Battalion Headquarters to observe for the guns. He found snipers numerous and troublesome. The Luftwaffe was up early and in force and high-velocity shells from one or two of the Bofors near the airfield were soon streaking up the hillsides, setting the scrub on fire. The enemy was bringing mortars into play and many requests came from the infantry to shell suspected enemy positions. The guns of A and B Troops opened fire regardless of the many fighter aircraft machine-gunning the area; but they ceased fire when Stukas came over and were not bombed. The enemy's chief concern was now to get more men on the ground and more ammunition and other supplies. The airfield was in his hands and he was determined to use it. At 8.10 a.m. one of the Dorniers which had been bombing the area came swiftly down and landed. In a matter of moments it attracted fire from the guns, the red earth spurted upwards around it, and it did not wait for more. In the next few minutes more bombers, fighters and troop-carrying aircraft came down in spite of the gun fire and took off again. Shortly after 9 a.m. some 60 transport planes dropped parachutists to the west and these were shelled at once.

There were targets in profusion and the question was how to engage them. There was no OP, communications were still difficult, and reports from the infantry were intermittent and unreliable. Moreover, shooting by map reference was unsatisfactory. Most of the firing in the early part of the day was simply a matter of waiting for the dust cloud which rose when an aircraft landed and then letting off a few rounds at the airfield. The most that could be said for this method was that it was better than nothing.

The enemy was getting together a considerable force west of the airfield and by the middle of the morning he began to exert pressure against 23 Battalion. The paratroops were supported by heavy machine guns, mortars, a few light field guns, the captured Bofors, and the countless fighter and bomber aircraft at their disposal; but they made negligible progress. What was more serious was that aircraft were landing on the airfield and taking off and that other aircraft were crash-landing on the beaches and at some points inland. Wherever and whenever possible these landings were shelled; but the enemy was evidently prepared to accept severe losses to secure a foothold in this vital region. His other landings in Crete offered no immediate hope of success.

The French 75s of C Troop were the only guns which could bring down accurate fire on the landing strip and for the gunners of this troop the battle grew bitter indeed. The gun position was by now well known to the enemy and attracted intense fire. Bofors rounds came spitting up at the guns when- ever they fired, bursting inside the open gun position and wounding one man after another. C Troop could not silence this fire, though it tried to engage the Bofors from directions given by an Australian officer who had commanded some of the light anti-aircraft guns on the airfield. By some miracle no bombs landed near C Troop; but machine-gunning from the air was a constant menace, causing casualties and even marking the gun barrels. Bullets and cannon shells picked off one gunner after another, but did not silence the guns. The work of the gun sergeants, Ames, Dolamore, Paterson
[31] and Stevenson, [32] and their men was watched by the engineers below, by stretcher-bearers who came up for the wounded, and by all others within sight and all marvelled at their courage and persistence. Their accuracy, moreover, was confirmed by infantry below, especially of the Maori Battalion. Captain Baker [33] of this unit, who was moving along the beach at the time, remarked later that this ‘battery, which was under the command of Captain Snadden, gave a first-class exhibition of gunnery and accounted for the six planes nearest us. Certainly in practically all cases they were set on fire before the occupants had a chance of alighting and out of the six planes I saw only twenty men who ever left that beach.’ (Each troop-carrier carried 11 men besides its crew.) Another Maori report stated that troop-carriers were landing on the beach and that ‘our arty, showing great form, put four of them on fire in quick succession.’

The tempo of the enemy landing on the airfield increased in the afternoon and troop-carriers began to arrive like trams at a main terminus, halting for a minute or two and then taking off. The Bofors became very troublesome and Captain Snadden tried hard to neutralise it. To get a better view of Maleme village he took his assistant, Gunner Storey, [34] up to a higher terrace. While they were there the gun position was severely strafed from the air and Snadden hurried back. He found Second-

Lieutenant
Hume
[35] dying from bullet wounds in the back. Hume had been an inspiration to the men and this was a sad loss; but later in the afternoon it was avenged. Sergeant Ames scored a bull's-eye on a Bofors near the road in Maleme and turned it upside down, to the delight of the other gunners. Smoke from burning aircraft on beach and airfield marked other successes; but the steady arrival and departure of planes continued.

Late in the afternoon the men of C Troop, sweating from their exertions on the open hillside, were treated to a magnificent spectacle. A parachute landing took place right on top of 18 Army Troops Company below them. The enemy force, about 260 men, suffered terrible loss inflicted by the sappers and Maoris. All but a handful were killed or captured within an hour. In a matter of minutes the cornfields and vineyards were strewn with dead and wounded Germans. But the gunners had little time to sit and gaze. They kept firing and the enemy kept firing at them. All the gun commanders were wounded and their places were taken by lance-bombardiers or gunners. By the end of the day C Troop had lost 15 men, a third of its strength.

One incident during the afternoon caused some annoyance. Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. Strutt of 2/3 Australian Field Regiment had been made temporary CRA of the New Zealand Division and eight of his guns, at first stationed at Georgeoupolis where they were not needed, came under divisional command, as well as two 2-pounders of the 106th RHA. Planning for a counter-attack on Maleme was in its initial stages at Creforce and Divisional Headquarters, both of them rather out of touch with conditions on the Maleme front. The idea at this stage was that Strutt's guns and the RHA ones would move forward and support this night attack and the RAF would bomb the airfield, while 27 Battery fired ahead of the attacking troops, who would fire green Very lights to indicate their forward positions. Had he been asked, Major Philp might have explained how unrealistic this scheme was; but he could not be consulted.

At all events, Strutt came forward in the afternoon to 5 Brigade and saw Brigadier Hargest. [36] Word had come through, either then or earlier, of the heavy casualties of C Troop, and Strutt must have gained the impression that 27 Battery was intending to cease fire to cut down losses. He therefore ordered the battery to continue firing. Philp would have been indignant had he received this order; but he did not do so. His A and B Troops, it is true, ceased fire from time to time, but only when Stukas were overhead. Late in the afternoon they were shelled by guns west of the airfield and briefly ceased fire. The only guns to which Strutt's order could have applied, therefore, were those of C Troop; and neither Snadden nor anyone else at the gun position had any thought of ceasing fire. They were determined to carry on regardless of what was fired back at them.

A and B Troops had meanwhile carried on as best they could. They fired on the airfield with little or no knowledge of the effect they created. At intervals throughout the day they shelled a gully south of the runway which had become a centre of enemy activity. One B Troop gun, switched at right angles to its normal line of fire, shelled Maleme village in response to an infantry request. As the guns became hotter the cartridge cases began to swell and the gunners had much trouble with them, having to ram them very hard to get them into the breeches.

It was mid-afternoon before Lieutenant Cade got back to 27 Battery, after a night of many adventures with his mixed party from Point 107 and a morning of danger and difficulty. He was worn out; but he at once went to B Troop and climbed up from there to a ridge 1000 yards to the west where he began to observe for the Italian 75s. The indomitable Sergeant McLeay followed him and set up a visual signalling station on the open slope behind, just out of sight of the enemy on the ground, and there, 100 yards behind Cade, he relayed fire orders to the guns. Cade's OP on the forward slope, in an open region of vineyards, was swept from time to time by small-arms fire; but Cade stayed there through the heat of the afternoon and until dark. On Cade's directions B Troop engaged many targets beyond the river and did much to hamper the development of the enemy's efforts to gain full control of the airfield and its environs.

[30]
Lt-Col H. M. McElroy, DSO and bar, ED; Auckland; born Timaru, 2 Dec 1910; public accountant; CO 21 Bn Jun 1943-Jun 1944; four times wounded.

[31]
S-Sgt R. A. Paterson; born Hamilton, 4 Jun 1916; warehouseman; wounded 23 May 1941; died Lower Hutt, 12 Nov 1962.

[32]
WO II J. K. P. Stevenson; Rotorua; born Wellington, 11 Apr 1916; cabinetmaker; twice wounded.

[33] Lt-Col F. Baker, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; born Kohukohu, Hokianga, 19 Jun 1908; civil servant; CO 28 (Maori) Bn Jul-Nov 1942; twice wounded; Director of Rehabilitation, 1943–54; Public Service Commissioner, 1954–58; died Wellington, 1 Jun 1958.

[34]
Gnr G. Storey; Paparoa, Northland; born NZ 5 Dec 1917; clerk; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[35]
2 Lt L. H. Hume; born NZ 3 Mar 1918; accountant; killed in action 21 May 1941.

[36]
Brig J. Hargest, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d., MC (Gk); born Gore, 4 Sep 1891; farmer; Member of Parliament, 1931–44; Otago Mtd Rifles, 1914–20 (CO 2 Bn, Otago Regt); comd 5 Bde May 1940-Nov 1941; p.w. 27 Nov 1941; escaped, Italy, Mar 1943; killed in action, France, 12 Aug 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Minor Fighting at Galatas

Minor Fighting at Galatas

The second day of the invasion started at Galatas with a sortie by MacLean's 4th Field patrol to locate and bring back two infantry companies which had spent the night in no-man's land. They had been ordered to attack the prison area, but this order was now cancelled. MacLean came upon a company commander as he was about to attack. The front was quiet, however, and all returned safely. The enemy had suffered severe losses, was shaken, and could not be reinforced. He was vulnerable in the Prison Valley to counter-attack; but the New Zealand command at divisional and brigade level was defence-minded.

The only operation attempted this day was a small one to regain Cemetery Hill. The enemy there were driven off with considerable loss; but reoccupying the feature was a different matter. It was open to fire from both sides and in the end the New Zealanders gave up trying to re-establish their positions there. This particularly troubled Captain Duigan of F Troop, who was most anxious to get his OP set up again and could not do so. As an alternative Captain Bevan set one up on Wheat Hill; but communications from it to the guns were uncertain. More often than not, in any case, the gunners were concerned with targets close at hand. Enemy mortars fired all round the gun position and Stukas attacked so accurately that the troop had to cease fire when the dive-bombers were overhead. F Troop nevertheless maintained a considerable volume of fire and the main restrictions on it were imposed not by the enemy, but by Major Bull, because existing stocks of ammunition could not be replenished.

On the Composite Battalion front little happened except that enemy mortars steadily increased their fire, though it was no more than a slight nuisance as yet, and air attack became more and more personal. The NZASC men and gunners holding this front, all inexperienced as infantry, had the situation well in hand and would have been better pleased had they been called on to do more. The ones who were asked for more, Carson's and McLean's patrols, did extremely well. Carson had a full and profitable day, clearing the rear area of parachutists and bringing in small arms, ammunition and other supplies invaluable to the lightly armed infantillery.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Counter-attack on the Airfield Fails

The Counter-attack on the Airfield Fails

The night of 21–22 May at Maleme was a time of feverish waiting, quick decisions, and the belated start of the counter-attack on the airfield. For fear of a seaborne landing—which General Freyberg still considered a more dangerous threat than the existing one from the airborne troops—20 Battalion just west of Canea could not be released to take part until relieved by an Australian battalion from Georgeoupolis. The fear seemed justified by the gun flashes seen at sea as the Royal Navy intercepted an invasion fleet, and the defenders of the island were not to know that this was no more than a follow-up force quite incapable of making an opposed landing. Because of this delay only two companies of the 20th reached the start line for the counter-attack by 3.30 a.m. on 22 May, nearly three hours late. The bombing of the airfield promised by the RAF did not eventuate. The eight guns of 2/3 Australian Field Regiment did not arrive. Two light tanks that came forward could do little except drive along the road to Maleme. Such support as the infantry got for their advance came chiefly from the nine guns of 27 Battery.

To Major Philp it was disappointing and in some ways exasperating. He had no communications to the attacking troops, no FOOs, the timetable was shattered before the start, and his guns could do little to help. ‘A and B Tps bashed the aerodrome area once more but were in the dark re our own troops after a while and so held fire until a definite location … was supplied’, is how he explained it later. His nine assorted guns, even under ideal conditions, could scarcely have turned the tide of battle; but as things were they could do almost nothing. C Troop answered some calls for fire on the flat below, shouts which could be heard from time to time above the noise of battle. When daylight came the French 75s could do a little more; but the situation was still very confused.

By this time, too, Philp was worried about ammunition. Existing stocks were small and it was reported that no more rounds could be got for the French 75s. Fortunately this was incorrect. Lieutenant Dyson
[37] of the 4th Field had been appointed DAQMG, New Zealand Division, and he managed to locate more ammunition and, harder still, three lorries to carry it. With these he arrived in the 5 Brigade area early on 22 May, attracting much attention from the Luftwaffe. At least one lorry was set on fire and its precious cargo lost. One lorry-load of French 75-millimetre ammunition was safely delivered to C Troop. Gunners already aching with weariness had to carry it up the steep hillside. A and B Troops had to go without. It is doubtful if lorries could have reached them in any case; for the enemy covered the only road to the gun positions.

The infantry of 20, 28 (Maori) and 21 Battalions meanwhile pushed on. The 20th reached the edge of the airfield before being driven back by murderous fire, particularly from the air. The 21st carried on during the day and made quite good progress in the hills to the south, though Brigade Headquarters was unaware of this. The gunners did what they could to help. Troop-carrying aircraft were by now running a taxi service to the airfield. Many of them were hit and the area became strewn with derelicts, but the taxi service continued. The guns kept pounding the airfield and did much damage; but they could not halt the inexorable build-up of enemy strength. The Luftwaffe in turn did its best to silence A and B Troops; but its efforts took the form of bombing and strafing suspected gun areas and it seemed doubtful that the actual gun positions were discovered from the air. Philp's headquarters, however, had a narrow escape. Philp had decided to move it and had just done so when a bomb scored a direct hit on the schoolhouse which he had used, causing the roof to collapse. Philp worked from then onwards alongside the headquarters of 23 Battalion.

Lieutenant Cade again went to his OP position on the open hillside and for the third day running Sergeant McLeay went forward to establish communications. Cade came under small-arms fire from the ground and McLeay, who for most of the day worked the visual signalling station by himself, was constantly threatened by air attack and more than once attacked in decidedly personal fashion. From this ridge Cade managed to get quite good observation over the airfield. The firing he controlled was accurate: targets were well registered. As soon as troop-carriers started to glide down for a landing shells would start to fall on the runway. Cade did not have the satisfaction of seeing a plane hit before its troops got out, but several were set on fire on the ground. Other targets were groups of men. The alpine troops who landed followed set routes and Cade soon had these taped. He saw many men hit and quite a lot of them must have been killed; for their bodies lay all day in the open. Enemy accounts make much of the intensity of the fire which met the alpine troops as they landed and dashed for cover. One Italian howitzer of B Troop suffered a broken buffer-spring late in the day and had to cease fire; but this made little difference to the output of the troop, for ammunition was by this time severely limited in supply. As night approached gunners were beginning to think seriously of destroying their guns and fighting on as infantry.

C Troop had no such worry; but it had plenty of other troubles. So few men remained to carry out the elaborate preparation of its ammunition that the rate of fire was affected. But the gun crews continued to fire on the airfield almost regardless of the fire that came back at them. By the end of the day the troop was down to about half its original strength.

The great struggle of 27 Battery, however, was coming to a close. With the failure of the counter-attack and the strengthening of the enemy the odds against 5 Brigade were increasing, and it was eventually decided to withdraw to Platanias for fear of losing contact with the troops on the Galatas front. There was no hope of withdrawing the guns of A and B Troops and little hope of getting the C Troop guns out. It would mean, moreover, the loss of Crete; for there was no chance of holding out for long against an enemy who could reinforce at will. Such reinforcements as the defence had had since the battle started were negligible and there was no possibility of significant addition to them.

[37]
Col R. H. Dyson; Bangkok; born Christchurch, 4 Dec 1917; public servant; CO 5 Fd Regt Aug-Dec 1945; now Regular Force; Military Planning staff, SEATO.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Paratroop Attack on Galatas is Repulsed

A Paratroop Attack on Galatas is Repulsed

The battle at Maleme on the 22nd attracted most of the attention of the Luftwaffe and the day started quietly at Galatas. Aircraft dropped supplies in the prison area in the morning and the captured 3.7-inch howitzer began to fire on 19 Battalion. Worries about the enemy cutting in between the Maleme and Galatas fronts caused Lieutenant Clark of the 4th Field, who had been commanding an RMT platoon, to set up an OP for F Troop, 5th Field, to gain observation along the coast road westwards. He was given two assistants and some telephone wire was brought up for him. The position he selected was some 200 yards north of the chapel which was the chief landmark on Red Hill. There he and his men dug a slit trench, installed the telephone, and by dawn on the 22nd were ready for business. No targets appeared, however, and all he could do was to report to 10 Brigade Headquarters that nothing was happening on his front.

The 5th Field on Wheat Hill, supported by two Vickers guns with inadequate sighting equipment and mountings, drew some fire from the direction of the prison; but that was all. Divisional Supply on Ruin Hill received rather more attention from the enemy, and Divisional Petrol just behind Pink Hill at long last received picks and shovels and got busily to work improving their positions.

The afternoon was more eventful for two reasons: the Luftwaffe reappeared in great strength and attacked the whole area and the same danger which caused Clark to set up his OP was the reason for a policy of active patrolling westwards. Patrols from the 4th Field worked their way towards Ay Marina and the hamlet of Stalos. One of three RMT patrols clashed with an enemy party and brought back four prisoners. Two strong patrols from the 4th Field, under Captain Nolan and Lieutenant Dill, went into the hills west of Red Hill and stayed until dark, but met no enemy. A further patrol, Carson's, went as far as the reservoir, disposed of slight opposition, and duly returned.

As part of the same belated policy of aggression two companies of 19 Battalion attacked southwards in the afternoon, supported by F Troop and the infantry mortars. Requests for support from F Troop, however, were coming in at that time from several quarters and only one gun could be spared. This one gun, under Lance-Sergeant Williams, [38] was dragged forward about 100 yards to the top of a ridge from which it could be fired over open sights. Captain Duigan went with it and the adjutant of the battalion indicated targets to him. Williams had fired only a few rounds, however, when the gun came under heavy mortar fire. The unseen enemy were evidently observing from close at hand and made it impossible to continue from this position or even to bring back the gun until after dark.

F Troop nevertheless had some success this afternoon. A mortar had been plaguing Divisional Supply from the south-west and Bevan from his OP on Wheat Hill engaged it and scored a direct hit. Bevan also conducted fire on mortars in the Prison Valley, silencing them from time to time. Bevan was an exceptionally good shot and even under these adverse conditions he produced effective fire.

Air attack on the southern approaches to Galatas reached a crescendo late in the afternoon in preparation for an attack by the paratroops from the prison area. Towards dusk they attacked on a wide front west of the road. Divisional Petrol Company met the brunt of this. Pink Hill, which had not been occupied since 20 May, again fell into enemy hands. But Divisional Cavalry fired heavily into the flank of the attack and Greeks counter-attacked with immense vigour—soldiers, civilians, even women. Some men of Divisional Petrol and Supply joined in. Once again Lieutenant MacLean's 4th Field patrol was called for and it advanced readily against Pink Hill from the road leading into Galatas. With MacLean were some Greeks and some of Divisional Petrol. A Divisional Cavalry detachment, also with Greeks, rushed the crest of Pink Hill. MacLean thrust down towards some cottages occupied by Germans and his men disposed of the few who remained to meet the charge. Then he turned round to clear Galatas of any enemy remaining. None in fact remained and the action, thus ended. The surviving paratroops retreated at top speed to the prison, leaving many of their comrades behind. They had still not been reinforced from the Maleme front and a quick follow-up of this success might have had highly beneficial results for the defence. But the only result, apart from the losses inflicted on the attackers, was that the defence of the southern approaches to Galatas was tightened up and Major Russell of the Divisional Cavalry was given command of the Divisional Petrol and a platoon of 19 Battalion.

Mortar bombing on Ruin Hill had become troublesome, two platoons of Divisional Supply were slightly withdrawn because of it, and after dark Dill's 4th Field platoon was sent there to reinforce the position. Late in the afternoon Captain Bliss was asked to send some gunners to reinforce the depleted gun crews of 27 Battery at Maleme. He chose a dozen men from those who volunteered and they were taken westwards by truck, reaching a point near C Troop late at night. It was too late, however, for them to take part in the Maleme battle. By then 5 Brigade was already withdrawing.

[38]
WO II E. A. Williams, MM; Auckland; born NZ 28 Jun 1913; timber worker; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

5 Brigade Withdraws

5 Brigade Withdraws

Philp first heard of the withdrawal about 4 a.m. on the 23rd, when he was given an hour's notice to move. There was no time to lose. Very little of A Troop's 600 rounds or B Troop's 1000 rounds now remained, and the gunners could at least console themselves with this thought when it came to leaving their guns behind. A few stayed behind to disable the guns by taking out firing mechanisms, removing dial sights, and ramming rounds down the barrels and up the breeches. Then they followed their comrades across country to Platanias, ‘an arduous trip for tired, ill-fed men’, as Philp remarks. There they assembled near Brigade Headquarters. A Troop at the rear was machine-gunned on the way, but most of the gunners arrived safely.

C Troop was better off for ammunition and four 15-cwt trucks arrived to tow the guns back. But the drivers of these trucks had been shaken by the air raids of the preceding days and were unsteady. One of them drove his truck over a steep bank and another truck was found to have no towing attachment and no rope. Two guns therefore had to be left behind, to the great disappointment of their crews. They were disabled very thoroughly. The other two guns reached the road safely and were towed back towards Platanias. The remaining gunners were picked up by a 30-cwt truck. After they left, Snadden and a sergeant went back to the gun position to look for stragglers and found none. Satisfied that they were the last to leave, they descended to the road and there met Second-Lieutenant Boyce and a few others who were waiting for them. It was then daylight, there were no other troops on the road, and all drove back to Platanias in a damaged truck, being comforted on the way by the sound of two 6-inch guns at Suda which were shelling the airfield and the road at Maleme. The new gun position, chosen by Lieutenant-Colonel Strutt, was off the road near Ay Marina.

Strutt had been doing his best to get together an adequate gun group to support 5 Brigade. The withdrawal and consequent loss of seven guns destroyed his hopes of achieving this; but he set about making the best of what was left. It seems that on the morning of the 23rd he had a troop of four Italian 75s of his own regiment, two Bofors of 156 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA, two 2-pounders of 106 Battery RHA, and the two French 75s of C Troop. (Snadden recalls that Strutt was very annoyed when he heard that two of C Troop's guns had been left behind.) These guns (if this list is correct) were all in position around Platanias and Ay Marina in the morning of 23 May and ready to give what help they could to the weary infantry of 5 Brigade.

The two guns of C Troop went into action just west of the lane which runs from the coast road to Ay Marina, among olive trees. The gunners found sugar and potatoes in a little house behind the gun position and hungrily ate them. They had received no rations since before 20 May and were famished. The guns were sited facing Maleme according to a compass bearing and elevated to 15 degrees. There were no orders to fire and no way of telling where the rounds landed if they did fire. At this stage Snadden left to get information and at the same time have his wounds attended to. Second-Lieutenant

Boyce, who was then in command, did not dare fire for fear of hitting his own men. Later in the morning an Australian troop took up position 200 yards to the north and Boyce took the opportunity of speaking by telephone to its observation officer. He explained that he had C Troop's two guns ready and wanted fire corrections. The guns were duly fired and after a long pause (for the FOO was busy directing the fire of his own troop) he heard that the rounds fell just beyond an enemy-occupied village. Boyce thereupon made the necessary correction of elevation and opened a steady fire on the village. It was a rough and ready system which probably did little damage to the enemy, though the sound of the guns was comforting to the New Zealand infantry.

After a short time a mortar of fairly heavy calibre scored a direct hit on one of the two guns. Boyce was away at the Australian gun position and he hurried back to find Sergeant Stevenson wounded and a gunner gravely hurt. [39] Nearby ammunition had been set on fire and there was danger of further explosions, so Boyce ordered the men away from the guns. He then noticed a newcomer to the gun team, Bombardier Buchanan [40] (who had come forward with the 4th Field reinforcements from Red Hill), go up to the gun, look for a moment to see if there was immediate danger of explosion, and then calmly shovel earth on to the flames until he put the fire out. It was a brave action and Boyce mentioned it later to Colonel Strutt, who in due course recommended Buchanan for an MM.

C Troop did not fire again that day. The only tempting target was a party of Germans approaching along the coast road. The Australian troop engaged them; but the telephone was too busy for Boyce to get fire corrections. The two Bofors guns near Platanias were captured in the morning by a sudden enemy advance, but later in the day they were recovered. One of the two-pounders was sited to the left rear of C Troop; but no targets presented themselves.

The rest of 27 Battery had become infantillery. They numbered about 100, of whom 80 were armed. At Brigade Headquarters, in an area littered with band instruments (the bandsmen, sent at the last moment to Crete, had also become infantry), they found some food and ate it ravenously. The armed party went off to help the Maoris, coming in for heavy mortar fire.

While talking to the Maori Battalion commander, Philp was wounded by a stray bullet and was sent, much against his will, to hospital. Before he went, however, Brigadier Hargest relayed to him General Freyberg's congratulations on the fine work of 27 Battery. He was fiercely proud himself and delighted that his men should receive this well-earned recognition. [41]

The Australian gunners were the only ones able to bring down fire in the afternoon against the enemy in the Platanias area and they did so effectively. They shelled a gun which had been brought forward and forced the Germans to withdraw before it fired a shot. They also shelled enemy infantry around Platanias so accurately and persistently that one party of them were seen by the Maoris to make off back across country towards Maleme, looking as though they had had enough. Two German light guns discovered later were both put out of action. When two motor-cycles drove up to these and their drivers tried to remove them, the Australian gunners destroyed one of the motor-cycles. In the afternoon, too, a few Maryland bombers flew over, dropped their bombs on the airfield, and disappeared, leaving at least six aircraft burning and greatly cheering the weary men of 5 Brigade.

The halt at Ay Marina, however, could be no more than pause. The enemy was free to outflank 5 Brigade and would certainly do so as soon as he was strong enough. In the evening the brigade was ordered to withdraw behind 4 Brigade at Galatas. Snadden returned to C Troop late in the evening with orders to hook on the guns and drive back to the Galatas turn-off, and there the troop came to rest in the early hours of the 24th. The armed party of 27 Battery had come under machine-gun fire, but had not come to grips with the enemy. After dark these gunners trudged back along the road eastwards and settled down just before dawn, foot-sore and unutterably weary, not far from C Troop.

[39]
Gnr T. Conroy, who died of wounds after being taken prisoner.

[40]
Sgt M. J. Buchanan, MM; born Auckland, 5 Mar 1913; Regular soldier; wounded 30 Nov 1941; killed in action (sinking of Chakdina) 5 Dec 1941.

[41] Among those he deemed specially worthy of mention, other than those already named in this history, are Sgt J. B. Kroupa, L-Bdr G. T. W. Ingham, Gnrs R. B. Laird, T. L. Charlesworth and M. Johnston. But he was proud of them all.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Composite Battalion is Relieved

The Composite Battalion is Relieved

The 23rd was a livelier day at Galatas. The enemy had infiltrated during the night into the gap between 5 Brigade and 4 and 10 Brigades, and a party of 160 men had reached the village of Stalos. A few had got through as far as Ay Marina. Two strong patrols, one from the RMT and one from the 4th

Field, went forward to snipe and observe. One of these sent a detachment forward towards Stalos and it engaged in a skirmish which lasted for an hour, caused the enemy the loss of 14 men and two machine guns (at a cost of one RMT man wounded), and ended only when a company of 18 Battalion arrived to take over. (A platoon of this company attacked and brilliantly captured the village, driving out or killing the strong enemy force.) While this action was going on the Composite Battalion formed a forward line of standing patrols to guard against further infiltration in this area.

The Prison Valley remained fairly quiet, though there was heavy bombing on the southern approaches to Galatas. Such targets as F Troop engaged this day were mainly those indicated by Captain Bevan from Ruin Hill. There was no significant reply to this fire until the evening, when a heavy mortar bombardment started up. This set cordite alight in the ammunition dump, igniting surrounding trees and thereby causing a crisis. The fire was got under control; but valuable charges had been lost, the enemy mortars were now sure of their target and hammered it relentlessly, and the foliage which had covered F Troop from aerial observation was burnt away, leaving the gun position out in the open. The outlook for F Troop was most unpromising.

Colonel Kippenberger had meanwhile formed the impression that the Composite Battalion could not be relied on and he arranged for 18 Battalion, which had been in reserve, to change places with it after dark. In fact all its elements had carried out at least adequately, and in some cases in exemplary fashion, all that had so far been asked of them. The patrols had done splendidly and none of the artillery officers concerned will concede that their men were even at this late stage downhearted. They were anxious to do more and were sorry that they had not been allowed to carry out the active role in the defence of the Prison Valley for which they had trained under Oakes. Moreover, elements of Composite Battalion remained in the line and were among its most stalwart defenders when the pressure reached its peak. But the relief was ordered and in due course it was carried out. The 5th Field under Sprosen, the RMT group under Veale, and Divisional Supply under Boyce moved back to Ruin Ridge, a feature running north from Galatas (and not to be confused with Ruin Hill, to the west). The 4th Field moved to the northern exit of the town and Major Lewis set up his headquarters in what was called the

NAAFI building, just outside. Dill's platoon from Ruin Hill strengthened Divisional Petrol between Pink Hill and the southern end of Galatas.

The relief had one lamentable feature: Ruin Hill was not taken over by 18 Battalion. Whatever the explanation of this, it was a serious mistake. This feature covered the flank of Red Hill on the right and Wheat Hill on the left and enemy on it could enfilade both.

The changeover coincided with the retreat of 5 Brigade behind the Galatas front, now held by 4 Brigade (with what was left of 10 Brigade under its command). Strutt reported to Divisional Headquarters at 10.30 p.m. on the 23rd that he had brought back from the Maleme front four French 75s (actually, of course, only two), four Italian 75s, two 2-pounders and two Bofors—welcome news, for all these had been reported lost. But communications were such that a 4 Brigade operation order for the defence of the Galatas front, issued at 12.50 a.m. on the 24th, listed the available artillery as ‘One tp 5 Fd Regt, One tp 75 mm guns’. It gave this small contingent the following ambitious instruction:

‘Guns to be superimposed on the whole front and to be located in depth for anti-tank role.’

This was like a poor man pretending his pennies were pounds. What made the outlook even more uncertain for F Troop was that the stock of accurately weighed propellant charges was almost finished. When these were gone charges would have to be made up by careful guesswork. Already in the afternoon of the 23rd the gunners had experimented with makeshift charges, to Bevan's astonishment. He had called down fire on the prison area and was startled to see one round fall far short of its predecessor. It was far short of where he thought the foremost enemy positions were and it was a revelation to him when several Germans rose up and ran from the vicinity of the shellburst.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Difficult Gunnery at Galatas

Difficult Gunnery at Galatas

Lieutenant Clark at his OP on Red Hill soon discovered on the 24th how haphazard gunnery can be when propellant charges have to be made up by the handful. He could see several enemy groups moving on his front at dawn and quickly took advantage of one target that was offering: machine guns set up on a hill to the south-west. Directing one gun at them, he soon put the machine-gunners to flight. Later in the day the enemy reoccupied this hill and he tried again; but the accurate charges were by this time all used up and with the made-up ones he found that more often than not F Troop missed the hill altogether. In the end he gave up trying to dislodge the machine guns. When more and more enemy appeared on the scene and their activity centred on the coast road, there was nothing he could do to hamper them; for not one gun of F Troop could be switched far enough round to fire on the road.

Bliss's 4th Field group of the Composite Battalion had begun to dig in on the northern outskirts of Galatas, and rations had just arrived in the morning when Bliss was ordered to go at once to reinforce the line between the company of 18 Battalion on Wheat Hill and Divisional Petrol facing Pink Hill. Before his men could move off they came under mortar fire. Moving forward and expecting it to get worse, they were agreeably surprised to find Captain Rowe
[42] of the NZASC company quietly reading a book. The front was quiet. Bliss therefore sent parties back to pick up the rations. One of these, under Bombardier Johnson, [43] came under mortar fire on the way back and took cover. Messerschmitts came over almost at once and strafed the area. The men moved on and the same thing happened again, making it clear that the mortars were acting as markers for the German fighter aircraft. At the reserve position Johnson was told to get back quickly with the rations. He did so and found things much livelier. Divisional Petrol and some of the 4th Field gunners were in action. All afternoon the word was passed from post to post, from olive tree to olive tree: ‘Are we in touch with 18 Battalion?’ The infantillery were determined to do their job properly.

They might have been reassured had they known what the enemy thought of them. The Germans in the Prison Valley had long since decided that they were up against a highly skilful force and suspected that they were picked marksmen, because so many of their own casualties had been shot through the head. They intended to take no risks they could avoid. All afternoon they watched the dark gushes of earth and smoke among the trees and vines and agave thickets as Stukas bombed the hillsides by Galatas. The paratroops (now being strongly reinforced by alpine troops) thought they faced cleverly entrenched positions constructed by first-class infantry. Men of the Composite Battalion, poorly endowed even with picks and shovels, would have been flattered had they known. The storming of Galatas was expected to be costly and demanded careful and thorough preparation and the Germans were not yet ready. The Luftwaffe had not yet done its job.

F Troop had suffered so badly from mortar fire on the 23rd that the guns and remaining ammunition had been moved back, and the gunners laboured until 5 a.m. creating a new gun position 300–400 yards north of the old one and out of sight of the enemy. C Troop and the rest of 27 Battery had been told they would have a day of rest on the 24th. But in the afternoon Captain Beaumont, who now commanded the battery, was told to supply crews for six Breda heavy machine guns which were to take up anti-tank and anti-aircraft roles with the three brigades of the New Zealand Division (4th and 5th and 19th Australian). Second-Lieutenant Sunley
[44] and 10 men therefore went to 5 Brigade, Second-Lieutenant Francis with a similar number to 4 Brigade, and Second-Lieutenant Woolley
[45] likewise to 19 Australian Brigade. Only three Bredas arrived, one for each of these detachments. During the night Lieutenant Gibson reconnoitred positions for the two C Troop guns, which duly went into position, one on the road from Galatas to the coast, guarding a concrete bridge, and the other a mile west of the Galatas turn-off. The troop of four Italian 75s of 2/3 Australian Field Regiment—also C Troop, under Captain G. Laybourne-Smith—was sited by Major Bull 500 yards north of F Troop to bring down fire on the coast road to the west of Red Hill and its OP was set up alongside Lieutenant Clark's. The two Bofors also went into position at Galatas and one 2-pounder was sited at the southern exit from the town. Communications were bound to be uncertain and little could therefore be expected of this small gun group when the enemy attacked in full force, as he was certain to do on the 25th.

Meanwhile the afternoon of the 24th had seen much activity on the right of the New Zealanders, from Galatas to the sea. The 5th Field infantillery under Sprosen, having spent a quiet morning in reserve on Ruin Ridge, were warned that they would have to relieve the Divisional Cavalry south of the town.

They were ready and willing to do so, and Major Lewis was discussing details with Sprosen when the latter was wounded by a mortar burst. Captain Hardy
[46] succeeded him; but before he could move word came that the relief was cancelled.

The infantry who had relieved the 4th Field and RMT groups on the right of the line gave way under pressure in the afternoon—partly through their failure to take over Ruin Hill, from which their positions were enfiladed by alpine troops. The centre company on part of Red Hill was pushed back some 300 yards and the battalion commander asked for reinforcements. MacLean's 4th Field patrol went first, followed after dark by the rest of Bliss's group (excepting Dill's platoon) and Divisional Supply, a total of about 120 men. They stumbled through the darkness, illuminated intermittently by German flares, and somehow fitted themselves into a complicated defensive layout, partly on Murray Hill just behind Red Hill and partly on Ruin Ridge behind it. With no digging tools to protect their positions, their situation was anything but enviable.

[42]
Capt H. A. Rowe, MC; Piha; born Hokitika, 12 Aug 1914; salesman; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[43]
Bdr H. E. Johnson; born Dunedin, 9 Nov 1904; clerk; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; died Lower Hutt, 5 Jun 1954.

[44]
Capt H. M. Sunley; London; born Wellington, 26 Apr 1917; accountant's clerk; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[45]
Maj P. Woolley, ED and bar; Auckland; born Carterton, 19 Sep 1918; warehouseman; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[46]
Capt B. Hardy; born NZ 13 Jan 1911; accountant; died while p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Desperate Fighting by Gunners and ‘Infantillery’

Desperate Fighting by Gunners and ‘Infantillery’

The climax of the struggle for Galatas was sure to come on 25 May; but it was slow to develop. The Luftwaffe arrived as usual; but the only immediate action on the ground was severe machine-gunning from Ruin Hill, to which the infantillery on Murray Hill replied effectively. Clark's OP, however, was rendered useless before dawn, since streams of bullets were coming right into it, and Clark and his two assistants therefore moved back 50 yards, taking their telephone with them. When morning came, however, the telephone refused to work and Clark could do nothing to subdue extremely heavy mortar fire which came down on the infantry.

The southern approach to Galatas also came under fairly heavy fire, to which the machine guns, mortars and artillery (F Troop, 5th Field, and C Troop, 2nd/3rd Australian Field) replied with some authority. It was held by Nolan's 4th Field company on the right, then Divisional Petrol, then Dill's 4th Field platoon, then Divisional Cavalry, east of the road, with 19 Battalion on its left. Some 370 Greeks under an English officer were in Galatas. The enemy was now so thick on the ground that even the erratic fire of F Troop was quite useful.

artillery positions at galatas

The 7th Anti-Tank on Queen Street, Auckland, 27 April 1940

The New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery on the range at Lydd, Kent, March 1940

A 4th Field 18-pounder at Maadi Camp, early 1940

W. F. McCarthy and his E1 crew fire a French 75 at Larkhill, August 1940

A 60-pounder in Libya, early 1941

A 4.5 medium gun in Libya, 1941

A 4.5 howitzer of the 6th Field, Helwan, January 1941

B1 of the 6th Field driving through Athens, March 1941

The 4th Field in the Olympus Pass

J. S. Clark of the 4th Field and the highest 25-pounder in Europe— Olympus Pass

A spectacular 4th Field gun position at Olympus

Driving past Thermopylae

Tempting the Stukas: the 6th Field at Molos

4th Field shells bursting among Germans at Kriekouki

Paratroops over Maleme

The Askifou Plain from the north

Bill Carson near Galatas in Crete

The embarkation beach at Sfakia

The 4th Field moves back into the desert, September 1941

4th Field RHQ at Baggush

A 14th Light Ack-Ack Bofors ready for action, 22 November 1941

A 6th Field conference in Libya: J. B. Hardcastle, C. K. Reed, J. V. Masefield, J. T. Stewart (back to camera), M. G. Oliver, Panaho Smith, A. J. Edwards, J. R. Prisk

A 2-pounder portée in Libya with Bren gun on ack-ack mounting

Portée action in Libya, November 1941

An L Troop portée firing near Point 175, 1 December 1941

Maffey's Halo rises as A1 portée burns, 25 November 1941

The few surviving 6th Field guns prepare to withdraw from Belhamed

Jack Spring (GPO of D Troop, 6th Field) and his staff have just withdrawn from Belhamed. From left: A. A. Jackson (47 Battery), Arch Forbes (Signals), Gordon Eastbury, TSM Alf Otto, Spring, Roger Rabone, Pat Foster

The 4th Field looks towards Belhamed, with 6th Field pick-up in foreground

E. Troop, 4th Field, with captured 105 in background

Monstrous 210s shell Belhamed

4th Field RHQ near Belhamed. Major D. A. Carty in foreground

4th Field Signals Office near Belhamed

The bombing and aerial machine-gunning reached a peak of intensity early in the afternoon, making communications between guns and observers highly unreliable and straining the fabric of command. But the troops holding the line were as determined as ever and fought back fiercely. The first ground attack came against the extreme right at 2 p.m. and continued for an uneasy hour, during which more infantillery went forward to reinforce the infantry. An attack from the south met the fire of the gunners and Petrol Company head on and was enfiladed by Divisional Cavalry and beaten back. In the 19 Battalion area Sergeant Tavendale with a Breda but no mounting for it was given the curious task of shooting down a reconnaissance plane that seemed to hover overhead. His men fired a few rounds to test the heavy machine gun and then tried to rig up a makeshift mounting in the trees, but without success.

A pause in mid-afternoon ended with the heaviest bombing raid of the battle, which broke all telephone communications, and a general attack started against the whole front. After an hour the company on the right, north of Red Hill, was overwhelmed and the commander of 18 Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, [47] led a group of infantillery in what would have been a bayonet charge had they had bayonets. They could do no more, however, than impose a slight check on the enemy advance. Before long the battalion began to fall back towards the reserve position of the Composite Battalion on Ruin Ridge, though this had already been greatly weakened to reinforce the front. A high wind swept over the hot slopes of Murray Hill and made it hard to disguise the clumsy defences there, which accordingly came under devastating fire. Men of 18 Battalion and odd detachments of infantillery among them kept falling back, and by 6.30 p.m. MacLean, with his 4th Field detachment on the northern tip of Murray Hill, realised that the troops around him had gone, that the enemy had passed him on both flanks, and he was in grave danger of being cut off. He therefore withdrew to where 18 Battalion Headquarters had been, only to find it deserted. Continuing towards Ruin Ridge, MacLean lost several men wounded and was himself hit in the foot.

One little party trying, Canute-like, to turn back the grey waves of German airborne troops, consisted of Second-Lieutenant Herrick, [48]
WO II Harding
[49] and Staff-Sergeant Kyle
[50] of the 4th Field and two NZASC men. They had been engaging enemy snipers beyond Red Hill and were so intent on this task that they were unprepared for hundreds of enemy much closer at hand. Kyle suddenly saw them advancing through the vineyards, and when he rose to warn the others he was wounded in several places. The two NZASC men picked him up and carried him back just ahead of the advancing Germans. They left him at a crossroads in Galatas and there he was later captured. Herrick and Harding were both killed.

The centre of the line, the southern approaches to Galatas, remained unbroken, though the collapse of the right threatened to outflank it. Carson's patrol went forward to strengthen the right of the Petrol Company. As they did so 30 Stukas bombed the Wheat Hill area, opening a gap which Carson hastened to fill. The infantry to the right had withdrawn, however, and the flank was being turned. The Petrol Company was ordered back and, with Carson's patrol and Nolan's two 4th Field platoons, they swung their right flank back eastwards, pivoting from the lower slopes of Pink Hill and hoping to form a front facing west to guard Galatas. It was a move which might have done credit to trained infantry; but it was wasted, as no troops remained to anchor the right flank and continue the line northwards. The various detachments therefore withdrew through the town.

Divisional Cavalry withdrew at about the same time, but Dill's 4th Field platoon remained between Pink Hill and the road, together with a platoon of 19 Battalion. Dill, a nephew of the field marshal, was made of stern stuff indeed. His men feared for him and with good reason. At the height of the attack he went forward to the foremost spur of Pink Hill to watch the development of the assault and there he stood, scorning to take cover from the machine-gun fire which swept the area. Sergeant Hill
[51] who was with him tried to get him to keep down, but Dill calmly refused. Hill swore at him, exasperated, but Dill said (as he undoubtedly believed), ‘If a man believes he will be hit, he will (be hit)’. There was no mock heroics here, no trace of ostentation, only the recognition by an instinctive leader that men in a critical and desperate situation will respond to firmness in the face of danger. Enemy swarmed among the trees and thickets below and tried again and again to mount the slopes and gain this key to the southern access to Galatas. The gunners thwarted every enemy attempt. The handful of infantry of 19 Battalion did the same, driving machine-gun crews from their guns with hand grenades. Inevitably Dill was wounded and Hill dragged him back out of sight of the enemy, where the crew of the solitary 2-pounder picked him up and carried him a little farther. Hill then went back to an RAP in the town, found it deserted, and returned to Dill, discovering that he had been wounded again in the meantime. Desperate to save his officer, the sergeant dashed back to get help; but already it was too late, for Dill was dying. The survivors of the two platoons, gunners and infantry, were by this time falling back from Pink Hill under overwhelming pressure and they entered Galatas, followed up closely but cautiously by the Germans.

The time gained first by the Cavalry, Petrol Company, Nclan's 4th Field platoons, and Carson's RMT patrol and then by the two platoons, including Dill's, which fought on was of crucial importance to the defence. Without it the measures being carried out to form a line between Galatas and the coast after the collapse of 18 Battalion could scarcely have been completed. The brave and skilful defence of Pink Hill held up a powerful attack, blunted its point, and kept the Germans out of Galatas until it was getting dark. By this time the defence on the right had hardened.

Another group of gunners, however, also made a valuable contribution at this critical hour. F Troop had kept up its somewhat erratic fire on the Prison Valley all afternoon, reinforced at times by the fire of C Troop of the Australian regiment, though this concentrated mainly on the right flank by the coast. There were also two guns of C Troop of the 5th Field in anti-tank roles; but this day neither could fire. One of the two, a long way west of the Galatas turn-off, was disabled by its crew when Lieutenant Gibson judged that practically all of 18 Battalion and the Composite Battalion had passed the gun position in the course of their retreat and Second-Lieutenant Francis arrived to say that the front had collapsed.

Both Gibson's and Francis's detachments (the latter having ditched their useless Breda) were still determined, however, to do what they could to hold up the enemy. They joined the 5th Field armed party under Captain Beaumont and with him came under command of 20 Battalion, which was trying to plug the gap on the right. Quickly they disposed themselves on the extreme right, between the coast road and the sea, alongside two companies of the 20th. The other French 75, under Second-Lieutenant Boyce, had been facing Galatas village from an antitank position south of the turn-off. The Australian C Troop was little more than 100 yards away to the east, the other side of the road to the coast and behind the crest of a steep rise. These guns, able to bring down indirect fire (as Boyce's gun was not), had been extremely busy during the afternoon. Boyce was out of touch with the general situation and strolled over to the Australians for news of what was happening. While there he had to take cover from a particularly heavy bombing attack, and after it he learned that the Australian OP was closing down. Since the enemy was evidently getting close to Galatas and the neighbourhood was thick with stragglers, Boyce hurried back to his gun, only to find that the crew had departed. He managed to catch up with three or four of them and called them back. They told him an officer had ordered them to spike their gun and withdraw. Thinking Boyce must have been hit in the bombing, they obeyed—though in fact they had done no more to disable the gun than throw away the firing mechanism. Boyce was furious; but for the moment there was nothing he could do except take the men to see if they could help the Australian gunners. Major Bull was at this time gathering together stragglers and organising them into a defence platoon for the Australian C Troop. Boyce's men readily joined this and Boyce, who still had his binoculars, offered his services to the Australians. He was soon needed. Germans could be seen moving across Ruin Ridge and the guns were manhandled to the crest of the ridge to engage them over open sights. This called for Gun Control and Boyce took command of one of the guns. All four Italian 75s fired right into the enemy groups and drove them pell mell off the ridge. Another enemy party then set up what looked like a heavy machine gun in front of the ridge and not far from Galatas. Boyce's gunners found themselves looking down its barrel and their first round blew it to pieces. The Australian gunners rose splendidly to the occasion and worked furiously as dusk was gathering. Boyce was suffering from conjunctivitis, however, and found it hard to pick out targets. He therefore handed his binoculars to an Australian officer. At the very last flicker of daylight a large body of enemy was seen moving towards the turn-off, and the guns were about to fire when someone shouted that they were Maoris. A moment later it was too dark to fire.

F Troop had carried on as before, firing on instructions from Captain Bevan on Wheat Hill when the telephone was working and on registered targets when it was not. The line kept getting cut by the bombing and mortar fire and Bombardier Khull
[52] worked bravely and well to repair it again and again. Then Bevan had to withdraw when Wheat Hill fell and it was all predicted fire—though in fact somewhat unpredictable because of the need to improvise propellant charges. After dark, when the situation seemed to be in a state of extreme flux, F Troop ceased fire.

Boyce then learned that the Australian troop had orders to move back and he asked them to tow his gun to their position before they left. Collecting his men from the defence platoon, he went back, they found the firing mechanism, and the last gun of C Troop, 5th Field, reached the position of C Troop of the Australian regiment in working order but with only one round of ammunition, which was in the breech. The rest of the ammunition was at the anti-tank position. A large fire in Galatas kept flaring up, but otherwise there was no sign of battle and the neighbourhood seemed strangely quiet. A fierce engagement had taken place in the town at dusk and shortly afterwards, when infantry with slight tank support had counterattacked and driven the Germans back to the southern outskirts; but the only gunners who knew anything of this were those in a group of the 5th Field under Captain Cowie, which lined a stone wall on the northern outskirts during the critical last hour before nightfall and stayed there until ordered, late at night, to withdraw.

Lieutenant Clark from Red Hill also reached the Australian gun position in the evening and there met Major Bull. A new line was to be taken up next day by the New Zealand Division, running southwards from the hospital and excluding Galatas. Together Bull and Clark went back to reconnoitre positions from which F Troop and the Australian C Troop could support this line. They picked a site just east of the last bridge on the coast road to Canea—a bridge under which flowed the stream which passed the Perivolia transit camp. The Australian troop arrived first and went into position on the left. They sent back a truck to pick up Boyce's ammunition, which it did, only to slide into a ditch afterwards from which it could not be extricated. Boyce himself waited and waited with his gun at the former Australian gun position. When all around was ominously quiet and day was not far off, he heard lorries coming from the direction of Karatsos and learned to his delight that it was F Troop. Captain Duigan had a spare truck, the gun was hooked on to it (with the round still in the breech), and the one C Troop gun and the three F Troop ones were driven to the new gun position, where they were ready for action at dawn.

The night 25–26 May saw the end of the Composite Battalion as such and its story from then onwards was of small groups which became intermingled with the many other groups on the road, and in rest areas and some of the defensive positions that were created in the course of a general retreat, which had by now become inevitable. Most of the infantillery—Beaumont's group with 20 Battalion on the right, Bliss's group on Ruin Ridge, Kissel's of nearly 20 gunners with 18 Battalion, Nolan's and Dill's 4th Field men from Pink and Wheat Hills, a 5th Field group under Captain Hardy at Ruin Ridge, and Cowie's detachment at the stone wall north of Galatas—heard some time in the night that their destination was the Perivolia transit camp; but they did not all reach there by dawn.

Many gunners lay dead, dying or wounded on the Galatas battlefield. Staff-Sergeant Kyle, to take one example, was lying helpless at the main crossroads in Galatas, unable to move because of his terrible wounds. When the battle was still raging around him, a German wearing a white helmet and carrying a white stick came up to him, knocked his steel helmet off, and dropped a field dressing into his hand. Then, as an afterthought, the German turned back to him and asked, ‘Why you fight?’, at the same time firing a bullet which cut through Kyle's battledress and braces but did him no further harm. German troops then appeared in strength, firing profusely ahead of themselves. One of them came over and gave Kyle some morphia and another, after asking where he could fill Kyle's water bottle, took it and brought it back full. They put him on a stretcher and asked about the contents of various tins of rations they had found. Next day, the 26th, others came and took away his stretcher. In the afternoon he was put on a blanket and carried laboriously over Red Hill to the coast road and then driven by ambulance car to Maleme airfield, from which he was flown to Greece. He spent the rest of the war years as a prisoner.

[47]
Brig J. R. Gray, ED, m.i.d.; born Wellington, 7 Aug 1900; barrister and solicitor; CO 18 Bn Sep 1939-Nov 1941, Mar-Jun 1942; comd 4 Bde 29 Jun-5 Jul 1942; killed in action 5 Jul 1942.

[48]
2 Lt R. S. Herrick; born Auckland, 13 Mar 1915; traffic officer; killed in action 25 May 1941.

[49]
WO II L. A. Harding, m.i.d.; born NZ 3 Sep 1904; coal merchant and cartage contractor; died of wounds 25 May 1941.

[50]
WO II A. H. Kyle, ED and bar; Lower Hutt; born Wellington, 16 Sep 1911; clerk; wounded and p.w. 27 May 1941.

[51]
Sgt N. H. R. Hill; Kaikohe; born Otaki, 13 Jan 1916; civil servant; twice wounded.

[52]
Bdr E. M. Khull; Wellington; born Wellington, 12 Oct 1912; joiner; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Retreat from Galatas

Retreat from Galatas

The coast road and the so-called Valley Road which led from the Prison Valley direct to Canea carried thousands of marching men in a night of apparent confusion. Yet the plan of defence was somehow put into effect, and the morning of the 26th found a line manned from the coast just east of the hospital to a point across the Valley Road where it linked with 19 Australian Brigade. The only gunners other than those with the gun group who are known to have served in this line are Sergeant Tavendale and his Breda gun team, minus their gun, who stayed with 19 Battalion (on the left), and Gunner Crompton and three or four others originally of Boyce's C Troop gun team, who had joined a group 150-strong, mostly of 7 Field Company (on the extreme right).

The new line was shorter and crossed far more open ground than the former line guarding Galatas. To the Luftwaffe it offered far more distinct targets and air attack became almost intolerable. F Troop of the 5th Field was much handicapped by it. This troop (now including the remaining C Troop gun) badly needed observation ahead, and Captain Bevan and Second-Lieutenant Caughley tried to set up an OP in a house high up on the opposite bank of the stream. But every time they tried to cross the intervening open ground they were viciously attacked by German fighters and they had many narrow escapes. In the end they gave up trying. The available telephone line was too short to reach any other vantage point for observation and it was therefore connected to the circuit of the nearby Australian troop, which had gained limited observation of the front. Most of F Troop's firing, however, was by map reference (which was unsatisfactory because of the defective propellant charges). The firing was limited by shortage of ammunition and also by the fierce air attack which each outbreak of gun fire attracted. It was a day of brilliant sunshine, and the day above all others in which the Luftwaffe had the advantage. Even individual soldiers on the move found themselves frequently attacked.

The various detachments of gunners had all reached the Perivolia transit camp by mid-morning and all were ordered to march eastwards from there along the route to Suda. They set out in fairly good order; but there were many other troops on the road, including 18 Battalion, and air attack turned the move into a series of breathless dashes to take cover from the bullets and bombs, interspersed with short walks along the road or footpath. All made the best pace they could; but control inevitably broke down. Groups and detachments were intermingled and broken up. Cowie's 5th Field group had been sent to get rations for the gunners and to take them towards Suda until they caught up with the main body. They collected the rations, but in the constant scurrying for shelter the party dwindled to about 15 men. Cowie met Freyberg on the way and was told to carry on eastwards until he was stopped. He did so, meeting no gunners, and was not stopped until he reached Kalami, six miles beyond Suda, where he was told to rest for the night beside a stream. His men were by that time weary beyond words with carrying the rations and dodging the planes and they needed no encouragement to sleep. The other parties eventually halted at various points, all out of touch with the rest of the gunners. Such orders as they received on the march were conflicting and the guides they were told they would meet did not appear.

Despite the fierce air attacks, Tavendale's little detachment with 19 Battalion did not have a strenuous day. They saw two tanks come forward to support the infantry and then one of them return at top speed, chased by a twin-engined Messer-schmitt, which raised a line of dust behind the tank. The greatest excitement was when a German motor-cyclist drove straight into the battalion area. Two Bren guns opened fire on motor-cycle and side-car and the driver dived into a ditch, where one of Tavendale's men promptly shot him. Booty from the side-car included two machine guns, two rifles, and two pistols, all most welcome, and a kitbag with bolts of RAF cloth, obviously taken from Maleme airfield. After dark 19 Battalion moved back without haste and Tavendale stayed with it.

Crompton's detachment on the right had a much harder day. To their right front was the general hospital, now containing only such patients as could not be moved, with enough staff to care for them. Behind, in a rather prominent building, was a dressing station. The Germans did not recognise the whole headland on which the hospital was sited as being protected by the Red Cross and they brought down damaging flanking fire from it, as well as making repeated frontal attacks on the line. There were many local emergencies; but Crompton's little group did its best to return the enemy's fire and did not move until the infantry and sappers around them started to withdraw about 10 p.m.

The good order was lost, however, when the troops withdrew, and in the course of the night Crompton's party joined the only body of men they came upon in the darkness which seemed to be under firm control, the Maori Battalion. The gun group, after a terrible day of air attack and of exertion which the gunners, weakened by days of hunger and thirst, could scarcely find the strength for (many of them were suffering from dysentery), came under long-range machine-gun fire before dusk. After dark the group withdrew. The French 75, formerly of C Troop of the 5th Field, still had its one and only round in the breech and it was abandoned when one of the Australian towing vehicles broke down. Boyce's truck towed the Australian gun instead—an Italian 75 which still had some ammunition, as well as instruments Boyce's gun lacked. F Troop and the Australian C Troop drove to a position six miles east of Suda and a mile inland, and there they stayed for the rest of the night and the whole of the next day, 27 May.

The only gunners in or near the firing line this day seem to have been those with Gunner Crompton, who were with the Maoris, Captain Snadden, who had left hospital at Suda with a small party of infantry, and a few others. The line ran along a sunken road called 42nd Street, and as Snadden's men found their own units there they left him. He therefore attached himself first to a party of Australian infantillery. Later he heard that some New Zealand gunners had collected with 23 Battalion and was ordered to take command of them. Meanwhile Crompton's party joined the Maoris in a rousing counter-attack which took them more than a mile. A German battalion had been all but annihilated; but fire was now coming from the rear. Crompton's party and some Maoris thereupon charged in the reverse direction and overcame a German detachment which had been by-passed in the main advance. In so doing Crompton was wounded and he ended up in enemy hands. Fighting flared up again in the evening and then it died down. After dark Snadden attended a conference and was given command of two companies (acting as one) of 23 Battalion.

The New Zealand Division and all other troops who could do so were now retreating over the mountains to the south coast, where it was hoped they could embark for Egypt. Two routes led south from the coast road, one from near Beritiana and the other from farther east at Kalami, and they linked near Stilos before starting to climb the White Mountains by way of Vrises and the Askifou Plain to the little fishing village of Sfakia. Which of the two routes the gunners took was a matter of luck.

The rough and narrow roads were so congested with men who had lost contact with their units, a hopeless mixture, in parts extremely disorderly, that the officers of a large gathering of infantillery east of Suda decided to break their group up into manageable detachments, each under an officer or senior NCO. In this way they hoped to retain some control and prevent the gunners from deteriorating, as many other groups evidently had, into a formless rabble. The detachments were formed and they set out at night, trying to keep together as much as possible. The jostling throng on the road, however, defeated all attempts to hold the detachments together. The men had to have water, moreover, and the scene at each of the few wells on the way was like bedlam. Captain Bliss had 50 men with him when he reached the foot of the mountains, but at the top of the pass at dawn on the 28th there were no more than half a dozen. By next evening, at Sin Kares in the Askifou Plain, his party had built up to over a hundred. Cowie and his 15 men at Kalami were lucky enough to find a truck and drove back in it towards Suda until ordered southwards to Sfakia. In the evening of the 27th they found another and the two vehicles drove over the mountains, picking up men who could no longer walk and reaching the end of the road above Sfakia in the afternoon of the 28th. The gun group of 28 Battery was not allowed to take its guns over the mountains: with very little ammunition and imperfect charges they were not much use, whereas vehicles were in great demand. After destroying their guns, therefore, the crews set out at intervals to drive over the mountains and picked up on the journey those who seemed in greatest need, including Captain Hardy, who was utterly exhausted and who died a few days later. At the end of the road they handed wounded men over to medical units and assembled in the foothills above Sfakia. Boyce and 12 gunners marched in good order, keeping together admirably, and in due course reached the same area. Major Bull worked ceaselessly to keep his gunners together or to reunite them when they separated, and when he reached Imvros he carried on this work.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Snadden's Gunner Platoon

Snadden's Gunner Platoon

Captain Snadden left 42nd Street in command of what became known as the Gunner Platoon of 23 Battalion, which brought up the rear of 5 Brigade. They marched rapidly, despite their weariness, along the motor road which led round Suda Bay. Branching off southwards the route got steadily rougher and climbed steeply, so that Snadden began to think they were on the mountain proper. One patch of lights they saw on the way turned out to be the burning stumps of olive trees, glowing in a strong breeze. When a plane came over they stood still and the flare it dropped outlined the welcome sight of a well. In the early hours of the 28th they halted on a stony ridge above the road and at once fell asleep. They were woken at dawn and given a tiny ration of bully beef and a few biscuits each. It was not far from Stilos and 5 Brigade soon found itself fighting a brisk rearguard action in which the Gunner Platoon played its part. An hour later the brigade broke off the action and withdrew. The route was lined with arms and equipment and at a little bridge they saw a derelict Italian 75-millimetre gun. Three young Greek soldiers in an olive grove seemed to be kneeling in prayer; but all were dead. As the road got steeper the day got hotter. Several times it began to descend, only to rise again steeper than ever. In one such pause in the climb, in a little pine-clad valley, Snadden came upon a handful of New Zealand gunners who readily joined him, bringing his party to a total of 15. All were armed, and such was the strength of 23 Battalion that they almost qualified for the title of ‘company’ and were treated as such. Nobody talked on the march, in the course of which they passed scores of men who had fallen out or were struggling to keep going. The urge to help these was strong, but the gunners knew they must keep together and play their part in their adopted battalion. There would be fighting to do on the way. The green freshness of the Vale of Vrises with its many water wells gave them new life and energy. Aircraft were often overhead, and when they had to the gunners took cover from them. By the time they reached the foot of the main pass and the road had degenerated into little more than a cart track, they seemed to be walking on a treadmill past which the scenery was slowly being pushed. Clambering over the loose rock by a gaping demolition was almost beyond their strength. On and upwards they went into the night until the battalion halted near the top of the pass, at a place with the unlikely name of Amigdhalokorfi—it was no more than a name.

There the Gunner Platoon took up a defensive position on the right of the battalion, which extended along the higher arm of a hairpin bend. The gunners were nearest the actual bend and would therefore be the last to move out. For what was left of the night they slept on boulders, but as Snadden says, ‘it might have been a feather bed’. An Australian rearguard passed through soon after dawn, giving the gunners a few biscuits and chatting with them for an hour or two. Snadden describes the situation:

‘The narrow, rocky, sun-baked gorge got hotter and hotter. We got what little shade we could, all the time keeping a watch on the road that wound below us and the hills that towered around us. Some time in the afternoon a Bren carrier arrived bringing with it water and some food. We gulped our bottles and a fatigue went down to refill them. There was about half a tin of bully each…. Three Henschels and a Stuka flew over and we crouched among our rocks expecting every minute to find ourselves blasted from our scanty cover.’ Late in the afternoon the battalion began to prepare to move on, but before it could do so the enemy appeared on the scene. Snadden's lookout reported that a party of school children and a policeman were coming up the road and round the bend; but it was soon evident that the lookout was mistaken. The party was carrying small arms, rifle fire was soon directed at the gunners, and a machine gun joined in. As they busied themselves with answering this fire, orders came to withdraw. The platoon that was to cover them had already gone and Snadden had to despatch his men up the road in little clusters covered by the rest and in turn covering them. It was a tense little act, but it ended well, though at the finish lungs were bursting. Some of 23 Battalion had evidently been hit, for Snadden picked up a trail of blood that followed a goat track and slightly shortened the route. Soon the fire that was whistling round their ears was checked by the machine guns of an Australian rearguard a mile or so along the road, and the gunners were happy to get behind this and be able to breathe freely. They found the descent in some ways worse than the climb. ‘New muscles ached’, as Snadden says, ‘and the soles of our feet seemed to slip inside our boots. Our socks were full of holes; many of us had wrapped our feet in our first field dressings.’ By the time they reached the wells and the pleasant shade of the Askifou Plain the shadows were lengthening and others took over the task of checking the enemy advance.

The plain was a small basin or saucer less than a mile square, south of the main pass, but still high among the mountains. It sheltered several little villages, of which the first was Sin Kares. The road skirted the western edge of the plain, passed up a narrowing valley, and climbed again to the village of Imvros, beyond which it climbed again before descending steeply to end a quarter of a mile west of Komitadhes, almost due east of Sfakia, but far above it in the hills.

C Troop of the 2nd/3rd Australian Field had brought two Italian 75s over the mountains and they were in the Askifou Plain when 23 Battalion came through Sin Kares late on the 29th. A mile above the village a company of 18 Battalion held a rearguard position and engaged the enemy as soon as they appeared. The 50 men concerned, however, could easily be outflanked on either side, and it was not long before the enemy had a machine gun covering the road behind the rearguard. This was a chance for the Australian gunners which they quickly seized. Brigadier Inglis, [53] himself a machine-gunner, indicated the target and Lieutenant-Colonel Gray of 18 Battalion observed for the guns. ‘It was the first time I had ever spotted for artillery and Geoff Kirk
[54] and I sat on the rocks above the road directing the fire and calling out corrections to the guns’, Gray wrote two months later. ‘The range, by trial and error, was 3200 yards and they literally rocked it in, firing, I believe, all the 40 rounds which was all they possessed.’ There is a message from Inglis timed 6 p.m. which informed the commander of C Troop that the enemy in unknown strength was in contact with our troops north of Sin Kares and that the gunners were to watch both flanks. This they did most effectively; but Gray was mistaken about the ammunition, for the Australians still had some left and Captain Laybourne-Smith was at that time reconnoitring positions for a further rearguard. The two guns were in action as late as 31 May. It was a splendid achievement by the Australians and one for which the New Zealanders were grateful. Duigan says of them that they deserved ‘the highest praise for the offensive spirit they showed at all times’.

Snadden's Gunner Platoon had meanwhile carried on with 23 Battalion, spent a quiet day on the 30th, expecting to be evacuated that night, and then learned that the unit was to stay another day. The gunners had already given up their water bottles for the benefit of others who could not go that night. They had suffered agonies from thirst and were shocked at the thought of a day in the barren hills under a hot sun with no water at all. Fortunately the bottles came back and a fair supply of water with them. Snadden describes it thus:

‘That night there was a mug of water per man and a full bottle for every four men to be consumed on the morrow. We took as long over our water ration as a four-course meal. In the gathering dusk we smoked our last grains of tobacco.’

Early next morning the Gunner Platoon was on its way down the precipitous track, with its series of hairpin bends, which led down the cliffs to Sfakia. They found the village much damaged by bombing and were exploring the beach when they heard they had to provide their share—three men—of a large patrol which was to climb up the face of the cliff to guard against infiltration. The three were chosen by ballot. ‘Nobody said much’, Snadden comments; ‘everyone was dead tired and many were ill with dysentery’. The three disappeared in the rugged heights above and the remainder found their strength increased by Lieutenant Johnston
[55] and six men of the 4th Field. Then rations were issued, a thing they had ceased to hope for. It worked out at one spoonful of ‘M and V’ [56] and six biscuits per man. Taking cover in a gully some distance above the beach, the ‘platoon’ met another party of gunners under Lieutenant Young
[57] which brought the strength to 30. The newcomers were doubly welcome, for they had more rations, and the outlook seemed quite cheerful. In due course the standing patrol returned, Snadden's enlarged party descended to the beach, and it was taken off after dark.

[53]
Maj-Gen L. M. Inglis, CB, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, VD, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk); Hamilton; born Mosgiel, 16 May 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde and MG Bn, 1915–19; CO 27 (MG) Bn, Dec 1939-Aug 1940; comd 4 Inf Bde, 1941–42, and 4 Armd Bde, 1942–44; GOC 2 NZ Div, 27 Jun-16 Aug 1942, 6 Jun-31 Jul 1943; Chief Judge of the Control Commission Supreme Court in British Zone of Occupation, Germany, 1947–50; Stipendiary Magistrate; died Hamilton, 17 Mar 1966.

[54]
Maj G. C. Kirk; born Auckland, 8 Apr 1917; insurance clerk; wounded Nov 1941; died of wounds 4 May 1943.

[55]
Capt I. T. Y. Johnston, ED; Hamilton; born Gisborne, 25 Apr 1912; mercantile clerk.

[56] Meat and vegetables.

[57]
Capt J. H. Young; Christchurch; born Marton, 17 Feb 1906; insurance representative.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Cruel Ending to the Campaign

A Cruel Ending to the Campaign

Captain Bliss had gone on with his party on the 29th until told they could go no farther, when they slept on the hillside. Next day he saw Inglis, who told him the artillery had gone on ahead and told him to do likewise. Somehow he missed the control posts which had been set up on the way and which directed all but ‘fully-formed units’ to the assembly area in the Komitadhes ravine. On the beach he could get no orders and no rations and took his 4th Field party up the hillside above Sfakia. They watched the village being bombed and heard where Major Bull's much larger group had assembled. Bliss sent a message that he and his party would join Bull's when the latter came through to the beach. The reply from Bull asked Bliss to send any 5th Field men (and there were a few with Bliss) to him in the Komitadhes ravine, an instruction which Bliss ignored, feeling it unfair to send weary and famished men on an unnecessary climb of several miles. Bliss had also heard that the evacuation authorities had misjudged the rate at which men could be embarked the previous evening and had been ‘screaming out’ for another 700 men. Had any been at hand they could have gone. He therefore determined that whatever happened his men would be down on the beach and ready to embark that night. They were there as planned and in due course were taken off—in the cruiser Phoebe, or one of the destroyers Jackal, Kimberley and Hotspur, or the fast minelayer Abdiel. Bliss's judgment was sound: there was room enough for his men and this turned out to be the last night of the evacuation. His group and Snadden's and one or two other detachments were the only gunners who got away from Crete, apart from some of the wounded (several of whom, including Philp, had been evacuated from Suda) and a few who had got away on earlier nights.

Major Bull was not, of course, to know this. What he did was what seemed best at the time. He was a magnificent organiser and had the evacuation been left to him many more would certainly have got away from Crete. Had he not done what he did, the evacuation officials would have had immense trouble with stragglers. He had first started to collect stragglers in the neighbourhood of Imvros on the 29th and had gathered a large group, including NZASC men and others. That night he was told to move to Komitadhes and did so. There, on the 30th, he assumed control of the area, arranged pickets from among his gunners, dispersed the troops in the ravine, and organised them into parties of 50. The artillery officers compiled nominal rolls of their parties and the total rose to more than 3000 troops. Bull tried hard to get food and water for them all, but the best he could manage was one tin of bully beef for each group of

50 men. He sent Second-Lieutenant Allison
[58] down to the beach again with a party of men, but no rations could be got. A beach officer ordered Allison to embark that night, but Allison refused on the grounds that his duty was to report back to Bull.

The men under Bull in the Komitadhes ravine were ravenously hungry, but many were too weak to do anything about it. Bull conferred with Brigadier Hargest and was told that his group could not be taken off that night, 31 May 1 June, that ships would be sent to pick them up the following night, and that six artillery specialists could go at once. Bull refused this last offer, thinking it would be bad for the morale of the remainder and accepting Hargest's assurance that the evacuation would not end that night.

By this time Bull had some 3500 troops under his command (of a total of 5000 apart from those who were to leave that night). They were hungry and enfeebled and the morale of some of them was low. The great majority, however, behaved well and obeyed orders. It was their misfortune that the evacuation was being organised by infantry commanders. There was much talk of getting the fighting men, the formed units, off before the stragglers, as if only the infantry had maintained good order and only the other arms supplied the stragglers. This was unjust, as was later realised, to the gunners and NZASC men who had fought as hard and well as any troops on Crete and were ready to the last to do what was asked of them. In fact the infantry battalions supplied as high a proportion of stragglers as any of the divisional units. Moreover, the 4th and 5th Field men under Bull included a great many specialists that the New Zealand Division could ill afford to lose and could certainly not replace at short notice. Bull himself was first-class in every way; he and many others should have had high priority. The gunners were particularly unlucky that Brigadier Miles was not there to speak up for them.

Bull and his men did not taste the full bitterness of it all until next day. The night passed quietly and the morning of 1 June came with no outward change. Rumours started to circulate in the ravine that the force was capitulating, but Bull refused to believe them. In the end he began to take notice of them and sought confirmation. He saw the written order signed by Major-General Weston (who had left by flying-boat) and with a heavy heart set about putting it into effect.

For the first time his men were reluctant to accept his orders. They were thunderstruck. The thought of surrendering smacked of treachery. When a white flag was put up some of them tore it down. Slowly they came to realise that there was no other way. For the troops left on Crete there was only the prison camp. It was a sad ending to the campaign, not only for them, but for their friends back in Egypt. Lieutenant Gibson, for example, had taken a party of gunners straight through to the beach on the 30th, had helped with the evacuation arrangements, and his party had been taken off that night in the Nizam or Napier. He had not dreamed that the rest might fail to get away. He waited at Alexandria and next day saw 20 or 30 more of his unit arrive. Still thinking that the remainder would follow, he searched the embarkation rolls for the names of his friends and was dumbfounded to learn that there were no more to come. ‘It was hell returning to the regiment at Helwan,’ he wrote later, ‘to tell them the news’.

The story of the gunners on Crete, however, does not end here. Some of the men who had served the guns under appalling conditions at Maleme or Galatas or (like the gallant defenders of Pink Hill) had been rock-like in their determination to hold on when the line was crumbling in front of Galatas—some of these men resolutely refused to accept the fate to which the evacuation officials had condemned them. Some made off into the hills at once, as fast as their weak and weary legs would carry them. Others bided their time and escaped, either in Crete or later on the European mainland. The people of Crete saw many of them in the months and years to come and recognised some of them as heroes of the Resistance. Some gunners made their way back by boat to North Africa or by island-hopping in the Aegean to Turkey and elsewhere. A few came to know Crete so well before they left that they were sent back there by the Middle East authorities. Staff-Sergeant Moir
[59] of the 4th Field and Bombardier Johnston
[60] of the 5th Field organised a party a year later and sailed to Sidi Barrani. Moir, who went back on special service, won the DCM and Johnston the MM.

Gunner Perkins, [61] who was to have left with them, got away in a Greek submarine a little later. He, too, went back. Perkins had given an indication of his mettle in the Pinios battle in Greece; as a special agent he gave evidence of extraordinary ability and as ‘Captain Vassili’ (he was actually a staff-sergeant and the ‘commission’ was not assumed, it was bestowed by grateful and admiring Cretans) he became known from end to end of Crete. After he was killed in ambush early in 1944 his grave was kept adorned with flowers. Above all others of the Resistance, his name lives on in Crete. [62]

New Zealand Artillery casualties in Crete were as follows:

| Killed in Action | Died of Wounds | Wounded | Wounded and Prisoner of War | Prisoner of War (Unwounded) | Total
HQ NZA | | | 1 [*] | | | 1
4th Field | 15 | 2 | 25 | 12 | 67 | 121
5th Field | 19 | 1 | 43 | 22 | 194 | 279
| 34 | 3 | 69 | 34 | 261 | 401

Since only 361 of the 5th Field and 177 of the 4th Field served in Crete, together with a mere handful of men from the other units, this was a very high rate of loss indeed: more than 68 per cent of the 4th Field in Crete and 77 per cent of the 5th Field. The figures tell slightly less than the truth, for many men who were wounded were not officially reported as such, especially among those taken prisoner.

[58]
Capt D. C. Allison; Auckland; born London, 4 May 1918; Regular soldier; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

[59]
S-Sgt T. Moir, DCM, MM; Kiangaroa, Rotorua; born Gisborne, 4 Jan 1916; service station attendant; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; escaped 18 Jun 1941; returned to Egypt, Apr 1942; seconded to MI 5, May 1942, and returned to Crete; recaptured 5 Jun 1943.

[60]
L-Bdr B. W. Johnston, MM; Auckland; born Thames, 11 Nov 1913; fitter; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; escaped to Egypt, Apr 1942.

[61]
S-Sgt D. C. Perkins, m.i.d.; born NZ 23 Feb 1915; art student; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; escaped 18 Jun 1941; returned to Egypt, 1942; seconded to MI 5 and returned to Crete, Jul 1943; killed in action, 25 Feb 1944.

[62] For further details of these and other NZ gunners on Crete after the evacuation, see Davin, Crete ( War History Branch, 1953), Appendix VII.

[*] *Major Queree, who served with Creforce Headquarters.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 5 — Recuperation, Training and Reinforcement

CHAPTER 5
Recuperation, Training and Reinforcement

THE fortunes of the gunners in Crete were followed anxiously by those who had reached Egypt, though reliable news was hard to come by. The bulk of the 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank had disembarked at Alexandria or Port Said by the end of April and various detachments of these units arrived from Crete before the invasion started. In Egypt the gunners got new clothing and personal gear and then went on a week's leave. Arrangements for this were made by Brigadier Miles, who landed on 2 May and at once took command of a special headquarters, ‘New Zealand Troops, Helwan’, in charge of troops from Greece and Crete. On the 11th the 6th Field formed a ‘battalion’, 224 strong, of two ‘companies’ for guard duty at Abbassia, the great barracks and administrative centre for the British Army, on the outskirts of Cairo. Germans had come to the rescue of the Italians in Libya and their combined forces had recaptured Cyrenaica except for Tobruk, which was now garrisoned and besieged. Battleworthy units in Egypt were therefore sent to hold the frontier with Libya and New Zealanders took over various duties in Cairo, the Nile Delta, and the Canal Zone. On 20 May 30 Battery of the 6th Field moved to Almaza and there became Depot Battery. In this capacity the battery helped to train officer candidates from the local OCTU and its gun drill and shooting were much praised.

The 7th Anti-Tank meanwhile resumed training at Helwan and on the 9th welcomed fourteen 2-pounders from Ordnance. Another 10 guns soon followed. All guns were used for drill, but they had to be handled with care, for no gun stores were yet available. Anti-tankers, too, were sent to Almaza for guard duties, starting on the 14th with a detachment of 116. Two days later Lieutenant-Colonel Duff took command of the Artillery Training Regiment at Maadi and Oakes, newly-arrived from Crete and promoted to lieutenant-colonel, became the commanding officer of the 7th Anti-Tank. Oakes at once began a programme of elementary training and ‘spit-and-polish’ of a kind which might have had a beneficial effect in the Indian Army which he knew well, but which aroused resentment among many of his gunners.

The 14th Light Ack-Ack Arrives

The 36th Survey Battery had reached Egypt with the ‘ 4th Reinforcements’ (actually the first reinforcement draft from New Zealand), but it remained a non-divisional body and did not become part of the Divisional Artillery until more than a year later. [1] The 5th Reinforcements in May, however, brought a valuable addition to Miles's command: the 14th Light Anti-Aircraft (Ack-Ack). This unit, formed on 7 January 1941 at Papakura Camp under the temporary command of Captain Aldridge, [2] was the subject of much discussion and negotiation at various levels to decide what establishment it should adopt and what duties it should perform. Like the Second Echelon anti-tank batteries, it could not get its proper guns and equipment until it reached a theatre of operations. The guns were to be 40-millimetre Bofors and the main questions about them were the number to be allotted and the number of predictors [3] that were to be supplied. It was not British Army policy to allocate its scarce light anti-aircraft resources permanently to divisions, but to place them at all times where they were most needed. Miles naturally objected to this, and his experience in Greece greatly strengthened his resolve to have the regiment under his command at least when the New Zealand Division was in action. At other times it might be used for the defence of rear areas; but he certainly did not want it attached to another division in action. Freyberg concurred and in the end Miles won the argument. The establishment had been provisionally for three 12-gun batteries, with a fourth to be added later. A War Establishment table providing for three batteries had been drawn up on 20 April and it made the 14th Light Ack-Ack, even on this smaller organisation, by far the largest unit of the Divisional Artillery in terms of manpower and vehicles. The strength, excluding the attached Signals, Workshops and NZASC (transport) sections, was to be 881 all ranks, with 70 motor-cycles and 127 other vehicles.

After elementary training at Papakura, the unit moved at the end of January 1941 to Ngaruawahia, a far less comfortable camp. There the gunners trained with 18-pounders, in default of any weapons at all like the Bofors they were to receive overseas. Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel Carty
[4] assumed command and in due course the regiment sailed from Wellington on 7 April in the Nieuw Amsterdam. At Sydney, three days later, the troops had to stay on board, to their great disappointment; but they more than made up for it in the three days (16–19 April) that they spent at Fremantle. For the first two days they had leave to visit Perth and sample the warm hospitality of the Western Australians. In a voyage of exceptional interest they left the main convoy on the 22nd, experienced a violent electrical storm at sea, and docked at Singapore two days later. A tiny warship escorted them through the anti-submarine booms, they sailed past the huge floating dock, and tied up in front of the Aquitania. Australians left the convoy to serve in Malaya, a fateful task, and on the 25th the New Zealanders disembarked, marched through the yards of the naval base, bathed in an open-air swimming pool, and then embarked in the Aquitania, a larger but much less attractive ship. Sailing on the 27th, they docked at Colombo on 1 May, and there, too, had ample opportunity to see the sights before they sailed on the 6th. Two days later they heard of the New Zealand cruiser Leander's capture of the armed Italian merchantman Ramb II no more than 200 miles away. They sailed in close to the coast of Italian Somali-land to enter the Red Sea and docked at Port Tewfik on the 13th. An epidemic of influenza had struck the troops in the Aquitania and the stretcher cases and walking patients disembarked first, entrained in a sandstorm in the late afternoon, and began their journey to Helmieh Hospital before midnight. Next day half the fit men went ashore and reached Maadi Camp, where Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow
[5] took command. The remainder disembarked on the 16th.

With a total strength, including the sick ones but not counting the Signals, Ordnance and NZASC sections to be attached, of 920 all ranks, they constituted the largest unit of the Division. They were organised into four batteries, but the new establishment decreed only three and they were rearranged accordingly on the 18th. The regiment from then onwards consisted of RHQ and 41 Battery (A, B and C Troops), 42 Battery (D, E and F Troops) and 43 Battery (G, H and K

Troops). The RSM was WO I Holland. [6] The authorised strength (including reinforcements) was 910, but for the time being the unit retained three officers per troop, one above establishment. ‘Q Area’ of Maadi Camp, which the 14th Light Ack-Ack occupied, was like an oven and the thermometer in the RAP tent reached a daily peak of between 114 and 125 degrees Fahrenheit. Besides the 14th Light Ack-Ack, the 5th Reinforcements included 546 other gunners, a useful number, though not nearly enough to replace losses in Greece and Crete, as was soon to be discovered.

Lessons of Greece

A searching inquiry into artillery operations in Greece was carried out in mid-May by the acting CRA, Colonel Parkinson, who conferred for five days on the subject with almost all available artillery officers. Miles, when he resumed as CRA early in June, carefully considered the findings of this conference and on the 11th summed them up, together with his own conclusions, in a letter to General Freyberg. He gave first place to anti-tank defence. The Germans had proved adept at getting tanks across natural and artificial obstacles and the 2-pounder had not been effective against ‘the heavier natures of tanks’ (a rather doubtful generalisation based largely on one incident in the Molos battle). Many more anti-tank guns were needed, particularly heavy ones, and he suggested that French 75s fitted with Martin Parry adaptors [7] and Beach platforms might be used. If these or similar guns could be obtained, an infantry anti-tank company of nine 2-pounders might be formed in each brigade, backed up by anti-tank batteries with heavier guns. On the British Army attitude to light ack-ack guns Miles was scathing: ‘The cliché that “anti-aircraft defence must be on an area basis” cannot excuse the exposure of troops … to uninterrupted and unopposed attack by low-flying enemy aircraft.’ Small-arms fire had proved ‘quite ineffective’ and he recommended that all combatant units be equipped with machine guns of .5-inch calibre for anti-aircraft defence. The light anti-aircraft regiment, moreover, must be ‘an integral part of the Division’.

Regarding the 25-pounders, he was impressed by their anti-tank power but regarded their use in an anti-tank role as wasteful. Beach platforms—like huge steel cartwheels—which provided stability and quick traverse for anti-tank action, however, facilitated quick and accurate gun-laying even in field roles. Some 25-pounders had been fitted experimentally with attachments under their trails for carrying these platforms and these had proved successful. The normal way of carrying Beach platforms on trailers led to slower handling of the guns. Regarding fuses for 25-pounder shells, Miles thought that the fuse HE 117 was ‘very effective’ against troops in the open, and that HE 119 with the cap on gave a good cratering effect and could be used against dug-in positions. He suggested carrying a higher proportion of HE 119 fuses. For both field and anti-tank guns he thought two more men per gun were needed to allow for casualties, provide reliefs, and help guard against infantry attack on the guns.

New Equipment but No Medium Guns

The 4th and 5th Field were greatly concerned about their comrades in Crete and it came as a bitter disappointment to the latter unit that so few of them got back to Egypt. The 5th Field therefore had the lion's share of available artillery reinforcements and by the end of the third week in June new faces predominated. Meanwhile equipment of various kinds had been coming forward. The 4th and 5th Field received quads on 6 June and the former gladly took over two 25-pounders next day, and on 9 June six more arrived for the 4th Field and eight for the 5th Field. Next day three Mark II Bofors arrived for the 14th Light Ack-Ack and ack-ack gunners who had been attached for training to Bofors batteries in the Canal Zone carried out an excellent practice shoot at Ismailia in front of the CRA and the artillery COs.

All this was encouraging; but units remained desperately short of training equipment and the transport they had so far received was insufficient even for administration. Miles argued the matter at Divisional Headquarters and also at GHQ Middle East Forces, and a higher priority was given to the re-equipment of the Divisional Artillery. By 25 June all field regiments had received their full allotment of quads and on the 29th they gained armoured OP vehicles. The NZASC had suffered even heavier losses in Crete than the gunners and there was a critical shortage of ASC reinforcements. The 14th Light Ack-Ack could not operate, however, without its ASC section, and 14 Light Anti-Aircraft NZASC Section was therefore formed on

17 June under Second-Lieutenant Fordyce
[8] with a strength of 74 all ranks. By 6 July all three field regiments had 16 guns each and 32 trailers—two-thirds of their full complements.

General Freyberg had early in the war declared his wish to have a largely self-contained division under his command with its own medium artillery and tanks. His ‘charter’ (as he called it) allowed him to form new units in the Middle East if he wished and resources allowed. The British Army, in turn, wanted New Zealand to provide more Corps and administrative troops and suggested as much in high-level discussions in May and June. The opportunity was too good to miss and Freyberg, warmly backed by Miles, earnestly explored the possibility of raising a medium regiment of artillery—intending, of course, that it should become, like the light anti-aircraft regiment, an integral part of the Division. German divisions were normally equipped with a battery each of 150-millimetre medium howitzers, which greatly outweighed and outranged the 25-pounder. A medium regiment equipped with 4.5-inch or 5.5-inch gun-howitzers (or both) would have remedied this disability and given the Divisional Artillery the advantage against any likely opposition. There was therefore much to be said for the proposal. The discussion was carried on between Cairo, London and Wellington; but in the end a shortage of manpower in New Zealand caused the scheme to be dropped. In a matter of months Miles and his regimental commanders were to regret this bitterly when they came under fire from the medium howitzers of the German Africa Corps and lacked the range or shell-power for effective reply. For the rest of the war the Division had to make do with whatever medium guns were allotted to it in action. This allotment was frequently inadequate, and in the very next campaign, when the situation cried out for medium artillery, none at all was provided for the Division. The only consolation was that this arrangement brought the New Zealand gunners into contact from time to time—when medium guns were allotted—with the gunners of some very fine medium regiments of the Royal Artillery—the 7th and 64th, old friends from the days in Greece, and many another unit.

In the fierce heat of July field gunners overhauled their equipment, paying particular attention to the packings of gun-recuperators, which had proved troublesome in Greece. Packings on the new guns were almost all defective and had to be replaced. Since it was important to keep sand out of the mechanism while recuperators were repacked, permission was obtained from the RAF to use part of the hangar at Helwan airfield for this purpose. Much attention was also paid to physical fitness and by the middle of July the 5th Field was able to report that its men were ‘desert-hardened’ and very fit. All units formed ‘tank-hunting’ squads and practised with anti-tank grenades and similar devices. With the arrival at the end of July of 370 gunners of the 6th Reinforcements, units were brought up almost to full strength.

The assumption during this period of training and re-equipping had been that the Division was not likely to go into action before August, though 6 Brigade might be needed sooner. The 5th and 6th Field, the 7th Anti-Tank, and the Survey Troop trained in the tented camp of Mahfouz, beside Helwan Camp, the 14th Light Ack-Ack stayed at Q Area in Maadi Camp, and the 4th Field occupied a new camp site at Maadi. Many field guns had been calibrated by 1 August, and many practice shoots had been carried out, but there was still a grave shortage of unit transport. Miles was therefore startled to learn from General Freyberg in a chance encounter on the 4th that their two headquarters were to move to Syria in two days' time and that advanced parties would leave the same day. Miles was to take command of all New Zealand troops in Egypt and Lieutenant-Colonel Weir of the 6th Field would travel to Syria as acting CRA. [9] In a desperate race against time the many consequences of this astonishing order were explored, and appropriate steps were being taken when Miles returned breathlessly to his headquarters with the news that the move was cancelled. Sighs of relief were audible in many quarters.

Two other important items of news also arrived on the 4th: training in combined (or amphibious) operations was soon to be carried out in the Canal Zone and field regiments were to adopt a new three-battery organisation. The New Zealand Artillery had already thoroughly digested the lessons of the fighting in Greece; but the larger mills of the Royal Artillery ground rather more slowly. The fighting in France and Belgium a year before had demonstrated weaknesses in field artillery procedure and the existing organisation had proved cumbersome in mobile operations. Subsequent experience had con- firmed this and the new arrangement was designed to make the field batteries more mobile and flexible. The changeover, however, required much preparation, and it was not until 19 August that a new establishment was issued for field regiments. The total strength, formerly 611, was now 686 all ranks. Each regiment would have 36 quads and 48 trailers as before; but motorcycles would increase from 29 to 44 and other vehicles from 76 to 94—the latter including nine armoured OPs. Instruments and equipment for observing and controlling fire would need to be increased by almost 50 per cent.

New equipment was arriving almost daily, the tempo of preparation for battle was increasing, and to superimpose on it this far-reaching reorganisation of the field regiments created much extra work at all levels. On the 19th the field regiments received the balance of their quota of guns and trailers. The 14th Light Ack-Ack had received its Signals Section, 34 strong, earlier in the month and its Workshops Section obtained two 3-ton lorries on the 4th, a stores lorry on the 21st, and a fully-equipped machine lorry on the 26th.

The programme of combined operations training had meanwhile begun at Kabrit in the Canal Zone and a troop of 32 Battery of the 7th Anti-Tank had gone there with 5 Brigade at the end of July. All batteries of the 7th Anti-Tank except the 34th had their turn at Kabrit before the end of August, and all without exception carried out live shoots on an anti-tank range off the Suez Road. They were busy days.

Action for the Bofors Gunners

The 14th Light Ack-Ack, however, was first into action. Bofors guns were in too great demand for defence of the vital shipping and stores in the Canal Zone and the port of Alexandria to be spared exclusively for training purposes. Nine of them arrived on 19 August for 41 Battery and, with the previous three issued, brought it up to full strength; but Headquarters British Troops in Egypt, which was responsible for the Nile Delta and Canal Zone, meant them to be used without delay against enemy aircraft. On the 20th 42 Battery moved to the Alexandria area under the command of HQ, BTE, and took over guns at Ikingi Maryut and Aboukir from the Northumberland Hussars. Two days later the whole regiment came under the command of HQ, BTE, and 43 Battery relieved 88 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA, at Ismailia, Kantara and Port Said. RHQ of the

14th Light Ack-Ack gained valuable experience of commanding and administering a mixed force of anti-aircraft artillery when it relieved the 25th Light Ack-Ack at the end of August at what was curiously called Spinney Wood, near Ismailia. Royal Artillery guns at Tel-el-Kebir, also in the Canal Zone, were taken over by 41 Battery and all three New Zealand batteries were soon in action against enemy aircraft. Firing was almost all by night and under conditions which made hits on enemy aircraft unlikely; but K Troop, heavily engaged at Port Said on 2 September, possibly helped to shoot down a German bomber. Early in September the other two troops of 43 Battery, G and H Troops, and BHQ left the Canal Zone and set up their guns to defend the huge Ordnance depot at Abbassia. K Troop came under operational command of an RA battery at Port Said. At Tel-el-Kebir 41 Battery was credited with bringing down a plane in the night 7–8 September. All G and H Troop guns fired when the enemy raided Cairo (including Abbassia) on the 15th-16th. For ‘Gussy’ Glasgow's men it was interesting and valuable experience.

The New Zealand ack-ack gunners and their associated Signals and Workshops sections (the ASC section remained at Maadi) had done much to improve gun positions and communications in the course of these operations and HQ, BTE, held them in high esteem. They had in fact done too well and a tug-o'-war began between Freyberg and Miles on one side and the Middle East authorities on the other for the services of the 14th Light Ack-Ack. The Middle East command wanted to keep the unit in action in defence of the rear areas until the last possible moment before the Division moved into its next campaign. It was almost certain, however, that this campaign would entail highly mobile operations and the Division was training with this in view. Anti-aircraft defence of infantry brigade groups moving over open desert was a matter of the first importance and Freyberg was just as anxious as Miles that the 14th Light Ack-Ack should have ample opportunity of practising this role before being called on to take it up in earnest. He wanted no last-minute dash from the elaborate fixed defences of the Canal Zone to fluid operations in the open desert. Moreover, Miles well knew that equipment received from Ordnance in the Middle East almost all needed thorough overhaul before it could be deemed desert-worthy. Freyberg would not budge from his position and by the end of September the 14th Light Ack-Ack was back in Maadi except for 41 Battery, on its way to Baggush in the

Western Desert, and the ASC section, which was at Helwan. All batteries were more or less fully equipped for mobile operations.

Preparing for Desert Operations

Miles and his staff had meanwhile been extremely busy planning and supervising the artillery part of brigade manoeuvres, the amphibious training at Kabrit, and a move from Maadi and Helwan to Baggush. [10] All field regiments completed calibration and practice shoots. On 1–2 September Miles was umpire of an important exercise by 6 Brigade in the desert near Helwan Camp and his headquarters also took part. The 6th Field crossed a canal by a bridge built by the New Zealand Engineers, fired several concentrations, and laid a smoke screen, while 33 Anti-Tank Battery tried out its new portées in mobile defence of the infantry.

Units were warned on 5 September that they would soon move to Baggush in an operational role; but two days later 5 Brigade, with the 5th Field, fresh from Kabrit, were rushed to the desert south of El Alamein—a name at that time of no particular significance—to prepare an elaborate defensive position and construct roads to serve it. The 6th Field carried out, with 6 Brigade, a most important exercise on the 10th to test the new Air Support Control system in conjunction with the RAF. Then 6 Brigade got ready to take its turn at Kabrit, while 4 Brigade moved to Baggush. Divisional Artillery Headquarters, which among its many other tasks had been developing a Counter-Battery Organisation to co-ordinate information about hostile batteries and provide reliable data for engaging them, moved on the 12th. By a last-minute change of plan, perhaps connected with a German reconnaissance-in-force in mid-September, 6 Brigade and associated artillery moved to Baggush instead of to Kabrit. For the ‘old hands’ among the 4th Field gunners it was like going home; but for newcomers it was an absorbing experience to camp in the coastal desert far from the Nile Delta and there begin a new life, away from the fleshpots of Cairo and the restrictions of base-camp routine and spit-and-polish.

The Division took over the Baggush Box, an all-round defensive area on the coast, from an Indian division on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis, which meant that time and labour would not be spent on extensive improvements (though the need for these was obvious). The defences were manned and held more or less ready; but training for a forthcoming desert offensive was the main task. This was to be mounted by the newly formed Eighth Army, which consisted of 13 and 30 Corps and the Tobruk garrison, and the New Zealand Division was to be part of 13 Corps.

The immediate task was to practise moving brigade groups by day and night in ‘open formation’ across the changing face of the desert. Each brigade would have about 1000 vehicles and would need to be protected against air or tank attack while on the move and be ready to fight an encounter battle at almost any time. Suitable techniques therefore had to be developed and co-operation between the many components of the brigade group practised until it became second nature. In this the Division was starting almost from scratch; for previous experience of other troops against Italians in the desert scarcely counted. The Germans, who would undoubtedly provide the main opposition, had been developing and refining techniques for mobile operations over open country since 1934. It was a tall order for the New Zealanders to cram a parallel development into a few short weeks.

The gunners' role in this war of movement was of critical importance. No tank force was to be permanently allotted to the Division except the Divisional Cavalry, which had some obsolescent light tanks and was intended for reconnaissance, but not for hard fighting. In the periodic absence of fighting tanks the guns would bear the full burden of protecting the Division on the move. Had the gunners become thoroughly proficient in the use of their own equipment and well-acquainted with their own organisations, their task of developing suitable tactics and techniques would have been hard enough; but all were concurrently immersed in learning the intricacies of new equipment and the workings of new organisations.

Field and Anti-Tank Batteries are Reorganised

The three-battery organisation of the field regiments, adopted in late August, besides involving many appointments, promotions and transfers, entailed getting used to new roles, new ways of doing business, and new systems of communication. Each regiment, moreover, had its own way of effecting the changeover, so that there was no standard designation of troops in the two-troop batteries. The 4th Field, for example, decided to extract the middle troop of existing batteries to form the new battery, which therefore contained B and E Troops. The 6th Field took the last troop of the first battery and the first troop of the second battery, C and D Troops, to form the third battery. The 5th Field took the last troop from each former battery, C and F Troops. The numbering of the new batteries had to await advice from New Zealand so as not to duplicate numbers used there and the final listing was as follows:

4th Field | 25 Battery: A and C Troops
| 26 Battery: D and F Troops
| 46 Battery: B and E Troops
5th Field | 27 Battery: A and B Troops
| 28 Battery: D and E Troops
| 47 Battery: C and F Troops
6th Field | 29 Battery: A and B Troops
| 30 Battery: E and F Troops
| 48 Battery: C and D Troops

For the ‘old hands’, long used to the old numbers and letters, it was as if their brothers had all changed their names by deed poll and it was not easy to get used to it.

The anti-tankers had to put up with changes only slightly less confusing. In Greece only 34 Battery had had portées; now all batteries had them and had to master gun drill appropriate to them and learn a new set of tactics. The policy was to carry the guns into the forward area (the 2-pounders suffered damage when towed far over rough ground), but to dismount them when action threatened and engage the enemy from ground positions. Only in an emergency were the guns to be fired from the portées. This had seemed, on the flimsy basis of some of the experiences of 34 Battery in Greece, to be the best way of handling this equipment; but conditions in the desert were different and there was more to be said for portée action there. The 7th Anti-Tank could not leave Mahfouz Camp until late in September, because it was still in course of being re-equipped when the other regiments left for Baggush. Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes therefore had more time to consider the move and decided that, instead of the rather monotonous drive along the Cairo- Alexandria road and then the coast road, he would take his regiment in ‘desert formation’ across country from Mena. It was a good idea; but he found it hard to convince the Middle East Movement Control authorities of this and get their permission. In the end he succeeded and on 25 September the regiment moved through Cairo, out towards the Pyramids, and then off the paved road and into the desert. Careful checks were made of the petrol, oil and water consumption of the various kinds of vehicles, the gunners had each to make do with three-quarters of a gallon of water per day, and drivers gained valuable experience of changing desert conditions. The journey took three days, and in the course of it the LAD handled only two major repair jobs and 11 minor ones, as well as helping to pull seven vehicles out of soft sand.

Four-troop anti-tank batteries had already been provided for in a revised war establishment of 10 May. But Brigadier Miles's recommendation of heavier equipment bore fruit when 18-pounders were provided for the extra troops in place of the 2-pounders listed in the establishment table. These guns, adapted for use on Beach platforms in an anti-tank role, and fitted with telescope and open sights, were rather cumbersome, but would provide a useful and versatile addition to anti-tank resources, for they could fire HE shell as well as AP shot. They were manned mainly by gunners who had arrived with the 6th Reinforcements in July. After a course in anti-tank gunnery at the Artillery Training Regiment in Maadi, they were formed into detachments under NCOs sent for this purpose from the 7th Anti-Tank and drilled with the converted 18-pounders. The new troops, totalling 152 all ranks, joined the regiment at Baggush towards the end of October and brought the batteries up to their four-troop establishment as follows:

31 Battery | A, B and C Troops (2-pounders)
| D Troop (18-pounders)
32 Battery | E, F, and G Troops (2-pounders)
| H Troop (18-pounders)
33 Battery | J, K and L Troops (2-pounders)
| M Troop (18-pounders)
34 Battery | N, O and P Troops (2-pounders)
| Q Troop (18-pounders)

So great was the demand for Bofors to defend the huge dumps, railheads, and other centres of activity concerned with preparations for the forthcoming offensive, that even Freyberg's and Miles's sternest resolve could not deny the use of some of the guns of the 14th Light Ack-Ack for this purpose. The regiment did not move to Baggush until the end of the first week in October; but the senior anti-aircraft officer of Eighth Army had asked Miles a fortnight earlier if 41 Battery could supply guns to defend the forward depots and A Troop was at once despatched to the busy area known as Charing Cross. All its guns fired in the course of a bombing raid on the 10th. Two days later 42 and 43 Batteries each sent a troop to take up an operational role—F Troop to Similla, 10 miles east of Matruh, to guard the railway sidings, and H Troop back to Fuka for the same purpose. Other troops relieved these in due course and all took part in the brigade manoeuvres which were the main feature of the training at Baggush. A long argument about the number of predictors that the regiment was to have and the way they would be controlled was settled before leaving Maadi: the issue would be four per battery and they were to be under the control of the three battery headquarters. At the last possible moment—9 November—the batteries were reorganised to have two troops each of six guns, with the troops divided into sections of three guns.

All three infantry brigades carried out large-scale manoeuvres in the rough hinterland of Baggush; but Freyberg's and Miles's headquarters took part in the three main ones and made them in many respects divisional manoeuvres. The 4th and 6th Field and anti-tank and light anti-aircraft guns accompanied 6 Brigade on 9 October and took part in its attack on the simulated strongpoints ‘Sidi Clif’ and ‘Bir Stella’ two days later. The 4th Field and the 5th Field (after working on the Alamein defences) took part in the next manoeuvre with 4 Brigade on the 16th, with the Survey Troop and a different lot of 2-pounder and Bofors troops. The final exercise on the 20th was carried out by the 5th and 6th Field in support of 5 Brigade, with further anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. A troop from each of the field regiments took part in a final exercise with the RAF on the 9th and carried out a shoot in co-operation with aircraft.

The Battle Plan

Many were the other preparations for battle, all of them now complete. The Eighth Army offensive, known as CRUSADER, was to be on a grand scale, the culmination of five months of planning. Brigadier Miles had attended a select conference of New Zealand brigadiers and two colonels on 17 October at which Freyberg had disclosed, in conditions of great secrecy, the outline of the plan. The object was the capture of Cyrenaica and the first phase would be the destruction of the enemy armour. To make the enemy deploy his armour, Eighth Army was to threaten the forces besieging Tobruk; but the relief of Tobruk would be incidental. The British armour was thought to be slightly stronger than the combined German and Italian armour and it was expected to complete their destruction with little or no help from the rest of Eighth Army. The New Zealand Division was to be grouped with 4 Indian Division and 1 Army Tank Brigade (with heavy but slow infantry tanks) in 13 Corps to cut off the enemy defending the frontier positions and to do the mopping up when the enemy armour was defeated. Surprise was to be gained, if possible, by a series of marches on moonless nights to the Egypt- Libya frontier.

The artillery details stressed that protection on the move was vital. Command of the artillery was to remain with Miles and was not to be decentralised to brigades ‘unless necessary’. Freyberg thought tank attack was the greatest danger. To guard against this, anti-tank mines would be carried by sappers and infantry, and if mines were laid they must be covered by artillery fire. The anti-aircraft defence of a brigade while it was fighting a battle raised difficult problems, all the more worrying because the enemy was expected to have a decided superiority in the air, though nothing like the virtual monopoly he enjoyed in Greece and Crete.

These were Freyberg's views of the requirements of his Division if it followed the programme drawn up for it by higher authority; but the programme was hopelessly confused and unrealistic, the assumptions behind it—such as those about the relative strengths of the armour and air forces—were almost all incorrect, and Miles gained no useful guidance. But Freyberg's further points indicated that he realised at least some of the inadequacies of the crusader plan and was uncomfortably aware that the battle was not likely to follow the course that the planners supposed. He asked the brigadiers to consider two possibilities and plan for them: that the armoured protection promised for divisional moves might not be provided and that a brigade group (or more) might have to advance unescorted along an escarpment. Later Freyberg got the sappers to construct a relief model of the battle area, and when he studied this he became increasingly certain that the Division would have to fight not to blockade the frontier positions but to relieve Tobruk. If so, the escarpments leading towards Tobruk and passing through Belhamed or Sidi Rezegh would be all-important.

To Miles one defect of the Divisional organisation was that the Divisional Cavalry was too weak to overcome even slight opposition and it might therefore be prevented from carrying out its tasks. He was prepared to attach anti-tank 2-pounders to it, but was sceptical of their worth against German medium tanks. The 18-pounders, he felt sure, were vital to the defence of the infantry brigades. The only solution, therefore, was to attach a troop of 25-pounders to the Cavalry, and he considered the conditions under which the field guns might be able to operate with such a mobile force. There was no suggestion of putting a medium regiment of artillery under Freyberg's command; yet without one the Divisional Artillery was likely to be outweighed and outranged. Both Freyberg and Miles thought the crusader planners underestimated the fighting qualities of the Germans.

The New Zealand Division was in fact the only infantry division which was to have no medium guns. The 1st South African Division, in the armoured corps, was to have the 7th Medium and 4 Indian Division was to have the 68th Medium, while 70 Division, the garrison of Tobruk, had two medium batteries and a few heavy guns. Against the 172 guns of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery, the relatively immobile 4 Indian Division was to have about 300, including the medium unit and four field regiments. It was a curious distribution of resources.

All reservations or misgivings were filtered out as the plan passed from Division to brigade to regiment and then to battery and troop. The gunners were generally enthusiastic. They loved their new equipment and were confident of their skills. Morale was extremely high. When 5 Brigade moved forward from Baggush along the road to Matruh on 11 November (with the 5th Field, 32 and 34 Anti-Tank Batteries, and 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery) it seemed certain to be the beginning of a wonderful adventure. The troops had seen so much evidence of British strength on land and in the air and so little evidence of the enemy that they readily believed the most optimistic estimates.

The Move to the Libyan Frontier

The route branched southwards towards Siwa and then into the open desert for a few miles to a divisional assembly area. Next day 4 Brigade (with the 4th Field, the 7th Anti-Tank RHQ and 31 Battery, the 14th Light Ack-Ack RHQ and 41 Battery, and 1 Survey Troop) and Divisional Headquarters Group (with Divisional Artillery Headquarters) left Baggush and reached the assembly area. On the 13th Freyberg himself set out early, followed by 6 Brigade (with the 6th Field, 33 Anti-Tank Battery and 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery).

All but the Divisional Cavalry, already at the frontier, and a few detachments were assembled in the open desert in the morning of the 14th, the first time the whole Division was together. Occasionally some vehicle tore a thin ribbon of dust from the flat, scrub-covered desert. But 3000 lorries, quads, pick-up trucks and staff cars kept still, their engines silent, the troops resting. Freyberg called together officers down to battery or company commanders and gave them some of his ideas about the forthcoming battle, which promised to be ‘a very tough one’. The Germans were brave and skilful. ‘They realise the value of AFVs [armoured fighting vehicles] and they will not hesitate to use them in a desperate counter stroke.’ He drew attention, among other matters, to the constant dilemma of desert commanders: whether to open out and minimise losses from air attack or to close up and present a stronger front to enemy tanks. Tank attack could do more damage, and if this threatened then formations should close in, to thicken up defensive fire. Miles later conferred with his COs and the artillery Intelligence officers then met to exchange views, mark maps, and receive code lists. Three Bofors sections were detached, two to defend Headquarters Group and the third to defend the NZASC Group.

The Division, as it drove slowly forward on the 15th, made an unforgettable spectacle, with vehicles well-spaced and stretching from horizon to horizon, windshields flashing in the sunlight, and wisps of dust rising, building up here and there in the soft patches to a billowing cloud which trailed each lorry. The going became stony and ‘Steve’ Weir of the 6th Field was critical of the control of the march, which he thought was ‘rather ragged’. The 4th Field suffered several ‘blowouts’ and broken springs.

Aircraft were heard throughout the night and bombs fell in the distance. The morning of the 16th was cold and the wind raised much dust. Vehicles were mostly covered with camouflage nets and the troops rested. The Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General A. R. Godwin-Austen, visited the Division and met officers down to the rank of major. Brigade groups closed in as evening approached and at intervals of 10–20 yards between vehicles they set off at dark on a march of 16–18 miles. The leading vehicles soon struck trouble in the form of patches of soft sand. The concertina motion which developed as columns slowed down and then raced to catch up with their neighbours led to reckless speeding at times. The anti-tank portées could keep up; but the field and ack-ack guns could not be towed over rough ground at anything like the pace the 3-ton lorries maintained. Confusion therefore reigned until the going improved.

Gunners of the 4th Field were annoyed in the morning to learn that because 5 Brigade had halted too far south 4 Brigade would have to conform. Because of this they had to fill in their slit trenches and dig new ones. The frontier was close and much attention was therefore paid to anti-tank defence. Later in the day Freyberg conferred with Miles about the placing of guns in the columns on the move, and whether a 25-pounder troop should accompany the Divisional Cavalry in the opening stages of the offensive. On the prospects of success, the GOC remarked, ‘Everything depends on whether he [the enemy] has hidden reserves. If he has things are going to be difficult.’ Next day, 18 November, the Division would be through the frontier and facing north and crusader would begin. Anti-tank guns were to be posted in line 500 yards outside the concentrations of vehicles and protected by infantry in depth. On the move anti-tank portées and Bren carriers were to protect the flanks. The Divisional Cavalry returned to Freyberg's command during the day and 34 Anti-Tank Battery with two 2-pounder troops was placed under its command. [11]

[1] See

Chapter 13.

[2]
Maj F. A. Aldridge, DSO; Te Puke; born Christchurch, 23 Sep 1907; company secretary; wounded 6 Jan 1943.

[3] ‘Magic boxes’ which computed the course of aircraft. They found some favour among ack-ack gunners in a static role; but on mobile operations, particularly against low-flying aircraft, firing over open sights was usually preferred.

[4]
Lt-Col D. A. Carty; Wellington; born Feilding, 21 Dec 1902; warehouseman.

[5]
Col K. W. R. Glasgow, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; born Wellington, 15 Nov 1902; headmaster; CO 14 Lt AA Regt May-Dec 1941; 5 Fd Regt Dec 1941-May 1943; GSO I, NZ Maadi Camp, 1944; died Waikanae, 4 Oct 1958.

[6]
Maj A. J. Holland; Papakura; born Timaru, 23 Jun 1913; Regular soldier; Camp Commandant, Papakura Military Camp, 1958–60.

[7] Rubber-tired wheels in place of iron-shod wheels, with appropriate rearrangement of the gun carriage.

[8]
Capt G. Fordyce, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Calderbank, Scotland, 13 Mar 1911; salesman and schoolteacher; Bde Supply Offr, 6 Bde, Aug 1942-Apr 1944.

[9] Ike Parkinson had already gone back to New Zealand to command an army tank brigade which was to be formed there.

[10] Miles did manage to find time on 27 August, however, to be invested by the Prime Minister of Greece (in company with Prince Paul) with the Greek Military Cross, 1st Class.

[11] Strengths and chief appointments at this stage were as follows:

Headquarters | CRA, Brig R. Miles BM, Maj H. E. Gilbert | 54 all ranks
4th Field | CO, Lt-Col C. S. J. Duff | 754 all ranks (including E Sec Sigs, 9 LAD and other attached personnel)
5th Field | CO, Lt-Col K. W. Fraser | 721 all ranks (including F Sec Sigs, 16 LAD, etc.)
6th Field | CO, Lt-Col C. E. Weir | 731 all ranks (including G Sec Sigs, 18 LAD, etc.)
7th Anti-Tank | CO, Lt-Col T. H. E. Oakes | 774 all ranks (including H Sec Sigs, 15 LAD, etc.)
14th Light Ack-Ack | CO, Lt- Col K. W. R. Glasgow | Just over 1000 all ranks (including Sigs, Workshops and ASC Sections, etc.)
I Survey Troop | OC, Capt S. H. Dawe | 43 all ranks

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE fortunes of the gunners in Crete were followed anxiously by those who had reached Egypt, though reliable news was hard to come by. The bulk of the 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank had disembarked at Alexandria or Port Said by the end of April and various detachments of these units arrived from Crete before the invasion started. In Egypt the gunners got new clothing and personal gear and then went on a week's leave. Arrangements for this were made by Brigadier Miles, who landed on 2 May and at once took command of a special headquarters, ‘New Zealand Troops, Helwan’, in charge of troops from Greece and Crete. On the 11th the 6th Field formed a ‘battalion’, 224 strong, of two ‘companies’ for guard duty at Abbassia, the great barracks and administrative centre for the British Army, on the outskirts of Cairo. Germans had come to the rescue of the Italians in Libya and their combined forces had recaptured Cyrenaica except for Tobruk, which was now garrisoned and besieged. Battleworthy units in Egypt were therefore sent to hold the frontier with Libya and New Zealanders took over various duties in Cairo, the Nile Delta, and the Canal Zone. On 20 May 30 Battery of the 6th Field moved to Almaza and there became Depot Battery. In this capacity the battery helped to train officer candidates from the local OCTU and its gun drill and shooting were much praised.

The 7th Anti-Tank meanwhile resumed training at Helwan and on the 9th welcomed fourteen 2-pounders from Ordnance. Another 10 guns soon followed. All guns were used for drill, but they had to be handled with care, for no gun stores were yet available. Anti-tankers, too, were sent to Almaza for guard duties, starting on the 14th with a detachment of 116. Two days later Lieutenant-Colonel Duff took command of the Artillery Training Regiment at Maadi and Oakes, newly-arrived from Crete and promoted to lieutenant-colonel, became the commanding officer of the 7th Anti-Tank. Oakes at once began a programme of elementary training and ‘spit-and-polish’ of a kind which might have had a beneficial effect in the Indian Army which he knew well, but which aroused resentment among many of his gunners.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The 14th Light Ack-Ack Arrives

The 14th Light Ack-Ack Arrives

The 36th Survey Battery had reached Egypt with the ‘ 4th Reinforcements’ (actually the first reinforcement draft from New Zealand), but it remained a non-divisional body and did not become part of the Divisional Artillery until more than a year later. [1] The 5th Reinforcements in May, however, brought a valuable addition to Miles's command: the 14th Light Anti-Aircraft (Ack-Ack). This unit, formed on 7 January 1941 at Papakura Camp under the temporary command of Captain Aldridge, [2] was the subject of much discussion and negotiation at various levels to decide what establishment it should adopt and what duties it should perform. Like the Second Echelon anti-tank batteries, it could not get its proper guns and equipment until it reached a theatre of operations. The guns were to be 40-millimetre Bofors and the main questions about them were the number to be allotted and the number of predictors [3] that were to be supplied. It was not British Army policy to allocate its scarce light anti-aircraft resources permanently to divisions, but to place them at all times where they were most needed. Miles naturally objected to this, and his experience in Greece greatly strengthened his resolve to have the regiment under his command at least when the New Zealand Division was in action. At other times it might be used for the defence of rear areas; but he certainly did not want it attached to another division in action. Freyberg concurred and in the end Miles won the argument. The establishment had been provisionally for three 12-gun batteries, with a fourth to be added later. A War Establishment table providing for three batteries had been drawn up on 20 April and it made the 14th Light Ack-Ack, even on this smaller organisation, by far the largest unit of the Divisional Artillery in terms of manpower and vehicles. The strength, excluding the attached Signals, Workshops and NZASC (transport) sections, was to be 881 all ranks, with 70 motor-cycles and 127 other vehicles.

After elementary training at Papakura, the unit moved at the end of January 1941 to Ngaruawahia, a far less comfortable camp. There the gunners trained with 18-pounders, in default of any weapons at all like the Bofors they were to receive overseas. Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel Carty
[4] assumed command and in due course the regiment sailed from Wellington on 7 April in the Nieuw Amsterdam. At Sydney, three days later, the troops had to stay on board, to their great disappointment; but they more than made up for it in the three days (16–19 April) that they spent at Fremantle. For the first two days they had leave to visit Perth and sample the warm hospitality of the Western Australians. In a voyage of exceptional interest they left the main convoy on the 22nd, experienced a violent electrical storm at sea, and docked at Singapore two days later. A tiny warship escorted them through the anti-submarine booms, they sailed past the huge floating dock, and tied up in front of the Aquitania. Australians left the convoy to serve in Malaya, a fateful task, and on the 25th the New Zealanders disembarked, marched through the yards of the naval base, bathed in an open-air swimming pool, and then embarked in the Aquitania, a larger but much less attractive ship. Sailing on the 27th, they docked at Colombo on 1 May, and there, too, had ample opportunity to see the sights before they sailed on the 6th. Two days later they heard of the New Zealand cruiser Leander's capture of the armed Italian merchantman Ramb II no more than 200 miles away. They sailed in close to the coast of Italian Somali-land to enter the Red Sea and docked at Port Tewfik on the 13th. An epidemic of influenza had struck the troops in the Aquitania and the stretcher cases and walking patients disembarked first, entrained in a sandstorm in the late afternoon, and began their journey to Helmieh Hospital before midnight. Next day half the fit men went ashore and reached Maadi Camp, where Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow
[5] took command. The remainder disembarked on the 16th.

With a total strength, including the sick ones but not counting the Signals, Ordnance and NZASC sections to be attached, of 920 all ranks, they constituted the largest unit of the Division. They were organised into four batteries, but the new establishment decreed only three and they were rearranged accordingly on the 18th. The regiment from then onwards consisted of RHQ and 41 Battery (A, B and C Troops), 42 Battery (D, E and F Troops) and 43 Battery (G, H and K

Troops). The RSM was WO I Holland. [6] The authorised strength (including reinforcements) was 910, but for the time being the unit retained three officers per troop, one above establishment. ‘Q Area’ of Maadi Camp, which the 14th Light Ack-Ack occupied, was like an oven and the thermometer in the RAP tent reached a daily peak of between 114 and 125 degrees Fahrenheit. Besides the 14th Light Ack-Ack, the 5th Reinforcements included 546 other gunners, a useful number, though not nearly enough to replace losses in Greece and Crete, as was soon to be discovered.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Lessons of Greece

Lessons of Greece

A searching inquiry into artillery operations in Greece was carried out in mid-May by the acting CRA, Colonel Parkinson, who conferred for five days on the subject with almost all available artillery officers. Miles, when he resumed as CRA early in June, carefully considered the findings of this conference and on the 11th summed them up, together with his own conclusions, in a letter to General Freyberg. He gave first place to anti-tank defence. The Germans had proved adept at getting tanks across natural and artificial obstacles and the 2-pounder had not been effective against ‘the heavier natures of tanks’ (a rather doubtful generalisation based largely on one incident in the Molos battle). Many more anti-tank guns were needed, particularly heavy ones, and he suggested that French 75s fitted with Martin Parry adaptors [7] and Beach platforms might be used. If these or similar guns could be obtained, an infantry anti-tank company of nine 2-pounders might be formed in each brigade, backed up by anti-tank batteries with heavier guns. On the British Army attitude to light ack-ack guns Miles was scathing: ‘The cliché that “anti-aircraft defence must be on an area basis” cannot excuse the exposure of troops … to uninterrupted and unopposed attack by low-flying enemy aircraft.’ Small-arms fire had proved ‘quite ineffective’ and he recommended that all combatant units be equipped with machine guns of .5-inch calibre for anti-aircraft defence. The light anti-aircraft regiment, moreover, must be ‘an integral part of the Division’.

Regarding the 25-pounders, he was impressed by their anti-tank power but regarded their use in an anti-tank role as wasteful. Beach platforms—like huge steel cartwheels—which provided stability and quick traverse for anti-tank action, however, facilitated quick and accurate gun-laying even in field roles. Some 25-pounders had been fitted experimentally with attachments under their trails for carrying these platforms and these had proved successful. The normal way of carrying Beach platforms on trailers led to slower handling of the guns. Regarding fuses for 25-pounder shells, Miles thought that the fuse HE 117 was ‘very effective’ against troops in the open, and that HE 119 with the cap on gave a good cratering effect and could be used against dug-in positions. He suggested carrying a higher proportion of HE 119 fuses. For both field and anti-tank guns he thought two more men per gun were needed to allow for casualties, provide reliefs, and help guard against infantry attack on the guns.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

New Equipment but No Medium Guns

New Equipment but No Medium Guns

The 4th and 5th Field were greatly concerned about their comrades in Crete and it came as a bitter disappointment to the latter unit that so few of them got back to Egypt. The 5th Field therefore had the lion's share of available artillery reinforcements and by the end of the third week in June new faces predominated. Meanwhile equipment of various kinds had been coming forward. The 4th and 5th Field received quads on 6 June and the former gladly took over two 25-pounders next day, and on 9 June six more arrived for the 4th Field and eight for the 5th Field. Next day three Mark II Bofors arrived for the 14th Light Ack-Ack and ack-ack gunners who had been attached for training to Bofors batteries in the Canal Zone carried out an excellent practice shoot at Ismailia in front of the CRA and the artillery COs.

All this was encouraging; but units remained desperately short of training equipment and the transport they had so far received was insufficient even for administration. Miles argued the matter at Divisional Headquarters and also at GHQ Middle East Forces, and a higher priority was given to the re-equipment of the Divisional Artillery. By 25 June all field regiments had received their full allotment of quads and on the 29th they gained armoured OP vehicles. The NZASC had suffered even heavier losses in Crete than the gunners and there was a critical shortage of ASC reinforcements. The 14th Light Ack-Ack could not operate, however, without its ASC section, and 14 Light Anti-Aircraft NZASC Section was therefore formed on

17 June under Second-Lieutenant Fordyce
[8] with a strength of 74 all ranks. By 6 July all three field regiments had 16 guns each and 32 trailers—two-thirds of their full complements.

General Freyberg had early in the war declared his wish to have a largely self-contained division under his command with its own medium artillery and tanks. His ‘charter’ (as he called it) allowed him to form new units in the Middle East if he wished and resources allowed. The British Army, in turn, wanted New Zealand to provide more Corps and administrative troops and suggested as much in high-level discussions in May and June. The opportunity was too good to miss and Freyberg, warmly backed by Miles, earnestly explored the possibility of raising a medium regiment of artillery—intending, of course, that it should become, like the light anti-aircraft regiment, an integral part of the Division. German divisions were normally equipped with a battery each of 150-millimetre medium howitzers, which greatly outweighed and outranged the 25-pounder. A medium regiment equipped with 4.5-inch or 5.5-inch gun-howitzers (or both) would have remedied this disability and given the Divisional Artillery the advantage against any likely opposition. There was therefore much to be said for the proposal. The discussion was carried on between Cairo, London and Wellington; but in the end a shortage of manpower in New Zealand caused the scheme to be dropped. In a matter of months Miles and his regimental commanders were to regret this bitterly when they came under fire from the medium howitzers of the German Africa Corps and lacked the range or shell-power for effective reply. For the rest of the war the Division had to make do with whatever medium guns were allotted to it in action. This allotment was frequently inadequate, and in the very next campaign, when the situation cried out for medium artillery, none at all was provided for the Division. The only consolation was that this arrangement brought the New Zealand gunners into contact from time to time—when medium guns were allotted—with the gunners of some very fine medium regiments of the Royal Artillery—the 7th and 64th, old friends from the days in Greece, and many another unit.

In the fierce heat of July field gunners overhauled their equipment, paying particular attention to the packings of gun-recuperators, which had proved troublesome in Greece. Packings on the new guns were almost all defective and had to be replaced. Since it was important to keep sand out of the mechanism while recuperators were repacked, permission was obtained from the RAF to use part of the hangar at Helwan airfield for this purpose. Much attention was also paid to physical fitness and by the middle of July the 5th Field was able to report that its men were ‘desert-hardened’ and very fit. All units formed ‘tank-hunting’ squads and practised with anti-tank grenades and similar devices. With the arrival at the end of July of 370 gunners of the 6th Reinforcements, units were brought up almost to full strength.

The assumption during this period of training and re-equipping had been that the Division was not likely to go into action before August, though 6 Brigade might be needed sooner. The 5th and 6th Field, the 7th Anti-Tank, and the Survey Troop trained in the tented camp of Mahfouz, beside Helwan Camp, the 14th Light Ack-Ack stayed at Q Area in Maadi Camp, and the 4th Field occupied a new camp site at Maadi. Many field guns had been calibrated by 1 August, and many practice shoots had been carried out, but there was still a grave shortage of unit transport. Miles was therefore startled to learn from General Freyberg in a chance encounter on the 4th that their two headquarters were to move to Syria in two days' time and that advanced parties would leave the same day. Miles was to take command of all New Zealand troops in Egypt and Lieutenant-Colonel Weir of the 6th Field would travel to Syria as acting CRA. [9] In a desperate race against time the many consequences of this astonishing order were explored, and appropriate steps were being taken when Miles returned breathlessly to his headquarters with the news that the move was cancelled. Sighs of relief were audible in many quarters.

Two other important items of news also arrived on the 4th: training in combined (or amphibious) operations was soon to be carried out in the Canal Zone and field regiments were to adopt a new three-battery organisation. The New Zealand Artillery had already thoroughly digested the lessons of the fighting in Greece; but the larger mills of the Royal Artillery ground rather more slowly. The fighting in France and Belgium a year before had demonstrated weaknesses in field artillery procedure and the existing organisation had proved cumbersome in mobile operations. Subsequent experience had con- firmed this and the new arrangement was designed to make the field batteries more mobile and flexible. The changeover, however, required much preparation, and it was not until 19 August that a new establishment was issued for field regiments. The total strength, formerly 611, was now 686 all ranks. Each regiment would have 36 quads and 48 trailers as before; but motorcycles would increase from 29 to 44 and other vehicles from 76 to 94—the latter including nine armoured OPs. Instruments and equipment for observing and controlling fire would need to be increased by almost 50 per cent.

New equipment was arriving almost daily, the tempo of preparation for battle was increasing, and to superimpose on it this far-reaching reorganisation of the field regiments created much extra work at all levels. On the 19th the field regiments received the balance of their quota of guns and trailers. The 14th Light Ack-Ack had received its Signals Section, 34 strong, earlier in the month and its Workshops Section obtained two 3-ton lorries on the 4th, a stores lorry on the 21st, and a fully-equipped machine lorry on the 26th.

The programme of combined operations training had meanwhile begun at Kabrit in the Canal Zone and a troop of 32 Battery of the 7th Anti-Tank had gone there with 5 Brigade at the end of July. All batteries of the 7th Anti-Tank except the 34th had their turn at Kabrit before the end of August, and all without exception carried out live shoots on an anti-tank range off the Suez Road. They were busy days.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Action for the Bofors Gunners

Action for the Bofors Gunners

The 14th Light Ack-Ack, however, was first into action. Bofors guns were in too great demand for defence of the vital shipping and stores in the Canal Zone and the port of Alexandria to be spared exclusively for training purposes. Nine of them arrived on 19 August for 41 Battery and, with the previous three issued, brought it up to full strength; but Headquarters British Troops in Egypt, which was responsible for the Nile Delta and Canal Zone, meant them to be used without delay against enemy aircraft. On the 20th 42 Battery moved to the Alexandria area under the command of HQ, BTE, and took over guns at Ikingi Maryut and Aboukir from the Northumberland Hussars. Two days later the whole regiment came under the command of HQ, BTE, and 43 Battery relieved 88 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA, at Ismailia, Kantara and Port Said. RHQ of the

14th Light Ack-Ack gained valuable experience of commanding and administering a mixed force of anti-aircraft artillery when it relieved the 25th Light Ack-Ack at the end of August at what was curiously called Spinney Wood, near Ismailia. Royal Artillery guns at Tel-el-Kebir, also in the Canal Zone, were taken over by 41 Battery and all three New Zealand batteries were soon in action against enemy aircraft. Firing was almost all by night and under conditions which made hits on enemy aircraft unlikely; but K Troop, heavily engaged at Port Said on 2 September, possibly helped to shoot down a German bomber. Early in September the other two troops of 43 Battery, G and H Troops, and BHQ left the Canal Zone and set up their guns to defend the huge Ordnance depot at Abbassia. K Troop came under operational command of an RA battery at Port Said. At Tel-el-Kebir 41 Battery was credited with bringing down a plane in the night 7–8 September. All G and H Troop guns fired when the enemy raided Cairo (including Abbassia) on the 15th-16th. For ‘Gussy’ Glasgow's men it was interesting and valuable experience.

The New Zealand ack-ack gunners and their associated Signals and Workshops sections (the ASC section remained at Maadi) had done much to improve gun positions and communications in the course of these operations and HQ, BTE, held them in high esteem. They had in fact done too well and a tug-o'-war began between Freyberg and Miles on one side and the Middle East authorities on the other for the services of the 14th Light Ack-Ack. The Middle East command wanted to keep the unit in action in defence of the rear areas until the last possible moment before the Division moved into its next campaign. It was almost certain, however, that this campaign would entail highly mobile operations and the Division was training with this in view. Anti-aircraft defence of infantry brigade groups moving over open desert was a matter of the first importance and Freyberg was just as anxious as Miles that the 14th Light Ack-Ack should have ample opportunity of practising this role before being called on to take it up in earnest. He wanted no last-minute dash from the elaborate fixed defences of the Canal Zone to fluid operations in the open desert. Moreover, Miles well knew that equipment received from Ordnance in the Middle East almost all needed thorough overhaul before it could be deemed desert-worthy. Freyberg would not budge from his position and by the end of September the 14th Light Ack-Ack was back in Maadi except for 41 Battery, on its way to Baggush in the

Western Desert, and the ASC section, which was at Helwan. All batteries were more or less fully equipped for mobile operations.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Preparing for Desert Operations

Preparing for Desert Operations

Miles and his staff had meanwhile been extremely busy planning and supervising the artillery part of brigade manoeuvres, the amphibious training at Kabrit, and a move from Maadi and Helwan to Baggush. [10] All field regiments completed calibration and practice shoots. On 1–2 September Miles was umpire of an important exercise by 6 Brigade in the desert near Helwan Camp and his headquarters also took part. The 6th Field crossed a canal by a bridge built by the New Zealand Engineers, fired several concentrations, and laid a smoke screen, while 33 Anti-Tank Battery tried out its new portées in mobile defence of the infantry.

Units were warned on 5 September that they would soon move to Baggush in an operational role; but two days later 5 Brigade, with the 5th Field, fresh from Kabrit, were rushed to the desert south of El Alamein—a name at that time of no particular significance—to prepare an elaborate defensive position and construct roads to serve it. The 6th Field carried out, with 6 Brigade, a most important exercise on the 10th to test the new Air Support Control system in conjunction with the RAF. Then 6 Brigade got ready to take its turn at Kabrit, while 4 Brigade moved to Baggush. Divisional Artillery Headquarters, which among its many other tasks had been developing a Counter-Battery Organisation to co-ordinate information about hostile batteries and provide reliable data for engaging them, moved on the 12th. By a last-minute change of plan, perhaps connected with a German reconnaissance-in-force in mid-September, 6 Brigade and associated artillery moved to Baggush instead of to Kabrit. For the ‘old hands’ among the 4th Field gunners it was like going home; but for newcomers it was an absorbing experience to camp in the coastal desert far from the Nile Delta and there begin a new life, away from the fleshpots of Cairo and the restrictions of base-camp routine and spit-and-polish.

The Division took over the Baggush Box, an all-round defensive area on the coast, from an Indian division on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis, which meant that time and labour would not be spent on extensive improvements (though the need for these was obvious). The defences were manned and held more or less ready; but training for a forthcoming desert offensive was the main task. This was to be mounted by the newly formed Eighth Army, which consisted of 13 and 30 Corps and the Tobruk garrison, and the New Zealand Division was to be part of 13 Corps.

The immediate task was to practise moving brigade groups by day and night in ‘open formation’ across the changing face of the desert. Each brigade would have about 1000 vehicles and would need to be protected against air or tank attack while on the move and be ready to fight an encounter battle at almost any time. Suitable techniques therefore had to be developed and co-operation between the many components of the brigade group practised until it became second nature. In this the Division was starting almost from scratch; for previous experience of other troops against Italians in the desert scarcely counted. The Germans, who would undoubtedly provide the main opposition, had been developing and refining techniques for mobile operations over open country since 1934. It was a tall order for the New Zealanders to cram a parallel development into a few short weeks.

The gunners' role in this war of movement was of critical importance. No tank force was to be permanently allotted to the Division except the Divisional Cavalry, which had some obsolescent light tanks and was intended for reconnaissance, but not for hard fighting. In the periodic absence of fighting tanks the guns would bear the full burden of protecting the Division on the move. Had the gunners become thoroughly proficient in the use of their own equipment and well-acquainted with their own organisations, their task of developing suitable tactics and techniques would have been hard enough; but all were concurrently immersed in learning the intricacies of new equipment and the workings of new organisations.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Field and Anti-Tank Batteries are Reorganised

Field and Anti-Tank Batteries are Reorganised

The three-battery organisation of the field regiments, adopted in late August, besides involving many appointments, promotions and transfers, entailed getting used to new roles, new ways of doing business, and new systems of communication. Each regiment, moreover, had its own way of effecting the changeover, so that there was no standard designation of troops in the two-troop batteries. The 4th Field, for example, decided to extract the middle troop of existing batteries to form the new battery, which therefore contained B and E Troops. The 6th Field took the last troop of the first battery and the first troop of the second battery, C and D Troops, to form the third battery. The 5th Field took the last troop from each former battery, C and F Troops. The numbering of the new batteries had to await advice from New Zealand so as not to duplicate numbers used there and the final listing was as follows:

4th Field | 25 Battery: A and C Troops
| 26 Battery: D and F Troops
| 46 Battery: B and E Troops
5th Field | 27 Battery: A and B Troops
| 28 Battery: D and E Troops
| 47 Battery: C and F Troops
6th Field | 29 Battery: A and B Troops
| 30 Battery: E and F Troops
| 48 Battery: C and D Troops

For the ‘old hands’, long used to the old numbers and letters, it was as if their brothers had all changed their names by deed poll and it was not easy to get used to it.

The anti-tankers had to put up with changes only slightly less confusing. In Greece only 34 Battery had had portées; now all batteries had them and had to master gun drill appropriate to them and learn a new set of tactics. The policy was to carry the guns into the forward area (the 2-pounders suffered damage when towed far over rough ground), but to dismount them when action threatened and engage the enemy from ground positions. Only in an emergency were the guns to be fired from the portées. This had seemed, on the flimsy basis of some of the experiences of 34 Battery in Greece, to be the best way of handling this equipment; but conditions in the desert were different and there was more to be said for portée action there. The 7th Anti-Tank could not leave Mahfouz Camp until late in September, because it was still in course of being re-equipped when the other regiments left for Baggush. Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes therefore had more time to consider the move and decided that, instead of the rather monotonous drive along the Cairo- Alexandria road and then the coast road, he would take his regiment in ‘desert formation’ across country from Mena. It was a good idea; but he found it hard to convince the Middle East Movement Control authorities of this and get their permission. In the end he succeeded and on 25 September the regiment moved through Cairo, out towards the Pyramids, and then off the paved road and into the desert. Careful checks were made of the petrol, oil and water consumption of the various kinds of vehicles, the gunners had each to make do with three-quarters of a gallon of water per day, and drivers gained valuable experience of changing desert conditions. The journey took three days, and in the course of it the LAD handled only two major repair jobs and 11 minor ones, as well as helping to pull seven vehicles out of soft sand.

Four-troop anti-tank batteries had already been provided for in a revised war establishment of 10 May. But Brigadier Miles's recommendation of heavier equipment bore fruit when 18-pounders were provided for the extra troops in place of the 2-pounders listed in the establishment table. These guns, adapted for use on Beach platforms in an anti-tank role, and fitted with telescope and open sights, were rather cumbersome, but would provide a useful and versatile addition to anti-tank resources, for they could fire HE shell as well as AP shot. They were manned mainly by gunners who had arrived with the 6th Reinforcements in July. After a course in anti-tank gunnery at the Artillery Training Regiment in Maadi, they were formed into detachments under NCOs sent for this purpose from the 7th Anti-Tank and drilled with the converted 18-pounders. The new troops, totalling 152 all ranks, joined the regiment at Baggush towards the end of October and brought the batteries up to their four-troop establishment as follows:

31 Battery | A, B and C Troops (2-pounders)
| D Troop (18-pounders)
32 Battery | E, F, and G Troops (2-pounders)
| H Troop (18-pounders)
33 Battery | J, K and L Troops (2-pounders)
| M Troop (18-pounders)
34 Battery | N, O and P Troops (2-pounders)
| Q Troop (18-pounders)

So great was the demand for Bofors to defend the huge dumps, railheads, and other centres of activity concerned with preparations for the forthcoming offensive, that even Freyberg's and Miles's sternest resolve could not deny the use of some of the guns of the 14th Light Ack-Ack for this purpose. The regiment did not move to Baggush until the end of the first week in October; but the senior anti-aircraft officer of Eighth Army had asked Miles a fortnight earlier if 41 Battery could supply guns to defend the forward depots and A Troop was at once despatched to the busy area known as Charing Cross. All its guns fired in the course of a bombing raid on the 10th. Two days later 42 and 43 Batteries each sent a troop to take up an operational role—F Troop to Similla, 10 miles east of Matruh, to guard the railway sidings, and H Troop back to Fuka for the same purpose. Other troops relieved these in due course and all took part in the brigade manoeuvres which were the main feature of the training at Baggush. A long argument about the number of predictors that the regiment was to have and the way they would be controlled was settled before leaving Maadi: the issue would be four per battery and they were to be under the control of the three battery headquarters. At the last possible moment—9 November—the batteries were reorganised to have two troops each of six guns, with the troops divided into sections of three guns.

All three infantry brigades carried out large-scale manoeuvres in the rough hinterland of Baggush; but Freyberg's and Miles's headquarters took part in the three main ones and made them in many respects divisional manoeuvres. The 4th and 6th Field and anti-tank and light anti-aircraft guns accompanied 6 Brigade on 9 October and took part in its attack on the simulated strongpoints ‘Sidi Clif’ and ‘Bir Stella’ two days later. The 4th Field and the 5th Field (after working on the Alamein defences) took part in the next manoeuvre with 4 Brigade on the 16th, with the Survey Troop and a different lot of 2-pounder and Bofors troops. The final exercise on the 20th was carried out by the 5th and 6th Field in support of 5 Brigade, with further anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. A troop from each of the field regiments took part in a final exercise with the RAF on the 9th and carried out a shoot in co-operation with aircraft.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Battle Plan

The Battle Plan

Many were the other preparations for battle, all of them now complete. The Eighth Army offensive, known as CRUSADER, was to be on a grand scale, the culmination of five months of planning. Brigadier Miles had attended a select conference of New Zealand brigadiers and two colonels on 17 October at which Freyberg had disclosed, in conditions of great secrecy, the outline of the plan. The object was the capture of Cyrenaica and the first phase would be the destruction of the enemy armour. To make the enemy deploy his armour, Eighth Army was to threaten the forces besieging Tobruk; but the relief of Tobruk would be incidental. The British armour was thought to be slightly stronger than the combined German and Italian armour and it was expected to complete their destruction with little or no help from the rest of Eighth Army. The New Zealand Division was to be grouped with 4 Indian Division and 1 Army Tank Brigade (with heavy but slow infantry tanks) in 13 Corps to cut off the enemy defending the frontier positions and to do the mopping up when the enemy armour was defeated. Surprise was to be gained, if possible, by a series of marches on moonless nights to the Egypt- Libya frontier.

The artillery details stressed that protection on the move was vital. Command of the artillery was to remain with Miles and was not to be decentralised to brigades ‘unless necessary’. Freyberg thought tank attack was the greatest danger. To guard against this, anti-tank mines would be carried by sappers and infantry, and if mines were laid they must be covered by artillery fire. The anti-aircraft defence of a brigade while it was fighting a battle raised difficult problems, all the more worrying because the enemy was expected to have a decided superiority in the air, though nothing like the virtual monopoly he enjoyed in Greece and Crete.

These were Freyberg's views of the requirements of his Division if it followed the programme drawn up for it by higher authority; but the programme was hopelessly confused and unrealistic, the assumptions behind it—such as those about the relative strengths of the armour and air forces—were almost all incorrect, and Miles gained no useful guidance. But Freyberg's further points indicated that he realised at least some of the inadequacies of the crusader plan and was uncomfortably aware that the battle was not likely to follow the course that the planners supposed. He asked the brigadiers to consider two possibilities and plan for them: that the armoured protection promised for divisional moves might not be provided and that a brigade group (or more) might have to advance unescorted along an escarpment. Later Freyberg got the sappers to construct a relief model of the battle area, and when he studied this he became increasingly certain that the Division would have to fight not to blockade the frontier positions but to relieve Tobruk. If so, the escarpments leading towards Tobruk and passing through Belhamed or Sidi Rezegh would be all-important.

To Miles one defect of the Divisional organisation was that the Divisional Cavalry was too weak to overcome even slight opposition and it might therefore be prevented from carrying out its tasks. He was prepared to attach anti-tank 2-pounders to it, but was sceptical of their worth against German medium tanks. The 18-pounders, he felt sure, were vital to the defence of the infantry brigades. The only solution, therefore, was to attach a troop of 25-pounders to the Cavalry, and he considered the conditions under which the field guns might be able to operate with such a mobile force. There was no suggestion of putting a medium regiment of artillery under Freyberg's command; yet without one the Divisional Artillery was likely to be outweighed and outranged. Both Freyberg and Miles thought the crusader planners underestimated the fighting qualities of the Germans.

The New Zealand Division was in fact the only infantry division which was to have no medium guns. The 1st South African Division, in the armoured corps, was to have the 7th Medium and 4 Indian Division was to have the 68th Medium, while 70 Division, the garrison of Tobruk, had two medium batteries and a few heavy guns. Against the 172 guns of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery, the relatively immobile 4 Indian Division was to have about 300, including the medium unit and four field regiments. It was a curious distribution of resources.

All reservations or misgivings were filtered out as the plan passed from Division to brigade to regiment and then to battery and troop. The gunners were generally enthusiastic. They loved their new equipment and were confident of their skills. Morale was extremely high. When 5 Brigade moved forward from Baggush along the road to Matruh on 11 November (with the 5th Field, 32 and 34 Anti-Tank Batteries, and 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery) it seemed certain to be the beginning of a wonderful adventure. The troops had seen so much evidence of British strength on land and in the air and so little evidence of the enemy that they readily believed the most optimistic estimates.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Move to the Libyan Frontier

The Move to the Libyan Frontier

The route branched southwards towards Siwa and then into the open desert for a few miles to a divisional assembly area. Next day 4 Brigade (with the 4th Field, the 7th Anti-Tank RHQ and 31 Battery, the 14th Light Ack-Ack RHQ and 41 Battery, and 1 Survey Troop) and Divisional Headquarters Group (with Divisional Artillery Headquarters) left Baggush and reached the assembly area. On the 13th Freyberg himself set out early, followed by 6 Brigade (with the 6th Field, 33 Anti-Tank Battery and 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery).

All but the Divisional Cavalry, already at the frontier, and a few detachments were assembled in the open desert in the morning of the 14th, the first time the whole Division was together. Occasionally some vehicle tore a thin ribbon of dust from the flat, scrub-covered desert. But 3000 lorries, quads, pick-up trucks and staff cars kept still, their engines silent, the troops resting. Freyberg called together officers down to battery or company commanders and gave them some of his ideas about the forthcoming battle, which promised to be ‘a very tough one’. The Germans were brave and skilful. ‘They realise the value of AFVs [armoured fighting vehicles] and they will not hesitate to use them in a desperate counter stroke.’ He drew attention, among other matters, to the constant dilemma of desert commanders: whether to open out and minimise losses from air attack or to close up and present a stronger front to enemy tanks. Tank attack could do more damage, and if this threatened then formations should close in, to thicken up defensive fire. Miles later conferred with his COs and the artillery Intelligence officers then met to exchange views, mark maps, and receive code lists. Three Bofors sections were detached, two to defend Headquarters Group and the third to defend the NZASC Group.

The Division, as it drove slowly forward on the 15th, made an unforgettable spectacle, with vehicles well-spaced and stretching from horizon to horizon, windshields flashing in the sunlight, and wisps of dust rising, building up here and there in the soft patches to a billowing cloud which trailed each lorry. The going became stony and ‘Steve’ Weir of the 6th Field was critical of the control of the march, which he thought was ‘rather ragged’. The 4th Field suffered several ‘blowouts’ and broken springs.

Aircraft were heard throughout the night and bombs fell in the distance. The morning of the 16th was cold and the wind raised much dust. Vehicles were mostly covered with camouflage nets and the troops rested. The Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General A. R. Godwin-Austen, visited the Division and met officers down to the rank of major. Brigade groups closed in as evening approached and at intervals of 10–20 yards between vehicles they set off at dark on a march of 16–18 miles. The leading vehicles soon struck trouble in the form of patches of soft sand. The concertina motion which developed as columns slowed down and then raced to catch up with their neighbours led to reckless speeding at times. The anti-tank portées could keep up; but the field and ack-ack guns could not be towed over rough ground at anything like the pace the 3-ton lorries maintained. Confusion therefore reigned until the going improved.

Gunners of the 4th Field were annoyed in the morning to learn that because 5 Brigade had halted too far south 4 Brigade would have to conform. Because of this they had to fill in their slit trenches and dig new ones. The frontier was close and much attention was therefore paid to anti-tank defence. Later in the day Freyberg conferred with Miles about the placing of guns in the columns on the move, and whether a 25-pounder troop should accompany the Divisional Cavalry in the opening stages of the offensive. On the prospects of success, the GOC remarked, ‘Everything depends on whether he [the enemy] has hidden reserves. If he has things are going to be difficult.’ Next day, 18 November, the Division would be through the frontier and facing north and crusader would begin. Anti-tank guns were to be posted in line 500 yards outside the concentrations of vehicles and protected by infantry in depth. On the move anti-tank portées and Bren carriers were to protect the flanks. The Divisional Cavalry returned to Freyberg's command during the day and 34 Anti-Tank Battery with two 2-pounder troops was placed under its command. [11]

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 6 — CRUSADER: Retrieving a Disastrous Start

Contents

- [section]
p. 185

- The Division Moves North p. 187
- The Attack on Bir Ghirba p. 191
- Bad News of the Tank Battle p. 194

- 6 Brigade Overruns Africa Corps Headquarters p. 196

- Hard Fighting at Point 175 p. 198

- L Troop's Anti-Tank Action p. 205

- Major Sawyers recaptures a Dozen Tanks p. 208

- An Anti-Tank Advanced Guard p. 210
- 4 Brigade Captures Gambut
- The Blockhouse p. 216
- The First Attack on Sidi Rezegh p. 222
- Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda p. 229

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

FOR the New Zealand Division the CRUSADER offensive started slowly. The night march on the 17th-18th became more and more confused as it progressed, many lorries sank up to their axles in sand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Weir described it as the ‘most difficult, dangerous and hair-raising night march in its [the 6th Field's] history’. He went on to say that the lights that marked the route led ‘over escarpments and other obstacles’ and the journey became ‘a scramble’. His efforts to collect his regiment together were ‘hopeless’. The night sky was ominously lit with brilliant flashes, caused as it happened not by gun fire, but by a vivid electrical storm. No rain fell in the divisional area, south of the enemy's frontier line; but many places along the coast suffered a deluge and were flooded. Vehicles opened out just before dawn to ‘daylight laager’ formation—widely dispersed—and most men had little to do until late afternoon. Freyberg told his brigadiers what was happening elsewhere this day: 30 Corps was crossing the frontier and wheeling majestically towards Tobruk with three armoured brigades fanning out as they advanced.

Headquarters of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack, two troops of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, and the Survey Troop came under command of Divisional Headquarters. The guns of the 4th Field were widely dispersed in extended troop positions along the northern flank and north-western corner of the 4 Brigade laager, guarding against attack from the Omar forts. Troop commanders were pleased to discover that their new loudspeaker system of control worked well and by means of it orders could be passed clearly over quite long distances. Major Hall-Kenney
[1] of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, with his headquarters and P and N Troops, located Divisional Cavalry in the afternoon and came under its command. P Troop and half of N crossed the frontier wire with C Squadron in the late afternoon and thus became the first of the Divisional Artillery to enter Libya in this campaign. [2]

Units such as the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack, with their batteries dispersed throughout the Division, had little for their headquarters to do under such circumstances and their COs were apt to be given ad hoc commands or special duties. Thus Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes took command of Divisional B Group, the administrative part of Divisional Headquarters Group.

The night march took 5 Brigade, then 4 Brigade and finally 6 Brigade through the Wire and into Libya. It was a cold night, but the going was considerably better than that of the previous night and the only major trouble was caused by faulty navigation in 4 Brigade, which caused a long detour and had the quads of the 4th Field racing along with 25-pounders bouncing wildly behind in an effort to keep pace. Lieutenant-Colonel Duff realised that there was no hope of achieving order within the brigade group until morning and therefore drew his headquarters and B Echelons away from the rest of the brigade to keep them intact until dawn. The total distance travelled varied from 20 to 30 miles and most gunners, after digging shallow slit trenches, had time for several hours' sleep.

Waking in Libya was not the same as waking in Egypt; it was enemy territory and gunners looked around as if to find proof of this. Their eyes told them nothing: the desert looked much the same. But a faint rumble of shellfire came from the north. Except for the Administration Group, still east of the Wire, the Division was just across the frontier and some 20 miles from the Omar forts. Infantry units laid out their defences, the guns moved to support them, and brigade layouts were inspected. Brigadier Miles found 4 Brigade well sited and ‘from an artillery point of view … excellent’; but there was a wide gap between two 5 Brigade battalions. A few of the latest-type Messerschmitt fighters, much superior in performance to any RAF aircraft in the desert, machine-gunned part of Corps Headquarters a few miles to the rear and then flew over the divisional area, where they were quickly engaged by 42 Battery (which claimed to have damaged one of them). These were the first NZA shots of the campaign.

Conflicting news of the armoured battle caused some hesitation, but in mid-afternoon the Division drove rapidly northwards over smooth desert for a distance of about 12 miles. A rumble of shellfire ahead was not enough to cause concern. At dusk the Division settled down between the Indians ‘masking’ the Omar forts and a British armoured brigade which, unbe- known to the New Zealanders, had fought a furious action in the afternoon. A powerful German battle group was only a dozen miles to the north-west. Shelling could be seen to the north-east and enemy flares rose up after dark in several directions. There seemed nothing ominous about the situation, however, most gunners were highly optimistic, and they slept well.

The 20th dawned brightly and good news soon came in. Some 45 Italian tanks had been destroyed and the German armour had taken a hard knock. Freyberg heard that the armoured brigade was fighting some 180 tanks five miles to the north and, confident that it would do well, prepared to move. He saw Miles and decided to send a 25-pounder troop to support the Divisional Cavalry which would lead the advance. This regiment, with its two attached anti-tank troops, had spent a noisy night alongside the armoured brigade. B Troop of the 4th Field under Captain Moodie
[3] joined it at noon and got ready to engage the enemy; but no targets were found.

Some uncertainty crept in when it seemed that the German armour might manage to concentrate against the nearby armoured brigade—the 4th—and Freyberg hastened to assure Corps that the brigade could rally, if hard pressed, alongside the Division. He was not at all nervous. Colonel Oakes nevertheless felt some anxiety about the anti-tank defence of Divisional Headquarters Group and redisposed his anti-tank and Vickers guns to cover what now seemed to be the threatened flank. Miles's staff was suspicious of a visitor and was pleased to confirm that he was what he claimed to be: an American official observer.

The morning of the 21st was cold and after breakfast men began to throw or kick footballs about to get warm. The sound of guns to the north and in the direction of the Omars and the many RAF sorties passing overhead were the chief signs of battle. The news which came in was most encouraging and Freyberg, with every encouragement from General Godwin-Austen, prepared to move at once.

[1]
Maj J. H. Hall-Kenney, ED; born Wellington, 4 Dec 1906; architect; wounded 2 Nov 1942; died Wellington, 25 Nov 1965.

[2] Though several New Zealand anti-tankers with the Long Range Desert Group had crossed the frontier earlier.

[3]
Lt-Col J. W. Moodie, DSO, ED; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 9 Jun 1907; warehouseman; wounded 26 Nov 1941; Bty Comd, 4 Fd Regt, Nov 1942-Apr 1944; CO 16 Fd Regt, K Force, Aug 1950-Apr 1952.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Division Moves North

The Division Moves North

Divisional Cavalry led off at 11 a.m., with its 25-pounder troop and two anti-tank troops. In the late afternoon it came upon the mud huts and a few tents of Sidi Azeiz, a 2-pounder portée opened fire, and an Italian officer promptly appeared waving a towel. Fifty Italians and four Germans were captured and Captain Moodie of the 4th Field had them driven back to the Division in his six quads and a pick-up truck. A Breda gun which would have been well able to deal with the lightly armoured Cavalry was also captured without firing.

the advance into libya, 18–21 november 1941

The rest of the Division followed, with 5 Brigade leading, then 4 Brigade, then Divisional Headquarters Group, and 6 Brigade last. The task of marking the route was given at short notice to Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow of the 14th Light Ack-Ack and he led off with his RHQ and Workshops Section, detaching a truck or lorry at intervals with its ‘breakdown flag’ flying to mark the axis of advance. After dark he carried on, marking the route with lamps spaced half a mile or so apart. In the darkness his little group ran into a carload of Italians and duly accepted their surrender.

As the Division advanced northwards, 5 Brigade veered to the right and fanned out, 4 Brigade carried on towards Menastir, overlooking the Bardia- Tobruk road (the Via Balbia), and 6 Brigade veered to the left. Before dark 43 Battery engaged six Italian aircraft. After dark 5 Brigade captured Fort Capuzzo with ease, but the other two brigades struck very muddy going and were held up.

Next morning, 22 November, 4 and 5 Brigades, having surprised the enemy, began to exploit a promising situation. In the first glimmerings of daylight in the Menastir area, however, the surprise at a local level was often mutual and in one unfortunate case it resulted in the capture of a 4th Field FOO, Captain Atchley
[4] of 25 Battery. Atchley, with 18 Battalion, saw some men in the half light and left his vehicle and the three escorting Bren carriers and went ahead to investigate. That was the last that was seen or heard of him and it gave rise to anxiety not only on his behalf, but because he was known to have with him a map reference code and a daily time and map reference adder for adjusting codes up to 30 November. ‘These were not dated’, Divisional Headquarters hopefully reported to Corps in the afternoon, ‘but are just a mass of figures in his notebook.’

In a matter of minutes the 4th Field was firing briskly at a thoroughly confused enemy, 25 Battery in direct support of 18 Battalion and the other two batteries at targets along the

Via Balbia and the country north of it. FOOs were on the top of the high escarpment and had excellent observation over an area that, as the brigade commander remarked, ‘resembled a disturbed ant's nest.’ Camps and bivouacs were hastily abandoned and vehicles drove off in all directions. The first 4th Field rounds were fired at 6.20 a.m. by E Troop of 46 Battery at a cluster of vehicles under the escarpment. Several were destroyed on the spot and others were stopped in full flight and men were seen to run from them. The loss of Atchley delayed 25 Battery's registration until the battery commander, Major Kensington, came forward and acted as FOO. After an hour or so a few enemy aircraft came over and 41 Battery promptly engaged them and drove them off.

All went splendidly until mid-morning, when 20 Battalion, blocking the Via Balbia at the western end of the brigade front, was counter-attacked from the west by what looked (to both the battalion commander and Colonel Duff of the 4th Field) like half a dozen tanks and an armoured self-propelled gun with motorised infantry. It was actually a scratch force mainly of German supply troops supported by 20-millimetre light anti-tank/anti-aircraft automatic cannon on half-track carriers. The company at that end of the road-block had no anti-tank guns and began to withdraw. Two 2-pounders rushed across, but the company departed and the anti-tank troop commander, Second-Lieutenant Hill, sited them to cover the open west flank of the other company that was below the escarpment. The field guns meanwhile engaged the enemy heavily and accurately and halted him. A squadron of infantry tanks (I tanks) had been attached to each New Zealand brigade and those with 4 Brigade were sent down the escarpment to deal with this enemy. As they advanced astride the Via Balbia, 26 and 46 Batteries fired a five-minute concentration at a rapid rate. Duff's instructions were that this should be lifted (i.e., the range extended) by observation if the tanks advanced faster than expected and this should have been a simple matter. The OPs were, as he says, ‘practically on the flank of the objective’ and looking down on it. In fact 26 Battery did not lift its fire and the tanks had to go round the curtain of bursting shells. No harm resulted; but the incident illustrated the lack of understanding between armoured and infantry forces which was a grave weakness of the desert army. The tank commanders had given an inaccurate estimate of timings and 26 Battery had placed too much reliance on it and had not watched the action closely enough. (Shortly afterwards the tanks fired at another company of 20 Battalion making a parallel advance above the escarptment.) The battery commanders concerned, Majors Bevan and Levy, acted as FOOs, engaging opportunity targets as the enemy withdrew, and the I tanks rounded up prisoners, mostly Italians. One column of vehicles on the road presented a splendid target, but radio-telephony (R/T) failed at the critical moment and the column was almost out of range before the guns could engage it. Two infantry guns (probably short-barrelled 75-millimetre howitzers) in good condition and with plenty of ammunition were captured.

Above the escarpment and farther to the west Divisional Cavalry operated with Moodie's B Troop of the 4th Field and N and P Troops of 34 Anti-Tank Battery. When the cavalry screen was held up Moodie came forward and engaged several pinpoint targets on a ridge ahead, anti-tank guns and machine guns, and soon cleared the way. At the landing ground at Bir el Baheira there was still much activity when the cavalry arrived and Sergeant Fowler, a daredevil anti-tanker, with one of his men, took possession of a Bofors gun there and with it fired on machine-gun nests and transport. Second-Lieutenant Webb
[5] and Gunner Brown
[6] then relieved Fowler and fired a further 50 rounds before the Bofors jammed. Sergeant Stephens, [7] with the gun P3, in the terms of an official report ‘silenced a 20 mm Breda gun, destroyed one truck and immobilised another’ in the afternoon. It thus took anti-tank gunners to demonstrate the effectiveness of Bofors guns against ground targets, and the many New Zealand Bofors, reserved strictly for action against aircraft, had little or nothing to do. They were largely wasted and many opportunities of engaging ground targets were missed, through no fault of the gunners concerned. They simply followed the policy laid down. The enemy had no such rigid doctrine, as the action below the escarpment demonstrated.

[4]
Capt T. R. Atchley; Hamilton; born London, 19 Sep 1905; clerk; p.w. 22 Nov 1941.

[5]
Capt R. C. Webb, m.i.d.; Cheviot; born Christchurch, 13 Sep 1917; clerk; wounded and p.w. 27 Nov 1941.

[6]
L-Bdr C. V. Brown, m.i.d.; Kent, England; born Kent, 20 Apr 1904; farming; p.w. 13 Dec 1941.

[7]
Sgt E. R. W. Stephens; Clyde; born Invercargill, 9 Feb 1908; sports goods retailer; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Attack on Bir Ghirba

The Attack on Bir Ghirba

A very different kind of action had meanwhile started up on the right of 5 Brigade. The early-morning successes there, in terms of various enemy detachments captured or driven off, were followed by an attack by 21 Battalion on a tiny settlement called Bir Ghirba, which happened to be the headquarters of the Italian division controlling the various strongpoints which constituted the frontier line from Sollum to Sidi Omar. This was regarded at the outset as a small and unimportant affair, undertaken to help distract enemy attention from a much larger concurrent attack by the Indian division on the southern anchor of the frontier line, a few miles to the south. The attention of 5 Brigade Headquarters was taken up with exploiting the capture of Fort Capuzzo and pushing on towards Bardia and Sollum. No anti-tank guns were therefore allocated to 21 Battalion. The right section of D Troop, 42 Battery, with its three Bofors guarded against hostile aircraft; but none bothered the battalion group. The only other artillery was 47 Battery of the 5th Field, a mere eight 25-pounders and far too few for the task of subduing the 600-odd defenders of Bir Ghirba in their well-fortified positions. The action that developed was a bitter tragedy, not so much because of the 70-odd casualties the infantry suffered (though these were serious enough for such a ‘side-show’), but because it was hopeless and pointless from the start, and to persist with it (as the battalion commander, the valiant Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, [8] was told he must) was a serious misjudgment. To the 5th Field gunners it was heartbreaking. They worked hard and their FOOs braved the same fierce fire which pinned the infantry time and time again to the flat, open desert; but the 25-pounder shells made no impression on the concrete fortifications. In the afternoon, when the infantry could do no more than crawl forward inch by inch whenever the firing eased, the gunners worked like slaves, firing almost continuously, but to little effect. They were nevertheless delighted to score direct hits on an ammunition dump and see it go up in flames and start off a series of explosions. Some of these were heavy enough to shower the foremost New Zealand infantry with fragments, and they continued with a fireworks display well into the night. But the field gunners were miserably aware that their fire was not checking the machine guns and mortars which held up the attack. The infantry, for their part, were full of admiration for the gunners and the battalion war diary has this to say:

‘The 47 Bty NZA plus a further troop of the 5 Fd Regt (Lieut. Moir
[9] O.C.) from the time it opened up at 1200 hrs and apart from a very short stop fired continuously all the afternoon and evening and destroyed at least one med-heavy tank which had been dug in and was used as a MG post. The Bty fired all its ammunition and had to replenish during the afternoon. The Arty fire was directed by their own FOO and also by reports sent back to him by our foremost pls.’

The extra troop, D Troop of 28 Battery, was added in the afternoon when the brigade major (a former gunner) came forward to see for himself what was holding up 21 Battalion. It is curious that neither he nor anyone else sent up anti-tank guns and it was a stroke of luck that the enemy, who had several tanks at Bir Ghirba, was unenterprising and did not use them except at long range against 21 Battalion, which was extremely vulnerable throughout to tank attack. At 9 p.m. the twelve 25-pounders fired a barrage, hoping that the infantry might advance behind it in the dark and capture their objective; but defensive fire remained too fierce. A further attack was planned for two hours before dawn and the gunners prepared to support it; but orders came soon after midnight for 21 Battalion to withdraw. These orders had nothing to do with the immediate difficulties and were prompted by events elsewhere; but they undoubtedly saved the infantry from further heavy loss—perhaps complete disaster. The field guns fired over 2300 rounds all told, a heavy expenditure indeed on mobile operations and more than twice the first-line holding of 120 rounds per gun.

The fortified positions in the enemy's frontier line were immensely strong and the Indian division, attacking only a few miles to the south, accorded them full respect. This attack by two infantry battalions started with bombing and aerial strafing, was covered by the fire of a medium regiment of artillery and two field regiments, and was supported by two squadrons of heavily armoured I tanks and two anti-tank batteries. Even with this massive support, the attack was not completely successful. But Colonel Allen of 21 Battalion and Major Beattie
[10] of 47 Battery, in their lonely and desperate venture against Bir Ghirba, knew nothing of this.

As 21 Battalion received the welcome order to withdraw, 28 (Maori) Battalion, with G Troop of 32 Anti-Tank Battery, was poised to attack Sollum Barracks, at the top of the pass by which the coast road climbed the steep escarpment. From positions near Fort Capuzzo 27 Battery of the 5th Field was ready to give support. The Maoris attacked with great vigour before dawn on the 23rd, a squadron of I tanks came through soon after and entered the barracks square, and the enemy was quickly subdued, though guns from Sollum itself, below the escarpment, reacted strongly. The 2-pounders went into position around the barracks.

[8]
Lt-Col J. M. Allen, m.i.d.; born Cheadle, England, 3 Aug 1901; farmer; MP (Hauraki) 1938–41; CO 21 Bn May-Nov 1941; killed in action 28 Nov 1941.

[9]
Capt J. I. Moir; Auckland; born Auckland, 24 May 1911; accountant; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941.

[10]
Lt-Col R. R. Beattie; born NZ 24 Sep 1908; warehouseman; wounded 1 Dec 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Bad News of the Tank Battle

Bad News of the Tank Battle

With this success the offensive actions of the New Zealand Division in the frontier area ceased. The large garrisons of Sollum and Halfaya (another and rougher pass on the escarpment) and of the strongpoints between there and the Omar forts to the south-west were cut off from Bardia and their sources of water. But all chance of exploiting this favourable situation further had for the time being vanished. The armoured battle, on the successful prosecution of which the whole CRUSADER plan rested, had by the 22nd almost come to an end, and in it the British armoured corps had been completely outclassed by an enemy inferior in almost every respect except organisation, training and tactics. The only important weapon superiority the enemy possessed was in anti-tank guns: long-barrelled and low-slung 50-millimetre guns and huge, vulnerable, but devas-tatingly powerful 88-millimetre triple-purpose guns. The German tanks had no decisive superiority over British tanks and were in some respects inferior. The few Pzkw IVs with their stubby, low-velocity 75-millimetre guns were of little use in tank-versus-tank fighting, and the short-barrelled 50-millimetre guns in the Pzkw IIIs had very much the same AP performance as the 2-pounders of the British tanks. Had the British I tanks, especially the Mark IIs (Matildas), which the Germans dreaded, been used against them, the German tanks might have fared far worse. But only cruiser and light tanks were employed against the German armour, with little or no infantry support, few anti-tank guns, and no concentrated field artillery. No amount of bravery on the part of the British tank crews—and there was no lack of this—could compensate for being introduced to action with little or no support against a skilful enemy who carefully co-ordinated the efforts of his tanks, guns, engineers (with mines), and infantry.

All this was, however, unknown to General Freyberg and his brigadiers as they pursued their skilful and successful operations around Bardia. When Freyberg was asked to send 6 Brigade westwards towards Tobruk late on the 21st he took it that things were going well with 30 Corps. When, next afternoon, he was asked to send 4 Brigade to Gambut, halfway to Tobruk on a parallel northern escarpment, he thought it strange, but still had no reason to doubt that all was well. His GSO I, Lieutenant-Colonel Gentry, [11] thought that only a raid to Gam-but was intended and Freyberg continued to think in terms of an assault on Bardia, which was more strongly held than he had been led to believe. Brigadier Miles called to discuss ammunition holdings, which were getting low. They agreed that there were insufficient field guns available for an effective barrage and regretted the lack of medium guns to support an attack on the fortress. Something Miles said reminded Freyberg of a talk, before the campaign began, with the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, who spoke of the desert war as a ‘brigade-group war’ and was hotly challenged on that point by Freyberg. ‘Against the Boche’, Freyberg wrote in his diary, ‘[I] consider the striking power and manoeuvrability of a Division is necessary to give weight and effect to attack.’ Freyberg advocated to Corps ‘a definite policy of dumping ammunition’ so that the Division could go ahead with its aggressive operations—particularly against Bardia.

The next visitor was a liaison officer from 30 Corps with the news that the Support Group of 7 Armoured Division (two infantry battalions with field and anti-tank artillery) was surrounded at Sidi Rezegh and in urgent need of help. This was scarcely credible; but confirmation came from another messenger from the armoured divisional commander. Still thinking only in terms of a local setback in the armoured battle, far short of the disastrous situation that had actually developed, Freyberg sent an urgent message for 6 Brigade to hurry westwards along the escarpment that led from Bir el Chleta through Point 175 to

Sidi Rezegh. He had predicted to the Army Commander that more infantry would be needed in the struggle to join hands with the Tobruk garrison and he now began to consider taking as much as possible of his Division to strike through the Italian divisions he supposed were besieging Tobruk (a German division had actually taken their place on the sector concerned) and link up with the garrison, which had staged a sortie the day before. By early morning on the 23rd he decided to leave 5 Brigade (less 21 Battalion and 47 Field Battery) and Divisional Cavalry (less a squadron) to hold the ground won in the frontier area and keep Bardia isolated. The rest of the Division would move to the Tobruk front. The Corps Commander duly approved.

[11] Maj-Gen Sir William Gentry, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Bronze Star (US); Lower Hutt; born London, 20 Feb 1899; Regular soldier; served North-West Frontier 1920–22; GSO II NZ Div 1939–40; AA & QMG 1940–41; GSO I, May 1941, Oct 1941-Sep 1942; comd 6 Bde Sep 1942-Apr 1943; Deputy Chief of General Staff, 1943–44; comd 9 Bde ( Italy) 1945; Deputy Chief of General Staff, 1946–47; Adjutant-General, 1949–52; Chief of General Staff, 1952–55.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

6 Brigade Overruns Africa Corps Headquarters

6 Brigade Overruns Africa Corps Headquarters

The advance of 6 Brigade along the road or track called the Trigh Capuzzo, which led westwards parallel to the Via Balbia, had been held up on the 21st until the I-tank squadron arrived. The Valentines (I Tanks, Mark III) did not arrive until 3 p.m., and almost as soon as the brigade moved off a liaison officer from 30 Corps and then a wireless message brought news of the crisis at Sidi Rezegh. The brigade could move no faster and it continued on its way, with 24 Battalion leading and 48 Battery of the 6th Field well forward in support. A landing ground at Gasr el-Arid was still showing signs of enemy activity and beyond it a large group of vehicles, including some tanks, was astride the road. Carriers investigated and 48 Battery fired a few rounds, the I tanks moved through to the head of the group, and the enemy made off. The brigade halted for a brief rest at 9 p.m. and was to move on again at 3 a.m. on the 23rd.

This it did, with the I tanks and anti-tank guns on the flanks, 6th Field in the middle, and the Bofors guns distributed throughout the group. It took over an hour to get the whole group in motion and by this time the leading elements on the right had veered too far northwards. The escarpment began just east of Bir el Chleta and the given route passed well south of this; but when the brigade halted for breakfast at 6 a.m., just before first light, the leading battalion on the right was astride the Trigh Capuzzo at Bir el Chleta and below the escarpment.

What followed was dramatic in the extreme. The men were cold, tired and hungry and lost no time in dismounting to set up cookers and get something to eat. Each vehicle and those who travelled in it constituted something like a domestic household which went about its affairs of waking, washing and cooking unmindful of its neighbours. The war could wait until after breakfast. Suddenly some of the neighbours realised that they were total strangers: 6 Brigade had halted in the midst of the Headquarters of the German Africa Corps and some supply troops.

Sudden recognition was followed by sudden action and it was still dark enough for the gun flashes to be spectacular. The field guns—29 Battery—were quick off the mark. Bombardier Hawkins
[12] had been sent out on his motor-cycle to investigate a column of vehicles that was approaching from the north and the sight of him ‘hurtling back’, chased by bullets, alerted the gunners. The range was 150–400 yards and every shot a coconut. Fires broke out everywhere among the enemy vehicles and several witnesses insist that all were destroyed. Tracer bullets flew in all directions. Brens, Vickers and tank guns all engaged the enemy at ranges down to a few yards. It is a striking evidence of the vigour, skill and presence of mind of the field gunners that they were among the first to open fire. A company runner of 25 Battalion gives a typical account:

‘…an enemy column consisting of heavy cars with rear tractor wheels, staff cars and armoured transport was heading for us at…about 350 yards…. When the artillery swung into action the gun nearest to me, a distance of 12 or 15 yards, collected with a beautiful shot a huge Jerry caterpillar truck, and the gun crew supported by us let forth a mighty cheer. I recall one voice above all the others, I believe it was Captain Fisher, [13] calling out in a stentorian voice, “Whacko, first blood to Murphy.” Murphy
[14] I learned later was the gun layer.’

A private of the same unit says, ‘the roaring of our 25-pounders informed us that we had camped alongside a Jerry armoured car outfit. The whole lot of the cars were destroyed with the exception of one that came in and surrendered.’ A sergeant says, ‘Our artillery opened up at point blank range and had most of the enemy vehicles in flames in a matter of minutes.’ The battalion diary says, ‘Five AFVs were put out of action in quick succession by one Arty gun.’ One company staged a bayonet attack with complete success. I tanks and carriers and a party under Gunner Ainsworth
[15] of the 6th Field RHQ rounded up prisoners. Over 200 were taken all told, including a colonel who was the chief Italian liaison officer at Africa Corps Headquarters. The corps commander and his chief staff officer had left only a minute or two earlier and were lucky not to be captured.

The firing slackened after 20 minutes or so, though it continued at a reduced rate for more than an hour against enemy to the north. The brigade commander had no wish to linger and got the brigade moving again as soon as he could, covered by a rearguard of a company, a carrier platoon, K Troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery, and a 25-pounder troop. The field gunners kept their guns in action until the last moment and showed more interest in searching the wrecked vehicles in the area than in following the brigade. A similar interest on the part of the brigade Intelligence staff might have been rewarding; for it was not realised until later that this was the German corps headquarters. For the rest of the campaign the operations of the German armour were seriously handicapped by the loss of wireless sets, codes, and trained staff in this chance encounter.

[12]
Bdr R. J. Hawkins; Rotorua; born Auckland, 25 Apr 1915; painter; p.w. Dec 1941; escaped, Germany, 30 Mar 1945.

[13]
Maj F. M. Fisher; Howick; born Christchurch, 24 Apr 1907; bank clerk.

[14]
Gnr C. F. Murphy; Eketahuna; born NZ 28 Feb 1915; public servant.

[15]
Gnr W. Ainsworth; born England, 3 Apr 1905; labourer; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Hard Fighting at Point 175

Hard Fighting at Point 175

The next halt was at the Wadi esc-Sciomar, a few miles farther along the escarpment. Just beyond it was Point 175, marked clearly enough on the map, but exceedingly hard to locate on the ground. Major Wilson
[16] of 29 Battery says, ‘Point 175 could not be distinguished as a feature and there was no visible indication that enemy were in the locality.’ Brigadier Barrowclough had been ordered to occupy the feature, nevertheless, and went forward with Lieutenant-Colonel Weir to ‘have a look and make a plan’, as the latter says. ‘We got up and had a look and there wasn't a thing to be seen and I could have sworn that there were no Huns holding that hill.’ To most observers the ground ahead looked like flat desert, with perhaps a slight upward slope to the west. From the head of the brigade group the escarpment to the north and the Rugbet en-Nbeidat to the south (a deep wadi starting south of Point 175 and cutting the escarpment west of it) could not be seen.

The brigadier decided to deploy 25 Battalion on foot to advance and occupy the feature. K Troop of 33 Battery was already attached to the battalion and Weir received no request for any other artillery support; but he nevertheless decided to place 29 Field Battery under command of the battalion. Another mission had already been agreed to: 26 Battalion with 30 Field Battery and L Anti-Tank Troop were to move south-westwards to make contact with 5 South African Brigade south of Sidi Rezegh. Then a third task was accepted: the squadron of I tanks, with a troop of 48 Field Battery and two infantry platoons, was to move far to the south-west to capture some 50 Italian tanks reported to be abandoned there. This would have left only one troop of the 6th Field and the remaining anti-tank and Bofors guns to guard the long perimeter of the brigade group—and the brigade group was very much on its own.

The day continued in the same dramatic vein in which it began. The surrounding desert contained many little groups of enemy, most of them only too anxious to get away. Some, however, could not resist taking a few pot shots or letting loose a few bursts of machine-gun fire before they left and a few, more determined or foolhardy, needed to be routed out. The escarpment, with its many wadis and minor indentations, provided good cover, and to the south-west and south there were many derelict vehicles, victims of the furious fighting which had led to the defeat of the British armour. Some of them were still smouldering and figures moving among them were identified, when the brigade got closer, as German. Several truckloads drove off hastily and L Troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery engaged them at long range, firing some 50 rounds until Lieutenant-Colonel [17] of 26 Battalion ordered the anti-tankers to cease fire on the grounds that there might still be some wounded among the wreckage. The anti-tank portées, instead, covered a section of carriers which went forward to investigate. At this, an ambulance car filled with British wounded who had been in enemy hands drove into the battalion area. Farther off enemy transport could be seen and D Troop of 48 Battery fired at it.

The ambulance car brought with it a medical officer of 8 Hussars who had sensational news. His unit was, of course, a tank unit, and he knew something about enemy tanks. He gave an eyewitness account of a great mass of German tanks of all kinds which had assembled that very morning on Point 175 (after having captured the tanks of 8 Hussars in the night). At first light there had been at least a hundred Pzkw IIs, IIIs and IVs there. To the brigade commander, who had no knowledge of the disaster which had struck the British armoured corps and envisaged, like Freyberg, only a local setback which the arrival of his brigade was to remedy, this was highly disturbing. It put the occupation of Point 175 in a very different light. The sally by the I-tank battalion ( 8 Royal Tanks) was at once cancelled and the I tanks were ordered to accompany 25 Battalion in its advance (which had already started).

Some of the battalion had been halted; but at noon it started off again—two companies forward, widely deployed across the flat scrubland, and behind them the portées of K Troop. At the same time 26 Battalion drove south-westwards towards the South Africans with L Troop's four portées and the eight 25-pounders of 30 Battery. Near the Wadi esc-Sciomar 29 Battery had gone into action and two FOOs moved forward with 25 Battalion. The remaining artillery of the brigade group, 48 Field Battery, J Troop with four 2-pounders, M Troop with four anti-tank 18-pounders, and 43 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, remained with the straggling mass of brigade vehicles which stretched out for more than a mile along the top of the escarpment. One troop of 48 Battery was in action and fired from time to time against enemy to the south-west, among the many derelicts.

Major Wilson's 29 Battery began by firing at a slow rate on a cairn of stones which seemed to mark Point 175 itself—a trig point. No enemy was to be seen ahead and the fire was meant only to reassure the infantry as they advanced on foot. The battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McNaught, [18] hastily called a conference and produced a string of orders to meet the changed situation, and Major Wilson and Major McKay
[19] of 33 Anti-Tank Battery listened attentively. K Troop was to move 800 yards behind the forward infantry—too far behind, as it happened. J was to protect the awkward right flank on the escarpment. The field guns were to fire on the cairn, on trenches which could be seen (though there was as yet no sign of enemy in them), and on the Blockhouse beyond

—a square stone building used by the local tribe of Bedouin, though it looked from a distance like a fortification. It was hoped that the I tanks, which at that stage were believed to be almost invulnerable to anti-tank fire, would be able to deal with any enemy tanks that appeared on the scene.

6 brigade positions, 1 p.m., 23 november

Wilson asked if there were any special orders for the guns; but all McNaught could add was that Wilson should move with him—no sinecure, for McNaught was among the bravest of the brave. There was only one armoured OP vehicle, a Bren carrier, and Wilson therefore sent this forward on the right, with Captain Fisher of A Troop. Captain Molloy
[20] of B Troop travelled in his pick-up truck with D Company on the left. Fisher and Molloy were both told to engage the cairn until better targets could be seen. There was no restriction on ammunition, as only a few AP rounds had so far been fired. None had any inkling of the fury that lay ahead.

The infantry on the left, led by I tanks, soon reached the cairn, after a sharp skirmish, and took many prisoners. But this was only the beginning. The scrub, sparse towards the south but thicker towards the escarpment, concealed a strong battalion defence and the re-entrants and wadis, including the Rugbet en-Nbeidat which curled round from the right front to the left rear, gave covered approach to reinforcements from the Blockhouse area. As the advance continued opposition stiffened. I tanks were soon blazing wrecks, their myth of invulnerability shattered by 50-millimetre anti-tank guns close at hand and by ‘88s’ in the Blockhouse area. Low and deadly machine-gun fire—the mark of crack troops—thinned the ranks of the infantry. Molloy and Fisher, trying to locate its sources and braving intense fire in so doing, were baffled. McNaught had said that he would have his advanced headquarters a few hundred yards south-east of the cairn within half an hour and he did so. Wilson was with him and the area was swept by fire.

On the right, just above the escarpment, a bitter struggle developed. The infantry found that every re-entrant harboured machine guns and brought them under cross-fire. They tackled each centre of opposition in spirited fashion; but they got fewer as they advanced. Behind them the two portées under Lieutenant Muirhead
[21] drove backwards, to give their gun crews the slight protection of their gun shields and be in instant readiness to fire. The leading portée engaged a German tank below the escarpment and forced its crew to evacuate. A short distance beyond, K1 fired on a machine-gun post and got away about 10 rounds when a mortar bomb put it out of action. The crew dismounted, McNaught came along to investigate, and Muirhead suggested bringing K2 forward. ‘No,’ said McNaught, ‘you are infantry now. Forward!’ No more than 25 yards farther on the crew of K1 was pinned down by murderous fire which wounded Muirhead and mortally injured Lance-Bombardier Sievert. [22] K2 was not dawdling behind. It engaged a large tank which came up from below the escarpment, blew its turret off, and set it on fire. Pushing on into what had become a curiously empty stretch of desert swept by fire, K2 came upon another tank and dealt with it likewise. On their high portée the anti-tankers felt naked. They could see nothing ahead—no infantry—and they could hear the bullets and feel the blast of the mortar bombs. An hour or so later more infantry—a company of 24 Battalion—came up from below the escarpment and moved past them.

Meanwhile on the left Second-Lieutenant Ryan
[23] led the other two K Troop guns forward. A supposed derelict tank to the south suddenly came to life and enfiladed the advancing infantry, killing an officer. Ryan quickly drove over towards it and his two portées tackled it, one on each flank, both scoring hits and between them knocking it out. Mortar fire was directed at both portées, but did no harm. But this action, brief though it was, held up the two guns long enough for the two companies of 25 Battalion on this flank to be overrun by three tanks. A deceptive curve of the ground hid the whole episode from the anti-tankers and it was only after the surrender that Ryan spotted one tank. Both guns fired and must have hit the tank gunner; for the tank kept coming at them but did not fire. Finally, at 50 yards, it burst into flame. K4 had kept pumping 2-pounder shots at it, one after the other. Before this another tank had appeared. Ryan at first thought it was a Valentine; but he decided that it was hostile and switched the fire of K3 to it. K3 scored several hits and then infantry rose up just in front of the tank—to Ryan's surprise—and lobbed anti-tank grenades at it. The tank was knocked out; but Ryan says, ‘I think the honour should go to the infantry.’ The third tank disappeared.

This flank was now open and McNaught hastened to reinforce it. Yet another ‘derelict’ tank appeared in the middle of the position and tried to run over the infantry of the reserve company which McNaught had called forward; but one of Ryan's guns or K2 drove over and knocked it out.

The afternoon was frustrating to Fisher and Molloy, who could seldom locate the machine guns that caused heavy loss to the infantry or the anti-tank guns which disabled all but three or four of the 16 I tanks. As soon as Molloy and Major Wilson realised that the enemy was reinforcing by sending troops up the Rugbet en-Nbeidat to the left flank, 29 Battery fired heavily and frequently into this area, causing the hidden enemy much loss (as was later discovered) and discouraging him from exploiting the gap that resulted from the surrender of the two companies of 25 Battalion. When another company was sent forward it came under heavy fire, and 29 Battery responded by ‘putting down a spot barrage that was suicidal in its closeness’, according to an infantry sergeant. It nevertheless helped to save the day.

In mid-afternoon all battalion wireless and telephone communications had broken down and only the artillery wireless sets were working between battalion and brigade. McNaught wanted the I-tank commander to intervene again to ease the pressure on the infantry and Wilson drove back to find him. Only three tanks had rallied, however, and two of these were damaged. While Wilson and the I-tank colonel were discussing McNaught's request, the brigade commander arrived and Wilson told him of the plight of 25 Battalion, suggesting that, as no tanks were available, more infantry were urgently needed and stating that ‘the situation was extremely serious’. The guns of 29 Battery were firing nearby and the brigade commander asked what targets they were engaging. Wilson went across to find out and as he approached the gun position he could hear the wireless operator calling to the GPO that he had a message for the brigade commander. The message was: ‘Send reinforcements 25 Bn right flank urgently.’ Wilson describes what followed.

‘I got in touch with both FOOs and they reported that our infantry had been practically wiped out and that their positions were almost untenable. It was at this time that Fisher reported his driver wounded and I instructed him to return to the battery area. Molloy had good observation and he was instructed to cover the whole area using both troops if necessary.’

Fisher had managed to bring down fire which destroyed a troublesome mortar; but one of its last few bombs narrowly missed Fisher's Bren carrier, damaged it slightly, and badly wounded the driver. Fisher reported this to Wilson, who promptly suggested he teach himself to drive. Somehow Fisher did so, under fire from machine guns and mortars, and managed to get the carrier back to safety. Molloy carried on as best he could; but eight 25-pounders could provide only slender support on a front of well over a mile.

Meanwhile on the right flank the gun K2 on its high portée claimed a third or fourth victim. A company of 24 Battalion had come forward and was advancing above the escarpment when it was threatened by a tank which came up a re-entrant. The portée intervened, backing up to the edge of the escarpment and destroying the tank. Machine-gunners, too, came forward and by degrees the front settled down. Firing died down after dark and stretcher parties worked to breaking point to bring in the hundreds of wounded.

[16]
Maj H. S. Wilson, ED; Auckland; born Auckland, 19 Jul 1907; company secretary; p.w. 30 Nov 1941.

[17]
17
Brig J. R. Page, CBE, DSO, mid; Wellington; born Dunedin, 10 May 1908; Regular soldier; CO 26 Bn May 1940-Nov 1941; wounded 27 Nov 1941; Commander, Northern Military District, 1950–52; Adjutant-General, 1952–54; QMG 1956–60; head of NZ Joint Services liaison staff, Canberra, 1960–63.

[18]
Lt-Col G. J. McNaught, DSO, ED; New Plymouth; born Wanganui, 26 Nov 1896; schoolmaster; NZ MG Corps, 1916–19 (2 Lt, 1919); CO 29 Bn ( UK) Jun 1940-Mar 1941; 25 Bn Sep-Nov 1941; wounded 23 Nov 1941.

[19]
Lt-Col L. N. McKay; London; born Auckland, 25 Nov 1908; Regular soldier; wounded 25 Nov 1941.

[20]
Capt J. T. Molloy; born NZ 22 May 1912; secretary; died of wounds 30 Nov 1941.

[21]
Maj J. C. Muirhead, MC; Palmerston North; born Palmerston North, 5 Oct 1911; clerk; wounded 23 Nov 1941.

[22]
L-Bdr F. E. Sievert; born NZ 30 Jul 1918; apprentice electrician; died of wounds 18 Jan 1942.

[23]
Capt E. L. Ryan; Auckland; born Wellington, 15 Aug 1906; bank officer; wounded 25 Nov 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

L Troop's Anti-Tank Action

L Troop's Anti-Tank Action

The mission of 26 Battalion with 30 Field Battery and L Anti-Tank Troop also led to a fierce action, but of a very different kind. The South African brigade sprawled across a large area of desert a few miles south-west of 6 Brigade and the New Zealand battalion group approached to within two miles and then took up a defensive position on a very slight rise in the open desert. The desert around was strewn with derelicts from the tank battle, but the only action was occasional shelling of the great laager ahead to which the South African guns replied. The battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Page, a Regular gunner, noticed that long-range shelling of the laager was increasing and knew that the 25-pounders had no answer to it. The 4th RHA posted itself along a line between the northern part of the South African position and 26 Battalion, but could do little to subdue the fire on the South Africans. The New Zealand gunners could do even less and they tried with scanty success to protect their gun positions on the rocky ground.

For the next hour or so the shelling of the South Africans increased and clouds of smoke and dust rose up. A solitary shell was all that landed in the New Zealand position before 3 p.m. From then onwards, however, the fighting ahead became intense, though at first it was hard to see what was happening. A request then came from the South Africans for urgent anti-tank support. Page realised the danger of detaching guns from his group, isolated as it was in open desert, and sought permission from brigade headquarters, which duly authorised him to send a troop of 25-pounders. The guns of 30 Battery were therefore hooked on and quickly driven through the battalion position to the western perimeter. At the same time two portées of L Troop were also rushed to the west. Just as the field guns reached the foremost infantry posts, however, enemy tanks were seen to break through the South African positions and head towards 26 Battalion. The field guns were at once unhooked and prepared for emergency action and the 2-pounders got ready for portée action. Shelling of the area had begun, rather spasmodically, and small-arms fire, mostly ‘overs’, began to arrive. Lorries packed with South Africans drove at high speed through the New Zealand lines. E and F Troops of 30 Battery and L Troop were now in a north-south line level with the foremost infantry. The 25-pounders of the 4th RHA, to their right front, soon moved off, probably to new positions to the south-west. The New Zealand field guns were on their platforms and the four anti-tank guns en portée.

As soon as the retreating South African lorries drew clear of the guns 30 Battery opened fire, at first indirectly. What was thought to be a derelict British tank to the right flank then suddenly fired on the portée L1 and disabled it, smashing the foot of the gun-layer. The other three portées at once retaliated and knocked out the tank. They then turned their attention to a mass of tanks which seemed to be coming straight at them. The range, however, was still too great for effective fire and the anti-tankers, high up on their portées, had to endure several anxious minutes of exposure to small-arms fire which now began to sweep through the area. L3, nearest the source of this fire to the south-west, fired several shots at long range and then was put out of action, its driver mortally wounded.

Only L2 and L4 and the eight 25-pounders now remained in action and they fought a furious action against a large body of tanks. Some of the field guns quickly ran through their small stocks of AP shot and had to use HE shell and then, when this was finished, smoke shell. Captain Stewart, [24] forward in his pick-up truck, at first directed the fire of F Troop. Then, as the range dropped, he ordered Gun Control and the field guns fired over open sights. ‘Spare’ gunners manned Bren guns or rifles from the ground alongside the guns and kept up heavy fire. Extra ammunition for the two remaining 2-pounders came from the other two and the troop commander, Lieutenant Pepper, [25] scouting round the desert, found some more and replenished the rapidly dwindling stocks on the two portées.

After an hour of this firing, almost continuous on the part of the anti-tank gunners (who could see more from their high platforms than could the field gunners, often blinded by dust on the ground), the enemy tanks and transport drew off, leaving behind many blazing tanks and trucks. By a careful count, which included only burning tanks, the two L Troop guns, with some help from the field guns, had disabled the remarkable total of 24 tanks, though at long range and under such confusing conditions it was hard to be sure. Each of the two portées fired more than 300 rounds, a quite extraordinary total. Bombardier Barker, [26] who was layer on L2, says that at some stages targets were ‘very numerous and creeping closer all the time, so it was practically impossible to miss a shot.’ But much of the shooting was nevertheless at long range and the gunners were delighted to see that their fire was effective. As Sergeant Robertson, [27] who commanded L2, says, ‘We fired at everything we saw and put tanks on fire with one or two shots at extreme range, 1800 yards’. For the field gunners the range was even longer, for they were north of the 2-pounders and the tanks came from the south-west. Throughout the action Lieutenant Pepper moved from gun to gun—when he was not away looking for more ammunition—and one gunner recalls his ‘shouts of joy as the German column veered to the left past our guns’, adding that Pepper ‘had courage to burn’. All were later delighted to learn that Pepper won for this action an MC.

But the action was far from finished with the disappearance of the German tanks. After a fairly long pause, during which the field guns engaged various targets as they appeared, a heavy attack by German motor-cyclists and machine-gunners serving as infantry brought the whole area under intense small-arms and mortar fire. The field guns fired at their fastest possible rate into the oncoming enemy and the 2-pounders engaged whatever vehicles they saw. So fast and furious was the action that each gun crew got the impression that it was engaged single-handed against what looked like ‘the whole of the German Army’, as Sergeant Close
[28] puts it. ‘Still Gun Control’, he adds. ‘Gnr Robb
[29] has a captured Mauser Rifle and is kneeling behind the trailer using this and thereby earned the nickname of Rapid-fire Robb.’

For a few brief minutes the setting sun silhouetted the enemy against a dark desert background and the defensive fire from gunners and infantry caused heavy loss. But in the gathering darkness the enemy continued to advance. Several of the field guns had fired all their ammunition and withdrew in search of more. Close's gun of F Troop ‘retired a short distance to where our G.P.O. Chas Reed had found us some which we fired’. Looking around it seemed to Close that all the portées had gone, though he was mistaken in this. In the distance fires from the South African laager provided an eerie background. The field guns withdrew, but the two L Troop guns still had some ammunition and fired from time to time in the dark at enemy parties outlined against the burning vehicles. Flares lit up the desert briefly but brilliantly. Second-Lieutenant Scott, [30] subaltern of L Troop, describes the close of the action:

‘L Troop remained until the last movable truck had gone and then moved away from the area under a canopy of flares, the enemy by this time being only a matter of 100 yards away. Occasionally we opened up with Bren gun fire to show them that we were still there. My truck moved off first independently with the wounded [three men] to find an MDS.’

The very last vehicle to leave was Pepper's pick-up and in it was a German captured in the course of Pepper's search for ammunition. The battalion group disengaged with less trouble than expected (though some infantry were temporarily lost) and drove back without further incident to 6 Brigade, now closing up on the part of Point 175 which had been won at tragically heavy cost. The losses in the action near the South African laager were fortunately light. L Troop lost one killed and three wounded and 30 Battery had none killed and only a handful wounded. F Troop, for example, had four wounded, including a gun sergeant and the troop artificer. It was a small price to pay for an anti-tank action that must rank among the finest in the war.

[24]
Capt J. T. Stewart; Auckland; born Auckland, 9 Dec 1914; warehouse-man; p.w. 1 Dec 1941.

[25]
Lt C. S. Pepper, MC; born NZ 18 Nov 1911; clerk; injured 26 Nov 1941; died Wellington, 30 May 1943.

[26]
WO II F. C. Barker; Auckland; born Wanganui, 23 Apr 1912; freezing worker; wounded 13 Jul 1942.

[27]
Lt P. M. Robertson; Wellington; born Scotland, 7 Feb 1919; labourer.

[28]
Sgt M. H. Close; Rangiriri, Waikato; born Auckland, 30 Nov 1915; commercial traveller; wounded 23 Nov 1941.

[29]
Gnr S. R. Robb; Dunedin; born NZ 9 May 1917; nurseryman; wounded 24 Nov 1941.

[30]
Capt I. G. Scott; Auckland; born Aust., 1 Feb 1914; commercial traveller; wounded 2 Dec 1941; p.w. 22 Jul 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Major Sawyers recaptures a Dozen Tanks

Major Sawyers recaptures a Dozen Tanks

The Bofors guns of 43 Battery and the 18-pounders of M Troop, according to the records, did not fire this day, being reserved for the defence of the mass of 6 Brigade vehicles, and 48 Field Battery did little, though its commander, Major Sawyers, was extremely active. The restless energy of Sawyers took him on a journey of exploration of the huge concentration of derelicts to the south-west soon after 6 Brigade halted. Several enemy detachments were still working among the tanks there, many of which required only fuel to make them serviceable. Sawyers soon discovered that 18 tanks, 12 of them almost ready to drive off, and many other vehicles in similar condition, had been assembled by a small party of enemy. He promptly called for fire from his D Troop, bracketed the tanks, and boldly led his OP party forward, spraying the enemy with small-arms fire. The enemy, had they not panicked, might easily have repulsed this sortie. Some of them were inside tanks and could have brought them into action. But Sawyers' nerve was too much for them and the action ended after a few minutes with the surrender of some 50 Germans and the recapture of the vehicles. The 12 serviceable tanks were driven into the 6 Brigade area and later repossessed by British tank men. This success was important; for the enemy was quick to convert captured tanks to his own use and an increment of a dozen or more tanks to his strength at a time when British tank strength was dangerously low would have had far-reaching consequences.

The only other recorded action of 48 Battery this day was just before dusk, when half a dozen enemy tanks drove from the east straight for 6 Brigade. They evidently expected a friendly reception, but they soon learned better. C Troop had been moving with the rest of the brigade group towards Point 175 and was still in column of route with its guns hooked on. The gunners leapt into action and an AP shot set the leading tank on fire. The remainder at once veered off. One field gun fired about a dozen rounds before they disappeared. Shortly afterwards another enemy group of tanks and lorried infantry appeared to the south and the gunners prepared to engage it; but it was lost in a fold of the ground and did not reappear. A third group, also approaching from the south, caused anxious moments until it was identified as 12 tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade and was then warmly welcomed. After dark Weir of the 6th Field, McKay of 33 Anti-Tank Battery, and Bretherton
[31] of 43 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery arranged for the anti-tank defence of the brigade group, which in the light of the latest Intelligence seemed to be a matter of the greatest importance. The British armour had been defeated and it seemed highly likely that next day the enemy armour would exert its full weight against the isolated New Zealand brigade. The outlook was uncertain in the extreme.

[31]
Maj J. A. Bretherton, ED; Christchurch; born Wellington, 2 Jun 1911; barrister and solicitor; CO 15 Comp AA Regt, RNZA, 1948–55 (Lt-Col).

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

An Anti-Tank Advanced Guard

An Anti-Tank Advanced Guard

The day had been full of incident, too, for the various groups of the Division which moved westwards in accordance with Freyberg's ‘go-for- Tobruk’ policy and for those which stayed behind to ‘mask’ the Capuzzo- Sollum- Bardia area. Among the groups which headed westwards was an unintended advanced guard which consisted of BHQ of 34 Anti-Tank Battery and two guns of P Troop. The battery commander, Major Hall-Kenney, meant to travel with Divisional Headquarters, but he did not hear that this had been delayed and drove westwards in the belief that he was following it. He naturally made fast progress. Seven enemy tanks had been reported west of Sidi Azeiz, and when the little group came upon a single tank near Gasr el-Arid, some miles to the west, Hall-Kenney deployed his two guns to gain favourable ground and discover if the other six tanks were nearby. In so doing the two portées came under heavy fire from a group of vehicles two miles away and from anti-tank guns which could not be located. They returned this fire as well as they could and then withdrew. One gunshield was pierced and a gunner severely wounded. When the enemy moved off in mid-afternoon Hall-Kenney drove along its flank and tried to size it up, reporting back to his RHQ by wireless. Divisional Headquarters, duly informed of this, adjusted its route to avoid contact with the enemy. As daylight faded he came within sight of what looked like a brigade group and three tanks detached themselves from it and approached him. Not caring to tempt Providence by letting them get within range before he could positively identify them, he withdrew and his party bedded down for the night four miles south of Bir el Chleta. The tanks were in fact enemy and the ‘brigade group’ was a powerful rearguard, as enemy records now disclose.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

4 Brigade Captures Gambut

4 Brigade Captures Gambut

To the right rear of this unintended advanced guard, 4 Brigade moved above the Via Balbia to Gambut airfield. It was well supplied with artillery, though for the tasks which confronted it a few medium guns in addition would have been most valuable. The 8th Field, an RA unit specially trained to support I tanks and intended to work in close co-operation with 1 Army Tank Brigade, had come under Divisional command and its V/AA Battery, temporarily under the 4th Field, moved with 4 Brigade. B Troop of the 4th Field, under Divi- sional Cavalry for the opening moves of the campaign, now rejoined 46 Battery. Two guns of N Troop, 34 Anti-Tank Battery, supported a Divisional Cavalry squadron leading the advance. A battery (the 26th) of the 4th Field and a troop of 31 Anti-Tank Battery stayed with 20 Battalion at the roadblock on the Via Balbia. The rest of the 4th Field and 31 Battery drove towards Gambut, together with the whole of 41 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery. Since a regiment of I tanks, followed by another, also moved with or close behind 4 Brigade, there seemed little to fear from any likely encounter with the enemy on the way.

The ground, however, favoured enemy rearguards. It rose from sea level in a succession of low escarpments which gave good observation and cover. Of these escarpments one passed just north of Gambut airfield and another three miles south of it. The northern flank was covered by 25 Battery and the southern by 46 Battery, while V/AA Battery covered the rear (but was later moved forward). After only a few miles fire came from both escarpments and all field guns were soon in action. To the south, where the main opposition lay, 46 Battery acted swiftly. B Troop brought down quick and effective fire and the enemy, ‘after receiving a considerable burst’ (in the words of Duff's report), moved off westwards. But the CO was less pleased with 25 and V/AA Batteries. GPOs, as Duff caustically comments, failed to realise that speed was essential:

‘Lines were laid out by compass bearing and director and parallelism checked by compass, which caused quite unnecessary delay. The enemy was visible on the escarpment … and guns could have, and should have been laid direct over the muzzle by swinging the trail. Parallelism was unnecessary and it was definitely an occasion for “bow-and-arrow” methods.’

Just after noon 41 Battery chased a twin-engined Messerschmitt across the sky from east to west and the bursting Bofors shells attracted attention from all sides. Soon afterwards the enemy moved off and 4 Brigade pushed on rapidly. After a few more miles 46 Battery was again in action against transport near Gasr el-Arid, well to the south. Further opposition on the extreme left, however, failed to delay the brigade and by mid-afternoon the I tanks drove on to Gambut airfield amid much confusion. The enemy was taken by surprise and, though few prisoners were captured, huge stocks of supplies of many kinds were found in the neighbourhood, including large quantities of petrol and diesel oil of which the German Africa Corps stood in great need.

The gunners had little time to investigate their new surroundings, however; for the brigade came under shellfire from several directions and for a time the guns were extremely active. V/AA Battery faced west and fired furiously, while A Troop of 25 Battery faced north-west and engaged tanks, guns and transport below the escarpment, as well as pinpointing and destroying a deadly ‘88’. A Troop then switched its fire to the southern escarpment, while C Troop fired north, one section advancing to the very edge of the cliff and sniping vehicles on or near the Via Balbia. This section caused ‘considerable nuisance’, according to Duff (who directed its fire), and knocked out a tank. The other section meanwhile reversed its direction and shelled transport and a high-velocity gun on the southern ridge. Mortar fire was at times extremely heavy and it drove RHQ of the 4th Field from a wadi which proved to be exposed to observation from the north. Several vehicles were hit, but none was badly damaged. The anti-tank gunners, too, had a lively time, the 2-pounders being disposed on the perimeter and the 18-pounders around Brigade Headquarters. RHQ of the 4th Field in its new position was shelled persistently by a 150-millimetre medium field howitzer.

The relief of 20 Battalion at the Via Balbia road-block outside Bardia was rudely interrupted by what looked like about 20 tanks attacking from the west. The company astride the road had sent three of the four portées of C Troop, 31 Anti-Tank Battery, up the escarpment and was about to follow when the enemy appeared. Second-Lieutenant Hill of C Troop hurriedly reconnoitred and brought the three guns into action on a slight rise, the fourth gun being still with the infantry. When the leading tank was 800 yards away the three guns opened fire and it withdrew. The remaining ‘tanks’ (there were actually only one or two, the rest being 20-millimetre guns on armoured carriers) continued to advance, firing profusely at the route up the escarpment and at the anti-tank guns. The three guns fired 137 rounds altogether before the action ceased and did much to discourage the enemy. Several hits were observed at fairly long range and one tank, hit three times, was slow to move off and seemed to be damaged. A section of D Troop, 26 Battery, then opened fire and the other section joined in after a minute or two. I tanks were also committed; but the main deterrent was the rapid fire of the three 2-pounders. At the end of it all one tank remained by the roadside, evidently disabled. Early in the afternoon the battalion group, with attached artillery which included a section of 41 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, moved off to join Divisional Headquarters, which had already left on its journey westwards.

The many vehicles of Divisional Headquarters were protected on the march by no tanks and very few guns. At the head of the columns were 21 Battalion with 47 Field Battery, sadder but wiser after their action at Bir Ghirba. The 2-pounders of O Troop and the 18-pounders of Q Troop travelled with Headquarters, as did the RHQs of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack. In the early evening 20 Battalion Group caught up and its I-tank squadron and artillery were welcome reinforcements. By 2 a.m. on the 24th Divisional Headquarters, with 1 Army Tank Brigade (less two battalions) and the two infantry battalions, had settled down for the rest of the night at Bir el Chleta.

Dawn on the 24th disclosed poor dispersion of the huge assembly of vehicles below the escarpment and a few shell-bursts emphasised the point. A fairly strong enemy position had been by-passed in the night and could be seen to the east astride the Trigh Capuzzo, the main axis of the Divisional advance to the Tobruk front. Another enemy group was almost due north, between Divisional Headquarters and 4 Brigade at Gambut. After some hesitation General Freyberg decided to attack the second group and clear the route to 4 Brigade.

Major Bevan had been returning the enemy shellfire since shortly after dawn and when 20 Battalion, with a squadron of I tanks leading, attacked soon after 11 a.m., Bevan followed as FOO close behind the leading tanks. He proposed to support the attack with observed fire and his troop commanders followed, laying telephone wire as they advanced. Two 2-pounders of C Troop covered each flank. The fire of mortars, Vickers guns, and all other available weapons, brought down in support of the infantry, raised so much dust and added so much smoke to it that Bevan found it hard to observe his own fire. In the end he was forced to adopt the unusual expedient of ordering a round of gun fire from the whole battery to observe ranging rounds. The task was complicated by the fact that the guns of 4 Brigade were also firing from the north on the same enemy group. An ‘88’ firing at almost point-blank range disabled seven I tanks in quick succession and the infantry had to push on without tank support. Their lorries drove through heavy fire, the infantry fanned out from them and pushed on with great determination, and opposition soon ceased, the enemy departing eastwards. The ‘88’ and two 50-millimetre anti-tank guns were captured and perhaps two 105-millimetre light field howitzers: the evidence is conflicting.

20 battalion attacks point 172, 24 november

The ‘88’ had caused other damage, however, before 20 Battalion arrived on the scene. It had destroyed the tank of 44 Royal Tanks in which an FOO of the 8th Field travelled, killing an RA wireless operator. Before this 46 Battery had engaged this enemy pocket from Gambut airfield and C Troop of 25 Battery had moved forward in a sniping role. In this capacity C Troop claimed—perhaps correctly—to have destroyed the ‘88’. Later, when the 20 Battalion attack drove off the enemy, the guns of 4 Brigade, including V/AA Battery, helped to disperse the survivors and add to their confusion.

The chief concern of 4 Brigade was not with the small pocket of enemy to the south, but with what looked like powerful enemy concentrations to the north and west on both sides of the Via Balbia, as well as with mortars close at hand and the persistent 150-millimetre howitzer. The concentrations were actually of supply columns of the Africa Corps and they offered no threat to 4 Brigade; but this was not realised at the time. Lieutenant-Colonel Duff therefore ordered targets to be engaged by the largest possible number of guns, a display of strength to impress the enemy and deter attack. By 3 p.m. all was quiet and soon after this the brigade resumed its march westwards, parallel with a move by Divisional Headquarters along the Trigh Capuzzo. [32]

The move brought 4 Brigade almost level on a north-south line with 6 Brigade, which was completing its capture of Point 175. To the south the whole of the enemy armoured force was engaged in an astonishing manoeuvre, Rommel's celebrated dash to the frontier, which served the immediate purpose of ending the threat of tank attack on 6 Brigade and ultimately resulted in the defeat of the hitherto victorious German armour. Neither the scope nor the purpose of the move were immedi- ately apparent to 6 Brigade and the only effect it had this day was to attract fire from B Troop of the 6th Field, which was moved to the southern perimeter of the brigade to get within range of the close-packed enemy columns. Meanwhile 48 Battery engaged targets in the direction of Sidi Rezegh. Ammunition for the 25-pounders was not sufficient to allow a programme of supporting fire for the infantry attack in the afternoon which carried the barely discernible top of Point 175; but resistance was soon overcome. When Divisional Headquarters gained contact at dusk 21 Battalion Group joined 6 Brigade, to compensate for the heavy losses of the previous day, and 47 Battery came under the command of the 6th Field. The Divisional Artillery was further increased by the arrival of W/X Battery of the 8th Field and, unexpectedly, by 259 Battery of the 65th Anti-Tank. Both remained for the time being, however, with 1 Army Tank Brigade in Divisional Headquarters Group.

[32] The stay at Gambut had been frustrating for a detachment from 1 Survey Troop, which had first tried with little success to pinpoint by flash-spotting the guns opposing 20 Battalion and had then moved to the scene of the fighting to flash-spot the enemy concentrations north-west of 4 Brigade. No sooner were posts established for this purpose and communications completed, however, than word came to pack up and move westwards.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Blockhouse

The Blockhouse

The Division, less 5 Brigade, was now poised, with strong I-tank support, to strike at the enemy besieging Tobruk, and Freyberg was all for thrusting quickly through what he thought were weak Italian forces which barred the way. He was deterred only by what was evidently, according to the latest Intelligence, a strong gun group between Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda, the bottleneck of communications through which the Trigh Capuzzo and the Tobruk by-pass road ran. He conferred with the commanders of the two infantry brigades, the I-tank brigade, and Brigadier Miles and it was Miles's voice that urged caution. Miles was not at all keen to advance farther westwards without taking in the third and southernmost escarpment which ran a mile or two south of that on which 6 Brigade was deployed. His tactical sense was in this respect sound and many troubles later arose from allowing the enemy to retain this vital ground. Miles was also much impressed with the estimate of 119 enemy guns of calibres from 75 to 150 millimetre believed to be in the area through which the Division would have to pass. [33] Moreover, 6 Brigade now had too little field-gun ammunition to support daylight attacks. Freyberg was hopeful that the enemy was ready to pack up and retreat behind Tobruk, as the planners of the campaign had suggested he might; but Miles was sceptical of this. Both were still ignorant of the extent of the disaster which had befallen the British armour and believed their southern flank to be protected to a large extent by friendly tank forces.

Miles's counsel for the moment prevailed and the advance was to continue as he suggested, taking in the southernmost escarpment. It began with an early-morning advance by 6 Brigade, culminating in an attack on the so-called Blockhouse west of Point 175 at dawn on 25 November, while 26 Battalion carried on towards Sidi Rezegh airfield and 21 Battalion prepared to swing southwards and then advance along the southernmost escarpment. No detailed role was given to the brigade artillery and Weir therefore made his own arrangements, putting 48 Battery to support the right, 29 Battery the centre, and 30 Battery covering right and centre as the other two batteries moved forward; 47 Battery would move with 21 Battalion. The anti-tank guns would move up after dawn.

The Blockhouse on the right, across a deep wadi, was heavily defended and there was little the artillery could do to ease the burden of the attacking infantry. The enemy commanded the approaches to the Blockhouse so effectively that close and accurate observation of fire was not possible and there were several misunderstandings. Infantry mortars and the 6th Field guns, and even the Vickers guns, fired on outlying sections of 24 Battalion, luckily without causing them further losses. An unsuspected minefield on the western part of Point 175 held up artillery transport, mainly of 48 Battery, and delayed supporting fire. While the 6 Brigade infantry were closing in on the Blockhouse from east and south, 4 Brigade advanced in box formation below the escarpment until it drew level with the western end of Point 175. The left of this brigade, too, came under fire from the Blockhouse and could see up the deep wadi. More fire still was mistakenly directed at 24 Battalion for a few tense minutes. Then, when the action reached its climax, 24 and 26 Battalions were pressing on with great gallantry and the guns of the 6th Field were bombarding the area, the 4th Field joined in, knowing that fire was coming from the Blockhouse, but not knowing the rest of the story. The defence suddenly collapsed from the cumulative effects of this pressure and the 6 Brigade infantry rushed forward. The 6th Field fire stopped almost at once; but it took several exasperating minutes to get in touch with the 4th Field and get it to cease its bombardment. The gunners of 48 Battery had meanwhile suffered anxieties of a different kind as sappers worked their way through the gun positions clearing the mines.

the capture of the blockhouse, 25 november

No sooner had the Blockhouse fallen than enemy guns north of Belhamed to the right front began shelling the 6th Field gun positions, especially those of C Troop, as well as RHQ and the B Echelon vehicles. L Troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery followed closely behind 26 Battalion towards the airfield; but the other three troops came under heavy fire as they moved forward and by the end of the day they had lost three officers wounded, Major McKay among them.

The gunners of 47 Battery, moving towards the southernmost escarpment with 21 Battalion, had little to do at first and they marvelled at the profusion of abandoned vehicles, not all of them unserviceable, and the variety and quantity of equipment with which the desert through which they drove was bestrewn. It was the first evidence they had had of the fighting in which the British armour had been defeated and it came as a revelation to them. At the western end of the escarpment the group came under mortar fire and halted. As the infantry began to dig in the field guns returned this fire. Two 2-pounders of P Troop, 34 Battery, had been attached, but they were far too few to provide adequate defence to the battalion in its isolated position. There was no intention of committing the group to heavy fighting in such a situation and when patrols located a strong enemy position ahead the group stayed where it was.

The advance of 4 Brigade was an operation of a totally different complexion. It did not begin until after dawn on the 25th, when the group formed up in an impressive array of strength and drove forward unopposed. The 44th Royal Tanks and the squadron of Divisional Cavalry (with the two N Troop 2-pounders) led the way, taking 150 prisoners without firing a shot. Within an hour the leading infantry were past their allotted objectives and began to dig in, those on the right coming under fire from the Blockhouse.

The I tanks went some way beyond their objectives to overcome machine-gun fire directed at the leading infantry and in so doing struck trouble from anti-tank guns. A Troop of 31 Anti-Tank Battery had been committed to support the tanks and continued to advance when they withdrew a short distance. Lieutenant Harding rode on the portée A1 and got within 100 yards of a strongpoint before trying to engage it. The enemy, however, struck first. A 50-millimetre anti-tank gun hidden in the tufted desert fired three shots which could not miss and destroyed the gun, killing the No. 1, Sergeant Maffey
[34] and badly wounding the layer, Bombardier Sim. [35] Harding and the rest of the gun crew managed to get Sim back through 500 yards of enemy fire to a place of comparative safety, covered skilfully by Bren-gun fire from Gunner Hutchins. [36] The other three guns of A Troop meanwhile carried on the contest and knocked out the offending 50-millimetre gun and possibly another. In so doing the gun A4 was also hit and Sergeant Harper wounded. [37] Half an hour later an I tank returned and finished off several other enemy guns in this area.

FOOs with the leading infantry came under heavy mortar fire when the advance halted, thickened up after a few minutes by shelling from the Belhamed area. Captain MacLean of the 4th Field was seriously wounded, his OPA, Bombardier Organ, [38] and Gunner Copland
[39] were killed, and there were several narrow escapes. To their left rear, in the 20 Battalion area, C Troop of 31 Battery also ran into trouble and Second-Lieutenant Hill and his driver, Gunner Sweetman, [40] were killed. It was a bad morning for veterans of Greece and Crete. [41]

For the field gunners the day was confusing and at times annoying. On several occasions infantry sent requests for artillery support not direct to the nearest FOO, who might have dealt with them quickly and accurately and thereby economised in ammunition, but by a roundabout route. This usually led back through Brigade to Lieutenant-Colonel Duff and reached him in such vague form that the batteries could act on it, if at all, only by bringing down wasteful fire on suspected areas rather than on pinpoint targets. For example,

‘18 Battalion is being mortared from the north; can you deal with this?’. On the left 26 Battery had poor observation westwards across the thickly tufted desert below the escarpment. Exaggerated reports from 20 Battalion of enemy movement ahead gave rise to mistaken impressions at Brigade that counterattacks were brewing and the fire tasks on this part of the front therefore took the form, more often than not, of regimental or battery concentrations. Since it was later discovered that the battery grid was faulty, being based on a wrongly identified landmark, this fire could not have done much harm to the enemy (who was in any case thinking more in terms of flight than of counter-attack). Some useful fire was nevertheless directed at clusters of enemy vehicles and the counter-battery and counter-mortar fire was certainly not all wasted. The 456 rounds fired by the 4th Field this day was more than could be afforded, nevertheless, for targets which were for the most part unrewarding. But gunners and infantry were learning fast.

One sphere in which the gunners were rapidly improving their techniques was in counter-battery work. The Counter-Battery Officer at Divisional Artillery Headquarters worked closely with 1 Survey Troop, which established flash-spotting posts. The hostile batteries thus located were reported to both the 4th and the 6th Field, and the latter, with far better observation, was able to bring down some useful fire. Brigadier Miles himself moved with the 4th Field on the right flank, saw many tempting targets to the north-west, and greatly regretted the shortage of ammunition which forced him to neglect them. In his absence his staff noted with some apprehension that enemy guns bracketed Divisional Headquarters and expected the ranging shots to be followed by a heavy bombardment; but the fire surprisingly switched to the empty slopes of the escarpment.

On the Trigh Capuzzo just east of Divisional Headquarters
1 Army Tank Brigade took up position with RHQ of the 8th Field and W/X Battery and 259 Anti-Tank Battery. There they were joined in mid-morning by RHQ of the 65th Anti-Tank and 257 Battery, welcome reinforcements who had been bombed on their way from the frontier.

The Division had so far seen little of either the German or the Italian air force and had not been directly attacked in any strength from the air. Gunners who had served in Greece and Crete, and in the first few days of this campaign had been careful to dig slit trenches at every halt ‘just in case’, were now getting careless. The RAF seemed to have full control of the air above them. When a large formation of aircraft flew over at 4 p.m. many men did not bother to look up. It therefore came as a shock to them when the section of 41 Battery attached to Divisional Headquarters opened fire and its 40-millimetre shells quickly produced a cloud of dark smoke above the bombers. [42] Then came the whining dive of Stukas, and bombs began bursting among the lorries of Divisional Headquarters. They just missed G Office, but the many other headquarters clustered around it were badly shaken up. The worst hit was that of the 7th Anti-Tank, which had four killed or mortally wounded, including the quartermaster, Lieutenant McBride, [43] and another wounded. Bombs fell all round the three Bofors guns of 41 Battery and killed a gunner, as well as damaging four vehicles; but the light ack-ack fire did not falter. Altogether 18 other men were wounded in the various headquarters, not counting two killed and two wounded in or around the tank brigade headquarters.

This was part of a large air operation in which some 60–80 enemy aircraft took part. They were met, south of the Sidi Rezegh escarpment, by an RAF squadron and one from the RAAF, as well as by the fire of 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery, which brought down a Ju88 twin-engined reconnaissance aircraft. This battery had already had plenty of excitement from ground action and had fired against what looked like enemy tanks to the south. Some of the ensuing ‘dogfight’ took place over 6 Brigade and the successes of the defending fighter planes were warmly applauded.

[33] This was a slight over-estimate of the number of guns, but the maximum calibre was even greater than was thought: 210 millimetres.

[34]
Sgt H. G. E. Maffey; born England, 18 Jan 1917; Regular soldier; killed in action 25 Nov 1941. Maffey was very popular. The smoke ring which rose from the burning vehicle to a great height was called Maffey's Halo.

[35]
Bdr G. F. Sim; Te Poi, Matamata; born Gisborne, 1911; stock agent; MP 1943–; wounded 25 Nov 1941. Sim, who lost an arm and an eye, became the first returned serviceman of the war to gain a seat in the House of Representatives.

[36]
Gnr F. W. G. Hutchins; Whakatane; born Eltham, 12 Jan 1913; paper maker; p.w. Dec 1941.

[37] Harper was taken to the Main Dressing Station which three days later fell into enemy hands. There a stray shell killed him.

[38]
Bdr R. F. Organ; born Hastings, 30 May 1914; agricultural chemist; killed in action 25 Nov 1941.

[39]
Gnr A. J. Copland; born NZ 6 Feb 1915; advertising copywriter; killed in action 25 Nov 1941.

[40]
Gnr F. C. Sweetman; born NZ 14 Dec 1904; waterside worker; killed in action 25 Nov 1941.

[41] Hill had earned an MC in Greece and Harper an MM. MacLean's patrol earned much praise in the six-day battle for Galatas in Crete.

[42] The Bofors shells were self-destroying: i.e., if they did not first strike something solid enough to set off their sensitive percussion fuses they exploded after a set time, usually at 12,000 feet or more from the gun, though the altitude would of course vary according to the elevation.

[43]
Lt R. R. W. McBride; born Auckland, 8 Nov 1912; Regular soldier; killed in action 25 Nov 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The First Attack on Sidi Rezegh

The First Attack on Sidi Rezegh

The next stage of the Divisional operations was intended to effect a junction with the Tobruk garrison in the region of Ed Duda, and it included a scheme for a complicated and ambitious advance by 6 Brigade to this region and an altogether simpler and more modest advance by 4 Brigade to Belhamed. The details were not settled until the last moment, and for the 6 Brigade artillery the preliminaries were a race against time. No supporting fire could be provided for the infantry advance by night along the top of the escarpment and then across the low ground between Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda; but guns of all kinds would be needed from first light on the 26th. They would have to be sited provisionally by night, after a series of moves in the vicinity of treacherous escarpments and wadis and in close co-operation with infantry.

The detailed orders Brigadier Barrowclough issued to commanders of supporting arms flowed so fast that his IO, jotting them down in a notebook, found it hard to keep pace. But each required further elaboration for which there was desperately little time. Some commanders of outlying detachments, having to race back in the darkness to their men, could not snatch a moment to iron out difficulties with the infantry or other supporting arms. The general intention for the artillery was to concentrate the main strength in field guns in the Sidi Rezegh area and to send only one battery forward to Ed Duda. But Lieutenant-Colonel Weir, realising that 47 Battery, attached to 21 Battalion, had been overlooked, decided to include it in what was hoped would become the ‘garrison of Ed Duda’ (together with his 48 Battery, attached to 26 Battalion). Only essential transport was to cross the Trigh Capuzzo for the final advance. Twelve 2-pounders and three Bofors were to go, too, and four 2-pounders, four 18-pounders and five Bofors, according to the IO's notes, were to stay at Sidi Rezegh. The IO was not working from correct figures of available guns; but the action as it unfolded soon made the point academic. Few guns, in the event, got even as far as Sidi Rezegh. None got beyond. But an even more ominous consequence of the ambitious plan was that it entailed withdrawing from the southernmost escarpment and thereby giving the enemy a valuable springboard for counter-attack. On this point Miles was far from satisfied with the night's programme.

Infantry were, of course, to lead the advance and 24 and 25 Battalions did so, starting from somewhere near the Blockhouse. The former came under heavy fire near Sidi Rezegh, its southern flank got mixed up with the 25th, and much confusion resulted. In the early hours of the 26th, by a misunderstanding, 21 Battalion passed through and descended the escarpment, waiting near the Trigh Capuzzo for 26 Battalion. But the 26th was halted by strong positions halfway to Sidi Rezegh and the wait was in vain. Major Beattie's 47 Battery, following the 21st, drove through the darkness, confusingly lit by flares and gun flashes, to the edge of the escarpment and there came under heavy fire. Disaster threatened, Beattie quickly surveyed the situation with an infantry company commander, and decided he must get his eight guns back south-eastwards to reasonable cover before dawn exposed them to what was evidently a strong enemy force. For commanders of the other artillery detachments the night was similarly fraught with difficulty and danger. Transport groups of the four 6 Brigade battalions became hopelessly mixed up and as dawn approached they tended to draw back as Beattie had done to less vulnerable ground. There was no sense in making sacrificial offerings to an enemy who was as yet clearly unsubdued and who held the dominating ground above and below the escarpment. But they were between two fires and could not drive too far south for fear of the enemy on the southernmost escarpment. For all concerned the situation was extremely awkward and the approaching dawn was regarded with much apprehension.

The advance by 4 Brigade to Belhamed was simpler, it met far less opposition, and the infantry gained their objectives at small cost. Yet the task, to those who worked out the details in the afternoon and evening of the 25th and carried them out by night, had seemed formidable, mainly because of failure to perceive that the large enemy transport assemblies visible to the north-west belonged not to fighting troops, but to the supply services of the German Africa Corps. The 4th Brigade possessed, moreover, the advantage of strong support from heavily armoured Matilda tanks: 44 Royal Tanks were to move forward at 4 a.m. on the 26th with 46 Field Battery, 31 Anti-Tank Battery, and a troop of 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery and provide close support for the infantry at dawn. The 26th Battery moved forward after dark to take over the positions of 46 Battery, and from then onwards two batteries of the 4th Field and two of the 8th Field, RA, would be available to give supporting fire as called for, though no programme of supporting fire was ‘laid on’ other than a few harassing fire tasks before and during the early stages of the advance and some periodic bursts of gun fire to indicate the objective to the advancing infantry. For the infantry the advance started from roughly the line of their existing FDLs and there were no long and difficult approach marches such as the battalions of 6 Brigade had to carry out.

Lieutenant-Colonel Duff listened on a ‘party line’ and kept in close touch with the course of the advance. His batteries (which included, from 6 p.m. on the 25th, 257 Anti-Tank

Battery, RA, under Major D. F. Cartwright, MC), were ‘kept standing by’, as he says, but ‘no serious opposition was encountered.’ Some fighting did in fact take place before the two battalions, the 18th and 20th, reached their objectives and there was a certain amount of confusion; but all would undoubtedly have gone well had word not reached 4 Brigade that 6 Brigade had failed to clear the Sidi Rezegh escarpment and was unlikely to reach Ed Duda. Because of this Division ordered 4 Brigade to provide tank and artillery support for Barrowclough's troops, which in turn delayed the advance of 44 Royal Tanks, with its strong gun group, while its commander sought fuller instructions. The supporting arms therefore did not reach Belhamed by dawn, as originally intended, and the task of getting there proved far harder in daylight than it would have been under cover of darkness.

The 6 Brigade guns came under fire from several directions as soon as it got light on the 26th. They were plainly visible from the southernmost escarpment and were shelled by guns beyond it. For a short time, too, guns near Ed Duda and north of Belhamed were directed by observation from a lattice-work mast (the up-ended skeleton of an aircraft wing) south-west of the ‘Mosque’ or tomb of Sidi Rezegh. Soon after dawn, 47 Battery returned from the Mosque and went into action on the edge of Sidi Rezegh airfield, and a little later 48 Battery opened fire on enemy on the crest of the escarpment at very short range from the north-western edge of the airfield. ‘We were given a fairly warm reception during the morning’, says a 6th Field gunner. [44] The anti-tank gunners found it hard indeed to gain positions from which they could give effective support to the infantry. All likely ground was in full view of the enemy and there was much readjustment of position among the New Zealand infantry units. The 18-pounders of M Troop moved forward while it was still dark and were sited in what was thought to be the area of 24 Battalion, facing west and south. The 2-pounders of J, K and L Troops drove forward at first light and joined 24, 25 and 26 Battalions respectively. The first target engaged by M Troop was the lattice tower, the observer on which, according to the troop commander (Second-Lieutenant Betts
[45]), ‘had no further interest in breakfast that day or thereafter’. The effectiveness of enemy fire at once diminished.

For several hours the field gunners were powerless to give support where it was most needed: below the escarpment near the Mosque, where much of 21 Battalion was in desperate straits, and in many wadis and re-entrants between the Mosque and the Blockhouse where detachments of 21 and 24 Battalions assembled. Several enemy tanks operated between the escarpment and the Trigh Capuzzo; but it was mid-morning before the field guns managed to drive them away. More tanks appeared to the south-west and M Troop was quick to engage them. Four were ‘engaged and destroyed’ (to quote a troop report) at 3500–4000 yards in the early morning. Then M Troop fired at guns to the south-west and silenced them. When two light howitzers were set up 2500 yards away Betts's gunners knocked them out before they could open fire. Other tanks advancing towards 25 Battalion were driven back. Then, about noon, M Troop turned its attention to what were recognised as strong enemy positions in ‘the immediate foreground’—a strongly fortified stretch of the top of the escarpment. In a warm exchange of fire one M Troop gunner was killed and three more gunners wounded. These wounded and several other casualties from nearby infantry and MMG positions had to be treated at the gun positions under heavy shelling. A squadron of 8 Royal Tanks equipped with Valentines also engaged enemy on the southern flank and in mid-afternoon drove off an Italian party forming up on the southernmost escarpment, with the help of A Troop of the 6th Field. M Troop also took the leading part in an anti-tank action just before dusk, when six or seven tanks appeared to the south-west. ‘Nos. 3 and 4 guns definitely hit five of the seven out of action, two having their turrets blown off and the other three [being] set on fire’, according to the troop subaltern, Second-Lieutenant Mitchell. [46] The other two guns engaged the remaining two tanks, watched by an enthusiastic ‘gallery’of 6th Field gunners and infantry.

An entirely different set of problems and difficulties presented themselves this day, 26 November, to the artillery of 4 Brigade. The night advance had skirted the northern flank of a strong enemy position that was curiously sited between Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh and well concealed, so that its location, size and strength were only slowly disclosed. The 44th Royal Tanks, hastily briefed the previous evening, expected the infantry to occupy a larger area than in fact they did. Moving forward soon after dawn to support 18 and 20 Battalions, the Matilda tanks ran into this enemy position and seven of them were soon destroyed or damaged by an ‘88’ which found them easy targets as they breasted the gentle slopes of Belhamed. The infantry, meanwhile, had come under heavy MG and mortar fire and persistent shelling, and soon realised that their bald objective would not be easy to hold. It was bombarded from three sides and the field gunners were for some time unable to locate the sources of this fire.

The group of anti-tank, ack-ack and machine guns which was to accompany the I tanks to Belhamed came under heavy shellfire as soon as daylight came. The tanks paused for an uncomfortable hour and a half and then disappeared on their fateful sortie. In their absence the artillery and MMG officers weighed the situation and decided to make their own way forward to the leading infantry. Major Levy of 31 Anti-Tank Battery had been told by the tank officers that it was impossible to get the guns forward; but he rebelled at the thought of leaving the infantry unsupported. Leading his three troops forward (the fourth, D Troop of 18-pounders, had stayed with brigade headquarters and 19 Battalion at Zaafran) to the head of the column, he reconnoitred the northern edge of Belhamed—almost a cliff face—and found a difficult route. Taking one troop forward at a time, he despatched each gun separately along this and by degrees shepherded all his vehicles through machine-gun and shell fire without loss. It was a masterly performance on Levy's part. A, B and C Troops thus reached 18 Battalion; but the further journey to 20 Battalion on the western end of the feature had to pass ground so open and pitilessly exposed to fire from north and south that it could not be attempted until dusk.

Back at Brigade, Duff was much perturbed by the initial failure to get the group of supporting arms on to Belhamed and by the lack of FOOs on that feature. Calls for supporting fire were almost continuous from first light and, as a temporary measure, he ordered 46 Battery, which was waiting on wheels, to go into action at once on the eastern slopes of the long wadi which ran diagonally between Belhamed and Zaafran. Then, at 8.30 a.m., when it seemed possible to get field guns farther forward, he moved E Troop only, leaving B Troop in position to help answer the many calls for fire. E Troop could get no farther than the other side of the wide wadi and, though the two troops in their new positions were put on the permanent grid by the regimental survey section ‘in very fast time’ (according to Duff's report), 46 Battery could not function as such throughout the day. Calls were so frequent and compelling that each troop was too busy with its own tasks.

Observation was always hard to provide and most targets were engaged by predicted fire, after Duff and Inglis had agreed on ‘safe lines’. Infantry reports testified to the accuracy of this fire and confirmed that the 1:100,000 map from which the gunners were working was very accurate—a most reassuring discovery. Switches of fire required, however, took in so many points of the compass that existing artillery boards had insufficient scope and some delay was caused thereby. Communications with Belhamed were entirely by W/T, as lines were constantly being cut by mortar bombs or shells.

For an hour from 9 a.m. the field gunners fired almost continuously in a succession of quick tasks and quick switches. Many of these were repeated from 10.30 a.m. onwards, subduing enemy fire and greatly easing the strain on the Belhamed infantry, but at the cost of creating a shortage of ammunition which greatly worried Inglis and Duff. Towards the end of it Duff had to order the guns to engage only essential and emergency targets. It was no longer possible to reply every time mortars fired on the infantry: 25-pounder ammunition was down to 30 r.p.g. (rounds per gun).

It was already painfully clear that the first- and second-line holdings of ammunition (i.e., what the Division carried with it) on mobile operations were too small to sustain heavy fighting of the kind which was clearly developing. Prompt and reliable replenishment from ammunition dumps was essential; but behind the Division the supply situation was chaotic in the extreme and the German Africa Corps and Italian armour stood at that time across the lines of communication on which the New Zealanders relied. All that was known of this within the Division, however, was that supplies were coming forward slowly and haphazardly. Had Duff realised the true situation he would certainly have not allowed his regiment to fire, as it did, 564 rounds this day and leave itself with about 700 all told. The 8th Field, which had an equally busy day, was little or no better off.

The fire of both regiments was largely controlled from Duff's headquarters and the pressure of work was immense. Flash-spotting went on all day and all night and resulted in a stream of data from battery OPs and the flash-spotting OP of the Survey Troop, as well as much other counter-battery and tactical information. All this had to be co-ordinated, the artillery board had to be kept up-to-date, and the many and various fire tasks ‘farmed out’ as the situation dictated. Under the strain of this work the adjutant broke down and took some hours to recover. The CBO came over from Divisional Artillery Headquarters to help, the RSM and IO plotted information, and the 2 i/c (Second-in-Command), Major Mitchell, worked like a Trojan.

To supplement artillery support and ease the pressure on the infantry, Inglis was quick to avail himself of air support. Bombing was called for soon after dawn and several missions were flown in close support of 4 Brigade. But the assumption that the New Zealanders would be first to reach Ed Duda proved false. This day, unbeknown to the Division, the Tobruk garrison reached forward from the already extensive ‘bulge’ it had created in the siege lines around the fortress and extended its sortie to Ed Duda. Air support control was then in its infancy and its safeguards proved insufficient to save the gallant Essex battalion which carried out this task from falling victim to an RAF bombing attack called for in support of 4 Brigade. The situation on Belhamed, though anything but comfortable, was in fact not nearly as serious as the many calls for help suggested.

Much annoyance, however, was caused by a small German reconnaissance aircraft which persisted in flying over very low and in a most provocative manner, ignoring the small-arms fire directed at it from all quarters. No Bofors guns had managed to get through to Belhamed—they could not possibly negotiate the narrow track across the face of the escarpment, which fell away to the north, by means of which the anti-tank portées got forward—and it seemed to the infantry there that the troublesome aircraft escaped harm. But 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery waited patiently at Zaafran until the plane came within range and then the right section of B Troop, supported enthusiastically by small-arms marksmen, promptly shot it down. The wreckage yielded a most useful map of friendly and enemy positions in the Tobruk area, which was sent to Division and its contents reported to Corps.

[44] A. L. Cook.

[45]
Capt B. F. Betts; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 1 Apr 1913; warehouseman.

[46]
Maj N. B. Mitchell, MBE; Wellington; born Morrinsville, 12 Sep 1916; Regular soldier; p.w. 28 Jun 1942; escaped, Italy, and rejoined 2 NZ Div Jun 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda

Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda

By late afternoon of 26 November it was clear that 6 Brigade had much hard fighting ahead to gain full control of the Sidi

Rezegh area and had no immediate hope of reaching Ed Duda. When Division learned that the Tobruk garrison had reached there and was ordered to join hands with it, therefore, 4 Brigade had to be given the task.

Though the advance from Belhamed to Ed Duda would have to cover a greater distance and seemed a formidable task, the capture of Sidi Rezegh was in fact far harder. The attack mounted on it in the night of 26–27 November, to which the artillery could lend very little support, saw the hardest fighting of the campaign and caused the already depleted infantry of 6 Brigade heavy loss indeed.

All the gunners could do was to close in on Sidi Rezegh under cover of darkness in readiness to take up whatever positions seemed suitable at first light. When Barrowclough went forward soon after dawn he found that he had got what he hoped and also what he feared. The success was complete and Sidi Rezegh was his; but the cost was only too apparent in terms of bodies scattered thickly on the ground, some clustered in front of the barrels of captured machine guns and anti-tank guns, others in the many wadis and indentations along the escarpment. In the region dominated by the Mosque itself the infantry came under fierce fire from below, much of it from three tanks which were shepherding the survivors of the enemy force to waiting transport. No FOO had succeeded in establishing communications back to the field guns from this point and there was a painful hiatus until two or three 2-pounders of the 65th Anti-Tank, RA, drove bravely forward and began to fire down at the tanks. The enemy at once withdrew and the action ceased.

The 6th Field (with 47 Battery) had meanwhile established its guns forward of the airfield with communications to FOOs in an arc from north through west to south. The only enemy activity to be seen was movement in the distance south of Ed Duda and this was at once shelled, though observation of results was obscured by rain squalls sweeping down from the north. Enemy guns far to the west and well out of range could be seen in action against Tobruk. The only remaining enemy in the area was the garrison of the strongly fortified position from which M Troop had been engaged on the 26th, an isolated pocket halfway between the Blockhouse and the Mosque which still proved troublesome. But the extent and strength of this pocket was still greatly underestimated and the gunners paid little attention to it.

linking up with tobruk, 25–27 november

For one thing, they were getting short of ammunition and all who could be spared went with salvage parties to scour the derelict-strewn desert to the south and south-east for fresh supplies. Many hundreds of rounds were thus recovered and by the end of the day the 6th Field had enough to afford to send 500 rounds to the 4th Field, whose need was even greater. Towards dusk the 6th Field belatedly turned its attention to the strongpoint on the escarpment and shelled the general area of it, having failed to pinpoint any single target.

The advance from Belhamed to Ed Duda, undertaken rather gingerly in expectation of heavy opposition, was carried out almost without incident and without loss. The I-tank commanders were persuaded (though some have told different stories) to lead the way and 44 Royal Tanks did so on a narrow frontage. The 4th Field fired at the start on a known pocket of anti-tank and machine guns to the left front; but neither guns nor FOOs of that regiment were to accompany the advance. Perhaps the 8th Field sent an FOO or two with the tanks; but field artillery support at Ed Duda was expected to come from Tobruk. Behind the tanks, 19 Battalion followed in vehicles on the same narrow frontage, and with it went N2 and N4 guns of 34 Anti-Tank Battery under Lieutenant Lund. [47]

The leading tanks did some firing to the flank, but met no opposition. It took them an hour and a quarter to reach Ed Duda, which they did before midnight. Lund in his bald report describes it thus:

‘Marched steadily via Belhamed to Ed Duda. The I tanks apparently overcame all resistance, and when I passed through Belhamed I saw broken guns and a few German dead. Arrived at Ed Duda approx 0100 hrs (27 Nov) and contacted Tobruk garrison.’

The guns he mentions were medium ones, deserted by their crews and disabled in passing by the New Zealand infantry. At Ed Duda Lund found the position well defended by the I tanks of the Tobruk garrison, the battalion of the Essex Regiment, and the guns of the 149th Anti-Tank, RA, and his two guns went into position in reserve behind the RA unit. This quiet but fateful meeting with the troops on Ed Duda completed the relief of Tobruk, a vital, if temporary, achievement; but the troops concerned were too tired and became too bored with the waiting while arrangements were made to deploy them to appreciate the historic nature of the occasion. It was not until next morning, between periods of heavy shelling, that they grasped it.

On Belhamed itself the night was spent getting anti-tank guns—part of A and C Troops of 31 Battery—and other supporting arms and supplies through to 20 Battalion and consolidating the position. B Troop, which had spent the 27th en portée, now dismounted and dug in its guns in support of 18 Battalion, while the doughty BSM, WO II Stobie, took over a German anti-tank gun and sited it in an isolated position on the southern flank, manning it himself. Opposition in the neighbourhood of Belhamed had quietened down and the 4th Field spent an unexpectedly quiet night.

The day of the 27th should have been spent not only consolidating the positions on Belhamed and Ed Duda, but in effecting a firm junction between the two and co-ordinating resources. In particular, the artillery of the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk garrison should have done all they could to concert their activities and gain full benefit of the domination of the vital bottleneck of enemy communications which they had gained. But there was curiously little effort from either side towards this end. The 1st RHA from Ed Duda concerned itself with enemy artillery to the south-west, including a 210-millimetre howitzer which was bothering the Essex positions. At Belhamed and Zaafran the chief interest of the artillery was similarly with local difficulties and adjustments and with the scarcity of 25-pounder ammunition.

The gun areas of the 4th and 8th Field were mainly in the wadi between the two features. From there they briefly shelled the strong enemy position to the south-west at 11 a.m. and then two companies of 20 Battalion attacked. They soon struck trouble. The main position was some 2000 yards away and the intervening desert was flat and devoid of cover. Well short of the enemy they came under deadly fire, suffered heavy loss, and the survivors were pinned to the ground. The operation was hastily and poorly planned and it was some time before further artillery support was called for. The position was in any case too extensive and ill-defined to be effectively engaged with the few rounds that the 4th and 8th Field could in their impoverished state spare for such a task. The attack had clearly failed, a call for the 44th Royal Tanks to intervene from Ed Duda could not be met in time, and, indeed, an unprepared and unsupported I-tank attack from the west would have been a hazardous enterprise, unlikely to bring relief. The senior surviving officer in the two companies sent back three runners asking for artillery support and two other 20 Battalion officers, anxiously watching the scene, made further requests. A further concentration was fired in the early afternoon, but there was little else that Duff could do to help. Only heavy concentrations by both regiments could have subdued the enemy fire and ammunition states forbade any such extravagance.

In the course of the day, however, the artillery of both brigades, in conjunction with Miles's headquarters, concerted their arrangements. The gift of 500 rounds from the 6th Field to the 4th was one result of this. In the evening Miles got the 6th Field to prepare defensive fire tasks to be superimposed at call on those of the 4th Field, and later one of these was cancelled when it was found to take in part of the ground held by 18 and 20 Battalions. Several warnings were received of impending attack from the north and much movement was heard from that direction, while flares after dark lit up the sky all round. The enemy armour was returning from the frontier area and the opportunity of gaining firm contact with Tobruk and proper co-ordination between the Division and the garrison was passing.

[47]
Maj W. D. Lund; Hamilton; born NZ 17 Mar 1908; clerk.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 7 — crusader: A Hard-won Victory

Contents

- [section]
p. 235

- The Enemy Armour Approaches Bardia p. 236

- The Guns Fail to Save 5 Brigade Headquarters p. 240

- The Garrisons of Menastir and Capuzzo Repel Attacks p. 246

- Mopping Up Near Sidi Rezegh p. 249
- Pressure on 6 Brigade p. 253
- Divisional Headquarters under Attack p. 256
- Point 175 is Lost p. 258
- Panzers Overwhelm Most of 6 Brigade p. 260

- A Merciless Bombardment of 25 Battery p. 265

- The CRA Fails to Clear Up High-level Misunderstandings p. 267

- The 6th Field is Overrun p. 269

- Belhamed is Also Lost p. 275

- The Remnants of the Division Gather at Zaafran p. 278

- Duff's Gun Group Beats Back All Attacks p. 281

- The Maori Victory at Menastir p. 285
- Gunners in Tobruk Fortress p. 286
- The Sinking of the Chakdina p. 289
- The Gazala Battle p. 291

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE artillery of 5 Brigade had meanwhile fought several hard actions in the frontier area. For three and a half days, while the New Zealand Division fought its way through to Tobruk, the German Africa Corps busied itself almost exclusively with trying to subdue 5 Brigade and an Indian brigade in the frontier area. In the end it failed and had to dash back to the Tobruk front still smarting from this failure. The effect of this on the outcome of the campaign was every bit as great as that of the success of the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk garrison in gaining the vital triangle formed by Belhamed, Ed Duda and Sidi Rezegh.

When 22 Battalion relieved the 20th at Menastir on 23 November, Headquarters of 5 Brigade took over the defence of Sidi Azeiz, with its small but useful landing ground. Its resources for this task were small indeed. In the end, after thinning out the Menastir position slightly, they amounted to two cavalry squadrons, a company of the 22nd, a defence platoon, E Troop of the 5th Field, the 18-pounders of H Troop, 32 Anti-Tank Battery, four 2-pounders of 34 Battery, and a section (three Bofors) of D Troop, 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery, together with a platoon of four Vickers guns. Besides these there were various headquarters: those of Divisional Cavalry, the 5th Field, 32 Anti-Tank Battery, 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery, and the Machine Gun Battalion–a valuable but largely defenceless aggregation of staffs and vehicles.

At Menastir 22 Battalion (less the company) held the road block and the lofty escarpment above with 28 Battery (less E Troop), F Troop of 32 Battery, a section of 42 Light Ack-Ack, and an MG company. At Capuzzo 23 Battalion held the battered fort and the track junctions to the east as far as Musaid with 27 Field Battery, E Troop and part of G Troop of 32 Anti-Tank, a section of E Troop, 42 Light Ack-Ack and an MG company. At Upper Sollum the barracks and the pass itself were held by 28 (Maori) Battalion, which shared the support of 27 Battery, part of G Troop of 32 Anti-Tank and an MG platoon. The brigade therefore occupied four distinct positions, Sidi Azeiz, Menastir, Capuzzo and Upper Sollum.

The last two shared the services of 27 Battery, but in other respects there was no co-ordinated defence. The weakness of such dispositions when it came to meeting the onslaught of the Africa Corps are evident enough and a well-planned attack would certainly have overwhelmed 5 Brigade. Had it been left to the Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General Cruewell, this might well have happened; but General Rommel himself intervened in hasty and haphazard fashion and squandered his resources.

The first serious fighting on this front, however, was not with the Africa Corps, but with the Bardia garrison, which staged a sortie at 7 a.m. on 24 November against the Menastir position. The 25-pounders of 27 Battery fired ‘point blank over open sights’ (according to the brigade major) and the Bofors gunners depressed their barrels and joined in with excellent results. After half an hour the enemy drew off, mounted their vehicles, and hastened away. The only other action this day was counter-battery fire by 27 Battery against the strong artillery of the enemy position around Sollum proper and Halfaya Pass.

The Halfaya guns resumed this duel on the 25th, and since some of them were at very long range and well hidden, 27 Battery could not always give effective reply. Ammunition was, moreover, scarce and it could not be wasted on long-range fire of doubtful effect. A more rewarding task was to engage actual enemy movement below and likely OPs, and the field gunners gained much applause from the watching Maoris when they scored a direct hit on a much-frequented warehouse by Sollum pier.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Enemy Armour Approaches Bardia

The Enemy Armour Approaches Bardia

First reports came in this morning of the approach of the enemy armour and in the afternoon Second-Lieutenant Fagan
[1] took a section of E Troop portees on patrol from Capuzzo to inspect a concentration of transport to the south. When mortars opened fire he withdrew and 27 Battery engaged the enemy. Observation was from the top of the wrecked fort, which gave a wide field of view over open desert to the west, south and east. In the afternoon some guns of the battery changed position and almost immediately the vacant sites were shelled from the south by four ‘88s’, which later switched their fire to the new positions.

At Menastir F Troop 2-pounders destroyed three lorries which drove towards them along the Via Balbia and decapitated the passenger of a motor-cycle combination, capturing the driver. The 28th Battery contented itself with shelling an OP inside the Bardia perimeter. The 34th Anti-Tank Battery (less various detachments) was still under the command of the Divisional Cavalry and its B Echelon moved during the night, with that of the cavalry, to the shelter of the escarpment at Menastir–a fortunate change as it turned out.

The night of 25–26 November was tense throughout the brigade area. Enemy flares rose and fell in all directions and there were several minor clashes. An hour before dawn the two guns of P Troop patrolling the southern approaches to Sidi Azeiz with a cavalry squadron heard vehicles pass close by in the moonless night and halt about 50 yards off. German voices could be heard and the cavalry opened fire. When flares lit up the scene P4 fired and hit a staff car. The vehicles were captured, together with their owners, and some 50 British troops they carried were released from captivity.

After dawn the surrounding desert was soon alive with movement as seemingly endless columns of German vehicles drove past both sides of the Sidi Azeiz garrison, making for Bardia. E Troop of the 5th Field went on patrol with Vickers gunners–a curious misuse of the slender resources of the garrison–and had an exciting afternoon driving to within 2000 yards of the enemy, ‘dropping our trails and banging a few rounds into them, then hurriedly shifting out again, only to do the same further along’, according to a gun sergeant, Cook. [2] ‘We did this exciting manoeuvre three times’, he adds, ‘when we found we were out of ammunition with the exception of smoke’. Three Pzkw IIIs detached themselves from the column and drove towards E Troop, pausing to fire a few rounds and then advancing again. E Troop raced back to Sidi Azeiz and that was that. What prompted the 5 Brigade staff to despatch E Troop on such a reckless mission is hard to imagine. The four portees–two of N Troop and two of P–were better-adapted for such harassing tactics; but in several attempts they failed to get within effective range of the enemy columns before being engaged by heavier guns. Each time the anti-tank crews had narrow escapes and had to withdraw. Lieutenant Webb of P Troop could plainly see German tanks among the vehicles, but observers at brigade headquarters could not. The latter evidently thought the columns consisted solely of enemy supply troops (they were in fact the bulk of 15 Panzer Division) and Webb was taken aback when Brigadier Hargest reprimanded him for not ‘going on and getting stuck in’. Hargest and his advisers in this matter had a lot to learn and they learnt it too late.

Even the Bofors guns had their share of action, engaging an anti-tank gun and tractor which drove from the columns towards Sidi Azeiz. The diary of 42 Battery describes it thus:

‘1500 [hrs] No 1 gun (Sgt. Webb [3]) opened fire with alternate H.E.-S.A.P. Hit petrol tanks and tractor burst into flames. 5 of crew destroyed 2 captured. Guns of Rt Sec D Tp fired at M.T. several times.’

The three 18-pounders of H Troop, 32 Battery, shared this success. Having fired some 20 r.p.g. at the main enemy column, between Sidi Azeiz and Menastir, in the morning, they kept the tractor covered as it approached, but intending to hold their fire until it reached point-blank range. When the Bofors opened up H3 quickly joined in, firing high with its first shot, but scoring a direct hit with the second at 700 yards.

The guns at Menastir also engaged the enemy columns, but with little effect, and D Troop of the 5th Field finally decided that the target was ‘too dispersed’. Three tanks appeared, however, within the 22 Battalion area, having come along the Via Balbia from the west to try to open a route for supplies to the Africa Corps, and all four 2-pounders of F Troop engaged them at fairly long range, scoring many hits in a total of 36 rounds fired and driving them back. Though the antitankers did not know it, this was an important incident, for it deterred the German supply authorities from further effort to open up a direct route and caused them to continue to make long detours by way of E1 Adem which greatly delayed the maintenance of the Africa Corps in its frontier operations.

A half-hour concentration by 27 Battery at 7 a.m. on Lower Sollum, followed by a bombardment by an Indian brigade of the Halfaya position, were the start of a day-long exchange of fire between Major Philp's battery and the Halfaya guns. It was not until the evening that the large-scale movements entailed by the operations of the Africa Corps directly affected the Maoris. But 23 Battalion was on tenterhooks throughout the day. The guns of E Troop, 32 Battery, had to move several times in the morning to escape shelling from the south. Then they stood by to escort a 5th Field convoy to Sidi Azeiz; but by 4.30 p.m. it was clear that there was no hope of getting through this day. Shortly afterwards the troop commander, Lieutenant Moor, [4] heard of an assault near the road to Sollum and hastened there to meet it. To the staff of the 27th Battery OP at Capuzzo the movements to the east above Halfaya were mystifying; but trouble was evidently brewing. In ignorance of the presence in the area of the Africa Corps, the impression gained ground that the garrisons of other frontier strongpoints were assembling to try to break through to Bardia and a covering attack from that fortress seemed likely.

An OP was stationed with an infantry company on the road to Bardia and from it fire was directed briefly on enemy forming up in front. Shortage of ammunition, however, prevented further fire on this tempting target. Just before dusk this enemy attacked and a lively action ensued until an hour after dark, in the course of which the New Zealand infantry by vigorous defence held off greatly superior numbers. The main attack, however, unconnected with this, came against Musaid, falling with great force on a Maori company there and on part of 23 Battalion.

As night was falling enemy approached in great strength. The Maoris held their fire until the leading vehicle had passed their FDLs; then they swept the enemy ranks with bullets and mortar bombs. The four portees of E Troop soon arrived and took up positions across the road to Sollum. Their first targets were half a dozen half-tracks towing guns driving towards Capuzzo and all were stopped. Then two light tanks drove boldly along the road and these, too, were disabled. A third group of vehicles followed the line of telegraph poles which led to Musaid and the anti-tankers watched them closely, intending to let them get closer; but 27 Battery opened fire first and they changed direction, moving parallel to the 2-pounders, which then opened fire at 1000 yards and scored several hits. In so doing the anti-tankers attracted a good deal of return fire, which continued until it was too dark to pick out targets. Then they moved inside the infantry position at the Customs House. Well after dark an E Troop gun opened fire again on an approaching tracked vehicle and was itself fired on by two anti-tank guns. The vehicle was knocked out at a range of some 200 yards and infantry mortars disabled one of the enemy anti-tank guns. Though heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy in this action and much booty was taken in the morning from the battlefield, the enemy nevertheless succeeded in slipping between the mile-and-a-half gap between the Maoris at Musaid and the rest of their battalion at Upper Sollum and entered Bardia during the night.

Meanwhile 22 Battalion reported finding a dump of 25-pounder ammunition near Menastir and some of it was collected to augment the meagre stocks of E Troop of the 5th Field. It was doubly welcome because earnest efforts by the BM had failed to get fresh supplies from the Indian division, under whose command 5 Brigade now operated. At the same time some of the mass of transport that clogged Brigade Headquarters at Sidi Azeiz and hampered its defence was sent to the Menastir position, where there was good cover. But hundreds of lorries still remained, including those of the various attached headquarters, and if Sidi Azeiz was to be defended there was every reason to move them, too, to Menastir. Had Hargest done so Sidi Azeiz might well have been left alone by an enemy who had no great interest in capturing it. Instead Hargest, after some hesitation, decided to stay where he was and as he was: he did not even attempt to redispose his slender forces to meet attack from the only quarter it now threatened–from the direction of Bardia.

[1]
2 Lt J. F. Fagan; born NZ 6 Aug 1918; shop assistant; killed in action 17 Dec 1941.

[2] 2 Lt A. W. Cook; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 12 Oct 1918; salesman; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

[3] 2 Lt F. T. Webb, m.i.d.; Auckland; born NZ 5 May 1909; manager.

[4] 4 Lt-Col R. J. Moor, ED; Christchurch; born Auckland, 11 Mar 1920; clerk; wounded 26 Nov 1941; now Regular Force.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Guns Fail to Save 5 Brigade Headquarters

The Guns Fail to Save 5 Brigade Headquarters

The night of 26–27 November was bitterly cold and flares rose thicker than before in the Sidi Azeiz area. The cavalry patrolling with its four attached portees reported half an hour before dawn that all was quiet and no enemy was in sight. Visibility to north, west and south was excellent; but to the east it was restricted by gently curving upward slopes.

All but a platoon of the infantry company was on the western flank, in close defence of E Troop of the 5th Field. The remaining platoon was in the south-east, around the 18-pounder H3. Another H Troop gun faced west along the Trigh Capuzzo and the third was in the north-east, with the Vickers guns. One Bofors was in the north, one in the south-west and the third in the south-east. The four portees, after dawn, remained within the perimeter, ready to move in any direction. Thus only one 18-pounder, one Bofors, and one Vickers gun, plus the portées, could bring down unobstructed fire to the east, where danger threatened. The 25-pounders had poor fields of fire in that direction, blocked by masses of lorries.

Nearly an hour had passed after dawn and men were getting ready for breakfast when the cavalry commander drove in and reported 40 tanks approaching from the direction of Bardia. Hargest told him that his lightly armoured tanks and carriers could do little against tanks and he should therefore get clear. The cavalry vehicles therefore raced through the headquarters area and away to the south. The portées were still under cavalry command and in default of other orders might have done the same; but the two officers concerned, Lieutenant Webb of P Troop and Second-Lieutenant Thomas
[5] of N Troop, had no hesitation in driving in the opposite direction to meet the attack.

Since there was no organised defence in the east there was no pattern into which they could fit their four guns. On the spur of the moment, therefore, they took them forward some 200 yards beyond the perimeter and up a slight rise to get good visibility and arcs of fire. There was not a vestige of cover for the high portées and nothing for it but to form them up in line. The two remaining Tac/R Hurricanes hastily took off from the landing ground–just in time–and then the enemy attacked out of the rising sun. The Bren-gunner of P4 counted ‘about forty’ tanks in a long line. There was no point in holding fire, for the portées were too conspicuous. P4 therefore opened at 1200 yards and the other three quickly followed suit. When still 1000 yards away the tanks began to reply, concentrating their machine guns and heavier armament on the four portées and scoring hits on all of them. The 2-pounders also scored hits; but the circumstances were so desperate and the enemy so numerous that it was impossible to judge the results.

The No. 1 of P4, Bombardier Niven, [6] directed the fire of his gun with remarkable aplomb, allowing three shots for each tank engaged and then switching to another until his gun was hit and its traversing and elevating gears wrecked. The other crews remained similarly steady in what was as all knew a hopeless contest. N1 was on fire, one of its crew killed and two others wounded. On P3 Gunner Allen, [7] a skilful artist well-known in London, had his leg shot off (and in an hour or two he died). Two of the crew of N4 were killed and the sight bracket was damaged. All this took place in a very few minutes and the large gallery of spectators in the headquarters area, including Hargest himself, marvelled at the parade-ground drill of the anti-tankers under such terrible fire.

the capture of 5, brigade headquarters, 27 november

Niven strolled, with a deliberation thrilling and yet agonising to watch, to the other guns to lend a hand, helping the wounded aboard N4 and directing the driver to the ADS within the perimeter. Then he brought the portée back into action with Gunner Hynes
[8] (who was in Niven's own words ‘as cool as a cucumber’) as driver. Between the two of them they got it back into action from a position abreast of Hargest's slit trench. The gun had had its sights shot off, the telescope smashed, and the semi-automatic firing gear out of order. But with the help of a wounded gunner observing with binoculars, Niven fired seven or eight more shots. ‘I watched him load, aim, fire–load, aim, fire, time after time’, Hargest wrote in his book. [9] ‘Soon the enemy concentrated on him. His truck received a direct hit on one side, starting a fire, then another just behind the gun; a third struck the shield and shot the muzzle straight upwards where it remained pointing to the sky.’ Niven then made his way to the nearest 18-pounder and stayed until it, too, was knocked out, then to a Bofors, and he joined E Troop of the 5th Field in its last agony. [10]

With the four portées silenced and the enemy getting closer, other guns took up the fight. H3 was the only one of the 18-pounders which gained a clear field of fire, and it engaged the tanks when they breasted a rise 1000 yards away, drawing heavy return fire almost at once. Three gunners were killed, but the rest kept firing until the gun itself was wrecked, by which time two more were killed and two wounded. The last shot, as the layer, Bombardier Brown
[11] says, was at about 150 yards and he saw the tank slew round under the impact. One of the three Bofors also managed to get away 15 rounds of HE and AP, halting one of the tanks: ‘Probably damaged tracks’ is the laconic remark in the 42 Battery diary. This gun also carried on firing until it was put out of action, by which time another Bofors was able to come into action, firing all its AP ammunition, 30 rounds, and then getting away 40 rounds of HE before it was damaged and its crew withdrew.

E Troop of the 5th Field, served not only by its own officers and gun crews, but by many members of 5th Field Headquarters including the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, and the 2 i/c, Major Grigg, [12] opened indirect fire at a range of 2000 yards over the mass of lorries between the guns and the oncoming tanks. It was no time for finesse. As Sergeant Cook says:

‘We could still see nothing. We fired away for some time before answering shots fell near us. Then once they got our range things started to happen. In a very short time guns 1, 2 and 3 were knocked out which left my gun the only one firing. We were running short of ammunition so the gun numbers led by Major Grigg … carted the remaining ammunition from the other guns.’

Captain Ombler
[13] set his E Troop gunners a gallant example and at the height of the action he was killed. Cook himself was badly wounded in the arm as he was lifting the trail of his gun. As he moved back to a slit trench he saw Gunner Mathews
[14] drive a three-tonner to the rear of the gun, where it was at once hit by shellfire and burst into flames. Mathews tried to put out the flames with his fire extinguisher and while so doing was killed. Cook tried to get back to the gun, but a storm of enemy fire made it suicidal to persist and he gave up the attempt.

Fraser and Grigg had gone from gun to gun throughout the action, encouraging the gun crews and trying to observe through the swirling smoke the effects of their fire. German artillery to the strength of almost a full regiment, including 105–and 150-millimetre calibres, started by firing airbursts to keep the heads of the defenders down (which they failed to do). Then, when E Troop opened fire, it concentrated its great weight on the New Zealand field guns at a range of no more than two or three miles. The effect of this fire was formidable indeed and it was only from time to time that, in the closing stages of the action, the field gunners could glimpse, as one of them says, [15] ‘tanks on the skyline silhouetted against the rising sun.’ Accurate fire by E Troop was out of the question, whereas the enemy easily gained by flash-spotting from higher ground the bearings he needed to engage the 25-pounders with great precision.

Fraser was lightly wounded by a bullet luckily deflected by a cigarette case in his breast pocket. Grigg, after Ombler was killed, virtually assumed command and his gallantry was outstanding. He had already earned an MC in the First World War and was MP for Mid-Canterbury. When he saw the need for more ammunition, he found a truckload and started back with it to the gun position. Bullets flew thick around and the smoke from bursting shells and burning lorries made it impossible to see from the cab of the ammunition lorry. Grigg therefore dismounted and led it forward on foot, ‘threading his way past burning vehicles and round obstacles such as wire and trenches, for a quarter of a mile.’ The quotation is in the stilted language of a VC citation submitted a year later and supported, as usual, by the testimony under oath of several witnesses of standing. But all who saw him this day gained the same impression of fearless dedication. The lorry was the one Cook saw hit. Grigg continued to unload ammunition until the flames drove him back and propellant charges began to explode. This made the gun position untenable and Grigg moved on to another gun, collecting for it a scratch crew which included Bombardier Stone
[16]–one of those who testified for Grigg.

No other gun in the Sidi Azeiz position remained in action but this solitary 25-pounder and it therefore attracted the undivided attention of the enemy artillery and many tank guns. But Grigg carried on, standing to a flank from which he could see better than Stone could see through his sights. Calmly, in full view of the enemy, he directed the fire. He was wounded in the thigh by a mortar burst; but he carried on until hit again and rendered unconscious. By this time Hargest and most of the surviving troops in the area had already surrendered to tanks which closed in on them, and when E Troop at long last ceased fire an eerie silence descended on Sidi Azeiz.

In this ill-planned and probably unnecessary action 44 men were killed and 49 wounded, most of them gunners, and 700 were captured. But never have gunners faced more hopeless odds or served their guns with greater devotion. It is some consolation that most of those captured were held in Bardia and within a few weeks were released. The officers, however, were almost all sent on to Italy. Fraser, among these, a first-class regimental commander, was a serious loss to the 5th Field. Only one or two officers wounded too badly to be taken to Bardia eventually got away. Grigg was taken with these wounded to the ADS and there visited briefly by his parliamentary colleague, Hargest, by special permission of his captors. Then Hargest walked off into captivity and his friend Grigg did not recover consciousness. It is a matter of record that the VC citation was not accepted; but gunners and others who saw Grigg at Sidi Azeiz have in their hearts awarded him the highest honours.

[5]
Capt R. J. Thomas, m.i.d.; Lower Hutt; born Masterton, 6 May 1911; civil servant; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

[6]
Bdr M. G. Niven; England; born Singapore, 24 Oct 1913; farmer; p.w. 27 Nov 1941.

[7]
Gnr J. T. Allen; born Palmerston North, 23 Mar 1911; artist and sculptor; killed in action 27 Nov 1941.

[8]
Gnr A. D. Hynes; Tauranga; born Inglewood, 23 Apr 1918; labourer; p.w. ( Bardia) 27 Nov 1941–2 Jan 1942; wounded 13 Jul 1942.

[9]
Farewell Campo12 (Michael Joseph, 1945), p. 20.

[10] Niven volunteered for medical duties when captive in Bardia and because of this was one of the few other ranks who were taken to Italy and remained in enemy hands after Bardia fell. Characteristically, he made two attempts to escape, travelling hundreds of miles on the first of them and being caught unluckily in a routine street check. The second was successful.

[11]
L-Bdr A. D. Brown; Gisborne; born Gisborne, 5 May 1917; labourer; wounded 4 Dec 1941.

[12]
Maj A. N. Grigg, MC, m.i.d.; born NZ 16 Nov 1896; MP 1938–41; died of wounds 29 Nov 1941.

[13]
Capt E. P. Ombler; born Timaru, 13 Dec 1917; warehouseman; killed in action 27 Nov 1941.

[14]
Gnr S. L. Mathews; born NZ 29 Sep 1913; farm labourer; killed in action 27 Nov 1941.

[15] Bdr C. H. B. Stone.

[16]
WO II C. H. B. Stone; born Auckland, 20 Mar 1906; general store proprietor; wounded 27 Nov 1941; p.w. ( Bardia) 27 Nov 1941–2 Jan 1942; died Kaipara Flats, 8 Apr 1955.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Garrisons of Menastir and Capuzzo Repel Attacks

The Garrisons of Menastir and Capuzzo Repel Attacks

At Menastir 22 Battalion anxiously watched the smoke and heard the guns for an hour and then realised that Brigade Headquarters was lost. Later in the morning two more tanks, one of them a captured Matilda, advanced from the west–another mission to open a supply route to the Africa Corps–and F Troop engaged them. One drove off westwards, but the other suffered track damage and could not escape. For some time its tough armour defied the 2-pounders, but one shot knocked the smoke projector off the turret, another passed through the resultant aperture and wounded some of the crew, a third shot jammed the turret, and a fourth, knocking off a plate guarding the suspension, allowed a fifth shot to penetrate the motor. More than 50 shots were needed to disable it completely. It was an impressive demonstration of the fighting quality of the Matilda and explained the high regard the Germans had for this tank. But it made nonsense of the decision of the Crusader planners to exclude Matildas from the battle of the armour and reserve them solely for direct support of the infantry. Most German tanks were fitted with a short 50-millimetre gun which had very much the same power of penetration as the 2-pounder.

In an effort to gain confirmation of the loss of Brigade Headquarters a volunteer was called for to investigate in person, and Gunner Dobson
[17] of the 14th Light Ack-Ack offered to do so. He drove off by motor-cycle at 1 p.m. and did not return. He found Sidi Azeiz in enemy hands, was chased by the enemy, and had his motor-cycle shot from under him.

Taken prisoner, he soon made his escape, heading straight into the fire of a British detachment to do so, his courage and persistence earning for him an MM.

In the early afternoon the Menastir defences received their severest test, when a detachment of 21 Panzer Division attacked from Bardia with strong supporting fire of all kinds. D Troop of the 5th Field was heavily outgunned and received a merciless bombardment. Hits or near misses were suffered on all four guns, knocking out two of them and temporarily disabling the other two. Four men of one gun team alone were killed and losses throughout the troop were heavy. Following on the action of E Troop at Sidi Azeiz, this made it a bad day indeed for 28 Battery.

The defence, however, was far from subdued. F Troop's 2-pounders fired at ranges up to 2000 yards, destroying a staff car, decapitating yet another passenger in a motor-cycle combination, and hitting several other vehicles. The Left Section of D Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack moved two of its Bofors to the edge of the escarpment and they shot up transport at 1500–2000 yards, one gun firing 110 rounds. At 3000 yards they hit a mortar and exploded its ammunition. Vickers gunners fired relentlessly. To the enemy it was apparent that the Menastir position was not weakening under pressure and soon after 5 p.m. he suddenly broke off the action. The night was unexpectedly quiet.

Capuzzo, too, had its share when a German engineer battalion, also with strong support, attacked from the south-west in the early afternoon (under the keen eye, as it happened, of Rommel himself). The 27th Battery engaged quickly and scored direct hits which forced the oncoming enemy to dismount. A G Troop 2-pounder portée under Sergeant Stewart
[18] was also quick to react, driving well forward and knocking out many vehicles, but attracting much return fire. The portée caught alight but its crew put out the flames and continued firing. Again it was set on fire and the three gun numbers, including Stewart, were wounded. The Bren-gunner of the crew then joined Stewart and the two kept up fire until exploding ammunition forced them to abandon the portée, after removing the firing mechanism. Form the ground they continued to engage the enemy with small-arms fire until surrounded. When Stewart realised that continued resistance was endangering his wounded crew members he agreed to surrender. (He later escaped and rejoined his troop, and was awarded in due course a well-earned DCM.) The gun G3 also took part at this stage. Its sergeant and bombardier had been wounded earlier in the day and it was now commanded by Gunner Ashby, [19] who scored several hits on enemy vehicles.

attack on capuzzo, 27 november

The enemy, daunted by his reception, began to work his way round towards the northern flank and in so doing came within reach of a Bofors of E Troop, 42 Battery, which set a troop-carrier on fire. This in turn attracted fire and the troop subaltern, Second-Lieutenant Chance, [20] came forward to see if he could help. Quickly sizing up the situation, he decided to bring another gun forward, No. 1 under Sergeant McClelland. [21] This drove forward under cover of the west wall of the old fort until the driver was killed by a sniper. McClelland at once brought his gun into action and ‘engaged and knocked out an enemy tank, silenced a machine gun nest, and dislodged a considerable number of enemy infantry’. The quotation is from a report soon after the event by the troop commander, Lieutenant Stratton, [22] who was with the third gun just to the north-west and saw it all. In a fierce engagement four of the crew were killed and two wounded, and at this stage Second-Lieutenant Chance ordered the survivors to withdraw the gun, which they did successfully. A gun of E Troop, 32 Anti-Tank, also intervened, driving forward from the Musaid area with the troop subaltern, Second-Lieutenant Foubister, [23] and in the ensuing engagement Foubister was killed. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the transport lines of 23 Battalion and the situation for an hour was highly confused. Friend and foe were so intermingled that the gunners could do little to help, and the situation was in the end righted by vigorous infantry counter-attacks.

[17]
Gnr G. R. Dobson, MM; Lower Hutt; born NZ 6 Jan 1912; truck driver; wounded and p.w. 26 Oct 1942; escaped Nov 1942.

[18]
Lt A. B. Stewart, DCM; Auckland; born NZ 17 Apr 1906; planter; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

[19]
Gnr E. Ashby; Auckland; born England, 17 Jan 1917; welder and barman; wounded 27 Mar 1944.

[20]
Capt G. R. Chance; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 21 Jun 1916; optician; wounded 2 Sep 1942.

[21]
Maj A. V. McClelland; Auckland; born Auckland, 13 May 1918; hardware assistant.

[22]
Maj M. I. Stratton; Australia; born Auckland, 5 Jan 1914; dancing instructor; Bty Comd, 7 A-Tk Regt.

[23]
2 Lt W. Foubister; born NZ 1 Aug 1916; clerk; killed in action 27 Nov 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Mopping Up Near Sidi Rezegh

Mopping Up Near Sidi Rezegh

The action at Capuzzo in the afternoon of 27 November was the enemy's last effort in the frontier area, and before it ceased the bulk of the Africa Corps was well on its way back to the Tobruk front. After clashing on the way with British armour at Bir el Chleta this evening, advanced elements were working their way along the southern flank of the New Zealand Division by the morning of the 28th. The significance of their return was grasped no better than that of their departure from the Tobruk area had been comprehended on 24 November and the Division was destined to experience some rude shocks.

The Division still concerned itself chiefly with putting its own house in order. Two places in particular needed to be cleaned up: the fortified position on the escarpment west of the Blockhouse and the large enemy pocket between Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. The strength of the latter had been reassessed after the failure of the two-company attack the previous day and planning for a second attack was far more careful. Divisional Headquarters and 6 Brigade both contributed to it. Brigadier Miles spent a busy morning concerting arrangements between the 4th and 6th Field. Both regiments and some of the 8th Field, RA, were to fire in support, the 4th Field starting with a five-minute concentration at 4 r.p.g. per minute ‘in front of tank start line’, the 6th Field joining in later. This programme required 480 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition, which was more than Duff could afford for this preliminary shoot. Weir, who had far better observation of the ground than Duff, was put in charge of the field artillery, and in the morning registered targets with all batteries concerned and his headquarters made the calculations on which predicted fire was to be based. As an afterthought, Captain Turner of Miles's headquarters went to see Major ‘Stump’ Gibbon of the 44th Royal Tanks, who was to command the attacking force, with an offer (which was accepted) for the 6th Field to fire smoke shells to shield the advance of the I-tank squadron which was to lead the advance.

sweeping the corridor as the panzers return, 28 november

The concentration started at 2 p.m. and the tanks and two companies of infantry, with carriers and some of the cavalry squadron, attacked promptly. Freyberg and Miles watched it intently and it was an impressive sight. Weir, observing from the escarpment above and in touch by wireless with both regiments, says ‘I had the best bird's eye view of any attack that I suppose I am likely to get.’ He brought down fire from his own regiment on the second objective and kept it there until the I tanks arrived and the enemy there surrendered. Then he lifted fire to the third objective. The attack went like clockwork except that, at the last moment, he had to cancel the 6th Field part in the third and final concentration because of urgent need for supporting fire for 6 Brigade infantry south of the Mosque. This made no difference. The attack was a complete success and something like 700 prisoners were taken at very little cost. All three field regiments provided observed fire as required and it was overwhelmingly effective. The defended area was ‘thoroughly churned up’, according to the 4th Field report, ‘and little resistance was met.’ By 2.14 p.m. 25 Battery reported its fire tasks were completed. At 2.45 p.m. F Troop OP reported thus to the 4th Field:

‘Tks well up into area. INF. well into area. Prisoners coming out in all directions. Firing practically stopped. Leading Tks are well up towards Sidi Rezegh. One vehicle on fire believed Bren Carrier.’

Five minutes later E Troop OP stated that there was ‘still a little opposition’. At the end of it all the three batteries which had fired under Duff's command reported their ammunition states as follows:

25 Battery | 35 r.p.g.
26 Battery | 30 r.p.g.
V/AA Battery | 55 r.p.g.

The whole operation was a polished demonstration of the co-operation of all arms in an attack and stood in sharp contrast to many other operations carried out in this campaign in which the same effect might have been produced had the authorities concerned made the necessary effort. It was followed almost immediately by an example of much the same kind of thing to the north-west of Belhamed where the Tobruk garrison was ‘mopping up’ strongpoints. I tanks were in evidence to watchers on Belhamed, large numbers of prisoners were glimpsed, shelling was seen from both sides, and 46 Battery contributed on the spur of the moment one round of gun fire which silenced three enemy guns. Just before 6 p.m. Major Bevan of 26 Battery, the easternmost of the 4th Field guns, reported that a ‘Heavy scrap’ was taking place on the escarpment above him to the south, and that ‘someone [was] on edge of escarpment, someone below shooting up MG A Tk and mortar, people on top doing same. People on top firing white flares.’ This was the first indication to 4 Brigade that the rear of the Division was threatened, though it contained no suggestion that the German Africa Corps had returned from the frontier. It was taken more seriously at Brigade Headquarters when further information came in during the night and Brigadier Inglis caused Duff to set up a strongpoint at Bir Sciuearat, north of the Wadi Esc-Sciomar, with 26 Battery and later five 2-pounders of the 65th Anti-Tank, RA, and some attached infantry, including South Africans.

After a quiet morning, 6 Brigade spent an anxious afternoon. Its battalions were greatly below strength. One company consisted of a captain, a corporal and thirty-odd privates. Barrow-clough nevertheless decided to capture without fail the fortified position on the escarpment west of the Blockhouse, and preparations for this were in progress when much enemy activity was seen to the west and south.

The first move was to register the targets for the 6th Field for the attack on the strongpoint and A Troop did so. It proved difficult, for the strongpoint, as Weir himself says, was ‘built into an escarpment’ and ‘very cleverly constructed and concealed’. His officers failed to locate suitable targets and so he went personally to a derelict tank from which he could observe at least part of the general target area. From there he could ‘plainly see Huns walking about taking the sun.’ He ranged on the area and they quickly went to ground. At the same time (and unknown to Weir), Major Sawyers of 48 Battery had set up an OP from which he could bring down small-arms fire on part of the enemy position. As soon as Weir completed his part of the artillery programme of the 4 Brigade attack, he turned his attention to this task. Two infantry platoons had been waiting to stage the attack. Weir called for them to do so and watched them work their way towards the strongpoint, holding it under fire from A Troop. As soon as the infantry were close, Weir lifted his fire and they charged.

The result surprised everyone. Even the infantry concerned thought they still had some way to go when the enemy rose from the desert around them and surrendered. Sawyers had gone forward, impatient as usual, to get a better view while his OP staff kept up covering small-arms fire, when he noticed a German who evidently wanted to give himself up. Sawyers indicated that he should bring the rest of the garrison with him and the German apparently did so. Weir, who had meanwhile planned a programme of supporting fire by most of his guns to reduce the strongpoint, was delighted to see the enemy thus easily taken. Thinking that the strongpoint contained no more than an anti-tank gun and about 20 men with a machine gun or two, he was astonished when 180-odd Germans plus 20 of their captives (most of these New Zealanders) appeared. Doubtless the enemy were depressed by the sight of the surrender of the much larger strongpoint below them, of which they had a grandstand view. The fortifications were also astonishing. They contained an ‘88’, several smaller anti-tank guns, and several mortars, as well as many machine guns. All gun pits were roofed in and concreted and had covered sleeping quarters.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Pressure on 6 Brigade

Pressure on 6 Brigade

Events now began to crowd in on Weir and his field gunners and also on the anti-tankers of 6 Brigade. The movements to the west and south of the Mosque had resulted in an attack on the thin infantry line in the south-west, which was not recognised as such until almost too late. Three ‘companies’ (they were that in name only), too of the 24th and one of the 21st, were overrun. J Troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery had five portées with 24 Battalion–its own four and one from K Troop. They came under heavy shell and mortar and machine-gun fire, which wounded the troop commander, Lieutenant Stych, [24] killed two members of gun teams, and wounded a third member, Bombardier Pilling. [25] All of Pilling's gun team were captured, after he removed the telescope and breech block and hid them in a slit trench. (The gun was recovered after dark and the missing parts found, and it went back into service the same night with a scratch crew.) After dark Lieutenant Jamieson
[26] of K Troop arrived to replace Stych and he had all five guns in position and manned by 10 p.m. to support a shorter line formed by the remaining troops of 24 Battalion. There were many reports of tanks taking part in this attack; but the antitankers saw none.

The field gunners were largely taken unawares by this sudden adverse turn of events. Their observers watched the approaching enemy—uncertain, like the infantry concerned, that they were enemy—and were astonished to see the New Zealand infantry surrender with little or no attempt at resistance. The actual circumstances were very different from the appearances. Then, after this, it was extremely hard to sort out friend from enemy and bring down effective fire. Enemy guns had been firing well into the brigade area and it was not realised that this fire was meant to support this attack. Major Rawle [27] of 30 Battery was only five yards from Headquarters 26 Battalion when he was mortally wounded. The battalion commander made Captain Molloy of 29 Battery take shelter in his headquarters until there was a lull in the firing and Molloy did so, only to receive mortal wounds soon after leaving. The shelling, moreover, cut many lines to OPs, and Captain Symon, [28] who was observing with 24 Battalion, was out of touch with his guns. The 6th Field had not even completed its tasks in support of the 4 Brigade attack and was firing at the strongpoint on the escarpment when the enemy attacked. Weir, in a letter home, described it thus:

‘Two of my O.P. officers were wounded…and I had to get other O.P. [officers] forward to take their place which meant delay at the critical time. The attack came on a bit and came within our view from the gun line so we opened on them a fierce concentration and helped to restore the situation. Three German tanks came out of the dust about fifteen hundred yards away. I ran to the leading troop who quickly delivered a broadside of Armour-piercing shot at them and sent them up in flames.’

Sawyers' 48 Battery fired at infantry and tanks on the southernmost escarpment and 30 and 47 Batteries fired the concentration Weir mentions. Then F Troop tried to engage a hostile battery to the south which had been very troublesome, but the light was failing and the results were doubtful. Before dark, however, two more attempts were made to ease the situation: Valentine tanks supporting 6 Brigade were sent on hasty and unsupported missions into enemy territory which achieved little and ended for them in disaster—a sad sequel to the excellently staged 4 Brigade attack.

Three medium howitzers from the south-east opened fire on the gun areas of the 6th Field a little before dusk and continued for an hour and a half, doing only slight damage, but threatening serious harm; for on that rocky ground the gun positions could not be well protected. Weir was reluctant to reply to this fire until he felt sure he could do so effectively, and his observers and staffs were busy making cross-observations and calculations to pinpoint the howitzers from their flashes. Here the survey troop would have been most useful; but it was stationed with 4 Brigade and could do nothing. (The survey flash-spotting team might have served even 4 Brigade better had they been stationed above the escarpment, where observation all round was much superior.) When the howitzers ceased fire the 6th Field still lacked measurements needed for accurate counter-battery fire and so the opportunity was lost.

This was a mere taste on the tip of the tongue of the medicine 6 Brigade would have to swallow in great gulps in the next few days, and neither Weir nor Barrowclough, suspecting something of what lay ahead, relished it. The 6th Field gun positions around the airfield were extremely vulnerable to fire from the south and were overlooked by enemy on the escarpment there. During the night, therefore, the regiment moved below the escarpment to the 6 Brigade transport area halfway between the Blockhouse and Belhamed—ground until then dominated by the enemy pocket overcome this afternoon by 4 Brigade. From their new positions the batteries of the 6th Field could cover by indirect fire any part of the long brigade front, from Point 175 (reoccupied this night) to west of the Mosque. But they could no longer, as a last resort, take up an anti-tank role in defence of the infantry, and the burden of anti-tank defence to that extent fell more heavily on 33 Anti-Tank Battery and the attached guns of the 65th Anti-Tank, RA. It is therefore curious that M Troop with its valuable 18-pounders, which could provide the same kind of solid backing to the 2-pounders, was also moved below the escarpment.

[24]
Capt K. Stych; Auckland; born Auckland, 25 Sep 1912; cheesemaker; twice wounded.

[25]
Bdr R. S. Pilling; Upper Hutt; born Blenheim, 3 Aug 1917; clerk; wounded and p.w. 28 Nov 1941; repatriated 13 Apr 1942.

[26]
Capt A. S. Jamieson; Auckland; born Coromandel, 6 Mar 1907; draughtsman; p.w. 30 Nov 1941.

[27]
Maj A. T. Rawle, m.i.d.; born Auckland, 26 Sep 1909; insurance clerk; died of wounds 3 Dec 1941.

[28]
Capt R. B. Symon; born England, 7 Aug 1918; Regular soldier; died of wounds 2 Dec 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Divisional Headquarters under Attack

Divisional Headquarters under Attack

Divisional Headquarters received various indications that the Africa Corps was on its way back; but earlier reports of the tank fighting with which Crusader began so greatly exaggerated enemy tank losses that no great danger to the Division was apprehended. Moreover, a South African brigade was expected almost from minute to minute to reinforce the Division. But Headquarters, too, had a taste at dusk of what was in store; the Germans made a quick thrust northwards and seized the huge New Zealand MDS, in effect a vast field hospital with more than a thousand patients, and liberated prisoners held in a nearby compound. On the escarpment itself they clashed briefly in the gathering dusk with part of Divisional Headquarters below—the ‘scrap’ Bevan reported to 4 Brigade.

‘B Group’ of Divisional Headquarters was still in existence as a defence force under Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes of the 7th Anti-Tank, though it had no great strength: only whatever the various headquarters could muster in makeshift infantry, plus O Troop (2-pounders) and Q Troop (18-pounders) of 34 Anti-Tank Battery and half a troop of 43 Light Ack-Ack. In this ad hoc force Captain Savage, [29] adjutant of the 7th Anti-Tank, acted as' company commander' and the RSM, WO I Gilberd, was a ‘platoon commander’. Trouble was not expected because, apart from the misinformation about enemy tank strengths, it was believed that a British armoured brigade was guarding the southern flank (though the Africa Corps had in fact pushed it aside) and the rear, along the Trigh Capuzzo, was guarded (as it was—stoutly) by a rearguard commanded by the 8th Field.

When fire from the escarpment started up without warning, O and Q Troops began to reply and Gilberd's' platoon' boldly attacked up the escarpment. The response daunted the enemy, armoured cars which had accompanied the attackers quickly disappeared, and Gilberd had no trouble in occupying the top of the ridge. In a matter of minutes firing died down and a few moments later it was quite dark. A vehicle on the crest was in flames. The gun Q1 was given credit for having, as the battery report says, ‘obliterated one MG post and immobilised one truck’. Spare personnel, gunners among them, then formed posts along the top of the escarpment. The Headquarters of 13 Corps, which had been driving along the Trigh Capuzzo, passed through during the night and entered Tobruk, leaving with the Division as it did so a few infantry and some more guns of the 65th Anti-Tank.

Staff officers of Divisional Artillery Headquarters had spent an interesting afternoon watching enemy approaching from the east along the Trigh and seeing W/X Battery of the 8th Field engage them with evident success. The 8th Field had reported back throughout the day and was the chief source of reliable information on what was happening in the rear of the Division. A further rearguard was formed after dark under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Walton of the 8th Field, with 10 tanks, two cavalry troops, his own guns and almost a company of infantry. This little force set itself up astride the Trigh and well to the rear. It was well over a mile from the strongpoint then being set up around Bir Sciuearat, the easternmost defended locality in the main Divisional area.

A large supply column led by Colonel Clifton
[30] drove from the south during the night, regardless of enemy detachments, and descended the escarpment somewhere near W/X Battery, which was by that time very short of ammunition. Clifton therefore left six lorries of 25-pounder ammunition with the battery when he drove on westwards. It was a timely move; for the battery was engaged soon after dawn on 29 November with enemy pressing along the Trigh Capuzzo and above the escarpment parallel to it. In mid-morning Walton's guns came under heavy fire, several men were hit, and the tank component of the rearguard was completely destroyed in a series of clashes in defence of the guns. It was only when the rearguard drew back far enough to be helped by the Matildas of the 44th Royal Tanks from 4 Brigade that the situation eased, and a new front was slowly established between the Sciuearat strongpoint and the escarpment which fell away to the north—near Ed Dbana, east of Zaafran. By this time ‘B Group’ of Divisional Headquarters was almost in the front line and Lieutenant-Colonel

Oakes was in his element. The ammunition provided by Clifton's convoy was most welcome and an even larger consignment arrived from Tobruk the same night.

[29]
Lt-Col W. C. Savage, DSO, m.i.d.; Rhodesia; born NZ 28 Oct 1905; clerk; wounded 7 Apr 1943.

[30]
Brig G. H. Clifton, DSO and 2 bars, MC, m.i.d.; Porangahau; born Greenmeadows, 18 Sep 1898; Regular soldier; served North-West Frontier 1919–21 (MC, Waziristan); BM 5 Bde 1940; CRE NZ Div 1940–41; Chief Engineer, 30 Corps, 1941–42; comd 6 Bde Feb-Sep 1942; p.w. 4 Sep 1942; escaped, Germany, Mar 1945; Commander, Northern Military District, 1952–53.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Point 175 is Lost

Point 175 is Lost

For the field gunners the day was extremely busy. The newly reoccupied Point 175 was evidently vulnerable to counter-attack and many of the tasks fired by 26 Battery at Sciuearat, 25 Battery to the west of it, and 48 Battery of the 6th Field were in support of 21 Battalion there. The 6th Field also fired several regimental concentrations for the same purpose, some of them by all four of its batteries. At one stage an infantry private directed the fire of field guns from his slit trench. Anti-tank defence was by three 2-pounders of the 65th Anti-Tank and they performed splendidly. In the late morning the position was under heavy attack, supported by mortar fire which scored several direct hits or near misses on one gun. ‘The last man was wounded but remained loading and firing his gun until he was killed’, according to an officer of 21 Battalion.

By 2 p.m. the attack ceased and the Germans moved off. Both 26 Battery of the 4th Field and D Troop of the 6th had an OP on Point 175 and their FOOs watched a large group approach later in the afternoon. They were tempted to open fire; but were dissuaded from doing so, the opinion prevailing that the group was the long-awaited South African brigade. But when the leading elements, including three tanks, were recognised as enemy it was too late. They were among the infantry and rounding them up as prisoners. The ‘Log Diary’ of 6 Brigade has the following dramatic entry:

1710 hrs 21 Bn. Bn Comd sends urgent message for Arty support. ‘They are in my lines with three tanks and are taking prisoners. Arty support at once for God's sake.’

As the enemy approached, an artillery FOO alongside the battalion commander had been more sceptical than the infantry about the identity of the approaching force and had given his guns directions to lay on it. A 4th Field observer had gone so far as to call down fire, but higher authority had blocked it. Now it was every man for himself. Those near the escarpment descended if they could and made their escape. Captain Hall
[31] of D Troop, 6th Field, and his assistants just managed to get away. Major McKenzie, who commanded the battery of the

65th Anti-Tank supporting 21 Battalion, had gone for reinforcements and was at the foot of the escarpment with two portées and some gunners (to replace the many casualties suffered in the morning attack) when the survivors descended. With some difficulty McKenzie was persuaded to accompany the survivors towards Brigade Headquarters. Tanks came to the top of the escarpment and started to fire down at the party and the two portées replied, carrying on at intervals on the retreat until out of range.

The whole episode had been watched anxiously by 25 Battalion in the Blockhouse area. Fire directed from the Blockhouse had been brought down by the 6th Field in support of 21 Battalion in the morning and early afternoon. Then a liaison group from the South African brigade passed through and the arrival of the main body was expected from minute to minute. There were plenty of targets for the 6th Field on the southernmost escarpment. The force coming from the south-east exactly fitted what 25 Battalion had been told to expect—in appearance, direction and timing—and the disaster to the 21st was therefore totally unexpected. L Troop of 33 Anti-Tank nevertheless did what it could to help by engaging Italian tanks at long range from across the Rugbet en-Nbeidat until it was too dark.

Observers at Sidi Rezegh saw much activity to the south and in the afternoon witnessed in the distance an attack by 15 Panzer Division on Ed Duda which overran much of the position. Two batteries, the 29th and 30th, covered the intervening ground, 47 Battery fired to the south, and 48 Battery to the south-east. For much of the day they could barely reach the most tempting targets and a medium battery would have been invaluable. Two large-calibre guns on the southernmost escarpment fired furiously towards Ed Duda until 29 Battery silenced them at almost extreme range. This was almost the limit of assistance by 6 Brigade to the Tobruk garrison at Ed Duda this day—a day when both 4 and 6 Brigades might have done much to ward off the attack on that vital position had firm links and effective liaison been established between the garrison and the Division. Among the many concentrations fired by the 6th Field, one or more was almost certainly directed at artillery of the British armoured division operating to the south-east (in reply to fire on 6 Brigade); here, too, liaison was sadly defective. But worst of all was fire brought down on the captured

MDS, which endangered staff in their work of mercy and patients and hit some of them. It was a muddled battle. [32]

The main strength of the Division now lay in the strong gun group south-east and east of Belhamed—the 4th, 6th and 8th Field, plus three 18-pounder troops of the 7th Anti-Tank—and the loss of Point 175 gave the enemy observation over the gun areas. Already he had demonstrated his ability to bring down devastating counter-battery fire when observation favoured him. Late in the afternoon 25 Battery, which had been firing on the escarpment east of Point 175 from gun areas just southwest of Zaafran, was about to engage enemy due east when C Troop came under fierce fire. C3 and C4 were quickly put out of action, as well as three troop vehicles, and five gunners were killed and an officer and eight others wounded. Enemy fire continued until dusk, rising to a peak every time the remaining two guns were manned and fired. The position was evidently under direct observation and any movement in it provoked immediate fire. With Point 175 in enemy hands the outlook for the next day was bleak.

One incident in the afternoon, however, gave much satisfaction. An intercepted wireless message indicated that the enemy wanted artillery fire on Belhamed at a point to be indicated by two flares to be fired from tanks. Two flares were therefore fired at a point well away from the defending troops and in due course there were ‘terrific enemy concentrations on the empty hillside’.

[31]
Maj G. F. T. Hall, ED; Wellington; born Woodville, 26 Oct 1902; motor dealer.

[32] One serious handicap was that the Tobruk garrison and the British armour were using different codes from those of 13 Corps which the New Zealand Division used. This led to delay and misunderstanding.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Panzers Overwhelm Most of 6 Brigade

Panzers Overwhelm Most of 6 Brigade

A night counter-stroke overran enemy at Ed Duda and regained the position for the Tobruk garrison, which spent the day of 30 November strengthening it and the rest of the bulge from the original perimeter. Having failed there, the enemy turned his attention to Sidi Rezegh, meaning to break through from there to Belhamed and thereby sever the so-called Tobruk Corridor. But this was not at all clear to the Eighth Army, which was still thinking in terms of a decimated enemy mobile force trying to escape. Rearrangements of the New Zealand defences which would have made the enemy's task very much harder were therefore not undertaken and they remained as vulnerable as before to attack from the south.

Messages during the night suggested that the South African brigade might have recaptured Point 175 by morning and eyes turned anxiously to this feature as it grew light. They saw a mass of transport on the edge of the escarpment there and speculation at once began as to its identity. Meanwhile enemy attacked westwards along the Trigh Capuzzo and were easily repulsed by the Matilda tanks and the artillery on the eastern flank. Miles had tentatively ordered all guns to lay on Point 175 while he conferred with Freyberg. It was after 8 a.m. when Freyberg was finally convinced that the vehicles on Point 175 were enemy, and Miles at once ordered all guns to fire four rounds per minute for three minutes starting at 8.35 a.m.—a total of nearly 800 rounds, duly fired with highly gratifying results. The whole feature erupted in flame and smoke and many vehicles, tanks among them, went up in flames. The rest quickly disappeared. A repeat order was sent to the 6th Field,' with emphasis on tanks on right', to deal with enemy still lingering in the neighbourhood. There was no need for more fire on Point 175. The New Zealand Artillery had given the Italians an unforgettable lesson.

The attention of the 6th Field was at once attracted to largescale movements to the south-west, and 29 and 30 Batteries engaged these at long range and at such a rapid rate that by early afternoon their ammunition was running very low. In such circumstances it would have been wiser to reserve fire—as 4 Brigade had done—for more rewarding targets and this lesson was soon driven home. Bombing by the RAF on the enemy concentrations eased the situation for a while; but by mid-afternoon the enemy began to move towards 6 Brigade. Just before 4 p.m. 50 tanks were reported in the approaching force and the outlook was ominous. The report was passed on to Lieutenant-Colonel Weir, who already knew about the tanks, and whose 29 and 30 Batteries were engaging them at such a rate that the former soon ran out of ammunition. A tremendous bombardment of the 6 Brigade area had begun and heavycalibre shells rocked the defences. Telephone wires were cut and communications between observers and guns were highly uncertain.

The 6th Field gunners had been firing all day. ‘I remember with what difficulty we managed to get anything to eat’, says one of them; ‘for no sooner did we start to eat than orders would come through to fire again and all the food prepared would have to be left—to be covered with dust raised from the firing of the gun’. [33] When the tanks finally closed in on the infantry of 6 Brigade, many of the 6th Field guns were silent and 29 Battery was desperately replenishing its ammunition stocks from lorries of the Divisional Ammunition Company which had just driven through from Tobruk.

The brunt of the action at this stage fell on the 2-pounders of 33 Battery and the 65th Anti-Tank, RA, above the escarpment. J Troop under Jamieson had three guns at 50-yard intervals along the crest from the Mosque westwards and one gun just below, level with the Mosque. Second-Lieutenant Ollivier
[34] had K1 and K2 some 500 yards to the east, among 26 Battalion positions, and there were two 65th Regiment guns to the west of him. The remaining two K Troop guns and some more of the 65th were in direct defence of Brigade Headquarters below the escarpment, as were the four 18-pounders of M Troop, which would have been worth their weight in gold had they been sited above the ridge. Two P Troop portées were with engineers to the east and beyond them L Troop had three with 25 Battalion near the Blockhouse. Records of the 14th Light Ack-Ack are vague, but it seems that none of the Bofors were above the escarpment, where their considerable anti-tank capabilities might have been demonstrated, to the benefit of the sorely pressed infantry of 24 and 26 Battalions at the western end of the brigade line.

Had the Division been flexible enough in its approach to anti-tank defence, which in such circumstances was of paramount importance, it could quickly have reinforced the position with I tanks and many other anti-tank guns, including two more 18-pounder troops. Only a fraction of available resources was committed against what could very well have been a deathblow to the whole Division. Miles had had an inkling of the situation in the morning, when he signalled Divisional Headquarters asking if the western flank needed more anti-tank defence and offering for this purpose four guns of the 65th Anti-Tank. But Divisional Headquarters was obsessed with the idea that the main danger threatened the eastern flank and was still reinforcing this flank when 6 Brigade was overrun. The death of Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes from shellfire during the afternoon on the eastern flank perhaps contributed to the maladjustment and inflexibility of the anti-tank defences; for he was not the sort of man to stand idle in the face of disaster.

Such guns as were available to 24 and 26 Battalions when the tanks closed in—six and possibly eight—were doomed. The tanks came close enough to locate them, and then, with the help of accurate mortar fire, proceeded to shoot them to pieces. A captain of 24 Battalion describes it thus:

‘The 40 tanks deployed in groups of threes, two in front and one at the rear, and came on in this formation across our whole front. Their fire power was terrific. The 2-pdr Antitank guns were soon reduced to heaps of tangled metal, their gunners firing to the very last.’

A private mentions that the ‘anti-tank gun dug in just behind me was knocked out by the leading tank while it (the tank) was still hull down.’ Another says that ‘The two anti-tank 2-pdrs were the first to go and part of the shield of one landed on the side of my slit trench.’ A call for more anti-tank support from the battalion commander resulted in three more portées rushing to the scene, two of K Troop and one of the 65th Anti-Tank, all from below the escarpment.

The anti-tankers faced into the setting sun as they fought their brief action, but they nevertheless scored several hits and disabled a few tanks. The newly-arrived guns of K Troop under Second-Lieutenant Stone
[35] had to go into action from their conspicuous portées and their crews knew at the outset that their task was hopeless. But, as Stone says, ‘they were splendid, and never hesitated’. He adds, ‘The guns got a lot of shots away and I saw several hits …. one tank [being] definitely stopped.’ Of the two gun crews, only the driver of K4 got away, with the disabled and unmanned gun. All on K3 were killed or wounded. Stone was captured, but Ollivier managed to get away with his pick-up truck and an empty portée truck. All of 24 Battalion and two companies and headquarters of 26 Battalion were lost. Observation posts of all four batteries of the 6th Field were also overrun, though a few men, including Captain Symon, made good their escape.

Several accounts mention a puzzling silence at the 6th Field gun positions at the critical moment when the tanks started their final advance, and it was not only shortage of ammunition that caused this. ‘During the afternoon heavy firing became evident on the top of the escarpment’, says Gunner Cook
[36] of 48 Battery Signals, ‘although our guns did not appear to be very active.’ Part of the explanation lies in the continued anxiety, even when the tanks were on the last leg of their journey to the Mosque, for the safety of the eastern flank. As late as 4 p.m. Weir was ordered by Artillery Headquarters to give ‘all available support’ to defeat a tank attack threatening from the east, and 47 Battery was told to stand by for this. Lieutenant Stedman
[37] of this battery had an OP near the Mosque and asked for registering fire, which was refused. More ammunition arrived at the gun position; but 47 Battery was still not allowed to fire at the oncoming enemy. Then tanks were seen by the Mosque.

It was only then—too late to help the infantry—that the full strength of the 6th Field was exerted against the enemy in this area and the captured infantry, previously critical of the inactivity of their supporting field guns, now had to pass through a curtain of fire from them, to which the 4th Field belatedly made a solid contribution. In the gathering darkness they heavily bombarded the area of the Mosque, and burning vehicles on the crest of the escarpment lit up the surrounding desert.

As attack became imminent, Brigadier Barrowclough had ordered the four L Troop guns with 25 Battalion to be sent at once to the Mosque, a risky project since Ariete had many tanks in the Point 175 area threatening the infantry by the Blockhouse. The portées were being withdrawn when several tanks suddenly appeared in the Rugbet en-Nbeidat and started to attack. L Troop reacted quickly and L2, backing over a rise, set two of them on fire, damaged a third which drove off with smoke rising from it, and discouraging the fourth, which disappeared. The move was then cancelled.

The two guns of P Troop with the engineers some distance east of the Mosque could do nothing to help until just before dark, when two enemy tanks were seen descending the escarpment to the west and making for Brigade Headquarters about a mile to the north. Both disappeared, and then one reappeared closer and was destroyed by the two guns. After dark vehicles were heard below, approaching from the west, and when they were identified as enemy the anti-tank guns drove to the edge and fired down on them, destroying an ammunition lorry and starting a fireworks display. Two other lorries towing anti-tank guns were disabled and the guns captured.

Lieutenant-Colonel Weir had been taken largely unawares by the sudden setback in the Mosque area. Reports had been coming in regularly from the OPs there, and it was only when they suddenly ceased and all lines to them went dead that he began to realise what had happened. It seemed to him that all the infantry of 6 Brigade had been overrun and that his gun positions were now completely open to the enemy, though 25 Battalion, the engineer company, and two companies of the 26th were intact. He therefore pressed to have the guns moved behind infantry defences before dawn. Barrowclough took up the matter with Divisional Headquarters and was told to stay where he was. In the end he decided to allow Weir to move the guns a short distance north, where they would at least be beyond small-arms and mortar range of the Mosque, which the enemy now held. The guns accordingly moved an average of less than two miles north and took up hastily selected positions, most of the gun crews merely dropping trails and waiting for daylight, with all spare men ready to act as infantry. Barrowclough's hopes were still pinned on the hoped-for arrival of the South African brigade; but there was no chance at all of this.

[33]
Bdr I. H. Loughnan, later Brother Ambrose of the Holy Name Priory, Wahroonga, New South Wales.

[34]
Capt C. M. Ollivier; Kaikoura; born Christchurch, 27 Aug 1918; clerk; p.w. 15 Jul 1942.

[35]
Capt J. C. Stone; Wellington; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1918; bank officer; p.w. 30 Nov 1941; escaped, Northern Italy, Sep 1943; recaptured Apr 1944.

[36]
Sgt A. L. Cook; Waikite Valley, Rotorua; born Christchurch, 7 Mar 1917; salesman; p.w. 1 Dec 1941.

[37]
Capt A. C. Stedman; Auckland; born NZ 23 Apr 1908; accountant; p.w. Dec 1941.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Merciless Bombardment of 25 Battery

A Merciless Bombardment of 25 Battery

The trouble in 4 Brigade this day largely stemmed from the proximity of Divisional Headquarters, which was still expecting a heavy attack from the east, in accordance with plans taken from a captured German general. Any evidence which seemed to support this was taken very seriously and the troops on the eastern flank were constantly being alerted to the danger. There was plenty of activity in the east, as it happened, but no real danger from there.

The first action, after the firing of the early morning concentration on Point 175, was when three Italian tanks appeared on or near that vague feature and Major Bevan was able to bring them under direct fire from three D Troop guns in the Sciuearat strongpoint, setting one of them on fire. The strongpoint was under close enemy observation, but the gun positions were well chosen and the enemy had much trouble trying to range on them. His mortars were most effective, however, killing a gunner of D Troop and another of F Troop in the morning.

Eventually the enemy brought three guns close to the edge of the escarpment east of Point 175 to get a better aim; but they were visible to F Troop, which carefully engaged them and hit all three. Bevan's battery was particularly enterprising in its efforts to gain observation over enemy said to be approaching from the east, establishing an OP at the eastern end of Zaafran with line communication and another for flash-spotting purposes four miles to the east, well behind the enemy's flank.

The merciless bombardment of 25 Battery continued unabated. For long periods the gun positions were quite untenable. With careful searching fire Captain Shortt
[38] of A Troop silenced the most troublesome hostile battery, but at the cost of a direct hit on one of his guns. Lieutenant Widdup
[39] at the gun position reported heavy shelling from another battery. Later he asked the battery commander, Major Kensington, if he could withdraw a short distance as the position was untenable. In the end Kensington agreed; but meanwhile the gunners had been repeatedly called to the guns for ‘emergency tasks’ (an exaggerated classification). By 3 p.m. all guns were in an anti-tank role to meet the attack from the east which did not come. A little later Shortt got quads to pull three guns out and tow them to ‘a more covered position’. By this time all A Troop guns had suffered damage of some sort and none was properly fit for action. The C Troop guns were brought out under fire by Second-Lieutenant Varian, [40]
Sergeant Wheeler
[41] and Bombardier Hutchinson. [42] Only two of them were fit for action and these went into position with E Troop of V/AA Battery. (Hutchinson, who had already behaved splendidly, played a leading part in getting the guns out under terrible fire and for this and later brave efforts he was awarded an MM.) Shortly before dusk C Troop hurriedly went into an anti-tank role, this time facing the Mosque where the real danger lay, and the sole remaining useful gun of A Troop did likewise.

What puts this action, with its many alarms about attacks along the Trigh Capuzzo, in proper perspective is the diary of the 8th Field, which was well placed to observe to the east.

It says' Quiet day'. Both batteries of the 8th Field suffered attention from enemy guns, though not nearly so much as 25 Battery. The diary of Artillery Headquarters logs the messages from the 8th Field and from Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes of B Group and they are not alarmist. In mid-afternoon Oakes was mortally wounded, a serious loss indeed, for he was a brave and skilful gunner and a striking personality. The main action was a long-range anti-tank shoot by F Troop from the Sciuearat strongpoint. Major Bevan posted an officer at each gun and did ‘single gun ranging’ on individual tanks, though the lack of good binoculars did not favour this type of shooting. By 4 p.m. all was quiet, the enemy having retired, leaving five tanks on the field, one of them burning from a hit by the gun F3.

Miles himself came forward later, surveyed the scene, and decided that all that was needed was to prepare a defensive fire task on a north-south line east of the Sciuearat strongpoint, and by 5.50 p.m. this was done. His headquarters had at long last busied itself arranging more anti-tank support for 6 Brigade and was also preparing to despatch all non-essential vehicles to Tobruk during the night.

In due course the vehicles were assembled and made their way through the night to Ed Duda and beyond. They included the bulk of the B Echelons and practically all of Miles's own headquarters, as well as the whole of B Group, with the headquarters of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack and several battery headquarters. They did not, by an unlucky chance, include the non-fighting vehicles of the 6th Field or any of the mass of transport of 6 Brigade, which remained to clutter the fields of fire of the guns and greatly hamper their effectiveness against the attack which they had to meet in the morning.

[38]
Maj G. M. Shortt; Auckland; born Dunedin, 28 Nov 1909; merchant.

[39]
Maj M. Widdup; London; born Nelson, 6 Sep 1917; schoolteacher.

[40]
2 Lt F. A. H. Varian; born London, 9 Jun 1910; theatre manager; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

[41]
WO II G. O. Wheeler; born Auckland, 16 Oct 1915; bank clerk; died of wounds 29 Jun 1942.

[42]
Sgt T. M. Hutchinson, MM; Invercargill; born Napier, 14 Mar 1912; clerk; twice wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The CRA Fails to Clear Up High-level Misunderstandings

The CRA Fails to Clear Up High-level Misunderstandings

Brigadier Miles went on a vital mission to Tobruk at 8 p.m. to see the Corps Commander on Freyberg's behalf. Freyberg's orders were to hold the Corridor at all costs, and next day seemed likely to bring disaster unless these could be modified or further help provided. What Freyberg meant Miles to do is not quite clear: the GOC's report merely says that he was to ‘see the Corps Commander and give him the picture’. But evidence suggests Miles's mission was to get permission to withdraw behind or alongside the Tobruk garrison at Ed Duda: that is, to relinquish the New Zealand part of the Corridor. Miles reached Corps Headquarters soon after midnight—very quick time for a difficult journey—and gained verbal instructions confirmed later (too late to affect the issue) in writing. The Corps Commander wanted Freyberg to await the outcome of an attack by the South African brigade on Point 175 and then on Sidi Rezegh. If this were successful then the positions gained should be consolidated. If not, the Division should move to an area north of Ed Duda and Belhamed and continue to hold the latter. Freyberg was to use his own discretion about withdrawing from the Zaafran and Sciuearat areas.

This, at least, is how the written orders read. What Miles actually understood from the Corps Commander and told Freyberg cannot be known for sure. The alternatives offered, however, were unreal. By the time the outcome of the South African ‘attack’ was known it would have been too late to withdraw. No such attack in fact took place and, as the G Branch war diary remarks, it was already too late to withdraw when Miles got back at 4.30 a.m. on 1 December. But a serious misunderstanding seems to have clouded the discussion. The Corps Commander understood by the term ‘Corridor’ the whole area of the break-out from the original Tobruk perimeter, whereas Freyberg meant merely the New Zealand positions which linked with this—the New Zealand end of the bulge. Freyberg was dissatisfied with Miles's message and briefly considered going to Tobruk himself. It was too late, however, even for this, and in the end Freyberg had to turn for guidance and support to the Corps Commander near at hand, LieutenantGeneral C. W. M. Norrie of 30 Corps, who was with the South Africans on the escarpment east of Point 175. Miles himself seems to have favoured an immediate move—perhaps to the position suggested by the 13 Corps commander—and to have resented the way Freyberg received him on his return. At all events he acted from then onwards as though he had' a chip on his shoulder'. If so it was not without reason; for the misunderstandings between Division and Corps and the resultant indecision greatly endangered his beloved guns.

The danger was not immediately apparent, however, to most of the gunners. The 6th Field in its new positions was southeast of Belhamed, with 47 Battery to the south-west, 30 Battery to the west, 29 Battery north and 48 Battery east of the regimental position, RHQ being to the west of centre and G Section, Divisional Signals, just below the top of the Belhamed escarpment near 29 Battery. Many guns were still limbered up and their crews expected, as Bombardier Loughnan
[43] says, to drive in the morning to ‘ Tobruk, water, fresh bread and a wash!’ Major Beattie's 47 Battery was in the midst of the enemy position captured on 28 November and German dead ‘were still littering the area’, according to Gunner Smith
[44] of Headquarters Troop. ‘Greatest thing of interest was the bags of sugar lying around’, says Lance-Bombardier McLaren
[45] of F Troop; ‘badly in need of same, I smartly got a sand bag and walked about 50 yds to help myself’. The situation as these men understood it was broadly correct: the South Africans were to attack the area of the Mosque and the British tanks were to arrive in the morning after refitting. The ADS of 6 Brigade was some 300 yards to the right front of 47 Battery and there was much other transport in the area.

[43]
Bdr I. H. Loughnan; Wahroonga, NSW; born NZ 3 Mar 1918; draughtsman; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941.

[44]
L-Bdr D. Smith; Lower Hutt; born England, 18 May 1918; clerk; wounded 1 Nov 1942.

[45]
L-Bdr H. J. McLaren; Auckland; born Auckland, 13 Jul 1908; motor driver; twice wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The 6th Field is Overrun

The 6th Field is Overrun

A light mist settled during the night on the lower ground between the Mosque and Belhamed. It was possible to see from one to the other at dawn, but in the 6th Field gun area distant vision was blurred. For a few minutes all was deceptively quiet and gunners were stowing away bedrolls and thinking of getting breakfast. Some had petrol burners going and were boiling billies. Many eyes turned towards the Mosque area as they had turned the morning before to Point 175 in the hope of seeing friends there—South Africans or the British armour. Major Snadden's OP of 46 Battery on Belhamed reported tanks to the south at 6 a.m.; but FOOs of the 6th Field who saw them nearer at hand were undecided as to their identity. When they moved forward a few minutes later Captain Crawford-Smith [46] of 47 Battery—the nearest gunner-officer to them—still thought they' were our own … the second tank was flying our identification signals'. The leading tank was actually a captured Matilda, still flying its pennants.

The battalions on Belhamed, the 18th and 20th, had changed places so that the former was now at the western end, which came under heavy shellfire. Smoke and dust soon obscured the view southwards, though 20-odd tanks, guns and lorried infantry could still be seen advancing. To the south-east the shelling was not quite so heavy; but it was thickly sewn with machinegun bullets. Weir estimated that ‘two batteries started to shell us at a slow rate, just sufficient to raise the dust’.

All the defects of the positions taken up in the dark now glared at the gunners and in a mad rush they tried to remedy what they could of them. Guns were hastily moved here and there and unlimbered. Emergency anti-tank positions were taken up facing the Mosque or the oncoming tanks and ammunition was hastily prepared. The fields of fire in many cases were obstructed by vehicles, some of which caught on fire and further clouded visibility. Bombardier Loughnan's F Troop gun, [47] for example, raced clear of the vehicles immediately around and then was unlimbered under fire. As he recalls it,

‘The gun was brought into position, sights clear and prepared; but no ammunition ready. Two of the others were trying to get the armour-piercing shot off the limber…. Next I was peering through the open sights at the tanks; they were far too close by now. Their light machine-gun bullets were penetrating the shield, and shot was flying in all directions.

‘Geoff Oliver, [48] the gun-sergeant, swung the trail around and we fired the first shot—with what effect I do not know. After each shot we had to wait several seconds for the dust to clear and as it did so Geoff would heave the trail over and drop it to give me a sight on to the next.’

The section commander, Lieutenant Masefield, [49] stood behind the gun and the GPO, Lieutenant Reed, moved from gun to gun, both of them regardless of enemy fire. After three or four rounds Loughnan was knocked from his layer's seat and Masefield ran up to take his place. A few more rounds and then a direct hit knocked out the gun, though the only further casualty was one man lightly wounded. Masefield then took the survivors to a neighbouring gun, the crew of which had all been hit. There they suffered another direct hit which killed all but one of Masefield's crew. [50]

By this time the tanks were through the line of F Troop guns and infantry followed closely. E Troop, to the right rear, fired through a thickening fog created by the burning vehicles of F Troop. ‘Both sides fired at each other's gun flashes through the dense haze’, according to Sergeant Buchanan. [51] E Troop had lost its commander the night before and Major Levy of 31 Anti-Tank Battery came up and directed fire at three Pzkw IIIs which were trying to outflank the troop, destroying two of them and disabling the third. Two F Troop guns were still in action when all four E Troop guns were knocked out almost simultaneously, and Levy ordered the survivors to destroy any workable gun parts and then withdraw. The wounded had to be left.

The struggle of 47 Battery was, if anything, even more desperate. It was a few hundred yards to the south and had even less notice that the oncoming tanks were hostile. Bombardier McCowan
[52] was at the C Troop command post and the tanks were ‘almost near enough to throw stones at us’ when the telephone rang and Weir announced, ‘I think those tanks are hostile’. The tanks were in most cases about 200 yards away when the guns opened fire, hitting two or three and driving the rest round the western flank and on to 30 Battery. Some tanks opened fire from the shelter of transport at the ADS 300 yards to the right front, while infantry advancing through the smoke brought the guns under fierce small-arms fire. Drivers and spare gunners replied with rifles and here and there a Bren gun.

It was Gun Control from the start, and in F Troop of 47 Battery Captains Cade and Crawford-Smith and Lieutenants Young and Harper
[53] each took over a gun. Major Beattie was everywhere. Bombardier McCowan became, as he explains, the sole survivor of C2:

‘Lt Hume
[54] was with us firing a rifle and was killed and all the rest….By this time infantry were among the guns, ammunition was done and tanks were coming from the rear. I had been hit twice.’

He was taken prisoner and marched towards the Mosque with others, including the Right Reverend Bishop Gerard. [55]

When only one F Troop gun under Sergeant Cooper
[56] remained serviceable, Beattie, Cade, Harper and Young rallied to it. All AP ammunition had gone and Cooper was firing HE with 119 capped fuse against tanks, to increase penetration. Then, when infantry appeared ahead, closing in, he ordered caps to be removed from fuses. Then more tanks came on and it was again 119 with cap on, and the last round was fired at a tank which had actually reached the gun position. Beattie ordered the survivors to withdraw and Cooper removed the gun sights, only to be killed a moment later. Gunner Jackson [57] picked up the sights and carried them out. On the way back towards the east Beattie was badly wounded and Cade picked him up and carried or dragged him behind the shelter of a trailer. Beattie ordered Cade to leave, but again he picked up his battery commander and carried him back under terrible fire. For the last few hundred yards Gunner Nevins
[58] helped and between them they got the badly wounded major to comparative safety.

At the height of the action a burly and familiar figure appeared on the scene, carrying a rifle and wearing his CRA armband. Miles himself, evidently feeling that the situation had been mismanaged—as indeed it had—to the point that his guns were being needlessly sacrificed, and wanting to be with his gunners to the last, strolled forward ‘for all the world as though he were going duck-shooting’, according to Sergeant Ross
[59] of 29 Battery. ‘He patted one of the Nos. 1 on the shoulder and said “Every shot a tank, boy” and then wandered away ahead of the guns.’ He went from A Troop to B Troop, and by the time he reached the latter 30 and 47 Batteries were finished and 29 and 48 Batteries were chiefly concerned with infantry pushing their way through the smoke, taking cover behind burning vehicles, and bringing deadly machine-gun and mortar fire to bear on the remaining guns.

Many of the gunners had felt, like Weir himself, that they were ‘getting the better of him’. As Gunner Henderson
[60] of B Troop describes it,

‘We've driven them off. The tanks have pulled out. Rest. Hunched, tense shoulders slump down, backs curve, bodies relax—we wipe our mouths with the back of our hands and look round at one another.’ [61]

A Troop had missed the worst of the anti-tank action, mainly because its front was thickly encumbered with vehicles. By the time tanks appeared it was impossible to engage them without endangering men of the troops in front. B Troop had better fields of fire and blazed away at tanks and then at infantry. The final assault on the gun position was strongly supported by machine-gun and mortar fire which put three guns out of action. The fourth withdrew in the nick of time. (Weir himself had authorised the gunners to pull out when the position became untenable, after seeing what happened to 30 and 47 Batteries.) Miles described it all in a letter as follows:

‘I reached the nearest gun—No. 4—as most of the crews of the others were casualtied by m.g. fire; though we could see nothing for smoke. Then figures appeared which I saw were German infantry, and I told 2/Lt. Bevin [62] to take them on. As I spoke No. 3 gun pulled out past us, and a shell struck the quad; but the gun and quad went on though I could see no driver. Almost simultaneously a burst of m.g. fire shot down Bevin and most of the crew of No. 4 alongside me. I was a bit dazed, but heard a voice say “Limber up”. Another voice said “Cannot tow the gun with a punctured tyre” and the first replied “What else to do unless we fire over open sights”. I called out “Yes, fire over open sights”, but as I spoke a shell landed to the left of the gun, a splinter slightly wounding me in the small of the back. The German infantry were advancing straight towards us, so I got into a slit trench by the gun with my rifle, hoping to pick off the German officer leading them and the chap beside him with a Tommy gun. Unfortunately I had no amn but the 5 rounds in the magazine, and though I waited till he got close and fired steadily I missed him! Shades of my early days as a rifle shot!! The German inf. then enveloped us, and I thought they'd have got the whole bag. Thank God they didn't.’

Captain Fisher saw it from a distance of 200–300 yards and lost no time in withdrawing his guns, finding a route down the escarpment to the north. It was barely passable and only an extreme emergency would have prompted him to try to use it. But the vehicles bounced down, followed by machine-gun fire, and at the foot of the ridge they turned left towards Tobruk. By this means all four A Troop guns withdrew and one of B Troop, joining vehicles of 30 Battery on the way to what was left of the Tobruk Corridor.

Gunner Winthrop
[63] was driver of the quad B4, and though wounded in both arms and both legs he managed to crawl into his seat and drive to the gun position when withdrawal was ordered. The gun was already disabled, but survivors of the crew were able to get on the truck; Winthrop drove them for two miles before he collapsed and had to be lifted from the driving seat. For this he gained a DCM.

Another DCM was won in this withdrawal by Sergeant Batty
[64] of A Troop, whose gun was the leading one, heading towards the corridor. Having escaped from the desperate action south-east of Belhamed, the little column was suddenly beset with danger from the north as it reached the Tobruk by-pass road. Some enemy tanks operating there in support of the remaining strongpoints on that side of the Corridor attacked without warning. They fired heavily with cannon and machine guns, and one was charging the party when Batty firmly ordered, ‘Halt, Action Rear’ and with his first shot destroyed the tank. He then engaged the others, giving the rest of the gun crews time to get into action. The rest of the tanks then drove off. Batty's presence of mind prevented a nasty incident from developing, for the other guns were awkwardly placed and their crews could not have reacted in time to save themselves.

The only other 6th Field guns which got away were those of C Troop, 48 Battery, which did not open fire. ‘From where we were’, Lieutenant Wood
[65] wrote, ‘all we could see was a black pall of smoke … with a few figures milling about and plenty of small-arms ammunition whistling everywhere. We could see nothing to fire at so I got the guns out and … stopped to have a word with the General who was as cool as a cucumber. When I left him I found all our vehicles had scampered off, so I wandered off on foot and later rejoined the troop.’ These guns, however, turned right and drove across the wide wadi to Zaafran, where they joined 4 Brigade. D Troop continued to fire under circumstances that were truly formidable until all guns were overrun. Sawyers exercised his own initiative in withdrawing C Troop and the survivors of D Troop at a time when Weir was trying to get orders through to that effect. In the 4 Brigade area the C Troop guns were quickly put into anti-tank positions and the spare gunners formed a thin infantry screen in front.

The great fight of the 6th Field had ended and the scene of utter desolation caused Weir much anguish as he saw off the last vehicle of 48 Battery and then retraced his steps to where he had left his car. As he neared his headquarters he saw German infantry in possession and he turned tail and hastily descended the escarpment. When things got quieter he moved on eastwards, only to be fired on by I tanks defending 4 Brigade, though he escaped harm and in due course joined the survivors of his regiment on Zaafran. G Section, Divisional Signals, and many RHQ vehicles, together with stragglers from various batteries, made their way to the Tobruk Corridor.

The losses of the 6th Field (with 47 Battery) came to the extraordinary total of about 275, including 57 killed, by far the heaviest losses of an NZA unit in a single action in the Second World War. Those listed as wounded numbered 113 and the prisoners (many of them also wounded) 96. The 29th, 30th and 47th Batteries lost 75, 87 and 75 respectively. With them, of course, was Brigadier Miles, marched off to captivity.

[46] Maj H. O. Crawford-Smith, ED (later Crawford); born Lyttelton, 10 Apr 1909; commercial traveller; died Wellington, 20 Aug 1960.

[47] 30 Battery consisted of E and F Troops; 47 Battery of C and F Troops.

[48]
Bdr M. G. Oliver; born NZ 27 Nov 1914; photo-engraver; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

[49]
2 Lt J. V. Masefield; born Akaroa, 6 Jul 1917; farmer; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

[50] Some accounts say that Masefield was the last survivor and continued to fire one gun single-handed until he was killed.

[51]
Sgt G. E. Buchanan, MM; born NZ 29 Jan 1905; forestry worker; died Wellington, 2 Dec 1951.

[52]
Bdr H. W. McCowan; Auckland; born Auckland, 24 Oct 1915; accountant; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941.

[53]
Capt J. Harper; Dunedin; born Sydney, 15 Oct 1911; salesman; twice wounded.

[54]
Capt H. R. Hume; born NZ 20 Nov 1902; oil company representative; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

[55]
Rt. Rev. G. V. Gerard, CBE, MC, m.i.d.; Rotherham, England; born Christchurch, 24 Nov 1898; Lt, The Buffs, 1918–19 (MC); SCF, 2 NZEF, May 1940–Nov 1941; p.w. 1 Dec 1941; repatriated Apr 1943; SCF, 2 NZEF (IP), Apr-Dec 1944.

[56]
Sgt J. H. Cooper; born England, 30 Apr 1914; labourer; killed in action 1 Dec 1941.

[57] Not traced.

[58]
Gnr G. F. Nevins; Tokirima, Taumarunui; born Annedale, 30 Nov 1909; farmer; wounded 1 Dec 1941.

[59]
Sgt J. F. V. Ross; born Hunterville, 25 Sep 1916; civil servant; died Auckland, 30 Jul 1963.

[60]
L-Bdr J. H. Henderson; Eastbourne; born Motueka, 26 Aug 1918; journalist; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941; repatriated Jun 1943.

[61]
Gunner Inglorious (Whitcombe and Tombs, 1945), p.27.

[62] 2 Lt R. O. Bevin; Lower Hutt; born Lower Hutt, 11 May 1917; clerk; wounded 1 Dec 1941.

[63]
Gnr C. J. Winthrop, DCM; born Christchurch, 16 Oct 1914; motor driver; twice wounded.

[64]
WO I W. Batty, DCM; Auckland; born Tonga, 1 Jan 1905; insurance agent.

[65]
Capt W. N. Wood; born NZ 11 Mar 1908; schoolteacher; died on active service 28 Mar 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Belhamed is Also Lost

Belhamed is Also Lost

The 6th Field was not entirely alone in its last stand, nor was this action isolated and complete in itself. It was part of an attack on Belhamed which was opposed, in the first instance, not only by the 6th Field who met it head on, but by flanking fire from troops around 6 Brigade Headquarters to the southeast. In its later stages it came up against the eastern defences of Belhamed: 20 Battalion and supporting weapons.

Major Snadden had his OP in the western half of Belhamed, near Headquarters 18 Battalion, and mortar bombs showered down there, as he says, ‘like rain’. It was the heaviest bombardment Snadden experienced throughout the war. There was nothing he could do about it, however, for his line to the 4th Field was cut and his wireless out of order. The only gunners in the neighbourhood who could help were the anti-tankers. They had A2 and A3 covering the north-western approaches and C3 the southern, with A4 near the boundary with 20 Battalion and facing south-east. A fifth gun, B2, was on the other side of the boundary and a sixth, a captured German gun manned by WO II Stobie, was some 200 yards south-west of A4.

When Stobie gave a sharp ‘Tank Alert’ A4 engaged an infantry truck which emerged from the smoke and destroyed it, together with the gun it was towing, according to Gunner Cowan, [66] the gun layer. ‘The smoke and dust swirled forward again and covered everything.’ C3 fired on a troop of field guns taking up position to the south, hit several of them, and forced the rest to withdraw behind the smoke. Then A2 and A3 swung round and engaged tanks to the south-east.

The four 2-pounders of B Troop were disposed with B1, B2 and B3 just behind the leading platoons of the 20th and B4 nearer to the escarpment. C Troop had been sited to fire northwards from the eastern end of the feature; but Major Levy, the 31 Battery commander, brought it into action behind 29 Field Battery once the direction of the attack became apparent. When the tanks finally approached 20 Battalion they did so with great caution, halting and firing smoke grenades or shells to blind the gunners. B1 and B3 got away one round and four rounds respectively before being put out of action and the survivors of B3 were shot down when they tried to get away. B2 fought a brave action which lasted a good deal longer. The last part was a solo effort by the only survivor of the gun crew, Bombardier Marshall. ‘He must have been shooting at gun flashes’, says a witness, ‘for it was impossible to see tanks in the thick smoke’. Marshall continued to fire after the infantry in front had surrendered to the tanks and he was still firing when the attack moved on to the 18 Battalion area and the gun A4 was overrun. He had been captured in Greece and then escaped, vowing he would never again be taken prisoner. In the end a tank ran right over his gun. The Germans must have been impressed; for Marshall was the only New Zealander on Belhamed they bothered to bury in their short occupation of that feature. The crew of B4 and Second-Lieutenant McCluskey
[67] who was with them could see no target through the haze, and when the infantry around surrendered they made their escape down the escarpment, taking their firing mechanism and followed by machine-gun fire, which wounded McCluskey and a gunner. The gun was later recovered.

Only a few detachments of 18 Battalion near the 20th surrendered and the crew of A4 was among them. The rest of the battalion stood fast, still supported by the 2-pounders A2, A3 and C3, and field artillery support was somehow obtained in the form of DF tasks from Tobruk guns to the north-west. Stobie had manned his German gun until wounded and when German infantry began digging in nearby he shammed dead. (Next day he took over a deserted vehicle and drove to safety.) When 18 Battalion withdrew a short distance and wheeled to face the enemy on the eastern part of the feature, A2, A3 and C3 could not be taken. There were no towing vehicles and the distance was too great and the ground too rough to manhandle them under fire. The survivors of their crews therefore served for the time being as infantry and became, like the rest of the battalion, part of the Tobruk garrison. All guns but A4 were later recovered. [68]

[66]
Sgt J. L. Cowan; Waipawa, Hawke's Bay; born Gisborne, 8 Jan 1916; farmer; p.w. 1 Dec 1941; escaped, Benghazi, 21 Dec 1941; safe at Base Camp, Maadi, 8 Jan 1942; wounded 25 Oct 1942.

[67]
Lt F. H. McCluskey; Wellington; born Dunedin, 18 Dec 1905; engineer; twice wounded.

[68] Brigadier H. B. Latham, BRA (Brigadier, Royal Artillery) of 13 Corps, went over the Belhamed battlefield two or three days later and was much moved by what he saw. After the war he was in charge of the preparation of narratives for the British Official History, and in a letter of 16 July 1949 to Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger he described this episode. The letter in part reads as follows:

‘The first thing one noticed was that the Gunners had obviously put up the hell of a fight. And I was so impressed that I picked up a rammer and after having it roughly inscribed sent it off to Freyberg. Practically every gun was a “write off” though in the shops it might have been possible to make up one out of the parts of two. The dead were lying around each gun, each man nearly in his place and burnt out tractors and trailers were just in rear. Here undoubtedly there had been no thought of surrender or withdrawal and all had died in the service of the guns.

‘The whole thing gave me the feeling of the fort in “Beau Geste” and I thought to myself: I have seen these chaps fighting for many a day now and something has happened here quite out of the ordinary … a battle royal had taken place with the N.Z. guns which ended in the utter annihilation of the latter.

‘I found poor Miles's car, on its side with its kit still in it and I went back sadly to Tobruk to ask the New Zealanders there to send out a party to clear the battlefield and bury the dead.’

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Remnants of the Division Gather at Zaafran

The Remnants of the Division Gather at Zaafran

Divisional Headquarters—the little that was left of it after non-essential vehicles had gone into Tobruk—had camped in the north-eastern part of the 6th Field area and from it Freyberg and his senior staff watched the battle. Only at the last moment, when men no more than 200 yards ahead were surrendering and 48 Battery less D Troop had driven through, did Freyberg agree to withdraw. The last remaining ‘runners’ of the 44th Royal Tanks had gone forward and up the rough track leading on to the north-eastern end of Belhamed, where they stayed for most of the day hull-down, discouraging any exploitation of the enemy success.

Barrowclough's headquarters was to the south-east, covered by a thin line of infantry, 10 more or less damaged tanks of the 8th Royal Tanks, and a few guns, with the engineer company and 25 Battalion still clinging to their positions above the escarpment. On the western flank of 6 Brigade Headquarters there were at least three guns of the 65th Anti-Tank and three Bofors of 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery, with the four 18-pounders of M Troop to their left rear, much hampered by vehicles to their front. All had fired furiously as the enemy attacked towards Belhamed. As an infantry private recalls it, ‘Our AA were barrel down, flat out, open sights’. Shelling of the area continued after the tank force had passed and M Troop replied, though with doubtful effect. A lorry which came up to replenish 18-pounder ammunition was hit and one of the guns was put out of action. After two or three hours had passed and enemy was seen approaching from the direction of the Mosque in considerable strength, the situation seemed hopeless.

Salvation came, however, after much high-level discussion, in the form of Stuart tanks of a British armoured brigade, which drove from the south-east into the lines of the engineers and 25 Battalion and descended the escarpment. Screened by these tanks, most of the troops in and around 6 Brigade Headquarters managed to get away, in many cases under heavy fire, and after a false start which took some of them up the Rugbet en-Nbeidat towards the Italians on Point 175, they headed northwards to join 4 Brigade at Zaafran. The engineers had little transport and many of them travelled part of the way on tanks or on the anti-tank portées (two each of O and P Troops). L Troop with 25 Battalion withdrew under shellfire, but suffered no harm.

The remnants of the New Zealand Division—3000-odd men—were now utterly dependent on a handful of I tanks and on the guns, almost all of them under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Duff and most of them sited in the shallow wadi between Belhamed and Zaafran. The staff of 4 Brigade, after continuing to reinforce the eastern flank during the night, did not fully realise even at this late stage that the main danger was from the west. But Inglis's headquarters had moved in mid-morning from the wadi to Zaafran, interrupting communications and for several critical hours losing track of the situation. Duff stayed where he was and his communications to the guns were all-important. He commanded virtually a divisional artillery, with two field regiments (the 4th and 8th) and some of the remnants of the 6th Field, many anti-tank 2-pounders and 18-pounders, and some of the remaining Bofors. E Section, Divisional Signals, under Lieutenant Laugesen, [69] improvised skilfully to cope with traffic far greater than their equipment was designed to handle. A diary entry in the afternoon reads: ‘Signal office exchange has now 21 subscribers and all lines very busy’. The RHQ office truck from which Duff conducted operations was exposed to fire from almost all directions and a hole some six feet in diameter was therefore dug nearby and equipped with extension telephones in case the truck was hit. But it was not until the final conference this day that the hole was used—with the warm approval of the officers concerned.

The wide, shallow wadi became for most of its length the front line and there was little or no infantry cover for the guns in it, though several resolutely manned Vickers guns gave close support. Near the mouth of it 46 Battery was badly placed to meet a tank attack after Belhamed fell and therefore moved back 500 yards to a slight ridge from which anti-tank fields of fire were better, though the guns remained in a field role, controlled mainly by Major Kensington of 25 Battery from the eastern edge of Belhamed itself. Also near the mouth, Lieutenant Gapes
[70] had his three remaining 18-pounders of Q Troop. A little to the south-east but still near the mouth, V/AA Battery of the 8th Field was getting short of ammunition when it was joined by C Troop of the 6th Field from Belhamed with welcome come reserves. Ascending the wadi, the next guns were nine 25-pounders of W/X Battery of the 8th Field, also badly placed for anti-tank action. Four of these (including the two attached from 25 Battery) were therefore sent farther south in an antitank role. At the Sciuearat strongpoint 26 Battery, in a combined anti-tank and field role, was joined by five 2-pounders of the 65th Anti-Tank. In the heart of the brigade position D Troop's four 18-pounders were the last defence against tank attack from the west. All available 2-pounders and Bofors were interleaved with the heavier guns in the shallow wadi to stiffen the anti-tank defence. Ten more 2-pounders and three 18-pounders (one of them unserviceable) arrived with the 6 Brigade remnants and could well have been used, with the infantry, to provide further strength on the threatened western flank; but the 4 Brigade BM had them sited or deployed on the eastern flank, which was quiet. The only enemy active there were some 3000-odd Italians in large lorries, intent on surrendering after the 8th Field fired a brief concentration at them. A few tanks were seen to the east from time to time, but none of them was venturesome. To the west it was a very different story. The bulk of 15 Panzer Division was preparing to continue its advance from Belhamed to Zaafran and only the few I tanks and the guns blocked its way.

The wadi was under constant shellfire, yet the many and various tasks which had to be performed to serve the guns and control their fire were carried out without pause. They included the work of 9 Light Aid Detachment under Second-Lieutenant Bourke, [71] repairing damaged guns. Bourke worked in the open, with first a bombardier and then a sergeant of the 4th Field helping him. After the campaign there was a court of inquiry into the loss of certain guns and Bourke's evidence to this under oath reads in part as follows:

‘One of A Tp's Bdrs came to see me about repairing a gun with a damaged trail. I … found it had the trail damaged badly on the left side and also the dial sight carrier damaged. We then decided that there was enough of the trail left to carry on firing provided we changed the dial sight carrier bracket with the gun mentioned first.

‘No. 2 gun also had both tyres cut to ribbons. We changed the dial sight bracket from No. 1 and removed the two wheels complete from No. 1 gun….No. 2 gun was then taken away by the Bdr to A Tp….Captain Shortt sent down a further gun (No. 3 gun). The tell tale rod on this gun was right out. We removed the stuffing box and U-section packings Sgt Ayton
[72] of 26 Bty assisting me. We got new U-section packings and at this stage while fitting packings the position we were in was heavily shelled. We then decided to move the LAD and moved about 200 yards in the lee of the hill. I went back with Sgt Ayton. We managed to get two complete wheels at this stage which we placed on No. 1 gun.’

And all this work, related in this matter-of-fact fashion, went on in front of the infantry and in constant expectation of tank attack by enemy just beyond the slight rise to the west! In the overcrowded RAP of the 4th Field, also under shellfire most of the day, the same kind of selfless devotion to the work at hand was evident and taken for granted. Some of the patients, including Beattie and Symon (both badly wounded), were casualties of the 6th Field in its early morning fight.

[69]
Capt N. W. Laugesen; born NZ 4 Dec 1903; real-estate agent; killed in action 22 Jul 1942.

[70]
Capt B. G. Gapes, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wellington, 17 Jul 1915; car salesman. Gapes had gone forward in the morning in time to see elements of 20 Bn rounded up on Belhamed. Hull-down tanks knocked out one of his guns, Q1 under Sgt D. G. Mackenzie, and forced him to withdraw the other three.

[71]
Capt H. J. Bourke, m.i.d.; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 15 Jul 1911; motor mechanic.

[72]
Capt J. J. Ayton, MBE, m.i.d.; Auckland; born New Hebrides, 12 Apr 1918; brass finisher; now Regular Force.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Duff's Gun Group Beats Back All Attacks

Duff's Gun Group Beats Back All Attacks

The 4th Field had waited anxiously for instructions when the early morning attack took place, unable to bring down fire because of the smoke pall which blocked observation. By the time this cleared the action was finished and the 6th Field and 20 Battalion were overrun. From then onwards observation was steadily maintained and the enemy to the west was shelled vigorously. ‘Throughout this day’, Duff says in his report, ‘tasks were allotted by question and answer to Btys, as FOOs were continually on the move and with guns swinging all round the 360 deg. and RHQ confined to a hole in the ground … it was very difficult to find out who could or could not observe and to remember which btys were at any given moment facing in the most suitable direction.’

That the Division would have to withdraw by nightfall at the latest was obvious and Freyberg had earnest R/T discussions with General Norrie on this point before deciding to do so to the east and south-east. But to the gunners covering the approaches from Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh it was painfully evident that the enemy was getting ready for a further advance, ammunition was running low, and the situation was critical. To delay the impending attack was important; but how much ammunition could be spared for this? A gathering of vehicles and tanks south of Belhamed was shelled at 3 p.m. with gratifying results. An ammunition lorry went up in flames and the tanks moved away.

Half an hour later Duff was called to a conference at Brigade Headquarters and told to begin forming up for a move eastwards, but that no move was to take place until 5.30 p.m. It was an hour before he could assemble all battery commanders and the commander of 1 Survey Troop to pass on these orders. By this time the artillery preparation for the further advance of the panzer division to Zaafran was well under way and the wadi was under intense fire from 150-millimetre medium howitzers and 105s.

The RAF provided a welcome interruption to this fire when two squadrons of Marylands bombed south of Belhamed. This bombing had originally been requested by Brigade Headquarters soon after midday; but the bomb line specified was much too far east. Many guns and all the I tanks were beyond it, indicating how little Brigade Headquarters knew of the situation of the gunners. The mistake was pointed out and a new line proposed; but this, too, was dangerously close to the gun group in the wadi and there were several FOOs well beyond it, including Major Kensington and Lieutenant Varian. Kensington escaped harm, but Varian was killed. Soon afterwards the Luftwaffe came over and Stukas bombed their own panzer troops.

There was no question of moving any gun until the last possible moment and the gunners faced the spectre of empty limbers as they waited for word to pull out. For them the timing of the enemy attack was all-important and they conserved ammunition to meet it. Duff envisaged a fighting withdrawal and therefore did not attempt to form batteries up when they withdrew. He merely told battery commanders where he wanted them to be in the divisional assembly and instructed them to take up those positions after they withdrew as and when circumstances allowed.

The attack started just before 5 p.m. and in the shallow wadi almost all guns reverted at once to Gun Control and fired over open sights. Withering fire from Q Troop and 46 Battery met tanks which appeared at the mouth of the wadi and tried to ascend it. Though ‘shooting was very hard on account of the dust and smoke’, according to the CPO, Lieutenant Hodge, [73]

the tanks were repulsed. More then appeared due west, across the wadi, and trails were quickly swung round to meet them. The three 18-pounders of Q Troop, on the extreme right of the gun line, fired as fast as they could and to better effect than the field gunners, who were not so experienced in this kind of fire. Farther south the 25-pounders, 2-pounders and Bofors blazed away until the tanks fell back. Then the gunners had to contend with infantry, engaging them with HE over open sights and causing them heavy loss, but failing to subdue the machine-gun fire which swept the gun areas. Fortunately this was not accurate or well-controlled.

Enemy shell and mortar fire had in the preceding half-hour caused a rapid turnover to take place in some gun crews and the attack came when several guns were manned by scratch crews.

The desperate nature of the fighting from five o'clock onwards is well illustrated by the case of the two 4th Field guns with W/X Battery. Second-Lieutenant Nathan
[74] had just returned from the command post and with two gunners he took over C2, while Sergeant Lindsay
[75] controlled C3. One of the C2 gunners was badly wounded almost at once and on Nathan's orders the other helped him back towards the RAP. Sergeant Masters
[76] appeared on the scene and with his help Nathan continued to fire until the appointed time for withdrawal, 5.30 p.m. Meanwhile one of Lindsay's gun crew was so gravely wounded that it took four men to carry him out of action and get urgent medical attention for him. This left C2 and C3 with only two men each; nevertheless they replied vigorously to the enemy fire which swept the gun lines. When W/X Battery began to withdraw in parade-ground order, Lindsay signalled his driver, who had been waiting to the rear with his engine running, and the quad at once came forward. Nathan sent Masters to get the C2 quad, but in the turmoil behind the gun lines it could not be found. There was no alternative, therefore, but to abandon the gun and Nathan and Masters both went to help Lindsay. C3 was under fierce fire, but the four men managed to hook it on to the quad without further harm. On the way back Lindsay paused under fire long enough to hook on an abandoned trailer as well. It seemed to him that a gun of W/X Battery halted to cover the withdrawal and was overrun in so doing. The 8th Field had served the Division magnificently.

The gun C4 had joined A Troop of the 4th Field and spent an hour or two in the afternoon under fire so heavy that it put two other guns in the vicinity out of action. The situation quickly got worse. A1, struck between the wheels, had its traverse and bearing face damaged. A bombardier was killed and five gunners were wounded, and the one remaining unwounded man of A Troop went to get transport for the wounded. He succeeded and all were carried back to safety. Captain Shortt, with two officers and two wounded men, left the gun position under terrible fire at 5.30 p.m., by which time the enemy had practically reached the gun lines. It was out of the question to attempt to save the guns.

Meanwhile Lance-Bombardier Gay
[77] on C4, seeing transport moving off to the rear, ordered all but one of his gunners to ‘make their way out as best they could’. With Gunner Whitehead
[78] he continued to fire the gun, hoping from moment to moment that his quad would arrive and enable him to take the gun out. An enemy column had advanced from the right and was perilously close. The two gunners, when it seemed that they were on their own and it was plain that any effort to get the gun out would have been suicidal, decided to cease fire. Reluctantly they removed the dial sight, sight clinometer and firing mechanism and set off across the wadi in the gathering dusk. A short distance to the rear they came upon Nathan and rode out with him.

The three 18-pounders of Q Troop fired until it was ‘too dark to pick out targets’. They were near the mouth of the wadi, and since they reserved their fire for tanks the enemy artillery paid them less attention. This was particularly fortunate, for their anti-tank fire was more effective than that of the 25-pounders: with one-piece ammunition their rate of fire was higher and they were better trained in firing over open sights. When they finally ceased fire, bringing the action to a close, they claimed six tanks knocked out—revenge, as it seemed to them, for the loss of one of their guns in the early-morning action.

The remnants of the Division had meanwhile been assembling on Zaafran to withdraw south-eastwards. The attack from the west halted at dusk, allowing the gunners in the wadi to form up with unexpected ease for the night move. But 26 Battery and the five guns of the 65th Anti-Tank in the Sciuearat strongpoint were hotly engaged until 6 p.m. by a dozen German tanks which advanced from the east and worked their way round the southern side, along the foot of the escarpment. The range was about 1100 yards and the panzer troops showed no inclination to come closer. They were making for Sidi Rezegh, and when they broke off the action it was dark.

The various artillery vehicles joined the divisional columns for what promised to be an exciting dash through enemy lines, but the enemy had flown and the journey was remarkably free from incident. Drivers struggled to keep awake as they drove towards Bir Gibni, the starting point of their Crusader adventures; but exhausted gunners lay limply wherever they could find room on their portées, quads or three-tonners [79] and most of them slept throughout the journey. They reached their destination about 3.30 a.m. on 2 December, quickly arranged pickets, and then resumed their sleep. Their contribution to Crusader campaign had ended.

[73]
Capt J. G. Hodge; Dunedin; born NZ 14 Apr 1916; warehouseman; wounded 31 Oct 1942.

[74]
Maj E. C. W. Nathan; Wellington; born NZ 28 Feb 1911; stockbroker.

[75]
WO II H. C. Lindsay, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 9 Jan 1915; engine driver; twice wounded.

[76]
WO I C. S. Masters; Auckland; born Dunedin, 1 Mar 1917; salesman; wounded 15 Jul 1942.

[77]
L-Bdr K. Gay; Millerton; born NZ 31 Jul 1909; labourer.

[78]
Sgt B. P. K. Whitehead; Palmerston North; born Wellington, 31 Jul 1913; NZR employee; twice wounded.

[79] The anti-tank 18-pounders were drawn by 3-ton lorries.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Maori Victory at Menastir

The Maori Victory at Menastir

Hundreds of other New Zealand gunners remained in action in the frontier area and with the Tobruk garrison. Those in the Menastir area—28 Battery less E Troop, F Anti-Tank Troop and half of D Light Ack-Ack Troop—had moved with 22 Battalion on the 28th to the Omar forts and next day joined 23 and 28 Battalions in the Capuzzo– Sollum area. All three battalions with their artillery moved to the Menastir area in the first two days of December, with 22 Battalion in its original position, the 23rd nearer Bardia, and the 28th just to the west of the 22nd. The field guns—27 Battery and what was left of 28 Battery—took up a central position in the folds of the escarpment and the 2-pounders and Bofors gave close support to the infantry, while the cavalry reconnoitred westwards.

The new 5 Brigade position was considerably stronger than the former one and on 3 December it gave decisive evidence of this in repulsing a probing attack by strong elements of 15 Panzer Division. This began at 11.30 a.m. with shelling of Maori positions on the escarpment to which 27 Battery quickly replied. The Maoris lay low and held their fire until about 1 p.m., by which time the foremost enemy troops were well past the Maori FDLs. The Left Section of D Troop of the 14th Light Ack-Ack was stationed on the flat among the Maoris, but only one of its three Bofors could engage the enemy. When the Maoris opened fire, which they did with immense enthusiasm, this Bofors joined in and its fire at very close range was devastating. In a matter of minutes it set five German vehicles on fire and put out of action an anti-tank gun drawn by a ‘halftrack’. The field guns quickly subdued their enemy counterparts and brought the many vehicles on the Via Balbia under heavy fire. Within an hour the enemy was in full retreat and the front was strewn with blazing vehicles. On the right flank, towards the coast, however, enemy detachments persisted courageously with efforts to outflank the defence and folds in the ground gave them good cover from field artillery fire. The only way to deal with them was to counter-attack and this the Maoris did in the late afternoon, supported by the single Bofors and by every 2-pounder of 32 Battery that could be brought to bear on this flank. The field guns fired smoke shells to blind the enemy and under this cover the Maoris attacked, clearing the ground at the point of the bayonet. By dark it was all over and the enemy had suffered very severe loss at small cost to the defence. The gunners had given useful support, but the honours of this action clearly belonged to the Maoris.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Gunners in Tobruk Fortress

Gunners in Tobruk Fortress

Inside Tobruk fortress, which from 1 December was again besieged, there were more than 3500 New Zealanders, including many hundreds of gunners. Most of the survivors of the 6th Field, less 48 Battery, were among them and the five 25-pounders they brought with them from Belhamed went into action under command of the 1st Field, RA, near the Tobruk By-pass Road while the Belhamed battle was still raging. Three Bofors of 43 Battery had also managed to withdraw from Belhamed with the 6th Field, together with several other battery vehicles. They came under heavy shellfire as they drove towards Tobruk and then struck serious trouble in the form of anti-tank mines, which disabled four ack-ack vehicles including a gun tractor and badly damaged a Bofors gun. The remaining two guns went into action in support of 2/13 Australian Battalion.

Divisional Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, with many B Echelon trucks, including those of the 4th Field and 31 Anti-Tank Battery, had driven into Tobruk in the confused night before the Belhamed battle.

RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack eventually settled in an Italian barracks, but Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow, the senior NZA officer in Tobruk, had to leave later in the day to join Artillery Headquarters as acting CRA.

Enemy attacks on the Ed Duda part of the Tobruk Corridor were renewed while the Belhamed fighting was still going on, a further attack started up during the night of 1–2 December, and next day it gained added momentum. The garrison commander and all his Eighth Army superiors had been ready to withdraw from the Corridor to the original Tobruk perimeter on the 1st, not realising that such a move would have conceded victory to the enemy and ended Crusader campaign. A detached observer might therefore have concluded that the New Zealanders in the Corridor—gunners, infantry, Signals and ASC—had jumped from the frying pan into the fire. But the men concerned knew better. The anti-tankers serving as infantry with 18 Battalion, for example, helped to repulse a German attack on the 2nd and drive the enemy back in disorder. They realised in the course of this fighting that the morale of the German positional infantry, unlike that of the panzer troops they had fought the day before, was on the verge of collapse and their own spirits therefore soared upwards.

Behind them other New Zealand gunners were learning, to their surprise, that there were many guns to spare in Tobruk, most of them captured from the enemy. A Troop of 29 Battery and the one gun of B Troop—the five guns of the 6th Field that had reached the Corridor from Belhamed—took up antitank roles with the 1st RHA in the area of 2/13 Australian Battalion, at first on a notorious feature known to the ‘locals’ as Murderers' Ridge, where they were shelled mercilessly from three directions. Later A Troop was directed by the RHA to an area they called with good reason Quiet Valley, and the B Troop gun with its crew were ‘given away’ to an RHA troop. Meanwhile Major Sharp
[80] took the remaining men of 29 Battery and some of 47 Battery who were with them, together with various wounded New Zealanders from the Belhamed battle, to Tobruk proper, reporting to Artillery Headquarters there. He arranged for rolls to be called and for the wounded to be evacuated to hospitals in the town. Then he and other senior artillery officers worked out details of a plan for New Zealand gunners to take over some of the idle guns and with them to strengthen the defences of Tobruk. There would still, however, be an undue proportion of headquarters and administrative troops and those not needed to service the guns would be evacuated by sea as soon as possible. The Division had already suffered grievous loss, the whole of the fortress area was under shellfire and was frequently bombed, and General Freyberg (who was in touch by wireless) had no wish to expose his men to unnecessary danger.

These arrangements were made in close co-operation with the Tobruk garrison. The Workshops Section of the 14th Light Ack-Ack worked with a parallel section of the Royal Ordnance Corps to salvage and repair guns, Bren carriers, and other vehicles, while the Ack-Ack Signals Section established telephone communications between NZA detachments in the fortress area.

Two or three days later most of the New Zealand guns withdrew inside the perimeter—though not before a Bofors of 43 Battery was damaged by shellfire near Ed Duda. The five 25-pounders of the 6th Field plus four Italian ‘75s’ and four German 105-millimetre gun-howitzers—P, Q and R Troops respectively—made up a composite field battery under Major Snadden. In a brief course on the foreign guns RA instructors explained, among other things, that they were quite likely to blow up when fired. It was just as well, therefore, that they were not in fact put to the test. The battery moved into a reserve position near the original perimeter and stayed there a few days without opening fire. The main role of these field gunners was anti-tank and none of several enemy efforts to regain the Corridor area gained enough ground to present them with targets. The Tobruk battle was dying down. The enemy, exhausted by the fighting at Sidi Rezegh and the strain of maintaining the siege of Tobruk against a lively and powerful garrison, was losing his grip.

The gunners who were best placed to observe this were those of the two N Troop guns of 34 Anti-Tank Battery under Lieutenant Lund who had accompanied 19 Battalion to Ed Duda and stayed there in reserve positions. ‘In reserve’ had a special meaning at Ed Duda: it signified getting shelled from three sides by guns of calibres from 75- to 210-millimetres without being able to hit back. In these last days of the siege, moreover, it meant not having the encouragement that the forward troops had of seeing for themselves the diminishing strength of the enemy infantry; for the artillery and mortar fire remained heavy. The last major effort against the Corridor was on the 4th. It occasioned many fireworks and a slight local withdrawal; but its repulse was decisive. On the 6th outside British forces again made contact with the garrison and the siege was virtually ended.

From then onwards only the Bofors crews had occasion to fire their guns. When Snadden's field battery was formed, the light anti-aircraft gunners formed X Battery under Major Bretherton, with nine Bofors manned by New Zealanders and eventually two existing RA troops each of five Breda LAA guns. Three Bofors under Lieutenant Simpson
[81] were at once detached and came under the command of the 39th Light Ack-Ack, RA, serving in the area of the composite field battery. The rest of X Battery came under the 69th Heavy Ack-Ack, RA, and took up positions guarding the El Gubbi airfield and satellite landing grounds in roughly the middle of the fortress area, with roles also in the harbour defence scheme. They contributed to the spectacular night-time ack-ack barrages over Tobruk on the 5th, 6th and 7th of the month. Next day Simpson's section returned to X Battery. From the 10th to the 19th the battery fired nightly and also engaged Stukas and other aircraft which attacked Tobruk by day. Enemy ground troops had already slipped away westwards towards Gazala; but Tobruk retained a high priority as a target for the Axis air forces and the New Zealand addition to its ack-ack defence was very welcome. By the time X Battery handed its guns over to an RA regiment on 21 December and prepared to drive back to Baggush, other New Zealand gunners had resumed fighting against enemy ground troops and aircraft west of Tobruk, at Acroma and then Gazala.

[80]
Maj R. W. Sharp; born NZ 23 Apr 1907; civil engineer; 2 i/c 6 Fd Regt Sep 1941-Aug 1942.

[81]
Maj R. S. V. Simpson, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Hastings, 4 May 1914; solicitor; GSO III (Ops) 2 NZ Div, Aug 1943-Mar 1944; Bty Comd, 5 Fd Regt, May-Nov 1944; wounded 27 Jun 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Sinking of the Chakdina

The Sinking of the Chakdina

Of the many sequels to the Corridor battle which ended the main New Zealand part in the offensive, the unhappiest by far concerned the evacuation of wounded from Tobruk. Hospitals in the fortress area were grossly overcrowded as a consequence of the unexpectedly long and bitter fighting, and it was a matter of the greatest urgency in the first few days of December to get wounded back to less congested hospitals where they could get proper attention. There was no knowing at that stage how long it would be before the land route eastwards was opened and too few hospital ships were available for the task. The little s.s. Chakdina when it sailed in the afternoon of 5 December on its return voyage to Alexandria therefore carried 600 men (including 120 New Zealanders) of whom 380 were wounded, 97 of them New Zealanders and among these over 30 gunners. Just after 9 p.m. an aerial torpedo struck and exploded in an after hold and in three and a half minutes the crowded little ship sank in a strong swell. Some 400 men were drowned, 80 of them New Zealanders and almost all of these survivors of the fighting at Sidi Rezegh and Belhamed. Thirty gunners were lost in this disaster, among them Sergeants Buchanan and McLeay, both decorated in Crete, and other veterans of the early fighting.

Second-Lieutenant Butcher
[82] of the 7th Anti-Tank was one of the stretcher cases below and like the others had been issued with water-wings. When the ship rolled after the explosion and the engine-room crew raced past, he got up, grabbed his waterwings and made for the nearest stairs as the lights went out. Others forced their way past, one trampling on his fingers in so doing, but he managed to reach the opening on to the deck as the ship went down. Behind him he heard a ‘cry, in an agony of terror’ from the trapped men below and then he struggled in a ‘smashing, dinning rush of water, wreckage and rigging’ in which he—a very poor swimmer—lost his waterwings. He bobbed up and down in the whirlpool and then found himself in deep, still water and it seemed ages before he broke the surface. Grabbing all the bits of wood he could lay his hands on, he finally came upon a large piece and clung to it, hearing cries for help all round him. Coming within reach of a Carley float, he clutched this until a sailor, seeing he was wounded, hauled him on to it. Two and a half hours later all those on or around the Carley float were rescued by a corvette. Butcher is believed to be the only New Zealand stretcher case who escaped from the Chakdina. [83]

From Tobruk the gunners recovered much equipment lost in the course of the fighting, including guns. The anti-tankers of A and C Troops, who had lost their guns at Belhamed and served as infantry with 18 Battalion near Ed Duda, took part in many patrols. Second-Lieutenant Ward [84] on his second patrol discovered that the enemy had disappeared from the western part of Belhamed and at once organised salvage parties which brought in A2, A3 and C3. These were duly emplaced in support of the infantry, but when the battalion was withdrawn inside the fortress area on 10 December the trail of one gun broke. Only the piece [85] and the wheels could be taken farther and these were in due course carried back to Baggush, while the other two guns were towed behind the two N Troop portées when these withdrew from Tobruk with part of 19 Battalion. Other salvage parties recovered what they could of the remains of the 6th Field guns at Belhamed.

[82]
Maj E. Butcher; born NZ 7 Dec 1910; storeman; wounded 30 Nov 1941.

[83] More New Zealand gunners were among 44 New Zealanders lost off Greece on 9 December when the Jantzen, carrying prisoners of war, was torpedoed on its way to Italy. The explosion in this case caused frightful carnage, and ineptitude in handling the survivors in southern Greece resulted in further loss of life. See W. W. Mason, Prisoners of War ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1954), pp. 110-12.

[84] Lt C. M. Ward; born NZ 17 June 1916; bank clerk; died Hamilton, 27 Sep 1960.

[85] i.e., the barrel and buffer-recuperator, with the firing mechanism.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Gazala Battle

The Gazala Battle

It seemed like the end of the story for the New Zealand gunners in Tobruk; but there was more to come. After a few quiet days in the Bardia area following the slaughter at Menastir on the 3rd, 5 Brigade was committed to pursue the Axis forces retreating westwards. Its depleted artillery, however, was in urgent need of reinforcement and the 5th Field therefore entered Tobruk on its way to the front. The composite battery there discarded its German and Italian guns and added its remaining resources to those of the newcomers to form a new 5th Field of five 25-pounder troops under Major Sprosen, with Major Philp commanding 27 Battery and Snadden 28 Battery. The gun crews were a mixture of all three field regiments.

E Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack had meanwhile salvaged the three Bofors of the Right Section of D Troop which had been lost at Sidi Azeiz and by 5 December D Troop had five guns and E Troop seven. The two troops, numbering 123 all ranks, moved with 5 Brigade to the outskirts of the Tobruk fortress area on the 9th; but D Troop lost one gun which capsized in a culvert. (It was salvaged by morning, but needed repair and was retained by the New Zealand Bofors gunners in Tobruk.) The brigade group paused outside Tobruk for a day, gathering and improvising resources for mobile operations, and then drove on westwards in the early hours of the 11th without waiting for the field guns. At Acroma it split up and the D Troop Bofors moved with the Maori Battalion inland while those of E Troop with 23 Battalion took the coast road.

The Right Section of E Troop, which was leading, leapt into action when 13 three-engined Ju52s came over very low, evidently believing Acroma to be in Axis hands, and gave them a rousing reception. One Junkers came down in flames and others were almost certainly damaged. It was some compensation for the days spent under shellfire in the Sollum and Capuzzo areas when the Bofors gunners had no way of hitting back.

At Gazala from the 11th onwards the ack-ack gunners had a most exciting time. Three bombers coming out of the clouds on the 12th met the fire of E Troop and veered off quickly. Then E Troop engaged a formation of Me109Fs—high-performance single-engined fighters—moving away at 4000 feet. A twinengined Me110 made a better target; but a large group of Stukas did not come within range. D Troop with the Maoris was in action early on the 13th, firing at Heinkel bombers at long range. Two Me109Fs kept coming over and were engaged whenever possible; but they were elusive targets. Shellfire damaged a D Troop gun; but E Troop avenged this near Bir el Geff by bringing down three out of 25 Stukas. Two of the remainder were seen to be smoking as they flew away. An enemy bomber retaliated by making a deliberate attack on one of the Bofors; but it caused no casualty and did no damage. Next day the Right Section of E Troop saw 15 Stukas and 40 fighters and later in the morning a similar force; but to the keep disappointment of the gunners neither group came within range. D Troop with the Maori Battalion also had a frustrating experience watching a heavy dive-bombing attack on 5 Brigade Headquarters, just out of reach of the Bofors. From then onwards the ack-ack gunners, well forward with the infantry, came under shellfire which was at times quite heavy; but they had only one more opportunity to engage enemy aircraft in the Gazala area. On the 17th four Me109Fs attacked a force of Blenheim bombers with fighter escort and the Bofors were quick to bring the German fighters under fire and help to drive them off. [86]

The New Zealand infantry began their operations at Gazala under cover of fire from two brave and skilful troops of the 1st RHA. One of these with a famous name harking back to the Peninsular War, Chestnut Troop, advanced with 23 Battalion along the coast road. When the leading infantry came under heavy artillery fire on the 11th, Chestnut Troop engaged the much larger enemy artillery and covered a slight withdrawal. In fierce fighting next day the RHA gunners helped the New Zealanders to seize and hold against counter-attack the last major outpost in front of the Gazala line proper, while the other RHA troop covered the Maoris on an easier advance inland. On the 13th Chestnut Troop suffered a heavy bombardment from several enemy batteries and lost one man killed and five wounded. The other troop gave covering fire to 22 Battalion in a further advance; but at the end of it no fewer than 10 troops of enemy field guns were located ahead and for further operations much stronger artillery support would be needed. It looked very much as though the enemy was prepared to fight a pitched battle in defence of the vital Gazala line.

assault on the gazala line, 13–16 december

The reorganised 5th Field was therefore most welcome when it arrived on the 13th from Tobruk. Major Philp's 27 Battery with three 25-pounder troops relieved the RHA troop inland and this went to join Chestnut Troop with 23 Battalion on the coast, while Major Snadden's 28 Battery with two 25-pounder troops supported the Maoris. Philp and his OP party came under heavy and accurate fire as they went forward to study the situation, but they ‘took evasive action which was very neatly done’ (according to one witness) and suffered no harm. Philp was asked to bring down predicted fire during the night, but he was sceptical of reported locations of hostile batteries and did not do so—a decision vindicated when these were later found to be most inaccurate. The Maoris, however, were itching to attack a strongpoint immediately ahead and at 3 a.m. on the 14th Snadden's battery fired a 15-minute concentration on it before the Maoris charged in and took it at the point of the bayonet, making much use of hand grenades.

No further advance was attempted on the 14th, but the infantry were close up against the main defences and came under a lot of fire which the field gunners did their best to overcome. They engaged several Italian 75s and damaged more than one of them—old-fashioned guns with wooden wheels, some of them bravely but curiously fired from ground level and not from gun pits. Brigade Headquarters was twice bombed and in RHQ two gunners were wounded when an ammunition truck was hit. [87] The Bofors were too few to give adequate cover to the large area occupied by the various headquarters, but one Stuka was shot down by small-arms fire.

A Polish brigade now arrived on the scene and its units were sited in an area overlapping that of 5 Brigade. The Poles were to attack in conjunction with the Maoris, but zero hour was changed several times and the impatient Poles, disclosing their positions prematurely, brought down much fire on themselves. This in turn caused 27 Battery to undertake a long and difficult counter-battery programme to ease the strain on the Poles, and in the course of this some Polish guns, in trying to help, fired short and caused casualties in a Polish battalion headquarters. Much confusion resulted and Major Philp had to try to sort things out with a Polish liaison officer.

Both attacks were nevertheless successful and bit deep into the main defences of the Gazala line. That of the Maoris, starting in mid-afternoon, was ambitious and complicated and the gunners had a hard time trying to keep in touch with the changing situation and give support where it was most needed. Daylight on the 16th, however, disclosed many local difficulties with enemy posts by-passed in the night. A Polish carrier fell victim to one such post on the left flank and Captain Bent
[88] and his driver, with a Polish motor-cyclist, laboured bravely under fire to rescue the wounded. In the evening the Poles carried out a special patrol to avenge this incident and their success was attested ‘by the squeals of the Italians’. Early on the 16th, too, what looked like a counter-attack on the Maoris and Brigade Headquarters attracted the fire of every field gun within reach and of four New Zealand Vickers guns, and it was shattered before it began. Many of the force of some 800 Italians were killed or wounded, the remainder fled, and when the scene was inspected next day it provided some gruesome sights. The Maoris meanwhile struck dogged opposition in trying to extend their positions and a thrust by 22 Battalion failed to capture some troublesome enemy posts. The field gunners were therefore called on to keep these quiet.

Further strong opposition was expected on the 17th; but the enemy had fled in the night. It was a sudden anti-climax and many of the gunners felt somehow cheated. Infantry carrier patrols were allowed to carry on westwards (though they were soon recalled); but the guns had to stay where they were. On the 18th, in a concentration area at Bir el-Geff, gunners learned that they would soon return to Baggush. Next day Major Philp, with the full support of his men, asked that 27 Battery might be allowed to continue to serve with 13 Corps when 5 Brigade withdrew; but his request was flatly refused. On the 21st Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow arrived to take command of the 5th Field and a party of officers including Sprosen and Philp returned to Baggush. Two days later the regiment followed. X Ack-Ack Battery had handed over its war equipment, including guns, to RA gunners in Tobruk on the 21st and also made its way back to Baggush. The main body of the 5th Field split up in a fierce sandstorm near Buq Buq on the road back, with the result that RHQ and 27 Battery reached Baggush on Christmas Day but 28 Battery did not arrive until Boxing Day. There were many warm reunions and New Year's Eve was lively and spectacular. It was soon followed by the good news that almost all the NCOs and gunners (though not the officers) of the 5th Field, 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack who had been captured at Sidi Azeiz and imprisoned in Bardia were safely recovered and on their way back to Base. This was a happy tailpiece to what was for the Divisional Artillery as a whole the hardest campaign of the war.

The losses when they were finally worked out produced the following figures:

| Killed and Died of Wounds | Wounded | Wounded and Prisoner of War | Prisoner of War (Unwounded) | Total
HQNZA | 1 | 1 | 2 [*] | 1 | 5
4th Field | 26 | 56 | 2 | 6 | 90
5th Field | 49 | 52 | 8 | 53 | 162
6th Field | 55 | 97 | 11 | 73 | 236
7th Anti-Tank | 49 | 76 | 17 | 44 | 186
14th Light Ack-Ack | 17 | 41 | — | 6 | 64
1 Survey Troop | 1 | 3 | — | — | 4
| 198 | 326 | 40 | 183 | 747

Among them were two regimental commanders, Oakes, an inspiring leader in action, killed while recklessly refusing to take cover from the fire of 21 Panzer Division on the Trigh Capuzzo, and Fraser, captured at Sidi Azeiz. [89] The gravest loss by far, however, was that of Miles (who escaped from captivity but did not survive the war). Reggie Miles was an all-round gunner, interested and accomplished in every sphere of gunnery; but he was more than that. At all levels and in all units he was admired and respected and when he disappeared into the swirling smoke and dust at Belhamed in the company of some of his beloved gunners it was as if the Divisional Artillery had lost its father.

[86] On the same day, by an unkind twist of fate, a gunner of 42 Battery held captive in the Bardia compound was killed by an RAF bomb.

[87] Gnrs J. Heenay and R. V. Green.

[88]
Maj W. S. Bent, m.i.d.; born Waiuku, 3 Oct 1916; insurance clerk.

[89] Fraser in due course was repatriated and served with distinction in the New Zealand Returned Services Association, for many years as its president. As CO of the 5th Field he was most conscientious, and characteristically he did not regard his duty towards his wartime colleagues as ended with the ending of the war.

[*] *Includes Brig R. Miles, later classified as Died on Active Service.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 8 — Interlude in Syria

CHAPTER 8
Interlude in Syria

REINFORCEMENTS had reached Baggush from base camp long before Christmas and units were quickly restored to something approaching their original strengths. This meant many new faces in some units—one in three in the 6th Field and over one in four in the 7th Anti-Tank, for example. [1] It meant four new regimental commanders: Glasgow, as mentioned, for the 5th Field, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter
[2] for the 6th Field, Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell (formerly second-in-command of the 4th Field) for the 7th Anti-Tank, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carty (formerly of 41 Battery) for the 14th Light Ack-Ack. [3] And it meant a new CRA, ‘Steve’ Weir, promoted to brigadier. Among existing regimental commanders there were only two Regulars of the RNZA, Weir of the 6th Field and Duff of the 4th Field, and the former was one rung higher on the gradation list. Both were highly accomplished gunners, but of very different kinds. Weir was a dominant personality whose heart and soul was in field gunnery. He had so far found regimental life ‘all that one could wish for’ (as he wrote in a December letter to his brother); the 6th Field was to him a ‘very happy family’, and he did not at first welcome the wider responsibilities of his new command.

Weir's record was already auspicious. In 1925 the officer commanding the Central Military District had written of him that he had ‘outstanding qualities—a strong personality, a good physique, soldierly appearance, and a very good cadet and Territorial record’. What was at issue was a cadetship to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and the OC continued, ‘I place him first and strongly recommend his selection as a man well fitted to uphold New Zealand's reputation and to become a valuable officer’. Fortunately for the artillery it was not to Sandhurst that Weir went but to the Royal Military

Academy at Woolwich. Passing out in 1927, he spent a year attached to field, medium and anti-aircraft units of the Royal Artillery before returning to New Zealand. A varied career included special duty at Napier after the 1931 earthquake. In 1933 he became adjutant of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade and in 1936 of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Battery. The outbreak of war forestalled a course at Camberley; but it led to rapid promotion. By July 1941 Weir had already been twice mentioned in despatches. For outstanding service in Greece he was awarded the DSO and in due course, for his contribution to the fighting at Sidi Rezegh, he earned a bar to it. Only 37 years old when he became CRA, even greater honours were in store for Steve Weir.

Training in Combined Operations

In the first week of January 1942, 5 Brigade with its artillery moved to Kabrit in the Canal Zone and Artillery Headquarters to Fayid in the same area (followed within a few days by the RHQs of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack), while 4 Brigade moved back to Maadi Camp. At Kabrit the gunners trained earnestly with the infantry to make landings by night on a hostile coast, and those at Fayid, Baggush and Maadi undertook more orthodox training. Towards the end of the month 5 Brigade completed its exercises and moved to a desert area south of the Sweetwater Canal, and 4 Brigade took its place at the Combined Training Centre, being in turn replaced at Maadi by 6 Brigade from Baggush. [4] It was like an intricate version of musical chairs, the complications arising mainly from shortages of transport and other essential equipment, so that there were many train journeys and much borrowing. Early in January the 6th Field had been ordered to send a detachment to Tobruk to collect guns and trailers, and sent Captain Angell
[5] on this mission with a party of drivers and 23 quads. He expected the journey to take four days; but it actually took eleven. The guns so far salvaged, he found when he got there, were all earmarked for immediate operations; but he was determined not to return empty-handed. He and his party therefore scoured the Tobruk battlefields on their own account, salvaging and repairing trucks and guns, and on 16 January they got back to Baggush with no fewer than 34 guns and trailers for the NZA, a splendid achievement. After a brief rest Angell carried on to Maadi to deliver most of these guns to the 4th and 5th Field, with the dual capacity of acting as advanced guard for the main body of the 6th Field. In Maadi the transport of the regiment dwindled rapidly as various items were requisitioned for operations in the desert: six three-tonners and the 30 Battery water truck, then 16 pick-ups and six ‘monkey trucks’ for the RHA and a Signals unit of 7 Armoured Division. ‘We were beginning to wish that someone would come and take the lot,’ one officer remarked, ‘and then we would know where we stood.’

A brigade amphibious exercise in the first week of February took the 5th Field and 32 and 42 Batteries in Glen ships (designed for landing operations) into the Red Sea for a beach landing in the Gulf of Suez. It was a spectacular undertaking; but some details of it gave rise to apprehension about what it would have been like had it been the ‘real thing’. C Troop of the 5th Field left its mother ship by MLCs, followed half an hour later by RHQ and 47 BHQ in another MLC, which had to stop on the way to the beach to take in tow a sinking MLC carrying two guns and a quad and some of the gunners of C Troop, which in due course was safely beached. On the beach there was much confusion. The guns of 47 Battery waited, conspicuous and vulnerable, while their quads towed 27 Battery guns. Late in the afternoon all guns were technically ‘in action’, but no ammunition had so far reached them, while communications remained uncertain throughout.

General Auchinleck was among the high-level observers. He had hoped that 5 Brigade would be able to land behind the last-ditch Axis position at Agheila, covering Tripolitania, to pave the way for a British advance to Tripoli. But the enemy was at that very time thrusting forward from Agheila towards Benghazi and within a short time was back at Gazala. The New Zealanders were therefore spared a landing in the Gulf of Sirte which would almost certainly have been disastrous (as they realised when they inspected the ‘objective’ later).

The shape of the war had changed for the worse. Considerable German air strength had been transferred from the hiatus of the Russian winter to the central Mediterranean and covered the despatch of ground reinforcements to North Africa. At the same time British forces were called away from the Middle East to Burma and Singapore to meet the Japanese threat and two

Australian divisions were off home for the same reason. New Zealand gunners heard the news of rapid Japanese advances with mixed feelings. The war had seemed distant indeed when they sailed from New Zealand. Now it was closing in behind them and gave many of them an uneasy sense of being far away from where they were most needed. America had scarcely begun to mobilise her strength, but even when American troops did reach New Zealand their presence there, when news of it reached the Middle East, was not regarded as an unmixed blessing.

5 Brigade Mans the El Adem Box

The gunners of 5 Brigade perhaps felt all this most acutely. They had the unhappy task of retracing their steps in the second week of February to the Tobruk area, where their brigade stationed itself in an all-round defensive position at El Adem. A last-minute rush of re-equipping had put all units more or less on war establishments. Now they had to dig in and prepare to engage the enemy if he ventured past the Gazala position. It seemed as if the bitter fighting of the Crusader campaign had yielded no lasting reward—nor, for those interested in tactics, had it taught any lessons. Isolated brigade boxes, out of reach of each other, seemed all too likely to be defeated in detail and overrun. Moreover, the propensity Eighth Army had displayed in Crusader to split itself up into ineffectual mobile detachments now seemed to have become a mania and the brigade was ordered to form itself into Jock columns for the purpose of ‘swanning about’ the desert. The New Zealand command, however, insisted that all defensive positions be well dug and protected and the 14,000-yard perimeter was strongly wired and mined.

On the way to El Adem a 5th Field truck sent to Matruh to collect water tins was unluckily hit by high-level bombing and two gunners were hit, one of them being killed instantly and the other dying of wounds. [6] Orders to form a Jock column arrived before the guns got past Belhamed on 15 February. The gunner contribution was to be 28 Battery, F Troop of 32 Battery, and the Right Section of E Troop, 42 Battery. These were to stay with their units, but were to be ready to move within a quarter of an hour when ordered. Of the field guns, 28 Battery was to remain mobile, while 27 and 47 Batteries were to take up anti-tank positions, excepting one troop of each which were to have dual anti-tank and field roles. To strengthen the anti-tank defences still further, six 75-millimetre and six 47-millimetre Italian guns were to be manned by infantry, supervised by a field gunner on each ‘75’ and an anti-tank gunner on each ‘47’. The brigade layout seemed to be designed for a do-or-die action against a full-scale panzer onslaught—not a reassuring prospect and even less so when it was discovered that the 75s were practically useless and the 47s almost as bad. The least that could be expected if a strong enemy did reach the neighbourhood would be a bombardment by field and medium artillery to which, in replying, the 5th Field would be very much at a disadvantage. Even the Bofors gunners, who looked forward to some brisk action, had their spirits dampened by orders not to open fire except against planes which were actually attacking the El Adem Box from a ‘reasonable height’. In the next few days they saw many hostile aircraft; but most were at high altitudes, evidently respectful of the heavy ack-ack guns defending Tobruk and the El Adem landing ground. [7] Four 18-pounders arrived in mid-March to replace defective Italian 75s and were duly dug in. The anti-tank guns—2-pounders, 18-pounders, 25-pounders and captured enemy guns—were sited in depth with overlapping arcs of fire.

Early on the morning of 28 February 13 Italian aircraft came over low and ground-strafed the nearby landing ground and the gunners of 42 Battery fired freely at them whenever they came within reach. Fierce sandstorms at the end of the month were followed early in March by heavy rain which bogged many lorries and flooded or otherwise damaged gun pits, but also reduced air activity on both sides. Mainly because of salvage work, which was extensive, ammunition for most types of gun became plentiful and live-shoots gave field, anti-tank and ack-ack gunners good practice. Some shooting of this kind was even carried out by guns on patrol with the brigade mobile column; but no enemy was seen on those occasions. Then, on 16 March, the Bofors gunners had the interesting experience of carrying out a practice shoot with a new automatic loader. A few days later an advanced party of a South African brigade inspected the El Adem Box, and on the 24th the main body of 5 Brigade was relieved and withdrew, in a sandstorm which cut visibility down to a few yards and made travel most unpleasant, across the frontier. By the 28th it was back in Maadi, to the delight of the gunners.

Springtime in Syria

Meanwhile the Division had been committed to a holding role in Syria, a different and much more attractive land. But the story of how the various units and sub-units of the artillery conformed to this role is too fragmented to follow in full detail. Various detachments of 41 and 43 Batteries, for example, helped to defend Kasfareet aerodrome near Kabrit from 21 January onwards, and the last of them, part of 43 Battery, did not leave until 19 March. G Troop was briefly detached in this period and sited at Shallufa aerodrome. Then this battery moved late in March to Beirut, stayed there for a day or two while the mountain passes were under snow, and then drove through the magnificent scenery of the Lebanons to Rayak aerodrome, set in green fields some 10 miles from the pretty town of Zahle; but the Left Section of H Troop stayed at Khalde on the coast near Beirut, under command of 84 Sub-Area of Ninth Army.

Most divisional units other than those of 5 Brigade moved to Syria in late February or early March. The 6 Brigade artillery, after Combined Operations training in the Canal Zone, moved by way of Beirut and Tripoli to Aleppo on the Turkish frontier, where various gun troops were dispersed among infantry battalions in defensive positions. The 4 Brigade guns moved to the so-called Djedeide fortress astride the main road and railway 150 miles to the south, in the Bekaa Valley flanked by the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains, where the gunners occupied various prepared camps—mainly corrugated-iron Nissen huts with a few square EPIP tents.

The 5 Brigade artillery paused briefly at Maadi and the 5th Field served for nearly three weeks as depot regiment at the RA school at Almaza, near Cairo, before travelling by road or rail-and-road to the fortress area. Artillery Headquarters was established in barracks in Baalbek.

For the gunners camped near Djedeide or the large villages of Laboue and Zabboud there was plenty of work. With the infantry and engineers they laboured to create a real fortress, with many concreted positions including anti-tank ‘pillboxes’, and to improve their camp areas. Brigadier Weir and his senior officers spent much time reconnoitring, planning and supervising the work. But the CRA had other matters as well which demanded his attention.

The ‘brigade-group thinking’ that lay behind the fruitless and frustrating experience of 5 Brigade in the El Adem Box showed itself in many other ways which aroused his strong antagonism. Some of the most enthusiastic supporters of brigade groups went so far as to want all units, including artillery and engineers, permanently brigaded. RHQs of anti-tank and light anti-aircraft units were in their view better disbanded. Auchinleck himself supported this view and soon after reaching Syria Brigadier Weir received instructions to disband the RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack and amalgamate each of the regiment's batteries with the field regiments of their respective brigades. This would have been the beginning of a permanent commitment to the ‘brigade-group battle’, diminishing the firepower of the field artillery by two-thirds. In cases where a brigade, perhaps because of the terrain, had no need of ack-ack guns, it would have an idle battery at a time when another brigade was badly in need of more than one battery. If this policy extended, as it was very likely to do, to the anti-tank regiment, the same would be true of anti-tank batteries. And the decisions of brigade commanders about the siting of anti-tank and light anti-aircraft guns—a matter on which few infantry brigadiers were knowledgeable—would be beyond appeal. The brigadier would simply give his orders to the major who commanded the battery and that would be that. At the divisional level there would be no expert voice but the CRA's to speak for these specialist arms—and even the CRA and his headquarters, if the policy were logically applied, might be dispensed with. The effect on the fighting power of the Division would be disastrous.

This was all in accord, as Weir says, with Auchinleck's ‘doctrine of Brigade Groups’, [8] which was the main cause of many of the setbacks in the desert fighting. Weir therefore submitted a strong case in writing for not carrying out these instructions and took it personally to General Freyberg, who readily agreed with him. The CRA's ideas marched in the opposite direction from those of the Middle East authorities: he was most anxious that the Divisional Artillery, which in the Molos battle in Greece, the preliminary exercises at Sidi Clif and Bir Stella before the Crusader fighting, and in the Belhamed battle had moved towards centralised control, should develop divisional fire drills and practice deployment and communications as a single entity. He therefore asked Freyberg to let him take each field regiment in turn into the Syrian desert to practise under Divisional Artillery control and to learn its place and tasks as part of an operational divisional organisation and not merely an administrative one. In the context of current Middle East thinking this was revolutionary; but the GOC was in full sympathy and again agreed.

For Weir and his immediate staff the days at Baalbek were crowded with duties related to the defence of Syria—conferences and committees, visits to Damascus and beyond on Ninth Army business, reconnaissances of the ‘front’ (including ground likely to be occupied by hostile batteries if it came to the worst), demonstrations to visiting senior officers, and much detailed planning. At the same time the 4 Brigade artillery laboured on gun pits, command posts, OPs and other defence works on ground so rocky that engineers had frequently to be called in with their pneumatic drills and explosives. The 6 Brigade artillery also had an active time, though less arduous, with headquarters in or near Aleppo (the 6th Field RHQ lived in a spacious barracks built for the German Asian Corps in 1917) and troops and batteries dispersed to distant border regions in support of the infantry—at Idlib in the north-west or Bab el Kaoua or by the large village of Afrine in the north, in wild, scrub-covered hills which sheltered trout streams and were the scene of night raids across the border by the picturesque Kurds to steal goats. [9]

Essential work on defences naturally had first call on the resources of the CRA, but he pressed forward with his project to form the Divisional Artillery—especially the field regiments—into a single weapon, powerful and flexible, able to exert whatever of its strength was required rapidly and accurately against any target within reach. All senior officers were soon brought into the discussion; but those of the 4 Brigade artillery were fully committed for the first few weeks on the Djedeide defences. So Brigadier Weir's former regiment, the 6th Field, was the first to conduct exercises conforming with his ideas of divisional control. A preliminary exercise at a firing area near Dezzaboui entailed a night occupation of a position on 1 April so as to be ready to fire a regimental concentration early on the 2nd. But Bedouins had also carried out a night occupation of the target area, as it happened, and it took some time to persuade them to leave. The concentration then came down on the target, course shooting followed, and the exercise finished with ‘a very effective smoke shoot with fuze zero’, according to a regimental report. A gallery of distinguished visitors seemed impressed.

In the second week of April 5 Brigade from Egypt relieved 6 Brigade on the Turkish frontier and the latter, with its artillery, took over a sector of the Djedeide fortress, the gunners being quartered mainly in camps near Laboue. The 5th Field did not take part in this relief and did not go to Aleppo: it went straight to the Djedeide area, arriving on 23 April, and set to work without delay preparing a regimental position in the fortress. In a fortnight the newcomers completed 17 gun pits, three command posts and one OP. As with the other regimental positions, those of the 5th Field were to include not only main gun emplacements, but alternative pits and posts, so there seemed no end to the work. The gunners in the fortress area paused briefly to smarten up for inspection by HRH the Duke of Gloucester on 20 May and then, five days later, the 5th Field carried out as an exercise a comprehensive and realistic occupation of the Djedeide position, going through the motions of firing barrages, air co-operation shoots and link shoots, and carrying out cross observation and other schemes.

the eastern mediterranean

By this time, however, the CRA's plans for exercising the field artillery under divisional control had matured, despite the many other demands on his time, and he had the opportunity to put some of them into effect in the course of manoeuvres. The first of these began on 24 May when Divisional Headquarters (with Artillery Headquarters) and 4 Brigade and its artillery plus the 6th Field moved into the semi-desert to the north-east of the Fortress. The artillery contingent was further strengthened in the course of the manoeuvres by 211 Medium Battery, RA, and 27 Mountain Battery, RIA, and at the end of the month by the 5th Field and further elements of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack.

Besides taking their place in the brigade-cum-divisional exercises, the gunners practised various tasks independently. Field and ack-ack gunners, for example, carried out anti-tank shoots, a gun of 47 Battery demonstrated the new 210 fuse fired so as to burst low (its effect, not unlike that of shrapnel, was considered highly suitable for use against infantry or transport), and there were several shoots in conjunction with air co-operation and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, as well as more course shooting for the field gunners.

One of the main purposes of the divisional exercises was to free the Division, as Scoullar puts it, of the idea of ‘brigade groups as tactical entites’. [10] The experience of other formations in previous campaigns had won converts, including many non-NZA gunners, to this current Middle East doctrine; but Freyberg and his senior officers were against it. All this reinforced Brigadier Weir's own determination to create a true Divisional Artillery as opposed to a mere aggregate of brigaded regiments and batteries. The exercises, in the Forqloss area a few miles east of Homs (fairly flat semi-desert with just enough water to serve the needs of the Division), were therefore a turning point in the history of the Divisional Artillery. They were conducted in weather that was getting hotter and hotter and the transport raised huge clouds of dust; but the physical unpleasantness was more than offset for most gunners by the awakening consciousness of unity and power. As one observer put it, ‘it was a grand sight to see a whole regiment, or a brigade…, rolling relentlessly on in desert formation, turning when the leader turned, stopping when he stopped, like a well-disciplined herd of buffalo’.

Increased Anti-Tank Strength

There were other encouraging developments, too. A surprising order early in April that all portées of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, complete with guns, were to be returned to the ordnance depot at Abbassia in Cairo was duly complied with. It was followed by news that all four anti-tank batteries were to be re-equipped with 6-pounders. These guns, mentioned at first only guardedly by code-names, would certainly be more powerful and therefore very welcome. The much-maligned 2-pounder had in truth served well against enemy tanks in the Crusader battles, but a few German tanks with specially hardened armour had caused some concern, more were certain to appear (as indeed they had already done in the Libyan desert), and anti-tank guns which could engage them at longer range and with more destructive effect were most desirable.

The course of the Crusader fighting, moreover, indicated that the allotment of C4 anti-tank guns was insufficient for all-round protection in mobile operations, in which many more or less isolated detachments would be subject to tank attack. This point had been strongly urged by senior New Zealand officers after the campaign and their urgings now bore fruit. All the 2-pounders were to be handed over to the infantry and more still were to be provided so that each infantry battalion would have two four-gun anti-tank platoons, making a total of 80 infantry anti-tank guns. The 7th Anti-Tank, when fully re-equipped, was to have 64 6-pounders. This huge increase in the anti-tank strength of the Division would allow far greater tactical flexibility in mobile operations.

The task of training infantry to man the 2-pounders was undertaken by 34 Battery, which in the early days in Egypt had trained Australians, Indians and RA gunners. It was the sort of thing this battery did extremely well. It still retained many of the ‘old hands’ recruited in the United Kingdom, more widely-experienced and rather better educated than average New Zealand recruits; it had been on active service longer than any other sub-unit of the Division, and its present commander, Major Hall-Kenney, probably knew as much about anti-tank gunnery as anyone in the Middle East. The six-weeks' course he provided, with every detail meticulously planned, gave representatives of all 10 infantry battalions, a total of 21 officers and 88 NCOs who were to form the nuclei of the infantry anti-tank platoons, a thorough grounding in their new roles. The camp at Zabboud resounded to their gun drill, the course included many lectures and demonstrations, and it ended late in May with a field exercise and a live shoot. [11]

Key Men Leave for Service in the Pacific

Syria provided a wealth of new experiences for the New Zealand gunners, most of them enjoyable: leave at Baalbek, Damascus or Beirut, a ski school high up in the Lebanons, entertaining and being entertained by the French Foreign Legion in Aleppo, and a variety of interesting outings and tasks, including reconnaissances, which brought them into contact with the colourful and hospitable inhabitants. The climate, too, provided far more variety than that of the North African desert. An enduring concern, however, in both the Bekaa Valley and the frontier area was the guarding of camps against would-be thieves, who were numerous, skilful and daring. It was a period, too, of rumour and counter-rumour and earnest debate about the future of the Division in the light of the disasters in the Pacific. Despite denials from General Freyberg himself, there were many plausible allegations that the New Zealanders in the Middle East were going home. A few able gunners did go, to help train forces in New Zealand and to provide a leavening of battle experience for forces in the Pacific, then at brigade strength.

Among these was Danny Duff, who had commanded 34 Anti-Tank Battery in the early days, then the 7th Anti-Tank in Greece, and then, for nearly a year, the 4th Field. His extensive knowledge of gunnery and battle experience would be of great value in dealing with the urgent problems presented by the Japanese advances in the Pacific. Not everyone in the 4th Field was sorry to see him go; but the 4th Field owed more to him than most of its members realised. He had reconstructed the regiment after the disaster of Greece and Crete and saw that it was trained to the highest standards for the campaign in Libya. His handling of his guns at Zaafran and Belhamed, in circumstances of bewildering complexity, was superbly skilful. On the fateful 1st of December after the 6th Field was overrun, the defence of the remnants of the Division at Zaafran against disaster which threatened from the west was entirely in his hands. Even the divisional commander and his two brigade commanders did not fully grasp the danger and debated a quite unrealistic proposal to withdraw westwards; but Duff saw it clearly and, out of touch with them for several critical hours (because he insisted on keeping his complex telephone communications intact and refused to move when brigade headquarters moved), he fought a lone battle with all available guns, field, anti-tank and ack-ack, against two panzer divisions and the Italian Ariete Armoured Division and held them off until dark, when the Division withdrew. His contribution in this crisis was never properly recognised in the Division; but in due course his abilities were rewarded by his appointment as CRA of 3 Division in the Pacific. He left the 4th Field in April and was replaced early in June by Lieutenant-Colonel Queree, slender, retiring and at that time relatively unknown, but also of high ability which took him eventually in Italy to the position of CRA. [12]

Manhandling Bofors into position on the way to Gazala

A 5th Field gun in the Gazala battle

2-pounder portée at Gazala

5th Field on Combined Operations training in the Gulf of Suez

A 33 Battery portée below the Aleppo citadel

Gas-mask practice on the Forqloss manoeuvres, Syria

25-pounder on Forqloss plain

Boys anti-tank rifle on manoeuvres—seldom fired in action

The first shell lands at Minqar Qaim, 27 June 1942

A 25-pounder in the Minqar Qaim action

A makeshift OP at Minqar Qaim

Disabled vehicles at the foot of Minqar Qaim, from a painting by Sergeant J. W. Crippen

Minqar Qaim, by Crippen

A nearby wadi

The break-out, from a painting by Captain Peter McIntyre, formerly of 34 Anti-Tank Battery

A jeep towing a 6-pounder in the early days in the Alamein Line

The remnants of the Ariete Divisional Artillery, 3 July 1942

A 5th Field gun firing under a camouflage net, at Alam Nayil, August 1942

The 14th Light Ack-Ack engaging the Luftwaffe at Alam Nayil

The burial of a gun crew of 43 Battery, all killed when their Bofors sustained a direct hit by a bomb, 16 July 1942

27 Battery goes to ground in a Stuka raid, August 1942

‘Swordfish’ area, September 1942

General Montgomery presents a DSO to Steve Weir, 12 October 1942

Lance-Bombardier B. W. Johnston receives an MM from the 8th Army Commander

36 Survey Battery relaxing on the shore of the Dead Sea

A survey camp in the Transjordan. Front row: A. W. Cross, Jack Arthurs, A. I. Lyall, N. Russell, Back row: Pat Malthus, Jeff Hole, J. Fenton, T. Harmon

General Freyberg confers with senior officers before the Alamein offensive. Steve Weir centre

A 4.5 at Alamein

A gun of A Troop, 5th Field, fires its last round on supercharge before the breakthrough, November 1942

A Troop gun crew, 5th Field, relaxing before beginning the pursuit, November 1942

A 7th Anti-Tank lorry bogged down near Fuka

Fuka after the deluge, November 1942

There was no thought early in June of doing anything more than continuing the manning of the frontier positions, completing the Djedeide fortress, and carrying out more extensive and advanced divisional manoeuvres (in the course of which Brigadier Weir hoped to get nearer to his ideal of a divisional artillery trained to operate flexibly and efficiently at all levels from single guns up to unified control at divisional level or even higher). But all these projects suddenly dissolved on 14 June when orders arrived for the Division to move in great haste to Mersa Matruh in the Western Desert. The Eighth Army had been defeated at Gazala, Tobruk was threatened, and reinforcements were urgently needed to check the advance of the victorious Axis army. Acutely aware of the many shortages of transport and war equipment, the officers and NCOs of the Division hastened to comply with this startling order, improvising and borrowing to meet deficiencies, and turning the many camps in the Bekaa Valley and at the frontier into scenes of turmoil. The 4th and 6th Field and 1 Survey Troop left on the 16th, the 5th Field on the 18th, and the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack in batteries and smaller groups, as their attachments and various local tasks allowed, between the 16th and 19th.

It was an extraordinary exodus. When 31 Anti-Tank Battery moved off on the 17th, for example, it did so without 50 men, a significant proportion of its strength, who were still on leave. Two troops of 33 Battery had left as recently as the 9th with 6 Brigade for Aleppo to relieve 5 Brigade, and E Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery had remained in the frontier area. [13] The Left Section of A Troop of 41 Battery had not long gone to Saida ( Sidon) on the coast south of Beirut and 43 Battery still had a section at Khalde. All these far-flung detachments and the men on leave and on special tasks [14] had to be gathered in and despatched southwards. New Zealand insignia of all kinds had to be removed from uniforms and vehicles in a hasty effort to disguise the move and deceive enemy agents—though none of the civilians on the route seemed in any doubt about the identity of the New Zealanders. At Rayak 41 Battery had lent four three-tonners to a pioneer unit, its remaining vehicles were crammed with men and equipment, and still the predictors had to be left behind, to be picked up by the four lorries when they returned. The first main staging area was to be at Affule, south of Tiberias in Palestine, and it was hoped that many detachments would rejoin their units there.

Impressions of the journey varied. Some detachments, for example, had refreshing interludes in orchards and citrus groves when their convoys were held up. All found the heat oppressive. At Tiberias, over 120 in the shade, it was stifling. The haste under such conditions caused vehicles to overheat and the scorching roads—especially the shimmering macadam through the Sinai desert on the second day—and overloading caused some tyres to burst.

The main convoy crossed the Suez Canal on the 19th, drove through Cairo without halting, refuelled near Mena, and staged in the Wadi Natrun near Halfway House. The familiar scenes brought home to the gunners that the Syrian interlude, instructing, refreshing and in the main very enjoyable, had ended. All realised the gravity of the situation they now faced; but in good health and high spirits most of them welcomed the new adventure.

[1]
J. L. Scoullar in his campaign history, Battle for Egypt ( War History Branch, 1955), p.9, exaggerates the losses of these two units.

[2]
Lt-Col C. L. Walter, DSO, ED; Hamilton; born Christchurch, 10 Dec 1902; electrical engineer; CO 6 Fd Regt Dec 1941–Nov 1943.

[3] ‘Snow’ Walter was a popular choice and was to retain his command, as it happened, longer than any other CO of a field regiment. Jack Mitchell was equally popular and retained his new command even longer.

[4] Since mid-December various guns of the 14th LAA—at first of 41 Battery, then of 43 Battery—served in static roles as part of the harbour defences of Mersa Matruh and they continued to do so until 8 January.

[5]
Lt-Col A. A. Angell, MC; Auckland; born Whangarei, 27 Jul 1906; importer; Bty Comd, 6 Fd Regt, 1944; 2 i/c 5 Fd Regt Mar-May 1945; CO 6 Fd Regt May 1945-Jan 1946; wounded 26 Sep 1944.

Capt W. Halford of the 4th Field had also taken a salvage party back to the Tobruk area and recovered guns and equipment.

[6] Gnrs G. D. McGillivray and J. R. Skinner.

[7] One of them dropped six bombs in the 5th Field B Echelon area on 26 February, killing two gunners and wounding Capt H. T. W. Nolan.

[8] Letter of 9 June 1948.

[9] Some unexpected gunner reunions took place at Aleppo in March when 36 NZ Survey Battery (not strictly at that time part of the Divisional Artillery), less detachments on the Red Sea and in Cyprus, moved there to check existing maps of northern Syria. See

Chapter 13.

[10] Op. cit., p. 39.

[11] A logical sequel to this course was another at Almaza in mid-June on the Roberts gun or 6-pounder. The CO, all four battery commanders, all troop commanders, and two sergeants per troop of the 7th Anti-Tank went to this; but they were not able, as it happened, to complete it. Before the course ended some of them were firing the new gun at the enemy in the Western Desert.

[12] Queree soon demonstrated that he was a good ‘sport’ by taking part in a regimental gymkhana on 14 June and winning the donkey race on ‘Phar Lap’ (with Major Sproven second on ‘Beau Vite’ and Major Bevan third on ‘Wotan’).

[13] Men of E Troop detailed to go on leave on 5 June had their leave suddenly cancelled ‘because of food riots among native population’.

[14] A typical task was one undertaken by the 14th LAA, which had to send two lorries loaded with jerricans to Alexandria. These managed to rejoin the regiment at Affule, but it meant that the unit was short of two invaluable three-tonners when it left the Fortress area.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

REINFORCEMENTS had reached Baggush from base camp long before Christmas and units were quickly restored to something approaching their original strengths. This meant many new faces in some units—one in three in the 6th Field and over one in four in the 7th Anti-Tank, for example. [1] It meant four new regimental commanders: Glasgow, as mentioned, for the 5th Field, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter
[2] for the 6th Field, Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell (formerly second-in-command of the 4th Field) for the 7th Anti-Tank, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carty (formerly of 41 Battery) for the 14th Light Ack-Ack. [3] And it meant a new CRA, ‘Steve’ Weir, promoted to brigadier. Among existing regimental commanders there were only two Regulars of the RNZA, Weir of the 6th Field and Duff of the 4th Field, and the former was one rung higher on the gradation list. Both were highly accomplished gunners, but of very different kinds. Weir was a dominant personality whose heart and soul was in field gunnery. He had so far found regimental life ‘all that one could wish for’ (as he wrote in a December letter to his brother); the 6th Field was to him a ‘very happy family’, and he did not at first welcome the wider responsibilities of his new command.

Weir's record was already auspicious. In 1925 the officer commanding the Central Military District had written of him that he had ‘outstanding qualities—a strong personality, a good physique, soldierly appearance, and a very good cadet and Territorial record’. What was at issue was a cadetship to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and the OC continued, ‘I place him first and strongly recommend his selection as a man well fitted to uphold New Zealand's reputation and to become a valuable officer’. Fortunately for the artillery it was not to Sandhurst that Weir went but to the Royal Military

Academy at Woolwich. Passing out in 1927, he spent a year attached to field, medium and anti-aircraft units of the Royal Artillery before returning to New Zealand. A varied career included special duty at Napier after the 1931 earthquake. In 1933 he became adjutant of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade and in 1936 of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Battery. The outbreak of war forestalled a course at Camberley; but it led to rapid promotion. By July 1941 Weir had already been twice mentioned in despatches. For outstanding service in Greece he was awarded the DSO and in due course, for his contribution to the fighting at Sidi Rezegh, he earned a bar to it. Only 37 years old when he became CRA, even greater honours were in store for Steve Weir.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Training in Combined Operations

Training in Combined Operations

In the first week of January 1942, 5 Brigade with its artillery moved to Kabrit in the Canal Zone and Artillery Headquarters to Fayid in the same area (followed within a few days by the RHQs of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack), while 4 Brigade moved back to Maadi Camp. At Kabrit the gunners trained earnestly with the infantry to make landings by night on a hostile coast, and those at Fayid, Baggush and Maadi undertook more orthodox training. Towards the end of the month 5 Brigade completed its exercises and moved to a desert area south of the Sweetwater Canal, and 4 Brigade took its place at the Combined Training Centre, being in turn replaced at Maadi by 6 Brigade from Baggush. [4] It was like an intricate version of musical chairs, the complications arising mainly from shortages of transport and other essential equipment, so that there were many train journeys and much borrowing. Early in January the 6th Field had been ordered to send a detachment to Tobruk to collect guns and trailers, and sent Captain Angell
[5] on this mission with a party of drivers and 23 quads. He expected the journey to take four days; but it actually took eleven. The guns so far salvaged, he found when he got there, were all earmarked for immediate operations; but he was determined not to return empty-handed. He and his party therefore scoured the Tobruk battlefields on their own account, salvaging and repairing trucks and guns, and on 16 January they got back to Baggush with no fewer than 34 guns and trailers for the NZA, a splendid achievement. After a brief rest Angell carried on to Maadi to deliver most of these guns to the 4th and 5th Field, with the dual capacity of acting as advanced guard for the main body of the 6th Field. In Maadi the transport of the regiment dwindled rapidly as various items were requisitioned for operations in the desert: six three-tonners and the 30 Battery water truck, then 16 pick-ups and six ‘monkey trucks’ for the RHA and a Signals unit of 7 Armoured Division. ‘We were beginning to wish that someone would come and take the lot,’ one officer remarked, ‘and then we would know where we stood.’

A brigade amphibious exercise in the first week of February took the 5th Field and 32 and 42 Batteries in Glen ships (designed for landing operations) into the Red Sea for a beach landing in the Gulf of Suez. It was a spectacular undertaking; but some details of it gave rise to apprehension about what it would have been like had it been the ‘real thing’. C Troop of the 5th Field left its mother ship by MLCs, followed half an hour later by RHQ and 47 BHQ in another MLC, which had to stop on the way to the beach to take in tow a sinking MLC carrying two guns and a quad and some of the gunners of C Troop, which in due course was safely beached. On the beach there was much confusion. The guns of 47 Battery waited, conspicuous and vulnerable, while their quads towed 27 Battery guns. Late in the afternoon all guns were technically ‘in action’, but no ammunition had so far reached them, while communications remained uncertain throughout.

General Auchinleck was among the high-level observers. He had hoped that 5 Brigade would be able to land behind the last-ditch Axis position at Agheila, covering Tripolitania, to pave the way for a British advance to Tripoli. But the enemy was at that very time thrusting forward from Agheila towards Benghazi and within a short time was back at Gazala. The New Zealanders were therefore spared a landing in the Gulf of Sirte which would almost certainly have been disastrous (as they realised when they inspected the ‘objective’ later).

The shape of the war had changed for the worse. Considerable German air strength had been transferred from the hiatus of the Russian winter to the central Mediterranean and covered the despatch of ground reinforcements to North Africa. At the same time British forces were called away from the Middle East to Burma and Singapore to meet the Japanese threat and two

Australian divisions were off home for the same reason. New Zealand gunners heard the news of rapid Japanese advances with mixed feelings. The war had seemed distant indeed when they sailed from New Zealand. Now it was closing in behind them and gave many of them an uneasy sense of being far away from where they were most needed. America had scarcely begun to mobilise her strength, but even when American troops did reach New Zealand their presence there, when news of it reached the Middle East, was not regarded as an unmixed blessing.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

5 Brigade Mans the El Adem Box

5 Brigade Mans the El Adem Box

The gunners of 5 Brigade perhaps felt all this most acutely. They had the unhappy task of retracing their steps in the second week of February to the Tobruk area, where their brigade stationed itself in an all-round defensive position at El Adem. A last-minute rush of re-equipping had put all units more or less on war establishments. Now they had to dig in and prepare to engage the enemy if he ventured past the Gazala position. It seemed as if the bitter fighting of the Crusader campaign had yielded no lasting reward—nor, for those interested in tactics, had it taught any lessons. Isolated brigade boxes, out of reach of each other, seemed all too likely to be defeated in detail and overrun. Moreover, the propensity Eighth Army had displayed in Crusader to split itself up into ineffectual mobile detachments now seemed to have become a mania and the brigade was ordered to form itself into Jock columns for the purpose of ‘swanning about’ the desert. The New Zealand command, however, insisted that all defensive positions be well dug and protected and the 14,000-yard perimeter was strongly wired and mined.

On the way to El Adem a 5th Field truck sent to Matruh to collect water tins was unluckily hit by high-level bombing and two gunners were hit, one of them being killed instantly and the other dying of wounds. [6] Orders to form a Jock column arrived before the guns got past Belhamed on 15 February. The gunner contribution was to be 28 Battery, F Troop of 32 Battery, and the Right Section of E Troop, 42 Battery. These were to stay with their units, but were to be ready to move within a quarter of an hour when ordered. Of the field guns, 28 Battery was to remain mobile, while 27 and 47 Batteries were to take up anti-tank positions, excepting one troop of each which were to have dual anti-tank and field roles. To strengthen the anti-tank defences still further, six 75-millimetre and six 47-millimetre Italian guns were to be manned by infantry, supervised by a field gunner on each ‘75’ and an anti-tank gunner on each ‘47’. The brigade layout seemed to be designed for a do-or-die action against a full-scale panzer onslaught—not a reassuring prospect and even less so when it was discovered that the 75s were practically useless and the 47s almost as bad. The least that could be expected if a strong enemy did reach the neighbourhood would be a bombardment by field and medium artillery to which, in replying, the 5th Field would be very much at a disadvantage. Even the Bofors gunners, who looked forward to some brisk action, had their spirits dampened by orders not to open fire except against planes which were actually attacking the El Adem Box from a ‘reasonable height’. In the next few days they saw many hostile aircraft; but most were at high altitudes, evidently respectful of the heavy ack-ack guns defending Tobruk and the El Adem landing ground. [7] Four 18-pounders arrived in mid-March to replace defective Italian 75s and were duly dug in. The anti-tank guns—2-pounders, 18-pounders, 25-pounders and captured enemy guns—were sited in depth with overlapping arcs of fire.

Early on the morning of 28 February 13 Italian aircraft came over low and ground-strafed the nearby landing ground and the gunners of 42 Battery fired freely at them whenever they came within reach. Fierce sandstorms at the end of the month were followed early in March by heavy rain which bogged many lorries and flooded or otherwise damaged gun pits, but also reduced air activity on both sides. Mainly because of salvage work, which was extensive, ammunition for most types of gun became plentiful and live-shoots gave field, anti-tank and ack-ack gunners good practice. Some shooting of this kind was even carried out by guns on patrol with the brigade mobile column; but no enemy was seen on those occasions. Then, on 16 March, the Bofors gunners had the interesting experience of carrying out a practice shoot with a new automatic loader. A few days later an advanced party of a South African brigade inspected the El Adem Box, and on the 24th the main body of 5 Brigade was relieved and withdrew, in a sandstorm which cut visibility down to a few yards and made travel most unpleasant, across the frontier. By the 28th it was back in Maadi, to the delight of the gunners.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Springtime in Syria

Springtime in Syria

Meanwhile the Division had been committed to a holding role in Syria, a different and much more attractive land. But the story of how the various units and sub-units of the artillery conformed to this role is too fragmented to follow in full detail. Various detachments of 41 and 43 Batteries, for example, helped to defend Kasfareet aerodrome near Kabrit from 21 January onwards, and the last of them, part of 43 Battery, did not leave until 19 March. G Troop was briefly detached in this period and sited at Shallufa aerodrome. Then this battery moved late in March to Beirut, stayed there for a day or two while the mountain passes were under snow, and then drove through the magnificent scenery of the Lebanons to Rayak aerodrome, set in green fields some 10 miles from the pretty town of Zahle; but the Left Section of H Troop stayed at Khalde on the coast near Beirut, under command of 84 Sub-Area of Ninth Army.

Most divisional units other than those of 5 Brigade moved to Syria in late February or early March. The 6 Brigade artillery, after Combined Operations training in the Canal Zone, moved by way of Beirut and Tripoli to Aleppo on the Turkish frontier, where various gun troops were dispersed among infantry battalions in defensive positions. The 4 Brigade guns moved to the so-called Djedeide fortress astride the main road and railway 150 miles to the south, in the Bekaa Valley flanked by the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains, where the gunners occupied various prepared camps—mainly corrugated-iron Nissen huts with a few square EPIP tents.

The 5 Brigade artillery paused briefly at Maadi and the 5th Field served for nearly three weeks as depot regiment at the RA school at Almaza, near Cairo, before travelling by road or rail-and-road to the fortress area. Artillery Headquarters was established in barracks in Baalbek.

For the gunners camped near Djedeide or the large villages of Laboue and Zabboud there was plenty of work. With the infantry and engineers they laboured to create a real fortress, with many concreted positions including anti-tank ‘pillboxes’, and to improve their camp areas. Brigadier Weir and his senior officers spent much time reconnoitring, planning and supervising the work. But the CRA had other matters as well which demanded his attention.

The ‘brigade-group thinking’ that lay behind the fruitless and frustrating experience of 5 Brigade in the El Adem Box showed itself in many other ways which aroused his strong antagonism. Some of the most enthusiastic supporters of brigade groups went so far as to want all units, including artillery and engineers, permanently brigaded. RHQs of anti-tank and light anti-aircraft units were in their view better disbanded. Auchinleck himself supported this view and soon after reaching Syria Brigadier Weir received instructions to disband the RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack and amalgamate each of the regiment's batteries with the field regiments of their respective brigades. This would have been the beginning of a permanent commitment to the ‘brigade-group battle’, diminishing the firepower of the field artillery by two-thirds. In cases where a brigade, perhaps because of the terrain, had no need of ack-ack guns, it would have an idle battery at a time when another brigade was badly in need of more than one battery. If this policy extended, as it was very likely to do, to the anti-tank regiment, the same would be true of anti-tank batteries. And the decisions of brigade commanders about the siting of anti-tank and light anti-aircraft guns—a matter on which few infantry brigadiers were knowledgeable—would be beyond appeal. The brigadier would simply give his orders to the major who commanded the battery and that would be that. At the divisional level there would be no expert voice but the CRA's to speak for these specialist arms—and even the CRA and his headquarters, if the policy were logically applied, might be dispensed with. The effect on the fighting power of the Division would be disastrous.

This was all in accord, as Weir says, with Auchinleck's ‘doctrine of Brigade Groups’, [8] which was the main cause of many of the setbacks in the desert fighting. Weir therefore submitted a strong case in writing for not carrying out these instructions and took it personally to General Freyberg, who readily agreed with him. The CRA's ideas marched in the opposite direction from those of the Middle East authorities: he was most anxious that the Divisional Artillery, which in the Molos battle in Greece, the preliminary exercises at Sidi Clif and Bir Stella before the Crusader fighting, and in the Belhamed battle had moved towards centralised control, should develop divisional fire drills and practice deployment and communications as a single entity. He therefore asked Freyberg to let him take each field regiment in turn into the Syrian desert to practise under Divisional Artillery control and to learn its place and tasks as part of an operational divisional organisation and not merely an administrative one. In the context of current Middle East thinking this was revolutionary; but the GOC was in full sympathy and again agreed.

For Weir and his immediate staff the days at Baalbek were crowded with duties related to the defence of Syria—conferences and committees, visits to Damascus and beyond on Ninth Army business, reconnaissances of the ‘front’ (including ground likely to be occupied by hostile batteries if it came to the worst), demonstrations to visiting senior officers, and much detailed planning. At the same time the 4 Brigade artillery laboured on gun pits, command posts, OPs and other defence works on ground so rocky that engineers had frequently to be called in with their pneumatic drills and explosives. The 6 Brigade artillery also had an active time, though less arduous, with headquarters in or near Aleppo (the 6th Field RHQ lived in a spacious barracks built for the German Asian Corps in 1917) and troops and batteries dispersed to distant border regions in support of the infantry—at Idlib in the north-west or Bab el Kaoua or by the large village of Afrine in the north, in wild, scrub-covered hills which sheltered trout streams and were the scene of night raids across the border by the picturesque Kurds to steal goats. [9]

Essential work on defences naturally had first call on the resources of the CRA, but he pressed forward with his project to form the Divisional Artillery—especially the field regiments—into a single weapon, powerful and flexible, able to exert whatever of its strength was required rapidly and accurately against any target within reach. All senior officers were soon brought into the discussion; but those of the 4 Brigade artillery were fully committed for the first few weeks on the Djedeide defences. So Brigadier Weir's former regiment, the 6th Field, was the first to conduct exercises conforming with his ideas of divisional control. A preliminary exercise at a firing area near Dezzaboui entailed a night occupation of a position on 1 April so as to be ready to fire a regimental concentration early on the 2nd. But Bedouins had also carried out a night occupation of the target area, as it happened, and it took some time to persuade them to leave. The concentration then came down on the target, course shooting followed, and the exercise finished with ‘a very effective smoke shoot with fuze zero’, according to a regimental report. A gallery of distinguished visitors seemed impressed.

In the second week of April 5 Brigade from Egypt relieved 6 Brigade on the Turkish frontier and the latter, with its artillery, took over a sector of the Djedeide fortress, the gunners being quartered mainly in camps near Laboue. The 5th Field did not take part in this relief and did not go to Aleppo: it went straight to the Djedeide area, arriving on 23 April, and set to work without delay preparing a regimental position in the fortress. In a fortnight the newcomers completed 17 gun pits, three command posts and one OP. As with the other regimental positions, those of the 5th Field were to include not only main gun emplacements, but alternative pits and posts, so there seemed no end to the work. The gunners in the fortress area paused briefly to smarten up for inspection by HRH the Duke of Gloucester on 20 May and then, five days later, the 5th Field carried out as an exercise a comprehensive and realistic occupation of the Djedeide position, going through the motions of firing barrages, air co-operation shoots and link shoots, and carrying out cross observation and other schemes.

the eastern mediterranean

By this time, however, the CRA's plans for exercising the field artillery under divisional control had matured, despite the many other demands on his time, and he had the opportunity to put some of them into effect in the course of manoeuvres. The first of these began on 24 May when Divisional Headquarters (with Artillery Headquarters) and 4 Brigade and its artillery plus the 6th Field moved into the semi-desert to the north-east of the Fortress. The artillery contingent was further strengthened in the course of the manoeuvres by 211 Medium Battery, RA, and 27 Mountain Battery, RIA, and at the end of the month by the 5th Field and further elements of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack.

Besides taking their place in the brigade-cum-divisional exercises, the gunners practised various tasks independently. Field and ack-ack gunners, for example, carried out anti-tank shoots, a gun of 47 Battery demonstrated the new 210 fuse fired so as to burst low (its effect, not unlike that of shrapnel, was considered highly suitable for use against infantry or transport), and there were several shoots in conjunction with air co-operation and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, as well as more course shooting for the field gunners.

One of the main purposes of the divisional exercises was to free the Division, as Scoullar puts it, of the idea of ‘brigade groups as tactical entites’. [10] The experience of other formations in previous campaigns had won converts, including many non-NZA gunners, to this current Middle East doctrine; but Freyberg and his senior officers were against it. All this reinforced Brigadier Weir's own determination to create a true Divisional Artillery as opposed to a mere aggregate of brigaded regiments and batteries. The exercises, in the Forqloss area a few miles east of Homs (fairly flat semi-desert with just enough water to serve the needs of the Division), were therefore a turning point in the history of the Divisional Artillery. They were conducted in weather that was getting hotter and hotter and the transport raised huge clouds of dust; but the physical unpleasantness was more than offset for most gunners by the awakening consciousness of unity and power. As one observer put it, ‘it was a grand sight to see a whole regiment, or a brigade…, rolling relentlessly on in desert formation, turning when the leader turned, stopping when he stopped, like a well-disciplined herd of buffalo’.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Increased Anti-Tank Strength

Increased Anti-Tank Strength

There were other encouraging developments, too. A surprising order early in April that all portées of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, complete with guns, were to be returned to the ordnance depot at Abbassia in Cairo was duly complied with. It was followed by news that all four anti-tank batteries were to be re-equipped with 6-pounders. These guns, mentioned at first only guardedly by code-names, would certainly be more powerful and therefore very welcome. The much-maligned 2-pounder had in truth served well against enemy tanks in the Crusader battles, but a few German tanks with specially hardened armour had caused some concern, more were certain to appear (as indeed they had already done in the Libyan desert), and anti-tank guns which could engage them at longer range and with more destructive effect were most desirable.

The course of the Crusader fighting, moreover, indicated that the allotment of C4 anti-tank guns was insufficient for all-round protection in mobile operations, in which many more or less isolated detachments would be subject to tank attack. This point had been strongly urged by senior New Zealand officers after the campaign and their urgings now bore fruit. All the 2-pounders were to be handed over to the infantry and more still were to be provided so that each infantry battalion would have two four-gun anti-tank platoons, making a total of 80 infantry anti-tank guns. The 7th Anti-Tank, when fully re-equipped, was to have 64 6-pounders. This huge increase in the anti-tank strength of the Division would allow far greater tactical flexibility in mobile operations.

The task of training infantry to man the 2-pounders was undertaken by 34 Battery, which in the early days in Egypt had trained Australians, Indians and RA gunners. It was the sort of thing this battery did extremely well. It still retained many of the ‘old hands’ recruited in the United Kingdom, more widely-experienced and rather better educated than average New Zealand recruits; it had been on active service longer than any other sub-unit of the Division, and its present commander, Major Hall-Kenney, probably knew as much about anti-tank gunnery as anyone in the Middle East. The six-weeks' course he provided, with every detail meticulously planned, gave representatives of all 10 infantry battalions, a total of 21 officers and 88 NCOs who were to form the nuclei of the infantry anti-tank platoons, a thorough grounding in their new roles. The camp at Zabboud resounded to their gun drill, the course included many lectures and demonstrations, and it ended late in May with a field exercise and a live shoot. [11]

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Key Men Leave for Service in the Pacific

Key Men Leave for Service in the Pacific

Syria provided a wealth of new experiences for the New Zealand gunners, most of them enjoyable: leave at Baalbek, Damascus or Beirut, a ski school high up in the Lebanons, entertaining and being entertained by the French Foreign Legion in Aleppo, and a variety of interesting outings and tasks, including reconnaissances, which brought them into contact with the colourful and hospitable inhabitants. The climate, too, provided far more variety than that of the North African desert. An enduring concern, however, in both the Bekaa Valley and the frontier area was the guarding of camps against would-be thieves, who were numerous, skilful and daring. It was a period, too, of rumour and counter-rumour and earnest debate about the future of the Division in the light of the disasters in the Pacific. Despite denials from General Freyberg himself, there were many plausible allegations that the New Zealanders in the Middle East were going home. A few able gunners did go, to help train forces in New Zealand and to provide a leavening of battle experience for forces in the Pacific, then at brigade strength.

Among these was Danny Duff, who had commanded 34 Anti-Tank Battery in the early days, then the 7th Anti-Tank in Greece, and then, for nearly a year, the 4th Field. His extensive knowledge of gunnery and battle experience would be of great value in dealing with the urgent problems presented by the Japanese advances in the Pacific. Not everyone in the 4th Field was sorry to see him go; but the 4th Field owed more to him than most of its members realised. He had reconstructed the regiment after the disaster of Greece and Crete and saw that it was trained to the highest standards for the campaign in Libya. His handling of his guns at Zaafran and Belhamed, in circumstances of bewildering complexity, was superbly skilful. On the fateful 1st of December after the 6th Field was overrun, the defence of the remnants of the Division at Zaafran against disaster which threatened from the west was entirely in his hands. Even the divisional commander and his two brigade commanders did not fully grasp the danger and debated a quite unrealistic proposal to withdraw westwards; but Duff saw it clearly and, out of touch with them for several critical hours (because he insisted on keeping his complex telephone communications intact and refused to move when brigade headquarters moved), he fought a lone battle with all available guns, field, anti-tank and ack-ack, against two panzer divisions and the Italian Ariete Armoured Division and held them off until dark, when the Division withdrew. His contribution in this crisis was never properly recognised in the Division; but in due course his abilities were rewarded by his appointment as CRA of 3 Division in the Pacific. He left the 4th Field in April and was replaced early in June by Lieutenant-Colonel Queree, slender, retiring and at that time relatively unknown, but also of high ability which took him eventually in Italy to the position of CRA. [12]

Manhandling Bofors into position on the way to Gazala

A 5th Field gun in the Gazala battle

2-pounder portée at Gazala

5th Field on Combined Operations training in the Gulf of Suez

A 33 Battery portée below the Aleppo citadel

Gas-mask practice on the Forqloss manoeuvres, Syria

25-pounder on Forqloss plain

Boys anti-tank rifle on manoeuvres—seldom fired in action

The first shell lands at Minqar Qaim, 27 June 1942

A 25-pounder in the Minqar Qaim action

A makeshift OP at Minqar Qaim

Disabled vehicles at the foot of Minqar Qaim, from a painting by Sergeant J. W. Crippen

Minqar Qaim, by Crippen

A nearby wadi

The break-out, from a painting by Captain Peter McIntyre, formerly of 34 Anti-Tank Battery

A jeep towing a 6-pounder in the early days in the Alamein Line

The remnants of the Ariete Divisional Artillery, 3 July 1942

A 5th Field gun firing under a camouflage net, at Alam Nayil, August 1942

The 14th Light Ack-Ack engaging the Luftwaffe at Alam Nayil

The burial of a gun crew of 43 Battery, all killed when their Bofors sustained a direct hit by a bomb, 16 July 1942

27 Battery goes to ground in a Stuka raid, August 1942

‘Swordfish’ area, September 1942

General Montgomery presents a DSO to Steve Weir, 12 October 1942

Lance-Bombardier B. W. Johnston receives an MM from the 8th Army Commander

36 Survey Battery relaxing on the shore of the Dead Sea

A survey camp in the Transjordan. Front row: A. W. Cross, Jack Arthurs, A. I. Lyall, N. Russell, Back row: Pat Malthus, Jeff Hole, J. Fenton, T. Harmon

General Freyberg confers with senior officers before the Alamein offensive. Steve Weir centre

A 4.5 at Alamein

A gun of A Troop, 5th Field, fires its last round on supercharge before the breakthrough, November 1942

A Troop gun crew, 5th Field, relaxing before beginning the pursuit, November 1942

A 7th Anti-Tank lorry bogged down near Fuka

Fuka after the deluge, November 1942

There was no thought early in June of doing anything more than continuing the manning of the frontier positions, completing the Djedeide fortress, and carrying out more extensive and advanced divisional manoeuvres (in the course of which Brigadier Weir hoped to get nearer to his ideal of a divisional artillery trained to operate flexibly and efficiently at all levels from single guns up to unified control at divisional level or even higher). But all these projects suddenly dissolved on 14 June when orders arrived for the Division to move in great haste to Mersa Matruh in the Western Desert. The Eighth Army had been defeated at Gazala, Tobruk was threatened, and reinforcements were urgently needed to check the advance of the victorious Axis army. Acutely aware of the many shortages of transport and war equipment, the officers and NCOs of the Division hastened to comply with this startling order, improvising and borrowing to meet deficiencies, and turning the many camps in the Bekaa Valley and at the frontier into scenes of turmoil. The 4th and 6th Field and 1 Survey Troop left on the 16th, the 5th Field on the 18th, and the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack in batteries and smaller groups, as their attachments and various local tasks allowed, between the 16th and 19th.

It was an extraordinary exodus. When 31 Anti-Tank Battery moved off on the 17th, for example, it did so without 50 men, a significant proportion of its strength, who were still on leave. Two troops of 33 Battery had left as recently as the 9th with 6 Brigade for Aleppo to relieve 5 Brigade, and E Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery had remained in the frontier area. [13] The Left Section of A Troop of 41 Battery had not long gone to Saida ( Sidon) on the coast south of Beirut and 43 Battery still had a section at Khalde. All these far-flung detachments and the men on leave and on special tasks [14] had to be gathered in and despatched southwards. New Zealand insignia of all kinds had to be removed from uniforms and vehicles in a hasty effort to disguise the move and deceive enemy agents—though none of the civilians on the route seemed in any doubt about the identity of the New Zealanders. At Rayak 41 Battery had lent four three-tonners to a pioneer unit, its remaining vehicles were crammed with men and equipment, and still the predictors had to be left behind, to be picked up by the four lorries when they returned. The first main staging area was to be at Affule, south of Tiberias in Palestine, and it was hoped that many detachments would rejoin their units there.

Impressions of the journey varied. Some detachments, for example, had refreshing interludes in orchards and citrus groves when their convoys were held up. All found the heat oppressive. At Tiberias, over 120 in the shade, it was stifling. The haste under such conditions caused vehicles to overheat and the scorching roads—especially the shimmering macadam through the Sinai desert on the second day—and overloading caused some tyres to burst.

The main convoy crossed the Suez Canal on the 19th, drove through Cairo without halting, refuelled near Mena, and staged in the Wadi Natrun near Halfway House. The familiar scenes brought home to the gunners that the Syrian interlude, instructing, refreshing and in the main very enjoyable, had ended. All realised the gravity of the situation they now faced; but in good health and high spirits most of them welcomed the new adventure.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 9 — Minqar Qaim: Another Gunners' Battle

Contents

- [section]
p. 312

- The Minqar Qaim Position p. 315
- More 6-Pounders Arrive p. 318
- Vulnerable Transport p. 320
- Threats from All Quarters p. 321
- The Break-out After Dark p. 326

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE journey along the coast road, after the next refuelling point at Amiriya (outside Alexandria), was like swimming against the tide. The Eighth Army seemed to be in full retreat, with vehicles nose to tail and much evidence of disorder and poor morale. Tobruk had fallen by the time most of the gunners travelled this road, and when they staged at El Daba rumour was indeed rife and some lively imaginations were at work in the NAAFI. The pace was slower on the way to Sidi Haneisb because of the weight of traffic on the road in both directions; but most detachments reached their general destination, Mersa Matruh, in five or six days from when they left their camps or barracks in Syria, exceptionally quick time for such a long journey over roads which were mostly the worse for wear. ‘The long trip from Syria was a good test for guns and vehicles,’ the diary of 43 Battery noted, ‘some minor faults being weakness of stub axles and gun stays, several breaking down during the 1000-mile journey.’

The 4th and 6th Field carried on past the town on 21 June to bivouacs some miles farther west, and the 14th Light Ack-Ack was in course of following suit when it was recalled to take up defensive positions within the Matruh Box. Most of the Bofors were still on the move when an air raid began, they had been allotted no role in the defensive barrage, and they did not open fire. The 5th Field did not arrive until the 23rd and at once deployed in the Box. RHQ of the 7th Anti-Tank and the main body of the regiment halted on the 23rd at Smugglers' Cove, six miles east of Matruh. The move could scarcely have come at a worse time for the anti-tankers. They had been in daily expectation of the arrival of 6-pounders in Syria, 34 Battery had already sent its 2-pounders back to Egypt, and all senior officers and many NCOs were at the 6-pounder course at Almaza. Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell and his battery commanders left the course hastily after one week and rejoined the regiment. There was not much 34 Battery could do without guns and with very little transport, and on the 25th it was sent back to Amiriya to be re-equipped. All other batteries expected their 6-pounders from hour to hour. Then word came on the 25th that 28 of the new guns were to be collected at Baggush and the RQM, Lieutenant Cornwell, [1] hastily unloaded two trucks, left his RQMS and a small party in charge of the equipment from them, and departed with drivers for the ordnance depot. [2]

The Division had meanwhile withdrawn into the Box and occupied a sector of its defences, which meant for the gunners a lot of work repairing old gun positions, command posts and living quarters or preparing new ones. The dugouts taken over by RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack on the 23rd, between the railhead and beach behind the waterfront hotel, were filthy. Most other quarters were not much better. By this time ack-ack barrage lines had been worked out, three predictors were put into action with A Troop, and the Bofors opened fire in the night 23–24 June, 41 Battery firing 144 rounds and 43 Battery about the same. Telephone lines were laid underground to all three ack-ack batteries for early warning of raids; but 42 Battery was unable to fire until the night of the 24th, by which time E Troop had arrived.

Ten miles south of Matruh, 20 Battalion from 22 June guarded the important road junction called Charing Cross with 48 Battery of the 6th Field and C Troop of 31 Anti-Tank Battery. To reach there the gunners had to drive against an even more chaotic and undisciplined mass of retreating vehicles than that they had met on the way to Matruh. The group returned early on the 25th only to retrace its steps later in the day, this time with 25 Battery of the 4th Field in place of 48 Battery and B Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery as well. The guns covered a huge minefield which various sapper detachments, including some New Zealand ones, were laying and the gunners saw several sappers blown up and the shattering explosion of an RE truck. All in all, the situation seemed anything but reassuring.

Those who were planning and working on the defence of the Box were not at all happy about it. The front was overlooked by an escarpment to the south and the anti-tank prospects were poor indeed. Fortunately the stay there was to be only brief and a mobile role was now envisaged for the Division. Not nearly enough transport was at hand to move all units at once, 6 Brigade (but not its artillery) had been left at Amiriya, and now each battalion of 4 and 5 Brigades sent back one company.

For the force that remained to meet the oncoming enemy there would therefore be a high proportion of guns to infantry. [3]

When it was further suggested that the Division should reorganise into battle groups not unlike the Jock columns that had dissipated the strength of the desert army in earlier fighting, General Freyberg would not hear of it. He intended to retain firm control of the forthcoming New Zealand operations and in particular would not decentralise command of the all-important artillery, to the delight of Brigadier Weir. But a greater compliment was yet to come. After much hesitation and many changes of plan at corps or army level (and at army level there was even greater confusion than usual, because General Auchin-leck, who had sacked his army commander at the height of the CRUSADER battle and evidently believed in changing horses in midstream, now sacked another and took over personal command of Eighth Army), the Division was finally told to secure a box in the general area of Minqar Qaim on an escarpment some 25 miles south of Matruh and to maintain a ‘mobile reserve of columns’. Eighth Army then and for many months to come, until Auchinleck himself was superseded, could think of nothing but boxes and columns. Freyberg did not intend to get boxed in; nor did he intend to disperse his strength in columns. He proposed to fight a delaying action in which he could exert the full force of his artillery under circumstances as favourable as possible. And for this purpose he consulted his CRA closely and with him reconnoitred the ground. ‘The position we take up will depend a good deal on what you say,’ he told Weir. ‘You must fight the guns.’ [4]

This was a startling advance on previous practice. Instead of merely conforming to what seemed best for the infantry (which would among other things, of course, take into account anti-tank possibilities), the gunners were to have a large influence on the choice of the actual ground to be defended. It was, as Weir remarked, a turning point in the history of the Divisional Artillery. The battle that resulted, like Molos in Greece, was a gunners' battle. [5]

An Indian division relieved the New Zealand Division in Matruh on the 25th and in the afternoon and evening the two brigades moved off and travelled an average of about 15 miles to the south-east. The 6th Field (with another 14 three-tonners and three pick-ups which arrived at the last moment), 33 Anti-Tank Battery and 43 Light Ack-Ack travelled with Divisional Reserve Group. Next morning there was much juggling of scarce transport and carting of ammunition dumped at Matruh. Then the Division moved to Minqar Qaim. From the escarpment there 5 Brigade despatched a column including 27 Battery and E Troop of 32 Battery—the only troop so far with 6-pounders [6]—to guard supply depots at Bir Khalda 10 miles farther south. Above and below the escarpment 5 Brigade Headquarters established itself at Minqar Qaim itself, with 22 Battalion to the west, 23 in the centre and 28 (Maori) Battalion some distance away to the east, 18 Battalion of the Reserve Group being between the last two.

[1]
Maj L. J. Cornwell, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Auckland, 28 Feb 1909; company manager; wounded 30 Oct 1942.

[2] The RQMS and party stayed on guard until the enemy overran the area and captured them.

[3] Various detachments were ordered to be left out of battle (LOB), among the NZA ones being all but a skeleton of Div Artillery HQ and RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, less the CO and a handful of others, and these left Matruh on the 25th and reached Maadi next day. On the 25th, too, Lt-Col Carty became sick and was evacuated to hospital, his place as CO being taken by Major Bretherton. LOB personnel from the LAA batteries took the predictors with them.

The 14th LAA Signals Section, now under the command of 2 Lt L. E. Vaughan, was also to be LOB, its essential duties being taken over by remaining Signals sections. It travelled by coal trucks on one of the last trains to leave the Matruh area and reached Amiriya on the 29th.

1 Survey Troop and many unessential elements of other NZA units drove eastwards on the 26th.

[4] As remembered by Weir in a letter of 9 June 1948.

[5] It might have been part of a larger battle crowned with success; for Eighth Army could deploy far greater strength on this front than the advancing enemy, whose resources were rapidly dwindling. But Auchinleck on his way up to take command, and before he had had a chance to examine the position closely, had already decided to ‘keep the Eighth Army fully mobile’—fateful words, highly reminiscent of the disastrous conduct of the armoured battle in CRUSADER campaign!—and withdraw to a line at El Alamein, many miles to the east. The quotation is from John Connell, Auchinleck, p. 614.

[6] E Troop had attended an anti-tank school at Matruh, but the course was cut short by the speed of the enemy advance. There it drew the new guns. B Troop of 31 Battery had one 6-pounder and four 2-pounders. No other 6-pounders arrived before the fighting started.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Minqar Qaim Position

The Minqar Qaim Position

The first intention was that 4 Brigade would settle some miles to the east at Bir Abu Batta. Gun positions had been chosen and gunners were busily digging as dusk approached, their vehicles, like others of the brigade, bunched closely together in a wadi. Over came a squadron or so of aircraft and few men other than ack-ack gunners bothered even to look up, so active had the RAF been in the past few days. The gunners of 41 Battery, however, saw what they took to be 27 Ju88s—twin-engined medium bombers—and quickly engaged them. They bombed from medium height, did much damage, and caused many casualties—seven killed and 55 wounded. [7] But the Bofors gave them a hot reception, 41 Battery firing 240 rounds, D Troop of 42 Battery 243, and E Troop (which fired briskly but later lost its records) probably as many. Three bombers were reported to have crashed. It taught both brigades a sharp lesson. Later 4 Brigade moved alongside the Reserve Group, making a divisional area of about five and a half miles long from east to west and up to two miles deep. When 5 Brigade learned that E Troop had the only 6-pounders, H Troop was sent to replace it at Bir Khalda. Before the relief, however, the column was heavily bombed and many infantry hit. E Troop escaped harm; but 27 Battery lost five killed and 17 wounded (according to a report to the 5th Field next day) and three ammunition trucks set on fire.

21 panzer division encircles minqar qaim, 27 june 1942

The night was full of activity, much of it enemy, as the many flares suggested and the morning of the 27th confirmed. The 6th Field, facing mainly north from the Reserve Group area, saw many columns to the north moving eastwards at long range. The 4th Field had meanwhile gained a welcome addition: a troop of the 121st Field, RA, and two anti-tank guns, cut off from their parent units, which drove in at 7 a.m. An hour and a half later the battle opened in earnest with ranging shells from the north. The guns responsible could not be located immediately. Their fire was not systematic; but one source roughly located after some time was at long range. The 4th Field sent a troop forward at 9 a.m. to engage the motorised troops and tanks passing to the north and it did so with evident success. Three-quarters of an hour later the 6th Field sent 30 Battery forward with two sections of 18 Battalion carriers to engage a hostile battery. It was a risky errand, as the enemy soon proved. The guns moved off, but tanks then attacked, setting one of the carriers on fire. The two 25-pounder troops, under Major Lambourn's skilful direction, then made a leapfrog withdrawal which earned the admiration of observers on the low escarpment to the south. [8] The tanks brought down very heavy fire, killing five men of the battery and disabling at least one quad and another vehicle. For their part the gunners claimed to have put three tanks out of action and damaged three others; but in the smoke and dust and heat they could not be sure.

In the artillery duel which began about 9 a.m. and was the main feature of the Minqar Qaim action, the enemy had several advantages. He had a variety of gun types and calibres which included 75s, 88s, 105s, 150-millimetre medium howitzers, a number of captured 25-pounders, and even, according to some accounts, heavy 210-millimetre howitzers. Against shallow trenches and gun pits on the rocky ground the tremendous blast of the heavier calibres could be far more effective than that of the defending 25-pounders—which were in any case outranged. The ‘88s’ could fire low air bursts for anti-personnel effect. Moreover, the enemy had far more ground on which to deploy and could move his guns as he pleased, whereas the Divisional Artillery had relatively little choice and most of its field guns were fairly close together. But the escarpment, low though it was and gently sloping, dominated the flat desert to the north and south: the GOC and CRA had chosen well. [9] Allied to this, the flexibility of control of the New Zealand field guns, in striking contrast to the piecemeal and somewhat disjointed control of the opposing artillery, more than compensated for all their disabilities. Even better results might have been achieved had better maps been available and had communications between Artillery Headquarters and the 4th Field been more reliable: telephone cables were frequently broken by shellfire and wireless was uncertain. Though far from perfect, the performance of the field artillery confirmed that the Syrian training and exercises had been highly beneficial. And for bravery and persistence the gunners won many admirers. ‘From my position on the cliff I could see shells bursting incessantly among our guns,’ the commander of 5 Brigade wrote, ‘and admired the way our gunners were standing to their work.’ [10]

[7] Only two gunners are listed among the killed, N. Hulme and J. S. Craig of the 4th Field, but others of that unit and at least one of 31 Battery were slightly wounded, and 41 Battery evacuated two gunners suffering from shock and ‘several slightly injured’. BSM B. K. Bassett gallantly drove a burning 26 Battery ammunition truck away from the area.

[8] Lambourn was in due course awarded for this a DSO.

[9] Though a brigade commander thought the position ‘a very odd one’ and was puzzled to know how to occupy his portion of it ( Sir Howard Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier, pp. 127–8).

[10]
Kippenberger, op. cit., p.131.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

More 6-Pounders Arrive

More 6-Pounders Arrive

For the anti-tankers it was a most exciting day and their excitement, centred on their new 6-pounder guns, was in many cases shared by the infantry and other gunners around them. The anti-tank defences consisted at first of minefields hastily laid and extended in the morning under fire, of the 2-pounders and five 6-pounders of the 7th Anti-Tank, of Bofors with dual roles, and as a last resort 25-pounders firing over open sights. But more new guns were on the way. The RQM, with a party of drivers mainly from the 6th Field, had got them the night before, too late to reach the Division on the 26th, and had spent a cold night with inadequate clothing (they had not expected to be away so long). In the morning they hastened to deliver the guns, reaching RHQ about 10 a.m.

Lieutenant Cornwell took 12 of them to just outside the 4 Brigade area for 31 Battery. He went away to get instructions and Lieutenant Butcher of A Troop, seeing them there and fearing they might be captured, took some men out and brought them to Brigade Headquarters, where he was told to take over four guns and give his four 2-pounders to the nearby Maoris.

The enemy had by this time worked round to the north-east of the brigade, the action was getting warmer, and Butcher hastened to get his new guns into action, while the Maoris happily accepted the 2-pounders. The new guns were still covered with grease and graphite and the gunners worked anxiously to clean them. Luckily the enemy did not press forward for two hours and in that time the four troops of the battery—C behind the Maori FDLs, A at the junction of the Maoris and 20 Battalion, B with the 20th, and D with 19 Battalion south of B—were ready to try their guns out and they had a gallery of spectators equally keen to see them open fire.

It took longer to reach the areas of 32 and 33 Batteries. When Cornwell reached the 32nd, early in the afternoon, the position was under quite heavy shellfire and an attack seemed imminent. The existing gun positions, mainly in the 22 Battalion area, were well forward and exposed, and the battery commander, Major Bliss, thought it better to defer the changeover. Major Sweetzer of 33 Battery, however, guarding mainly the southern approaches to the Division (though his M Troop was to the north alongside the Maori position), gladly accepted not only the new guns, but the added commitment of manning most of the 2-pounders as well, since the infantry were at that time too busy to take them over. He already had 16 guns and he ended up with 28 and, except for a troop of 2-pounders taken over by Maoris, managed to man them all. Every single man who could be spared from other duties was called to help with the guns. The scratch gun crews did their best, but it was not easy to clean the bores and some guns opened fire with much grease still clinging to them. Telescopes, according to Sweetzer, ‘were the exception rather than the rule’ and several of those that did arrive were defective. Only three men of the battery had even seen a 6-pounder before.

J Troop was closely watching an advance by lorried infantry from the south in mid-afternoon when the guns arrived. Some Maoris detailed to take over the J Troop 2-pounders had been ‘hovering round like vultures’ in their eagerness to do so. They followed the 6-pounders to the gun positions, helped to transfer gear from one portée to another in a race against time, and in a quarter of an hour drove off in triumph. The J Troop gunners, totally inexperienced in operating their new weapons and unhappily aware of the thick grease which almost smothered them, saw the enemy getting closer, hastily took up hull-down positions en portée, and opened fire, getting 100 rounds away as fast as they could.

K Troop changed over two guns at a time and had to deal with an attack before the second two guns arrived. Staff-Sergeant Calvert
[11] with a gun manned by a scratch crew from BHQ drove gallantly forward and engaged an enemy tank towing two guns. It stopped and the enemy was trying to get one of the guns into action when Calvert's gun disabled it. Then his gun and other K Troop guns engaged the tank, scoring hits on it at long range, but failing to prevent it from driving away. Mortar fire then disabled Calvert's gun and killed a machine-gun officer who was bravely helping. Another scratch crew nearby under Gunner Trace [12] claimed one tank knocked out for certain and another ‘probable’. M Troop was in two sections facing north, the forward one under the troop commander, Lieutenant Mitchell, being relatively isolated and out of touch with the other. Only six rounds per gun were at hand and many tempting targets therefore had to be ignored. The only firing, about 1.30 p.m., was with small arms against an enemy group about 50 strong which was driven to ground. When it was silenced Mitchell took a detachment forward and captured the survivors, some 25 young-looking Germans, and handed them over to nearby Maoris.

[11]
S-Sgt L. H. Calvert, m.i.d.; Greytown; born Whangarei, 10 Jun 1906; auctioneer's assistant.

[12] Gnr F. Trace (now Grace); Kamo; born Aust., 14 Mar 1909; carpenter.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Vulnerable Transport

Vulnerable Transport

The greatest danger to the Division at Minqar Qaim was from heavy air attack. The guns demonstrated again and again their ability to command the ground in front of them; but the position was compact and rather crowded and dive-bombing might have done much harm. A small force of enemy aircraft came over at 9.45 a.m. and 41 Battery engaged it; but it did not linger. In the afternoon the battery guns, all in anti-tank positions, fired 108 rounds at aircraft. In the 5 Brigade area 42 Battery had several guns well forward and some of these were heavily shelled and withdrew to the top of the escarpment. Other battery guns had to move several times to conform with movements of field guns or switches of their fire. One gun managed to fire four rounds at an Me109F which raced past overhead; but no air attacks developed. In Divisional Reserve area 43 Battery had to put up with heavy shelling aimed at the nearby field guns, the battery captain was wounded by a splinter, and a Bedford tractor destroyed; but the battery did not open fire. There was some compensation, however, when the gunners salvaged two 3-ton lorries in working order.

All vehicles not urgently needed had been sent to what it was hoped would be relatively safe rear areas. That of 4 Brigade, to the east-south-east above the escarpment, was quite quiet until mid-afternoon. The 5 Brigade transport area, however, below the escarpment east of the Division, soon came under fire from the north and was hurriedly moved three miles to the top of the rise. BHQ of 42 Battery and E Troop were involved. The Bofors did not fire; but a Wellington bomber crashed in the new area. About 2.30 p.m. the enemy, who had been working from north to east of the Divisional position, sent tanks probing forward to this transport area and caused the vehicles to scatter. The tanks fired from about 1000 yards with little effect other than to hasten the departure of the transport. Had the vehicles not scattered they would have presented the enemy artillery with a dream target; but discipline was soon evident in the way the drivers reassembled a few miles away. The only battery vehicle lost in this rapid retreat was a motor-cycle. The transport did not rejoin the Division at Minqar Qaim. As a result, wireless communications at gun and command posts deteriorated, because the battery chargers were with the transport. The troops of 32 Battery, moreover, had each sent at least two portées with the B Echelon transport, causing many headaches when the guns had to withdraw.

Lance-Sergeant Mantle
[13] of the 5th Field, with three gunners, had been repairing a truck when the tanks attacked the transport. They drove off in it and, while still threatened by the tanks, stopped to investigate three 6-pounders with portées which were standing unattended—possibly guns destined for 32 Battery. Rather than abandon these to the oncoming enemy, Mantle got out and drove one himself and ordered two of the gunners to drive the other two portées. Thus he saved three valuable guns, which could readily have been put to use by the enemy, from being captured. For this he was awarded an MM.

[13]
Sgt P. I. Mantle, MM; Hamilton; born London, 18 Jun 1914; driver.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Threats from All Quarters

Threats from All Quarters

The heat of the early afternoon was scorching and caused the FOOs much concern. The heat haze made targets look like jelly and monstrously tall. Gun blasts and exploding shells raised so much dust that accurate observation was at times almost out of the question. Nevertheless tanks approaching from the north soon after 2 p.m. met fire from the 4th Field and quickly halted. The 5th and 6th Field dealt with lorried infantry deploying farther east. A little later another group of tanks began to work round to the east of the Division. B Troop of 31 Battery had already lost one of its new 6-pounders in a duel with a German gun; the driver was killed and two crew members were wounded. Then A Troop destroyed an armoured car at 1300 yards and neighbouring infantry and field gunners literally jumped for joy at seeing the 6-pounders prove themselves. When the enemy reached the escarpment and began working back towards 19 Battalion he met the fire of the infantry 2-pounders, D Troop of 31 Battery, and all the 4th Field guns. The foremost elements were driven back, but the enemy built up strength in the cover of a deep, wide re-entrant in the escarpment at Bir Abu Batta and pushed on southwards and then south-westwards to threaten 4 Brigade from the south.

When shells began to land in the Divisional area from the south, a battery of the 4th Field was detailed to cover this new front and some of the 6-pounders, as already related, went forward to help. The threat developed against the southern flank of the Reserve Group. Besides the 6-pounders, some manned by scratch crews, the guns of 30 Battery engaged the tanks. Lieutenant Polhill's [14] troop fought the tanks fiercely. One gun was knocked out and the GPO wounded; but Polhill kept the other three guns firing from a most exposed position until the enemy had had enough and drew away, leaving four disabled tanks on the scene. Then Polhill recovered the damaged gun. For this stout engagement he received the MC. Many B Echelon trucks, including some artillery ones, had been dispersed south of Divisional Headquarters and this attack scattered them. Some rallied at once; others were not seen again until the Division reached Alamein.

The 1st Armoured Division had been operating some miles to the south and now ventured northwards to help, coming under fire from the New Zealand guns in so doing and losing one tank. This misfortune was a product of the loose control which characterised all Eighth Army operations. Corps control had never at any stage been effective and if Auchinleck had had his way with the battle-group scheme there would have been little or no divisional control. There was little enough to the north at that very time. Though the 10 Corps commander was doing his best to keep his divisions intact, they had already provided, under Army orders, a number of battle groups and further orders entailed even more dispersion. The New Zealand Division came under 13 Corps, whose commander, General Gott, had a fervent belief that in the desert war no ground was tactically important. This was in effect a standing invitation to all subordinates to avoid heavy fighting and this very day he told Freyberg, in the words of the Eighth Army war diary, ‘not to regard the ground which he was at present holding as vital’. It was a recipe for defeat and Freyberg ignored it. When 1 Armoured Division announced its intention, in the early afternoon, of withdrawing independently, however, Freyberg protested strongly: hence the last-minute and ill-planned intervention against the enemy attacking from the south, in the course of which a British armoured patrol came under New Zealand artillery fire. The enemy was at that stage highly vulnerable and a determined attack by the British armoured division, in conjunction with the damaging fire of the New Zealand Division and spirited local counter-attacks by its infantry, would certainly have had 21 Panzer Division in serious trouble. The armoured division was uncertain and ill-informed, however, and its squadrons withdrew southwards. Freyberg, realising that his division was under attack from three sides and that the enemy was across his line of retreat, decided he would have to withdraw by night and could expect no help.

It was a serious situation, but not a grave one. The guns retained their dominance of the battlefield and enemy attacks were tentative and not persistent in the face of the 25-pounder fire. The most worrying aspect was that ammunition was getting low and there was no hope of replenishing it, while a further concern was the diminishing effectiveness of wireless communications. Partly because of this, Brigadier Weir, controlling his guns from a central signals exchange, did not ‘have his hand on’ the 4th Field as much as he would have liked.

The attack from the south, then, petered out and an almost concurrent attack from the north by infantry covered by tank fire was opposed at first by the 6th Field. The field gunners, however, knew that the Maoris on that sector were well forward, though uncertain of their exact positions, and had to cease fire for fear of endangering them. Sergeant Parks
[15] of C Troop was holding his fire in case the tanks came on; but when a light gun towed by a lorry swung round at about 1800 yards as if to come into action against the Maoris, he engaged it. The 6-pounder demonstrated a vicious habit it had when the layer was struck in the eye by the shoulder piece and knocked unconscious. [16] The enemy gun was nevertheless disabled and a fresh layer took over, stopping the truck with his first shot. Meanwhile an ammunition number of Parks's crew gave the Maoris covering fire as they counter-attacked. His Bren gun had no spare barrel and other gunners cooled it by emptying their water bottles on it, enabling him to fire 13 magazines of .303 ammunition. The counter-attack was completely successful and the enemy made no further attack on the New Zealand position at Minqar Qaim.

FOOs and CPOs were puzzled by the German artillery tactics. Several times during the day they found their positions clearly bracketed and registered as targets and waited apprehensively for the fire for effect which the ranging shots heralded. Sometimes no such fire came; at other times it fell harmlessly distant from the registered target. Evidently, in the latter cases, the Germans were making some ‘correction’ after ranging which put them right off their target. In many cases, also, German guns which seemed fairly close together in certain areas did not fire in any kind of unison, but as separate guns, individually controlled, thereby minimising the effect of their fire. Freyberg wrote in his diary about the morning's action: ‘Proceedings opened with a searching strafe of the area early with the usual lack of success for amount of shooting.’ He had experienced this kind of gunnery before and Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow said, of this day's fighting, that this ‘curious feature of German gunnery’ was ‘met with not infrequently’.

The most striking example of it this day was from a group of at least a dozen guns in a very shallow, scrub-covered depression between 5000 and 10,000 yards north of 5 Brigade. Their fire was troublesome nearly all day, but not damaging. In the absence of the flash-spotters of the survey troop it was hard to range on individual guns which were firing irregularly. Finally, after many fruitless attempts to silence them, Glasgow adopted the policy of bringing down a regimental concentration on each known gun whenever it fired. It was expensive in ammunition, but completely effective. From about 3.30 p.m. these guns were silent.

The 5 Brigade area, which had seemed in the beginning most vulnerable to attack, was never directly threatened; but it suffered heavy shelling, directed mainly at the 5th Field guns. The gun positions had little or no protection and inevitably some guns and vehicles were hit. One gun, under Sergeant Hoare, [17] suffered damage and its trailer and ammunition were set on fire. Hoare rallied his men, put out the fire, and started to repair the gun. The shelling continued and he was forced to withdraw until it abated. Then he went back and brought the gun into action again. Bombardier Beard
[18] of 28 Battery was wounded, but stayed with his men. A lorry was set on fire and ammunition on it kept exploding, endangering nearby lorries. Beard collected some gunners and with them unloaded ammunition from these other lorries, regardless of the violent explosions close at hand. For the rest of the day he was tireless and selfless in his determination to keep the guns supplied with ammunition. Both Hoare and Beard were awarded the MM. [19]

Freyberg was wounded in the neck by a shell splinter at 5 p.m. while studying the aftermath of the attack which the Maoris repulsed. This spate of firing was the enemy's last major effort this day and when it died down the noise of battle slowly subsided altogether. As dusk approached, the field guns were down to about 35 rounds per gun, and many of these rounds would have been armour-piercing or smoke, of little use under the circumstances except as a last resort. A further heavy attack at this stage might have brought about a crisis; but the enemy had had enough.

[14]
Capt F. F. E. Polhill, MC, m.i.d.; Waipukurau; born Waipawa, 23 Sep 1908; salesman; wounded Nov 1941.

[15]
Lt C. H. Parks, MM; Lower Hutt; born Wales, 6 Mar 1919; Regular soldier (Grenadier Guards); wounded 15 Jul 1942.

[16] This early version of the 6-pounder was a menace to layers, but later versions were fitted with shoulder pads which overcame this trouble.

The injured layer, Gnr R. M. Williams, travelled in an ambulance in the night break-out and in the course of it was killed by machine-gun fire.

[17] 2 Lt H. R. Hoare, MM; Waitaki; born NZ, 6 Jan 1919; printer; wounded 5 Feb 1944.

[18]
Bdr J. G. Beard, MM; born NZ 10 Jun 1918; labourer; killed in action 2 Nov 1942.

[19] Another gunner who was decorated partly for what he did this day—though his DSO was not awarded until the end of the year—was Lt-Col Mitchell of the 7th Anti-Tank. He was here, there and everywhere at Minqar Qaim. His pick-up truck was riddled with shell splinters and his driver wounded in the arm. His own safety seemed to be the last thing he thought of. When the attack started from the south he helped to get the spare 6-pounders manned and into action and some say that he helped to fire one of them, though he denies this. His example was inspiring and greatly endeared him to his men. It was not until 7 p.m. that he returned to his HQ, consisting of the adjutant's truck in the Artillery HQ area.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Break-out After Dark

The Break-out After Dark

So long as the Division could escape from the encircling enemy during the night, the shortage of ammunition did not greatly matter; but the enemy was in considerable strength on the escarpment to the east, the ground to the south-east—the only direction not blocked by enemy forces—was unknown and might prove impassable on a night march, and a night fight was clearly necessary. The Division would have to force its way through or past the concentration to the east, which had been observed by the 4th Field as early as 5.15 p.m., but could not be effectively shelled because of the shortage of ammunition. For the same reason and to preserve the element of surprise, no artillery preparation could be given to the break-out attack.

The artillery was able to provide invaluable assistance, however, to the rest of the Division this night. A last-minute attempt by 5 Brigade to recover its transport, regrouped to the south-east, was unavailing and the transport stayed where it was. This was bad enough even for the gunners, who would have to do without many portées and other vehicles they needed for the night march; for the infantry it threatened calamity. A large-scale exodus on foot was unthinkable. The 4 Brigade position was less cramped and the brigade had retained considerably more of its transport than 5 Brigade. The artillery, however, had to keep many vehicles—ammunition lorries, OP and Signals trucks, and much HQ transport—at hand to service and control the guns and these were now worth their weight in gold. Without them the 5 Brigade infantry could not have got away from Minqar Qaim.

The plan was that 4 Brigade infantry would form up, stage a short, sharp, silent night attack, mount the transport following close behind, and the Reserve Group and 5 Brigade would drive through the gap thus made into the open desert beyond and make for El Alamein, 90-odd miles away. The anti-tank portées and field guns would guard the flanks and rear of the transport. Zero hour was 12.30 a.m. on 28 June.

The usual profusion of German flares of many colours went up after dark, seemingly in all directions. The four troops of 31 Battery formed their portées and other vehicles up behind the 4 Brigade transport, the exhausted gunners of the 4th Field lined up their vehicles on the flanks, [20] and 41 Battery dispersed its Bofors—ill-adapted for fast night travel over rough desert—among the other vehicles. Then the 4 Brigade gunners waited. Zero hour came and passed and they were still waiting, many of them fast asleep.

For the gunners of 5 Brigade it was not so simple. The 5th Field assembled all its vehicles as infantry were forming up to march off. Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow, asked to carry about a company of them, ended up by finding room for about a battalion and a half ‘on top of quads, in amn vehicles, PUs and even sitting on parts of guns’, as he later wrote. The anti-tankers had to carry a 6-pounder on each portée and tow another one, and also had infantry and others sitting, lying or clinging wherever they could on the overloaded vehicles. For the Bofors gunners of 42 Battery it was almost as bad. The packed transport drove into the Reserve Group and Divisional Headquarters area and there some men transferred from the grossly overcrowded vehicles into others with more room to spare. Even so, the 5th Field still carried the better part of a battalion, besides the gunners.

The 4 Brigade infantry attacked before 2 a.m. with great élan and burst through the lines of 21 Panzer Division, creating havoc as they did so and provoking much erratic fire. The transport and guns passed through almost as planned and the enemy was so shaken that very few of them were hit. The infantry mounted their lorries and the group moved on into the quiet desert beyond. The 4th Field, which had already lost an A Troop gun in the day's fighting, lost a B Troop gun and trailer and a pick-up truck disabled in the breakthrough. Sergeant Stevenson
[21] stopped to render the gun unserviceable. Later in the night the RHQ office truck broke down and RSM Bartley, [22] who could not bear to part with it, worked frantically until he succeeded in repairing it. A Troop of 31 Battery lost its troop subaltern, Second-Lieutenant Bloore, [23] who was killed while sitting on a portée by an AP shot which also wounded the driver. The same burst of fire damaged a hub of Sergeant Parks's 6-pounder, which was being towed, and after a few minutes, by which time C Troop was three or four miles from the enemy, the wheel came off. The gun crew, loth to leave their new gun, worked hard to repair it, together with the crew of another portée and the passengers of a three-tonner who generously stopped to help. The brigade had long since disappeared when they finally managed to put another wheel on and mount the gun on the portée. A little while later there was a sharp explosion, perhaps from an anti-personnel bomb lodged in the camouflage net, which slightly wounded Parks and caused Gunner Yates
[24] a nasty wound in the leg. Two portées of A Troop broke down on the journey and had to be towed by the other two. The two ad hoc gun crews of 33 Battery travelled behind 31 Battery. One of them, carrying Lieutenant Latta
[25] and four gunners including Frank Trace, was stripped for action; the other had 16 men on it and was towing a gun as well as carrying one. Latta had already sent away the 2-pounder portées still with 33 Battery laden with men of 18 Battalion after telling them that ‘if anything happened they were to head east and go for their lives’. When enemy fire opened on the transport, Trace's gun swung round and fired three shots at the flashes of tank guns. The third shot jammed and the portée hastened on. One tank, according to an NCO of Divisional Headquarters who saw it all, split in half and burst into flames. The ack-ack gunners with this group were luckier. They lost one 41 Battery vehicle; but none of the gunners was hurt.

The rest of the Divisional Artillery did not fare so well in the break-out. After waiting impatiently for 4 Brigade to send up the success signal, Brigadier Inglis, who now commanded the Division, decided to move over to the right of the 4 Brigade transport. The desert to the south-east seemed quiet by comparison with the firework display ahead and the rest of the transport might be able to drive through there unscathed. Some confusion occurred as a few 4 Brigade drivers joined this movement, but the mass of vehicles moved steadily for about a mile and a half until green flares rose up directly ahead. The leading vehicles halted, others at the rear closed up, and almost at once the enemy opened heavy fire on the packed transport, causing casualties, especially among trucks carrying men already wounded. The confusion that followed will live in the memories of all concerned.

Inglis drove out to the left as the darkness was shattered by gun flashes, tracers and burning vehicles, as well as the inevitable flares. Many drivers followed, including some of the 6th Field and 33 Battery and some of the 14th Light Ack-Ack; but the move took many painful minutes to get under way and those farther back had every reason to be impatient. Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow, quickly studying the situation and seeing that the enemy fire was on fixed lines, swung out to the right and then the left and gave the order ‘Right Take Ground’, bringing the following lines of vehicles out on to lines roughly parallel with those of the transport which followed Inglis. This manoeuvre was undoubtedly helped by fire directed at the enemy from a variety of weapons, and also by the fact that enemy fire was unduly high and much of it passed harmlessly overhead. Many other lorries farther back still, however, turned right away from the action and dispersed towards the north, where the commander of 22 Battalion spent anxious hours gathering them together. Other vehicles drove independently into the night and ended up driving eastwards in the general direction of the given destination.

Major Sawyers of 48 Battery rushed one of his 25-pounder troops into action in a manner reminiscent of the dawn engagement of the 6th Field seven months before at Bir el Chleta and it fired 10 rounds at the ominous shadows ahead before hooking on the guns and driving through. Many other gunners fired Bren guns, rifles or revolvers either from their vehicles or from the ground. Many vehicles were disabled and some of them burst into flames. Those travelling on them jumped, if they could, on to other vehicles passing. Captain Fisher of the 6th Field was one who lost contact with the main group under Inglis and made his own way through the enemy laager; he drove slowly, anxious not to attract attention, past an Opel car and other German transport, and once clear of it had no trouble in finding the dust clouds which marked the main route. Others were not so lucky. Lieutenant Mitchell and Second-Lieutenant Graham [26] of M Troop, 33 Battery, drove at the rear of Divisional Headquarters at first. Then the column in front halted and 5 Brigade, presumably under Glasgow's orders, swung away to the right. Mitchell was ‘cruising round in the rear … to make sure there was nothing following’ when what he thought was an ‘88’ shell struck the engine of his crowded truck (Graham thought it might have been hit by a mortar bomb). A truck loaded with anti-tank mines was also hit, crashed into Mitchell's truck, and burst into flames. Both vehicles were evacuated in great haste and the sapper truck blew up shortly afterwards. With their driver and two batmen, Mitchell and Graham set off on foot in the direction they thought the Division had taken, collecting several stragglers on the way, all of them wounded or suffering from burns, and were in course of trying to get through the German lines unobserved (and perhaps steal a vehicle) when they were captured. The portée J3 was struck in the ammunition box by a tank shell and three of the crew were wounded by the exploding ammunition, the other three being picked up by a passing lorry. E Troop of 32 Battery towed the 2-pounders of F Troop as well as carrying its own 6-pounders on the portées. The actual breakout ‘was a spectacular and highly terrifying affair’ according to Lieutenant Rutherfurd: [27]

‘There were German machine-guns firing at us from our immediate front, while on the left enemy tanks at close range were firing heavily and with devastating effect at our columns. It was impossible to keep the troop together, and after a short time it developed into a headlong dash eastwards. Later I found myself in a small column of about a dozen vehicles, and at dawn we halted after having covered about 50–60 miles…. Present in this party were Lt-Col C. L. Walter and Major Don Sweetzer. There were a number of dead in our vehicles, so we buried them before continuing.’

Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow's handling of the large group which followed him towards the enemy lines was masterly. The war diary of the 5th Field mentions a bombardment with thermite mortar bombs; but none of the 5th Field vehicles was lost. At great speed Glasgow raced through, veering away from any green flares that went up around him, until the enemy was some way behind. Then he halted and regrouped the vehicles. The columns passed within 20 yards of a tank laager without being challenged or fired on and the break-out was achieved at very small cost. When Glasgow halted again some miles farther on and took stock of the situation, he found he had what he took to be 22 of his own guns, six anti-tank and four Bofors; but some of the 22 must have belonged to the 6th Field, because his own 27 Battery was far away to the south. His RMO, Captain Bryant, [28] had three trucks carrying severely wounded men he had been caring for in the 5th Field RAP. Bryant felt that they had had as much as they could stand and now decided that they should leave the column and drive eastwards at a more comfortable pace than that of Glasgow's group. Ambulances and other trucks carrying wounded joined him and Bryant duly brought them safely back to a hospital in the rear area. For his skill and bravery he won an MC.

BHQ and E Troop of 42 Battery had spent the day with the B Echelon vehicles of 5 Brigade. Most of the latter remained near Minqar Qaim, joined the group gathered together by the CO of 22 Battalion next day, and withdrew with it. Whether BHQ and E Troop did this or travelled with some other detachments is not clear; but they got back safely on the 28th to the Alamein position. All told the battery lost one gun by night and one three-tonner; one officer was wounded and captured, another man was killed, three wounded, and three more were captured. Curiously enough, though 43 Battery ran into very heavy fire in the break-out and lost three guns and one three-tonner, it suffered only two casualties, one killed and one wounded. In such a situation the ack-ack guns were conspicuous, slow-moving and vulnerable.

Ten miles south of Minqar Qaim the 21 Battalion column, with 27 Field Battery and H Troop of 32 Battery, had spent a quiet morning, but a most confusing afternoon. The battalion commander received an order that a Divisional Cavalry squadron would relieve him and he was to leave a field troop with it. B Squadron arrived at 3 p.m. and the column departed, leaving A Troop of 27 Battery and H Troop with the Cavalry and taking Major Thornton's BHQ and B Troop. It did not reach the Division, however, being taken up with a series of moves in the broken country to the south-east of the Division in response to confused information and orders and to enemy activity. B Troop was at one stage ordered into action against an enemy position which had caused casualties to the carrier platoon. The battalion became split up in the course of all this and some of it returned to Bir Khalda, where A Troop was handed back by the Divisional Cavalry, which then withdrew. In due course 21 Battalion and attached artillery did likewise, learning that the Division was heading for Alamein and reaching there late next day. H Troop of 32 Battery, with the Divisional Cavalry squadron, travelled a longer route along the lip of the Qattara Depression to the south, but also got back safely.

On 28 June the Divisional Artillery, which had maintained a splendid unity at Minqar Qaim and made a panzer division and part of the 90 Light Division dance to its tune, was widely scattered, though mostly well under control—remarkably so, as Lieutenant-Colonel Queree of the 4th Field thought. But it took several days to reassemble all the bits and pieces and to count the cost of the Minqar Qaim action and the retreat. [29]

[20] Bty suffered about 25% casualties during the action and by the end of the day batmen, drivers and spare Sigs personnel were manning guns'.— Sgt J. A. Kennedy.

[21]
Sgt R. S. Stevenson, m.i.d.; Christchurch; born Edinburgh, 28 Feb 1917; timber machinist.

[22]
Maj F. R. Bartley, EM, m.i.d.; born NZ 26 Feb 1908; warehouseman; wounded 4 Sep 1942; died 6 Oct 1961.

[23]
2 Lt A. G. Bloore; born NZ 28 Sep 1915; shop assistant; killed in action 28 Jun 1942.

[24]
Sgt B. G. Yates; Tauranga; born Parenga, 6 Feb 1913; station hand; three times wounded.

[25]
Lt G. C. Latta; Auckland; born Pukekohe, 11 Aug 1908; salesman.

[26]
Capt J. B. Graham; England; born Feilding, 23 Aug 1917; shipping clerk; p.w. 28 Jun 1942.

[27]
Maj J. S. Rutherfurd, MC; Auckland; born Stratford, 23 May 1918; bank officer; wounded and p.w. 22 Jul 1942; escaped 23 Jul 1942; Bty Comd, 5 Fd Regt, 1944.

[28]
Maj A. L. Bryant, MC, m.i.d.; Otokia, Taieri; born NZ 25 Apr 1917; medical practitioner; RMO 5 Fd Regt Dec 1941-Jun 1943; 5 Fd Amb Jun 1943-Jul 1944; 1 Mob CCS Jul-Dec 1944; 1 Conv Depot Dec 1944-Aug 1945.

[29] Casualties to the end of June were:

| Killed and Died of Wounds | Wounded | Wounded and Prisoner of War | Prisoner of War (Unwounded) | Total
4th Field | 13 | 50 | — | — | 63
5th Field | 14 | 50 | 1 | 1 | 66
6th Field | 11 | 30 | 2 | 13 | 56
7th Anti-Tank | 3 | 28 | 2 | 4 | 37
14th Light Ack-Ack | 5 | 26 | 1 | 6 | 38
| 46 | 184 | 6 | 24 | 260

These figures must be taken as approximate as the exact date of casualty is not always given in the 2 NZEF casualty lists. Most of the above are Minqar Qaim casualties.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 10 — Summer in the Alamein Line

Contents

- [section]
p. 333

- The Jock Column Policy Continues p. 334
- Plenty of Work for the Bofors p. 338
- The Attack on Ruweisat p. 341
- El Mreir: Another Costly Failure p. 348
- Stalemate in August p. 353
- The Battle of Alam Halfa p. 357
- The Counter-attack Southwards p. 363

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE Eighth Army under Auchinleck suffered costly defeats at Matruh and Fuka and its prospects of holding the 30-mile gap between Alamein and the Qattara Depression looked anything but bright. Auchinleck reaffirmed the battle-group policy, again tried unsuccessfully to get the New Zealand Division [1] to adopt it, thinned out the defending infantry, and set about meeting the oncoming enemy with an army he had encouraged to look over its shoulder.

The New Zealand gunners, however, were anything but downhearted. They enjoyed many cheerful reunions as units gathered their various detachments together in the Kaponga (or Qattara) Box, which was already occupied by 6 Brigade (with 34 Battery and 1 Survey Troop) brought forward from Amiriya. On the 29th most of them spent several hours stripping and cleaning their guns and maintaining their transport: broken springs were the main trouble. It was a hot day and flies were a constant irritation. ‘Jerry bombers were around us after dark’, an ack-ack gunner noted, ‘and we spent a fair portion of the night in slit trenches.’

The next day, the 30th, was busy for most batteries, with much movement and digging as the Division rearranged itself to meet the enemy at this last ditch before the Nile Delta. Only 6 Brigade with its usual artillery plus 1 Survey Troop and a detachment of the 64th Medium, RA, [2] and the Maori Battalion were needed to man the Kaponga Box, also known as Fortress A. The other two brigades were to take up positions at Deir el Munassib, nine or ten miles away to the south-east, with the Divisional Cavalry and mobile columns forward covering the approaches to the Box. The consequent reconnaissances, moves, adjustments and readjustments, and the continual digging of slit trenches, gun pits and command posts in rocky ground kept the gunners busy indeed.

The 4th Field, after standing-to until after dawn on the 30th, had to detach 26 Battery for a mixed column before departing for the Deir (a shallow depression). A sandstorm blew in the new area in the afternoon and it was well after dark before the remaining two batteries dispersed and bedded down for the night. The quartermaster of the 7th Anti-Tank went off to collect another twenty-two 6-pounders and the ‘surplus’ men and vehicles of the regiment [3] drove back to Amiriya, in accordance with the ‘thinning-out’ policy. The ack-ack gunners had mixed fortunes. ‘Bombed to blazes last night’, a member of E Troop wrote in his diary. ‘Our truck was hit for the third time.’ Another in the same troop recorded that he had enjoyed a good night's sleep and the day was peaceful, with no bombing. A third member of 42 Battery wrote that, after taking up a dual role in support of infantry, changing position twice, then digging two gun pits in the later afternoon and evening, the men ‘were done’. Gunners of 41 Battery were luckier: they had ‘easy digging’. And 43 Battery, either on this day or the next (1 July), shot down two aircraft, probably Ju88s.

[1] Renamed the 2nd New Zealand Division from 29 June.

[2] Lt-Col Walter, as CRA of the Fortress (the Box), welcomed this detachment of three officers and 20 other ranks with their three 4.5-inch gun-howitzers (or two 4.5s and one captured enemy medium gun, according to one account). The extra range and weight of the mediums would be especially valuable for counter-battery work. They stayed with the Division as honoured guests for a considerable time.

The 2-pounders still possessed by 33 Battery were transferred to infantry anti-tank platoons and there was talk of up-grading these platoons by re-equipping them with 6-pounders and thereby freeing 33 Battery for a mobile role under Divisional control.

[3] Including the 2 i/c, Major Philp, who had been captured on the way back from the Minqar Qaim area and then rescued by a patrol of the Royals.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Jock Column Policy Continues

The Jock Column Policy Continues

There was bigger game, however, in the offing. The mobile column on the 30th returned empty-handed. Next day a larger one under Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow with two of his own batteries, two troops of 32 Battery, MMGs and carriers went forward to engage enemy attacking a brigade box at Deir el Shein, a dozen miles to the north-west. Glasgow deployed his field guns after a few miles and reconnoitred ahead with his OP parties. They saw a tank and it opened fire on them; but, as the war diary adds without comment, the tank ‘proved to be one of our own’. More tanks and vehicles farther ahead were moving in clouds of sand and smoke and the 5th Field observers could not tell whether they were friend or foe. This patrol, too, came back without firing. The afternoon sandstorm left the 6th Field gunners for some time in doubt about what was happening in front of the Box, where carriers and portées could be seen firing into a thick haze. Then it cleared and the 6th Field fired with gusto at about 20 tanks and 1000 vehicles until dusk. They were at almost extreme range and came very little closer. More enemy passed from first light on 2 July and the 6th Field again shelled various groups that came within reach, evoking return fire on the infantry and 6 Brigade Headquarters. The enemy, having overrun the box at Deir el Shein, was moving past it to Ruweisat Ridge, halfway between the Kaponga and Alamein Boxes. It was a critical stage of the fighting: if the enemy broke through the door to Egypt would be open. The New Zealanders had to do what they could to relieve pressure on the South Africans to the north.

The steps taken to deal with this crisis have been described after the event as if they were well-thought-out and part of a coherent plan; but they were not. The stock Eighth Army solution to such situations, though it had never worked in the past, was still to disperse its strength in mobile columns. The New Zealand Division began to conform; but it soon had second thoughts. It formed mobile columns as ordered, but made them stronger in artillery than the fashionable Jock columns. Lieutenant-Colonel Queree assembled all his 4th Field guns, three troops of 31 Anti-Tank Battery and another of 33 Battery, and moved off to the north early in the morning with three companies of infantry, carriers, and a Vickers platoon. Another under Major Snadden set off after it with 28 Battery and a 6-pounder troop of 32 Battery, also with infantry and carriers. Both columns soon reached Alam Nayil, five miles away, and there, on divisional orders, Brigadier Weir amalgamated them and himself took command of the combined force.

The object was to keep the enemy off the eastern end of Ruweisat; but in the absence of much of its artillery the Division was highly vulnerable and for the rest of the day Weir's strong gun group had to adjust and readjust its position in response to the moves of the enemy on Ruweisat and also to other enemy moves that seemed at times to be threatening the Division. None of the threats was sustained; but they had the effect of distracting the group from its main task and it was not until late in the day that the field guns were able to bring down much fire on Ruweisat and to support British tank sorties beyond Alam Nayil. The gun group stayed the night north of this feature and some enemy withdrew south-eastwards, halting out of range of the 6th Field. A column with 48 Battery, an anti-tank troop, and some Maoris went out from the Kaponga

Box and the field guns engaged enemy beyond El Mreir with doubtful results. In the Box itself the Bofors were busy and 43 Battery claimed a Ju88 and an Me110 probably shot down— the latter when flying very low.

Next day, 3 July, Weir's gun group was soon in action against numerous vehicles to the north-east. Return fire was half-hearted and the New Zealand guns clearly had the upper hand. The enemy turned out to be the Italian Ariete Armoured Division and was in poor shape. Infantry of 4 Brigade, after some delay, attacked the concentration and took many prisoners. More important still, they captured virtually the whole of the Italian divisional artillery: twelve 105s, eleven 88s and Russian 76.2s, sixteen 75s and five 25-pounders, 44 guns all told, not counting some 20-millimetre dual-purpose automatic cannons, mortars, and small arms. Two tanks were abandoned. There was other booty galore. Four of the 25-pounders were serviceable and the 4th Field gladly took them over, with one or two enemy guns, and large quantities of ammunition. The rest was destroyed. It was a striking and brilliant success and the four field batteries had done much to achieve it. At the end 4 Brigade Headquarters arrived to take over command, and Weir and his staff returned to Divisional Headquarters with (in the words of the war diary) ‘a small amount of loot and a large Italian gun tower’. Meanwhile 41 Battery went forward to give welcome ack-ack support to the 4th Field south of Alam Nayil.

The current plan was for 5 Brigade to relieve 6 Brigade in the Box and for the latter, short of transport, to withdraw from the battlefield. It quickly yielded to another: 5 Brigade was to pursue the remnants of Ariete towards El Mreir, picking up the 6th Field and 33 and 43 Batteries on the way. The 5th Field and 32 Battery were to join Divisional Reserve Group. The Box was to be evacuated and the Division was to keep mobile.

The ack-ack gunners did not conform to this scheme. In the Box 43 Battery spent a quiet day digging gun positions, while 42 Battery stayed in the Munassib area and was often in action against Stukas and other low-flying aircraft. D1 shot down a Ju88 which crashed four miles away. [4] The Bofors crews were beginning to enjoy themselves and their popularity was climbing upwards.

the rout of ariete division, 3 july 1942

The defile through the minefields of the Box and soft going afterwards held up the field guns, and 5 Brigade was already attacking towards El Mreir late in the afternoon when Lieutenant-Colonel Walter brought his guns into action, one battery at a time. He engaged enemy holding the northern lip of the depression, obviously not part of Ariete. Enemy guns were numerous and hard to locate and they fired freely until after dark. A smoke screen covered a withdrawal by New Zealand infantry before dusk, but it drew sharp retaliation against the guns. An hour or two later the 6th Field fired an eight-minute concentration of 58 rounds per gun, searching and sweeping, then fire lifted and for a quarter of an hour the guns fired at a slow rate north of the depression while infantry attacked from west to east across the brigade front and took a few Italian prisoners. By dawn the brigade was back in its former position facing El Mreir.

After dark the Reserve Group moved westwards to Deir Alinda, halfway to the Box, and 4 Brigade closed up to the north, linking up with the Box. Divisional Cavalry had been patrolling widely to the south-west, west and north-west with various troops of 32 and 34 Batteries and D Troop of 31 Battery and the anti-tankers had several engagements.

[4] D1 fired 27 rounds this day, D4 53, D5 18 and D6 35; E Troop also engaged, but its records were later lost—it claimed no hits.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Plenty of Work for the Bofors

Plenty of Work for the Bofors

The 6th Brigade infantry withdrew as arranged, thereby increasing the proportion of guns to infantry in the rest of the Division. The gunners who welcomed this most were those of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, who were well aware that their defensive responsibilities were far greater than their resources. They could not hope to provide an umbrella of ack-ack fire wherever it was needed. Any decrease in the size of the concentrations of New Zealand vehicles was therefore all to the good.

The Bofors were far more active on the 4th. E Troop gunners had just finished digging and were getting their guns into position when dive-bombers came over—26 according to one account—and bombs were bursting about them by the time they managed to open fire. The target seemed to be the guns of the 64th Medium in Deir Alinda, some of which were damaged. Bombs also fell among the vehicles of the 5th Field and 1 Survey Troop and several men were hit. [5] One Stuka crashed. Then 42 Battery moved to better positions on the lip of the depression and dug new pits. When the next raid came they were ready and their fire clearly deterred the enemy from pressing his attack. Several hits were observed. In the 4 Brigade area 41 Battery shot down one of two fighters which attacked early—excellent shooting against such difficult targets. In the Kaponga

Box 43 Battery, which was still short of four guns, destroyed a Stuka. The 14th Light Ack-Ack claimed six aircraft shot down this day, at a cost to the regiment of one killed and about 20 wounded. All told 41 Battery fired nearly 1700 Bofors rounds, 42 Battery 1509 rounds, and 43 Battery over 1000. As a 43 Battery sergeant wrote in his diary, there were ‘appreciative comments from infantry and arty chaps’. [6]

While driving westwards next day 41 Battery was bombed on the move by seven Stukas, which killed two gunners and wounded two more, and later in the day the battery suffered two more casualties and had a tractor destroyed. Many of the attacking planes flew out of the sun and E Troop of 42 Battery reported that two Me110s also cut off their engines and glided in to bomb and strafe. The German and Italian air forces had evidently been taught a lesson and they were now much more careful, though 42 Battery claimed two hits on the 5th-one by D5 on a D0215 bomber and one by D6 on a Ju88.

The raid which hit 41 Battery on the move, however, did much other damage. It killed 4 Brigade's commander and his BM and the 4th Field lost two killed and 14 wounded, as well as one of its guns. The brigade nevertheless pushed westwards and disposed itself to the west in the afternoon, while 6 Brigade reoccupied the Kaponga Box. Both the 4th and the 6th Field fired frequently during 5 July at transport, mortar positions and other targets and they did likewise next day, with added fire from the 5th Field. The CRA ordered a sweeping barrage by the 5th and 6th Field in the late evening and concentrations by these regiments and the detachments of the 64th Medium on widely separated targets in an arc from Ruweisat through El Mreir to Deir el Shein. This was believed to be in support of a British armoured thrust along Ruweisat from the east; but no such thrust took place. To General Inglis, when he heard this, it seemed a waste of ammunition; but it fell on the headquarters of the German Africa Corps, on 15 Panzer and on 90 Light and was most unwelcome.

In the same night, 6–7 July, 4 Brigade moved forward to draw level with 5 Brigade and west of it, and the 4th Field leapfrogged its batteries forward so that they could quickly bring down fire at any stage. After some bickering on the 7th the 4th Field brought down heavy fire on infantry to the north and dispersed them. The move was only a tentative one, however, and in the afternoon the brigade drew back to the south. Instead of retiring, as expected by Eighth Army, the enemy was well-placed to thrust between 13 and 30 Corps and cut off the New Zealand Division. Major Snadden patrolled with 28 Battery and some infantry to the west in the afternoon, fired at some vehicles in the distance, and then withdrew. After dark there was a complicated and difficult rearrangement of the whole Divisional position, in the course of which 6 Brigade again withdrew southwards from the Box and 4 and 5 Brigades formed up east of it in the areas of Deir Alinda and Munassib.

At the end of it the gunners were baffled by the turn of events and dog-tired—the Bofors gunners especially. They had to be in a state of constant readiness from dawn to dark, whether on the move or not. E Troop was directly attacked on the 6th, the guns E4, E5 and E6 each being dive-bombed by three or four Stukas. The gunners fired back furiously throughout, scored several hits, D1 claimed a Stuka, and later reports credited the regiment with four planes shot down this day. Luckily none of the bombs struck their targets. The ack-ack batteries had even more action on the 7th, despite frequent moves, and D1, which was building up a fine record, claimed a hit on a Ju88, while E Troop claimed two hits on each of two other aircraft and 43 Battery shot down a CR42 Italian fighter. Enemy aircraft were few and far between on the 8th and the ack-ack gunners rested gratefully.

Columns each with a battery of the 4th Field and an antitank troop went forward to Alam Nayil and ground south-east of it on the 8th and other anti-tankers patrolled with the Divisional Cavalry. After dark the Division side-stepped again to the east so that 4 Brigade on its right ended up at Deir el Muhafid, narrowing the gap between 13 and 30 Corps. Afternoon temperatures had risen sharply and the gunners had more digging to do in the burning heat, relentlessly pestered by flies until driven almost to distraction. In the afternoon of the 9th the 4th Field brought down observed fire on tanks probing towards Alam Nayil and destroyed two of them without provoking much return fire.

Heavy gunfire rumbled all night to the north, where Australians were attacking on the coast; but enemy activity on the New Zealand front did not slacken. OP parties of the 4th and 5th Field had to retire in the morning when tanks and lorried infantry approached. Several regimental concentrations halted the advance briefly, but three tanks and more lorried infantry came on in mid-morning. The 25-pounders again engaged, this time decisively, knocking out a tank and two lorries and driving the enemy back. G Troop of 32 Battery also engaged. G1 was machine-gunned by an armoured car from the right flank and three of its crew were wounded. Then G4 developed buffer trouble and could not fire. G2 and G3 covered their withdrawal and then returned to the attack, the latter, under Sergeant Kavanagh, [7] scoring a brilliant hit with its first round on the base of the turret of a hull-down tank at long range. The turret came right off. Several more tanks then took up hull-down positions to engage G3 and the two 6-pounder portées manoeuvred to gain the advantage. G2 destroyed one tank and hit a third. A massive intervention by the field artillery ended the action. The heat haze from noon onwards so violently distorted observation that activity died down. In the night 5 Brigade crossed to the eastern side of 4 Brigade and the latter readjusted its open left flank.

[5] In the survey troop Sgt K. J. H. Snell, Bdr F. Thomas and Gnrs N. B. Mills, R. W. Glendinning, W. A. Leyland and T. P. Morton were killed on 4 July and Sgt D. B. Marshall, L-Bdr P. R. Shadwell and Gnrs D. McMillan and A. S. Roe wounded.

[6] D1 claimed its second and third victims in this position, an Me109 and a Stuka. D2 claimed an He111K medium bomber. D4, which suffered three stoppages, hit a Ju88, and D5 claimed a Ju87 and a Ju88. It was splendid shooting.

[7]
Sgt F. J. Kavanagh; Lower Hutt; born Wellington, 12 Feb 1913; builder's labourer.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Attack on Ruweisat

The Attack on Ruweisat

The next step was a critical one. It took both brigades some miles north-westwards in transport, then on foot in the later afternoon of 11 July, to a line near Alam Nayil. Enemy artillery reacted strongly. The line thus gained was the starting line for a major attack on Ruweisat; but the move forewarned the enemy and the starting line was in any case most unsatisfactory. It was oblique to the front of the projected attack and too far from the objective.

There followed two days of continual artillery action, with lulls in the early afternoon when the heat haze was at its worst. Brigadier Weir and his staff worked without pause to settle the many details of the forthcoming attack. The main feature of the artillery plan was that it was designed not to disclose to the enemy what was afoot. Until 9 p.m. on the 14th the guns of the Division and of other formations within reach were to fire against hostile batteries and other known targets. Then normal harassing fire was to continue until 12.30 a.m. on the 15th. Half an hour later the infantry were expected to stage a silent assault, after a long approach march. This would be at almost extreme range of the 25-pounders, which could not therefore give close support. On current estimates of enemy strength there seemed no need for artillery at that stage. The allocation of guns to 4 Brigade was the normal one; but 5 Brigade would have the 6th Field and 33 and 43 Batteries instead of the 5th Field and 32 and 42 Batteries. At least two-thirds of the field guns were to be ready on the objective for whatever tasks were required from first light onwards.

ruweisat ridge, morning 15 july 1942

Enemy dispositions, however, were largely misunderstood and the enemy showed almost at the outset a lively awareness of what was happening. What were thought to be outposts were in fact part of the main defence line. When the infantry pushed rapidly past them and on towards the eastern end of Ruweisat they left behind them, in the form of posts by-passed in the advance, a copious source of trouble for the troops that were to follow, particularly the gunners.

There was trouble enough even before this for the anti-tankers. Major Sweetzer of 33 Battery on the right found it hard to collect his troops and only M Troop, allotted to brigade reserve, found its correct place for the start. In due course Lieutenant Ollivier, after waiting fruitlessly for the other two troops, drove forward with his K Troop and caught up with 5 Brigade Headquarters. J and L Troops were led astray by a liaison officer and found themselves in the 4 Brigade area. On the left B, C and D Troops of 31 Battery followed close behind the infantry and soon struck trouble. Flares rose on all sides when the infantry reached the ‘outposts’ and the portées were prominent targets. They were mortared heavily, a sergeant and an artificer were killed, an officer and two gunners wounded, and B4 with its engine disabled had to be taken in tow. A shell splinter punctured a tyre of C3 and the crew had an anxious time changing the wheel. ‘Morning seemed slow in coming,’ said the gun sergeant later. ‘Infantry were scattered among the knolls and shallow wadis. The enemy artillery was busy, some of the incoming shells being of heavy calibre. As the light increased, German tanks in hull-down positions put over a stream of bullets, clearing all our men from the mounds and forcing them into hollows. Truck after truck was destroyed.…’

Ollivier with K Troop ended up with 22 Battalion, but the situation was so confused that he thought it better to await firm instruction or reliable information before siting his four 6-pounders. He therefore halted in a little wadi containing about 100 Italian prisoners until dawn, which was misty. An infantry colonel then warned him that German tanks were in the offing and they soon appeared, machine-gunning the infantry. K4 at once opened fire, but the smoke and dust quickly thickened the mist and all the gunners could do was to fire at gun flashes. K1 suffered a hit which carried away a foot of the gun muzzle before it could fire. Sergeant Booth
[8] of K2 quickly set on fire a tank on the other side of the hollow. Then he was badly wounded, and while his men attended to him the portée was put out of action. Sergeant Wright
[9] of K4 knocked out two tanks and then, by a frightful chance, a light cannon shell or explosive bullet went right through the telescope, killing the layer and wounding Wright.

The last episode of this grim action was enacted by the crew of K3. The layer was wounded and the loader, Gunner Davies, [10]

at once replaced him, while Gunner Paulger
[11] loaded. They fired briskly and as they did so a shellburst set fire to the bedrolls and ammunition on the truck. They were ordered to abandon the gun; but instead Paulger threw the blazing gear and ammunition clear while Davies went on firing. A tank in front burst into flames. Davies suffered a painful grazing wound and was wounded again moments later when the gun received a direct hit. Paulger found to his surprise that the portée was still working and he drove it back over the ridge, only to have it hit twice in the engine by fire from another tank. He then continued on foot and got away. Davies, with other wounded, took shelter in slit trenches until rescued later by a carrier. Both these gunners were awarded the MM.

Seven other members of K Troop stayed with infantry nearby until 4 p.m., when the Germans counter-attacked and drove the infantry back to the area of 4 Brigade. The remainder, setting out later, found the route blocked. With four tanks in front and enemy infantry all round they had to surrender.

The anti-tankers of 31 Battery also had a hard task. The tanks opposing them at dawn were more cautious and fired hull-down. A curtain of smoke from burning lorries soon gave them further concealment. A large group of Italians to the left of C Troop had surrendered, but the tank fire kept captors and captives pinned down. C Troop fired steadily at a point some 2000 yards away from which most of the fire seemed to be coming and the enemy there moved away. Machine-gun fire from higher ground in front, however, could not be silenced. It set several trucks on fire including portées, some of them 2-pounders belonging to the infantry. Shells were also landing in the area, some of them monstrous 210s. C Troop gunners fired a captured Italian mortar at the nearest enemy guns; but its range was insufficient. New Zealand machine-gunners gave excellent covering fire on both flanks, but the rest of the infantry seemed to have withdrawn.

D Troop started rather better. Coming under fire from the south, the troop moved over a ridge and found itself in an Italian headquarters area. A solitary German opened fire, but a Bren gun fired from a portée silenced him and the Italians offered to surrender. Major Nicholson of 31 Battery located tanks to the south-west and B and C Troops engaged them.

They were difficult targets hull-down at 2000 yards, but the 6-pounders knocked out three tanks, two captured Grants and a Valentine manned by Germans. Nicholson then rearranged the guns and brought some infantry 2-pounders into his layout. Some crews tried to dig gun pits, but soon gave it up.

When the enemy counter-attacked in the late afternoon the portée were highly vulnerable. One of B Troop and another of D Troop were set on fire and a second one of B Troop was immobilised. Another B Troop portée trying to take the damaged one in tow also went up in flames. In the end an infantry portée took over and towed the damaged B Troop portée out—the sole survivor of the troop. The remaining three guns of D Troop and all four of C Troop, however, got out safely, though not without trouble. Sergeant Parks backed C1 up a rise when he heard the attack coming. He could see vehicles burning and infantry surrendering, but at first no enemy. Then he saw tanks at 300 yards and halted two of them. He had a third tank in his gunsight when a party of New Zealanders moved between gun and tank. He could see the tank gun trained on his gun and his situation was tense in the extreme. Neither fired until the last man crossed the line of fire. Then both fired at once. The tank shell struck just below the gun-shield and wounded all but the driver; the tank burst into flames. The portée driver started up and drove off. Parks, who was badly wounded, was awarded an MM for his work this day.

OP parties which had tried to get forward with the infantry in the night had similar adventures and few of them managed to establish workable communications with their guns. Other parties sent forward from the guns were halted as soon as they came within reach of the many weapons in the ‘outposts’ and naturally called down fire on these. No route through to Ruweisat could be established. The 6th Field fired persistently at what was clearly a main centre of resistance straight ahead and Major Sawyers of 48 Battery gathered a scratch force and attacked it, only to be driven back. He then brought down concentrated fire and softened resistance to the point that white flags appeared early in the afternoon. Sawyers sallied forth again and this time took the position, with 20 German prisoners and 160 Italians. It contained two 88s, several anti-tank guns, and many other weapons. Sawyers (who had carried out similar attacks twice in the previous campaign) also came upon a 6th Field truck and in a nearby slit trench a wounded OP officer,

Captain Pountney, [12] and his driver. The rest of the OP party had been killed.

Lieutenant Carson of the 4th Field was one of the very few persons on Ruweisat who succeeded (with his No. 11 set) in establishing any communications back to Brigade. Another 4th Field FOO was wounded and the third who went forward with the infantry survived (only to be killed two days later), but could get no word back to the guns. Gunner Worsdale
[13] of the 4th Field rose gallantly to the occasion. The armoured OP in which he was wireless operator was set on fire by tanks close at hand. When he was given fire orders to transmit back, however, he climbed into the burning vehicle and manned the wireless set. He managed to transmit two complete sets of fire orders before evacuating the now fiercely burning vehicle.

The 6th Field, impatiently waiting to get through to Ruweisat, eventually had to deploy in what later became known as Stuka Wadi, north of Alam Nayil. The 4th Field fired a two-battery concentration on Deir el Shein and was held up in the same way, taking up temporary positions south-east of the objective from which it shelled posts and strongpoints ahead. The area was crowded with vehicles and attracted much shellfire. ‘Not much to do during the day’, a sergeant of A Troop, 25 Battery, remarked; ‘knew little about the results of the attack’.

The new gun area in Stuka Wadi was bombed several times, though 41 Battery had deployed there and put up a thick barrage, firing 1268 rounds all told, and scored many hits. To the south-east 42 Battery did very well indeed. Every D Troop gun claimed either a Ju87 or a Ju88. In E Troop only the three guns of the Left Section were forward and they had much trouble with misfires; but E5 shot down a Ju87 and it crashed in their area. Similarly 43 Battery, in the same wadi, shot down a Stuka. In a final effort before dark 28 Ju87s and 15 Ju88s came over with an escort of more than 30 Messerschmitts and ‘All hell was let loose at them’, as an E Troop gunner remarked; ‘2 Stukas crashed and others were winged’.

For the field gunners generally the attack on Ruweisat was a succession of disappointments and frustrations, some of them annoying, some humiliating. Others blamed the British tanks for not supporting the infantry when well-placed to do so; but the field gunners could not feel completely guiltless about being unable to bring down fire when the infantry urgently needed it. For several critical hours when emergency steps might have been taken to provide supporting fire, men at the guns were led to believe that all was well, and it was saddening to learn later that the attack had ended in disaster and the greater part of three battalions and 4 Brigade Headquarters were lost—over 1200 men all told. That a larger number of Italians and a few Germans were captured was small consolation.

In the next few days 4 Brigade, less 18 Battalion but plus the remnants of the 22nd, withdrew to Maadi and 6 Brigade was called forward. The 4th Field came directly under the CRA, with the 6th Field still under 5 Brigade and the 5th Field with Divisional Reserve. For the period of urgent reorganisation which followed, Brigadier Weir arranged close liaison with the RAF and strong air support could be called up if needed. But the field guns were kept busy. They drove enemy gunners south of Ruweisat off their guns on the 16th. The enemy retaliated by bombing at 2 p.m., when the heat haze was at its worst. Ju87s came over first and then Ju88s dived from a different direction, so that Bofors gunners engaging the Ju87s were facing the wrong direction and were taken unawares. D1 claimed yet another Stuka and the Left Section of D Troop shot down another with small-arms fire. But 43 Battery suffered the rare disaster of a direct hit on one of its guns which wiped out the whole crew—a shocking spectacle for men of nearby guns. [14]

The 16th ended in a crescendo of fire by the New Zealand field guns and the 64th Medium against enemy armour to the north-west. The attack was not directly against the Division, but the New Zealanders opposed it strongly and the 4th Field alone fired 2224 rounds this day. In the 6th Field Sergeant Conway
[15] as an OPA took command of his OP when his officer was wounded and continued to shoot the guns coolly and effectively. When the attack was at its height and visibility from the OP inadequate, he took the telephone and crawled forward under heavy fire to gain observation and bring down fire on tanks and machine-gunners. For this and similar work later he was awarded an MM. The enemy on this front was evidently deterred by the weight of the strength of the opposition and next day went over to the defensive. A little ground had been gained by the New Zealanders and Indians at the eastern end of Ruweisat; but in the final accounting it was not nearly enough to justify the losses incurred.

[8]
Sgt E. Booth; Rotorua; born Napier, 16 Jan 1906; electrician; wounded 15 Jul 1942.

[9]
Sgt S. N. Wright; born NZ 17 Apr 1917; labourer; twice wounded.

[10]
L-Bdr W. F. Davies, MM; Wellsford; born Auckland, 5 Nov 1916; farmhand; wounded 15 Jul 1942.

[11]
Gnr A. D. Paulger, MM; Taupiri; born NZ 23 Nov 1918; fruiterer; wounded 9 Oct 1944.

[12]
Lt-Col J. A. Pountney, MBE; Wellington; born Hamilton, 17 Feb 1915; Regular soldier; 6 Fd Regt 1942; wounded 15 Jul 1942; CO 16 Fd Regt, RNZA, Korea, Apr-Nov 1954; Commander K Force, Nov 1954–May 1955; Director, RNZA, Army HQ, 1960–61; Director of Training, Army HQ, 1961–63; Area Officer, Area 5, Wellington, 1964–65.

[13]
L-Bdr O. Worsdale, DCM; Wellington; born Christchurch, 9 Dec 1919; brushmaker. For this and other distinguished service, Worsdale was later awarded the DCM.

[14]
Sgt D. P. Patterson, Bdrs E. J. McAlpine and C. A. Walker, Gnrs S. W. Bracken, W. W. Hooper, J. F. Lynn, H. F. Preston and M. G. Smith were killed and Gnrs T. L. Joseph and N. J. Thurlow died of wounds.

[15]
Lt S. Conway, MM; Wellington; born Islington, 19 Jan 1910; accountant, NZ Railways; wounded 22 Dec 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

El Mreir: Another Costly Failure

El Mreir: Another Costly Failure

The next major effort was on 22 July, when 6 Brigade attacked north-north-westwards towards El Mreir, and its similarities to the Ruweisat attack were too striking to pass unnoticed or to be forgiven. There was the same uncertainty from Auchinleck downwards about the main purpose of the operation, the same lack of timing in relation to other operations; again the approach march was too long and the co-ordination between infantry and armoured formations poor, and there was no fresh and promising solution to the vital problem of getting supporting arms forward. Moreover, the enemy minefields were far more formidable than any previously encountered by New Zealanders.

Stronger and more concentrated artillery support, however, could be provided. The fire of all three New Zealand field regiments plus the 64th Medium and an RHA battery could cover 6 Brigade (though some guns would also have to support 18 Battalion on a flanking mission). The programme worked out for them was heavy, starting with the medium guns and howitzers at 5.30 p.m. and ending with the 2nd RHA at 10.45 p.m., with further fire as required. One battery of each of the New Zealand regiments was reserved for special tasks. The rate of fire for the 25-pounders was ‘troop fire ten seconds’—one round every 10 seconds from each troop—for two or three minutes on each of about a dozen targets selected for each regiment. The formal part would entail the firing of about 2400 25-pounder rounds and much ammunition of the 64th Medium. It was only part, however, of a larger operation in which nine field regiments (not counting the RHA) and the medium regiment had a full share.

The violence of the result was awe-inspiring to gunners used to pinching and scraping for ammunition. Only First World War men had experienced anything like it. Back at Divisional

Headquarters the noise of gun fire sounded ‘terrific’. But the immediate aftermath was ominously like that of the Ruweisat attack.

el mreir, 22 july 1942

The 4th Field stayed where it was, stood-to at 4.30 a.m., and got ready to fire when FOOs with the attacking infantry indicated targets. No such information arrived. The 5th Field already had 27 Battery well forward and it was shelled and suffered loss. The other two batteries were to move forward 3000 yards when their tasks were completed; but the situation seemed so uncertain that Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow kept them where they were. The 6th Field was to move over three miles forward to new positions already reconnoitred by Lieutenant-Colonel Walter. He gave the order, but it did not reach the guns until about 4 a.m. and they could not reach the new area until after dawn. They, too, had to rely on what could be seen from near the guns or predicted from the map; for nothing came through from the FOOs. The enemy was so close that some of his guns could bring down direct fire on the 6th Field positions and they caused casualties and damaged several guns. By noon on the 22nd there was still no word from the FOOs and the CRA ordered predicted fire on the second objective.

Of the three 6-pounder troops of 32 Battery which set out for El Mreir, F Troop under Lieutenant Rutherfurd had got forward and its guns were sited in the dark to cover 24 Battalion, while H Troop under Lieutenant Holt
[15] and one gun of E Troop were with 6th Brigade Headquarters, ready to move when it was light enough to site them. The other three guns of E Troop under Lieutenant R. M. Smith
[16] had been held up by soft going and were eventually ordered to stay with 18 Battalion to guard the gap in the minefield. C and D Troops of 31 Battery also arrived later and disposed their guns, with those of Smith's troop, along the western flank. Their story from then onwards is tragically like that of Ruweisat—in one way worse, for the enemy had more tanks on the scene and used them more confidently and his supporting arms were far more numerous and deadly in their effect.

Of F Troop, only one man, a driver, returned unscathed. Even before dawn the enemy brought down crushing fire and some of the 6-pounders fired at gun flashes, some of them from tank guns. The enemy was in all directions and the gun crews could do no more than fire furiously until either they or their guns were disabled—a matter of minutes at the most. Sergeant Kavanagh's G3 was the only G Troop gun at El Mreir and Major Bliss of 32 Battery was with it. The portée backed up a slight rise and then was silhouetted by the light of two carriers that burst into flames. Bullets streamed past, their tracers looking very bright in the darkness, but an anti-tank gun dug in ahead could not quite depress its barrel low enough to hit G3. The situation was evidently hopeless and when it got lighter the portée would be a sitting duck. Kavanagh directed it back down the rise and in looking for a better position ran over a mine. The sole E Troop gun had lost its sergeant, wounded on the approach march, and was commanded in its brief action by a gunner. An H Troop portée on its way forward had caught fire while passing through a minefield; but the flames were put out. When the firing started H2 had its buffer holed immediately and its crew all wounded. On H1 only the driver survived and he was taken prisoner. On H4 two were killed and the rest captured. H3 by a stroke of luck was excellently placed at dawn, suffered no harm in the fight that followed, and when the infantry surrendered it made its way safely back through the minefield. (Rutherfurd and Holt of F and H Troops were both lightly wounded and captured; but they escaped next day and, after a march that would have been arduous even had they not been wounded, they got back to the Division. They both won an MC.)

No such onslaught was directed against the two 31 Battery troops and the three E Troop guns with 18 Battalion—partly because they managed to dig their guns in. Heavy fire swept the area after dawn and when an enemy vehicle could be discerned D3 opened fire at it. The D Troop commander, Lieutenant Laurenson, [17] walked over to the gun, and as he reached it a shell scored a direct hit, mortally wounding him and wounding several others. Timely and well-directed fire from the New Zealand field artillery drove off three tanks. [18] Shelling and mortar bombardments continued, but no counter-attack came. Instead the anti-tankers suffered a series of attacks from the air which caused few gunner casualties but damaged many portées beyond immediate repair. When Major Nicholson in the afternoon ordered the guns to withdraw some had to be left behind. A 15-cwt pick-up, after its tyres were changed under sniper fire, managed to tow one D Troop 6-pounder out. One badly-damaged D Troop gun had already been sent back and the two that were left behind were soon recovered by Captain Barry
[19]

and Warrant-Officer Spence
[20] of 15 Light Aid Detachment, whose splendid salvage work under fire earned them an MC and an MBE respectively. All C Troop guns were brought back safely, but three gunners were wounded in the bombing. For the anti-tankers El Mreir was worse than Ruweisat.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell spent all day forward trying to improvise anti-tank defences, which were urgently needed on the exposed western flank in the absence of the British tanks which had been expected to drive through to El Mreir before dawn. Neither he nor anyone else in the Division could persuade the tank commanders to carry out their part of the plan; but he did manage to direct the fire of an anti-tank gun attached to the armoured brigade and with his first shot hit a hull-down tank and caused it to surrender. Later he distributed the few remaining 32 Battery guns to other batteries and the 32nd ceased to exist.

The Bofors gunners spent one of their busiest days, 42 Battery firing over 1000 rounds and 43 Battery more than twice as many, for a score of one Ju88 shot down and a Ju87 hit and smoking. The enemy was keeping high and was therefore hard to hit. When the 6th Field advanced westwards from Stuka Wadi 43 Battery moved with it, coming under shellfire in the new area and even getting ‘mixed up with tank shells’, as a diarist put it. One Bofors suffered a ‘premature’ in the barrel—not necessarily a disaster with such a small-calibre gun—which pointed to a deficiency of the new Mark IV automatic loaders then in use.

At the end of the day the Division had lost another brigade headquarters and nearly 1000 men. The territorial gains were slight and there was no large haul of prisoners as there had been at Ruweisat. Of the thirteen 6-pounders lost two were soon recovered; but the heavy losses of gun crews and the small return for their gallant efforts were heart-breaking. To the field gunners who fired all day in the hope of bringing relief to infantry, most of whom, as it happened, had already been overrun, the train of events was baffling.

The Divisional Commander flatly refused, after El Mreir, to stage a further night attack unless he had tanks under direct command so as to ensure their support while the infantry were consolidating. This did not stop Eighth Army from repeating the sad ritual with other troops to the north in the night 26—27

July: infantry on their objectives, but no sign of ‘supporting’ tanks, and three battalions as a result overwhelmed. The New Zealand artillery gave strong support, the 4th and 6th Field and 64th Medium directly and the 5th Field in a diversionary programme. Two 6-pounders of 33 Battery also tried without much success to distract the enemy's attention, while the Divisional Cavalry with 28 Battery and the 6-pounders of Q Troop fired all weapons into the Kaponga Box (now in enemy hands) with rather more success, though they failed to persuade the enemy that this was the ‘real thing’.

[15]
Lt D. L. Holt, MC; Bay View, Napier; born NZ 14 Apr 1918; farmer; twice wounded.

[16]
Capt R. M. Smith; Wellington; born Mataura, 24 Sep 1906; bank auditor.

[17]
Lt I. G. Laurenson; born Christchurch, 12 Sep 1996; advertising clerk; died of wounds 22 Jul 1942.

[18] E Troop had engaged these tanks by night, the gun-layers sighting through their telescopes. They attracted such a hail of fire in return, however, that the infantry in front were seriously endangered and they therefore ceased fire.

[19]
Capt F. D. Barry, MC; born NZ 20 Oct 1911; labourer; killed in action 30 Oct 1942.

[20]
Lt-Col J. R. Spence, MBE, MC; Clevedon, Auckland; born Wellington, NSW, 20 Nov 1915; Regular soldier.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Stalemate in August

Stalemate in August

Though Eighth Army seemed curiously slow to recognise that the standard of co-operation between tanks and infantry was too low, in other directions it was learning fast. In August the front hardened, both sides were unadventurous, and the Division, like the enemy opposite, worked hard with barbed wire and mines to strengthen its front. Siege warfare was replacing a war of movement and it gave the artillery a chance to develop a wide range of techniques. Co-operation with the RAF had a high priority and was practised in many forms. And there were many minor operations to assert superiority over the enemy and keep him guessing.

For the CRA the August lull gave a long-awaited opportunity to improve divisional control of the field guns and it is significant that in this period field regiments were usually placed ‘in support of’ the infantry brigades with which they were associated and not ‘under command’. In other words, Brigadier Weir exercised a continuous supervision and could concentrate their fire on any targets within reach quickly and to whatever degree was required. On the other hand there was no impediment to quick response to local dangers: the infantry and gunners worked closely together at all levels of command. The object was the greatest possible flexibility of control and speed of response.

An ‘air shoot’ against a hostile battery in the El Mreir Depression on 3 August required much preparation; but the result justified it. An RAF tender arrived the day before and from the area of the 64th Medium it provided a ground-to-air link. A troop of this regiment was to fire the ranging shots and, to guide the aircraft, two smoke flares were lit due east of the gun position at intervals of one mile. When a 50-yard bracket was achieved the 6th Field and 64th Medium were to fire two three-minute concentrations at a rapid rate with an interval of 20 minutes between them. Clouds unexpectedly hampered this programme and the final bracket could not be observed. But the target was engaged as arranged and aerial reconnaissance showed that the shoot had been effective. The hostile battery position was evacuated except for one gun left behind, evidently damaged. The co-ordinates of the battery were passed to the artillery of an Indian division to the north for further attention if the enemy reoccupied the position.

Not only had the Divisional counter-battery organisation improved greatly: the Corps organisation was becoming sophisticated and this was one of several examples of its work. Information about hostile batteries was all passed to Corps and its reliability estimated on the basis of a wider range of data than could be available at the divisional level.

Two days later the 6th Field fired on Point 59 near the western end of Ruweisat to indicate it to a photographic-reconnaissance aircraft, the point being the centre of the area to be photographed. This, too, was successful. The 4th Field inaugurated on 6 August a policy of sending a battery forward to a night-firing position from which various tasks were carried out. Alternatively, guns moved forward by night to fire by day. Several such moves convinced the enemy that the main New Zealand gun areas were a good deal farther forward than they actually were and much fire intended for them fell short and did no harm. Another air shoot on the 7th found the enemy prepared. The opening salvo was fired by the medium guns, but the pilot could not observe it and the salvo was therefore repeated. The spotting aircraft and its escorting fighter were then attacked by Me109Fs and the shoot had to be abandoned. The pilot, as soon as he landed, reported that the second salvo was correct for line but fell 400 yards short. On this evidence a battery of the 6th Field and the 64th Medium engaged the battery in the evening, the medium guns searching 100 yards and sweeping 30 feet.

A gun of the 64th Medium had suffered a ‘premature’ on 27 July which blew away part of the barrel, but luckily only one member of the crew was wounded. On 8 August the gun B2 of the 4th Field suffered a much worse one while ranging. It was an ugly incident in which Gunner Growden
[21] was killed and two others wounded and it made other gunners shudder to think of it. The CRA and the BM (Captain Hanna) examined the damaged gun carefully at their headquarters and found that the shell had detonated in the chamber and had blown out the barrel and jacket for about 18 inches from the breech block.

The 5th Field a few days later fired a long programme rather like a creeping barrage at a very slow rate over ground thought to be a tank harbour and to contain guns as well. While this was going on the 64th Medium shelled the final line to catch any enemy trying to escape in vehicles or on foot. Then the medium regiment set about calibrating its guns and for this purpose made use of 1 Survey Troop. [22] The surveyors established several posts and from them made observations of air-bursts fired over the enemy lines. Several such airbursts had been fired in the evening of the 13th over Deir el Abyad northwest of Ruweisat when a ‘terrific explosion’ (to quote the Divisional Artillery diary) occurred. Calibration was immediately forgotten and the mediums began to fire for effect—ground burst, 10 rounds gun fire. Another huge explosion took place and the white smoke from the two rose well above 1000 feet high, a most unexpected dividend for a routine and exacting job.

The same day, the 13th, proved lucky in another respect: the CRA met the new Army and Corps commanders. Auchinleck had been relieved as Army Commander by Lieutenant-General Montgomery and as C-in-C, Middle East, by General Alexander. General Freyberg, having recovered from his Minqar Qaim wound, returned on the 10th, took temporary command of 13 Corps, and was succeeded in this capacity by Lieutenant-General Lumsden. Freyberg and Weir were greatly reassured to learn that the new man, Montgomery, was not enamoured of Jock columns and brigade groups and proposed to maintain firm control and to keep divisions intact wherever possible. Moreover he deplored the current talk of retreating if the enemy attacked and the open steps taken to prepare for such a contingency. In a desert gasping hot and plagued with flies this was like a breath of fresh air. On the 20th the CRA and representatives of the regiments met Mr Churchill, who was responsible for the change, and the CRA was invited to lunch. Montgomery spent most of the 23rd with the Division and the gunners saw him for themselves. [23]

For the ack-ack gunners the month was quiet until the last day, the enemy rarely attempting anything more ambitious than a hit-and-run raid with two or three fighter-bombers. The anti-tankers, however, found plenty to do. The 34th Battery ran yet another school to train men on the 2-pounder, this time from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. [24] More 6-pounders arrived on the 10th, bringing the regiment's total to 55 (of which 31 and 33 Batteries had 17 each and 34 Battery 21). Of the 34th guns, six were with the 46th Royal Tanks, four with Divisional Headquarters, four on patrol with the Divisional Cavalry, and six with 132 Infantry Brigade (which was under Divisional command), as well as one with RHQ. The new guns needed to be cleaned and tested and the adjutant, Lieutenant Wells, [25] therefore opened a firing range half a dozen miles to the south where the guns were zeroed at 700 yards. Loud complaints soon came from troops to the south-east that ricochets and ‘overs’ were setting off anti-personnel mines nearby. Another range was then set up 23 miles to the south and on it most of the anti-tank guns, old and new, were fired and adjusted.

The LAD officer, Captain Barry, and the RSM, Warrant Officer Spence, continued their remarkable salvage work, often under fire, and the list of what they retrieved in August would almost serve as an Ordnance officer's vade-mecum. Sergeant Campion, [26] whose experience of captured enemy weapons went back to July 1940 when he first entered Libya, trained field gunners to operate three 50-millimetre German anti-tank guns, one of which was then donated to each of the three field RHQs for local protection. On the 27th 32 Anti-Tank Battery returned to life, being made up of all the former members serving with other batteries, Lieutenant Williams
[27] with all of P Troop of the 34th (redesignated F Troop) and Lieutenant McKechnie
[28] as well, and 45 other ranks of the Divisional Cavalry. The battery was armed at first with eight 6-pounders (including a newly-arrived one) and six 2-pounders. Captain Dawe
[29] of the 6th Field took command. As the regimental diary says, ‘Everybody was most pleased’.

[21]
Gnr T. L. Growden; born Auckland, 25 Aug 1912; mercer; killed in action 8 Aug 1942.

[22] This troop had gone back to Maadi and returned on the 3rd. For the next few days it tried to carry out flash-spotting of hostile batteries, but was much hampered by uncertain line communications to posts.

[23] Few of the New Zealand gunners had even heard of Montgomery and most of them were not much impressed by British generals, though there were certainly some who felt that any change must be for the better. The recollections of Sgt J. A. Kennedy of A Troop of the 4th Field are fairly typical:

‘A message arrived at a time when the men were getting about in shorts, boots and nothing else, that General Montgomery had taken over command of Eighth Army and that he would be visiting the Battery. Instructions were given to wear shirts, tin hats and suchlike; a full troop mustered nearly fifteen men and they assembled some 200 yards behind the guns. Other troops arrived and the parade assembled. It was unimpressive: the men were thin and scraggy, smothered with desert sores, not interested in their new commander.

‘Three or four jeeps came over the horizon (the first they had seen) and Captain Monaghan called the parade to the alert with, “Here comes the circus”. The General's party came to a halt and he jumped out of his jeep, catching his foot in so doing and thereby delighting the multitude by almost biting the dust. He was not constructed according to the popular conception of a general: Australian hat smothered with badges; a shirt too big for him and socks too small; untidy clothes; a penetrating eye the only redeeming feature. He spoke to every second or third man. The first three whose occupation he asked were barmen, which delighted the troops, who had already learned that Montgomery was a teetotaller and non-smoker. The whole affair was the most informal of formal parades.’

[24] No such elaborate course could be arranged as that which Major Hall-Kenney had organised in Syria. But Lieutenant A. C. McKechnie and four NCO instructors did their best.

[25]
Capt V. E. J. Wells; South Africa; born Kilmeston, Hants., England, 23 Feb 1909; schoolmaster.

[26]
Sgt H. J. Campion; England; born Wellington, 9 Oct 1905; salesman and farmer.

[27]
Lt M. A. P. Williams; Auckland; born NZ 8 Jul 1917; commercial traveller.

[28]
Lt A. C. McKechnie; Invercargill; born Dunedin, 26 Jun 1918; salesman.

[29]
Lt-Col S. H. Dawe; Napier; born England, 1 Sep 1910; civil engineer; CO 7 A-Tk Aegt Dec 1943–Mar 1944; wounded 4 Sep 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Battle of Alam Halfa

The Battle of Alam Halfa

The enemy had reinforced strongly and it was known that he meant to attack towards the end of the month, probably in the south. To upset his arrangements two Maori companies raided El Mreir in the night 25–26 August, with very strong support indeed: the 4th, 5th and 6th Field, the 58th Field, RA (under New Zealand command), and a battery of the 64th Medium all fired—104 guns all told. The Maoris thought the effect ‘terrific’; but they noted with their customary acuteness that one or two guns were firing HE when they should have been firing smoke and that the smoke was in any case a nuisance as it made bad visibility worse. The effect was marred, also, by the eagerness of some of the Maoris who were wounded through keeping too close to the bursting 25-pounders. The raid was nevertheless highly successful and 41 prisoners were taken at very small cost. Four days later the same regiments, now totalling 112 guns, fired three rounds gun fire at sangars a few miles south of El Mreir—an awe-inspiring exhibition of gun power.

On 30 August 5 Brigade changed places with 132 Brigade within the New Zealand Box and the 5th Field and 58th Field did likewise that night, while 32 Battery, already at Halfa, stayed where it was. Enemy shelling as 30 Battery got ready to move killed two men and wounded two and the 58th also suffered loss. Gunners Carew
[29] and Derrett
[30] of 30 Battery both won an MM this night. Several drivers were hit and their quads were therefore immobilised under heavy fire, a desperate situation. Volunteers offered to drive, Derrett among them, though he was ‘badly and painfully wounded in both feet and the chest’ (to quote his citation). He had to be lifted into the driving seat and mustered his waning powers sufficiently to drive the gun crew together with some wounded drivers, as well as the gun and trailer, through the curtain of fire to an RAP. When he reached there he was on the verge of collapse. Carew's action was less dramatic, but it was typical of the selfless devotion he showed throughout the campaign. He went from his own E3, of which he was a crew member (as well as being the troop medical orderly) to E1 as soon as he heard there were casualties there needing attention. In so doing he had to pass through the thick of the shelling and did so unhesitatingly. He administered first aid and stayed until the wounded could be evacuated, when he managed to get on the last truck of his troop to depart for the new area.

The 4th Field answered many calls for help throughout the night from an Indian division to the north—an unexpected and puzzling direction. Enemy feints in the Ruweisat area were the cause of this; but other reports showed clearly enough where the main effort was being made. When this was established beyond doubt the CRA ordered the 5th Field to fire into Deir el Angar, south-west of Alam Nayil, through which the enemy was bound to pass, and the tasks were repeated until well after dawn on the 31st. Over 500 rounds per gun had been delivered in the preceding days—300 rounds more than the army quartermaster thought necessary, though General Freyberg considered the larger amount justified. Expenditure by daybreak was already 140 per gun and it was plain that Freyberg's judgment was sound.

The CCRA [31] signalled at 2.45 a.m. on 31 August that as many OPs as possible should be deployed on the southern flank. This was done; but the FOOs saw disappointingly little for some time after dawn. By 7.30 a.m. it was thought that enemy columns were moving east towards Muhafid, and in the next half-hour targets multiplied and all field and medium guns within reach were firing busily at transport to the south. Not much fire came back. The RAF could see better at first and reach farther and it bombed enemy concentrations to the west and south-west well beyond the reach of the guns until mid-morning, when a sandstorm started up. Visibility slowly deteriorated from the OPs (some of which were merely Bren carriers with wireless sets), the dust, smoke and heat haze combining by noon to make observation altogether too uncertain for several hours. The 4th Field continued to get calls for help from the Indian division to the north and just after 3 p.m. a massive concentration by all three field regiments and the 64th Medium was fired for two minutes at a rapid rate and two minutes normal towards Ruweisat—a waste of ammunition.

Although the Axis air forces could not match the strength of the RAF they did their best and gave the New Zealand ack-ack gunners their busiest day of the war. In the Divisional Headquarters area 41 Battery shot down an Me109F which crashed near G Office (the operational heart of the Division) and took the pilot prisoner. Another crashed nearby before 2 p.m. Early in the morning Divisional Cavalry reported two Stukas shot down in its area, probably by 43 Battery with 5 Brigade. A third Me109F fell victim to 42 Battery (with 6 Brigade) at 11.15 a.m. and a hit was registered on another which crashed to the north just after 2 p.m. Gunners manned their guns with scarcely a pause, firing at a succession of Me109Fs, Stukas and Macchi fighters or fighter-bombers. For such circumstances no accurate score-card is possible. The 41st Battery claimed two German fighters and 42 Battery claimed another two and a hit on a Stuka which was afterwards seen smoking, while 43 Battery states that five aircraft were shot down by the Bofors and a sixth by small-arms fire, though whether by the battery alone or by the whole regiment is not clear. The 7th Anti-Tank credits the 14th Light Ack-Ack with six aircraft shot down this day.

In the evening a large number of Stukas flew high over 43 Battery, out of range, but 42 Battery could reach them and fired non-stop at them and their fighter escorts, getting away 720 rounds and hitting a Stuka at 9000 feet. The gunners concerned will never forget it all and next day RHQ at Maadi was congratulated on the good work of its batteries.

At the height of the morning's action General Freyberg returned to his headquarters to learn that there was an incipient crisis over 25-pounder ammunition, as Corps had placed an embargo on further supplies for the Division—presumably because of the large dumping programme carried out before the enemy attacked. Already much of this had been fired and Freyberg telephoned the Corps Commander and got the embargo removed. Fortunately ammunition expenditure decreased during the long afternoon lull; but at 6 p.m. the sandstorm died down, accurate observation was again possible, and there was plenty to see and to fire at in the desert to the south. The 26th Battery of the 4th Field was attached to Divisional Cavalry and operated two mobile OPs. Several other OPs were also in front of the minefields covering the southern flank of the Division, but they were recalled in the evening when it was expected that the enemy would attack. [32]

The night was surprisingly quiet and even when the morning came, 1 September, and gave the field gunners a feast of targets in the areas of Deir Alinda, Munassib and Muhafid—mainly infantry and transport—it seemed curiously one-sided for the opening stages of an attack intended to break through the Alamein line. Infantry in the southernmost FDLs suffered slight mortaring and occasional shelling; but there was little return fire at the gun positions. A hostile battery in the Kaponga Box attracted 10 rounds gun fire from the 64th Medium early in the afternoon—the only recorded evidence of a gun duel this day.

It was very different, however, with the OP parties. They were mostly well forward and clashed frequently with elements of the Italian flank guard of Panzer Army Africa (the spearhead of which was far to the east of the New Zealand positions). At one stage a thrust by Italian tanks seemed to threaten several New Zealand OP parties and the Divisional Cavalry, operating some miles to the south-east of the Division, engaged the tanks to gain time for the OPs to withdraw. A mobile OP of 29 Battery was with the Cavalry and called down fire on the tanks, which withdrew and took up hull-down positions. F Troop of 30 Battery fired in the afternoon on guns deployed to the south-west. Evidence seemed to suggest the enemy was preparing to attack northwards and the guns were active in shelling any signs of movement throughout the afternoon. It was all observed shooting, against tanks, transport and infantry, and at the end of it five tanks were believed to have been destroyed and two damaged.

The enemy made no major move to threaten the Division, but an attack was thought likely at dawn on 2 September and various steps were taken to prepare for it. At the same time Eighth Army planned a New Zealand move to threaten the enemy line of supply by thrusting among the extensive minefields to the south. This called for another infantry brigade and a good deal more artillery. But the enemy had in fact already decided that the offensive had failed and was concerned now with the tricky problems of a withdrawal, in the course of which his northern flank would be exposed and vulnerable.

Most of the enemy's air attacks were in direct support of the critical armoured battle to the east this day and the New Zealand Bofors gunners, though they were kept busy, had few good targets and recorded no success. The gun E1 fired 111 rounds and the whole of 42 Battery, according to its diary, ‘heavily engaged Stukas and Me109Fs’; but it was not until the evening, when a few fighter-bombers raided the New Zealand area, that low-flying planes were seen. The 41st Battery fired 1332 rounds, most of them at long range.

The field gunners had to work hard and the 4th Field again fired more than 6000 rounds in 24 hours—actually 6304. The 5th Field figures are not recorded, but the 6th Field fired 2299 rounds, in the course of which 30 Battery set a tank on fire and disabled another (which the Cavalry later destroyed after it was abandoned).

Most of the anti-tankers saw enemy only in the far distance and could do no more than sit and wait. The exceptions were those of O Troop of 34 Battery, far forward with the Divisional Cavalry. Two carriers had incautiously approached a 2-pounder portée not knowing that it was manned by enemy and it knocked them out. An O Troop portée engaged the enemy-operated portée at fairly long range, there was a brief exchange of fire, and then the 2-pounder disappeared. A Cavalry officer then pointed out about a dozen tanks grouped 1200 yards away. The anti-tankers had seen them, but thought them friendly. The officer knew better and O Troop opened fire. Each gun fired about three rounds before the tanks moved off. The 6-pounders kept firing as the range increased until the tanks disappeared, except for one that had burst into flames and two others that were disabled. [33]

O Troop then withdrew a short distance to conform with Cavalry movements and was shelled all the way back. In the afternoon the troop returned to the scene of the engagement with the 2-pounder portée and there followed another sharp engagement between the 6-pounders and Cavalry Honey (or Stuart) tanks on the one hand and what was thought to be a German Mark IV tank on the other (though it was probably an Italian M13). A 6-pounder hit and immobilised the tank; but it kept firing and killed a Cavalry sergeant. Two more tanks, two high-velocity guns, and some enemy infantry then approached and the patrol fell back to a defensive position held by another Cavalry squadron and P Troop of 34 Battery. Field guns, probably of 29 Battery, fired at the enemy, but he kept coming. A 6-pounder fired at extreme range, 2500 yards on the range drum, at a captured Crusader tank and scored eight hits, all of them verified when the derelict tank was later examined. O Troop fired 110 rounds all told.

The night was again quiet; but in expectation of a dawn attack from the south-east, the CRA issued tasks to be fired at first light by two batteries from each of the three field regiments and by the whole of the 64th Medium. This formidable concentration duly fell east of Alam Nayil; but no attack was brewing. For most of the day two batteries from each of the field regiments, including the 58th Field, RA, and one battery of the 64th Medium were engaged in firing or repeating various ‘hates’ worked out at Artillery Headquarters, while the third battery fired by observation at enemy movement to the south. Thus in the 6th Field Captain Spring
[34] and his OP party of

48 Battery worked with an army tank brigade, but could do no more than bring down harassing fire on transport at almost extreme range. The ‘hates—precursors of what were to become known as ‘stonks’—prescribed an oblong target zone for each regiment and each was to be searched and swept.

There was nevertheless some variety. After 29 Battery of the 6th Field had used supercharge to engage transport far to the south-east, the battery commander, Major Turner, reported that an enemy fighter hit by small arms had made a forced landing in enemy lines. He ranged on to it and scored a direct hit. The 5th Field made greater efforts this day to get observers far enough forward to pick out suitable targets in the confusion of smoke and dust and transport movement to the south and south-east. Major Snadden for this purpose went to RHQ of the Divisional Cavalry and Captains Caughley and Parkes had mobile OPs with the squadrons. At the end of the day the 64th Medium had fired 390 rounds, the 4th Field 2279 rounds; the figures for the 5th Field have not been preserved but must have been of the same order, and the 6th Field had fired 609 rounds with supercharge and many more with Charge III.

The Bofors gunners had much the same kind of day as the one before, but there was one bright spot. Seven Ju88s flew over at noon after bombing targets to the east. Their crews evidently miscalculated and thought they were over friendly transport; but they actually passed over all three batteries of the 14th Light Ack-Ack at a height of 2000–3000 feet and three of them came crashing down in flames, while others were certainly damaged. A member of the crew of E1 recorded the incident in his diary:

‘We were the first gun to fire and we got 4 shots right into the leading Ju88. He caught fire and crashed. We then got direct hits on the second one and it caught fire and crashed. All told we fired 33 rounds in this action.’

The damage was not all on one side, however. One gun of 43 Battery suffered a premature, probably caused by a worn barrel, and a crew member was wounded.

[29]
Sgt C. P. Carew, MM; Masterton; born Christchurch, 20 Nov 1918; french polisher.

[30]
Sgt W. A. Derrett, MM; Auckland; born Auckland, 18 Oct 1914; clerk; wounded 30 Aug 1942.

[31] Brig H. M. Stanford, MC.

[32] The 4th Field diary records that it fired 6409 rounds from midnight on 30 August to 10 p.m. on the 31st. But it is not clear about when most of these were fired and there is a hint that it was on the night tasks to the north-west. It further states that gunners were feeling the effects of a hard night's firing and complained of deafness, which might refer to the night 30–31 August.

[33] There are various accounts of this action. The 7th Anti-Tank war diary says two tanks were knocked out. The Cavalry do not mention anti-tank guns. General Freyberg himself, who watched from a distance, says he saw the Cavalry knock out an armoured car. O Troop witnesses, however, are unanimous that they engaged tanks, not armoured cars, and destroyed three of them.

[34]
Lt-Col J. F. Spring, MBE, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Timaru, 3 Nov 1918; Regular soldier; Bty Comd, 4 Fd Regt, Feb-Sep 1944; 2 i/c 7 A-Tk Regt Feb-May 1945; 2 i/c 6 Fd Regt Jul-Aug 1945; CO 7 A-Tk Regt Sep-Nov 1945; Bty Comd, 25 Bty, J Force, Dec 1945-Dec 1946; wounded 1 Dec 1941; Director, RNZA, Army HQ, Sep 1963-Mar 1966; Area Officer, Auckland.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Counter-attack Southwards

The Counter-attack Southwards

A first instalment of the extra artillery strength needed for the thrust southwards against the enemy line of supply arrived in the morning of 2 September, when the 7th Medium, the 149th Anti-Tank (less two batteries) and two Bofors troops, all RA, came under Weir's command. At night the Division sent patrols southwards to ‘prevent enemy establishing himself in this area and facilitate your future operations’ (to quote an order from Corps). The 5th Field laid down fire on Deir el Angar to pave the way for one of these reconnaissances and had to bring down more fire to cover the withdrawal of the patrol when it struck trouble. The enemy was evidently in some strength and digging in.

Soon after daybreak on 3 September—the start of the fourth year of war—the FOOs discovered that opposition had hardened and there were several 88s sniping from the south, making it most uncomfortable for them. The enemy, anxious not to have his retreat cut off, was paying close attention to his long northern flank. Two or three divisional concentrations were fired at hostile batteries in late morning and early afternoon and there was much harassing fire. This day, too, the Divisional Artillery received its first jeeps and they were allocated on a meagre scale to units—three all told, for example, to the 7th Anti-Tank.

In the night 3–4 September the Division was to attack southwards to the edge of the Munassib Depression with 26 Battalion on the right, the inexperienced 132 Infantry Brigade (of 50 Division) in the middle, and 5 Brigade on the left or eastern side. Much of the day was taken up with preparations. It was to be a silent attack, so there was no night artillery programme to draw up; but a number of defensive tasks to cover the final objective had to be provided. Anti-tank and light ack-ack guns and artillery OPs were to go forward with the attacking infantry or be placed in handy positions to be able to give support when needed. The 6th Field was in support of (not ‘under command’) 5 Brigade, the 5th Field in support of 6 Brigade, and the 4th Field of 132 Brigade (the 58th Field, RA, remaining in the northern sector newly taken over by an Indian brigade). During the night the 1st Field, RA, with two batteries was to come under the command of the 7th Medium in the Divisional area. The CRA would therefore control well over a hundred 25-pounders and about 24 medium guns—4.5s and 5.5s. The only tasks to be fired during the night, unless some local crisis developed, were to be by the 5th Field on Deir el Angar in support of a diversionary raid by 6 Brigade infantry.

The raid to Deir el Angar went fairly well; but the attack by 132 Brigade met much opposition from ground and air and failed to gain the objectives. On the right 26 Battalion, with G Troop's three 6-pounders, had trouble getting past brigade transport milling around under shellfire in and beyond the minefield gaps; but it reached its appointed goal. The brigade, however, became disorganised. The enemy seemed to know what was afoot. Aircraft dropped anti-personnel ‘butterfly bombs’ by the hundred, many heavier bombs, and ground flares of a new kind which landed in rows and lit up the surrounding desert for a considerable distance. Strafing from the air was widespread and nerve-racking. As the 7th Anti-Tank diary says, it was a ‘Very unpleasant night with bombing, machine gunning and shelling’. Italians facing the advance, moreover, fought with unusual vigour and determination.

Major Bevan of the 4th Field, [35] travelling as liaison officer with brigade headquarters, thought the trouble all started when, about midnight, a shell or mortar bomb set a truck alight and attracted attention to the surrounding vehicles. Shelling and mortaring set more and more vehicles on fire and some of them exploded. The columns became thoroughly disorganised as drivers sought to dodge the shells and mortar bombs which seemed to be directed at each vehicle as it became silhouetted against the flames. ‘Every time another of our trucks went up in flames we moved just far enough to get out of the worst of the light’, Bevan says. ‘This was fairly frequently and there weren't many trucks left by morning.’

‘The situation in front was very obscure [he adds]. Brigade had no communication with any of its three battalions—no phone, no wireless, no runners—until after dawn. The Brigade wireless trucks were not hit and they must have been in touch with NZ Div all the time. I was in touch with my battery and regiment throughout.’

The brigade commander, searching for his battalions, was wounded and his brigade major took command. Bevan says of the brigade major that

‘It was bad luck for him that his first action should have been such a mess. He was willing to take any advice except that he would not move off that ridge. I wanted him to move back a few hundred yards on to the back slope where his vehicles—and mine—would be safer from observation and gun fire, but he would only say “I won't retreat”.’

deir el munassib, 3–4 september 1942

One of the vehicles put out of action was the wireless and cable truck of the liaison officer of the 64th Medium, no great loss in the current crisis, since the occasion was not one for night fire by the medium guns; but in daylight they might be badly needed. Bevan says that he called down at least two divisional concentrations in support of 132 Brigade during the night and the citation for the DSO he was awarded for this action reads in part as follows:

‘[Bevan], disregarding his own personal safety, was able to load a considerable number of wounded on to the wireless van accompanying him, [and] at the same time called for fire from the whole Divisional Artillery. Under this concentration, he restored complete order and confidence in the men around him by his coolness and utter disregard of danger.’

There is no record of the firing of such a concentration, but the war diaries for this period are far from satisfactory. The 4th Field fired a concentration at 3.30 a.m. on 4 September; but it seems doubtful that any divisional concentrations were fired this night, even if Bevan did call for them. At all events he did manage to bring down fire and it helped to restore order. A little later, with dawn approaching, Bevan persuaded the brigade major that ‘unless he moved off the ridge he would lose all his vehicles … and that he was useless without his wireless trucks’. Bevan then lined up the transport and guided it to about 400 yards from the minefield, dispersing it at first light.

The anti-tank guns chiefly concerned were G Troop of 32 Battery (which got through with 26 Battalion), all guns of 33 Battery and two troops of 31 Battery. G Troop came under heavy fire which wounded one man and immobilised a portée. Captain Dawe, who had supervised the resurrection of 32 Battery, did not hold his new command long; for he was wounded this night. C Troop of 31 Battery ended up on a minefield. Two portées were damaged and a third could not get out until more mines were lifted. The troop commander, Lieutenant Jardine, [36] and another officer and a gunner were wounded by a mine explosion, and another gunner was hit by a shell fragment. Being stranded on a minefield in the dark under shell and mortar fire with blazing trucks and evident confusion in the nearby brigade transport was hard on the nerves; but the anti-tankers did not panic and all the portées were recovered.

O Troop of 34 Battery was attached to the Divisional Cavalry and reached the gap in the minefield when the shelling was at its height. An aircraft dropped a string of flares when the Cavalry and anti-tank vehicles were nose to tail and stationary. ‘They fell just sufficiently clear’, a sergeant recalls, ‘but it was a nasty moment.’ Some of the trucks became stuck in the sand, but were pulled out. The infantry ahead made poor progress and O Troop could not deploy. A 34th gunner was killed by a bomb. From the anti-tank viewpoint the operation was badly planned and carried out and the gunners felt their efforts were in vain. None of them fired even a single shot throughout the night or the following day.

H Troop of 43 Ack-Ack Battery had the same sort of trouble in the night. It reached what looked like the FDLs by 4 a.m., and then had to withdraw with the infantry at dawn. The cost was one officer and four other ranks wounded by shellfire.

The main object of gaining observation over the supply routes of the enemy was far from being achieved. The FOOs, after much trouble, took up positions in the morning in the neighbourhood of Point 100, north-west of Muhafid; but even the imperfect observation to be gained there was soon to be denied them. The enemy was in considerable strength to the south and south-east and had no intention of letting Eighth Army cut off his retreat. Machine-gun, anti-tank and artillery fire swept through the area and tanks were seen approaching from the south-east. Before long the area was untenable.

Two batteries of the 6th Field fired smoke soon after dawn to cover a Maori withdrawal and the screen was particularly effective. The 5th Field also fired smoke. Then the 4th and 5th Field and all but a battery of the 6th Field, plus the 64th Medium, fired a concentration for 10 minutes at normal rate from 7.40 a.m. in support of 5 Brigade and repeated it at a very slow rate for half an hour from 8.30. A similar concentration a little later helped to repulse an attack on the exposed positions of 26 Battalion on the right or west. Enemy movement gave ample warning of an attack from the south against 22 Battalion, and when it began soon after noon the 4th and 6th Field brought down observed fire and the 5th and 58th Field and the medium guns and howitzers, including those of 107 Battery of the 7th Medium, repeated a concentration called ‘Arthur’ and fired it yet again in mid-afternoon. The total expenditure of ammunition was not great, except for the 6th Field and the mediums, but the effect of these massive concen- trations was important and perhaps decisive. A good deal of fire came back, from a variety of guns, and when this became troublesome it was also dealt with by heavy concentrations rather than troop or battery fire. One such task, at 6.40 p.m. against guns sited near the northern lip of Muhafid, was fired by the 4th, 5th and 6th Field and the 64th Medium.

In the air, too, the enemy made his main effort this day against the Divisional area, including the salient created by Operation BERESFORD, and all three batteries of the 14th Light Ack-Ack fired repeatedly. A diary of 42 Battery records attacks by Ju88s, Me109Fs and several kinds of Italian aircraft and there was a sharp Stuka raid at 10 a.m. on 41 Battery. One Ju88 was shot down. After dark H Troop withdrew, with the rest of the New Zealand troops and 132 Brigade, from the forward position south of the minefield and the Bofors guns went back to their former pits.

Early in the afternoon the CRA was asked to pass to all artillery units General Freyberg's ‘congratulations on the splendid way they have conducted themselves during the past three days’. All the New Zealand units were advised and the 58th Field and 64th Medium as well. The night was quiet and the gunners were duly grateful for this. They all needed a rest. When the 6th Field totalled up its ammunition expenditure for the day it came to a record for the campaign so far: 5307 HE, 812 smoke and 6 rounds with supercharge. (That of the 4th Field was a mere 1008 rounds.) The history of the 7th Medium, however, records that 107 Battery fired over 1000 rounds this day on ‘programmes and other targets’ (an astonishing total, relatively much greater than that of the 6th Field) and also that the battery was ‘repeatedly bombed and shelled and sustained several casualties’, as well as having one gun and tractor damaged. [37]

Whatever the verdict on BERESFORD, for the gunners it was a striking demonstration of the power of artillery under divisional control. Appropriate fire drills had been developed almost to perfection, counter-battery work was crushingly effective, and co-operation with infantry and other arms had improved greatly. Had the enemy not been so busy congratulating himself on his success in repulsing the threat to his communications, he might have drawn from this operation an ominous hint of the shape of things to come. But the battle was not quite over.

After withdrawing, 5 Brigade went into reserve, its place in the Divisional ‘box’ being taken by 151 Brigade. On the 8th it withdrew to a rest area on the coast road. Meanwhile 6 Brigade stayed in position and the Divisional Cavalry—always with 6-pounder portées—patrolled to the west and south-west.

The morning of 5 September disclosed an enemy clearly retreating. Deir el Angar was the chief source of trouble, especially with 88-millimetre guns, and at 9.20 a.m. nine batteries of the 4th, 5th and 6th Field and the 4th and 58th Field, RA, and the 64th Medium (with 107 Battery) shelled it. Mobile OPs engaged opportunity targets of infantry and transport to the south and south-west throughout the day. Heavy-calibre guns shelled 6 Brigade; but their fire was erratic and they did little damage. A Stuka raid in the morning and several fighter-bomber raids were followed by a heavy dive-bombing attack in the late afternoon which straddled the guns of 42 Battery, killed one and wounded six at the gun positions of 107 Medium Battery and totally wrecked a gun and tractor, and gave 43 Battery a success when it shot down an escorting Me109F. A shell landing near a 4th Field cookhouse in the evening slightly wounded eight men, including the RSM. The night was quiet.

Extensive rearrangements of artillery attachments were meanwhile carried out. [38] Targets had thinned out considerably by the morning of the 6th, though the enemy shelling continued and ‘88s’ searched the 4th Field area without causing casualties. The enemy had been moving north-westwards for some time across the western flank of the Division and the fire of the New Zealand guns followed him. They fired another heavy concentration on a hostile battery in front of the Kaponga Box; but in the afternoon they had to be content mainly with minor targets of infantry and transport. The main interest of the day was a series of ‘dogfights’ in the air, one in the morning lasting a considerable time and causing loss to both sides. It was fought at a very low altitude and the Bofors gunners joined in whenever they could, shooting down two German fighters and possibly a third. Then there was bigger game in the evening when Stukas bombed the medium guns again. The Bofors shot down two of them—E1 caimed one and E7 the second—and damaged others.

On the Army Commander's orders all OPs adopted an aggressive policy on the 7th, engaging all targets in sight, particularly to the south and south-west. They started early and provoked heavy counter-battery fire, some of it by 210-millimetre howitzers. The lines of 46 Battery of the 4th Field were heavily shelled, but no harm was done. Then it was the turn of 25 Battery and the popular and accomplished battery commander, Major Stevens-Jordan, [39] was killed by a direct hit on his bivouac tent. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart at once arranged for battery representatives to attend a burial service; but the guns did not pause and within an hour they fired two regimental concentrations on a point beyond Deir Alinda. By 6 p.m. the hostile battery was located with some confidence and the regiment shelled it vigorously. It did not fire again. By the end of the day Artillery Headquarters was busy on plans to hand over existing positions to the artillery of 44 Division and move to a rest area.

Reconnaissance parties of the relieving artillery arrived on the 8th, studied the ground, and were told all about the situation. The front was quiet and, for the first time for many weeks, the Bofors did not fire at all throughout the day. The 4th Field were still touchy about the death of Stevens-Jordan and fired 1608 rounds this day. The relief began on the 9th and was completed when the CRA handed over command to the CRA of 44 Division at 9 p.m. on the 11th. All went well except in the 4th Field, which had all three batteries heavily shelled on the 9th and lost one man killed and one wounded and a truck badly damaged.

Leave was started to Cairo and Alexandria even before the regiments reached the rest area south of Burg el Arab and those not on leave were given as much free time as possible to spend on the beach. For the next week skeleton staffs carried out essential administration—the 7th Anti-Tank, for example, being commanded by a captain who arrived as a reinforcement and found he was the senior officer in the camp.

The rest was badly needed. The men had lost a lot of weight, most of them had ‘desert sores’ and other disabilities, jaundice or its aftermath affected many of them, particularly officers, and the beach parties were not good advertisements for the physical qualities of New Zealand manhood. Two regimental commanders were admitted to hospital: Colonels Stewart and Glasgow of the 4th and 5th Field, replaced temporarily by Majors Sprosen and Philp respectively.

[35] Commanded since 20 August by Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. O. Stewart. Lieutenant-Colonel Queree this month became GSO I of the Division.

[36]
Lt J. E. Jardine; Wairoa; born NZ 9 Apr 1915; farmer; wounded 3 Sep 1942.

[37]
The History of the 7th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery during World War II, 1939–1945 (published by the regiment, renamed the 32nd Medium Regiment, RA; 1951), pp. 108–9.

[38] The effects on the NZ Artillery were that the 1st Field, RA, replaced the 58th Field, the battery of the 7th Medium (107 Battery, also called 426/7 Battery) returned to its parent unit, and the 64th Medium recovered a detached battery.

[39]
Maj J. B. Stevens-Jordan; born Granity, West Coast, 3 May 1908; surveyor and engineer; killed in action 7 Sep 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 11 — The Alamein Offensive

Contents

- [section]
p. 372

- Moving Up to the Front p. 375
- The Artillery Plan p. 376
- A Shortage of Gunners p. 380
- The Barrage

- The 4th Field Moves Up Behind the Armour p. 385

- OPs Under Fire p. 388
- Anti-Tankers on Miteiriya Ridge p. 389
- The Enemy Gun Line Is Not Broken p. 393
- The End of Operation Lightfoot p. 395

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE record of the Eighth Army now came under earnest scrutiny. It had so far lost most of its battles, though in every one its strength on paper had been greater than that of the enemy. In July it had exhausted itself in a series of sacrificial attacks. August had been quiet until it ended with the Alam Halfa battle. This it fought awkwardly and hesitantly. Its main move, the attack southwards from the New Zealand Box, had been a failure and only the strength and skill of the Divisional Artillery had held back the enemy while the infantry withdrew inside the Box. The Halfa ‘victory’, in fact, was gained not by Eighth Army but by the naval and air forces mainly based on Malta which immobilised the Panzer Army at a critical juncture for lack of petrol. The rest of September was quiet, with the balance of strength swinging in favour of Eighth Army. But bitter experience had shown that superior strength was no guarantee of victory. There were evidently serious disabilities which stood in urgent need of remedy.

To the New Zealanders the most obvious of these was the lack of understanding between infantry and armoured units and formations and their inability to co-operate effectively on the battlefield. They would therefore need to train together before Eighth Army attacked, as it must soon do. For this purpose 9 Armoured Brigade came under the command of the Division on 19 September, by which date preliminary plans for the attack were well advanced. Six days earlier the BM and Captain Gilchrist
[1] had reconnoitred a training ground southeast of the ‘Swordfish’ area towards the Wadi Natrun. On the 17th the CRA returned from leave and instructions for divisional training arrived. By the 21st the Divisional Artillery was widely dispersed in the training area, the Survey Troop had surveyed an artillery range to the south, and the CRA had attended a series of conferences and lunched with General Freyberg. On the 24th all units moved to an assembly area and by night they continued on to a deployment area; they deployed on a two-brigade front the following night, and in the night 26–27 September they ‘attacked’.

The exercise was tailored to fit at as many points as possible the attack the Division was to make in an Eighth Army offensive towards the end of October for which the precise form of the artillery support was not specified. Freyberg had explained to ‘Steve’ Weir that his main concerns related to the depth of the Axis minefields on the allotted front— Miteiriya Ridge between Tell el Eisa on the coast and Ruweisat—and the difficulty of controlling infantry in the dark while reserve battalions were passed through to broaden the front.

Freyberg suggested a solution that was classic, though in Eighth Army it seemed revolutionary (shades of Le Quesnoy!): the creeping barrage. On an artillery course for regimental commanders at Almaza 20 months before Weir had put it to the senior instructor that this kind of support might be helpful to assaulting infantry and had been told that ‘a creeping barrage would never be used in this war’. In Syria he got the field regiments to practise a simplified version of one. The more he thought about the task now facing him, the more convinced he became that Freyberg had the answer. He talked it over with the GOC and sat up late preparing a barrage trace for the exercise. In the morning he explained it and the GOC and the infantry brigade commanders, Kippenberger and Gentry, accepted it. There are many claimants for the credit of introducing—or reintroducing—the creeping barrage, which became the main form of support for infantry attacks towards the end of the October offensive and thereafter; but there was no mention of such a method in the various orders and training instructions which circulated in Eighth Army until after the New Zealand exercise, which was watched by Lieutenant-General Leese, the corps commander under whom the Division was to serve for the ‘real thing’.

With many guns (though not really enough by First World War standards) and plentiful ammunition, relatively flat ground, and a long advance—5800 yards in the exercise—there was much to be said for a creeping barrage. The screen of bursting shells would help to guide the attacking infantry and, if they kept close to it, it would set the pace—100 yards every two minutes—and help to keep them together. But many details needed to be worked out. The attack by two brigades, with simultaneous attacks assumed to be mounted by flanking divisions, called for effective marking of brigade and divisional boundaries. Weir's staff, busy with other work, had thought of no way of doing this. One morning the GOC's personal assistant, Captain White, [2] asked if Bofors guns could do this important job. His idea bore fruit and in the event the strings of tracer from Bofors guns, fired at regular intervals, indicated the boundary between the two brigades. A less successful expedient was to mark the divisional boundaries with the tracers of 25-pounder AP shot. The 25-pounders also fired smoke shells to mark the ends of the final objective and on the exercise this worked well enough; but in a real battle, when there would be many other sources of smoke and dust, this method might not succeed.

The barrage was thin at the start and got progressively thinner as the front of the attack broadened, so that the final objective was much longer than the start line. An infantry officer was wounded in the first phase by a shell which fell short and a ‘rogue gun’ firing short caused another light casualty later. Before first light on the 27th all supporting arms, including anti-tank and light ack-ack guns, were in position, the field and anti-tank guns fired at dummy targets, and soon afterwards 27 Battery began to move forward. A simulated counter-attack was ‘beaten off’ and at 9.45 a.m. the exercise ended, though the 4th Field moved off in the afternoon for further exercises with 9 Armoured Brigade. Freyberg meanwhile discussed the main features and congratulated the gunners on their performance. On the evening of the 28th he gave a dinner in Alexandria to introduce the commanding officers of the armoured brigade to those of the Division. The month ended with an inspection of the Divisional Artillery by General Montgomery, a spit-and-polish affair very different from the informal first meeting in the positions near Alam Nayil.

A series of brigade exercises in the first fortnight of October kept the gunners busy. They had to practise throwing out an anti-tank screen to a flank of an infantry brigade and also supporting daylight tank attacks with infantry co-operation. The field regiments carried out a comparative calibration of all guns, a necessary precaution for barrage work, and zeroed sights. Working parties went forward, regardless of brigade exercises, to dig gun and supply pits in the forward area for the coming attack on Miteiriya Ridge and to camouflage large stocks of ammunition and rations at battery positions which would be occupied for the start of the offensive. The atmosphere was tense with expectation.

[1]
Maj P. Gilchrist, MC, m.i.d.; born Te Aroha, 1 Aug 1904; barrister and solicitor; died 8 May 1960.

[2]
Maj J. C. White, MBE, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Dunedin, 1 Nov 1911; barrister and solicitor; PA to GOC 1940–45; Solicitor-General, Feb 1966– ; appointed QC Mar 1966.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Moving Up to the Front

Moving Up to the Front

The 4th Field welcomed Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart back on the 6th and Sprosen, now a lieutenant-colonel, left on the 11th to take command of the 5th Field. RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bretherton, moved forward from Maadi Camp in the middle of the month and on the 19th joined in a general and carefully planned advance from the ‘Swordfish’ area to the battle front. Artillery Headquarters followed on the 21st and its vehicles, moving in ones and twos, halted well forward near the Qattara Track, which ran from the coast road halfway between El Alamein and Tell el Eisa (‘Tell’ meant a hill), south-westwards over the divisional objective, Miteiriya. Nearby to the west was Bir el Makh Khad and beyond it Tell el Makh Khad.

These were names in a desert that was seething with activity. The journey forward had taken the gunners past huge concentrations of new Sherman tanks and transport and a great many workshops, supply dumps, ordnance depots, medical centres and other services provided more lavishly than ever before. Camouflage nets stretched tautly over most of the parked vehicles. Tracks had proliferated in the period since the New Zealanders were in the line and each had its distinctive sign: the sun, moon, star, bottle, boat and hat (from north to south) at the end of a steel rod driven into the sand and supplemented at night by hurricane lamps in four-gallon petrol tins cut to the appropriate shape, shielding the light from enemy observation while indicating the route to drivers. In the forward area thousands of acres had been sown with mines, marked clearly enough by day, but a deadly trap for the unwary by night. Here and there were parks of dummy tanks and lorries, some of them near the new gun positions of the New Zealand field regiments.

In their new areas the gunners rested as much as they could under camouflage nets, forbidden to move outside them and thereby attract enemy attention. Most officers and many NCOs, however, had much to do, especially in the field regiments, to prepare for the heavy programme on the opening night of the offensive and the moves which would follow it. Under the nets many trenches were dug to protect men and ammunition. Outside them miles of telephone cable were buried. In office trucks and command posts officers and their assistants plotted positions and targets on artillery boards and carried out hundreds of calculations with logarithms and slide rules, each calculation meticulously checked, so that the line, range and time of each 25-pounder shell was worked out and the information passed on to those who needed it. Artificers, knowing the strain to which the guns would be subjected, did their best to prepare them for it. Mechanics and driver-mechanics checked their vehicles and in some cases overhauled them. Some gunners, fully prepared for what lay ahead, were able to relax; but others were keyed up to a feverish level of excitement. All knew that the next few days of the desert war would be crucial. Very few had any doubt about the outcome.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Artillery Plan

The Artillery Plan

The CRA, BM and CBO spent a very busy day on the 19th preparing barrage and task tables and were able in the new area on the 22nd to relax. For a man with the restless energy of Steve Weir, however, the term ‘relaxation’ had only a comparative meaning. This day, among other things, he toured the gun positions with General Freyberg. He noted that some of the 5th Field guns were within 1500 yards of the enemy FDLs and vulnerable if the enemy attempted a night raid. Accordingly he rescinded an order that no vehicles but jeeps must stay in the forward area and had 12 of the 5th Field quads held forward by night to withdraw the guns in such an eventuality. He also told Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen that the E Troop guns were the best camouflaged of all the divisional guns. The 6th Field guns were mostly sited under dummy 3-ton trucks and the quads were also made to look like trucks. Freyberg critically inspected the regimental area and ‘expressed satisfaction with the camouflage and lay-out of the gun positions’, according to the 6th Field diary. The 4th Field had so far advanced its preparations for its role in the barrage and the later follow-through with 9 Armoured Brigade [3] that most of its gunners were able to spend the 22nd on the beach.

barrage trace for the new zealand sector, 23 october 1942

The artillery plan, as finally developed, was extremely complicated. Much has since been made of the weight of fire brought down in support of the opening attack; but the plan was in fact a masterpiece of making do with resources not really sufficient for the task. The three New Zealand field regiments were too few to produce an effective creeping barrage even on the 2500-yard front of the first objective and would be very thin indeed along the 4800 yards of the final objective. The main programme was therefore not a creeping barrage at all, but a complicated set of timed concentrations on ‘known’ enemy localities in the line of advance. Brigadier Gentry, for one, doubted that enemy locations were accurate and for that reason was in favour of a barrage which would sweep impartially over all the ground his men had to cross; moreover, he thought it would be helpful to stir up dust and obscure the enemy's view. A creeping barrage would also help to keep the infantry ‘on the proper line of advance’ (as Freyberg put it in a later report) and maintain the momentum of the attack. The 4th Field was therefore to fire what it correctly called a ‘lifting barrage’ while the other two fired timed concentrations in support of their respective brigades. A twenty-minute series of counter-battery tasks would precede this and DF tasks would follow as requested. The artillery of 51 Highland Division and 9 Australian Division to the north-west and of 1 South African Division to the south would be able to add weight to DF tasks in this final stage if needed; but the New Zealand gunners in turn had to be ready to reciprocate, and the inexperienced Highlanders were more likely to need help than the New Zealand infantry. The Australians, Highlanders and South Africans also included creeping (or lifting) barrages in their various plans, as well as timed concentrations. Since the latter in every case formed the major part of the programme, this was not really to be a full-scale test of the effectiveness of the creeping barrage. That was to come later. But Freyberg and Weir, for their part, were keen to try out the method even on this limited scale.

For the preliminary counter-battery shoots all the corps artillery would come under direct command of 30 Corps: 18 field regiments and three medium regiments, 480 guns in all. They would fire for 15 minutes and then pause for five. At 10 p.m. on the 23rd they would then fire for some minutes on the enemy FDLs, after which the field regiments reverted to divisional command. Most of the medium guns would continue the counter-battery fire under corps command throughout the attack. The New Zealand artillery would be supplemented by three troops of the 78th Field, RA, and three troops of the 98th Field, RA, from 1 and 10 Armoured Divisions, and also a 4.5-inch battery of the 69th Medium, bringing the total of field and medium guns to 104.

The 4th Field divided the barrage line into five sections, covered by A, D, F, B and E Troops in that order. C Troop was to fire single rounds of smoke every three minutes on the brigade and divisional boundaries to help the attacking infantry maintain direction and to guide detachments following up behind them, while a section of E Troop of the 14th Light Ack-Ack fired one round per gun per minute to mark the same boundaries from the start line to the first objective. The 4th Field was also to fire smoke briefly on the opening line of the barrage and also on the first objective as a general indication to the infantry.

This programme called for a huge expenditure of ammunition, made possible by the labours of the Ammunition Company earlier in the month. [4] In four nights 72 lorries dumped 48,384 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition for the 96 field guns, and on the fifth night they dumped a further 160 r.p.g. for the 72 New Zealand field guns, another 11,520 rounds, and 8000 rounds of Bofors ammunition as well. The procedure had been worked out carefully to facilitate the handling of the ammunition at the gun positions and avoid attracting enemy attention. The 72 lorries split up into groups of three, each guided by an artillery officer to a troop position. The first lorry carried 168 rounds of HE shell, 40 rounds of smoke, and 128 cartridges No. 111. The second carried 144 HE, 24 smoke, 128 cartridges and 48 supercharges. The third carried 140 HE, 28 smoke, 128 cartridges and 40 ‘super’. Each group therefore completed the ammunition for one gun per troop on each of the first four nights. The final instalment for the New Zealand guns only was for use after the attached guns passed from New Zealand command. It was dumped in ‘regimental packets’ for the field artillery and in ‘battery packets’ for the ack-ack artillery, three lorry-loads for each Bofors battery. Even this huge supply, however, fell short of the calculated requirements of the gunners for the coming battle, and in the night 18–19 October another 76 Ammunition Company lorries collected and dumped in the rear wagon lines south-south-east of El Alamein station a first-line holding of 160 rounds and a second-line holding of 200 rounds for each of the 72 New Zealand field guns, bringing the total stocks for each gun to the following impressive figures:

New Zealand Guns (72)

At guns | 664 rounds per gun
At forward wagon lines | 360 rounds per gun
At rear wagon lines: first line | 160 rounds per gun
second line | 200 rounds per gun
| ——
Total | 1384 rounds per gun
| ——

Field Guns temporarily under Command (24)

At guns | 504 rounds per gun

The combined total for the 96 field guns was 111,744 rounds. It was a back-breaking effort, as the gunners and drivers con- cerned well knew; but it inspired much confidence in the gun crews. [5]

[3] Weir had had an argument with Brigadier J. C. Currie of the armoured brigade about the 4th Field role at a conference on the 10th. The task was complicated, as 10 Armoured Division would be trying to push forward through the minefield gaps when the 4th Field was advancing in support of the 9th Armoured. It seems that the chief point of difference was that Currie was still wedded to the ‘orthodox’ use of field guns in ‘penny packets’ giving very close support to tank squadrons, while Weir was all for the power and flexibility that divisional control could provide.

[4] See S. P. Llewellyn, Journey Towards Christmas ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1949), pp. 259–60.

[5] Another rushed job was to replace camouflage nets left by the New Zealand gunners in the Alam Nayil area when relieved in September by 44 Division. In the end the Ordnance authorities had to send to Maadi for nets and other camouflage equipment and it was hurried forward by special convoy.

The medium regiment seems to have made its own arrangements to supply the battery under NZ command.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Shortage of Gunners

A Shortage of Gunners

This abundance of ammunition, however, contrasted with a shortage of gunners. No reinforcements had reached the Middle East since October 1941 and the losses of the winter campaign in Libya and the summer in Egypt, as well as the normal ‘wastage’ from sickness and other causes, had to be made up as far as possible by sending forward every available gunner from Maadi Camp and other rear areas. Wounded and sick men returned to their units, in many cases before they had fully recovered—sometimes at their own request. Even with these, the strengths of all units were well below establishment, though all but the 4th Field stated in their Field Returns that they did not consider the full establishment was really required in the desert. In almost every case there was a gap between posted strength and what was thought to be needed for the coming offensive. The following figures give some idea of the deficiencies:

| ESTABLISHMENT | | POSTED STRENGTH | | EXPECTED RATION STRENGTH |
| Officers | Other Ranks | Officers | Other Ranks | Officers | Other Ranks
HQ NZA | 8 | 40 | 6 | 28 | 6 | 21
4th Field | 42 | 644 | 36 | 497 | 39 | 549
5th Field | 42 | 653 | 29 | 408 | 38 | 478
6th Field | 42 | 644 | 38 | 474 | 38 | 511
7th Anti-Tank | 49 | 699 | 31 | 462 | 35 | 465
14th Light Ack-Ack | 32 | 962 | 27 | 549 | 28 | 540
1 Survey Troop | 3 | 41 | 3 | 35 | 3 | 41

The Posted Strengths are those recorded in Field Returns on a date close to the opening of the offensive. The discrepancies between them and the Ration Strengths arise mainly because the latter (which are less reliable) include attached personnel. [6]

It would seem from these figures that the 14th Light Ack-Ack was disastrously depleted; yet it considered that five officers and six other ranks were all that were strictly needed, not the more than 400 by which it fell short of its establishment. [7] The 4th Field, which was four officers and 147 other ranks below authorised strength, considered that 156 other ranks (nine above establishment) were required in the field—presumably because of the mobile role allotted in support of 9 Armoured Brigade, which might call for more liaison and administrative staff. All other units indicated that something less than the full establishment would be adequate. Even so, what they thought was barely sufficient was almost invariably greater than what they had to make do with in the event. For the gigantic labours ahead their resources of manpower were destined to be overstretched. [8]

The field regiments were sited so that the 5th Field could support 5 Brigade on the right of the divisional attack, the 6th Field could do likewise for 6 Brigade on the left, and the 4th Field could fire the barrage over the whole front and then follow the tanks of 9 Armoured Brigade through the minefield gaps. At the outset, with Headquarters of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack and 1 Survey Troop, they formed the Divisional Artillery Group under the CRA's command. The 7th Anti-Tank had 31 Battery with the armoured brigade, the 32nd with 5 Brigade, the 33rd with 6 Brigade, and the 34th with the Divisional Reserve Group. The batteries of the 14th Light Ack-Ack occupied areas close to the field regiments, ready to defend them and also the minefield gaps when these were formed. The gunners were briefed on the battle plan as a whole and their various tasks. The diary of the 14th Light Ack-Ack has the following entry for 1700 hours on 23 October:

‘From this time onwards there were definite signs that something was about to happen’. Had the signs proved wrong—and there were myriads of them—2600-odd New Zealand gunners would have been bitterly disappointed.

the second day of the alamein offensive

[6] The attachments included for field regiments an officer from each of the Signals, Ordnance and Medical Corps and the Chaplains Department (two Ordnance officers, an RMO and a padre for the 7th Anti-Tank and, in the case of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, only an RMO and a padre), and various Signals and Ordnance other ranks: 45 in the 4th Field, 46 in the 5th, and 49 in the 6th (the last including 34 Signals personnel, 14 Ordnance, and one man from HQ NZA); the 7th Anti-Tank had 15 Ordnance other ranks attached.

[7] The 14th Light Ack-Ack, unlike the other NZA units, consistently kept separate war diaries for RHQ and each battery. The 41st Battery, which was 67 other ranks short of establishment, thought six more were needed; the other two batteries, the 42nd and 43rd, which were 49 and 50 short respectively, felt they could make do with what they had. This was largely because the cumbersome predictors and their crews had been dispensed with.

[8] The manpower shortage affected the manning of guns only in the 7th Anti-Tank. F Troop of 32 Battery and N Troop of the 34th had been so hard hit by battle casualties and sickness—mainly jaundice—that they had to be temporarily disbanded, their remaining members going to reinforce other troops until their troops could be re-formed. These two batteries therefore entered the battle with only three troops each. For the gunners thus distributed among other troops it was as if their own families had gone on holiday and they had to live with relations—tolerable, even agreeable, for a day or two, but they looked forward with increasing eagerness to the re-establishment of the troop that was their family and their home.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Barrage

The Barrage

A breeze from the north-east stiffened in the late afternoon of the 23rd and when vehicles began to move after dark it lifted the dust uncomfortably through the rear areas. Later it died down and the night was calm, with bright moonlight. Over towards the sea the dark sky was hung with patchy bits of translucent cloud. At the gun positions the field gunners were making last-minute adjustments for the latest METEOR—a signal giving barometric pressure, air temperatures for various periods of flight of shells, and relative wind directions and velocities. Watches were checked and checked again. The Nos. 1 on the 25-pounders tried out their torches and the illuminating gear of their sights, as well as the night aiming points for their guns, while others saw to it that troop picket lights were satisfactory. They checked zero lines. They went carefully through their elaborate programmes—one page of task tables for the 4th Field besides the barrage trace and five pages of instructions, and five pages of task tables for each of the 5th and 6th Field. As soon as it was dark enough the field gunners whipped off their camouflage nets and began to prepare their ammunition. To the south there was a little firing; but to their immediate front all was quiet. The anti-tank portées drove forward and then halted, some of them in front of the field guns, some among them. The minutes ticked tensely by.

Those close enough to the guns could hear GPOs break the silence with their first fire orders: ‘Lay on Serial One, HE Charge Three. Angle of Sight zero. Two minutes to go.’ Thus it would have been—or something like it—for all the field and medium guns as 30 Corps prepared its counter-battery tasks. Then would come ‘Stand by’. Then, after further indications of the time to go, ‘Fire!’

The horizon instantly filled with gun flashes and the ground shook. It was 9.40 p.m. on 23 October 1942, an unforgettable moment in the desert war. Many anti-tankers learned in shattering fashion how close they had halted to field or medium guns when a gun flash streaked overhead and their ear drums were pounded. Every variation of whistle, rumble and scream followed the shells. White flares rose up and sank slowly. A row of yellow parachute flares hung calmly in the distance. The intensity of the firing seemed to increase and the hard undertones of machine guns added to the noise. The ammunition numbers—no more than four per gun—were soon sweating, but they had a long way to go: in under five hours each crew would have to prepare and carry to their gun nearly seven tons of shells, to say nothing of cartridges. At RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack the night had already been noisy from the sound of tank engines warming up, and when they began to move forward before 7 p.m. (when the full moon appeared from behind clouds), each making its own dust cloud, from inside the office truck their sound resembled ‘heavy surf pounding on a beach’—or so the diarist thought. At 9.55 p.m. the guns paused, beginning the barrage and timed concentrations—still under Corps command—at 10 p.m. as the infantry advanced. When they began the second task—in the case of the 4th Field the first lift of the barrage—they reverted to the CRA's command: 10.23 p.m. for the 4th and 6th Field and 10.29 p.m. for the 5th Field.

The barrage, fired from gun positions by Bir el Makh Khad, started at a slow rate on a front of 3100 yards. Before the first lift all guns fired one round of smoke, while C Troop throughout fired nothing but smoke to mark the divisional and brigade boundaries. The first series of lifts, at three-minute intervals, were of about 100 yards, with the frontage widening successively until at the 15th lift, which ended at five minutes past eleven, it was over 3850 yards long. At this, too, the last round was smoke; then the 4th Field abruptly changed from a lifting barrage to a series of timed concentrations at a very slow rate for about 50 minutes. This was the first objective and the pause was to allow the infantry to consolidate on it and perhaps reorganise before starting the advance to the final objective. At ‘Z plus 170’—12.50 a.m.—the regiment resumed the barrage, continuing with lifts of 100 yards every three minutes except for the 31st lift, at which the guns fired for three minutes, paused for eight, and then fired again for three minutes on the same line before starting the next lift. This was halfway between the first and final objectives and gave the infantry a chance to catch up if they had fallen behind. There was no need for this at least on the right; for the eager infantry of 23 Battalion had long since gone right through the barrage and were ahead of it. The battalion headquarters came under fire soon after midnight from the New Zealand guns and three men of the unit were hit. As the front widened and firing churned up the dust the barrage evidently became hard to follow; but the infantry still found it useful, not only to help them maintain direction, but to go some way towards checking the fire of the many centres of opposition outside the ‘known’ enemy localities. On three more lifts between the first and final objectives the guns fired a last round of smoke, which did nothing to improve visibility. As a guide it was much less effective than the pink Bofors tracer fired by the Right Section of E Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery to mark the boundaries in the opening phase. The front on the final objective was about 4250 yards according to the barrage trace, ridiculously long for a mere twenty 25-pounders.

The timed concentrations followed a similar general scheme, though the guns fired for longer than three minutes on the more important target areas, they varied their rates of fire, and they fired more rounds all told than the barrage guns. The tasks of the 5th Field lasted for 283 minutes, not counting the counter-battery fire before 10 p.m. on the 23rd, and those of the 6th Field lasted for 253 minutes, which took them to 2.43 a.m. and 2.13 a.m. respectively on the 24th. The barrage was supposed to last until 2.22 a.m., 262 minutes altogether, but the 4th Field diary says it went on until 2.30 a.m., which perhaps allowed for DF tasks covering the final objective. The regiment also fired smoke on selected areas beyond the final objective for 28 minutes after the barrage ceased.

Very little fire came back at the field guns and the only casualty reported was one 5th Field man evacuated with bleeding ears, a disability for which the enemy was not to blame. The wonder was that after an ordeal of more than four hours of constant firing there were not more like him at the gun positions. The last rounds were followed by the diminishing whine of the shells as they sped on their way and then an unexpectedly long period of rumbling as the sound of their bursting came back to the guns. The noise round the guns had ceased and after that the silence was almost painful. The divisional guns had fired an average of 630 rounds by the calculations of the CRA's staff and there was much evidence of it in the form of blistered paint on gun barrels.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The 4th Field Moves Up Behind the Armour

The 4th Field Moves Up Behind the Armour

There was to be no rest, however, for men of the 4th Field. Their next task, if all went well, was to move forward (with

31 Anti-Tank Battery) in support of 9 Armoured Brigade as it pushed beyond the objective to exploit the success. The brigade commander, Brigadier Currie, had been most anxious that the field guns would be in close support at dawn on the 24th and that their FOOs should be forward with the tanks; he had not been satisfied that there was close enough co-operation between the 4th Field, the CRA, and his own staff to ensure this, and he had therefore written on the 23rd to Freyberg himself. [9] He had been led to believe that the 4th Field OPs, which now operated in White armoured cars or Stuart tanks, would meet his regiments on the Qattara Track and go forward with them. Brigadier Weir had said nothing to the contrary when the two met in the morning of the 23rd and it was not until he, Currie, had returned to his own headquarters that he learned that this was no longer intended. Freyberg entirely agreed that the OPs should go forward as Currie proposed and instructed the BM at Artillery Headquarters accordingly (in the absence of Weir); but he was reluctant to send the soft-skinned vehicles of the 4th Field forward of Miteiriya Ridge at first light, as Currie seemed to wish. He promised that the guns would go forward as soon as possible and thought that ‘when you have been in action with the gunners, and certainly after any battle at 0700 tomorrow morning [24 October], you will be happy with the arrangements’. The misunderstanding seems to have arisen from a discussion between Weir and Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart of the 4th Field in which the latter took mere suggestions related to certain contingencies to be firm orders. It was soon rectified. Weir ordered the OPs to do as Currie wished and further instructed the 5th and 6th Field to do all they could to support the armoured brigade on the 24th.

The 4th Field was as a result even more determined to fulfil its support role satisfactorily. Its quads came forward at the earliest possible moment after the barrage ceased, though traffic congestion delayed them a little, and the guns were hooked on. They had barely begun to move, before 3 a.m., when they were suddenly ordered back into action and telephone lines were hurriedly relaid. The emergency—probably in the area of a flanking division—soon passed and the 4th Field moved on, though at an irritatingly slow pace because of the mass of vehicles pressing towards the minefield gaps. The gaps were narrow and the gunners saw several vehicles of other units blown up on mines. They themselves kept closely to the tracks and suffered no harm. By an extraordinary effort the ground ahead was reconnoitred and Stewart got his guns deployed before dawn at the foot of Miteiriya Ridge and well inside the former enemy FDLs.

The field gunners had not failed the armoured regiments; but they now found themselves perilously placed in an area thickly sown with Teller mines and booby traps, some of which were heavy bombs fused to explode through trip wires. All the armoured OPs had gone forward with the leading tanks; but unarmoured ones followed at first light and engaged hostile batteries beyond the ridge and infantry who were still holding up the advance of the South African division to the south. Many tanks came to grief on mines and the armoured brigade was in no position to exploit the almost complete success of the New Zealand infantry, who had gained all but the southeastern corner of their objectives. It was a tight and touchy situation. E Troop of the 4th Field came under fire soon after dawn at very close range until South African infantry, attacking boldly and skilfully, overcame the German pocket. Then, at 10 a.m., heavy shellfire came down on the gun positions and the 4th Field transport and caused heavy loss: 10 killed, including Captain Bell
[10] of E Troop, and 21 wounded. Bell and two gunners were standing by the RE truck and all were killed by one shell. A signals truck ran over a mine and was completely destroyed, causing four more casualties.

The enemy pocket which bothered E Troop of the 4th Field at first light also troubled 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery, which had accompanied the regiment from the Qattara Track and managed to get its trails on the ground and its Bofors ready for action by this time. Sergeant Goeffic
[11] of B Troop turned his gun towards this enemy, was wounded in so doing, but continued his preparations to fire. Menaced thus by an automatic cannon at very short range, the enemy lost heart even before the Bofors crew could open fire and after a single shot 20 men surrendered. They were handed over to South African infantry and in due course Goeffic was evacuated. His prompt and cool action was much admired by observers and for it he was awarded an immediate DCM. Later in the day a battery ammunition truck was damaged by mortar fire and had to be sent back.

[9] Currie pointed out in his letter that he had been a gunner for 27 years, a regimental commander in Crusader campaign, and a CRA since then, ‘so I do think I can be trusted not to throw my guns away.’

[10]
Capt C. D. Bell; born NZ 2 Feb 1910; civil servant; killed in action 24 Oct 1942.

[11]
Sgt H. L. Goeffic, DCM; Wanganui; born Napier, 23 Jun 1913; butcher; twice wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

OPs Under Fire

OPs Under Fire

The other two field regiments and the 69th Medium also had OPs operating on Miteiriya Ridge by first light and they found plenty of targets throughout the day: tanks, transport and infantry. They engaged them freely; but there was another misunderstanding with Brigadier Currie, who reported to Freyberg at 10.32 a.m. that 9 Armoured Brigade needed artillery support, that there were two OPs available, but they were under orders not to shoot except on Brigadier Weir's orders. Perhaps some FOOs had become indoctrinated too narrowly with Weir's creed of divisional control; but Weir when he heard of it a few minutes later was mystified. He had already sent every OP forward and ordered them to shoot at anything they saw.

The main trouble was to maintain communications. Tanks kept damaging artillery telephone lines and wireless did not work well. Even the crews of the armoured OPs of the 4th Field found things lively, for they were up with the leading tanks in a situation in which even the heavy Sherman tanks could advance no farther. Anti-tank fire was heavy and accurate. For the unarmoured OPs it was highly hazardous.

The 5th Field had two OPs per battery forward, but both those of 47 Battery were put out of action through mines and Captains Parkes and Smith
[12] were killed (and two gunners also). Major Cade, who was acting as liaison officer at Headquarters of 5 Brigade, heard this and went forward himself to open an OP. The area was heavily mined and under constant mortar and small-arms fire. He completed his journey on foot and set up his post in front of 22 Battalion, bringing down covering fire as the infantry consolidated. Enemy fire forced him to change position frequently and his own selfless determination prompted him to reconnoitre boldly. In so doing he discerned several important targets and engaged them effectively. It was an action reminiscent of his splendid performance at Maleme in Crete and for it he was awarded the DSO. [13]

The 6th Field OPs, from first light onwards, engaged enemy positions; but the FOOs soon perceived that the anti-tank guns which were holding up the advance of the armour were not easily dislodged by long-range 25-pounder fire. Two officers were slightly wounded by a mine and an anti-tank shot killed an FOO, Lieutenant D'Arcy. [14] RHQ and 29 Battery were much hampered by masses of vehicles which had come forward during the night, and late in the afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel Walter moved them into the former 4th Field area. The guns of 43 Battery were nearby, except for the Left Section of G Troop, which went forward at 2 a.m. to guard a gap in the minefield. One gun of this section suffered damage from a 50-millimetre anti-tank shot and had to be sent back to Workshops. In RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack a gunner was killed by a booby trap. More elbow room was urgently needed; but the minefields were vast and clearing them required skill, courage and patience. It was not a job that could be rushed. Operation Lightfoot (as the first phase of the offensive was called) had reached a most awkward stage.

[12]
Capt F. E. Smith, m.i.d.; born Dunedin, 15 Dec 1914; journalist; died of wounds 24 Oct 1942.

[13] One of the two OP vehicles destroyed, a Bren carrier of F Troop, had run over a mine before dawn. With the troop commander and driver seriously wounded (mortally, as it happened), the wireless operator, L-Bdr A. G. Peterson, and Gnr R. H. Finlay got out under heavy mortar and shell fire and carried the two casualties clear of the minefield. Then Peterson ran a long way and after much trouble got in touch with another OP, reported what had happened, obtained a vehicle, and in it carried the two wounded men to an RAP. Later in the day he went forward under shellfire and helped to salvage the wireless and other equipment from the wrecked Bren carrier. He gained an immediate MM.

[14] Lt D. C. D'Arcy; born Wanganui, 4 May 1908; accountant; killed in action 24 Oct 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Anti-Tankers on Miteiriya Ridge

Anti-Tankers on Miteiriya Ridge

The anti-tankers inevitably had much trouble getting their guns forward: a more open and exposed position than that occupied by the infantry on Miteiriya Ridge could scarcely be imagined and the profusion of mines made it perilous indeed to drive portées and emplace guns there. They nevertheless succeeded fairly well and with remarkably small loss. The portées of 31 Battery drove forward with the armour, breakfasted near the foot of the ridge, moved forward again, and the guns were then dug in. In the afternoon they moved farther forward and dug in again. The position seemed relatively quiet, but heavy shelling came down later, wounding Gunner Perrett
[15] and damaging some equipment. Then after dark on the 24th they moved on with the tanks.

The three troops of 32 Battery did their best to provide support for 5 Brigade. H Troop lost H4, damaged on a British mine early in the night, but pushed on and went into position in support of 23 Battalion. E Troop got forward but came under such severe fire (which wounded two gunners) that it was ordered back behind 23 Battalion and did not get properly established with 21 Battalion on the ridge until evening. G Troop was held up by slow-moving traffic and in an effort to by-pass it was ordered to use a track through the sector of the Highland Division. Fighting was still going on there, however, and the anti-tankers got mixed up in it before they could make their way through to 5 Brigade. When they got through they came under heavy fire from 88s and machine guns and could not get right forward until evening, when two guns were dug in on stony ground in the area of 22 Battalion.

Though 6 Brigade had more trouble than 5 Brigade in gaining its objectives, the supporting anti-tank guns, 33 Battery, had relatively little trouble in getting forward. The lie of the land was more favourable and L Troop managed to dig in on the crest of the ridge and just behind it in support of 26 Battalion, and J and K Troops similarly went into position with 24 and 25 Battalions. Two L Troop portées had broken down on the way; but they were quickly repaired and drove forward at first light. The troop commander's jeep, however, was blown up on a mine while carrying wounded infantry. The battery commander, Major Sweetzer, visited the forward sections, checked the siting of guns, and was pleased that none of his men had come to harm.

By evening Miteiriya Ridge was securely held; but there seemed little immediate chance of effecting the breakthrough which was the object of Operation Lightfoot. A further attack with strong artillery support was clearly called for. Two armoured divisions and 9 Armoured Brigade therefore advanced by night through the New Zealand Division and the Highland Division on its right flank. They were covered initially by counter-battery concentrations by some 300 guns from 10 p.m. to 10.15 on a very long frontage. These were fired by two field regiments of the Highland Division, the three New Zealand ones, four of 10 Armoured Division, and two of the South African division on the left flank, as well as by medium guns. In the New Zealand sector the concentrations were followed for an hour by a far more concentrated creeping barrage than that of the previous night, which lifted 200 yards every five minutes. At the last moment the CO of 26 Battalion learned that the opening line was within his FDLs and he at once withdrew his forward companies. One of them, however, was too slow, got caught in the barrage, and became disorganised.

A far greater confusion attended the attempt to pass a mass of armour quickly through the narrow minefield gaps under shellfire and very damaging attack from the air. Dozens of lorries burst into flames, blocking the narrow tracks and lighting the scene for further air attack. Two regiments of 9 Armoured Brigade somehow got past the obstructions, did some rather wild night firing to the south-west of Miteiriya, and found themselves at daylight facing well-sited 88s and other guns which soon caused them heavy loss. An armoured brigade to the north-west was even more exposed.

Long before daylight, however, Brigadier Currie had been in touch with Divisional Headquarters, making the familiar complaint that the 4th Field OPs were not forward. The CRA assured Freyberg that they would certainly be with 9 Armoured Brigade at first light; but Currie would not accept this. The OPs were in fact on the appointed ground, but there was some delay in establishing contact with the British armour—not surprising in view of the muddle into which the armour had got itself. The delay did not stop the FOOs from engaging any likely looking targets and the 4th Field guns were soon active. [16] A far more serious matter was the lack of understanding between the three armoured formations which staged the attack: the two divisions and Currie's brigade, all of which were supposed to co-operate closely in effecting a breakthrough. But the trouble was really deeper even than this. The effort to exploit a largely successful infantry attack with armour almost completely divorced from infantry and supported, if at all, only by artillery indicated that Eighth Army thinking was still far behind that of the enemy. The Germans would not have attempted either operation without tanks and infantry in close and constant co-operation. The armoured brigade needed far more than the support of the 4th Field to make any real headway.

The 31st Anti-Tank Battery was certainly not slow in getting forward to support the armour. A Troop was right up with the leading tanks at first light, came under terrible fire, and the gun crews had to take up whatever positions seemed to offer advantage on the spur of the moment. A1 was lucky enough to come upon a pit dug to shelter a truck and gained excellent cover. The others did not fare so well. A mortar bomb soon burst near A3 and wounded all but one of its crew. A4 found reasonable cover, but several portées of an English unit clustered nearby, attracting much fire and suffering many casualties. Several wounded men came into the A4 position, followed by the driver of A4 with blood streaming from his face. An English officer drove up, halted his jeep, and was at once mortally wounded by a shell which slightly wounded the sergeant of A4. The gun position became a shambles. The tanks had withdrawn to hull-down positions and Lieutenant Abel
[17] was ordered to withdraw A Troop. It was a formidable task, but he set about it boldly and managed to bring out safely all the wounded and the three manned guns. Then he drove in his pick-up back to A3, hooked it on under fire, and towed it back. For this he earned an MC.

B Troop with two guns went into action against a minor counter-thrust and one of the two, under Sergeant Dilly, [18] knocked out a tank. C Troop had gone into action the previous day with the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, which had since withdrawn. The commander of C1 and a gunner had been wounded in that action. This day the same portée suffered a direct hit which killed two gunners, and a portée following close behind had two men wounded by the same explosion. By the end of the morning only C3 remained in action. D Troop with the Royal Warwickshire Yeomanry had three portées deep in a minefield at first light and had to wait for sappers to clear a lane for them. [19]

The anti-tankers of 32 Battery were spectators of the fighting between the tanks of 10 Armoured Division and enemy guns to their front. It seemed like a grandstand seat, but their positions on the north-western extension of Miteiriya Ridge were barely 20 feet above the scene of the fighting. The many tank-versus-gun duels ‘continued throughout the day’, according to the battery diary, ‘and the firepower was enormous. Overs from the battle and from 88s and snipers kept the gun crews very quiet’. H Troop was lightly shelled, but E and G Troops suffered prolonged shelling and mortar fire, though the only casualty was a gunner who suffered a slight head wound but refused to be evacuated. Second-Lieutenant Doig
[20] and Sergeant Laing
[21] were both slightly wounded by shellfire while reconnoitring ahead. They went out again after dark and by day and by night they did very valuable work. They destroyed with hand grenades two 6-pounder guns which the Germans were using and brought back the firing mechanisms. They salvaged a 50-millimetre German anti-tank gun and a 41-millimetre Italian one and two anti-tank rifles. And they cleaned and repaired the machine guns of two burnt-out German tanks nearby, which were duly manned from last light on the 25th by two riflemen of 22 Battalion, who put them to good use throughout the night. For his part in all this Laing received the DCM.

[15]
Gnr R. C. M. Perrett; born NZ 21 Apr 1919; labourer; died of wounds 2 Nov 1942.

[16] Currie told Freyberg that his was the only armoured brigade without its own integral RHA regiment and a report by his brigade underlined the point: ‘It cannot be over-stressed that only the best and quickest-thinking Officers will ever succeed in this type of occasion, and it is no use thinking any Fd Regt can take on the job at a moment's notice…. When artillery support is expected and fails to materialise, it is a very serious matter.’ The implications for the 4th Field are clear, but they are unjust. The two regiments of another armoured brigade which got through were not saved from an even worse plight than that of 9 Armoured Brigade by their RHA regiments. Currie's tanks in fact received splendid support this day, not only from the 4th Field but from the rest of the New Zealand guns. The trouble was that the task they had been given of breaking through an enemy gun line was one which infantry attacking by night could have done far better.

[17]
Lt S. H. Abel, MC; Auckland; born Sydney, 12 Jun 1916; margarine manufacturer; wounded 2 Nov 1942.

[18]
Sgt C. W. Dilly; Auckland; born NZ 30 May 1907; carpenter's labourer. The layer was Gunner ‘Butch’ Mackenzie.

[19] The various accounts of B, C and D Troops of 31 Battery are vague as to dates. It is not easy to separate details of the fighting on the 24th and 25th and it might not have been done correctly.

[20]
Capt R. T. Doig; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 22 Oct 1914; accountant's clerk.

[21]
WO II J. A. Laing, DCM; Reporoa, Rotorua; born Auckland, 27 Aug 1914; contractor.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Enemy Gun Line Is Not Broken

The Enemy Gun Line Is Not Broken

All three New Zealand field regiments gave useful support to the armour operating beyond the infantry FDLs. The 4th Field caused several groups of transport to disperse and scored a direct hit on a 75-millimetre gun. The return fire, though it caused no loss of men or equipment, was formidable. It fell heavily in the area of RHQ and 25 Battery of the 4th Field and included calibres of up to at least 210 millimetres. The heaviest shellbursts detonated with tremendous violence on the rocky ground. The dust raised by bombing and shelling was carried by a strong wind that blew up and greatly reduced visibility in the afternoon. The whole of the 6th Field had intended to move forward, but the artillery and supply vehicles of 10 Armoured Division caused such congestion that only 48 Battery moved—three miles forward. A large force of Junkers aircraft bombed an area to the south-west at dusk and several guns of the 14th Light Ack-Ack were able to engage at long range, but they claimed no hits. In mid-afternoon 9 Armoured Brigade complained that it was being attacked by tanks and was blinded by smoke put down by the 25-pounders; it wanted this fire stopped. It turned out, however, that the artillery responsible was that of 10 Armoured Division and the request was therefore passed on. At the end of the day the 4th Field had fired 1843 rounds of HE and 37 of smoke.

The Survey Troop, after surveying the start line for the opening attack on the 23rd, had had a rather frustrating time since then. Three salvage parties sent out on the 24th found the tracks altogether too congested and they had to return. For the same reason attempts to put in bearing pickets for the field artillery also failed and one truck was blown up on a mine, fortunately without causing casualties. This day, the 25th, the troop had slightly better luck and established three points.

The effort to break through the enemy gun line had obviously failed and the armoured commanders had no desire to persist with their present fruitless operations. Currie's brigade withdrew during the night to take up hull-down positions in support of the New Zealand infantry. Most of 10 Armoured Division had already withdrawn. The next move was to be a thrust northwards, and while it took place the New Zealanders would mark time.

Early on the 26th the 4th Field fired briskly and discouraged small enemy parties moving in front of Miteiriya. Later 25 Battery withdrew to the original position and 26 Battery followed, as well as 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery. The 6th Field, however, completed its move forward, despite the very limited space available for deployment, and H Troop of 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery accompanied 29 and 30 Batteries. Enemy guns were active and several regimental concentrations, stiffened with medium guns, were fired to quieten them. At the end of the day the 4th Field had fired 2623 rounds, some of them on a programme in support of moves on the Australian front to the north. At dusk there was much commotion as 45 Stukas appeared over the gun areas, followed by rather wild firing from the Bofors of neighbouring formations which made the task of RAF fighters trying to intercept the bombers difficult. All the Bofors of 42 Battery fired and for a few minutes the air was thick with bursting shells, one gun claiming a hit on a Stuka.

The 6th Field gun positions were heavily bombed and two men were killed in them and three wounded. A disastrous ‘premature’ occurred in a 48 Battery gun in the afternoon which killed three of the crew and wounded two others. At the same time a fairly strong tank force threatened the 5 Brigade FDLs. Captain Caughley had an OP in support of 23 Battalion, and when the tanks began shelling the FDLs he engaged them.

Fire from the tank guns swept through the OP area and made observation difficult; but Caughley's fire was effective, though not heavy enough to drive the enemy away. He moved to a flank to get better observation and called down fire from two batteries of the 5th Field. It landed accurately and the enemy soon departed. For his determination and persistence in the face of heavy fire Caughley was awarded an immediate MC.

To secure the Miteiriya position properly and gain firm contact with the South African division to the south, 6 Brigade staged a two-battalion attack to secure the whole of the original objectives. Corps artillery fired counter-battery concentrations from half an hour before the start until half an hour after. The three field regiments fired a simple creeping barrage, with lifts of 100 yards every two minutes. The last round before lifting and the last on the final line were smoke. It was a far more effective barrage than that on the opening night, being fired by 72 guns instead of 20 and on a very much shorter front. It caused several casualties, however, among the infantry, either through over-eagerness or—more likely—through some shells falling short. But it also saved infantry lives; for the enemy was quite thick on the ground in places and the barrage enabled the attackers to take prisoners with relatively little fighting. So many enemy gave themselves up at one stage that it was only with difficulty that the infantry could round them up and still keep up with the barrage. Further support was called for and provided in the early hours of the morning and again after dawn. Two 6-pounders of 33 Battery followed closely behind the infantry and were in position, with infantry 2-pounders, covering the captured ground by about 2 a.m. After dawn they came under fierce machine-gun fire which lasted most of the day, 27 October, but caused no harm, though it occasioned much alarm and put several holes through Sergeant Gordon's [22] gunshield. To compensate for this, Gordon did some useful firing against transport.

[22]
Lt A. B. Gordon; Wellington; born Lower Hutt, 24 Mar 1917; student.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The End of Operation Lightfoot

The End of Operation Lightfoot

The next move was to hand over the existing 25-pounder positions to South African gunners in the night 27–28 October and take up new positions to the north to support a major Australian attack. But before this could take place the New Zealand gunners saw some sharp action.

Three Me109Fs came over bombing and strafing in mid-morning and destroyed one vehicle. They were hotly engaged by 41 and 43 Batteries and Bofors of other units. Already 42 Battery had claimed a hit on a single Ju88 which came over on a nuisance raid—no mean feat. Other enemy aircraft came over; but they had been warned and kept very high. The Right Section of A Troop of 41 Battery moved forward in the morning with 25 Battery when the latter adopted a sniping role on Miteiriya Ridge. The position was exposed and both the 25-pounders and the Bofors came under heavy shellfire which destroyed an ack-ack ammunition truck late in the afternoon, killed a gunner, and wounded two others.

When the armoured brigade withdrew, H Troop of 32 Battery moved back to the wagon lines south-south-east of El Alamein; but E and G Troops stayed in action and were heavily shelled. Lieutenant Holt and a bombardier of E Troop were both wounded, but they stayed with the troop. E3 fired one round at a truck, more as an outlet for pent-up emotions than in the hope of doing the enemy harm. A lance-bombardier and gunner of G Troop were wounded in the course of heavy mortar fire and Sergeant Laing carried the gunner to safety despite heavy machine-gun fire. When some 18 enemy tanks were seen approaching rapidly from a ridge 5000 yards away and the field artillery OPs could not observe them, Second-Lieutenant Doig went to an infantry post and from it directed the fire of the 5th Field, destroying one tank and immobilising another. The rest quickly withdrew.

The field regiments had meanwhile been busy co-ordinating arrangements for the relief and had parties reconnoitring the new areas in the sector of 9 Australian Division. Field batteries moved independently. The 4th Field took over positions vacated by the 2nd/7th Field, RAA, and was in full occupation by 9 p.m. The 5th and 6th Field were relieved later and then had to prepare new positions near Tell el Eisa station. The Bofors batteries accompanied them. Only essential transport was taken, the rest going back to the wagon lines. The CRA set up a tactical headquarters—a bare minimum of facilities—a mile to the east, with RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack and alongside the Australian divisional headquarters.

The New Zealand infantry and 9 Armoured Brigade withdrew to the rear. The anti-tank batteries went with them, except for 34 Battery, which had hitherto operated with the Divisional Reserve Group and now came under the command of 20 Australian Infantry Brigade. The night 27–28 October in which most of these moves took place was enlivened by the activities of enemy aircraft, some of which dropped baskets of butterfly bombs (anti-personnel) while others circled singly dropping occasional heavy bombs. At dawn Stukas and medium bombers were briefly active.

The fighting on Miteiriya Ridge, successful up to a point, though disappointing in its outcome, had cost the gunners the following casualties:

| Killed | Wounded
4th Field | 11 | 19
5th Field | 6 | 14
6th Field | 7 | 13
7th Anti-Tank | 1 | 16
14th Light Ack-Ack | 3 | 6
| —— | ——
Total | 28 | 68

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 12 — Operation SUPERCHARGE

Contents

- [section]
p. 398

- Planning supercharge p. 401
- The 192-Gun Creeping Barrage p. 405
- Trouble for the Anti-Tankers p. 406
- Breaking the Enemy Gun Line p. 410
- Another Big Barrage p. 414
- The End of the Alamein Line p. 415
- The Pursuit p. 417

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE Australian attack in the night 28–29 October was complicated and the Australian CRA-and his staff had worked out the programme before the New Zealand gunners arrived on the scene. Their work was meticulous and the task tables were models of their kind. They followed the prevailing doctrine at Corps and Army which was to employ the creeping (or lifting) barrage mainly when enemy positions had not been satisfactorily located. Since the Australians had been fighting in the coast sector for several months they had a good knowledge of enemy dispositions. The New Zealand field and light ack-ack guns, unlike those of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, were not ‘under command’ but ‘in support’ and remained under Brigadier Weir's command.

The NZA programme consisted of timed concentrations, some of them rather awkward to fire, since the infantry they were meant to cover attacked towards rather than away from the guns. The attack started late, did not go well in the early stages, and the final phase, which included most of the New Zealand fire tasks, was cancelled. The New Zealand field guns therefore did not fire many rounds. The regiments had expected to move back to the wagon lines next day, 29 October, to rejoin the New Zealand Division; but a new attack was now planned for the night 30–31 October.

Major Hall-Kenney of 34 Battery had to take over positions vacated by the attacking Australians and moved forward on the 28th to do so. His Australian counterparts were busy, however, with details of the night's attack and it was with great difficulty that he managed to get information and guides. The front was quiet when the guns went forward, though a sniper caused some concern. The changeover took place by night. The Australians pulled out their guns and the New Zealanders ran their 6-pounders into the empty gun pits, some of which were much the worse for wear by the time the job was finished. Scarcely had they done so when the barrage opened and the enemy began to reply. He evidently knew precisely where the

Australian guns had been and the guns were shelled with frightening accuracy. At one gun position five ammunition cases were blown up in quick order and the shellfire created havoc with the gunners' packs and bedrolls.

the australian sector, 28–31 october

The Australian infantry then appeared on the scene, advancing steadily through heavy machine-gun fire which killed one infantryman outside an O Troop gun pit. A little later a medical orderly appeared with a wounded man, and cover was so scarce in the neighbourhood that O Troop gunners had to take him and attend to him in a gun pit while shells were falling close all round.

The next visitor was a Valentine tank equipped with roller and flails to detonate mines—a Scorpion. This drove over the gun pit, halting with the tank tracks over both of the gun trails and within inches of the wounded man's head. A neighbouring gun had even worse luck. An Australian Bren carrier drove up, mistook the crew for enemy, and gave them a burst of fire at point-blank range which killed Gunner Goodwin
[1] and wounded Bombardier Hitchen. [2] It was a night of confusion and this incident, tragic though it was, aroused no hard feelings. The Australians had been fighting hard for some time, their infantry advanced with fine spirit, and the anti-tankers greatly admired them. In this position, too, an enemy sniper shot Hall-Kenney's batman.

The area was crowded with targets and attracted intense fire. Point 29, a key point of the German—Italian defences, was nearby, and Field Marshal Rommel (as he now was) made a tremendous but unavailing effort to recapture it when he arrived on the scene next day. Many enemy remained in the vicinity, however, and sniping on the 29th killed one gunner and wounded another.

The New Zealand anti-tankers were not sorry to learn that they would not be needed after the 30th and that they would withdraw that night. But they had many anxious moments before they got away. The new attack started with a heavy barrage and the enemy was replying freely when they pulled out. Liaison with the Australians was still very poor and they started off on the wrong track. They were heading straight for the enemy when an Australian stopped them. They had to turn round under fire, mount the 6-pounders on the portées, and then pass through a heavily shelled minefield gap before they could reach the coast road and feel at all safe.

The field regiments had put out OPs at first light on the 29th; but FOOs could see no suitable targets within range and the only firing was at almost extreme range by predicted fire. The 4th Field, which was farthest from the front, being sited right by the coast north-east of Tell el Eisa station, could do little and the gun crews were despatched to the beach in relays to have a swim. All guns were fully manned, however, by 5 p.m.

Men of 41 Battery were also able to swim during the day; but 42 and 43 Batteries were too far from the sea and they were both engaged during the 29th and the 30th against Stukas and fighter-bombers—the latter causing three casualties on the 29th in 48 Battery of the 6th Field. Early in the afternoon 42 Battery engaged and claimed hits on fighter-bombers. A butterfly bomb during the night damaged a tractor of H Troop 43 Battery, and it had to be sent back to Workshops.

The 5th and 6th Field were both called on to fire DF tasks when the enemy attacked in the evening of the 29th. The afternoon of the 30th was fully taken up with calculating, checking and promulgating details of the fire programme in support of the next Australian attack. For the New Zealand units it consisted as before solely of timed concentrations; but Australian regiments as part of their programme had to fire a creeping barrage.

It was again a complex attack and the New Zealand guns, particularly those of the 4th Field, were too far away to contribute much. They fired as ordered between 10 p.m. on the 30th—another awe-inspiring moment—and 3.28 a.m. on the 31st in the case of the 4th Field and five minutes past five for the 5th Field. Enemy aircraft flew over the gun areas throughout, dropping butterfly bombs and occasionally heavier bombs in an effort to check the firing. They wounded one man in the 6th Field. In the morning the gunners learned that the Australian attack had been very successful and hundreds of prisoners had been taken, but one strong position remained unconquered and this became the target of several concentrations fired during the day.

[1]
Gnr D. M. Goodwin; born NZ 12 Jan 1905; chaff cutter and truck driver; killed in action 29 Oct 1942.

[2]
S-Sgt M. K. Hitchen; Te Kuiti; born Auckland, 3 May 1915; stores manager; wounded 29 Oct 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Planning supercharge

Planning supercharge

Lieutenant-Colonel Walter of the 6th Field, the IO and two draughtsmen had meanwhile been called by the CRA (who was already there) to the artillery headquarters of 30 Corps to work on fire tasks for a proposed attack by the New Zealand Division to break through the Alamein line between the coastal position and Miteiriya: Operation SUPERCHARGE. The 4th Field left the Australian sector, starting at 6 a.m. on the 31st, and drove nine miles to a new area just south-west of Tell el Eisa proper (not the station). Before the batteries were ready for action 34 ammunition lorries arrived. Parties from the other field regiments followed and at 10 a.m. the 6th Field began to move by troops. The 4th Field was heavily shelled in this position and a direct hit on a 25 Battery gun killed three men and wounded two. A Stuka attack at dusk was aimed at the RHQ area and 43 Battery, which fired briskly, had three men wounded by bomb splinters. Most of the 42 Battery guns were out of range and those within reach ceased fire when their crews saw the RAF was about to intercept the dive-bombers.

Planning for SUPERCHARGE went ahead rapidly. It was to be an infantry attack at first under a powerful creeping barrage, and then the armour would break out beyond the minefield area and the enemy gun line and end the Alamein fighting. The infantry, however, were not to be New Zealanders, though Freyberg was to command the operation and his staff did the detailed planning. He had to reserve his own infantry for the pursuit which would follow. A brigade from 50 Division and another from 51 Highland Division would carry out the initial assault, with supporting fire from 13 field regiments and three medium regiments. With such a huge concentration of artillery in a small area, the siting of guns had to take precedence over all other requirements. From Brigadier Weir's point of view it was in one way an advantage that very little was known about enemy dispositions in the area: timed concentrations on ‘known’ localities could not therefore be provided with real confidence and a creeping barrage was essential. He was anxious to demonstrate to Corps and Army how effective this method could be when used with enough guns

The 6th Brigade (with 33 Anti-Tank Battery) relieved a Highland brigade late on 30 October, while the attacking force began to concentrate to the east. The forward area was cluttered with artillery vehicles and guns were going into position on almost every patch of ground that had been cleared of mines. When the many ramifications of the operation dawned on the planners it became clear that Operation SUPERCHARGE could not begin until the night 1–2 November. Even with this delay, the staff work had to be rushed.

As it finally emerged, the plan was impressive. The infantry brigade through which the attacking force was to pass would move back 1500 yards and the barrage would start on the line of its FDLs. From 20 to 17 minutes before zero all artillery would fire on these. From 12 to five minutes before zero the guns under the direction of the Commander, Corps Medium Artillery (CCMA), would fire counter-battery tasks. Then the New Zealand programme, starting with a creeping barrage, would be fired. The fire of the medium guns would be superimposed on this, though the CCMA would be able to call on them at any time for other tasks. DF tasks in front of the infantry objective were part of the New Zealand programme. A storm of bursting shells was to rage across the flat desert in front of the advancing infantry.

To plan such a programme was a heavy responsibility; but Steve Weir and his staff delighted in it. For the first time they had a relatively straightforward infantry attack—a front of 4000 yards and a depth also of 4000 yards—and something approaching the concentration of guns that they thought were needed to give really effective support to the infantry. Five regiments were to open on the first line, a gun to every 33 yards. They were the 4th and 78th Field, RA, on the right, and the 5th and 6th, with the 4th Field superimposed over the two of them, on the left. Two hundred yards beyond this the 97th Field, RA, on the right, the 104th RHA in the centre, and the 5th RHA on the left (all from 10 Armoured Division) would open, giving depth to the barrage, and they would continue lifting until they reached the final objective. To give even greater depth the 64th and 69th Medium, RA, would fire to the same plan but starting 800 yards beyond the first line. All told, therefore, there would be nearly one 25-pounder to every 20 yards of front and two medium regiments would add further weight. The lifts were to be 100 yards every two and a half minutes. The main statement of this plan appeared in New Zealand Artillery Operation Order No. 43 of 30 October; but modifications were added until the last moment and some changes were made, in the event, while the programme was being fired.

Besides this barrage, there would be concentrations on the flanks and also in the path of the barrage and DF tasks would cover the infantry while they dug in. Then, just before first light, the 5th and 104th RHA on the right and the three New Zealand field regiments on the left would fire a second and slightly slower barrage, with a medium regiment superimposed for the last seven lifts, to cover the advance of 9 Armoured Brigade from the final infantry objective until it crossed the Rahman Track. This would be deep into the enemy gun line, if not right through it. A subsidiary barrage was to cover a flanking infantry attack to the south and further support would be needed for a thrust by the Maori Battalion on the northern flank. The second barrage, covering the tank attack, would lift 100 yards every three minutes, giving the tanks time to deal with the guns they met in the darkness before dawn.

operation supercharge

At a high level the plan seemed very complicated, as it must be to provide for the participation of a large number of regiments on a relatively small front. But at regimental level it was in fact remarkably simple and for GPOs and their assistants the details were easy to work out—far simpler than the series of concentrations that the normal Eighth Army method called for. The New Zealand GPOs were on that account very pleased with it.

The anti-tank batteries were allotted as in the Miteiriya attack with the addition that 34 Battery came under the command of 151 Infantry Brigade, which was to attack on the right. The ack-ack batteries were retained under the CRA's command for tasks in the following order of priority: marking boundaries, covering forward gaps in minefields, protecting gun areas, and protecting headquarters. For the first of these, two E Troop guns and one gun of H Troop drove forward in the evening of 1 November. They were to fire one round per minute to mark the boundaries.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The 192-Gun Creeping Barrage

The 192-Gun Creeping Barrage

Freyberg himself waited expectantly as the time for the opening of the barrage approached. He envisaged an even more spectacular scene than that with which the October offensive started and in the event he was faintly disappointed. It did not look quite so impressive, perhaps because the firing was on a much narrower front and there was not the same effect of a horizon full of gun flashes from end to end. The ones who appreciated it most when the 192 barrage guns opened fire and 168 other guns began their concentrations were the infantry. Never before had British infantry been given such support in the desert war. The barrage played on the opening line for 20 minutes to give them time to get forward, then it moved onwards with crushing effect until it paused at 2.20 a.m. on the first objective. After half an hour it roared onwards again, battering down opposition, until it halted almost as suddenly as it began on reaching the final objective at 3.40 a.m.

With the Highlanders on the left all went well, though Freyberg himself intervened when tanks seemed to be threatening at 4.30 a.m. and called for DF tasks which were repeated a quarter of an hour later. On the right 151 Brigade did not do so well. There were several misunderstandings about mine-lifting and the guiding lights petered out. The infantry, moreover, bunched up badly in the advance and there was much hesitation, which made the task of the supporting arms difficult. The portées of 34 Battery had to drive through much small-arms fire and some heavy shelling and Lieutenant de Schryver
[3] was killed. One or two portées stopped for the crews to fill up sandbags and pile them on the sides, but the protection this gave them was moral rather than actual. As the anti-tankers advanced, mortar bursts began to thicken up the shellfire.

[3]
2 Lt J. M. de Schryver; born Auckland, 2 Dec 1911; branch manager; killed in action 2 Nov 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Trouble for the Anti-Tankers

Trouble for the Anti-Tankers

The first barrage had ceased and the second one was starting when the battery reached the objective. The cruiser tanks and Shermans had been supposed to drive right through and beyond the infantry objective; but there were many of them in the area, clustering together like the infantry had done and attracting much fire, and they showed no inclination to move on. There were also I tanks supporting the infantry. The commanding officer of one regiment, riding on the top of one tank, proposed to site the 6-pounders himself, but Major Hall-Kenney flatly refused. Hall-Kenney was at that time perhaps the most experienced anti-tank commander in the Middle East
[4] and he had no intention of allowing a non-expert, regardless of rank, to do his job for him. He sited his own guns, O Troop with the 9th Durham Light Infantry and P and Q Troops with 8th DLI. The whole area was under fairly heavy fire, and Lieutenant Morpeth
[5] of O Troop told his men to dig slit trenches for themselves before they dug their guns in—a most unusual order. When it was light enough to see, the anti-tankers found themselves in the midst of carriers and other anti-tank guns and they had to move on and begin all over again. The portées of P and Q Troops also had to move, some of them through a minefield, leapfrogging the guns forward to get better positions. Sergeant Hastie's [6] gun of O Troop drove forward under such heavy fire that the crew eagerly seized on an existing slit trench for their gun position and quickly enlarged it.

Many tanks were milling round in the area, some of them of 9 Armoured Brigade and some I tanks. They attracted intense fire and an 88 demonstrated its deadly power by knocking out one after another of them. The scene became blurred with smoke from the blazing tanks and the sudden interjections of the 88 gave the situation a desperate quality. The anti-tankers responded with a sense of urgency. Sergeant Wells
[7] rushed his gun into action and engaged the 88, and it at once turned its attention from the tanks to this new source of danger. Its first round struck with devastating effect, killing Wells and another of his crew and wounding others, and creating a shambles in the gun pit. Hall-Kenney at once went across to Sergeant Smith's [8] Q Troop gun and directed its fire against the German gun. The first round must have struck the target, for it did not fire again, and the succeeding rounds added to the damage. No more fire came from this quarter; but there were many other sources of fire, including infantry and mortars, heavier guns out of sight and range of the 6-pounders, and several tanks farther away than the 88 and intervening cautiously.

Hall-Kenney noticed that the infantry around were departing, leaving his guns uncovered. He protested, but to no avail. The portées withdrew so as not to attract fire on the gun positions; but the drivers drew much fire on themselves when they moved and Gunner Tristram
[9] suffered a painful neck wound. Another driver was wounded in the leg. One driver, however, was so heedless of this fire that he stopped to pick up Italian prisoners and carried them back. The anti-tankers here had to put up with a great many projectiles originally aimed at targets out of their sight in the course of the fierce action being fought at the same time by 9 Armoured Brigade. Part of one of these, the aluminium ballistic cap of a sophisticated German anti-tank shot, knocked an O Troop gunner unconscious.

A tank counter-attack seemed to be developing—hence the withdrawal of the infantry—and one of the tanks engaged Q Troop with high-velocity HE fire from a hull-down position which offered the anti-tank guns a poor target. Its first shot wounded Sergeant Smith and its second came right into the gun position, killing a gunner and wounding several others. At the end of it this gun position, like Wells's, was a sad sight indeed. The tanks did not, however, come much closer.

Nearby there were three 6-pounders of the Sherwood Foresters, but the detachment had lost all its officers and the guns were unmanned. Sergeant Trail
[10] of 34 Battery went over to them, across 300 yards of bullet-swept ground, and brought one of them single-handed into action against the tanks. After some time he was ordered to withdraw; but he removed the firing mechanisms of all three guns before he did so and carried them back across the flat desert exposed to all kinds of fire. He displayed perfect self-control throughout and was later awarded an MM.

Concurrently Lieutenant Trower
[11] of the 5th Field concerned himself with getting anti-tank guns to fire on two 88s he could see from his OP about 1000 yards away. He had been observing from the area of the 8th DLI and he, too, found that the infantry around him had disappeared. He reported accordingly by wireless to his own B Troop and tried to get the field guns to engage targets on his front. The 5th Field were busy, however, firing on a large concentration of transport to the flank. He therefore left his OP and ran across the intervening ground, regardless of the fire which was coming down thickly over the whole area. For his action he was later awarded an MC, and the citation says that he caused an anti-tank gun—evidently Smith's—to engage two 88s and that it ‘dealt effectively’ with them. But it seems that Smith had already knocked out one 88 when Trower arrived and he congratulated the anti-tankers on their shooting. His action was nevertheless a brave one and his persistence in manning an OP after the infantry had departed was especially praiseworthy. It was a situation in which distant field guns, firing indirectly, could not do much. It was too confused and the visibility too restricted.

‘Overs’ from the tank battle ricocheted wildly through the area and six fairly heavy guns—possibly 150s—shelled it methodically. The 34th continued to lose men. Hall-Kenney was wounded and several more gunners were also hit. One driver drove his portée forward ‘up to the head of the tanks, right over the ridge’, according to Hastie. ‘He carried the job through safely.’ The job was to pick up the wounded at a gun position that was still under heavy fire and he undertook it of his own accord. All told 34 Battery had six killed (including de Schryver) in this action and 15 wounded, a very heavy loss indeed, for fewer than 70 men were involved.

To the right rear of 34 Battery, the Maori Battalion had staged its supporting attack and E Troop of 32 Battery moved up with it, digging in under heavy small-arms fire and later coming under heavy shellfire which punctured several gun tyres. The troop took six prisoners before dawn. When day came the gunners saw enemy infantry well dug in 600–800 yards away and able to hold the gun area under fire, as every movement near the guns demonstrated. The enemy offered no suitable targets for the 6-pounders and E Troop gunners kept out of sight as much as they could.

While 34 Battery was fighting its desperate action at breakfast time, 31 Battery was also in serious trouble following through with 9 Armoured Brigade. Before dawn A Troop had to drive through a swirling cloud of dust raised by the tanks ahead and the portée A2 rammed A1 and was in turn rammed by A3. The guns A1 and A2 both suffered crippling damage. Then a tank blinded by the flying sand ran into A4, causing more damage. The troop was then heavily shelled and machine-gunned, and in the course of this a scout car ran over Second-Lieutenant Abel and a gunner, injuring them badly. The rest of the troop lost touch with the armour and ended up far from its destination. It could get no orders and finally returned to RHQ of the 7th Anti-Tank.

B Troop of 31 Battery was below strength and C Troop had only one gun at the start. D Troop found that visibility was at times practically nil. Going through a minefield D2 struck a mine. Its crew climbed on the side of a following tank, which in turn ran over two mines on their side, the explosions wounding four gunners. One of these was so badly hurt that Gunner Manson, [12] driver of D3, had to carry him back to a dressing station. At the end D Troop possessed only D1 under Sergeant Cossey
[13] and D4 under Sergeant Younghusband, [14] together with a gun and crew of the Sherwood Foresters who attached themselves to the New Zealand troop.

Soon after dawn these three guns began the final advance towards Tell el Aqqaqir with the Warwick Yeomanry, isolated from the rest of 9 Armoured Brigade and attracting the undivided attention of at least two 88s and many other guns. ‘Tracer and AP shot flew among the vehicles’, according to a

D Troop gunner, ‘and two tanks were knocked out almost immediately. The Colonel ordered one of his squadrons to get those guns. The tanks went straight in, blazing away. They quietened the guns. Trouble then seemed to brew up from another sector. The tanks were firing at anything they could see.’ While this was going on Sergeants Cossey and Younghusband got D1 and D4 into action, ‘using any old pits we could find’. Cossey spotted a target almost at once and was kneeling down to the right of his gun directing its fire when he was killed. At the same moment an AP shot went through the back of the portée and set it alight. The driver, McKay, [15] put out the fire and then reported to the troop commander, while the rest of the crew did what they could for the wounded.

‘All this time [according to the same gunner] the Tommy tankees were doing a wonderful job. Their Colonel had two tanks shot from under him. They just fought and fought, and there was never any question of their having enough. We were ordered to pull back to our lines and we did so, picking up several tank crews…. The Colonel was moving round in his own tank picking up wounded.

‘We came back through heaps of destroyed German equipment, both guns and tanks, and knocked-out enemy positions, with plenty of German dead. The chaps had a good feed of M and V (tinned stew) and we found the Warwicks reorganised. They had very few tanks left. There was a tremendous amount of our stuff concentrated, and we knew that we had broken through and were feeling in high spirits.’

The solitary C Troop gun went into position 300 yards behind RHQ of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, with some Vickers guns, and stayed there all day, though the Yeomanry withdrew soon after breakfast time. Fire came at the position from three sides throughout the day. The remnants of B Troop did much the same.

[4] He had trained for six months in England at the start of the war, had served in Greece and Libya, and had had a great variety of anti-tank experience since July in the Alamein line. He had been one of the first New Zealand officers to see action in the desert when attached to the 3rd RHA (at that time anti-tank) on the Libyan frontier in July 1940.

[5]
Capt G. B. Morpeth; Auckland; born Auckland, 13 Aug 1916; insurance clerk; wounded 10 Dec 1943.

[6]
Sgt W. R. Hastie; Matamata; born Palmerston North, 27 Jul 1917; farmhand.

[7]
Sgt I. M. Wells; born Wanganui, 4 Oct 1917; farmer; died of wounds 2 Nov 1942.

[8] L-Sgt O. M. Smith (later Turner); born Dunedin, 2 Oct 1918; student; wounded 2 Nov 1942; died Wellington, 11 May 1961.

[9]
Gnr H. J. Tristram; Palmerston North; born Pukengahu, 11 Oct 1908; motor engineer; wounded 2 Nov 1942.

[10]
WO II R. J. Trail, MM; Nelson; born Wellington, 1 Nov 1908; coach-builder.

[11]
Maj M. B. Trower, MC; Morrinsville; born Wellington, 17 Nov 1915; farmhand; wounded 2 Nov 1942.

[12]
Gnr E. S. Manson; born Tuakau, 22 Jul 1916; sheepfarmer.

[13]
Sgt W. H. Cossey; born NZ 6 Sep 1912; motor driver; killed in action 2 Nov 1942.

[14]
L-Sgt T. Younghusband; Howick, Auckland; born Auckland, 4 Oct 1911; accountant.

[15] BdrD. H. McKay; Masterton; born Pahiatua, 18 Jul 1916; shepherd; wounded 2 Nov 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Breaking the Enemy Gun Line

Breaking the Enemy Gun Line

The first barrage had served its purpose well, despite the trouble on the right of the infantry advance. Then there was doubt about the ability of the tanks to advance on time from the infantry objective towards Tell el Aqqaqir, and the second barrage, the one in direct support of 9 Armoured Brigade, was therefore postponed at Brigadier Currie's request for half an hour until 6.15 a.m. There was really no need for this, as most of the tanks, despite many difficulties and delays, managed to get forward at the appointed hour, and the delay gave the enemy a valuable half-hour to regain his composure and stiffen his defences. The rate of fire, however, was almost doubled (at least for the three New Zealand field regiments) and a very considerable weight of HE shell therefore came down in support of the tanks as they advanced on the last bound—though this did not stop some of the detachments from complaining about the thinness of the artillery support.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart of the 4th Field was travelling with Currie, his battery commanders were with the commanding officers of the armoured regiments, and OP parties were well up with the tanks. But all of them suffered from having only one wireless link each. They could either communicate directly with their guns or with the armour; they could not do both, though this was just what they needed to do. Stewart, for example, had no direct contact with his regiment and if he wanted to bring down fire he had to call on a battery commander and thereby impede the latter's prime task of liaison with an armoured regiment. In the event Stewart's wireless link was put out of action for several critical hours by a shell splinter; he called for fire through the set of the 26 Battery commander until the Stuart tank in which this was installed was disabled, and finally he had to make use of the wireless set of the D Troop commander, Captain Louisson. [16]

Since the armoured commanders were fighting a bitter and deadly duel with a strong anti-tank gun line when they most needed help and tanks were going up in flames all round them, the task of the field artillery commanders and observers was one of extreme urgency and fearful danger. Major Wiles of 25 Battery was wounded early and had to be evacuated, together with two sick officers and several others. The Stuart tanks of the commanders of 26 and 46 Batteries were both disabled. Somehow or other orders did get through to the guns and the 4th Field switched to close-support targets as soon as the barrage ceased.

The armoured commanders complained of lack of support; their situation was desperate in the extreme, and if help was to be effective it would have to be provided in very great haste. Only a great weight of accurate supporting fire could save them from disaster. Currie seems still to have favoured the RHA method of troop fire in very close support of tank squadrons against Weir's method of flexible control under which the full weight of the field artillery could quickly be concentrated against important targets. In this case it was out of the question for a single regiment to provide at long range the weight and accuracy of fire needed to silence dozens of anti-tank guns and several tank detachments scattered over an area of several square miles.

Stewart studied the development of the action quickly but carefully and located the main source of trouble, a large nest of anti-tank guns, on which he called down a full regimental concentration. The action was followed closely, moreover, at Weir's headquarters and also at Freyberg's, as well as at the headquarters of the other New Zealand field regiments. All were anxious to help and did so whenever they could. All three field regiments brought down fire in the morning, the 6th Field, for example, firing two regimental concentrations against 88s opposing 9 Armoured Brigade.

By mid-morning an armoured brigade of 1 Armoured Division was passing through the rear of 9 Armoured Brigade and with it drove a valuable regiment of self-propelled American 105-millimetre guns, the 11th (Honourable Artillery Company) RHA. This new brigade, with the rest of the division, should have been able to force the issue quickly. But it displayed none of the vigour that Currie's brigade had demonstrated and there was a danger that the position would end in stalemate, as it had done earlier beyond Miteiriga Ridge. What saved it from this were the desperate and ill-conceived counter-attacks by German armour, costly in tanks and easily repulsed with the help of the mass of available artillery. At the end of these the enemy had dissipated almost all his remaining strength.

The 4th Field had planned to move forward at the earliest possible moment to get its guns in close behind 9 Armoured Brigade for its close-support role. The crises soon after dawn, however, forbade this, as the calls for fire were too numerous. By 11.15 a.m., however, one battery was in action well forward and the rest of the regiment, now reorganising on a two-battery basis, was on the move. A Divisional Artillery concentration was fired an hour later, 10 rounds gun fire, north-west of Tell el Aqqaqir, and came down with crushing effect on a large target of infantry and transport. As the afternoon advanced the situation seemed to ease, the armour made slight progress, and prisoners flowed back in a steady stream. But the northern flank of the divisional position was still insecure, there were several local crises, and the field guns fired several heavy concentrations. Tanks, for example, seemed to threaten 151 Brigade just before 4 p.m. and a prearranged DF task was therefore fired.

The three Bofors guns returned to their batteries from their boundary-marking tasks at first light and the Left Section of D Troop of 42 Battery moved forward to cover newly-cleared gaps in the minefields, while H Troop of 43 Battery did the same. Enemy aircraft came over frequently in the afternoon, first some Italian planes which 42 Battery engaged, claiming several hits. Ju87s and Ju88s then came over and 42 and 43 Batteries both engaged, the former helping to shoot down several of them. A 43 Battery truck was blown up on a mine, thought no one was hurt; but it prompted the battery to fire all the more eagerly when Stukas came over at 5.30 p.m. The foremost Bofors were well within range of enemy guns and came in for much shelling. At night enemy aircraft dropped many flares and bombed the B echelon of 41 Battery.

The Highland brigade attacked again after dark on the 2nd and easily gained its objective, while 6 Brigade relieved 151 Brigade and took command of its supporting arms, including the battered 34 Anti-Tank Battery. The 7th Motor Brigade, under Corps arrangements, then staged a further advance across the Rahman Track north of Tell el Aqqaqir. The New Zealand field regiments (excepting the 4th Field, which was well forward but still in support of 9 Armoured Brigade) were too far back to take part in the supporting programme. All they were asked to do was to fire harassing tasks to the extent of 50 rounds per gun on a restricted area.

By the end of the day the 4th Field, which had lost one officer and 11 other ranks (apart from the two officers who were sick), had fired the considerable total of 9651 rounds of HE and 72 of smoke. The regiment completed its changeover to two batteries during the night, 25 Battery being absorbed into 26 and 46 Batteries. Because of shortage of men and equipment no more than one OP per battery could now be maintained. Each battery now had two six-gun troops.

General Freyberg was convinced, by the evening of the 2nd, that SUPERCHARGE had succeeded, the battle had been won, and that the pursuit would soon begin. His colleagues were not as confident of this as he was; but his reading of the omens was correct. He told the CRA that he would have to think of mobility now and would need to be alert in the morning for signs of an enemy retreat. The enemy had been broken by the massed guns of 30 Corps supporting first an infantry attack and then the armour. Many of the prisoners taken in the night attack and during the morning of the 2nd were nervous wrecks, their resolution shattered by the storm of shellfire which had swept their positions. Steve Weir's first full-scale creeping barrage had been a success, and the DF tasks and other concentrations that followed it had proved to his satisfaction (if not to Brigadier Currie's) that centralised control of the field artillery in a ‘set-piece battle’ was essential.

[16]
Capt N. M. Louisson; born Wellington, 8 Dec 1904; merchant; twice wounded; died (in NZ) 1943.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Another Big Barrage

Another Big Barrage

Another push was now planned to widen the salient south-westwards, the field regiments prepared for it on the 2nd, and ammunition was dumped on a liberal scale. By the original plan the New Zealand field guns were to play a major part; but this was later changed and their main task was to support an attack by an Indian brigade. The daylight hours of 3 November were relatively quiet and the three field regiments did little firing, while harassing fire on the 4th Field gun lines did no harm. The field gunners enjoyed a brief rest which they badly needed; but the CRA's staff was extremely busy.

The 5th Field nevertheless scored a success this day which reflected credit on the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen, and was largely instrumental in gaining him an immediate DSO. He was visiting his OPs and from one of them, which was under heavy shellfire, he saw a group of 88s engaging tanks. He went from the OP to his own wireless set some way away, regardless of the fire falling close all round, and brought his guns to bear on the target, personally correcting the fire. Then he brought down a full regimental concentration and ‘succeeded in neutralising the battery’, according to the citation (which also refers to his bold and skilful handling of his guns throughout the offensive).

The Indian attack was part of a series of operations and the preparation of the artillery programme had been going on for some time. There were some last-minute complications, however, and the CRA personally made arrangements to deal with them. The Indians, for one thing, had a very long drive along congested tracks to get to the front and only one battalion arrived on time. The brigade had not been trained to follow a barrage and Brigadier Weir had to persuade the brigade commander to accept this form of support (in conjunction with the usual timed concentrations). He had had to demonstrate in daylight to the brigade staff by laying a line of smoke on the start line and showing how the fire would lift. In so doing it became evident that the New Zealand field guns from their existing positions would be unable to reach the final objective. At very short notice, therefore, the scheme had to be changed and the medium guns had in effect to finish off the barrage for the field guns. This was on top of much other work in connection with other parts of the night's operations and it directly affected not only the three New Zealand regiments, but those of 1 Armoured Division and the Highland division as well as the medium guns. A further elaboration was that Weir decided to fire for one and a half hours on the opening line to indicate it clearly to the infantry of the Indian brigade and allow them to form up correctly. Then the barrage would unroll with 100-yard lifts every three minutes. Bofors were to mark the boundaries as usual.

Because of the late arrival of two of the battalions the start was postponed an hour, until 2.30 a.m. on the 4th. The 5th and 6th Field each had half of the front to cover and the 4th Field was superimposed over the whole front as in the earlier barrages. Word of the delayed start did not reach the 6th Field, however, and for 25 minutes it fired all alone, to the amazement of its gunners and many onlookers, until told to cease fire.

At the correct time all regiments opened fire and in due course the barrage rolled inexorably onwards, battering the defence and leaving little for the Indian brigade to do but gather up the dazed enemy in their line of advance. The barrage paused twice on the way to the final objective and then the guns fired several concentrations to cover the digging-in at the end. Once properly started it all went like clockwork, the Indians performed admirably, and Steve Weir and his staff gained many more admirers.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The End of the Alamein Line

The End of the Alamein Line

The morning of 4 November disclosed an enemy who was evidently defeated. Nobody now contested Freyberg's opinion that the battle had been won. As early as 7 a.m. the 4th Field, hitherto ‘in support of’ 9 Armoured Brigade, was placed ‘under command’ for the purpose of the pursuit, while the 5th Field came under 5 Brigade and the 6th under 6 Brigade for the same reason. Divisional control of the field guns would no longer be possible until a pitched battle was called for. In the case of the 5th Field this meant sending a liaison officer far to the rear to link up with brigade headquarters. In the afternoon, when the enemy was in full flight, the regiments began to move into position with their respective brigades, in readiness to travel south-westwards for a few miles and then north-westwards to the escarpment at Fuka, well on the way to Baggush. Fatigue had been slowing the gunners' movements and dimming their vision; but it now left them as if by magic.

An NZA group left at noon, passed dozens of burnt-out tanks and other wreckage, and drove in a mass of transport along the Boomerang Track. Dust rose in immense clouds, so thick in places that it was almost like night driving. East of Tell el Aqqaqir there were several halts and many adjustments of position. When night fell the 6th Field was ‘considerably split up’; but most detachments found the lighted divisional track, the diamond track which they were to follow for many hundreds of miles along the North African littoral and on some memorable diversions inland. The journey became a succession of stops and starts. RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack was told at 7.30 p.m. that it would rest until 11 p.m.; but it was 2 a.m. on 5 November before the column moved again and in the meantime most of the gunners slept.

The Division now had not only the sadly depleted 9 Armoured Brigade under its command, but 4 Light Armoured Brigade as well, and in the afternoon Brigadier Weir, in the company of General Freyberg, visited the newcomers. The CRA was pleased to have under his command 211 Battery of the 64th Medium, as well as the 3rd RHA which was part of the new brigade. He saw some action in the afternoon as this brigade, which was leading, overcame opposition. The 5th Brigade, however, had a heavy clash at 2.30 a.m. on the 5th with an enemy approaching from the rear. At the height of this the brigade group, in close formation, was swept by fierce machine-gun fire which caused many casualties. The 5th Field lost one killed and five wounded, while 32 Anti-Tank Battery had a bombardier and two gunners of H Troop wounded and several portées suffered punctured tyres or other damage. [17] It was an unexpected and unpleasant incident.

The Division reassembled in the course of the journey and before dawn of 5 November it was again concentrated and continued the advance with 4 Light Armoured Brigade leading.

The CRA travelled at the head of this brigade, saw it overcome several small centres of opposition and knock out seven tanks, and brought all his field regiments and the medium battery into action at noon against a gun line including 88s which was holding up the advance. The guns had barely begun to range on the enemy, however, before he moved off and the Division resumed its journey.

Before this the 4th Field had clashed with another enemy detachment and in the course of this Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, forward in his Stuart tank, took 60 prisoners and captured two trucks, with the aid of two Shermans of 9 Armoured Brigade (which now had only one armoured regiment).

Two Me109Fs reconnoitred the area in the morning and later in the day two more came over and dropped a few bombs. They were engaged by 42 Battery and some infantry thought that two were shot down. But the 5th Field was again unlucky, having three men wounded. Later in the afternoon the New Zealand field guns silenced enemy opposition to the light armoured brigade as it traversed a minefield south of Fuka—a dummy minefield, as it happened. A fairly strong gun group, including 88s and 105s, had fired on the British tanks and also engaged the 5th Field guns when these deployed. It scored a direct hit on a 27 Battery gun, but this time the regiment was fortunate: it suffered no casualties. By the time the British tanks moved on, however, and the 5th Field looked round to find 5 Brigade and resume its place in the brigade columns, there was no sign of the infantry and the regiment bedded down for the night beyond the minefield.

[17] Several detachments failed to link with their allotted formations and, not wanting to be left behind, joined in the march wherever they could. Thus 32 Battery was increased by a portée and crew of 34 Battery under Sergeant Cutbush and another anti-tank gun of the Sherwood Foresters.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Pursuit

The Pursuit

The sight of batches of prisoners became a commonplace of the advance and the desert was littered with disabled guns, tanks, other vehicles and equipment of all kinds. There was much evidence of enemy confusion and there were many cases of mistaken identity. ‘One Jerry half-tracked vehicle wandered into the area by mistake and its advent and capture were sufficient to make us redouble our alertness’, an officer of 32 Battery wrote later. ‘In G Troop we even had rounds up the spout.’ In another incident 32 Battery was on the point of firing at half a dozen vehicles, including an Italian tank, at point-blank range when a Maori voice called out from one of them and the gunners paused long enough to discover that all the occupants were Maori. At the end of the day RHQ of the 14th Light

Ack-Ack had travelled 34 miles and the 4th Field just over 40. The Division was well placed to help cut off a sizable body of enemy at the Fuka bottleneck; but the hesitation and delay at the minefield allowed the enemy to escape.

The weather came to the enemy's aid on the 6th. The day started overcast, with rain in places which became general and steadily increased, greatly slowing down the advance. The Division was now directed on Baggush, and the desert on the way there, a manoeuvre ground for the 4 Brigade artillery in the early days and therefore familiar to the ‘old hands’, quickly drank up the rainwater at first. Then it showed signs of having had enough. Pools formed everywhere and the surface became slippery. Innocent-looking stretches of scrubland became treacherous bogs. The steep routes down the escarpments became dangerously slippery. The leading brigade, now the 9th Armoured with the 4th Field and 31 and 41 Batteries, reached the escarpment above Sidi Haneish station in the former Baggush Box early in the afternoon against slight opposition. The going deteriorated rapidly, however, and the portées of 31 Battery had no chance of keeping up with the tanks. Most of the 4th Field guns made good progress despite the worsening surface of the desert and were in action before 2 p.m. to cover any assault that might be needed. The Bofors of 41 Battery did exceptionally well and were deployed in time to shoot down two Messerschmitts which flew off from a landing ground at the last moment before the Divisional Cavalry overran it.

The 4th Field, some 31 Battery portées and some Bofors descended the escarpment, in company with the tanks of the armoured brigade and cavalry. It was a difficult task indeed for the drivers of the quads and, when the regiment was ordered at 3 p.m. to ascend again without having fired, the effort seemed wasted. The rain was now very heavy, it was as much as the drivers could do to reach the top, and having done so by nightfall they found the desert there had become altogether too boggy for them to make further progress.

For other gunners farther back the journey towards Baggush became progressively slower as the rain filled in minor depressions, and vehicles in skirting them became mixed up. Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell of the 7th Anti-Tank was delighted when a Lieutenant Tosser of the Royal Artillery reported to him with four ‘Bishops’ (25-pounders on Valentine chassis), one three-tonner and three jeeps. At the end of the day, however, the only member of this detachment that had managed to retain its place in the group was a solitary Deacon, and Mitchell therefore searched the desert for miles around until he found the remainder. In the darkness he could not find Divisional Headquarters, however, and had to bed down for the night with his party of RA vehicles in the 6 Brigade area.

Most of 7 November was spent ‘digging, winching or pulling vehicles on to hard ground’, according to the RHQ diary of the 14th Light Ack-Ack. ‘In many cases tanks had to come to the rescue and pulled the worst cases out. Our Bedford tractors did good work with their winches, and the drivers had an extremely strenuous day. Wet feet were the order of the day.’ The rain had softened the surface of the desert overnight, but the morning was fine and ‘prospects of getting the vehicles out were bright’. Then rain set in again and things went from bad to worse. Even the four-wheel-drive jeeps sometimes got bogged and several of them had to be towed out of trouble. By this time, too, some vehicles were running short of petrol (though the Division had been ordered to leave the Alamein line with full tanks and enough for 200 miles as well) and several officers who tried to get more had to return empty-handed. The 4th Field, after a hard morning winching out bogged vehicles, was dismayed to learn in mid-afternoon that supply lorries with petrol were bogged down three miles away.

Dawn on 8 November was fine, the morning was sunny, and the ground was rapidly improving. As petrol and other supplies were not expected until about noon, however, the 4th Field gunners took the opportunity to dry blankets and clothing. It was now out of the question to intercept any significant part of the retreating forces. The Bofors guns were coated with mud and gunners spent a busy morning cleaning them. The next stage was Mersa Matruh and the Division moved off in the afternoon intending to attack it. The 4th Field found the going ‘particularly bad’ and so many vehicles were getting bogged that the regiment was ordered to close up at dusk and bed down. The 6th Field, too, had to drive through ‘very heavy mud and slush’. But RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, driving along beside the telegraph line at Matruh, found the ground quite firm and ‘there was very little bogging’. All passed many prisoners walking eastwards and even some parties sitting in vehicles waiting to be captured. None of the New Zealand units had time to bother with them.

Long before the main body of the Division got near Matruh the light armoured brigade reported it clear of the enemy. The units passed within sight of the Minqar Qaim battlefield in the afternoon and bivouacked for the night to the north-west of it.

The next stage was to be Sidi Barrani, and to reach it the Division would have to defile on to the road skirting Matruh. The CRA was now given command of the Divisional Reserve Group with the 4th Field, the 14th Light Ack-Ack less two batteries, 34 Anti-Tank Battery and the machine-gun battalion less two companies; but the 4th Field remained until the 11th with 9 Armoured Brigade. South of Sidi Barrani the light armoured brigade caught up with enemy rearguards in the afternoon of the 9th and the rest of the Division was six or seven miles away at dusk, except for 6 Brigade, which (with 33 Anti-Tank and 43 Light Ack-Ack) moved into Matruh and stayed there. Supply considerations dictated the shape of operations at this stage.

For the gunners of the two batteries it was disappointing, but there were many compensations. It was interesting for ‘old hands’ and newcomers alike to see the little town and port after nearly five months of enemy occupation. The guns of 43 Battery went into position covering the harbour; but they were soon displaced by RA Bofors and the gunners were able to relax on the beach and swim in waters that were still quite warm. Men of 33 Battery found they had camped by extensive enemy stores and depots, including a Luftwaffe workshop with all its magnificent equipment intact. Later they moved to an area in the original defensive perimeter and most of them took up residence in ‘pillboxes’. When they moved to rejoin the Division on the 20th they had taken advantage of their knowledge of former enemy supply depots to stock their cookhouse vehicles with large quantities of tasty items to supplement their army rations, as well as alcoholic refreshments originally intended for the Italian conquerors of Alexandria. For the rest of the North African campaign this was the best fed and the most hospitable of all the New Zealand batteries.

For the other batteries the advance along the coast to Sidi Barrani and then Sollum was chiefly memorable for the amount of enemy equipment strewn along the route and the ample evidence of the havoc created by the RAF as the enemy retreated along the coast road. The field batteries did not fire again; but on the 10th fighter-bombers in a fleeting attack destroyed a troop stores truck of the 6th Field, damaged a signals truck, and wounded three gunners. Next day 41 Battery was quick to engage more fighter-bombers which flew over and shot down one of them. This was the only firing by New Zealand guns between Baggush and the Libyan frontier. New Zealand infantry had stormed Halfaya Pass in a silent attack in the night 10–11 November, and the Bofors fire from the bottom of the pass in the morning at the fighter-bombers came uncomfortably close to the men at the top of the escarpment.

For the rest of the 11th and all through the night a continuous snake of New Zealand vehicles and others slowly wound its way up the pass, while engineers repaired the normally much superior road up the Sollum pass, blocked by a huge demolition. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart of the 4th Field, tired of waiting in columns five abreast to mount the Halfaya pass, led his regiment by a side route to the foot of the Sollum escarpment, reaching there at 3 p.m. on the 12th. Two hours later the sappers completed their repairs and the 4th Field was the first unit to ascend by this route.

By this time 9 Armoured Brigade had departed for the rear, [18] other formations not under New Zealand command were keeping up what pressure they could on the rapidly retreating enemy, the supply lines of Eighth Army were stretched taut, and the Division was to rest briefly and ease the strain on them. It therefore began to assemble in the Sidi Azeiz area near Bardia. Equipment—especially gun towers and portées—was badly in need of maintenance and the 4th Field and 7th Anti-Tank stood in urgent need of reinforcements. A breathing space was most desirable and the gunners hastened to take advantage of it. With Egypt clear of the enemy they felt they could now relax. A vital phase of the desert war had ended and the next, whatever form it took, promised to be very different. Their thoughts were now on Tripoli and no one was looking over his shoulder.

The fighting since the Miteiriya action had cost the gunners something like the following casualties:

| Killed | Wounded
4th Field | 5 | 17
5th Field | 4 | 23
6th Field | 1 | 19
7th Anti-Tank | 7 | 38
14th Light Ack-Ack | - | 6
Total | 17 | 103

There were quite a number, moreover, who had suffered ill-health without complaining, determined to stay with their units if they possibly could. At Matruh or Sidi Azeiz they now found they could hold out no longer and they had to be evacuated, several jaundice cases among them. Others still had been wounded but concealed the effects of their wounds. Some of these, too, had to go back for treatment. Major Hall-Kenney of 34 Battery made light of his wounds in

Supercharge
and returned from a rest camp on 6 November; but by the 16th they got the better of him and he was admitted to a medical dressing station, never to return to the anti-tank regiment which he had served from its earliest days, not only in action, but in organising and conducting several excellent courses in anti-tank gunnery for New Zealand infantry and other troops in the Middle East.

[18] Though they disagreed with Currie about tactics, those of the 4th Field who saw him in action admired him greatly and they were sorry to see the remnants of his gallant brigade depart.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 13 — The Surveyors

CHAPTER 13
The Surveyors

BEFORE the Alamein battle was over, Brigadier Weir arranged for a valuable addition to the Divisional Artillery: 36 Survey Battery. Formed as an engineer sub-unit, this battery had left New Zealand with a section of the 4th Reinforcements, broke its journey in India, sailed from Bombay in the Indrapoera, and reached Port Tewfik on 24 March 1941. It contained many men with a high educational level and they soon found outlets for their talents. Early in April Major Rawle
[1] carried out a survey of the area east of Maadi Camp, in addition to a crowded training syllabus. Towards the end of the month Rawle yielded command of the battery to Major Stevens-Jordan from the 4th Field, an able mathematician with an original turn of mind and a lively personality. At the same time the battery had to put aside its syllabus for a day or two and undertake camp fatigues on behalf of gunners returning from Greece. There followed a brief and tantalising encounter with these members of the Divisional Artillery, an organisation which the surveyors would have loved to join at once; but for well over a year they were destined to tread other paths, sometimes as a battery and sometimes as separate troops or smaller detachments, often far apart.

The first such task took X Troop under Captain Park
[2] to Amiriya, near Alexandria, on 12 June, and Y Troop under Captain Nelson
[3] sent No. 1 Section to Suez and No. 2 Section to Qassassin in the Canal Zone on the same day. No. 1 Section of X Troop surveyed water mains and worked out drainage levels in the camp area; but No. 2 Section had a more interesting task in connection with the desert pipeline which took it a hundred miles westwards along the coast. Shortage of transport hampered all this work; but the gunners begged and borrowed and made do. Headquarters Troop, stationed at Maadi, surveyed bearing pickets and a calibration range for the 4th Field in July; but this was no more than a taste of things to come when the battery eventually joined the New Zealand Division. For the time being X and Y Troops carried out engineering surveys, and at the end of the month Second-Lieutenant Christian
[4] took six men to Cyprus to help complete a topographical survey of the island in accordance with the instructions of the Survey Directorate of the Middle East Forces.

Surveying drains, pipelines and sewers was all very well; but the various sections (other than Christian's party) were far more interested in the prospect which opened up in mid-August when they were recalled to Maadi in preparation for a battery move to Transjordan. Four Dodge 8–cwt pick-ups, nine Chevrolet three-tonners and three motor-cycles arrived on the 17th and slightly eased a critical shortage of transport. Major Stevens-Jordan-a name that now seemed curiously apt—left on re-connaisance the next day, and by the 28th the battery had assembled at Amman and its leading elements had already begun their work, escorted by colourful detachments of the Arab Legion.

The battery came under the command of the Palestine and Transjordan Command and a letter from its Survey Directorate on the 18th outlined the tasks. The immediate one was to observe a primary triangulation chain in Transjordan. In particular the survey detachments were to gain trig control in the Ma'an and Aqaba areas, where railway and road surveys were already being carried out for the port development of Aqaba. They were also to relate their observations to similar work being carried out by South African surveyors along the border between Egypt and Transjordan and from there towards Aqaba. When the details were studied, Stevens-Jordan decided that Y Troop should carry out triangulation from Amman to Tafile and ordered X Troop to do the same from Ma'an to Tafile. X Troop accordingly moved to Ma'an on the 31st, escorted by men of the Arab Legion. They took with them some sore heads, for the RAF had entertained them the night before. Those who stayed at Amman made up a cricket team to play the RAF and the survey team lost. There was method in the RAF hospitality.

By this time the survey parties had already done a good deal of work and on 1September they completed the stations of the first polygon in the Amman area. Suitable materials to make opaque beacons for daylight observations could not at first be found and the surveyors had to do a good deal of work by night, using petrol pressure lamps for beacons and signalling lamps for communication. A strong wind rose every evening and blew nearly all night, obscuring visibility and making this method difficult. Major Stevens-Jordan therefore obtained some lengths of hessian and arranged for a tradesman in Amman to dye them black. He also managed to get a supply of timber and hired donkeys to carry these materials to the beacon sites. With them Y Troop constructed the necessary opaque beacons and made more accurate readings by daylight. Early in September, however, a persistent daylight haze in the Jordan valley impeded daylight observation.

Stevens-Jordan had already concluded from reconnaissances that the tasks allotted to X Troop could not be carried out as ordered. The ground in the Ma'an neighbourhood—famous to readers of T. E. Lawrence's The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, to say nothing of the Bible—was difficult in the extreme and he had to revise the scheme presented by the Director of Trans-jordan Surveys. He decided to use a quadrilateral scheme, but much careful reconnaissance was first called for. By mid-September the whole battery was quartered with the RAF at Ma'an and by the end of the month leave to Jerusalem began. The surveyors felt they had earned it. Erecting and occupying trig stations, particularly in the Ma'an area, involved climbing precipitous rock faces, often with heavy burdens. Two peaks in the south, Jebel el Ram and Jebel Bakir, were reputed to be unscalable and the Arab Legion men refused to attempt them. Many well-known mountaineers had failed, they pointed out, and without alpine gear it was a waste of time trying. But the surveyors, laden with instruments, timber and other materials, scaled both peaks and capped them with beacons. The local Bedouin were thought to be untrustworthy, except in the Kerak area where most of them were Christians and very friendly. When survey parties had to camp out for the night they therefore had Arab Legion protection. In the course of many contacts with the Bedouin throughout Transjordan, however, the surveyors (who always gave them whatever water they could spare) found them hospitable (though desperately poor) and suffered no molestation.

One subsidiary task was to fix on aerial photographs all prominent points such as ruins and the relics of the railway destroyed by Lawrence and his Arab guerrillas in the First World War. A newly-formed air-interpretation section quickly became skilled at pinpointing survey stations on the photographs provided. The battery was also asked to survey a deviation on the Ma'an- Aqaba road where it descended far too abruptly from the high plateau south of Ma'an to the Kuweira plain at Naqb Ashtar. For army transport this stretch was almost impassable. Stevens-Jordan and Captain Park reconnoitred the route and the latter with a detachment undertook this task. When Gunner Hayman
[5] became ill on the 26th a local Arab doctor diagnosed appendicitis. The nearest army medical officer was 80 miles away, but the RAF provided an emergency service from Ramleh and flew the sick man to hospital.

Second-Lieutenant Christian and his party duly finished their work in Cyprus and reached Jerusalem at the end of September. [6] Just over a fortnight later, however, Christian had to return to Cyprus with 10 men to rectify errors discovered in a minor triangulation carried out by civil authorities there. This task, too, led to others and Christian's detachment became involved in a check of details such as vegetation, village boundaries and cairns, which were to be printed in a series of topographical maps. In due course Christian produced a thorough critique of the proposed maps and made many useful suggestions to the map-makers. In this his knowledge of the kinds of survey work that were possible in the course of military operations was valuable. Certain details or distinctions which the civil authorities thought necessary, he pointed out, were either unhelpful or unreliable; if it turned out that they were wanted, they could be provided more accurately when the operational need arose.

The fixation of minor points for the aerial survey became a major task which engaged Captain Nelson and most of Y Troop for nearly a month. This took them through rugged and interesting country which included Petra with its spectacular approaches through a series of ravines, and its temples and dwellings carved in sandstone cliffs, a ‘rose-red city’ indeed. Most members of the battery were able to visit Petra from Ma'an on recreation days, and also the ancient town of Tafile and the crusader castle at Kerak.

An apparent error in azimuth of 10 seconds at various points on the main net, detected by astronomical checks, led to much extra work. It was found to be caused by gravitational deflection of the bubble in areas near the great rift of the Dead Sea, the Jordan valley, and the Wadi el Araba—a rare phenomenon also observed by the civil survey department. In the end Major Stevens-Jordan decided to measure another check base near the northern end of the net near Amman, thereby completely checking the battery survey. The balance of Y Troop and Lieutenant Mawson
[7]and two men of X Troop moved for this purpose to Amman at the end of October, and they stayed there when they finished this job, pending a battery move to the Jordan valley.

Leaving men behind to finish work on the Naqb Ashtar deviation, Captain Park and 22 other members of X Troop meanwhile travelled post-haste to Safaga, on the Red Sea coast of Upper Egypt, to carry out contour surveys, ground control surveys for aerial photographic surveys, and other work related to several small ports and islands in that area, and also to establish bearing pickets for some anti-aircraft batteries. The urgency of this mission probably had something to do with fears that the Suez Canal might be rendered unusable by air action, thereby creating a need for further port facilities in the Red Sea. The hinterland was rugged in the extreme and Park's men had a formidable task converting this contorted ground into lines on a map. Their boots soon wore through and could not easily be replaced. They also co-operated with the Royal Navy in carrying out a hydrographic survey, in the course of which they discovered an excellent swimming pool at Hurghada.

The battery completed the major triangulation in Transjordan and moved to the Jordan valley early in November. Despite the many difficulties the New Zealanders achieved a very high standard of accuracy, average closures being less than three seconds per triangle. Pride on this account, however, was mingled with apprehension. Stevens-Jordan wanted the battery above all to end its detached role and become part of the New Zealand Division. If this proved unacceptable, he suggested in a report of 7 November, it might do counter-battery work (presumably at Corps level) and for this the recent experience of air survey and air-photographic interpretation would be valuable. A reputation for speed and accuracy in work of the kind just finished could lead to other similar tasks and frustrate Stevens-Jordan's ambition, which was warmly shared by his men. And indeed it had this effect.

section of map showing 36 survey battery's major triangulation work north of aqaba, november 1941

The new headquarters area was on the eastern side of the River Jordan, five miles north of the village of Shune on the road between Jerusalem and Amman. Topographical and trigonometrical data were incomplete in the Palestine maps for the land between the northern end of the Dead Sea and Tiberias on the Transjordan side of the river, and the task of the battery was to fill in these gaps, to the point of producing finished fair drawings for reproduction. The weather was fine and the work proceeded rapidly with no high winds to interrupt it.

Royal Engineer surveyors had failed to provide an acceptable alternative to the hairpin bends and grades as steep as 1 in 7 at Naqb Ashtar, and the X Troop detachment which took over from them had to display great skill and ingenuity to find a solution. In due course the New Zealanders succeeded in surveying a route with easy curves and an average gradient of 1 in 16. They pegged the six-mile route, drew plans and other details, and handed them over to the Royal Engineers. On 8 November they and the party which had been working on the Aqaba port area rejoined the battery in the Jordan valley.

The battery was still uneasily in search of an identity: its present work belied its name. Major Stevens-Jordan drove to Cairo early in December to discuss its future with the RE survey authorities, senior RA officers, and the new CRA of the New Zealand Division, Brigadier Weir. In the vast ill-mapped expanses of the Middle East Command there was plenty of map work to be done and the Royal Engineers were all for turning the battery into a non-divisional field survey company of the NZE. The RA people and Steve Weir had other ideas and the matter, to the great relief of Stevens-Jordan, was deferred for further consideration. The officers of the battery were nevertheless considered to be interchangeable with those of the NZE rather than the NZA. Captain Nelson, for example, marched out late in the month to Headquarters of British Troops in Egypt and was replaced by Captain Clark, [8] NZE. Minor detachments continued to fragment the battery. Second-Lieutenant Arthurs
[9] and two men, to cite one case, went to the Survey Directorate in Cairo to carry out computations to tie up the New Zealand trig chain from Amman to Aqaba with the South African chain in the latter area.

The Jordan valley was notoriously unhealthy, as the experience of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles in the First World War had shown, but strict precautions against malaria and other sickness and whole-hearted co-operation from the local director of army medical services [10] kept sick parades small. The Arab Legion escorts were careless in this respect and paid a heavy price for their neglect. In the second half of December the weather, however, was atrocious and caused the surveyors much trouble. The rain came down in torrents, washing bridges away, blocking roads, and bogging lorries. Men had to labour until midnight on one occasion before they could salvage a three-tonner caught in a flood in a wadi near Shune. Other vehicles could not be brought out of remote places until the waters subsided and some parties, unable to carry on their work in the pouring rain, had a hard job getting back to camp. Even Christmas dinner had to be postponed until Boxing Day because of floods. It was held in the Winter Palace Hotel in Jericho and representatives of the Transjordan civil service and the Palestine Police attended. A local dignitary, Hanna Bishara Effendi, spoke eloquently of his service in that area with the Anzac Mounted Rifles, and Raouf Al-Khateeb Effendi, a staff officer of the Turkish Army in this area in the First World War, happily reminisced with a later generation of New Zealanders.

Despite the bad weather the redrawing of the Palestine 1: 25,000 maps, Jerusalem Sub-District (to give them their correct designation), proceeded rapidly. In mid-January an RE company printed the sheets ‘Sweime’ and ‘Es Shune’ of this series from drawings finished to the last detail and beautifully hand-lettered by the New Zealanders. They were warmly complimented on their draughtsmanship. Three more sheets were ready for printing by the end of February and the remaining three were finished except for the contours. What held up the contouring, apart from scarcity of equipment, was that three detachments had concurrently to undertake plane-table contouring of various defence works in the Jerusalem-Jericho area. One such job entailed contouring 25 or more sheets on a scale of 1: 2500, a huge amount of work. In the course of February, too, field parties were sent out on preliminary ground control work in an area called Amman West to revise a 1: 50,000 series. A subaltern and eight men also marched out to Beirut with theodolites to help calibrate coast defence guns. Their task, like most others, turned out to be more complicated than they had been led to expect. They detected inaccuracies in the existing French survey of the area and had to correct them before the calibration shoot could take place.

a corner of the survey battery's sweime sheet in its 1: 25,000 series

The battery was hard-pressed to provide transport for these widespread tasks and the RE authorities were far from obliging in this matter. As Stevens-Jordan wrote to a CRE in February, ‘on every job we have done for the R.E., whether here or in Egypt, we have had the same difficulty in obtaining assistance with transport. I do not know whether to sympathise for the R.E. lack of transport or get angry for lack of co-operation, but in either case it is very discouraging, because we are quite keen to help you’. The detachment in Cyprus had the same trouble. There and elsewhere detachments also found the army authorities obstructive in other respects. Red tape abounded, survey detachments engaged on work of the greatest urgency were expected to conform to regulations which, had they heeded them, would seriously have delayed their work, and on many occasions they were even told to drop their work and take part in field exercises. This, of course, they refused to do; but much time was wasted arguing such points. The first Cyprus detachment had to wait five days after arrival before transport—on a meagre scale—was provided. The second detachment there waited more than three weeks and was then given four Indian motor-cycle combinations. These worked well enough for a day or two, then the rains came and they proved useless. Trucks which were then provided were scarcely better; they had been poorly maintained and saw more of the RAOC workshops from then onwards than they saw of the Cyprus roads. Even with improvised mud chains they found the winter conditions more than their failing strength could cope with. The warmth of Cypriot hospitality could not overcome the continual exasperations and frustrations experienced by the second detachment in its battles with intractable transport and Cyprus mud. The battery as a whole was trying to carry out its many tasks with half its war establishment of vehicles—and those who drew up the establishment lists had not envisaged a battery divided into many pieces operating so far apart.

Even the Safaga detachment (which was also desperately short of transport) had to be subdivided in March, when Captain Drummond
[11] and three others went to Aden to do artillery survey work, carry out ground control for an air survey of some 300–400 square miles of the rugged hinterland, and reconnoitre a similar area running back to the Yemen border as a preliminary to a triangulation extension. Drummond's party spent three weeks in the arid coastal plain, a region of spiky scrub and thin desert grass with water wells at 10-mile intervals. Features were hard to discern in this monotonous terrain and the intense heat shimmer made accurate readings difficult to obtain. The results of a 1931 survey were nevertheless confirmed within close limits and much information was added from various sources. Then the party moved into the back country with an interpreter and an Arab escort. The local sheiks were touchy about their rights within their areas of the protectorate and their permission had to be sought at every move. The transport provided could barely negotiate the main roads and tracks and the surveyors had many a laborious climb over sun-baked rock to heights of 4000 feet or more. In one remote spot a truck sank into a hole and badly bent its front axle, tie rod and drag link. But the drivers would not admit defeat. They brought the petrol cooker into use as a blowlamp and after five hours' toil in blazing sunshine they got the truck going again. At the end, early in May, the party had to move on to Cairo and carry out computations arising from the work at Aden.

Towards the end of March the battery moved to Aleppo and the headquarters staff and draughting rooms were established in flats or in the German barracks, with a field troop 15 miles north of Bab, north-east of Aleppo, and another south of Djerablous on the Euphrates River at the Turkish frontier. The task was again a map-making one and the battery hoped to find time to finish the fine drawings as before and get them printed by the Service Géographique in Beirut. This time, however, the facilities were far better than before. The latest American stereo-contouring machines—' Stereo-comparagraphs' and ‘Contour-finders’—were provided. They were new to the Middle East and the surveyors and draughtsmen had to teach themselves how to use them. The pamphlets supplied with the machines and some technical instructions from the survey directorate were helpful; but there was still much to learn. Six sheets of a 1: 50,000 series were to be prepared from a French 1: 30,000 series in colour, and quick, accurate work and up-to-date methods were essential. Aerial surveys were to be flown so as to provide overlaps of about 60 per cent in consecutive photographs along the line of flight. This would ensure that each point to be established would appear in at least two pictures and could be viewed stereoscopically. Captain Arthurs undertook to prepare detailed instructions and did so admirably. ‘Technical Instructions’ Nos. 1 and 2 were consequently issued to all surveyors and draughtsmen, and besides these Arthurs also compiled tables for obtaining the true bearing of Polaris in those latitudes at various times every night from May to December, a total of no fewer than 7656 computations.

These tables, too, were reproduced and issued to those who might need them. With such aids the battery made rapid headway. [12] But events moved even faster and late in May it was learned that the battery could not be spared long enough to complete the fair drawings, and that these would therefore have to be done in Beirut.

The New Zealand surveyors were glad to be working in Syria, where the Division was then stationed, and those in or near Aleppo had many pleasant encounters with their countrymen. At the same time the CRA was able to consider more carefully the requirements of his Divisional Artillery and to persuade the authorities concerned that the battery should become a part of it. The headquarters of 2 NZEF had been working on this matter and in mid-June a war establishment for an NZA survey battery appeared, a promising development. A less welcome one was that Major Stevens-Jordan was posted on 10 June to his former regiment, the 4th Field, to assume command of 25 Battery. The year he had spent with the Survey Battery had been profitable in all respects. The maps of what are now Jordan and Israel and of Syria owe much to his skill, resourcefulness and independence of mind, and to the high standards he demanded of his men. As he pointed out in a farewell message, it was constructive work, unlike ‘the usual job of an Army Unit, which is destructive’. The men were sorry to see him go, anxious on his account when the Division rushed into action in Egypt later in the month, and sad indeed when they heard of his death in the Alamein line. Major Kensington, who replaced him, had commanded 1 Survey Troop in its early days. [13]

For a brief period the battery came under the command of the New Zealand Division; but a message of 15 June 1942 abruptly ended this agreeable status. Various reconnaissances were undertaken at the end of the month to enable Y Troop to cross the Euphrates and begin work on the eastern side. Early in July work started by another survey unit was taken over and the battery now had to prepare nine sheets of the 1: 50,000 series, all of them abutting the Turkish frontier. All detached parties had by this time returned, the battery was at full strength, and the work progressed rapidly. The main impediment at this stage was the continuing shortage of transport, which limited the number of parties that could be maintained in the field. Despite this, all field work was finished by the end of September and the final traces of all but three sheets were complete. All field parties had moved on to a new area to carry out triangulation and a plane-table survey of about 4000 square miles of land south-east of Aleppo in the course of a revision of the ‘Ressafe’ sheet of the 1: 200,000 Levant series.

Interesting though this work was, the members of the battery wanted above all to join the Division, and it was therefore good news when on 17 October they were ordered to hand over the results of their current work on the Ressafe sheet, which was already half finished, to RE surveyors and they were given until the end of the month to complete their part of the 1: 50,000 series. They were to revert to RA control and as soon as possible start training for artillery flash-spotting. Major Drummond returned from Cairo on the 28th with the further good news that the battery was to move to the artillery depot at Almaza near Cairo on 2 November. Contour plotters and other equipment associated with the aerial survey were returned to Ninth Army and the gunners happily packed their vehicles for the journey south. Forty men left by train on 1 November and the road party left next day, staging at Baalbek, where a detachment of 25 members of the battery was still engaged in RA survey work. In the second week of the month the battery reorganised itself into survey and flash-spotting troops, the Baalbek detachment returned on the 15th, and training started in earnest. When it was learned that sound-ranging equipment was available the nucleus of a sound-ranging troop was formed. On the 25th 1 Survey Troop arrived from the Western Desert to join the battery. This troop had what it called a ‘wind-up dinner’ on the 29th to mark the ending of its independence and it was attended by Major Dawe and other former members. By the end of the month the battery had regrouped to form survey, flash-spotting and sound-ranging troops, equipment was coming to hand in satisfactory quantities, and training was well under way.

The routine was interrupted on 2 December by an order from the Division that the survey troop was to join it at once. Transport for the troop was hastily procured and it left on the 4th. Two days later a detachment of 12 men was attached to the 4th Durham Survey, RA, for experience in sound-ranging, while a meteorological section of five men trained with the RAF at Heliopolis aerodrome. This section was to take the place of the similar RAF section that in RA units would be attached to the sound-ranging troop. Orders arrived at the end of the month for the flash-spotting troop to join the Division as soon as possible and for the sound-ranging troop to do so, with battery headquarters, as soon as it completed its establishment in men, transport and equipment. A Troop, the survey troop, had meanwhile caught up with the Division in the far reaches of Cyrenaica in the course of a headlong pursuit of the retreating Axis forces. The new year therefore saw the battery on the threshold of new adventures in the role for which it had been intended when it left New Zealand.

[1]
Maj F. C. Rawle, ED; Auckland; born Auckland, 26 Jun 1905; assistant county clerk; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

[2]
Capt F. L. Park; born NZ 2 May 1893; resident engineer, Public Works Department; died Te Puia, 8 Aug 1963.

[3]
Maj G. W. Nelson, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Leeston, 8 Nov 1897; civil engineer; served on loan to the Royal Engineers, Jan 1942–Apr 1944, as Deputy Asst Director of Works (Designs Officer I), Royal Engineers, GHQ, MEF.

[4]
Capt A. E. Christian; Dunedin; born NZ, 3 Jun 1907; surveyor.

[5]
Gnr P. A. Hayman; Opotiki; born NZ 15 Jul 1918; grocer's assistant.

[6] A three-tonner carrying this party from Jerusalem to Ma'an on 1 October turned over in the Dead Sea area when a wheel struck a rock and the road gave way. Lance-Sergeant J. J. Green was pinned under the side and suffered head injuries and broken legs. He died next day; when he was buried at Ramleh on the 3rd the battery provided a detachment to act as pall-bearers. Other members of Christian's party suffered minor injuries.

[7]
Capt K. J. Mawson; Wellington; born Wellington, 17 May 1909; civil engineer.

[8]
Lt-Col C. Clark, m.i.d.; Wellington; born NZ 9 Aug 1906; civil engineer; OC (in turn) 10 and 13 Ry Constr Coys, 7 and 8 Fd Coys; wounded 28 Mar 1944; Chief Civil Engineer, NZ Railways.

[9]
Maj J. P. Arthurs; Rotorua; born Wellington, 25 Aug 1910; surveyor; Deputy Asst Director, Survey, HQ Allied Armies in Italy, 1944–45.

[10] Ample anti-malarial and other medical equipment was provided and the area DDMS also attached an ambulance car to the battery.

[11]
Maj R. G. Drummond, m.i.d.; Greenmeadows, Napier; born Carterton, 2 Dec 1904; County Council engineer; OC 36 Svy Bty, Sep 1942–Sep 1944.

[12] One diversion late in May was when Captain Arthurs was sent to Haifa to investigate an error reported to have been found in the work of the detachment which had helped to calibrate the coast guns. He soon discovered that the error was in the work of another survey unit and received a handsome apology from the authorities who had complained.

[13]
Kensington suffered ill-health for the next few weeks and was in and out of hospital. On 19 September he yielded command of the battery to acting-Major Drummond.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 14 — The Conquest of Libya

Contents

- [section]
p. 437

- Crossing Cyrenaica p. 438
- The First Left Hook p. 439
- The Action at Wadi Matratin
- The Second Left Hook: To Nofilia p. 445
- Lobs and Others on the Coast Route p. 448

- Christmas and the New Year by the Gulf of Sirte p. 449

- The Development of the Stonk p. 451
- Moving on towards Tripoli p. 452
- Beni Ulid p. 457
- The Difficult Approaches to Azizia p. 458
- Suani Ben Adem p. 461
- Tripoli p. 462

- The Parade for Mr Churchill and Other Events p. 463

- The Bofors Gunners Defend Tripoli Harbour p. 464

- Preparing for a Divisional Artillery Exercise p. 466

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

WHILE the Division rested near Bardia the enemy retreated rapidly westwards across Cyrenaica. Eighth Army captured Benghazi on 20 November 1942 and a week later the German-Italian army had fallen back to the highly-defensible bottleneck at El Agheila between impassable salt marshes and the sea.

Not all the New Zealand units rested: the ack-ack gunners, as usual, were much in demand. Four-engined bombers attacked Halfaya Pass on 15 November and next day 41 Battery deployed B Troop to defend it and A Troop to guard Sollum Pass. Royal Air Force aircraft, including many low-flying freight planes, flew over frequently; but from then onwards enemy aircraft kept away. The Bofors gunners cleared their gun areas, dug in their bivouac tents, salvaged equipment from the neighbourhood (including a 6-pounder), and some of them fished successfully with sticks of gelignite in the Gulf of Sollum. The mornings were bitterly cold. Another call for ack-ack support came from the Acroma area south of Tobruk, where army supply and service units provided attractive targets for enemy aircraft, and 42 Battery moved there on the 25th. [1]

December started with a unique event: a Divisional Artillery route march, with small arms, packs and water bottles. The CRA led the way and looked much fresher at the end of the 17½ miles than many of his gunners. A dribble of reinforcements in the next day or two—21, for example, for the 4th Field—was not nearly enough to make up losses in LIGHTFOOT and SUPERCHARGE, and when the units moved off with their usual brigades [2] on the 4th and 5th they were even weaker in numbers than they had been at the start of the Alamein offensive. For an advance that was expected to take them at least as far as Tripoli in a very short time this was a serious matter. Morale was nevertheless high. Mail and parcels from home had been plentiful at Bardia and the news of the landing of a British and American army in Algeria and Morocco and its subsequent fast progress towards Tunis was heartwarming. The tide was turning.

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen assumed command of the 14th Light Ack-Ack on 24 November, Bretherton reverting to his substantive rank of major to command the newly re-formed 25 Battery of the 4th Field. (Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow replaced Sprosen in command of the 5th Field.)

The 14th Light Ack-Ack diary gives the following score of enemy aircraft for the month: 1 Ju87 for certain and another ‘probable’ on the 3rd; 2 Me109Fs on the 5th; 1 Me109F just east of Sidi Barrani on the 11th and another ‘probable’.

[2] With 5 Brigade were the 5th Field, 32 Anti-Tank Battery, and from 6 December onwards 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery. With 6 Brigade were the 6th Field and 33 and 43 Batteries. Since 4 Brigade was back at Maadi training to become an armoured brigade, the rest of the artillery travelled with Divisional Headquarters as part of Divisional Group under the command of the CRA.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Crossing Cyrenaica

Crossing Cyrenaica

The route, after negotiating minefields in the Sidi Azeiz area, was along the Trigh Capuzzo, and for those who had served in the winter battles it was heavy with memories. The 4th Field had lunch opposite the ‘mosque’ of Sidi Rezegh and very close to the ground on which they had fought desperately against 15 Panzer Division on 1 December 1941. The 6th Field veterans felt many a pang as they drove past their fateful battleground of that same day and then camped for the night at El Adem. But much had happened in the intervening year and now they were part of a triumphant army which had finally turned the tables on a stubborn foe. The airfield at El Adem was packed with aircraft—Douglas and Lockheed transports, many Wellingtons, and some four-engined bombers. Beyond it the columns of vehicles turned inland and drove over smooth desert. Then came the grim battlefields of Knightsbridge and Bir Hacheim, intensely interesting to veterans and newcomers alike. None had seen them before and all were much moved by the defiles through endless minefields, the burnt-out vehicles, the hosts of derelict tanks (mostly Grants), and the graveyards, one of them marked by two large crosses and an old artillery piece in memory of Italian gunner officers buried there. It was a chastening experience.

The desert continued in its usual variety: patches of rough rock, soft sandy stretches, scrubland with myriads of little mounds, and vast gravel wastes. The route took the dusty lorries ever farther inland, away from earlier battlegrounds. For the 7th Anti-Tank (less the two detached batteries), however, the monotony was broken in the afternoon of 7 December when, by some misunderstanding connected with the temporary absence of the CO, the three columns of lorries, jeeps and other vehicles began to increase speed, the leaders each trying to keep abreast of the others. Each thought that one of the other two was officially setting the pace and the competition soon had the columns racing over rough desert at a bone-jolting and spring-shattering rate. The crews of portées were riding their 3-ton lorries like bucking broncos. Then reason prevailed and the columns slowed down to something like the proper eight miles in the hour.

North of Saunnu on the 8th the going deteriorated badly, but Artillery Headquarters nevertheless reached its immediate destination north of El Haseiat by evening and the remainder of the artillery arrived next day. It was a sullen region of open, rolling desert with very sparse vegetation and a liberal sprinkling of sharp rocks, damaging to tyres. The gunners settled down for two or three days of much-needed maintenance of guns and vehicles while high-level discussions and planning went on ceaselessly. The rocks were soon found to harbour countless scorpions and a gunner who struck a match while lying down at night in his ‘bivvy’ was apt to find two or three of them on the underside of the canvas only inches from his face.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The First Left Hook

The First Left Hook

The next move on the 11th started with soft sandy ground on which many trucks stuck and had to be towed out. Then there were several miles of smooth, firm desert followed by more soft patches which caused some gunners to spend more time pushing their lorries than riding in them. The final stage, however, was little short of perfection: white sand, firm and flat as a billiard table on which trucks seemed to glide in relative silence in top gear. The distance was about 40 miles. The rain came in the new area in the afternoon and continued throughout the night and the morning of 12 December—a depressing downpour which augured badly for the next stage of the journey. Here Captain Robinson
[3] of A (Survey) Troop of 36 Survey Battery caught up after a long drive from Amiriya and consulted the CRA. Brigadier Weir decided that there was little chance of using the troop in the immediate future and therefore sent it to Agedabia on the coast, together with 24 surplus vehicles from various units, to await the opening of the coast road through El Agheila. [4]

left hook at el agheila

Sappers had meanwhile been busy with bulldozers and explosives preparing a crossing of a difficult stretch of desert known as Chrystal's Rift—a succession of almost impassable patches of rock interspersed with extremely soft sand. It was such a formidable obstacle to the passage of a large force that the enemy expected no such ambitious outflanking move as the New Zealand Division, reinforced by 4 Light Armoured Brigade (with 26 Sherman tanks, four Grants and 15 Honeys), was now attempting. The route, wide enough for three vehicles abreast, wound whimsically through the Rift; but it was not nearly as difficult in the event as the gunners had been led to expect. The rain had added to the good work of the sappers by providing a crust on the soft sand just strong enough in most places to hold the weight of the lorries, and a further bonus was that no tell-tale clouds of dust attracted enemy aircraft. By the 14th the Division was safely through the Rift, having passed a point called the South Pole—the most southerly point, more than 50 miles from the coast at Marsa Brega. Beyond the Rift there were many wadis and rocky defiles and the morning of the 14th started with a thick fog. Somehow progress was maintained and the Division halted near what was called the Marada Track, though in fact it ran from Agheila through Marada and far beyond it to the south. There the gunners passed through ‘scanty defences prepared by the Italians’ (as the Headquarters diary puts it); but no enemy were seen on the ground or in the air.

The enemy was in fact withdrawing by degrees from the Agheila position and General Freyberg, anxious to cut off whatever forces he could, advanced the timetable. The Division carried on after dark on the 14th, along a route marked by hurricane lamps inside petrol tins with holes in them in the form of a fernleaf—the night-time equivalent of the diamond track. The going at first was atrocious, but it quickly improved. Halting before midnight, the Division pushed on north-westwards after breakfast on the 15th. The 4th Field, the 5th Field, the 7th Anti-Tank less 33 Battery, and 42 Battery plus A Troop of the 14th Light Ack-Ack were now all with 5 Brigade, which made it far stronger in artillery than 6 Brigade. Since the latter was forward and much more likely to become involved with the retreating enemy armour, this seemed a curious allocation of resources; but Freyberg was concerned about the vulnerable mass of divisional transport. With 4 Light Armoured Brigade were the 3rd RHA, a troop of the 64th Medium, and a troop of Royal Artillery Bofors.

The Division and the enemy rearguards were now driving along parallel lines with the former slightly in the lead and hoping to be able to cut northwards across the enemy's line of retreat. The situation was complicated by mistakes in navigation which took the Division farther west than was realised, and by a dearth of maps of the ground north-west of Marble Arch on which the guns would have to fight if contact were established. After dark on the 15th 6 Brigade pushed on towards the coast, unwittingly making for the Wadi Matratin (rather than Bir el Haddadia). Lieutenant-Colonel Walter went forward with the brigade commander and others and they came under close-range fire. A few tank shells and mortar and small-arms fire were directed at the brigade group and Gunner Andrews [5] of 30 Battery was killed. The ground was too hard to negotiate in the dark and the brigade deployed. Two battalions, each with a troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery, staged an attack on the ridge from which the firing took place and the battalion on the left made contact with two or three enemy companies which retreated in disorder. In the course of this encounter a J Troop gunner was wounded in the leg. The ground was almost solid rock and gun pits or trenches were out of the question.

Fifth Brigade also deployed in the dark, about six miles away, unwittingly leaving a gap through which enemy rear- guards could easily pass. With the help of three bulldozers lent by the sappers, gun pits were prepared for the 5th Field and the positions were occupied by 8 p.m. Some of the 4th Field guns remained on wheels, but everything possible was done to facilitate a quick deployment in the morning. The CRA was with Freyberg's small tactical headquarters, forward in the area of the armoured brigade, which was well dispersed. There was much uncertainty, Freyberg was worried, and Brigadier Weir went towards the coast road. He got to within two miles of the coast and it became clear to him that registration by night was impossible and that the guns would have to do the best they could when daylight came. On the latest information it seemed possible that the German Africa Corps with up to 100 tanks was trapped, in which case there would certainly be a hot fight in the morning.

wadi matratin, 15–16 december 1942

A Bofors approaching Matruh, November 1942

Continuing the pursuit: Sidi Barrani

B2 of the 6th Field climbs Sollum Pass

A Bofors on the road above Sollum

Winching a 4th Field gun up a slope in the course of the left hook round El Agheila

27 Battery at El Haseiat

The parade for Mr Churchill at Tripoli: 5th Field guns

6-pounder portées pass the saluting base

Assembling the guns before the parade

A 6-pounder in action in the Tebaga Gap

The 5th Field fires in front of Medenine

Armour attacking the Roman Wall. From a sketch made from a 5th Field listening post by C. Hansen

Plotting corrections on an artillery board near Takrouna

Jack Spring observes from a camouflaged quad near Takrouna

Building on Takrouna

Senior officers in Tunisia: Bill Philip, Roy Sprosen, ‘Snow’ Walter, Jack Mitchell, Steve Weir and ‘Gussy’ Glasgow

A ‘Pheasant’ at Maadi Camp—a 17-pounder mounted on a 25-pounder carriage

A class at the Artillery Training Depot (the 32nd Field), Maadi Camp. Bombardier T. Galloway is the instructor

A 5th Field gun firing on manoeuvres near Maadi, August 1943. The shell can be seen emerging from the smoke

High-platformed Austin 6-pounder portées of 34 Battery preparing to leave Maadi, September 1943

Artillery HQ officers outside the ACV near the Sangro: Ken Myers, Steve Weir, George Cade, Murray Sidey, Phil Norrie

Artillery HQ in the first engagement in Italy on the way to the Sangro

D. McKenna oils a 5th Field gun during a lull on the Sangro front

Operating a Bofors predictor near the Sangro: J. D. Howard, V. R. Vinsen and L. M. Pamment

A B Troop, 4th Field, gun firing from a muddy gun pit near the Sangro

A Bofors crew surveys the Sangro front

Steve Weir, Ike Parkinson and General Freyberg near the Sangro

An American 155 drives past on the snowy Orsogna front—from a painting by Russell Clark

An Air OP aircraft on the Orsogna front

Crossing the Sangro

A 5th Field troop command post during an Air OP shoot. The man on the left is watching for hostile aircraft, to warn the Air OP pilot. The signaller outside is in communication with the pilot. Another inside is in touch with BHQ by telephone. The GPO is F. H. Mullins and the Section Commander P. Hayden

[3]
Capt E. L. Robinson; Titirangi, Auckland; born Dunedin, 13 Feb 1905; civil engineer and surveyor.

[4] Lt N. D. Russel of the survey troop and his driver stayed with Artillery Headquarters.

[5]
Gnr W. D. S. Andrews; born Dunedin, 7 May 1913; watersider; killed in action 15 Dec 1942.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Action at Wadi Matratin

The Action at Wadi Matratin

The morning was indeed full of surprises for both sides. Soon after daylight a stray Pzkw III crossed the front of K Troop of 33 Battery at a range of 600 yards and the 6-pounders quickly destroyed it. The 6th Field had to deploy again when they found that enemy on high ground to the west overlooked the gun area at close range. Fire of many kinds was directed through the gun area: 88s, mortars and small-arms all joined in and the field gunners replied with direct and indirect fire. [6] Targets included enemy OPs and guns and many clusters of vehicles, all anxious to get out of sight. The main targets on the Via Balbia, however, could not be observed. The infantry failed to hold the only possible vantage point for the OPs and the bulk of the enemy managed to get away in the course of the morning. A final effort by the infantry with 25-pounder support gained a rise to the west about noon, but it was too late.

Though unable to bring down observed fire on the coast road, 6 Brigade was fairly near to it, while 5 Brigade was some miles away to the south-west and the 4th Field was rather isolated south-east of the latter and roughly south of 6 Brigade. The 5th Field guns were mainly on the western side of 5 Brigade, expecting to fire north-eastwards towards the coast, with OPs advanced accordingly. E Troop of 33 Battery had a sharp clash with tanks as soon as it got light enough to see, and in the course of this exchange an AP shot went through the gunshield of E2, wounding Gunner Dobbs. [7] The other guns of 32 and 34 Batteries were unhappily sited on the wrong flanks and found no targets. The 5th Field found a few targets, mostly well-dispersed vehicles at long range and rather elusive. One troop of 47 Battery fired about 40 rounds at transport; another fired 10 rounds. E Troop of 28 Battery engaged some 50 vehicles moving north at 9.50 a.m., but soon found that most of them were out of range. The enemy hastily departed and by 10.30 a.m. there was nothing at which the 5th Field could fire.

The 4th Field was close to a sizable enemy force at dawn. A wireless intercept had indicated that the enemy would move at 5 a.m. and the regiment therefore stood to. The first targets did not present themselves, however, until 8 a.m., when transport crossed the front at long range. Half an hour later 20 tanks seen moving west were hurried on their way by the 25-pounders. Soon after 9 a.m. 26 and 46 Batteries engaged 17 tanks, mostly Pzkw IIIs, and about 15 wheeled vehicles. Some of these approached from the left flank at a range of 4000 yards; others appeared closer at hand and were engaged both by indirect fire and over open sights. For the next half hour the 4th Field was busy. The enemy had evidently been probing to locate the New Zealand force, had discovered the gap in the front, and was now pushing through it at top speed. In 46 Battery Major McKay ‘shot’ the guns, then Captain Shortt, then Captain Hanna, and finally, from the top of the GE truck, Lieutenant White, [8] GPO of E Troop. At one stage a Major Douglas of the Royal Artillery, who was acting second-in-command of the 4th Field, [9] controlled the shooting of a troop of 46 Battery. Driving round the guns in his jeep he announced, ‘I have one bottle of gin left and will give it to the first No. 1 who hits a tank’. All tried hard, but none qualified for this gift.

The last firing by the 4th Field, at 10.50 a.m., was at 10,000 yards. After this it was evident that the prey had escaped. In the afternoon a perhaps over-cautious Freyberg called 6 Brigade in to the 5 Brigade area and the enemy was allowed to get right away and recover from the wild disorder into which many elements had been thrown by the morning engagement. It was a disappointing outcome to what had promised to be an exciting encounter. The gunners had hoped to do a good deal of damage. A troop of 34 Battery, with Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell, took part in a pursuit of the enemy by a mixed force from 5 Brigade; but the enemy was well clear.

[6] When 88s began bursting near the water truck of 33 Battery the imperturbable Gunner George Crawford descended from the cab, strolled to the back where some of the liquor acquired at Mersa Matruh was stored, and announced loudly but calmly to all within earshot, ‘I think that calls for a drink’.

[7]
Gnr W. H. Dobbs; Tauranga; born NZ 6 Jun 1904; baker; wounded 16 Dec 1942.

[8]
Capt K. J. White, MC; Wairoa; born Waipukurau, 9 Mar 1913; company secretary.

[9] Several RA officers were at this time attached to NZA units, partly for experience, partly to make up for the shortage of New Zealand gunner officers.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Second Left Hook: To Nofilia

The Second Left Hook: To Nofilia

So as to allow an early start on 17 December, the Division was allowed to light breakfast fires before dawn. To gunners used to pinpoint aiming lights only by night and an occasional furtive cigarette, it looked like the lights of a great city and was a reassuring sign of the dominance of the RAF. This time, after the armour, 5 Brigade led the way, but with its normal allotment of guns plus 34 Battery, the remainder reverting to Divisional reserve. It was thought that some 30 tanks and 5000 infantry might be holding a position on the coast at Nofilia, under 40 miles away in a straight line, but considerably farther by the proposed desert route. Nofilia itself was an old fort and a few other buildings some miles south of the road and had no particular significance. The object of the move was to get behind the enemy rearguard and cut off its retreat along the road.

It took some time to get the thousands of vehicles marshalled for the advance; but once they got well under way the leading ones soon made contact with the enemy. At 11 a.m. the 4th Field, travelling behind Divisional Headquarters, could see shellbursts ahead and Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart went forward, met the CRA, and was ordered to deploy the regiment. [10] At the same time Brigadier Weir called forward 211 Battery of the 64th Medium. It was not until the afternoon, however, that the 5th Field went into action. OPs went forward with 21, 23 and 28 (Maori) Battalions as the 5 Brigade infantry pushed northwards to cut off the enemy rearguard. They engaged transport on the coast road with uncertain results, for observation was difficult in the extreme. The sand was soft and deep and shells bursting in the many hollows near the road could not be seen. Each battalion had with it a troop of 32 Battery and all three troops came under considerable fire and had fleeting engagements. G Troop fired 30 rounds and drove off three tanks, two 88s, and a staff car, and H Troop fought a dangerous duel with an 88. The 6th Field provided a screen for the rear of the 6 Brigade columns and carried out some shooting in the early evening. As night approached the enemy seemed still firmly in possession of the Nofilia position and the guns, firing in bad light at long ranges, could do little to dislodge him. Major Bevan of 26 Battery of the 4th Field was, as usual, well forward and became the only gunner casualty of the action when he was wounded. B Troop of 211 Medium Battery is recorded as having fired tasks of two rounds gun fire on the road at 10 and 11 p.m., but the results could not be assessed. Apart from this the night was quiet.

outflanking nofilia, 17–18 december

Infantry had seized ground overlooking the road after dark and tried to cross the road. In the morning it seemed certain that the strong gun group would dominate the enemy's escape route. Since the enemy known to be still in the Nofilia area was estimated to consist of 20 tanks and 4000 infantry there was a confident expectation of lively action after dawn. But the enemy drove along a track between the road and the sea and in the morning there was not a sign of him. The 4th Field fired for a time at a German lorry, but it had already been abandoned. The action at Nofilia was thus even more disappointing than that at the Wadi Matratin. [11]

By this time the Division had travelled about 500 miles by map distance from Bardia and well over 600 according to the instruments on most vehicles. [12] All of this had been crosscountry and much of it pretty rough—by far the longest advance of its kind on record. At first the intention was to continue the pursuit; but, when the army situation—particularly regarding supplies—was reassessed, it was decided to leave the New Zealand Division at Nofilia for two or three weeks. Drivers, mechanics and artificers were therefore able to carry out urgently needed maintenance.

Within a day or two the regiments were disposed in areas within 10 miles of Nofilia. The gunners were told they would not move on until after the New Year and they soon turned their thoughts to rest and recreation. The whole area formerly occupied by the enemy was profusely mined, as were the verges of the roadside for many miles westwards. Schu-mines which, after being activated by trip wires, exploded in the air and scattered steel balls in deadly fashion were a particular menace. Beach parties had to keep strictly to routes that had been cleared.

At Nofilia, as an anti-tank gunner put it, ‘football was a big thing’. Almost every unit constructed its own football field. The anti-tankers did so by first clearing the scrub with picks and shovels, then driving portées backwards and forwards over the cleared ground, each portée dragging behind it a ‘sand channel’ with two or three men on it to provide the necessary weight—a kind of makeshift grader. The posts of a 4th Field football ground were the masts of a German ship bombed and wrecked off shore.

[10] Stewart travelled in a Honey tank with RSM Rex Bartley as the 37-mm. gunner and in the late morning they fired a few rounds against retreating tanks.

[11] Casualties in the actions at Wadi Matratin and Nofilia were 1 wounded in the 4th Field, 2 killed in the 6th Field, 1 wounded in the 7th Anti-Tank, and 1 wounded in the 14th Light Ack-Ack.

[12] The total mileage of 47 Battery since leaving Bardia, for example, was recorded on 17 December as 634.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Lobs and Others on the Coast Route

Lobs and Others on the Coast Route

The LOB party and A (Survey) Troop of 36 Battery had meanwhile been travelling along the coast road. From the Haseiat area it had driven past huge RAF and American Army Air Force installations to a bivouac near the poor town of Agedabia. There the gunners awaited news of the operations to open the Agheila bottleneck, and in due course were ordered to rejoin the Division by way of the coast road. They drove past the salt marshes which gave the position its strength. Mines and booby traps were everywhere and in one flat stretch of desert the wind had uncovered dozens of rows of Teller mines in geometric patterns. Traffic on the road was extremely heavy as they approached Marble Arch, a huge marble landmark visible for many miles. Gingerly they helped themselves to rations from a deserted German dump. New Zealand sappers were still busy clearing mines from the landing ground at Merduma as the gunners passed. They reached Divisional Headquarters on 21 December, Captain Robinson reported to the CRA, and the LOB personnel returned to their units. (The CRA also welcomed this day the Topographical Section of 46 South African Survey Company.)

A more adventurous journey was that of a detachment of four men, Bombardier Gauntlett
[13] and three others of the 5th Field. They had been travelling in the truck Q5 of 28 Battery on 13 December when it blew a gasket. Help was promised, but it did not come: instead they were joined by two gunners of the 14th Light Ack-Ack whose truck was disabled nearby. Next day they removed the ‘head’ of the engine and found it was badly cracked. An English soldier then arrived. His truck, too, had broken down, and when they inspected it they found it was beyond repair and its parts were not interchangeable with their own. But they did find a tin of shellac and with this tried to seal the crack, waiting overnight for it to dry.

Next morning they started their motor, but again it failed. They then set out, one man towards each of the four cardinal points of the compass, and a fifth remaining with Q5 and firing flares at hourly intervals to help them maintain direction.

Gauntlett found a Chevrolet with a faulty gearbox three miles away and returned to Q5 to await the other three. In the afternoon they were joined by two jeep-loads of Special Air Service troops, who stayed the night and were convivial, but otherwise unhelpful.

On the 16th the six men removed the gearbox from Q5 and carried it to the abandoned Chevrolet. There they worked on into the night by the light of a trouble lamp to effect a changeover. In so doing they discovered that the clutch, clutch housing and flywheel were also defective, and next day they returned to Q5 to get these parts. All were in due course transferred, and two hours after dark on the 17th they finally got it working. Then there was trouble with the fan belt. By this time they were desperately short of water and rations were low. Gauntlett, trying to fire a Very pistol to attract the attention of a passing vehicle, suffered a painful burn to his hand. The vehicle did not stop.

Early on the 19th they set off, trying at first to tow the disabled ack-ack truck; but this proved too great a strain. The radiator of another derelict provided five gallons of water and from this they gladly made tea. The party eventually reached the coast road, drove past Marsa Brega on the 21st, and reached the 14th Light Ack-Ack lines on the 23rd. There the 5th Field men were hospitably received, and it was 10.30 a.m. on Christmas Eve when they reached their own lines.

[13]
Bdr S. K. Gauntlett; Waitemata; born Eltham, England, 1 Apr 1912; motor driver.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Christmas and the New Year by the Gulf of Sirte

Christmas and the New Year by the Gulf of Sirte

Two troops of guns, one from the 5th Field and one from 34 Anti-Tank Battery, moved westwards from Nofilia on 20 December with the Divisional Cavalry to the area of Sultan, halfway to the little town of Sirte. There, among other tasks, they covered a sapper detachment which was clearing mines from the roadsides and the Sultan landing ground. The 5th Field gunners were glad when the sappers were recalled on the 24th and they returned with them in time to have their Christmas dinner with their own unit. The gunners of O Troop of 34 Battery stayed in the Sultan area with the Cavalry; but they were not forgotten. A jeep arrived on Christmas morning laden with food, including turkey, and with much mail from home.

Christmas fare was splendid, except for a shortage of beer caused—so the gunners were told—by the sinking of a shipload of NAAFI stores. RHQ of the 7th Anti-Tank had constructed a messroom by excavating the side of a steep sandhill, building up the other side with timbers salvaged from the beach, rusty sheets of corrugated iron, and other materials, and roofing it with tarpaulins and canvas. In it the members of RHQ enjoyed their Christmas dinner on decorated tables and also a festive New Year's Eve dinner.

After Christmas efforts were made to complete the Absolute Calibration of a Standard Gun as a preliminary to the calibration of all the 25-pounders. A 46 Battery gun was chosen, a meteorological section arrived from Corps, and four OPs were stationed along the coast to observe the fall of shell at sea. All seemed to be going well; but after much work with logarithms checking the results it was found that the original data were wrong. All therefore had to be resurveyed and bad weather delayed this work. It was not until 3 January 1943 that the Absolute Calibration was finished and then bad weather again intervened. On 5 January the 5th Field hastily carried out its Comparative Calibration and in the afternoon moved to join 5 Brigade in an airfield construction task some 30 miles southwest of Sirte. The 32nd Anti-Tank Battery had already moved with the infantry on 1 January and Major Aldridge's 42 Battery gave ack-ack support. The 5th Field's share was to provide 25 lorries and 300 men.

The work had at first been most unpleasant because of sandstorms and then, on the 5th, the working parties were attacked by eight Me109Fs. Three Bofors engaged them, E1, E4 and E5, and fired 48 rounds, but did not hit any of them. Ten infantry were killed and some 35 wounded. Next day it was a different story. More than a dozen Me109Fs came over and 42 Battery engaged them at once and much more accurately. Sergeant Harris
[14] of D5, claimed four hits on one plane and two other aircraft were seen to crash. Gunner Newman
[15] of 42 Battery was killed by a bomb splinter and another gunner was wounded. The Messerschmitt pilots were taught a lesson, and when they came over again late in the afternoon they kept higher and there were no New Zealand casualties. On the 7th 10 Me109Fs made a direct dive-bombing attack on the Right Section of D Troop and the Left Section of E Troop, which were guarding a corner of the airfield, but the reception they got daunted the German pilots and they veered off without harming the guns or the crews. About 1 p.m. a dozen more Messerschmitts came over and all but three guns of 42 Battery engaged them. (They did not get within range of E2, D4 had a broken rammer spring, and E7 had suffered a misfire.) A third attack late in the afternoon was not pressed home and the Messerschmitts stayed mainly out of range of the Bofors. E5 nevertheless claimed a hit and two aircraft were seen to crash. By this time Spitfires and Kitty-hawks were operating well forward and the combined efforts of the ack-ack gunners and fighter aircraft caused the enemy to cease his attacks on the 2000 men labouring to construct the airfield.

The trickle of reinforcements continued while the Division was at Nofilia and there were many changes in all units. Some officers and NCOs were sent back to Base to train the next major reinforcement draft from New Zealand. Others were selected to form the nuclei of four troops to be equipped with a new and far more powerful anti-tank gun, still highly secret: the 17-pounder. At the same time F Troop of 32 Battery, which had been disbanded in July 1942, was reconstituted, entailing a considerable reshuffling of personnel in the 7th Anti-Tank. At long last, too, some HE ammunition arrived for the 6-pounders and it prompted an experiment with indirect fire by these guns. A sun compass was converted to give the line and a field clinometer gave the elevation. Major Nicholson of 31 Battery conducted a shoot, then Colonel Mitchell, and finally Brigadier Weir.

[14]
Sgt A. N. Harris; Lower Hutt; born Nelson, 15 Feb 1912; butcher; wounded 21 Oct 1944.

[15]
Gnr G. H. Newman; born NZ 24 May 1916; plasterer; killed in action 6 Jan 1943.

Major Aldridge was wounded by a Bofors shell which exploded on hitting the ground nearby; but he was not badly hurt and stayed with the battery.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Development of the Stonk

The Development of the Stonk

The stay in Nofilia is chiefly memorable, however, for an important development in field artillery tactics, foreshadowed by methods used in the Middle East School of Artillery, in training in Syria, and in action in the Alamein line. The first mention of this in the war diaries is by the 6th Field on 4 January, which states that that regiment practised ‘the “STONK” procedure’ and ‘also Quick Barrages’. Mobile warfare in the desert clearly called for methods quicker and more flexible than those formerly employed by the Royal Artillery. The field gunners wanted to cut fire orders to the barest minimum so as to permit effective fire against fleeting opportunity targets and to guard against sudden attacks, perhaps from unexpected quarters.

The essence of the stonk was that, at the divisional level, a target 1200 yards long and 300 yards deep could be engaged at extremely short notice. The regiments and batteries knew exactly what was expected of them so long as they were given the centre of the stonk area and the bearing of the long side. The elaborate reformulation of orders at each link as they descended along the chain of command, which was the orthodox method, became unnecessary. Once the method became widely understood many refinements were added to save even more time. Bombardier Gallagher
[16] of 29 Battery of the 6th Field, for example, an M.Sc. with honours in mathematics, designed a special template or protractor for use on the artillery board. It contained a hole which fitted over the stonk centre point and from it the area on which the battery had to fire could at once be marked on the sheet of talc which covered the map. In a matter of seconds, given the point and bearing, the line and range of individual guns could be called out. To facilitate coverage of the target area the 25-pounder troops got into the habit of occupying gun lines so laid out—where the ground permitted—that the first and fourth guns were 150 yards apart and the two-troop batteries covered the 300 yards normally allotted to them in the stonk area. Similarly a standard barrage of 10 lifts which could be brought down quickly was worked out and practised and for this, too, Gallagher designed an ingenious protractor. [17] Both methods became widely used, not only by the New Zealand gunners, but by the gunners of Eighth Army and, in the end, of much of the British Army.

[16]
Lt C. V. Gallagher; Christchurch; born Taihape, 30 Sep 1918; schoolteacher; wounded 13 Aug 1942.

[17] Some of these details are from an account by Captain J. H. Fullarton, who was then CPO of 29 Battery.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Moving on towards Tripoli

Moving on towards Tripoli

The Division, less 5 Brigade, began assembling in the desert south of Nofilia in the first week of January and on the 9th it moved off westwards. An elaborate exercise to lay out an antitank gun line on the right flank to guard against a hypothetical tank attack gave the gunners plenty of hard work digging gun pits and trenches and camouflaging them. All went well.

The next event was the crossing of the Wadi Tamet on 12 January, which meant driving slowly and uncomfortably through a rocky defile. Air attack was a serious danger for this phase and the RAF was asked to lend support. The guns of 41 and 42 Batteries had already gone forward and some of them, after much manhandling, were sited high on rocky eminences. Their crews waited patiently, but no enemy aircraft appeared and they did not fire. The route was very rough in parts, but the

Division negotiated it safely. During the day, too, Brigadier Parkinson, recently returned from New Zealand, joined Artillery Headquarters as an observer for the advance to Tripoli.

After a 17-mile journey on the 13th, the Division continued on partly by day and partly by night. The Divisional Cavalry and 34 Anti-Tank Battery reconnoitred ahead, followed by the armoured OPs of field batteries, particularly 26 Battery of the 4th Field. General Freyberg himself travelled well forward in his Honey tank. Starting about two hours before dawn on the 15th, the Divisional Cavalry had worked partly round the southern flank of a strong enemy force by first light. It was broken country, criss-crossed by wadis, and offered good cover for the defence. N Troop of 34 Battery, leading with A Squadron, suddenly came under fire from machine guns and one or two 50-millimetre anti-tank guns sited among three ‘pimples’ rising up from the flat coastal strip to the right front. The portées, threading their way up and down steep sandy slopes in the foothills with their engines roaring, were highly vulnerable and had the enemy held his fire he could not have missed them. The leading portée hastened into the shelter of a little hollow with bullets showering stones over it from the crest. Calmly the gun sergeant, McIntyre, [18] studied the ground, assessed the situation, saw there was no way out that was not under enemy observation, and backed the portée up to the top of the rise. With its gun pointing towards the three knolls, it then drove back and rejoined the other portée of the section. This then engaged the knolls and scattered enemy on the crests, almost certainly destroying a 50-millimetre gun. B Squadron and O Troop then worked their way round the left flank. They, too, came under fire and, responding to it, knocked out between them an armoured car, and O Troop also destroyed a half-tracked troop-carrier. B Squadron then withdrew; but the anti-tankers, N and O Troops, decided to brew some tea first, after a rather nerve-tingling few hours. In the midst of it enemy transport appeared and they manned their guns in a hurry. Then tanks of the Royal Scots Greys suddenly appeared on the scene at close range and caused some of the anti-tankers a few heart-stopping moments until they were identified as friendly. It was a tricky situation, full of surprises for both sides. P Troop with C Squadron came under fairly heavy shelling and a sergeant was wounded.

from nofilia to tripoli

Opposition was evidently stiffening and the CRA, who also travelled well forward, called up the two remaining batteries of the 4th Field (26 Battery was already under Cavalry command) and 211 Medium Battery. [19] The ground was too broken, however, for these guns to make much progress until the enemy relinquished his hold on the better ground to the right front, towards which 7 Armoured Division was pushing. With difficulty 26 Battery managed to get into position and open fire towards the end of the afternoon and by dark it had fired 193 rounds, while 46 Battery got away three. In this and similar engagements entailing skill and determination to pave the way for a Divisional advance, the esteem in which 34 Battery already held the Divisional Cavalry, with which it had collaborated in Greece and in many another desert operation, was increased. The anti-tankers had many friends in the capable and enterprising squadrons.

During the night 15–16 January Brigadier Weir formed a gun group consisting of the 4th and 6th Field and 211 Medium Battery, RA, with ack-ack support from 41 Battery (less a section) and 43 Battery, to operate in direct support of the Divisional Cavalry and the Greys. Weir took a small tactical headquarters forward to control them.

The next likely source of trouble was the Wadi Zemzem, but only its steep sides, demolitions and several suspected minefields caused delay on the 16th. It was not until the late afternoon, some 35 miles farther to the north-west, approaching Sedada by the Wadi Nfed, that the enemy offered opposition. Until then the advance had been exhilarating. The Divisional Cavalry and 34 Battery, followed by the 6th Field with 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery, were on the right and the Greys followed by the 4th Field and 41 Battery on the left. Behind them the Division spread out in an enormous mass of bouncing and jolting transport. The vegetation varied from low camel-thorn to chest-high bushes and here and there enemy stragglers were picked up. [20]

The pace was often set by General Freyberg himself and it was a fast one. On an occasional stretch of smooth dried mud the lorries and staff cars drove at full speed and the medium tanks were left far behind.

Suddenly black mushrooms of smoke sprouted among the leading carriers and Honey tanks on the right approaching the Wadi Nfed, and they quickly drew back behind cover to await the main body. The 4th and 6th Field quickly deployed and began to return the fire. Enemy tanks could be seen from time to time and the ruins of a great mediaeval castle gave the enemy excellent observation. Stukas soon arrived on the scene and circled high overhead; but the Bofors of 41 Battery quickly engaged them, splattering the sky with puffs of dark smoke. They stayed high and their bombing was ineffective. The reconnaissance group outside the ack-ack umbrella, however, received careful and leisurely attention from the escorting Messerschmitts, which came down almost to ground level, bombing and strafing the portées and armoured cars, though with little effect.

The enemy departed overnight and in the morning the Division wound its way slowly through the steep-sided defile surmounted by the massive ruins. Stukas came again, but this time they bombed 7 Armoured Division to the right rear. Once through the wadi the leading elements advanced rapidly, first through a curious landscape of grassy knolls sprouting small shrubs and short, distorted trees and then over a flat plain broken by areas of low sandhills, with here and there sticky patches of very soft sand. Away to the left the tanks of the Greys and their A Echelon trucks immediately behind them came under slight shelling from tanks in a low line of hills to the south-west. Then the columns halted for half an hour while the Shermans dashed into the hills and dispersed this opposition. The flat land merged into broken terrain inhabited by groups of poor Arabs whose ragged encampments marked cultivated patches of ground. Then came some ruins and the vanguard halted for the night not far from a gaunt Roman watch tower. The gun group behind, however, was savagely dive-bombed at 4 p.m. Two of the 4th Field and three of the 6th were killed, and three of the 4th Field and five of the 6th (including two officers) were wounded. [21] The Division halted for the night about 25 miles short of the next major obstacle, Beni Ulid, having driven 40–50 miles this day.

[18]
Sgt T. A. A. McIntyre; Plimmerton; born Wellington, 25 Mar 1913; salesman.

[19] This battery also fired this day. On 14 January the 94th Heavy Ack-Ack, RA, came under the CRA's command and supplied a battery to each of 5 and 6 Brigades and the Divisional Group. A battery of the 42nd Light Ack-Ack, RA, was also supposed to come under the CRA for this advance, but there is no confirmation in the NZA records that it did so.

[20] One of these, an Austrian, climbed aboard one of the leading 6-pounder portées and made himself so useful to the crew, cooking, cleaning dixies, and doing whatever else he could, that they kept him overnight and were sorry—as he, too, seemed to be—when an irate Cavalry 1O arrived next day to claim him.

This day, 16 January, 48 Battery captured a German officer and 15 other ranks.

[21]
Bdr W. Barnett and Gnr R. M. O'Brien of the 4th Field were killed and also Gnrs C. V. Clery, R. C. Crook and R. E. Thurston of the 6th Field.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Beni Ulid

Beni Ulid

Only those who have operated a pneumatic drill continuously for a whole day can know what the gunners felt like when they halted on the 18th. The surface of the desert was rough and thickly sprinkled with volcanic rocks of an average size of perhaps two house bricks but far less regular in shape. After hours of driving over this many gunners were battered into a sort of semi-coma, and when the rolling plateau in mid-afternoon disclosed in the distance what looked like a fairy city they did not believe their eyes. Embroidered across several hilltops, it seemed from afar to cover a large area and to comprise buildings which looked like illustrations from the Arabian Nights. Closer inspection was less flattering to Beni Ulid; but it was still a welcome sight. It turned out to be a sizable oasis, set below the level of the surrounding desert and supporting plantations of date palms and olives and much other greenery. The buildings clustered tightly together on higher ground. Some of them were modern and there were steel-girder ‘windmills’ among them to pump water.

Much confusion had been caused on the 17th when 7 Armoured Division veered across the New Zealand Division's front. Now there was much more: Beni Ulid was truly a bottleneck, much obstructed by mines and demolitions and by the difficult nature of the terrain. The sappers had a busy time. Meanwhile on the way to Beni Ulid, 29 Battery captured 14 prisoners from a German tank regiment, destroyed five armoured cars and two lorries, and salvaged two more lorries that were in better order. Captain Nathan of A Troop of the 4th Field also took four prisoners.

Air attack would be a constant menace to columns of vehicles passing nose-to-tail through the oasis and town, and 41 Battery and 261 Heavy Ack-Ack Battery were therefore established as area defence. The air, however, remained mercifully free of enemy aircraft. B Squadron of Divisional Cavalry, with O Troop of 34 Battery, got through on the 18th, and then 6 Brigade with attached artillery passed through by day or early evening of 19 January. The rest of the Division followed later, in brilliant moonlight. By day or by night, it was a memorable passage, if slow and irritating at times. Night-time softened the shabbiness of the buildings, and the barking dogs with their implication of human ownership and family life were in stark contrast to the lonely emptiness of the hundreds of miles of desert through which the gunners had travelled. Once through the gate in the town wall which was the exit, they felt that the desert war was in some sense behind and that the future held better things for them.

The route beyond Beni Ulid followed a white-powdered road for a dozen miles through hilly country with many cliffs. In the plain beyond this broken country 6 Brigade fanned out into open fields while the Cavalry reconnoitred forward. Large parties cleared mines from the road and verges. Just off the road a burning ‘88’ and tractor was sending a column of black smoke into the air. To the west lay a range of hills and to the north-east grassy plains, a welcome change.

The Division seemed likely to have to co-operate in an attack on Tarhuna to open the way to Tripoli and the Cavalry pushed on towards there. When news came that Tarhuna was clear of the enemy the town was left to 7 Armoured Division on the right and the Cavalry veered south-westwards towards Garian, from which another main route ran to Tripoli. The immediate destination was the settlement of Tazzoli, 10 miles south of Tarhuna. Every house in Tazzoli flew a white flag and the place was packed with Italians, all anxiously hospitable. To the north the armoured division shelled the hills ahead and airbursts flowered over its vehicles. To the rear 5 Brigade passed through 6 Brigade before the Division halted for the night.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Difficult Approaches to Azizia

The Difficult Approaches to Azizia

Working across tangled country, the Cavalry at 3 a.m. on 21 January found a possible short cut over the last range of hills which fell away abruptly to the plains of Tripoli and the sappers laboured to open it. They were still working on it when the leading Cavalry squadron with its troop of 34 Battery portées began to mount the steep and winding slopes on what had previously been no more than a footpath. General Freyberg soon appeared on the scene, riding on a palliasse tied to the front of his Honey tank. Overtaking the portées, which were straining in bottom gear, he waved them urgently on. This put one driver, Cliff Dorne, [22] on his mettle and with a rapid succession of skilful gear changes he managed to overtake the General's tank. As he did so the gun crew stood up on the back and waved the General on, causing his grim, dust-covered face to break into a smile.

There was every reason to hasten. The Division would be vulnerable as it defiled on to the plains below until an antitank gun line could be established and the field guns could get forward in support. The leading squadron was edging down the treacherous slopes and the crest of the pass behind it was a mass of vehicles when Stukas made a sudden appearance and dropped their bombs. Some of these fell near C Troop of the 4th Field, but did no harm, some were directed at 34 Battery portées but exploded on the far side of a gully, and the rest landed on the hillsides well away from the transport. Sherman and Grant tanks of the Royal Scots Greys squeezed past the lorries and descended to the plains. The portées followed and quickly fanned out to guard against interference from 40 enemy tanks reported to be in the neighbourhood. At this stage 34 Battery came under the command of the Greys. No German tanks appeared, but four 88s apparently directed from the white battlements of Azizia covering the approaches to Tripoli, opened accurate fire on the tanks and portées. For the latter the going was extremely difficult and it took several hours to deploy the 6-pounders in soft sandy country. Then the tanks moved on without warning and the anti-tankers followed as best they could. At one pause an anti-tanker renowned for his courage was strolling from his portée to the next and had reached halfway between them when four 88s burst almost simultaneously around him at very close quarters. The deep sand muffled the explosions and saved him from physical injury, and to the onlookers it seemed miraculous when he walked out from the midst of the cloud of sand and smoke. But his nerve was shattered and from then on he was a different man. Fighter-bombers straddled the distant hillsides; but the 88s continued to fire.

The field batteries found it even harder to deploy and it was not until late afternoon that 26 Battery and 211 Medium Battery opened fire. The 26th fired 11 rounds and, with the medium guns, destroyed one gun and a truck.

The Divisional Cavalry and the Greys, with 34 Battery, continued to push forward on the 22nd to find a route suitable for the rest of the Division and to push back the enemy. Behind them the field guns also advanced slowly. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart of the 4th Field established an OP in the afternoon from which he could engage the Azizia area. He spotted a gun and some vehicles and with accurate fire soon drove them away.

Major Moodie of 26 Battery observed gun flashes near Azizia and brought down fire ‘with good effect’, according to the regimental diary. By nightfall the 4th Field had fired 1305 rounds and 211 Battery about 300. Return fire had been sporadic and largely ineffective; but it wounded one man of 25 Battery and two men of 46 Battery.

In mid-afternoon of the 22nd the portées of N and O Troops of 34 Battery were suddenly taken forward and interspersed with tanks of the Greys—about a dozen Shermans and four Grants. This force then advanced over knolls 50—60 feet high and so close together in places that the portées had to drive over the crests at a walking pace, in full view of the enemy at Azizia. Four 88s near this white-walled fortress guarding the approaches to Tripoli engaged the tanks, and several enemy tanks also fired. The anti-tankers on the struggling portées felt naked and exposed. One tank burst into flames, then another. A third tank had its 75-millimetre gun shot away and the rest suddenly disappeared, taking up hull-down positions out of sight of the anti-tankers. The eight portées were thus trapped among the knolls, for with no tanks to attract enemy fire they dared not appear on the crests. The 88s had the whole area ‘taped’ and were quick to engage any targets offering. [23] Frey-berg and Weir strolled up one knoll just in front of the portées and had scarcely begun to raise their binoculars when four shellbursts almost at their feet caused them to scuttle down out of sight of the enemy at Azizia. Accurate airbursts followed them.

To the rear the Division continued to debouch slowly from the hills, creating an enormous congestion of vehicles. Infantry of 5 Brigade advanced through the Cavalry screen in the evening and the brigade guns and transport followed. They came up against a strong position, resolutely held, however, and withdrew behind the Cavalry. The enemy was expected to withdraw soon and there was no point in inviting losses at this stage.

[22]
Sgt C. H. Dorne; Ohau, Levin; born Lower Hutt, 31 Mar 1914; farmer; wounded Dec 1941.

[23] The two days 34 Battery spent under command of the Greys could not be considered ‘as satisfactory in any way’, according to the battery commander, Major W. C. Savage. They further emphasised the lack of co-operation between armoured and unarmoured units of the British army. Savage, in a report appended to the unit war diary, is scathing in his comments. He says of the officers of the Greys that they ‘did not appear in the slightest degree interested. Sqn. Commanders in particular, completely ignored Troop Commanders and passed no information’. He recommended more training with armoured units ‘if only to enable us to make a guess at some of their intentions and requirements’.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Suani Ben Adem

Suani Ben Adem

Dawn on 23 January, eagerly awaited, disclosed a quiet front with no sign of enemy. The Cavalry reconnoitred towards Azizia and soon found it to be unoccupied. The Shermans of the Greys followed impressively and the Divisional transport streamed after them along a good road. After days of crawling along in bottom gear with engines roaring it seemed like a dream. Passing the white buildings of Azizia the troops saw that Arabs had already taken advantage of the absence of their former masters and had carried out a thorough looting of property, while the few remaining Italians gazed apprehensively at what seemed to them a huge display of military power.

The road beyond Azizia headed straight for Tripoli, but the Division did not go more than halfway to that long-dreamt-of city and did not share the triumph of actually capturing it. British armour was already cutting across the front of the Division to continue the pursuit of the enemy and had already reached the dilapidated village of Suani Ben Adem, where the New Zealand Artillery units halted.

The CRA's tactical headquarters kept off the road until late afternoon and then drove for 25 miles to within a mile of Suani Ben Adem. About 100 yards west of the road Brigadier Weir established his headquarters in a lucerne paddock surrounded by tall trees, and in due course all regiments concentrated in the neighbourhood under his command. It was a region of flea-infested paddocks, ploughed fields, and many water-wells which harboured millions of mosquitoes. Next morning many badly-bitten gunners consulted their quartermasters and made their first acquaintance with DDT powder. RHQ of the 7th Anti-Tank, however, had no complaints. It parked in a ‘well sheltered orange grove … a delightful spot after the desert’, according to the war diary. And RHQ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack had an ‘Excellent area in grounds of a private house’. The 5th Field parked among trees near the village: in the long advance from the Gulf of Sirte this regiment had not once deployed its guns. The 6th Field stayed overnight with 6 Brigade and did not reach the concentration area until the 24th.

Maintenance of guns and vehicles was now the first consideration and the next was to build up supplies by land and sea to enable the New Zealanders and the Highland Division to join the pursuit of the enemy towards Tunis. The resources of

Eighth Army were badly overstretched and a stay of several weeks in the Tripoli area was to be expected. A faint possibility existed that the enemy might make some sort of riposte, and C Troop of 31 Anti-Tank Battery and H Troop of 32 Battery therefore reinforced road-blocks set up by 5 Brigade on the south-western approaches to Tripoli. The 6th Field and 33 and 43 Batteries had to move to the area of the town of Bianchi, some 20 miles south-west of Tripoli, on the 25th and there they again came under the command of 6 Brigade. These rearrangements, however, were only temporary and by 2 February these guns returned to the Suani Ben Adem area.

The survey troop of 36 Survey Battery, now called X Troop, carried out astro-fix training in the evening of the 24th. Next day it was joined by S (Flash-Spotting) Troop under Captain Allison. [24] This troop had left Almaza on 3 January and had travelled by road until the middle of the month, then, after some trouble, had caught up with the administrative tail of the Division. Battery Headquarters, leaving Almaza on the 21st, had a much quicker journey, travelling by road through Benghazi and Tripoli and joining S and X Troops at Suani Ben Adem on the 30th—1500 miles in 10 days. R (Sound-Ranging) Troop stayed at Almaza to complete its training.

Except for the sound-ranging troop of the Survey Battery, therefore, by the end of January the whole of the Divisional Artillery was for the first time concentrated in one area under the CRA's command. Gunners—and particularly gunner-officers, most of whom had served in more than one unit—took advantage of this unique situation to visit friends in other units. There was much reminiscing, often aided by plentiful supplies of Tripoli ‘plonk’, usually a raw purple wine. A 4th Field party visiting the 7th Anti-Tank found that it was being served with wine direct from the 200-gallon tank on the water truck. By the end of the month leave to Tripoli began.

[24]
Capt H. T. M. Allison; Rotorua; born Brighton, England, 8 Jun 1914; public servant; OC S Tp, 36 Svy Bty, Dec 1942-Jun 1943.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Tripoli

Tripoli

To go on leave, gunners were issued with rations (because of the food shortage in the city) and British military currency, all in paper notes down to the value of a shilling. The exchange rate was 400 lire to the pound sterling, but the lowest note fixed the price of the cheapest articles on sale in the battered city, which therefore soon became known as Bobtown.

At first the long city streets were almost empty of Italians and there was nothing but trinkets and tourist souvenirs to buy, with vast quantities of razor blades. It was only round the harbour that bomb damage was severe and there it was greatly augmented by huge demolitions and by block ships sunk in the entrance. The Spanish Mole and Quay, the Naval Basin Quay, the Karamanli Mole, and the South-West Quay were all destroyed or badly damaged, and the bridge linking the Spanish Mole with the land was demolished. The wide and otherwise impressive waterfront drive was littered with blocks of masonry and other debris. There was much to be done before Eighth Army supplies could arrive by sea in quantities large enough to permit the Division to resume its forward march.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Parade for Mr Churchill and Other Events

The Parade for Mr Churchill and Other Events

The next important event was to be a great ceremonial parade in honour of a ‘Mr Bullfinch’, and the CRA's staff worked hard to prepare for it. Leave to Tripoli was for a few days cancelled. On 2 February the Divisional Artillery marched four miles to the parade ground, marched past four times until the CRA was satisfied with the practice, and then marched back to Suani Ben Adem. To say the gunners enjoyed it would be an exaggeration. Next day was all spit-and-polish for men and equipment. [25] Then there was a divisional practice in the morning of 4 February. The only gunners who missed it were those of 43 Battery, whose Bofors guns were deployed to defend the huge concentration of vehicles on the parade ground and the parading troops. The parade in the afternoon was the real thing and ‘Mr Bullfinch’ turned out, as everyone expected, to be Mr Churchill. It was the very first full Divisional parade (and, as it turned out, the only one ever held), and it went off splendidly with a march past on foot and another of vehicles six abreast. The Greys led, followed by the Divisional Cavalry, then the Divisional Artillery, and then the infantry and services. To most of those who took part it was a moving occasion and Mr Churchill's address was characteristically impressive.

For the next few days the CRA was busy with conferences and other functions and with reconnaissances of a proposed artillery training range, and on the 9th he was joined by most of his officers and senior NCOs to hear an address by the Army

Commander on past and future operations. From then onwards there were many conferences and discussions, and the tempo of training and preparation for the next stage of operations increased.

The CRA interviewed 20 newly-arrived officer reinforcements on the 10th. They had sailed with the 8th Reinforcements from New Zealand, the first large draft for over a year. Not many of this draft came at this stage to artillery units, the largest being a group of four officers and 76 other ranks who reached the 7th Anti-Tank on the 23rd after flying from Tobruk. The 7th Anti-Tank urgently needed them, not only to replace losses, but to help to man the new anti-tank guns which arrived during the month. These were 17-pounders, Mark I, code-named Pheasants. [26] Eight 6-pounders were consequently transferred to 5 Brigade and six to 6 Brigade to supersede outmoded 2-pounders. This in turn caused the 7th. Anti-Tank to provide for the infantry anti-tank officers a 10-day course of instruction, called a' Young Officers' Course', on 6-pounder anti-tank work. At the same time a course had to be organised to train anti-tankers on the Pheasant, and a major and lieutenant of the Royal Artillery arrived to supervise this on 18 February. By the end of the month each anti-tank battery had three four-gun troops of 6-pounders and one four-gun troop of 17-pounders.

[25] Many gunners were startled to see their vehicles stripped down so that they carried nothing but authorised equipment. Great piles of unauthorised equipment appeared in the battery lines. Many missing articles turned up in the course of this clean-up.

[26] The Mark I had a 25-pounder gun carriage. The Mark II, which came later (the Partridge) had a specially designed carriage which was much more effective.

Another 10-day course was run by two NCOs from the Divisional Signals to train anti-tankers in the use of the No. 18 wireless set, with which batteries were to be equipped. The long advance from Alamein had repeatedly shown up the inadequacy of wireless communications in the antitank batteries and the issue of these sets was a step in the right direction.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Bofors Gunners Defend Tripoli Harbour

The Bofors Gunners Defend Tripoli Harbour

A party of 1200 gunners under Major Nicholson moved into Tripoli on 11 February to help control the operation of the docks and provide working parties. They were preceded by all but a few rear parties of the 14th Light Ack-Ack which deployed its guns on the 10th in positions vacated by an RA regiment in defence of the harbour. For operational purposes the regiment now came under the command of 2 Anti-Aircraft Brigade, RA. A harbour barrage had been worked out and, after several false alarms, it was fired at 7.15 a.m. on the 14th. It was highly spectacular and included heavy ack-ack guns as well as Bofors. But communications were inefficient and there was considerable delay in getting the guns to cease fire. By the time they did stop the regiment had fired 2460 rounds. No bombs were dropped, but the heavy guns claimed one aircraft shot down. Several more air-raid warnings were issued that day and at 8 p.m. the guns again fired, getting away 1923 rounds all told. [27]

The harbour was crowded with shipping, a compelling target for enemy bombers; but such was the weakness of the enemy air forces that for the next five days no attack developed. Then a few aircraft came over in the early morning of the 19th and the harbour barrage was fired three times between 5.45 a.m. and 6.20 a.m., each time for about 20 seconds. Very few bombs fell, but one narrowly missed the guns E3 and E4 and another seriously damaged the HQ of D Troop. It caused no casualties, but badly damaged two trucks and a jeep. The regiment fired 2939 rounds all told. Between 8 and 11 p.m. on the 21st the harbour barrage was fired eight times and the 14th Light Ack-Ack expended 5413 rounds. One bomb dropped 50 yards from RHQ and blew in all the windows; but it caused nothing worse than scratches to the gunners. Next morning, between 5.20 and 6.15, 11 harbour barrages were fired, 7225 rounds in all, and the regiment was credited with sharing one aircraft shot down by light anti-aircraft guns (the heavy ack-ack brought down two more and the RAF another one). The gun B1 suffered a premature which broke the breech casing and gave the crew a shaking. Seven other guns suffered various disabilities, but all were repaired where they were. The ack-ack defences relied mainly on radar for early warning; but several times it failed and enemy aircraft were over the harbour while the lights were still on and some of the ships unloading were also illuminated. Just before midnight an aircraft was heard diving on the harbour and the Bofors at once opened fire, followed by the heavy guns. Two bombs which fell beside a wharf failed to explode. The 14th Light Ack-Ack fired 3848 rounds.

There was very little warning of a raid which began at 4.10 in the morning of 26 February and which ended when dawn was breaking at 6 a.m. [28] The regiment fired 8968 rounds: one aircraft was reported shot down and possibly a second. Five guns suffered minor accidents, in one of which (when E4 had the breech cover blown off through not waiting long enough after a misfire) two men were injured and had to be evacuated. By 10.30 a.m. the same day the 14th Light Ack-Ack completed the handing over of its responsibilities to the 30th Light Ack-Ack, RA, and by 2 p.m. all batteries were back in their former area near Suani Ben Adem. In defence of Tripoli harbour the regiment had fired something like 35,000 rounds. The results in terms of aircraft shot down were small; but in terms of reassurance to the troops working the ships and lighters in the harbour, some of them handling ammunition, high-octane aviation fuel, and other dangerous cargoes, this ack-ack activity was well worth while.

For most of the New Zealand gunners the highlight of their stay at Tripoli was their service as ‘wharfies’ unloading cargoes into lighters or unloading the lighters at the wharfside. They worked hard and helped to keep up a fast flow of stores of all kinds to the depots ashore. They also played hard when the opportunity offered. When they came upon them in the course of their work, they helped themselves liberally to some kinds of rations which did not normally get as far forward as the fighting formations. Some replenished their battleworn wardrobes from clothing intended for officers' shops. Few cases of rum came their way and even fewer got past them.

[27] This rapid fire was too much for some guns after arduous desert travel and not enough time for maintenance. E5 suffered a broken rammer spring and D6 a broken crankshaft.

[28] Clocks had been put back an hour at midnight on the 22nd.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Preparing for a Divisional Artillery Exercise

Preparing for a Divisional Artillery Exercise

Back at Suani Ben Adem the rest of the gunners, though they all had plenty to do, found time to make themselves comfortable. Each regiment opened its own recreation room where the men could spend an evening listening to the radio, writing letters, or enjoying a mug of tea. Many messrooms were built from salvaged materials supplemented by Ordnance supplies. In 28 Battery, for example, Gunner Rush,

Gnr J. H. Rush; Palmerston North; born Palmerston North, 14 May 1910; carpenter.

a skilled carpenter, with a small band of helpers, constructed an excellent men's mess. Training courses of many kinds rapidly proliferated. Football grounds also multiplied, all of them far more attractive than those which had been constructed at Nofilia.

The dock parties returned to their units on 25 February and all units busily prepared for a three-day exercise which was to start on 1 March. The 4th Field had already carried out officer-training in fire drills, and its war diary for 15 February mentions for the first time in this connection the word stonk—evidently a novelty to the diarist. Three days later it carried out a ‘Div Arty Quick barrage exercise’. The CRA was determined that his field regiments should improve their fire drills and planned the forthcoming exercise, in an area south of Azizia, to include the firing of stonks and quick barrages.

A warning order reached Artillery Headquarters on 28 February that the 4th Field was to be at three hours' notice to move; but at 4 p.m. word came that the regiment would not move that night. Next morning, 1 March, the regiment left Suani Ben Adem for the practice range south of Azizia. By 10.12 a.m. the guns were ready to fire. Batteries registered targets at noon and in the afternoon fired stonks, as well as conducting course shooting for selected officers. The 6th Field also arrived and the two field regiments fired a divisional artillery concentration. For the 4th Field word came at 3 p.m. to return to Suani Ben Adem, and by 4.15 p.m. the regiment was back there and its vehicles were loaded with petrol, water and rations. Its destination was now given as Medenine in Tunisia and at 10 p.m. it moved off. The 6th Field drew six days' rations, 15,000 gallons of petrol, and was put on four hours' notice to move, though they did not set out, as it happened, until 12.30 p.m. on 2 March. The 5th Field were told at 6 a.m. on 1 March that ‘for this regiment’ the exercise was cancelled and that they would move with 5 Brigade to Medenine at 2 p.m. In the event they moved about midnight. The sudden ending of the exercise and the move to Medenine came as a surprise, also, to the 7th Anti-Tank and the 14th Light Ack-Ack. The former had been ordered to despatch 32 Battery with 5 Brigade, but not to send the troop of Pheasants. H Troop with its 17-pounders was therefore transferred for the time being to 31 Battery and replaced by A Troop, which had 6-pounders. Representatives from all three batteries of the 14th Light Ack-Ack were watching the manoeuvres south of Azizia when the movement order came. At 11.30 p.m. on 1 March 42 Battery moved off with 5 Brigade. The Survey Battery had its survey and flash-spotting troops deeply committed to the manoeuvres; they hastened back to Suani Ben Adem in the late afternoon, and by 10.15 p.m. the survey troop was on the road with Artillery Headquarters, bound for Medenine. The next campaign had already started. [30].

[30] Casualties from Bardia to Tripoli were:

| Killed | Wounded
4th Field | 5 | 10
5th Field | — | 1
6th Field | 5 | 12
7th Anti-Tank | — | 5
14th Light Ack-Ack | 1 | 4
| ——— | ———
Total | 11 | 32

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 15 — Tunisia: The End of a Long Road

Contents

- [section]
p. 468

- Field Regiments under CRA's Command p. 470
- Enemy Attack is Repulsed p. 474
- Air Attacks p. 476
- Outflanking the Mareth Line p. 477
- The Tebaga Gap p. 480
- New Zealand Corps Reinforced p. 483
- The Advance to Gabes p. 486
- Wadi Akarit p. 490
- The Pursuit Continues p. 492
- Takrouna p. 497
- Operations around Djebibina p. 507
- Return to Maadi p. 513

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE journey from Tripoli to Medenine provided a medley of impressions of daylight and darkness. For the early ones it started at night and ended in daylight; for others it was the opposite. Those gunners who set out by day from Tripoli saw in the first few miles elaborate blockhouses, anti-tank trenches, much barbed wire, and what looked like poor Arab houses but which turned out on closer inspection to be concrete ‘pillboxes’. Beyond Zuara, after miles of cultivated land, the convoys traversed semi-desert; at the frontier they passed more concrete emplacements, then, after many miles, the strange honeycomb hillside dwellings of Ben Gardane. Up to this place drivers enjoyed the almost-forgotten night-time luxury of using headlights. Drivers and others who stayed awake in the long night drive saw many empty tank transporters returning noisily and were held up by others advancing slowly in front. They saw, every now and then, Bofors tracers rising up lazily to mark the route for the RAF ‘taxi service’. Some of them saw the occasional distant flash of a bomb.

It was, on the whole, a fast move. Artillery Headquarters reached Medenine at 2.40 p.m. on 2 March, after a cold night on the road. In a light aircraft which had passed low overhead at 11 a.m. the staff had been thrilled to see the CRA. The 4th Field arrived at 5 p.m., having driven 135 miles. At 10 p.m. the 5th Field began to arrive, to occupy gun areas already reconnoitred by Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow, who had gone on ahead. In Medenine gunners saw a few gleaming French buildings among the Arab homes of blue-grey clay—three-storeyed homes in a series of arches leaning back upon the hillsides so that external stairways could serve the higher floors. The surrounding countryside was green and wooded, intersected with little valleys, leading up to higher country inland.

The German-Italian Army was planning an attack and Eighth Army well knew it. Since its object was likely to be to disrupt preparations for a British attack on the Mareth line, a few miles beyond Medenine, and gain time, the enemy attack was not likely to be long delayed—hence the haste in moving up the New Zealand Division.

medenine, 6 march 1943

The 5th Field was in position at 4 a.m. on 3 March and the regiment completed its gun pits and command posts in bursts of energetic work interspersed with sleep. Next day the sappers lent a compressor for further work at the gun pits and OPs.

The 4th Field soon suffered a serious setback. It had taken up a temporary position, and then on the 3rd the CRA called to indicate the final gun area. He took the second-in-command, Major Gilbert, [1] with him to reconnoitre, and the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, followed, travelling in a jeep with the RSM, WO I Bartley, and a Signals operator. The jeep ran over a Teller anti-tank mine and the RSM was blown up in the air, but he landed unhurt. Stewart was wounded, however, and had to be evacuated. From the leapfrog withdrawal of 26 Battery near Tempe in Greece through all the desert fighting Stewart had been a skilful and forceful commander, and it was very bad luck to lose him thus before the battle began. For the time being Gilbert assumed command of the regiment. Five days later Lieutenant-Colonel Philp from the 5th Field took over.

[1]
Brig H. E. Gilbert, DSO, OBE, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wanganui, 20 Jul 1916; Regular soldier; CO 6 Fd Regt Nov 1943-Apr 1944; GSO I 2 NZ Div 1944–45.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Field Regiments under CRA's Command

Field Regiments under CRA's Command

Brigadier Weir assumed command of all the field regiments as they arrived and meant to keep them under his personal control, though the 4th Field was to support 201 Guards Brigade of 7 Armoured Division to the right (north-west) of the New Zealand Division and 4 Light Armoured Brigade to the left rear. To the British armour, used to having field guns battery by battery, if not troop by troop, under direct command of squadrons and armoured regiments, this was not a popular doctrine; but Weir was determined that the forthcoming battle should demonstrate beyond doubt the power and flexibility of divisional control. Twelve stonks were worked out to cover the immediate front of 5 Brigade west and south-west of Medenine and another was later superimposed on this scheme. The area of each stonk was deepened by a further area in which the fire of medium guns and heavy ack-ack guns could be brought to bear. Nine more stonks were designed to support 7 Armoured Division to the north-west and a further five to the north and north-east of Medenine guarded against an enemy breakthrough on the coast in the sector of the relatively inexperienced 51 Highland Division. For further strength the CRA linked his artillery with that of the armoured and Highland divisions and 5 Army Group, RA, [2] which provided the medium guns.

In an arc from north-west to south-west of Medenine the 4th Field deployed on the right and the 5th Field on the left. The 6th Field, arriving at 10.30 a.m. on 3 March, deployed in the rear, north-east of Medenine in the 6 Brigade area, and dug its guns in and camouflaged them in the heat of the afternoon. Gullies running mainly east to west gave good cover for the guns, there was plenty of water, at least for the time being, and the ground was carpeted with spring flowers, some of them scented like cinnamon. The gaiety of the scene matched the spirit of the gunners: they were confident that the enemy, if he attacked, would get a thrashing.

For three days 36 Survey Battery worked hard, surveying bearing pickets and fixing them on a permanent grid, then surveying OPs. S (Flash-Spotting) Troop established three posts well forward, two of them on high ground west of the village of Metameur, which was nearly five miles west by north of Medenine, and one south of the village. A fourth was later added farther south. The 4th Field had OPs on the same high ground and 46 Battery was just east of the village. The surveyors and 4th Field men found Metameur a strange place, its honeycomb houses dominated by a mosque, and with a central courtyard strewn with straw and filth and infested with huge fleas.

The 7th Anti-Tank was deployed with 32 Battery supporting 5 Brigade, 31 and 33 Batteries with 6 Brigade, and 34 under the command of 4 Light Armoured Brigade on the left flank, south and south-east of Medenine. The 73rd Anti-Tank, RA, also came under the CRA's command and its three batteries all supported 5 Brigade. The Pheasants had been held up at Suani Ben Adem to have clamps fitted to lock the elevating gears while the heavy 17-pounders were travelling. The clamps proved a failure; but gunners somehow tied the heavy breechblocks firmly to the trails to take the strain off the gears. Thirteen Pheasants arrived early on the 4th and the remaining three later. D Troop, the 17-pounder troop of 31 Battery, joined 5 Brigade, and Q Troop of 34 Battery went to 22 Armoured Brigade, behind the centre of the front. When H Troop of 32 Battery arrived this, too, joined 5 Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell of the 7th Anti-Tank was pleased to have this great anti-tank strength available and looked forward to trying out the 17-pounders. Accordingly he instructed the battery commanders to site the 17-pounders well forward to guard a wadi which was the right boundary of 5 Brigade and an obvious avenue for tank penetration of the position. When he mentioned this to the CRA, however, Weir was much concerned. He pointed out that the 17-pounders—the only ones on the front—were still highly secret and must not be risked in forward areas for fear of capture. They had to be sited in depth. Mitchell pleaded with him but to no avail. The wadi was in the area of 131 Brigade and Mitchell would have much preferred to have it in his area so that his own battle-hardened gunners could cover it. But the gunners of the 73rd Anti-Tank and the infantry anti-tankers of 131 Brigade were keen and he did not want to indicate lack of confidence in them. The wadi was nevertheless a source of worry. He asked the sappers if they could lay a minefield across it, but they did not have time to do so. In the end a dummy minefield was erected—a wire on pickets with metal triangles suspended from it.

5 brigade positions at medenine
Stonk areas are shown in front of the infantry positions

For two years the German 88-millimetre gun had dominated the tank battlefields of the desert. Now, belatedly, the British army was prepared to use its even more powerful 3.7-inch heavy ack-ack guns against ground targets. [3] Brigadier Weir had been much impressed by a demonstration of 3.7s in a field role south of Tripoli and General Freyberg was enthusiastic. There were eight 3.7s guarding an airfield to the left flank and rear of the Division and Weir had them included in his DF scheme. But he also gave them an anti-tank role and considered that, if the opportunity presented itself, they would give the enemy armour a most unpleasant surprise. Since the three divisions in the line had 467 6-pounders, 16 17-pounders, and these formidable heavy ack-ack guns, to say nothing of the British tanks, the anti-tank strength of the defence was very great indeed. To strengthen the rather open left flank in the 6 Brigade area, Major Nicholson of 31 Battery commanded a mobile reserve of his own guns (less the Pheasant troop) and an MG company. A final increment of gun power came on 5 March when ‘Mac Troop’ (named after Brigadier ‘Mad’ McIntyre of 2 Ack-Ack Brigade, RA) arrived under a Captain Downing, RA, with four German 88s and came under the CRA's command.

The guns of the 14th Light Ack-Ack had been in action and dug in since the 3rd, 42 Battery with 5 Brigade, 43 Battery with 6 Brigade, and 41 Battery around Medenine itself. Me109Fs came over early on the 4th, but Spitfires of the latest type intercepted them and in the ensuing dogfights three of the intruders were shot down. Later in the morning Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen reconnoitred gun positions for Mac Troop when it arrived. More Messerschmitts came over at midday, but the Spitfires again engaged them and the Bofors had to remain silent. The 3.7s engaged high-flying aircraft, however, and a man of 30 Battery was wounded by a 3.7-inch shell which exploded on hitting the ground, the time fuse having evidently failed. Two 170-millimetre guns, far beyond the range of the defending artillery, shelled Medenine from time to time and the landing ground to the south.

[2] An AGRA provided not only artillery additional to the normal divisional artilleries, but appropriate command and staff personnel and facilities for control and administration. This AGRA controlled 7, 64 and 69 Medium Regts, RA, and 4 (Durham) Survey Regt, RA.

[3] They had been used thus in emergencies in defence of Tobruk during its eight-month siege; but the idea did not then catch on.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Enemy Attack is Repulsed

Enemy Attack is Repulsed

Fog shrouded the opening of the attack on 6 March, but the fairly heavy shelling of forward positions, which began at 6 a.m., proclaimed what was happening. The policy for the field guns was to hold fire until main enemy forces were within reach and could be heavily engaged, and similarly the anti-tankers were to open fire only when the leading tanks were very close. But visibility was poor and the attack at first came mainly against 51 Highland Division and 7 Armoured Division. The 4th Field, being partly in support of the latter, was the first to open fire. Captain Johns
[4] from B Troop OP began to engage targets at 7.30 a.m. and within half an hour the whole regiment was firing. A tall OP ladder raised by the enemy proved too tempting for 46 Battery and was engaged at 8.32 a.m. The enemy, too, had surprise weapons and Captain Johns reported being fired on by a nebelwerfer—a multiple rocket launcher.

Visibility improved at 9 a.m. and the FOO of A Troop of the 4th Field reported 30–40 tanks in the vicinity of the Cold-stream Guards. All batteries engaged them and at 9.15 46 Battery reported three tanks knocked out.

Tanks had meanwhile approached the right of 5 Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow held the fire of the 5th Field until the lorried infantry following them were well within range. Ten of the tanks ventured along the wadi until they reached the dummy minefield, when they swung up the side of the wadi as expected. One gun crew of the 73rd Anti-Tank quickly disabled four of them and another crew knocked out a fifth. [5] The remaining tanks, after some hesitation, directed fierce fire at the 6-pounders. Two members of one crew were hit. But fire came at the tanks from several quarters and they soon turned tail and disappeared.

At 10 a.m. 26 Battery reported 11 tanks knocked out by the Guards Brigade. By this time divisional artillery concentrations had been called for frequently and they landed with deadly effect, mainly on lorried infantry.

Command post staffs and GPOs were kept extremely busy handling a succession of tasks and the gun crews slipped off their shirts and glistened with sweat. Until 10.30 a.m. almost no fire came back at them—though the high ground beyond

Metameur on which OPs and flash-spotting posts were established, topped by what was called Edinburgh Castle, was heavily shelled. Then 46 Battery came under fire from 88s and heavier calibres. A 4th Field gunner was killed about this time. The gun B1 suffered a near miss, two gunners were wounded between B Troop guns and BHQ, and the truck M1 just behind the guns was nearly hit.

About noon an enemy force was seen working towards a Free French detachment on the hills some miles to the south and General Freyberg ordered tanks and field guns to be sent to help. D Troop of the 4th Field (which already had Captains Nathan and Rainbow
[6] in liaison with the Staffordshires) was therefore sent at 12.40 p.m. to support the 50 tanks of the Staffordshires. C Troop of the 6th Field was accordingly ordered forward to take the place of D Troop. There is no record, however, that this force of tanks and 25-pounders actually joined the Free French and it was probably held in readiness on the southern flank if the situation got worse.

Targets for the first half of the afternoon were mainly hostile batteries, all but one of which were engaged effectively. The exception was caused by an error in co-ordinates at the OP.

Major Gilbert had been well forward on the high ground west of Metameur, centred on Point 270, Edinburgh Castle, since early morning. From 3 p.m. onwards he reported infantry deploying with tanks and evidently preparing to attack this vital feature. These and other reports were carefully studied at Artillery Headquarters and the CRA was determined that an overwhelming concentration of fire would be laid down when the time was ripe. From the many reports it soon became clear what route the enemy proposed to take, and all three New Zealand field regiments, the artillery of 7 Armoured Division, 5 AGRA, and the heavy ack-ack guns on the airfield were all warned and given a centre point and bearing for a stonk about 3000 yards from Point 270. Captain Hanna of the 4th Field was watching closely from that feature and at the critical moment called for the fire. It was ordered by Artillery Headquarters at 5.45 p.m. and began to land two minutes later: five rounds gun fire from the three New Zealand field regiments, the 58th Field, RA, and the 7th Medium. Then, with suitable corrections, all these guns and the 146th Field as well fired another five rounds gun fire. The total number of rounds was 1240 and the effect was devastating. There was rarely more than six yards between shell holes, as the CRA discovered when he inspected the ground later.

The attack ended abruptly and with heavy loss. Minor movements before dark were shelled; but the main battle was clearly finished and by nightfall the enemy was withdrawing from the front. He was harassed by the guns throughout the night. The main fighting had not been on the New Zealand part of the front: enemy tank losses all told were 52 and none of them were clearly credited to New Zealand guns. But the New Zealand artillery certainly had much to do with the day's success, and particularly with the crushing defeat of the final thrust. The 4th Field fired 3148 rounds during the day, the 5th Field about 2400, and the 6th not quite so many.

[4]
Capt F. D. Johns; Tauranga; born New Plymouth, 17 Dec 1908; bank clerk.

[5] The Maoris claim to have destroyed a tank by mortar fire, so they may have shared in the destruction of one of these five.

[6]
Capt W. J. Rainbow; Havelock North; born Hastings, 4 Feb 1911; accountant.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Air Attacks

Air Attacks

Enemy aircraft had been active all day, but they seldom ventured within reach of the Bofors. Two Stukas, for example, came over at one stage high up and dropped their bombs with no attempt to dive. Mac Troop was still waiting near Artillery Headquarters to take up positions then being reconnoitred by Sprosen and the troop commander when the first targets were spotted. The crews of the four 88s went into action in great haste and opened fire; but they forgot to set the time fuses and several rounds fell into an NZASC area and exploded when they hit the ground. Then Mac Troop took up a position near Metameur; from then until the end of the North African campaign this valuable troop remained under the command of the 4th Field. Two stray shells landing in the RHQ area of the 14th Light Ack-Ack wounded two men in the afternoon. Later A1 of 41 Battery was straddled by bombs but they did no harm. In a raid at 5.30 p.m. D3 claimed three hits on an aircraft, but it was not seen to crash.

The chief activity next day was in the air. After firing at transport soon after dawn, the field guns remained silent. Just after 8.30 a.m. a Macchi 202 plane approached B Troop of the 14th Light Ack-Ack at 200–300 feet and was easily shot down. Then, as the unit diary remarks, ‘great argument developed as to which guns did hit it’ and a later report stated that two RAF cannon shells were found in the engine. The Bofors did, however, manage to drive off an Me109F that was on the point of shooting down a Spitfire. The popular BSM of 33 Battery, WO II Jackson, [7] was wounded by a Stuka. [8]

The 4th Field and two 6-pounder troops of 34 Battery moved out in the afternoon as part of an armoured force under Brigadier Currie, who now commanded 4 Light Armoured Brigade. On the left flank 26 Battery operated with a squadron of tanks and briefly engaged distant enemy transport which soon drove away. The main body met no enemy, but was shelled from mid-afternoon to dark by the two 170-millimetre guns. On occasions these were firing delayed-action shells—probably anticoncrete ammunition designed to break up fortifications—and these penetrated the ground, struck rock below, and then bounced up unpredictably into the air before they exploded. The force bivouacked in the open for the night. In the morning the anti-tank guns deployed and the shelling started up again, causing a few casualties, including four men of B Troop of the 4th Field. By noon on the 8th the force was back with the Division. For some of the portée crews of the 34th it made little difference; for they were stationed by the airfield and the German heavy guns then switched their attention to that.

It had been a bitter disappointment to the anti-tankers and to many other gunners as well that the 17-pounders had been sited so far back that they did not fire when the enemy attacked. But it was a slight compensation when on 9 and 10 March the crews were allowed to zero their guns towards the hills south of Medenine. This was done at 1500 yards with excellent results. The 17-pounders were found to be extremely accurate and their telescopic sights were first-class.

[7]
WO II R. E. Jackson; Auckland; born Petone, 28 Jan 1911; salesman; wounded 7 Mar 1943.

[8] The 7th Anti-Tank were glad to receive 56 reinforcements this day. This brought batteries up to a tolerable strength, though still well short of their establishment.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Outflanking the Mareth Line

Outflanking the Mareth Line

The 64th Medium came under the CRA's command on the 11th and the day was also notable for the arrival of a huge armoured command vehicle (ACV) for Artillery Headquarters. This soon became a familiar landmark for visitors, the office equipment and records were moved into it, and it immediately became the scene of highly secret discussions of the Division's next move. With the enemy in or behind the powerful Mareth line, the Division was to stage another left hook and attack through the Tebaga Gap towards Gabes, thereby, if all went well, forcing the evacuation of the Mareth line. But this time, unlike the operations at Wadi Matratin and Nofilia, the enemy was to be pressed frontally so that he could not simply swing round and block the outflanking force. The forces involved on both sides, moreover, were to be far larger than in the earlier operations.

plan for the left hook through the tebaga gap

The first stage was to drive back along the coast road to Ben Gardane and then south-westwards through Foum Tatahouine to an assembly area 25 miles farther to the south-west, some 130 miles all told. The 6th Brigade moved first, on 11 March, then 5 Brigade next day and an artillery group and Divisional Reserve Group on the 14th. The force also included 8 Armoured Brigade, extra artillery, and some Free French detachments. All New Zealand insignia and vehicle markings were supposed to be removed. From Foum Tatahouine onwards the journey was to be by night.

Most gunners drove through Gardane by day and Tatahouine by night and they therefore preferred the latter, with its windmills, palms, its husky Arab voices in the night, and its hilly setting. Beyond it the road got steadily worse. Very bad patches were marked by lights, but the early moon gave a false sense of security. The 6th Field, which had already had a truck blown up by an anti-tank mine, injuring one man, in this later part of the journey had a gunner of 30 Battery killed when his quad overturned. Towards the end high conical hills were outlined against the setting moon in weird fashion. But by this time on most vehicles only the drivers were awake—and not all of those.

The 16th was a day of bewildering weather: rain, wind, lightning and spasmodic sunshine. Then, as the road had done, the weather got worse. The wind stayed up and the temperature dropped down and down. Rain lashed the vehicles in the assembly area and made a soggy mess of camouflage netting. In the night of the 19th, by the light of a nearly-full moon, with heavy clouds overhead and lightning towards Mareth, the Division moved on—or, rather, the New Zealand Corps, which included the Division. It moved in nine columns across the desert. The going was rough and many lorries stuck in the sand. Those that completed the journey—just over 30 miles—ended up facing almost due north, towards the Tebaga Gap, with Mareth to the north-east of them. A lance-bombardier of 47 Battery fell off a three-tonner on the way and suffered concussion. At the staging area, in the early hours of 20 March, F Troop of the 4th Field was sent to join the King's Dragoon Guards (KDGs), a reconnaissance unit.

The 20th seemed a more promising day. It started in bright sunshine and disclosed a magnificent assembly of vehicles con- spicuous against a background of dark scrub. There were low rises covered with tamarisk and low bushes and the distances seemed infinite. Locusts soon began swarming, just above the ground, then rising as if sucked upwards by the great clouds of locusts overhead, all swiftly flying in the general direction of Tunis. Here many gunners saw for the first time men of the Free French Forces under General Leclerc, from the Cameroons by way of Lake Chad. Immediately ahead was a deep wadi through which the vehicles would have to close up and 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery moved on to cover them as they did so.

After breakfast the New Zealand Corps moved again. The thumping of guns could be heard in the distance and it seemed at first a mad rush over bumpy ground to reach the source of the sound. Then rocky gullies, and later minefields, made the columns converge. More gullies and then the pace quickened once more until, in mid-afternoon, shells began to land behind Corps Headquarters. To the left there was a village looking like a fortress. It was near here that Kittyhawks of the United States
Army Air Force bombed Artillery Headquarters, killing one man and wounding two others. The MT truck carrying all the first-line petrol reserve for Headquarters went up in flames. The total distance covered was not more than 40 miles, but it seemed much farther.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Tebaga Gap

The Tebaga Gap

The Tebaga Gap was now almost in sight. The 4th Field deployed at last light with orders to put out OPs at first light on 21 March. F Troop of the 4th Field was still out in front with the KDGs, and 8 Armoured Brigade began to push forward in the morning towards the Gap. The enemy there was bombed at 8 a.m., but, though the KDGs put up the orange smoke which was the agreed recognition signal, the Kittyhawks— RAF this time—strafed the group on the way back, wounding an F Troop man and destroying the troop ammunition and petrol lorries. The armour advanced slowly over bad ground and the 4th Field, which had opened fire at 9.40 a.m., also edged forward.

A section of X (Survey) Troop surveyed bearing pickets for the 4th and 6th Field, the 111th Field, RA, and the 64th Medium and by 10.30 a.m. had them fixed on the permanent grid. A lucky chance helped the accuracy of this work. A Trig List for Tunisia had been found in Tripoli. From it a trig station was located on an aerial photograph. This morning it was seen on the ground. It was tested by shooting and soon found correct.

The 64th Medium had been busy since breakfast time, engaging targets at 19,000 yards. But many obstacles, including minefields, barred the advance of the armour, and until it got farther forward the details of the defences confronting the Corps could not be accurately ascertained.

6 brigade attacks point 201, 21–22 march 1943

The 6th Field drove forward, came under the CRA, and fired in the afternoon, attracting fire in return. Mac Troop (with the 4th Field), which seemed to act as a magnet for enemy fire, suffered nine casualties. Even the ACV of Artillery Headquarters, edging forward, came under fire and one man in the area was killed and another wounded.

After dark there was much air activity on both sides as 6 Brigade moved forward to attack. At 10 p.m. two battalions attacked, covered by an artillery programme designed to make the most of the limited ammunition. The 4th and 5th Field, the 64th Medium and one battery of the 111th Field fired on the enemy FDLs for 21 minutes. Ending this with smoke, they lifted about 300 yards and then 300 yards again for a total of about 50 minutes for the field guns and 92 minutes for the mediums. It was thin, but it was enough and the attack succeeded. The foremost infantry were now up to the Roman Wall across the Tebaga Gap. A quick push through by the armour and exploitation in the morning might have seen the end of the fighting in this region; but it did not happen thus.

J and K Troops of 33 Battery were both forward and deployed by daylight on the 22nd. They saw no enemy tanks, but they engaged transport and each troop knocked out an anti-tank gun. In turn they suffered one man killed.

Counter-battery fire during the 22nd was very effective and the work of the CBO (Captain Spring) and his small staff was evidently efficient, while the FOOs, almost cheekily far forward on high ground captured in the night, also demonstrated their skill. A sound-ranging troop at this stage nevertheless could have provided valuable information and saved a good deal of ammunition that was expended on inaccurate ‘fixes’ of hostile batteries.

It was a day of much air activity and many attacks were made on the guns. One attack early in the afternoon was by Messerschmitts bombing from very low down indeed, so that the Bofors found it hard to engage them without hitting friendly troops. The bombs skipped along the ground before exploding, and though they did no damage they caused acute anxiety to gunners in the neighbourhood. New types of German aircraft were appearing. The Focke-Wulf 187 was already becoming known and in the evening a Focke-Wulf 190 came over and dropped a single bomb.

The Matmata Hills on the right flank gave the enemy excellent observation and on the 23rd he made good use of it. First A Troop and then C Troop of 25 Battery received thorough attention and were forced to move; the battery suffered three killed and a dozen wounded. [9] Even in their new positions the 25 Battery men suffered much shelling by day and by night. With hostile batteries so active, Artillery Headquarters ordered a series of 10 concentrations, mainly on hostile batteries. No sooner had these ended, however, than the enemy began to shell 46 Battery heavily. Much harm would certainly have resulted had not the shellfire fallen short because of a false crest. A scout car of B Troop of the 6th Field was set on fire and the signaller wounded. In the late afternoon the 5th Field came forward and went into action under the CRA's command. More FW190s came over and 43 Battery scored two hits on one of them, while 41 Battery hit a Ju88.

[9] Those killed were Lance-Sergeant W. R. A. Hill and Bombardiers A. R. King and R. B. Starky.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

New Zealand Corps Reinforced

New Zealand Corps Reinforced

A new stage of operations began on the 24th when the New Zealand Corps was strengthened by another division and a corps headquarters, which was expected in due course to absorb it and assume command. The effect of this was to stimulate General Freyberg into more vigorous action along lines suggested by the Army Commander. The 24th was a day of more counter-battery concentrations and much air activity. Ju88s came over low at 8 a.m. and H1 scored several hits. At 4.30 p.m. an FW190 scored a direct hit on A2, put it out of action, and killed two and wounded two of its crew. [10] The 25th was a quieter day, though not for the various staffs which were busily planning a major attack to take place next day. The 4th Field moved forward, attracted fire in so doing, and an 8th Reinforcement officer, Second-Lieutenant Reid, [11] was killed.

operation supercharge, the breakthrough at tebaga gap, 26 march

An essential preliminary was the capture of high ground to the right front of the proposed start line, and 21 Battalion seized this in the early hours of 26 March under cover of concentrations from the 4th and 6th Field and a medium battery which demoralised the defence. At the same time the 5th Field moved well forward for the big attack, but did not attract attention by opening fire. Artillery of 1 Armoured Division and 10 Corps also came forward hastily and Brigadier Weir personally deployed these guns by moonlight. The 6th Field helped also by guiding the 4th RHA forward to positions already reconnoitred by Lieutenant-Colonel Walter. The tanks of 1 Armoured Division came as far forward as they could without attracting much attention. By 3.30 p.m. all was ready.

Almost always in the desert war the New Zealanders had found themselves at critical moments like this looking into the sun and having the sand blown into their faces. But this was a different land. It suggested at one and the same time desert and fertility, there was the sweet scent of countless wildflowers in the air, there were blue distances and rugged mountains. For days the wind from the south-west had been lifting a fine white powder from the many tracks, and clouds of this powder now hung in the valleys and were creeping upwards like a fine mist. The attack followed the wind and the attackers, men and machines, appeared from the mist. Above them RAF fighter-bombers and tank-busters (Hurricanes mounting two 40-mm. cannon) stormed into the attack. As they did so gunners received their meteor corrections with gasps of surprise. They were enormous because of the wind and heat and called for much hasty correcting of programmes. (The telegrams were the work of R (Sound-Ranging) Troop, which reached the Division this day, bringing 36 Survey Battery up to full strength.)

For half an hour the air attacks continued, then the guns joined them. The artillery programme was complex, as the shape of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy decreed it must be. In the course of it the three New Zealand field regiments fired a 42-lift barrage, the first 10 lifts at one-minute intervals and the remainder every two minutes—97 minutes all told, the last four minutes being taken up by firing smoke 200 yards beyond the final objective, 4400 yards from the start line. For roughly the same period the 2nd and 4th RHA, the 111th Field, and the 69th Medium fired a series of tasks and the 64th Medium carried out for 113 minutes a heavy counter-battery programme.

As the guns fired and the aircraft flew overhead and the tanks and infantry moved forward they combined in an unforgettable spectacle. But though FOOs and other watchers on the hillsides might have seen it thus, the men in the 25-pounder pits, handling several tons of ammunition in the space of an hour and a half, were oblivious of everything but the task at hand and when it was finished they were weary beyond words.

For the anti-tankers of 32 and 33 Batteries who were forward with the infantry, there were many local emergencies and five men were wounded. Then, when the worst seemed over and they were moving forward, Lieutenant Baker
[12] ran over a mine with his jeep and was killed. Similarly when Lieutenant-Colonel Philp of the 4th Field was touring the forward area in his tank, it struck a mine and his driver [13] was fatally wounded.

Early on the 27th it was evident that the Maoris were still having trouble with a stubborn enemy on their objective and the 4th and 6th Field fired several stonks to support them, starting at 6 a.m. Apart from these tasks there was little to do. The enemy in the Tebaga Gap area was thoroughly disorganised and the British armour was pouring through towards El Hamma. The battlefield was totally unlike most desert battlefields. The fighting had been concentrated into a far smaller area and the work of the aircraft and guns was plainly evident. Twisted guns, burnt-out tanks and transport, and equipment of all kinds littered the scene. Prisoners or would-be prisoners were everywhere.

The New Zealand Corps, except for 5 Brigade, moved on again on 28 March, with the KDGs leading, still with F Troop of the 4th Field under command. At the Wadi Merteba, well on the way to El Hamma, there was opposition, F Troop under Captain Carson opened fire, and, with prompting from the KDGs, resistance collapsed and over 700 Italians were captured. The force continued, but the going was bad and the pace slow. The 5th Field was now with 6 Brigade and the 6th Field with 5 Brigade, which had stayed to guard the right flank and rear, where several large pockets of enemy remained. In the afternoon 29 Battery went into action against a few tanks and guns, but these soon disappeared. A 17-pounder of H Troop was rushed forward, with two 6-pounders, but they did not fire. Next day, with nothing more to guard against, 5 Brigade hastened to catch up with the rest of the New Zealand force.

[10] Sergeant S. C. Burge and Gunner E. W. Longman were killed.

[11]
2 Lt D. G. McM. Reid; born Dunedin, 18 Nov 1908; woolbroker; killed in action 25 Mar 1943.

[12]
Lt D. Baker; born Waimarama, Hawke's Bay, 2 Nov 1916; horticulturist; killed in action 26 Mar 1943.

[13] Gunner R. W. Savage.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Advance to Gabes

The Advance to Gabes

The main body of the New Zealand Corps had meanwhile advanced slowly, first towards El Hamma and then, turning right, towards Gabes. Opposition on the ground was negligible, but air attacks on the bunched-up vehicles caused casualties, mainly to the infantry. Beyond the pass through the hills—the Djebel Halouga—the country opened out into a pleasant landscape of cultivated patches and well-covered hillocks smothered with flowers.

Following a southerly route into Gabes, the artillery with 5 Brigade had a brush with the retreating enemy before reaching the town. Lieutenant Holt's troop of 32 Battery opened fire at long range, after manhandling the guns up a steep crest, but the enemy quickly moved off. The 29th Battery of the 6th Field also dropped trails and fired a few rounds at enemy retreating through Gabes. The leading elements halted at a demolished bridge and, with the willing help of civilians, began to build a causeway across the shallow watercourse. When the brigade group reached the town, 42 Battery engaged FW190s which attacked vehicles crossing the causeway: D Troop with the 6th Field and E Troop with 21 and 23 Battalions both fired, but the Focke-Wulfs were elusive targets. The 6th Field records that, as it passed through the town ‘within the hour of its falling, the civilian population gave them a very warm reception with flowers and cheering. The tri-coleur [ sic] was hoisted at various points’. Beyond the town Lieutenant Robertson
[14] led two

6-pounders in pursuit of various tardy enemy detachments. This group came upon two Italian armoured cars, one of them at very close range indeed, and the 6-pounders disabled both of them. [15] A section of H Troop with 17-pounders and F Troop with 6-pounders formed a gun line covering 5 Brigade for the night 29–30 March. Next day the 5th Field arrived and came under the command of 5 Brigade, the 6th Field reverting to the command of 6 Brigade, which was back towards Gabes.

Gabes, for those who had a chance to explore it, was the first really friendly town the gunners had seen since they left Greece. Most of them entered by driving past a line of modern, attractive homes whose inhabitants were much in evidence. They included many charming French girls who obviously enjoyed being the centres of attention. A well-known humorist of O Troop, 34 Battery, Sergeant Stark, [16] had proclaimed to his gun team on many a tense occasion since the summer at Alamein that he would far rather see a girl on a bicycle than a German tank. When a pretty French girl on a bicycle appeared, therefore, she was at once surrounded by anti-tankers all in hearty agreement with Stark's preference. The western part of the town, beyond a thick belt of trees flanking a riverbed, was typically Arab. Beyond it roads led in several directions and traffic was dense on all of them. For a short distance the route passed through a semi-desert of white sand sprinkled with flowers. Then the vegetation thickened, and at the destination in the Bou Chemma area a few miles to the north, the humpy ground was covered with shrubs and a few trees and a sheer carpet of small sunflowers. As gunners strolled about this golden countryside their boots became covered with pollen and their trouser-legs turned yellow. There was much evidence of a hasty German evacuation. In several places cooking equipment had been abandoned intact with food in it ready to eat.

Hills ringed the skyline ahead and shellfire could be heard from time to time. The enemy was holding temporary positions covering the occupation of a highly defensible line along the Wadi Akarit, 15–20 miles past Gabes.

The 4th Field, at the head of the gun group, stopped for lunch at 11.45 a.m. on the 29th and Lieutenant-Colonel Philp and his battery commanders continued along the road to Gabes with the CRA, reaching the town about 1 p.m. At the village of

Bou Chemma, the CRA ordered Philp to bring his regiment forward and the IO—now Rex Bartley, former RSM, who had been commissioned in the field—drove back with the message. The batteries had more trouble with the water crossing than the CRA's party, the day had turned wet and cold, and it was midnight before 26 and 46 Batteries settled in at Bou Chemma, having seen little of Gabes. RHQ, 25 Battery and the valiant Mac Troop were far back in the columns of vehicles and they travelled slowly, stopping and starting all night long.

There were several more brushes with enemy rearguards on 30 March. F Troop of the 4th Field was still with the KDGs [17] and D Troop also joined them at first light. Both troops fired this day. D Troop fired at tanks and infantry in the open. They withdrew and the KDG squadron advanced. D Troop then went into positions in a plantation near Oudref and again fired on transport and guns. Advancing through a wadi, the group reached an anti-tank trench and D Troop fired on a mining party and a few vehicles. By the end of the day D Troop was in position on the left of the road in the Wadi Rekrama, firing on transport and guns in the Wadi Akarit. Its gun position was then on what became the main gun line for the attack on Akarit. F Troop records ‘slight shooting’ this day; but in the late afternoon the troop was recalled and rejoined the 4th Field in the evening.

Concurrently on 30 March, 46 Battery of the 4th Field was attached to the Divisional Cavalry. The 25-pounders fired briefly in the morning only. RHQ, 25 Battery and Mac Troop all moved forward in the morning and, though they were to the rear of 46 Battery, they found targets and fired throughout the afternoon, attracting some return fire. Then in the late afternoon and evening there was a flurry of enemy air activity. Five Ju88s came over first and Bofors and 3.7s engaged them, and possibly Mac Troop did too. Then, towards dusk, the sky suddenly became crowded with fighters and fighter-bombers, many at tree-top height, and Bofors and small-arms filled the air with tracers. In one or other of these raids 43 Battery scored a hit on a Ju88.

The 31st was generally quiet and very little shooting was done. In the course of the day the field guns moved forward to occupy the positions from which they would engage the enemy when the attack on the Wadi Akarit took place about a week hence. [18] The area was congested with transport and other guns and the ground was difficult, a succession of little wadis, soft sandy patches, and marshes. All three troops of 36 Survey Battery were for the first time fully committed. The 69th Medium, RA, came under the CRA's command and on 1 April, when the New Zealand infantry withdrew into reserve, the 5th and 6th Field also reverted to his command. The anti-tank batteries moved back with the infantry and the light ack-ack troops were divided between the field artillery areas and the rest of the Division.

For the first five days of April the field gunners fired an average of 10 rounds per gun per day, mainly against infantry and small clusters of vehicles. It was vital to obtain accurate hostile battery locations for the forthcoming battle, but the flash-spotting troop of 36 Survey Battery soon realised that the enemy guns had excellent positions which betrayed no flashes. The sound-ranging troop had slightly better luck and air photographs also provided useful information. General Montgomery addressed selected officers and NCOs on the 2nd about the Mareth and Tebaga Gap fighting and the impending battle. Next day 34 Battery passed to the command of 8 Armoured Brigade and 31 Battery to the NZA Gun Group, while the 124th Field, RA, came under the CRA's command. Three guns, one each from the 4th, 5th and 6th Field, went forward in the night 4–5 April to snipe known enemy positions and traffic bottlenecks; but their flashes were soon picked up by an alert enemy and they were heavily shelled, a 4th Field man being wounded. By day the RAF and USAAF were far more active than the enemy air forces; but by night the latter dropped many containers of butterfly anti-personnel bombs, which scattered widely and caused considerable apprehension and loss of sleep. In a raid at dusk on the 5th 30 Battery lost Staff-Sergeant Hughes
[19] killed and three others wounded.

[14]
Maj M. M. Robertson, MC, m.i.d.; Pio Pio; born Auckland, 28 Dec 1918; agricultural student; comd 34 Bty, 7 A-Tk Regt, Feb-Jun 1945.

Major D. J. Robertson of 32 Battery commanded with vigour and skill an advanced guard which included 29 Battery, H Troop of 32 Battery (17-pounders), infantry 6-pounders and carriers, and an infantry company.

[15] Then, or soon after, Gunner E. R. Wilkinson was wounded by small-arms fire. The troop commander, Lt D. L. Holt, was later awarded an MC for this and other actions.

[16]
Sgt R. C. Stark; Takapuna; born Dunedin, 5 Jun 1917; clerk.

[17] F Troop had joined the KDGs on 19 March. On the 22nd it engaged Italians dug in near the Roman Wall and encouraged 43 of them to surrender next day. Moving with C Squadron on the 23rd, the troop supported Free French troops attacking enemy in the hills to the right of NZ Corps. With A Squadron on the 24th the troop engaged many targets at ranges of 3400-5000 yards, but had much trouble clearing crests in very broken country. F Troop did not take part in the barrage on the 26th, but was well forward in the pursuit on 27 March. Then, next day, came the action at Wadi Werteba (p. 486), mentioned in the citation for Captain Carson's MC, in which 700-odd Italians were captured. F Troop did not pass through Gabes on the 29th. The KDGs by-passed the town and, after two or three more fleeting engagements, camped quite near the 4th Field.

By the time F Troop rejoined the regiment on the 30th, it had fired, in the course of its detached role, 1574 rounds of HE and 14 of smoke, using 1454 normal charges and 134 supercharges.

[18] In the 5th Field Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow became ill and was evacuated to a Casualty Clearing Station.

[19]
S-Sgt E. W. Hughes; born NZ 3 Dec 1907; service station proprietor; killed in action 5 Apr 1943.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Wadi Akarit

Wadi Akarit

The attack opened on 6 April with a tremendous artillery programme by 18 field regiments and four medium regiments, a total of 496 guns, starting at 4.15 a.m. This was a greater concentration of fire than had ever before been achieved in North Africa, since the main front was no more than 10–12 miles long—running from the sea on the right at the Wadi Akarit to a complex of lofty and precipitous hills inland. Most of these heights had been seized by Indians and Gurkhas in a silent attack in the night, before the guns began their storm of fire against the wadi and the defences which linked it with the hills.

wadi akarit, 5–6 april 1943

The New Zealand guns supported 50 Division. The three field regiments fired for 25 minutes at selected targets and then, at ‘Z plus 30 [minutes]’, they fired a 31-lift barrage in two phases, in the first of which the 5th Field fired on the right, the 6th Field on the left and the 4th Field was superimposed over both. In the second phase, starting two hours later, only the 5th Field fired on the right and the 4th Field on the left, while one battery of the 6th Field fired a series of 12 tasks. At the same time the 2nd RHA, also under the CRA's command, and the 124th Field fired tasks. The barrage ended at Z plus 299—9.14 a.m. on 6 April—and the 6th Field tasks went on until 9.41 a.m. The New Zealand field guns each had 300 rounds above their normal complement and this programme called for a maximum of about 210 rounds per gun; but the programme also included a series of stonks to be fired if needed to cover the period of consolidation after the attack. The 64th and 69th Medium fired tasks and were also ready to fire the stonks. The 6th Field was to fire at intervals during the day to mark the bomb-line for the Allied air forces; but there is no record that it did so in the event. Captain Carson and Major Bretherton were responsible for liaison with 69 Infantry Brigade and the 4th County of London Yeomanry of 22 Armoured Brigade respectively.

Very little fire came back at the guns as they carried out their long programme, but once again Mac Troop was unlucky. One of a series of bombs scored a direct hit on one gun, killing two of the crew and wounding three others. Bombardier Shearer, [20] a medical orderly of the 4th Field, rushed to help the crew while bombs were still falling—one of several such actions on his part.

At first light on the 6th the whole front was covered with smoke and dust, but it soon began to clear. When it did so a thrilling spectacle unfolded itself on the hills to the left, where the Indians and Gurkhas could be seen mounting towering rock faces undeterred by the white puffs of smoke speckled with vicious-looking flashes which opened up everywhere among them as the enemy artillery concentrated on them.

When the New Zealand barrage and associated tasks ended there was much confusion in the centre of the front and the Northumbrians made little progress for several hours. The rest of the day was eaten up with bursts of fire to supplement the destruction wrought by the main artillery programme. In the afternoon the 4th and 6th Field moved forward and went into action again close to a large minefield. There were several casualties, mainly among OP personnel. Gunner Hall
[21] of the 5th Field, for example, was killed when his OP vehicle suffered a direct hit. The 6th Field had three men lightly wounded, two of them in OPs. In another raid by fighter-bombers of the USAAF an RASC truck was set on fire and its two occupants badly burnt. Anti-tankers nearby narrowly escaped harm. One bomb landed a few feet from a portée but failed to explode. Then, just before dark, six Ju88s made a low-level attack on the New Zealand gun positions, only to run into scorching fire from the Bofors [22] which sent two down in flames and two more were smoking as they flew away—the 6th Field says three were shot down. It was a spectacular episode and the field and antitank gunners gave their ack-ack colleagues a stand-up round of applause. There were mines everywhere, and after dark the truck X 2 of X (Survey) Troop struck one and was destroyed and a sergeant and two gunners were wounded. After dark, too, there were more butterfly bombs, particularly in the gun areas.

[20]
Bdr I. H. Shearer; Palmerston North; born Wellington, 10 Dec 1905; accountant.

[21]
Gnr A. E. Hall; born NZ 21 Sep 1918; mill hand; killed in action 6 Apr 1943.

[22] At least one battery of the 53rd Light Ack-Ack, RA, was forward with the 14th Light Ack-Ack.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Pursuit Continues

The Pursuit Continues

Artillery Headquarters prepared a programme for an attack next morning by 8 Armoured Brigade and 6 Brigade to clear the centre, where the enemy had fought stubbornly along an anti-tank ditch. The morning soon disclosed, however, that the enemy had gone, and the Division at once began to push through the Akarit line to the open country beyond and begin the pursuit.

Edging slowly through the shattered Akarit defences, often hemmed in by minefields, the gunners were impressed by the strength of the position and by the closeness of the shell craters. They were not reassured, however, by the negligible effect of their 25-pounder fire on dugouts and other deeply-dug and covered defences. Thousands of Italians had already surrendered and many more gave themselves up in bedraggled clusters as Eighth Army passed through. Brigadier Weir as he drove through counted 24 guns knocked out.

Once through the wadi and its heavy fringes of hills, the country flattened into a huge plain across which columns of vehicles hastened, each column raising a great streamer of dust. F Troop of the 4th Field was again with the KDGs and fired from three different positions in the course of the day. [23] The Divisional Cavalry and 8 Armoured Brigade, the latter with 34 Anti-Tank Battery under command, also advanced through scattered areas of barley mingled with low bushes and flower-strewn wastes, past many derelict vehicles. The watercourses were dry, though the soil was moist and the dull skies were topheavy with cloud. The 4th Field came under light shelling and then, about 2.30 p.m., a tank alert caused the regiment to go into action at high speed. E Troop fired for some time at an 88, the crew of which finally succeeded in hooking it on to its tractor and driving away—a gallant performance. Later Major Gilbert from the top of his office truck directed the fire of Mac Troop against infantry and guns until it was too dark to see them.

Meanwhile 8 Armoured Brigade had taken up hull-down positions to engage some 18 enemy tanks at fairly long range. The Nottingham Yeomanry had two 17-pounders of Q Troop with them and the anti-tankers welcomed the chance of trying out their new guns. Sergeant Logan
[24] boldly drove over a crest, unhooked his gun, and then sent his quad back out of sight. The enemy at once opened fire and the gun crew lay low. Although in full view of the enemy, the gun was on a slight ledge which was not easy to hit and most of the shells exploded either on the slopes below or beyond the crest. After some time Logan ordered his men to take post and they did so in lively fashion. They could see tanks at very long range, something like 3000 yards, and engaged them. A storm of fire came back at the Q Troop gun, but it continued until 25 rounds were fired, by which time the tanks had withdrawn well out of range. The gun suffered one hit but the crew were unharmed. For his determination Logan won an MM. In the course of the action the 17-pounder belched out great clouds of yellow-brown smoke which made it a prominent target. But the enemy evidently mistook it for a tank and for some time fired only AP ammunition. When he switched to HE the position was clearly untenable and Logan was ordered to cease fire and withdraw.

Concurrently the enemy fired a number of heavy shells in the general direction of 8 Armoured Brigade, but most of them went over a crest and thundered harmlessly among the rocks.

When night fell it was black indeed and Sherman tanks, seeking their HQ, plunged into a region of scrub and rather high mounds interspersed with bog, in which some of them half buried their great hulls in soft sand mingled with black slime. Many hours of toil in the clinging darkness were needed to free them, with troopers and anti-tank gunners hauling desperately like huge tug-o'-war teams on long ropes and chains. Then came the blessed order to bed down and the men did so where they stood, utterly heedless of prickly bushes and rocks. Indeed they felt no discomfort until they were wakened before dawn. The tanks were on the move again and the portées and other vehicles hastened to follow.

F Troop of the 4th Field enjoyed this day, 8 April. Advancing with the KDGs, the guns were soon in action against tanks which shelled the armoured cars. One tank went up in flames and the rest withdrew. Then F Troop took up a good position in a wadi and from it had plenty of shooting. A half-tracked vehicle towing an 88 also went up in flames. Then, at 3600 yards, the guns engaged a tank and caused it to drive away. In the evening the Division caught up and F Troop joined it in a night march which ended at 11 p.m. The position was about 35 miles due west of Sfax. The rest of the 4th Field, with the 64th Medium, fired at tanks in the morning and early afternoon which were holding up 8 Armoured Brigade. The main body of the Division, farther back, was dive-bombed at 2 p.m. by four FW1905, but the Bofors were at the alert and shot down one of them. A Q Troop 17-pounder engaged three tanks, at the instigation of 8 Armoured Brigade, but the range was too great.

The KDGs again led the advance on the 9th and F Troop fired at transport soon after first light. Moving on again at 8.30 a.m., the reconnaissance group was bombed by Allied aircraft ‘despite acres of recognition smoke’, as the F Troop diary remarks. The only damage was a punctured tyre. By 11 a.m. F Troop was close to the road from Sfax to Sbeitla, but enemy tanks were in the offing and the KDG squadron withdrew a little.

The Gun Group, the 4th Field and 64th Medium, with 31 Anti-Tank Battery, came forward after a long drive and was joined by the 111th Field from 8 Armoured Brigade. The field and medium guns had got into action and the anti-tank guns had just taken up position at 2 p.m. when 13 tanks appeared from a wadi to the west and came straight for the left flank, guarded by the 6-pounders of A Troop. The portées were driving away from the dismounted anti-tank guns as the tanks approached and the gun crews hesitated, not quite sure the tanks were enemy. When the tanks opened fire on the portées, Lance-Sergeant Cutforth [25] fired three or four rounds and knocked out a Pzkw IV Special. A direct hit on the gun axle then put the gun out of action and wounded Cutforth and two of his crew. The retreating portée of another gun was set on fire and the gun came under heavy machine-gun fire which wounded a gunner. Bombardier Keating
[26] nevertheless got this gun into action and hit another Pzkw IV Special. His layer was then so badly wounded by an AP shot that Keating ordered the remaining two members of the crew to carry him back for immediate medical attention. Keating carried on alone, loading and firing the gun, knocked out a tank, and scored a hit on a formidable Pzkw VI—a Tiger with massive armour and a huge 88-millimetre gun. The third gun of the troop had the loader and layer both wounded by machine-gun fire at the outset and did not fire, and the fourth was out of sight of the tanks. For a few moments it looked as though the rest of the tanks would come on and overrun this flank; but tanks of 8 Armoured Brigade appeared and the enemy made off hastily. The Tiger was later discovered to have been disabled and did not get away. Gunner Voss
[27] of A Troop died in this encounter. Later Cutforth was awarded an MM and Keating a DCM. Also this afternoon, a few miles to the east, a stray shell or mortar bomb killed Bombardier Dalgety
[28] of 34 Battery. Guns of the 64th Medium had moved forward surprisingly close to the head of the Gun Group and their fire was later reported to have destroyed two more tanks. The 4th Field had been standing ready with AP ammunition, but no targets came within range. Major Harrowell
[29] of 46 Battery was wounded, however, and had to be evacuated. D Troop of the 4th Field had moved out at noon to join the KDGs, but it did not fire this day.

The Division now moved north-eastwards and made fast progress over a land of low, prickly bushes thick with birds' nests, a melodious land. One column, after pushing through olive groves, across a few dusty tracks, then along a country lane, burst unexpectedly into a village where a girl, breathless with excitement, rushed forward to clasp every hand within reach, to the evident embarrassment of some of the gunners. Halting for lunch in fields of broad beans, the columns swept along even faster in the afternoon. The only contacts with the enemy on the ground were fleeting. Artillery Headquarters drove in the afternoon ‘through continuous olive groves which extended as far as the eye could see—all interspersed with carpets of red poppies and yellow daisies’. It is not often that war diarists write thus, and it was indeed an enchanting countryside. The air was so full of skylarks that their singing could be heard plainly above the gigantic roaring of the machines. The leading troops passed through the poor little village of La Hencha—a few buildings clustered on a crossroads, a schoolroom, a chemist, post office and suchlike. The rest halted for the night within a few miles of it. The 4th Field went into action and fired a few rounds, and D and F Troops with the KDGs engaged tanks and transport; but the enemy was obviously anxious to get away. The main obstructions now were numerous large demolitions, one of them near La Hencha, which blocked all routes towards Sousse, 50 miles to the north.

The KDGs pressed on next day, with D and F Troops of 4th Field, passed through El Djem, with its ruins of a magnificent Roman amphitheatre, and ended up a few miles south and south-east of Sousse. The 26 Battery gunners were welcomed as liberating heroes by many a French and Jewish community on the way, and the drive took on a carnival aspect which was rudely shattered when a C Squadron armoured car was destroyed in an ambush and another was lost on a roadside mine.

Artillery Headquarters and the main part of the Gun Group did not get properly under way until the late afternoon of 11 April, and they carried on slowly after dark, driving through villages dimly visible in the moonlight. Headquarters halted near Kerker, halfway to Sousse, in an olive grove. Other units came to rest at various points between there and La Hencha.

North of Kerker there were fewer olive trees and many high cactus hedges. In the sizable town of Msaken on the 12th gunners had a lively welcome from the French inhabitants and many of them got kissed. On they went through a lush countryside to Sousse itself, and there the welcome and the hospitality were too much altogether for many of the gunners. Some of them took several days to recover. The KDGs, with 26 Battery, were there only minutes after the enemy had departed. B Squadron with F Troop had breakfast on the waterfront and then moved to the northern outskirts, where they came up against enemy rearguards. In the afternoon the rest of the 4th Field was called forward and the dusty quads with guns and limbers swung past long lines of frenzied people who flung flowers at them. When the quads slowed down their occupants were clapped, cheered, kissed and offered drinks. Lieutenant Richmond
[30] of E Troop had his cap knocked off by a bunch of flowers, and people fought for the honour of restoring it to him. The regiment went into action among the houses of Hammam– Sousse just north of Sousse proper and fired 27 rounds by nightfall. The night was riotously happy.

Next day, 13 April, F Troop of the 4th Field, moving inland with C Squadron of the KDGs, had a brief action in which it came under accurate fire from one or two guns and two gunners were wounded. One of them, Gunner Thompson, [31] hit in the arm, insisted on driving his quad and gun back to safety before allowing his wound to be attended to.

[23] Captain Carson had left 69 Brigade in the afternoon of 6 April and was back with F Troop. He later recommended his OPA, L-Sgt D. S. Clark, for an MM. There was at least a prima facie case for decorating any OPA game enough to serve with Carson.

[24]
Sgt A. S. Logan, MM; Taihape; born Hunterville, 29 Aug 1911; bricklayer; wounded 2 Nov 1942.

[25] Sgt E. E. Cutforth, MM; Te Awamutu; born Whangarei, 23 Apr 1908; electrical wireman and farmer; twice wounded.

[26]
S-Sgt A. O. Keating, DCM; born Christchurch, 31 Oct 1906; clerk.

[27]
Gnr R. T. Voss; born Masterton, 21 Feb 1912; surfaceman, NZ Railways; killed in action 9 Apr 1943.

For his calm and efficient control of his troop in this hectic engagement Lieutenant L. de V. Gilbert won an MC.

[28]
Bdr W. S. Dalgety; born Christchurch, 27 Feb 1905; sheepfarmer; killed in action 9 Apr 1943.

[29]
Maj E. S. Harrowell; born NZ 24 May 1911; journalist; wounded 9 Apr 1943.

[30]
Maj C. P. Richmond, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 23 Jun 1914; solicitor; PA to GOC Feb-Nov 1945; now Hon. Mr. Justice Richmond.

[31] Sgt B. W. Thompson; Hamilton; born Whitianga, 7 Aug 1919; clerk; wounded 13 Apr 1943. The other gunner was R. C. Holman.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Takrouna

Takrouna

The Gun Group pushed on past the village of Sidi bou Ali on the road to Enfidaville, a town at the foot of a towering mountain range which barred the way to Tunis. To the west of the town the village—or perhaps twin villages—of Takrouna clung to a precipitous hill of the same name which dominated the approaches ominously. The fun was clearly over and there was heavy fighting ahead.

The 4th Field prepared positions in bare country 6–7 miles from Sidi bou Ali and half a mile west of the road to Enfidaville. The ground was almost solid rock, but the gun crews were spurred on by shellfire on the road near them. A section from B Troop went over four miles farther along the road and engaged a suspected enemy locality, attracting return fire. Late in the afternoon the section was recalled to the main gun area, and it was just clear of the forward position when that was very heavily shelled. It was a narrow escape. The KDGs had done their job well and now departed from the Division; 26 Battery returned to the 4th Field.

The 6th Field established two batteries two miles north-west of the 4th Field and 30 Battery remained on wheels, [32] while the 5th Field dug in four miles west of the 4th Field. Selecting these positions was simply a matter of making the best of a bad job; for good gun positions were quite unobtainable.

Two troops of 34 Battery took up positions covering the long stretch of white road leading to Enfidaville. For a day or two theirs were the foremost guns. Some infantry occupied a dark patch of trees half a mile along the road and a company was out to the right, towards the salt marshes by the sea. This company threaded its way back and that left only the infantry in the little wood ahead. Occasionally the enemy mortared the wood or shelled the field guns behind.

Planning and preparation for an Army assault on the great rugged fortress south of Tunis were well advanced. For the present there was no sense in provoking an enemy whose positions completely dominated the New Zealand gun areas. In the next day or two, therefore, the chief ambition of the gunners was to keep quiet and out of sight. But the 5th Field [33] had done less shooting than the other two field regiments in the course of the advance across North Africa and perhaps had itchy trigger fingers. On the 15th 28 Battery established a sniping gun 2500 yards in front of the main gun area and it engaged many targets. Next day another from 47 Battery also went forward and only these two guns fired. This was highly provocative; but it drew no return fire. No targets appeared on the 17th; but the sniping guns were busy again on the 18th. Still no response; but when 27 Battery and a troop of 28 Battery moved to a new position four miles farther north a heavy concentration came down just in front of the guns and Bombardier Tyler was killed. The 5th Field took care to do no firing by day from these vulnerable forward positions, and 47 Battery and the rest of 28 Battery did not move up to them until 7 p.m. on the 19th.

36 survey battery's flash-spotting and sound-ranging bases near enfidaville, april 1943

Meanwhile both the 4th and 6th Field moved in readiness for the big attack. The 4th Field, relieved in its existing positions on 16 April by the 65th Field, RA, of 50 Division, went to a ‘laager area’ eight miles south of Takrouna—-an area memorable for its cactus and for mosquitoes that copied the tactics of the Stukas. From this area working parties went forward by night to prepare battle positions on flat ground 6000 yards south-west of Takrouna. The soil there was black and sticky and hard to dig, but a bulldozer gave valuable help. The 6th Field moved to positions just under four miles due south of Enfidaville and about five and a half miles south-east of Takrouna, which was the main objective of the New Zealand part of the attack. The regiment gladly received on the 17th an air OP; for it was impossible to locate from the flat below many of the targets which were hidden in the labyrinthine folds of the mountains. This valuable OP consisted of a highly-trained RA captain, who flew solo a tiny aircraft which could operate from short and rough runways, and a supporting detachment of four other ranks with lorry and a motor-cycle. It was the first of many air OPs to operate with the NZA, and in Italy they became almost indispensable.

Another addition to the New Zealand guns was a huge, long-barrelled German 170-millimetre gun of very modern design, one of two captured in the Tebaga Gap. This one was manned by a special crew believed to be from the 51st Medium, RA, and it was set up among huge cactus trees between the laager area of the 4th Field and the reserve position of 34 Battery. At dusk one evening its long nose rose from the cactus and it fired one round, to the astonishment of many gunners who had not seen it arrive. Next day many of them strolled over to see it. They found that the crew consisted of about 35, with a high proportion of officers, all of them taking part in a vigorous debate about how the gun worked. The gun itself was plastered with detailed instructions; but none of the crew could read German. All in all, it was a highly entertaining sideshow. Some of the massive rounds were later reported to have gone clean over the enemy in the hills above Enfidaville and to have landed on the other side in the area of the First Army. When one of these rounds burst prematurely over RHQ of the 4th Field in the early hours of 19 April there was consternation; but it did no damage.

The preparations for the Takrouna attack were strikingly similar to those for many an earlier operation in the desert, and the artillery plan with its two-phase lifting barrage was of a familiar pattern. They were almost totally inappropriate to the task at hand, which was in the first place ludicrously optimistic in its allocation of forces in relation to the strength of the defences, and in the second place was of a kind so different from those to which the Division had become accustomed as to call for an almost completely new approach. Warfare in the mountains gave little or no scope for many of the skills and techniques developed in years of mobile desert warfare.

The New Zealand part was an attempted advance of 4000 yards on a front of 4000 yards, the same area as that of Operation supercharge which broke the Alamein line—the same area, but utterly different terrain. Brigadier Weir expressed his concern at a conference on 18 April. He pointed out that the guns had to be emplaced in the open and that it must be expected that some troops would be knocked out by counter-battery fire, causing gaps to appear in the barrage. If certain high ground, particularly Takrouna, remained in enemy hands, most of the gun positions would be untenable next day.

The barrage, when it did start at 11 p.m. on the 19th, [34] sounded different from earlier barrages. The sharp crack of the guns on the plain went through a quick series of metamorphoses as it echoed and re-echoed in the mountains until it became a dull heavy boom, a constant drumming background of noise. As they toiled at the guns, a breeze from the north blew the cordite fumes back into the faces of the gunners. For 6 Brigade on the right the barrage, fired by the 6th Field, the 65th Field and three troops of the 124th Field, pivoted on the right for 18 minutes to roll over enemy positions south of the road to Enfidaville until it straightened up. For 5 Brigade on the left, the barrage, fired by the 4th and 5th Field, the 111th Field, and the other three troops of the 124th Field, paused on the opening line for half an hour. Then with the two brigades in line—so far as the broken terrain permitted—the two barrages rolled on in unison, lifting 100 yards every two minutes, a rate of advance that was ridiculously fast for that type of country (though it was what the infantry said they wanted). With a two-hour pause in the middle the barrage ended at 1.44 a.m. on the 20th. Mac Troop, with badly worn barrels in its 88s which made its ranging uncertain, was allowed to take part only on condition that it fired 800 yards beyond the barrage. The 74th Field fired tasks on various danger points over the whole front. The 64th and 69th Medium, from 5 AGRA, also fired tasks on selected areas, mainly on the left. The right-hand gun of the 65th Field and the left-hand gun of the 5th Field fired smoke throughout to mark the divisional boundaries. The field guns fired 238 rounds each and very little fire came back at them. When word came that 5 Brigade had not taken the whole of Takrouna the 6th Field guns and at least 47 Battery of the 5th Field withdrew from their forward positions, and they were back in their former positions by first light.

the capture of takrouna

Soon after dawn Brigadier Weir drove with General Freyberg to 5 Brigade Headquarters, learned of difficulties the infantry were meeting, and ordered several stonks to be fired on high ground beyond Takrouna. Most of the 5th and 6th Field guns, however, were then too far back to take part and the CRA had to rely mainly on the 4th Field and the medium guns. On the other hand the enemy did not counter-attack as expected and his guns were curiously unenterprising. They gave some of the foremost infantry close attention from time to time; but they ignored tempting targets below Takrouna.

The FOOs of the New Zealand units were well forward at dawn, and soon after this an unnamed FOO and his OPA of the 64th Medium reached the leading elements of 28 (Maori) Battalion high on Takrouna. He saw useful targets below to the north, but was out of touch with his regiment and could only send his OPA down to report on the situation. Captain Catchpole [35] of 28 Battery reported back at 8.30 a.m. that the area he was in, approaching Takrouna, was heavily mined and booby-trapped, but that prisoners were coming in from that feature. An hour later he understood Takrouna was captured and he drove forward. From the foot of the feature he reported at 10.20 a.m. that machine guns were urgently needed there. At 10.30 a.m. a report from the OP of D Troop of 28 Battery reached RHQ:

‘Do not do Takrouna over as we are on top. Do it over West & Nth.’

Captain Muirhead of the 5th Field had been with 23 Battalion, but, unable to help them, he moved on to Takrouna and soon climbed to the top. There was little happening there and he had no communication with his guns, so he descended and about noon reported personally to Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow, suggesting that infantry reinforcements were urgently needed on the feature. In the afternoon Muirhead returned and played some part in defeating a local counter-attack, though he still could not bring down fire because of faulty communications. [36]

The 4th Field made similar efforts to get observers forward and bring down fire. Majors Bretherton and Moodie of 25 and 26 Batteries had got in touch with 8 Armoured Brigade in the morning, but tanks could do little until the infantry situation clarified. Captain Carson of F Troop and Lieutenant White of B Troop were also forward with their OP parties. In mid-morning the regiment fired a concentration north-west of Takrouna, probably one arranged through the infantry. Other concentrations followed throughout the day, interspersed with observed fire which the FOOs reported as effective. [37]

A few shells had dropped in the area of RHQ of the 4th Field soon after the barrage ended. At 11.30 a.m. a single 88 ranged to the west of the 5th Field gun area; it dropped eight rounds in the E Troop area, and then almost bracketed D Troop. In their rear positions the 6th Field and 47 Battery guns were left undisturbed. Encouraged by the enemy's evident disinterest in counter-battery work, the 6th Field and 47 Battery reconnoitred new positions well forward. The 6th Field guns moved forward after dark 9000 yards to gun areas south-west of Takrouna, and 47 Battery moved next day to what the battery log describes as a ‘very well covered posn’ in a large patch of cactus south of Takrouna.

The 21st was a busy day for the guns and the enemy artillery was also aggressive. Captain Spring's CB organisation had plenty to do. [38] The CRA's policy was to bring down heavy concentrations on any hostile batteries that could be accurately located, and on one of them this morning he ordered fire from nine regiments, a ratio of 48 guns to one and therefore a record for Eighth Army. The 5th Field records having fired 19 concentrations this day and six stonks, as well as troop and regimental targets engaged by observed fire; but 47 Battery, which moved forward during the day, did not take part until 3.15 p.m. Its first task was 10 rounds gun fire at what were thought to be 20 to 30 hostile guns.

Captain Harding of the 5th Field had gone forward and climbed Takrouna in the morning. He watched the infantry trying to engage enemy on the summit with a tiny mortar. Then he took over this task with an E Troop gun, at a range of 8000 yards on a target less than 100 yards from the ledge on which he was stationed. It was a risky venture, but it succeeded. From the top, he proceeded to bring down fire on enemy in the village on the hillside below, silencing mortars there and on ground to the north. Mainly for this, he was later awarded an MC. Captain Muirhead also arrived and engaged a nebelwerfer, but without success. The enemy in the lower village, however, were hard to get at and in the end a 17-pounder of H Troop, 32 Battery, was brought forward. This gun, H 3, fired 30 rounds all told and its high-velocity solid shot easily penetrated the damaged buildings and did much to drive the enemy out.

Visibility on 22 April was poor, heavy clouds appeared, and by mid-morning it was raining. Little observed fire was possible, but several divisional and corps tasks were fired. Takrouna, now firmly in New Zealand hands, was heavily shelled and the log of 47 Battery states this: ‘O.Ps. shelled off Takrouna’. The OP of D Troop, 28 Battery, signalled at 12.45 p.m. that the situation, presumably on Takrouna, was ‘Pretty sticky’. Next morning the CRA called for a 200-gun stonk on hostile guns and transport, and on the 24th under corps arrangements and with the corps commander observing from Takrouna, 14 regiments fired at a ridge ahead, Djebel Froukr, which directly overlooked the 6 Brigade area. This was a highly spectacular shoot, but its effect was doubtful; for the ridge was knife-edged and the all-important summit was hard to hit. [39]

In the night 24-25 April 6 Brigade staged a silent attack, hoping to meet no opposition. Three stonks were called for between 3.30 and 4 in the morning of the 25th to help the infantry and each was fired by eight regiments. A fourth was fired at 6.20 a.m. The 4th Field then heard from ‘Ike’ Parkinson, father and friend of the regiment, who now commanded 6 Brigade, that all objectives had been taken. The massive concentrations nevertheless continued, and in the afternoon 15 stonks were fired, each by 15 regiments. This fire could be observed even from RHQ of the 4th Field and seemed to be highly effective. Those who gave a thought to the date might have considered it to be an appropriate way to celebrate Anzac Day.

Never before had so many guns and so much ammunition been available to engage targets on the Divisional front—and never before had such speedy and effective methods existed of bringing down their fire in unison. Had it not been for the crushing weight and effectiveness of the artillery here, the infantry would have had a hard time indeed. For the enemy, too, had plenty of ammunition, he was making a last-ditch stand, the end was clearly in sight, and he had every reason to fire as many rounds as he could. Only the near-certainty of massive and indeed almost overwhelming reply from the great concentration of Eighth Army artillery served to restrain him, though even this could not fully neutralise his fire.

The 26th was by contrast quiet. In the night 26-27 April 6 Brigade was relieved, but the field artillery and some of the Bofors remained in action, though each regiment was allowed to withdraw one battery per day for a brief rest.

On the 28th all three regiments moved forward to new positions, mainly in olive groves north of Enfidaville, to support an attack by 56 ( London) Division. In the morning infantry of this division came pouring back through the gun lines in some disorder. Brigadier Weir ordered the gunners to man whatever small arms they could in defence of the guns. In the 4th Field area, however, elements of 4 Indian Division were resting, and these soon took up covering positions. No threat developed and in due course the hostile shellfire which had caused this setback was dealt with effectively by the usual massive concentrations of fire. The three enemy aircraft destroyed by the 14th Light Ack-Ack in April, according to the war diary, brought the total thus far to 59 aircraft destroyed, not counting those shot down in the month of October 1942.

May opened with several divisional tasks, a quick barrage, and (as an exercise) a new kind of pyramid barrage on a conical hill feature. Then, to the delight of the field gunners, who were by this time getting very weary indeed, all the New Zealand guns except the 6th Field withdrew in the night 1-2 May for a rest of about three days. The 6th Field had to stay behind to support 56 Division. With them were H Troop of 43 Battery guarding the wagon lines and a section of 36 Battery, which maintained the existing flash-spotting and sound-ranging bases on the front of 56 Division.

More reinforcements had arrived at the end of April. Detachments from each unit also met the Minister of Defence, the Hon. F. Jones, but he did not get a sympathetic hearing from gunners whose nerves were by this time getting rather ragged. The rest, welcome though it was, was all too short and on 4 May the artillery was moving once more to the front, this time farther inland in the Djebibina area.

[32] On 15 April the 6th Field were heavily shelled and suffered four killed and four wounded. Those killed included Gunners I. A. MacKechnie, R. Wilkin and R. A. C. J. Thomas.

[33] Major Kensington had been acting CO of the 5th Field; but Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow returned on 9 April and resumed command.

[34] Artillery supporting an attack by 4 Indian Division to the left opened fire earlier.

[35] Brig S. F. Catchpole, CBE, MC, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Huntly, 12 Apr 1916; salesman; BM 2 NZ Div Arty Nov 1944-Jul 1945; Associate Member representing the Territorial Force on the Army Board, 1964-.

[36] Catchpole and Muirhead were both awarded MCs, mainly for their work in this attack.

[37] Fire was also brought down by Captain Nathan of the 4th Field in close co-operation with an officer of 21 Battalion.

[38] Either this day or the next a marked enemy map was captured, probably by Captain Carson of the 4th Field, and, after Captain Robinson of X (Survey) Troop adjusted the grid, the CBO was able to arrange a thorough CB programme to deal with all the hostile batteries marked on it.

[39] The commander of 48 Battery, Major A. Marbeck, was killed early on the 24th when at an OP in the 26 Battalion area. His loss was ‘a blow to the Regt’, as the war diary remarks, and also to the 7th Anti-Tank, who warmly remembered him.

Four decorations were earned in this operation. Lance-Bombardier C. C. Daniell and Gunner K. Browne won the MM for extinguishing a fire on their portée while under fire. Although blown off the portée when it was hit again, they returned to put out the flames. Gunner C. Reeves of the 5th Field earned his MM for helping a wounded man back to an ADS from an OP under heavy fire. A similar action earned Captain P. Gilchrist of the 6th Field an MC. In an OP north-east of Takrouna his radio operator was gravely wounded. Under heavy shellfire, Gilchrist sought help from a tank some 50 yards away and arranged for it to evacuate the wounded man. He then returned to the OP, manned the wireless himself, and continued to observe for his guns.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Operations around Djebibina

Operations around Djebibina

The units moved off after several postponements, drove along the dusty road south-westwards towards Kairouan, and then turned north-westwards. The 4th Field despatched 25 Battery to join 19 French Brigade in the hills to the left or west of the Divisional position, and its commander, Major Bretherton, acted as liaison officer with the French force. The rest of the regiment camped for the night in an area that is described as ‘very cactusy’. Next day it was found that the 78th Field, RA, whose positions the 4th Field occupied, had left behind its 309 Battery to replace 25 Battery. The 5th Field put 47 Battery into position in the evening of the 4th, its vehicles coming under shellfire as they approached the gun positions, which were very close to the infantry FDLs in an area which still harboured many S-mines.

The RAF and USAAF had maintained their dominance of the skies to such an extent that a sudden raid by eight FW19os with anti-personnel bombs in the late afternoon of 5 May came as a shock, a reminder of the ‘bad old days’ when aircraft overhead could not be assumed to be friendly. Three of the bombs landed within 100 yards of the Headquarters ACV, but they did no harm.

When Lieutenant Russell
[40] and a party of X (Survey) Troop checked the survey of positions for the 5th Field carried out hastily the previous evening, he found that some of them were in front of the FDLs. It was dangerous work. Only 47 Battery had gone into position overnight and, when the position was reassessed on 5 May, 27 and 28 Batteries were sited some 4000 yards to the rear. Meanwhile 47 Battery dug in its command post and was getting comfortable when an armoured scout car of C Troop was blown up on a mine. Captain Haslett
[41] had a lucky escape, but Bombardier Ramsay
[42] was killed, a gunner was wounded, and another gunner was badly shocked. Only C Troop fired this day—on a hostile battery. Next day 27 and 28 Batteries and RHQ moved forward before dawn and they did so gingerly. Later in the morning a B Troop OP vehicle also struck a mine, but without harm to its occupants. Then Major Snadden's jeep went over a mine and his driver, Gunner Gilbert, [43] suffered fatal injuries. Snadden was sent back for a few days' rest and Captain Robertshaw
[44] took over 28 Battery. With the end of the North African campaign so obviously close, these last-minute casualties were hard to take and for the 5th Field it was somewhat nerve-racking.

5 brigade operations north-east of djebibina, 4–8 may 1943

For the next two days, therefore, it was just as well that there was plenty of work to keep the field gunners busy. A series of counter-battery stonks in the afternoon of the 7th was followed by harassing fire after dark and then more CB fire. These tasks were shared also by 5 AGRA, with field and medium units. Some tasks were in support of the French corps. The 25th Battery of the 4th Field, which had far more ammunition available than the French batteries, also found plenty of targets.

The air was electric with rumours about the fighting elsewhere in Tunisia and of the impending surrender of the Axis forces. On the 7th news arrived of the entry of American troops into Bizerta and of the 11th Hussars into Tunis itself. In the light of this the current operations in the heavily mined and booby-trapped country north of Djebebina seemed rather pointless. Then, on the 8th, the 4th Field, including 25 Battery, moved hastily back in the evening to the laager area between Sidi bou Ali and Enfidaville, preparatory to moving back into the line vacated on 1 May. This was, if anything even less welcome. The 5th Field, with 32 and 42 Batteries, stayed one more day with 5 Brigade in the existing area.

forward north of Enfidaville to simulate the registration of targets, to put down smoke at times, and generally to disguise the thinning out of guns that was taking place on that front. When they finished this task the two guns went back to the B Echelon area for a rest. By first light on 4 May the rest of the regiment was deployed in olive trees near the town, and at noon they began a series of harassing fire tasks that was to last for 26 hours. The enemy replied vigorously and a heavy concentration at dusk on the RHQ area killed Lance-Sergeant Dickens
[45] and wounded a gunner. When the series ended at 2 p.m. on 5 May the 6th Field fired counter-battery concentrations. Then, in the evening, the regiment, with the 4th Field, RA, and the 1st Medium, fired a mock barrage to simulate a tank and infantry attack. By the end of the day ammunition expended amounted to 3000 rounds.

General Freyberg was now in temporary command of 10 Corps and wanted it to push north of Enfidaville towards Hammamet. The 6th Field therefore fired a short but intense programme in the evening of 8 May to support the first stage of this plan, an attack by 56 Division north of Enfidaville. In 55 minutes the regiment fired 4000 rounds. The enemy, too, was active, having detected the forward movement before dark, and Lance-Bombardier James, [46] a C Troop artificer, was killed. During the barrage a limber of 30 Battery was hit in its pit and set on fire; but the gun crew escaped harm.

Dumping on the 9th brought the ammunition stocks up to 700 rounds per gun in preparation for the next phase, which started at 3.35 p.m. The fire programme was a series of concentrations with a total expenditure of about 5500 rounds. While it was being fired the enemy laid down ‘fairly intense’ counter-battery fire. The 4th Field had arrived and 25 and 26 Batteries went into their former positions north of Enfidaville, while 46 Battery took up a slightly different position to the west. This regiment prepared DF tasks, then new ones were ordered for the positions which 56 Division hoped to capture. The attack, however, failed and the first series of tasks ‘still stood’.

The 6th Field and associated artillery reverted to the CRA's command on the 9th. That evening newly-arrived 4th Field men were interested to hear a BBC announcement that fighting on the Eighth Army front had ceased. The comments this drew, against a background of gun fire echoing and booming in the hills and mingled with the shrieking of nebelwerfer rockets, were quite unprintable.

Some support was given to an early-morning attack on the left by French forces on 11 May. Then there followed the heaviest counter-battery programme of the whole campaign. In four hours 31 hostile batteries were massively engaged and RAF bombers also joined in, guided by smoke fired by the New Zealand guns. Great clouds of airburst concentrations formed over the gun areas as the enemy fired furiously to get rid of his remaining ammunition; but his gunnery was hasty and inaccurate and he did little harm. Mac Troop, also firing air bursts, gave the enemy some of his own back. Bombardier Farquhar, [47] who was in charge of signals of A Troop of the 4th Field, won an MM this day for bravery and persistence in repairing his telephone lines under heavy fire.

A new type of nebelwerfer or some similar rocket projector of long range and heavy calibre appeared at this stage, and on 12 May it was most troublesome. RHQ of the 4th Field suffered a severe shake-up in the morning. One rocket landed 25 yards from the main office truck and another very close to the RAP truck. The CO's tank and jeep and another office truck were damaged. Except for the effects of the blast, however, nobody in RHQ was injured. RHQ of the 11th Field, RA, was not so lucky. One rocket burst by the artillery board and killed several people including the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel W. P. Hobbs, a superb officer. [48] An unexploded rocket was examined with interest and found to be of 210-millimetre calibre: earlier examples had been 150-millimetres.

RHQ of the 4th Field lost no time in calling for fire on the source of its troubles. The long trail of smoke left by the rockets made them easy to trace to their source; but this was often a gully not easily accessible to 25-pounder fire. At 2.35 p.m. and 3 p.m. Mac Troop engaged multiple rocket launchers with airbursts.

As the afternoon drew on and the guns continued to thunder in the hills, great explosions took place in the rear areas of the enemy, and in some places white flags appeared. At RHQ of the 4th Field a series of intercepted wireless messages provided a kind of running commentary on surrender negotiations. By 6 p.m. 2000 prisoners had marhced in; but still enemy shells the and rockets kept coming over and the New Zealand guns replied with far greater weight and accuracy. It was exasperating that the last pocket of resistance in the whole of Tunisia should be that facing 10 Corps and that the New Zealand regiments, which were now the senior regiments in the whole of the army group, should have to continue thus when on all other fronts the guns were silent. A triumphant entry into Tunis would have been much more to the taste of the New Zealand gunners. At the end of the day the 4th Field, the senior regiment in North Africa, had fired over 7000 rounds and the 6th Field had fired 3541 rounds (bringing its total for 23 days to 48,902 rounds, an amazing expenditure). Isolated enemy pockets continued to fire during the night and the 6th Field put down harassing fire.

The morning of 13 May was sunny and all guns were still in action; but, as the 6th Field diary puts it, there was ‘nothing to shoot at’. Resistance was still evident to the left, where enemy were reluctant to surrender to French colonial troops; but this soon ceased. On the New Zealand front the gun A1 of the 4th Field—the senior gun—fired six or seven rounds about 9.30 a.m. at a cluster of vehicles. These were the last rounds of the land war in North Africa, and after the distant echoes of their explosions died down, the hills were almost painfully silent. Men of the 90th Light Division, which the New Zealand gunners first knew as the special Africa Division outside Tobruk in November 1941, marched past the guns into captivity, bearing themselves well and earning admiration.

Outwardly the New Zealand gunners took it all calmly. Some of them strolled forward to look over the hills which had hitherto blocked their view. They saw great plumes of black smoke rising up and prisoners or would-be prisoners streaming down the hillsides. Brigadier Weir and his CBO, Captain Spring, drove forward to inspect the results of their massive CB work. In the main they were satisfied; but here and there German guns sited close to steep reverse slopes had come through unscathed. A party from 36 Survey Battery conducted a similar check of hostile battery locations and was surprised at the number of dummy gun positions.

The 5th Field had been ready to drive forward and take its place alongside the other two field regiments, but at the last moment the move was cancelled. Parties had spent 12 May on the beach and more went on the 13th. In the evening, when all were back in the rest area south of Enfidaville, the regiment held a thanksgiving service, and when the padre, the Rev. C. G. Palmer, [49] had finished, Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow spent some time talking to his men.

[40]
Capt N. D. Russell; Opotiki; born England, 9 Oct 1917; surveyor.

[41]
Maj G. L. Haslett; Auckland; born Auckland, 17 Nov 1912; commercial traveller.

[42]
Bdr T. J. Ramsay; born England, 22 Jan 1911; nutritionist; killed in action 5 May 1943.

[43]
Gnr M. L. Gilbert; born Akaroa, 5 Nov 1914; truck driver; died of wounds 6 May 1943.

[44]
Capt F. D. Robertshaw; born Dannevirke, 8 Aug 1914; solicitor.

[45]
L-Sgt L. G. Dickens; born Invercargill, 4 Aug 1916; clerk; killed in action 4 May 1943.

[46]
L-Bdr H. W. James; born Christchurch, 4 Sep 1905; farmer; killed in action 8 May 1943.

[47]
Bdr G. E. J. Farquhar, MM; Lower Hutt; born Wellington, 18 Jan 1915; clerk.

[48] Hobbs had been attached to 34 Battery at Maadi in July 1940 to give the anti-tankers the benefit of his experince with the 3rd RHA on the Libyan frontier and he had won their whole-hearted allegiance. When the old hands of 34 Battery heard of Hobb's death they were much upset.

[49] Very Rev. C. G. Palmer, m.i.d.; Hamilton; born Christchurch, 19 Feb 1909; Anglican minister; p.w. Bardia, 27 Nov 1941-2 Jan 1942; Dean of Waikato.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Return to Maadi

Return to Maadi

Leave to Tunis began at once and one man per troop left on the 13th. More went unofficially and others went in the other direction, to Kairouan, one of the holiest cities of Islam. Next day Artillery Headquarters issued a movement order and Egypt was the destination. Vehicle maintenance at once became an urgent task.

After a Divisional Artillery church parade on the 15th, conducted by Padre Buck, [50] formerly chaplain of the 4th Field, the CRA gave an address and presented some immediate awards. When the 5th Field returned to its lines there was a further speech, this time of farewell from ‘Gussy’ Glasgow. He was to assume command of Base Camp with the rank of colonel. The hard task of following him as CO of the regiment was to fall on the tall shoulders of Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton.

On the 16th, when all too few of the gunners had had a chance of sampling the delights of Tunis in a carnival mood, the Divisional Artillery was on the road and moving south. The route was inland by way of Kairouan and then through Gabes, past the Mareth line with its formidable defences, through Medenine, Ben Gardane, and Suani Ben Adem to a staging area south of Tripoli on the 18th. There the 3572 men and 884 vehicles spent a day resting, and in the course of it they had to hand over to local authorities trailers, ammunition and jeeps. In return they received Patriotic parcels, mail and a little beer, and in the evening the Kiwi Concert Party gave a memorable performance.

The next staging area was Benghazi on the 24th, with a rest next day in the course of which many gunners saw the town for the first time and marvelled at the huge aerodromes for long-range bombers of the RAF and USAAF. Then came the winding journey through the foothills of the Green Mountain, very different from the desert route through El Haseiat on the first of the Divisional left hooks. The journey, when it ended at Maadi Camp on 1 June, added up to 1820 miles (taking an average of the distances recorded by the pick-ups of 47 Battery). The 4th Field were pleased to be greeted on arrival by Gordon Stewart, recovered from the wounds he suffered at Medenine.

At parties that night the news leaked out that furlough to New Zealand was in the offing, and next day details of the ‘Ruapehu Scheme’ were announced. It was for selected officers and married men of the first three echelons and a proportion of single men chosen by ballot. They would spend three months at home and then, in a second scheme, all who missed the ballot were to go. Meanwhile leave to Cairo began at once, and within a few days all but the Ruapehu men became eligible for a fortnight's leave and took their turn. On the 14th the Ruapehu men left—in the 7th Anti-Tank they numbered five officers and 144 other ranks; in the 4th Field seven officers and 204 other ranks. With upwards of half the remaining strength of units on leave in Egypt or Palestine the second half of June was very quiet. The 14th Light Ack-Ack and 36 Survey Battery, most of whose members had sailed with the 4th Reinforcements or later and therefore did not qualify for Ruapehu or its successor, Wakatipu, felt a bit neglected.

[50]
Rev. F. H. Buck, MC (First World War); born Nova Scotia, 24 Dec 1895; Anglican minister; in First World War served in Canadian Expeditionary Force; died California, 5 Oct 1951.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 16 — Italy: The Sangro and Orsogna

Contents

- [section]
p. 515

- Burg el Arab p. 516
- The Move to Italy p. 518
- Marking Time at Taranto p. 519
- A New Kind of War in Italy p. 520
- The Journey to the Adriatic Front p. 521
- Edging Towards the Sangro River p. 523
- The Crossing of the Sangro p. 526
- Guardiagrele and Orsogna p. 529
- The Second Attack on Orsogna p. 532
- The Third Attack p. 536
- The Final Attack p. 537
- The Casa War
- Guns Firing Short p. 544
- Famous Landmarks p. 545
- The Ack-Ack Record p. 546
- Survey Work
- Withdrawing from the Orsogna Front p. 547

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE war was far from Cairo in the summer of 1943 and the night-time blackout became a ‘blue-out’. In Maadi Camp the artillery units were quartered close together in and around what had been the Artillery Training Depot (later the 32nd Field, the training regiment at Base), except for the 14th Light Ack-Ack in a tented camp in Q Area. There was an artillery NAAFI, the Lowry Hut, the new El Djem open-air theatre; the YMCA and Shafto's ramshackle cinema were not far away, and in the shady outskirts of Maadi proper there were the cool Maadi Tent, with improved facilities, and the camp swimming pool. If it was not home it was the next best place.

Training began in earnest in the heat of mid-July—marching drill, gun drill, rifle drill, signalling, and even route marches, culminating in a Divisional Artillery parade and march past at the end of the month. The day before this, in a sports contest with the 6th South African Divisional Artillery, the honours were shared, the South Africans winning the cricket and athletics and losing the swimming and tennis. At a divisional sports meeting on 11 August the 14th Light Ack-Ack were equal first with the 20th Armoured Regiment and the 4th Field were third.

In the meantime the field regiments had received new 25-pounders and had calibrated them, and the Divisional Artillery had moved to a training area in the desert not very far from the Pyramids. There the gunners spent three weeks, first in battery training, then regimental training, and the final week in Divisional Artillery training. [1] It was a thorough course of advanced training. Some features of it were necessarily tied to desert conditions; but desert formation was dropped and the regiments and batteries deployed off roads and tracks with careful attention to march discipline on the road. In the course of the observed shooting the CRA had a contest with Major Fisher of the 5th Field to verify a short bracket and Fisher won. The judge's decision, however, was later disputed. Despite Fisher's excellent shooting, it was alleged that he had failed to establish his short bracket. But the enduring question is whether it is courage or temerity when a battery commander in such a contest allows it to be claimed on his behalf that he beat his CRA. [2]

The exercise ended with two days in the desert near Helwan, starting with a night occupation of a divisional position. A ‘pilot gun’ from the 4th Field accompanied the reconnaissance party from the Mena area and registered targegts as soon as a gun position was established. Meteor corrections were obtained from airbursts and the concentrations fired on this information were particularly accurate.

Brigade exercises followed. With 6 Brigade were the 6th Field and 31 and 41 Batteries. With 4 Armoured Brigade—infantry converted to armour—were the 4th Field only. Finally, with 5 Brigade were the 5th Field and 32 and 42 Batteries. The 14th Light Ack-Ack had the good fortune to go, battery by battery, to a practice camp near Alexandria and there enjoyed plenty of swimming. The artillery with 6 Brigade also had swimming—in the Red Sea—at the end of the exercise.

Meanwhile those destined to go home on furlough under the Wakatipu scheme left their units and there were many new arrivals from the 9th and 10th Reinforcements. The latter included many ‘dehydrated officers’-NCOs who had previously held commissions in New Zealand-and some of these even gave up their ‘stripes’ to expedite their posting to a unit. The CRA had interviewed selected ones and the most promising of these were in due course reinstated as officers before being posted. [3] Since the Ruapehu and Wakatipu schemes had removed many of the most experienced officers and other ranks, [4] this increment of men with prior experience in positions of responsibility was doubly welcome.

[1] See Appendix I, Training Directive of 1 August 1943.

[2] The case is recorded of an infantry brigade staff which was more tactful and always allowed the brigadier to win at chess ( Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier, pp. 192-3).

[3] Others were recommissioned when they proved themselves in action.

[4] The only senior officers who went in the Ruapehu scheme were Lieutenant-Colonels Sprosen and Stewart. Sprosen's place in the 14th Light Ack-Ack was taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Kensington. No regimental commanders left under the Wakatipu scheme until Lieutenant-Colonel Philip of the 4th Field wnet from Italy in December.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Burg el Arab

Burg el Arab

The next move was to Burg el Arab, halfway between Alexandria and El Alamein, for divisional exercises. Before it began the vehilcles were sprayed with a paint of sombgre grey, which prompted the usual guessing game about which theatre of operations had been chosen for the Division. When the invasion of Italy was announced on 3 September that country became a hot favourite; but some hopeful ones bet on England and others, the pessimistic ones, on Burma. The obvious choice, had New Zealand's interests been paramount, was the Pacific; but it was already clear that the Government in Wellington had somehow been talked out of that.

Burg el Arab, then, was the immediate goal and by the current plan almost all the gunners, like almost all the infantry, were to walk much of the way in a series of fast night route marches —97 miles in seven nights. Only the 4t Field as a whole and transport parties from other units would miss this test of endurance. The idea was to toughen up the men for a winter campaign in Italy; but it misfired badly. Preceded by a series of more modest route marches, it might have done some good. In the event it crippled many gunners for a considerable period and caused bad blistering which made the journey an ordeal for most men. A passing vehicle ran into the back of E Troop of 42 Battery as the column marched along the road from Mena towards Amiriya on the first night and injured two men, one of whom had to be evacuated. From then onwards the columns carried lanterns fore and aft. The 5 Brigade artillery marched for six nights, covered nearly 90 miles, and then the march was called off. Artillery Headquarters and the 6 Brigade gunners marched two nights only and then were picked up to take part in a brigade exercise near Burg el Arab. The 31st and 34th Batteries marched three nights, about 43 miles, and then were carried the rest of the way. Sick parades at Burg el Arab were inordinately long and some gunners were still limping when they embarked for Italy early in October.

The exercises near Burg el Arab were marred by a tragedy. Three shells from a 5th Field gun fell short in the course of a lifting barrage and they killed four Maoris and wounded six. The implications were even more serious. If the confidence of the infantry was undermined they might not keep up close to the barrage when it came to the real thing and this could cause heavy losses.

An error at the guns was only one of many possible causes of such a disaster and many of them were beyond the control of the gunners: imperfections of shell or charge, of gun or instrument, even of map or communication, and local vagaries of air conditions—these are some of them. In training as well as in battle men and machines operated under great stress.

Already the three New Zealand field regiments had fired over a million rounds in practice and in anger, and over each of them as the gun was fired there hung a question mark. Would there be a savage shattering of the gun itself or an explosion as the shell left the barrel, or would it continue on its mission only to hit friend instead of foe? No one was more distressed than the gunners when they did hear of such a mishap.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Move to Italy

The Move to Italy

Captain Sidey
[5] of Artillery Headquarters left Burg el Arab at 3.30 a.m. on 24 September with a tiny advanced party representing all the regiments. They were bound for an ‘unknown destination’, as the war diary describes it, and their departure attracted no attention. Then, at the end of the month, all New Zealand badges and insignia and all New Zealand markings on vehicles were banished from sight. Anti-malarial precautions shortened the odds on Italy as the destination of the Division and disqualified England. Preparing vehicles and equipment for a sea voyage and then packing, the issue of winter clothing, the tightening of censorship, injections against typhus, and the exchange of Egyptian currency for British Military Authority (BMA) notes—these, in early October, were stepping stones to Italy, as everyone by this time knew. In due course units, less transport parties (which stayed at Burg el Arab), moved to a vast transit camp at Ikingi Maryut, near Amiriya, and were each equally divided between Ship Camps A and B, corresponding with the ships in which they were destined to sail. The idea in relation to each unit was not to carry all the eggs in one basket: if a ship were sunk the unit would not be crippled.

The few men in each unit who had sailed for Greece 30 months earlier felt as though they had seen the film before, especially when embarkation day came and the gunners were grotesquely burdened with personal gear (including five blankets) for the march to the transport. This time it was not by train but by RASC lorries that gunners travelled to the docks. The first flight sailed on 5 October. ‘On board by 1130 hours’, the diary of 36 Survey Battery states, ‘after heavy struggle owing to huge packs carried by men.’ This draft also included Artillery Headquarters, the 6th Field, the 7th Anti-Tank less 31 and 32 Batteries, the 14th Light Ack-Ack and their various signals and ordnance sections. The two ships were the Reina del Pacifico of 18,000 tons and the Dunottar Castle. [6]

The first flight sailed in a calm sea along the North African coast, passing close to Derna, and then in a heavy wind and choppy sea, along the coast of Sicily, sighting Mount Etna in the distance. A message from General Freyberg stated the obvious, that the destination was Italy. At Taranto on the 9th the troops disembarked into lighters and marched five miles to a bivouac area in a rocky wasteland overlooking the harbour. Some of the bulky items of personal gear went by lorry and on arrival some bedrolls were missing. There followed almost daily route marches and much football until the end of the month, when the transport began to arrive. The rest of the units and sub-units sailed on 18 October in the second flight in the Nieuw Amsterdam and Letitia, with some officers in the Llangibby Castle. The local bianco was cheap and popular and a bottle of good vermouth could be had for less than 100 lire (five shillings). Evenings were spent mainly sitting round fires sipping and talking.

[5]
Capt J. M. Sidey, m.i.d.; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 16 Mar 1911; stock agent.

[6] There were three ships in the convoy; but it seems that New Zealand gunners travelled only in these two.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Marking Time at Taranto

Marking Time at Taranto

The CRA left with General Freyberg on the 27th to study the battlefront. Next day in the 5th Field Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton paraded his men and addressed them in honour of the memory of the first CRA, Brigadier Miles, whose death in Spain (after a brilliant escape from a prisoner-of-war camp) had just been reported. In the afternoon it began to rain, and in the evening it turned into a drenching downpour which continued all night, eased only slightly on the 29th, and carried on into the night of the 30th, by which time dozens of gunners were flooded out. The rain also gave them plenty of work on roads and drainage ditches. It was a sample of what the Italian winter had in store for them and taught them to camp with an eye to the fall of the ground and to make their ‘bivvies’ secure.

The transport parties had meanwhile had a succession of demonstrations of inefficient army and waterfront administration. One of them, for example, left Burg el Arab on the 6th, staged at the Wadi Natrun, and reached a vast military vehicle park at Suez on the 7th. They stayed there and had to be driven nearly three miles to a transit camp for meals, which were appallingly bad. The officer in charge was told that the loading lists had been completely changed; but he could not obtain revised lists. Lorries had been packed at Burg el Arab on the understanding that the cranes to be used could lift 10 tons. Now many of them had to be unloaded because the cranes could not lift more than five tons. Their loads had to be repacked when the vehicles were aboard. According to one diary, there was ‘a lot of duck-shovelling of vehicles from one ship to another’. Loading nevertheless was finished on the 13th, but it was not until the 16th that the ships sailed along the canal to Geneifa. They passed Port Said next day and sailed in a convoy from Alexandria on the 19th. For the next day or two the North African coast was near. Then at first light on the 23rd Malta was in sight and the convoy anchored off Valetta in the afternoon and stayed there until the afternoon of the 26th. [7] In a thunderstorm on the 29th unloading began at Bari. Vehicles went from the wharf to a marshalling yard and from there in small groups to Taranto. The last vehicles of this group arrived on the 31st, but others kept coming spasmodically for the next few weeks. Because of the poorly organised move from Egypt to Italy the units had spent three useless weeks at Taranto, hamstrung for lack of vehicles. The hasty move to Greece in 1941 had been far better planned and carried out. [8]

[7] No shore leave was allowed, but some gunners dived overboard and swam ashore. On their return they were charged, but they were unanimous that their day in this historic and heroic city was worth the seven days' pay they were fined.

[8] The strengths of the units on embarkation, including attached Signals and Ordnance personnel, were:

HQ 2 NZ Div Arty | 76
4 Fd Regt | 746
5 Fd Regt | 716
6 Fd Regt | 813
7 A-Tk Regt | 686
14 Lt AA Regt | 749
36 Svy Bty | 284

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A New Kind of War in Italy

A New Kind of War in Italy

The Allied line in Italy at this stage ran almost north-south from the River Sangro to the Gulf of Gaeta north of Naples, with Eighth Army on the right facing west and north-west over the rugged Abruzzi Mountains. Like the American Fifth Army, it was up against the German winter line. The Eighth Army hoped to break this on the Adriatic coast and the Fifth Army at Cassino. The Division was not well-organised for winter fighting in the Italian mountains. Its armoured brigade would have little chance of exerting anything like its full strength and two infantry brigades were not enough.

Even the artillery suffered disabilities. The 25-pounder, which had served wonderfully well in mobile desert operations, had certain disadvantages in positional mountain warfare. It was outranged by the 105 and 88, as well as by the 150s and 17os, and its shell was not likely to be effective against the strong defences to be expected in the enemy's winter line. The Division really needed its own medium regiment. The CRA could not always do with borrowed regiments what he might think of doing with his own. In the event, however, RA medium units were to serve the Division well, either under the CRA's command or under various AGRAs, and the 5.5s in particular were to demonstrate remarkable mobility and versatility. Heavy guns or howitzers would be invaluable, where the terrain and ground conditions permitted their deployment; but they were not likely to became available for some time to come. Even the fire drills developed to a high polish in North Africa would be less useful in the mountains, where the fighting would probably take the form of a complicated series of small-scale engagements, each in its own little pocket of land. Calls for support were likely to be many and varied, and in the tortured Abruzzi country the usefulness of standard patterns of fire like the stonk would be much restricted. Even the climate would have its effects, some of them serious: rapid changes of temperature and sudden violent winds would certainly be experienced. Predicted fire would often be called for, and the Italian maps with the British grid superimposed did not inspire confidence in all quarters.

On 1 November the CRA lectured to regimental and battery commanders about the difficulties for the gunners of the hill and coastal sectors, and he then discussed in detail the problems facing the field, anti-tank, ack-ack and survey batteries and the type of work they would have to expect.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Journey to the Adriatic Front

The Journey to the Adriatic Front

On the 6th the Staff Captain drove to Lucera, 160 miles towards the front, and on the 8th the rest of Artillery Headquarters, the 14th Light Ack-Ack, and 36 Survey Battery followed, with representatives of other units. They staged at Altamura, where the wind was strong and bitterly cold and the gunners were in no mood to explore the town of 30,000-odd people with its ancient cathedral. Next day they drove right through to Lucera and camped up to 10 miles beyond it.

The 4th and 5th Field followed one day behind this schedule, reaching the Lucera area on the 10th. For many drivers whose windscreens had been removed for desert fighting and not yet replaced the journey was an ordeal, and on the 11th, as the 46 Battery diary (among other sources) points out, there was what was called a ‘Salvage expedition for truck windshields, canopies and general waterproofing gear’—a rather more polite description than certain British and American drivers might have used. Wrecked buildings and bridges on the route marked the path of Eighth Army the previous month and Foggia was a mass of ruins. The 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank (less 31 and 32 Batteries) left Taranto on the 13th and reached Lucera on the 14th, and 31 and 32 Batteries came forward with 5 Brigade on the 18th and 19th.

The Division, however, was given no time to gather its scattered resources at Lucera. On the 11th the CRA took two of his own staff officers and one or two others, including Captain Robinson of X (Survey) Troop, forward to form a ‘Tac HQ’— a tiny tactical headquarters intended to operate as far forward as possible, with the bare essentials of transport and communications. They lunched at Furci and in the afternoon the CRA reconnoitred forward. Next day Artillery Headquarters, X Troop, and ‘Z parties’ of the 5th Field and 14th Light Ack-Ack [9] set out early for Furci. The rest of 36 Survey Battery followed later and independently. On the 13th the 5th Field and 14th Light Ack-Ack moved up.

On the same day the BM, Major Cade, studied the condition of the roads and the traffic on them with a view to moving Headquarters even farther forward. He found them badly congested owing to demolitions. The journey from Lucera to Furci, on the other hand, had been an agreeable one. It was through rolling country, covered with vineyards at first and with many stone walls. After San Severo it was more open, past many steep hills speckled with small oak trees. The roads were well graded and the banks bricked up. High on the hilltops were picturesque villages. When Artillery Headquarters moved forward in small parties in the afternoon of the 13th it was over such difficult roads that the ACV had to be left behind.

[9] These parties included the COs, the battery commanders, and various other key officers.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Edging Towards the Sangro River

Edging Towards the Sangro River

Slowly the 5th Field edged its way forward on the 14th with 28 Battery leading. The guns went into position beside the road to Atessa and a mile and a half from the village, RHQ was set up half a mile back along the road, 47 Battery laagered on the east side of the road level with RHQ, and in the afternoon 27 Battery took over the positions of R Battery of the 52nd Field, RA. At the Aliakmon River in northern Greece E Troop of 28 Battery had been responsible for the first NZA 25-pounder rounds fired in earnest in the Second World War and the first on the mainland of Europe. Now it was the turn of D Troop of 28 Battery, and when this troop began to register targets at 2.08 p.m. it opened the NZA account in Italy. The enemy also opened his account against the NZA, rather more effectively, by shelling 27 Battery as it crossed a bridge below Casalanguida, hitting a quad, and damaging two guns. Several gunners were slightly wounded, but they stayed in action. At 10 a.m. the 3rd Field, RA, had come under the CRA's command when the New Zealand Division took over the sector of 8 Indian Division and one of the Indian brigades. The 41st Ack-Ack Battery had deployed in bright moonlight the night before covering the bridge and also the village of Casalanguida, together with another bridge in the area and the gun positions now occupied by 27 and 28 Batteries.

The enemy was slowly falling back under pressure from Indians and the Essex Regiment, but he knew the ground and had it well taped, and on the 16th he shelled Artillery Headquarters accurately with a single gun all afternoon and part of the night. He hit several vehicles, but caused only light wounds to one or two men, including the Staff Captain, Myers. [10] Meanwhile the 5th Field guns had fired concentrations on the village of Archi, north-west of Atessa, and also shelled two crossings of the Sangro in the evening of the 15th in support of an attack on the left flank. An FOO of 28 Battery accompanied the Punjabis who attacked. B Flight of 651 Air OP Squadron came under the CRA's command on the 16th, the first of many such attachments, all of them most valuable in hilly country.

The 4th Field went into action just east of the 5th Field and both regiments fired smoke and concentrations in support of a thrust by the Punjabis and 19 NZ Armoured Regiment in which the village of Perano was seized, opening the way to the Sangro itself. This was the first time the New Zealand field guns were able to support the New Zealand armour.

the capture of perano, 18 november 1943

Meanwhile the 6th Field had been moving forward and on the 18th it suffered its first casualty in Italy, Gunner Graham, [11] wounded while on reconnaissance. Next day the guns went in well forward, no more than a mile and a half from the Sangro. On the 20th they fired their first rounds.

A heavy programme was planned to support a crossing of the Sangro and Indians and men of the 14th Light Ack-Ack helped to bring forward an adequate supply of ammunition for the 6th Field. The 4th and 5th Field moved forward in readiness. The river was running too high, however, and the crossing had to be postponed. All the field regiments could do in the meantime was to engage hostile batteries; but the enemy soon denied even this by moving most of his guns back out of range. A troop of the 80th Medium which came under the CRA's command for CB work on the 23rd was therefore most welcome. The need for it—and the limitations of the 25-pounder against existing enemy equipment—was underlined later in the day when F Troop of 47 Battery was heavily and accurately shelled and forced to move.

Early on the 23rd all three New Zealand field regiments and also the 3rd Field supported an extremely difficult attack by the Indian brigade on Sant' Angelo beyond the Sangro. The enemy counter-attacked and the guns fired many DF tasks. In the course of these the gun A3 of 25 Battery suffered a premature which damaged the breech ring and block and burst the eardrums of Sergeant Burden. [12] Two days later RHQ of the 5th Field was heavily shelled, at least one man was killed, [13] and five or six men were wounded.

The enemy artillery was outnumbered, but not outranged and certainly not outclassed. The RAF was active in bombing hostile batteries, but in such rugged country it was hard to hit them. On the 24th the CRA himself conducted a shoot against an enemy OP beyond the Sangro. He started at 10 a.m. and after a 46-degree switch from zero line in eight rounds he established a verified short bracket in record time. By 10.35 a.m. the 4th Field engaged the target with three rounds gun fire. ‘Major Fisher [of the 5th Field] was duly informed’, according to the Headquarters diary.

The rain which kept the Sangro flooding also damaged the overtaxed roads throughout the area and turned gun positions and HQ areas into quagmires. E Troop of 46 Battery had got into position on the 20th by manhandling guns one at a time, each with about 100 men on drag ropes. In the next few days the ground got worse, and the 14th Light Ack-Ack had large parties out under frightful conditions labouring to keep the roads and tracks open. On the 24th a TSM of 41 Battery, WO II Kidd, [14] was seriously wounded by a shell splinter through the face which caused him the loss of an eye. Two days later the 14th Light Ack-Ack opened its Italian account when A4 briefly engaged two Messerschmitts. On the 27th Lieutenant-Colonel Kensington reconnoitred with the commander of 41 Battery positions from which the Bofors could fire along the brigade and battalion boundaries to guide the attacking infantry, and also to protect the Bailey bridge which was to be erected across the Sangro in the big attack.

[10]
Capt K. B. Myers, MBE, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 5 Mar 1907; merchant; wounded 16 Nov 1943.

[11]
Cpl A. Graham; born Dunedin, 18 Jul 1911; surveyor; wounded 18 Nov 1943.

[12]
Sgt E. W. R. Burden; Nelson; born England, 30 Sep 1906; carpenter; twice wounded.

[13] Gunner K. R. Osborn.

[14]
WO II K. M. Kidd; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 8 Jan 1918; clerk; wounded 24 Nov 1943.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Crossing of the Sangro

The Crossing of the Sangro

A German tank thrust across the Sangro under existing conditions was out of the question and there was little need for anti-tank defence. The anti-tankers, especially of 33 Battery, therefore provided working parties, mainly for dumping ammunition for the field guns. In the early hours of the 26th the four 17-pounders of Q Troop of 34 Battery left Casalanguida, reached a lying-up area below Atessa by dawn and stayed out of sight of the enemy until dark. Then Q1 under Sergeant McDonald
[15] and Q4 under Sergeant Carmichael
[16] moved forward to take up positions on the wide stretch of flat land which formed part of the bed of the Sangro, about 1000 yards from the river itself. Q1 dug in near a farmhouse on a corner where the road from Atessa joined another road running up the Sangro valley. The gun was in a grove of young bamboos and well camouflaged. Q4 was hidden among the farm buildings all that night and next day, about 400 yards to the right or north of Q1, with the gun barrel poking round a corner of the house, between it and a haystack.

These two 17-pounders really opened the attack across the Sangro. In the half light before dark on the 27th they opened fire. Their targets were houses or farm buildings which would probably harbour machine guns to oppose the infantry after the river crossing. The ranges, up to as high as 4500 yards, were mostly well above the limit on the range drums; but the fire was extremely accurate. Q1 fired 70 rounds in about 35 minutes, though with 11 misfires from faulty ammunition. Q4 fired about 60 rounds. Almost all of them were direct hits and the high-velocity solid shot did much damage. Their fire was augmented by that of Vickers guns firing from the hills behind. The tremendous blast of Q4, however, ruined the roof of the farmhouse alongside which the gun fired and by the time the crew ceased fire the large haystacks nearby had disappeared. Two escaped prisoners of war sheltering in one of the target houses were driven into the open and succeeded in crossing the river to safety.

Zero hour for the attack was 2.45 a.m. on the 28th. The artillery programme was not, by previous standards, particularly heavy and it could not include a creeping barrage because of the nature of the operation and the lie of the land. The three New Zealand regiments, the 3rd Field, RA, and the troop of the 8oth Medium all fired timed concentrations, each ending with smoke and followed by a 15-minute pause. In 46 Battery, for example, B Troop fired four tasks and E Troop three. They carried on until 6.15 a.m., like all the other battery programmes, and in the case of 46 Battery entailed the expenditure of about 205 rounds per gun. The guns A1, A2 and A4 of 41 Battery fired along their appointed lanes to mark the boundaries for the infantry, each firing one round a minute for about 100 minutes. Six guns of the battery, including A1 and A2, were deployed at first light to guard the Bailey bridge.

crossing the sangro river, 28 november 1943

Confined by the hills, the noise of the bombardment was in places deafening. To the FOOs, especially those of the 4th Field who were well forward in tanks intent on giving close support to the armoured brigade when daylight came, it was a spectacular night with vivid gun flashes, the flickering of the shell bursts in the hills, machine-gun tracers streaking in both directions, nervous defensive flares, and the occasional Bofors tracer.

Soon after dawn, when the situation was sorted out, calls for prearranged DF tasks came thick and fast and for two or three hours the gunners were busy answering them. Then firing died down and for the first day of a major attack it seemed at times strangely quiet. An FOO had gone forward with each of the five attacking battalions and three FOOs had gone with the armour; but few shoots were arranged through them, mainly because their wireless communications proved ineffective. An unlucky hit by an enemy shell put a pontoon bridge out of action, but the sappers, regardless of heavy shelling, continued their work on the Bailey bridge. It was ready for use at dawn, but boggy approaches greatly slowed the traffic across it. All three tank OPs of the 4th Field were across the river by 4 p.m., but the far side was thickly sewn with mines. Captain Gapes of 46 Battery in RB struck a mine and his tank shed a track. Already his crew had endured bombing, strafing from the air and shellfire, to say nothing of the water which seeped into the interior. Then, when the crew emerged from the crippled tank, they came under small-arms fire. By the end of the day the 4th Field had fired 5301 rounds of HE and 77 of smoke.

Bombardier Paris
[17] of 27 Battery had already distinguished himself in the fighting on the other side of the Sangro, when seven miles of telephone cable were laid under his direction in difficult country under almost constant fire. Paris kept this line working at a time when it was the only link between the forward battalion 27 Battery was supporting and its brigade headquarters. After crossing the Sangro in the course of this attack, he had to return in the morning with a maintenance signaller. He helped a wounded man back across the river; in midstream they were fired on by a machine gun and the signaller was wounded. Paris then carried the signaller to safety and returned to help the wounded man, regardless of the risk of getting hit himself. For these actions Paris earned an immediate MM.

FW190s made several swift raids on the Bailey bridge or the tanks and the Bofors engaged them. A4 claimed to have shot down one of them in flames; but a Spitfire seen in the neighbourhood might have had something to do with it. By the end of the day 41 Battery had fired 564 rounds.

The main action on the 29th was a series of linear concentrations fired at 12.30 p.m. by the 5th and 6th Field and the 3rd Field, RA, in support of a tank and infantry attack. All the effort was wasted, for the enemy had flown. On the 28th and 29th the two 17-pounders, Q1 and Q4, continued their fire at houses far beyond the river and excellent results were reported.

On the 30th Tac HQ and the three field regiments crossed the river by way of the Bailey bridge, and the 6th Field, from a muddy flat behind a low hill, fired in support of infantry advancing towards Castelfrentano. A fire plan worked out to support a larger attack was not needed, the little town being taken without fighting on the 2nd.

[15]
Sgt D. G. McDonald; Wanaka, Central Otago; born NZ 14 Apr 1911; warehouseman; wounded 15 Jan 1943.

[16]
L-Sgt W. E. Carmichael, m.i.d.; Maramarua; born Te Aroha, 6 Apr 1917; dairy-farm manager; wounded 6 Apr 1943.

[17]
Bdr J. H. Paris, MM; Dunedin; born NZ 29 Apr 1918; bootmaker.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Guardiagrele and Orsogna

Guardiagrele and Orsogna

The next objectives were Guardiagrele to the west and Orsogna to the north-west, and their tactical importance was curiously intertwined. The enemy's winter line had been pierced and perhaps shattered and no great trouble was expected from either town. Yet in the end both defied the New Zealanders, and Orsogna remained unconquered months after they had left the scene. Orsogna's natural strength was immense, yet it took much fierce fighting to demonstrate this even to the defenders. To a New Zealand command long accustomed to victory the question was not whether Orsogna would fall but when. It took bitter experience to teach that this was not really the question at all, once the fleeting opportunity was lost of taking the place by storm in the evening of 2 December, before it was properly defended.

The ground was white and hard with frost at dawn on the 3rd and the snow on the heights glistened in the sun. Captain Edgar
[18] of 46 Battery went forward with 18 Armoured Regiment and a company of 22 Battalion which attacked the hamlet of Melone on the Guardiagrele– Orsogna road. The 4th Field fired for three-quarters of an hour on this little place and the ridge above it—the same ridge as that on which Orsogna huddled. But opposition was far too strong. Edgar conducted several shoots and registered two targets. Other concentrations fell on Guardiagrele itself. In mid-afternoon Melone, Guardiagrele and defences between them were heavily shelled. But the defence held firmly.

Both the 4th and 6th Field had moved forward again and were well placed to support the left flank as well as the Orsogna front. The previous night the 6th Field had been asked to fire one stonk across the road to Orsogna—presumably the road from the east along which 6 Brigade was advancing—and it did so. But somehow on the 3rd the regiment and the brigade did not co-operate closely and an attack on this innocent looking but vital town went in without proper preparation or support. At Division and Brigade there was much optimism. When infantry got into the streets of Orsogna in the morning there were no tanks in close support. During the attack Major Nolan of the 6th Field entered the village in a jeep, but an anti-tank shell hit it and wrecked his wireless set. The jeep had to be abandoned and Lance-Sergeant Murray
[19] was fatally wounded. In the afternoon the Air OP attached to the 6th Field ranged 48 Battery on to the road north of Orsogna to impede the flow of reinforcements to a hastily arranged defence. By that time, however, the chance—if indeed there had been one—was lost.

roads and landmarks north of the sangro

25 battalion attacks orsogna, 3 december

Artillery Headquarters was preoccupied with high-ranking visitors and arrangements concerned with a major strengthening of the artillery on this part of the army front. The 6th AGRA with the 111th Field and 66th Medium, RA, came under the CRA's command in the afternoon and also the 1st Air-Landing Light Regiment, RA. Next day, 4 December, 152 Battery of the

51st Heavy Ack-Ack also arrived. On 6 December the CRA placed it under the command of the 14th Light Ack-Ack and its commander, none other than Major Downing, formerly commander of the redoubtable Mac Troop in Tunisia, duly reported to the acting CO, Major Sawyers.

The intention was to break through beyond the Orsogna- Ortona road to Chieti and Pescara, to keep the enemy on the run—to do, in short, on the Adriatic coast what it was hoped that the American Fifth Army would do on the Tyrrhenian coast. But the intention and the hope were unrelated to reality —they were tied to political rather than military thinking—and a winter campaign of constant aggression in that part of Italy offered no worth-while rewards except, possibly, in relation to the war in Europe as a whole.

All now depended on breaking through Orsogna. The 4th Brigade had probed again towards Melone early on 4 December, again with strong artillery support, and was firmly repulsed. In the afternoon it was told that the artillery could no longer carry out other than counter-battery tasks on the left. Apart from this all guns would support the two infantry brigades on the Orsogna front.

In the night of 4–5 December the 4th and 6th Field gun areas were heavily bombarded by ‘88’ airbursts and massive 170-millimetre shells for two ear-splitting hours. The worst hit was 26 Battery of the 4th Field. A gun crew of D Troop was occupying a tent of the type called R.D. and had not bothered to dig it in or sandbag it. A terrible price was exacted for this neglect. Six men were killed and one wounded. [20] For the rest of the night the gunners were kept busy with CB tasks and a DF task called for by 22 Battalion.

[18]
Capt D. G. Edgar, m.i.d.; Hamilton; born Ashburton, 11 Dec 1913; traveller.

[19]
L-Sgt R. D. Murray; born NZ 6 Jun 1916; butter-maker; died of wounds 3 Dec 1943.

[20] Those killed were Sergeant D. J. L. Power, Bombardiers H. N. Boyd and P. V. Burlace, and Gunners V. A. B. Cameron, J. B. Elliot and R. H. Hughes.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Second Attack on Orsogna

The Second Attack on Orsogna

In the same night the Sangro rose sharply and undermined both bridges, halting traffic and causing restrictions in the expenditure of ammunition—for the field guns 40 rounds per gun for observed shooting and 20 for tasks. The ammunition supply soon improved, however, and in the next two days 50,000 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition were issued to the regiments, mainly to support a divisional attack in the afternoon of 7 December. This was to be a frontal assault on Orsogna and on a 2000-yard stretch of the narrow ridge to the north-east. On the 6th Q Troop, to cover this narrow ridge, hauled its four 17-pounders by night up the parallel ridge of San Felice, north-west of Castelfrentano, and emplaced them there at 200-yard intervals.

5 and 6 brigades attack orsogna, 7 december

The day of the attack was wet and misty and heavy air attacks, which were also planned, were consequently much reduced. The guns, however, fired according to plan. The 4th Field on the left and the 5th Field on the right, with the 111th Field superimposed over both, fired from 1 to 2.30 p.m. 300 yards ahead of the start line and then lifted 100 yards every six minutes until their fire reached 500 yards west of Orsogna. This meant on the left a total of 23 lifts and on the right fewer than this, because of the shape of the ridge. Concurrently the 6th Field fired smoke for 20 minutes on the Sfasciata ridge which dominated the right flank of the advance, and then concentrations of HE on it until 4.10 p.m. Three troops of medium guns at the same time shelled Orsogna and the road to the west and a fourth troop shelled the Sfasciata ridge. The 1st Air-Landing Light Regiment, RA, fired on the main road on both sides of the town. Four medium troops and a 3.7 troop of 152 Battery fired a series of 20 CB tasks lasting a total of 98 minutes. The total required per field gun in 46 Battery was 336 rounds and the 4th Field expenditure, including later DF tasks, was 8022 rounds of HE and 102 of smoke.

The barrage inevitably cut all the telephone cables running along the ridge, damaged many wireless sets, and almost completely obstructed the flow of orders and information on which the coherence of the defence depended. Counter-attacks nevertheless developed and the guns responded to many calls for DF tasks until late in the night. The enemy, in turn, shelled the gun areas, though with far less weight. Again the 4th Field were unlucky, this time 46 Battery. Three gunners of B Troop were killed and one gunner of BHQ. The 5th Field lost one gunner. [21]

A toehold on the Sfasciata ridge was the only reward of this vast effort. Next day enemy aircraft appeared in unusual numbers—24 in each of the three main waves—and the Bofors gunners were active. Several single aircraft also came over. All kept respectfully high. As the gun A3 was traversing to engage a fresh target at noon, however, it was straddled by butterfly bombs and strafed out of the sun. Gunner Freeman
[22] was killed, four others were wounded and the gun was disabled. In D Troop of 28 Battery a bomb fell on the parapet of Sergeant Cammell's [23] gun and Cammell himself was wounded. Several others were wounded and Cammell went to their aid. When help arrived Cammell refused to allow his own wounds to be dressed until his men had been attended to.

For the next week the field and medium guns had no major tasks. One minor but interesting task was fired by the 4th Field on 12 December to mark the departure on leave of Lieutenant-Colonel Philp. This quiet, dedicated field gunner, on the shy side though he inspired great confidence, had been with the regiment since March and was now very much part of it. His farewell was a task fired in the form of his initials. Gordon Stewart, back from convalescence and furlough, resumed his former appointment as CO.

mountain sector in which anti-tankers supported 2 parachute brigade

The 2nd Parachute Brigade had gone into position on the left rear of the Division on 5 December and 31 Anti-Tank Battery came under its command, in country even more difficult than that of the Orsogna front. On the 9th 6 AGRA had taken over CB work in the divisional area and 36 Survey Battery came under its command, together with the New Zealand CBO and his staff. The flash-spotting and sound-ranging troops had been busy throughout the Sangro fighting and were now operating well forward and with considerable success. The rate of sound-ranging locations was very high indeed and the flash-spotters were beginning to get good results from new flash-spotting cameras. In a letter to the CRA of 14 December the battery commander, Major Drummond, pointed out that checks on the ground of the accuracy of five locations shelled on information supplied by the battery indicated that four were highly successful and the fifth, engaged on the basis of sound-ranging only, might have been successful had a flash-spotting location also been taken into account. The survey troop, responsible for surveying in the many regiments and batteries in the Divisional area and providing bearing pickets, had been very busy indeed.

[21] The B Troop gunners were C. E. Anderson, A. R. Laird and A. E. Savage; the 46 BHQ gunner was H. L. Kinzett; and the 5th Field gunner was O. C. Martin.

[22]
Gnr P. A. Freeman; born Wellington, 24 Jun 1914; french polisher; killed in action 8 Dec 1943.

[23] 2 Lt D. H. Commell; Auckland; born NZ 16 Feb 1918; carpenter; wounded 8 Dec 1943.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Third Attack

The Third Attack

The next major move was on the 15th, when 5 Brigade attacked westwards and then south-westwards from the Sfasciata ridge to outflank Orsogna. The artillery programme, starting at 1 a.m., included a creeping barrage by the 4th and 5th Field and another one by a battery only of the 156th Field from 1.54 a.m. The 6th Field and 111th Field fired timed concentrations throughout and the remaining two batteries of the 156th Field and two 5.5-inch batteries of 6 AGRA fired CB tasks. For the 4th and 5th Field this meant an expenditure of 224 rounds per gun, apart from the many DF tasks also fired. In 46 Battery alone 11 DF and other tasks were fired—a sign of trouble. Stonks landed among counter-attacking paratroops several times and did much to save the New Zealand infantry from disaster. By morning the counter-attacks were spent and the Division held a considerable stretch of the ridge north-east of Orsogna and blocked the Orsogna– Arielli road. But 5 Brigade had suffered considerable loss and could do no more. The enemy line, though badly bent, remained unbroken.

On the 16th the 4th Field moved forward, this time to an area south-east of Orsogna and within three miles of it. The same day 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery was thrilled when the gun

B6 shot down an aircraft (an FW190) with predictor control—the first time the regiment had done this. In the next week the chief point of interest was the firing of smoke of various colours to mark targets for bombing, almost all of them in Orsogna. It looked impressive and certainly impressed the Germans; but bombing alone could not win the battle.

The next major operation was by a neighbouring division to the north-east, which attacked Arielli in the afternoon of 23 December with support from all three New Zealand field regiments and many other units as well. The New Zealand gunners engaged hostile batteries, then they fired concentrations on heights beyond the objectives of the attack, and after dark they joined in a massive DF task.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Final Attack

The Final Attack

The final attack on the Orsogna front began at 4 a.m. on Christmas Eve. The object was to turn the position from the north, and the first step was to attack north-westwards on a front of 3500 yards, covered by 272 field and medium guns of 5 Division, 6 AGRA and the New Zealand Division. The shape of the creeping barrage had to follow the shape of the ground. It was therefore divided into a large right wing, pivoting on the left for the first four lifts, and a much smaller left wing. The right half of the right wing was fired by the artillery of 5 Division, the left half by the 4th and 5th Field. The left wing, facing west by south, was fired by the 6th Field and the 111th Field. Both wings lifted 100 yards every five minutes, which was too fast. The infantry soon fell behind. Two further barrages were to be fired if all went well, to support advances by 4 Armoured Brigade. But all did not go well and the work put into this part of the programme was wasted. Five 5.5-inch troops of 5 AGRA fired for two hours and 20 minutes on targets beyond the infantry objectives, but low cloud with mist and rain restricted air attacks on Orsogna and on the roads to the northwest which were planned for the early hours of daylight. Three Bofors of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery had come forward to the Sfasciata ridge and they fired tracer along the battalion boundaries as usual.

In the first 10 minutes of the barrage a few rounds fell short on the right and landed among a company of 21 Battalion, causing several casualties and delaying the company, so that it lost at the outset the protection of the line of bursting shells.

The infantry had to cross steep-sided gullies in the dark and in their upward climb overcome stubborn German paratroops. In some cases they had to fight their way along heavily defended crests. In such country by night the gunners could do little to help them. But after dawn the guns responded to a flood of calls for DF tasks to help stabilise precarious lodgements, in some cases by firing smoke to cover men digging in. On the extreme left the Maoris in furious fighting worked their way on to a little plateau where several ridges converged just north of Orsogna, their final advance being covered by gun and mortar fire, ending with a smoke screen as they dug in short of their objectives but very close indeed to strong defences. Several times in the day what looked like threatening moves by the numerous enemy in front of the Maoris were met with thunderous stonks. New Zealand tanks, too, were helped out of difficulties by smoke screens as they pushed forward to support the infantry.

5 brigade's attack, 24 december

The 6th Field, under orders to move forward, decided to have Christmas dinner in the evening of the 24th. The day was cold and wet and the men at the guns were heavy with fatigue. But the cooks rose to the occasion and the roast turkey and pork and Christmas pudding they sent forward were excellently cooked and did much to cheer up the men in the muddy gun areas.

Christmas Day of 1943 was as festive as the gunners could make it. It rained slightly in the morning as units held church services and the newly arrived ribbons of the Africa Star were issued to those who had qualified for them. ‘Approaching dinner time’, the diary of 46 Battery notes, ‘the enemy pushed a few into the area but they mostly failed to work.’

‘Xmas dinner was an epic by the cooks [the diary continues].

War very quiet and afternoon & evening fairly social.’

In general the batteries had dinner at midday and the COs and officers went the rounds and waited on the gunners. Then RHQs dined in the evening. The 14th Light Ack-Ack welcomed Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen, back from furlough, and prepared to farewell ‘Huck’ Sawyers, now a lieutenant-colonel. In 43 Battery dinner was deferred until evening and the battery entertained members of ‘45 Scottish Bty’. The 7th Anti-Tank deployed A and C Troops and two 17-pounders of D Troop about 2000 yards east of Orsogna under the command of 6 Parachute Battalion. The demands of war overrode those of peace and goodwill even on this day. The 6th Field move was cancelled not because it was Christmas, but because the guns were bogged down in the mud.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Casa War

The Casa War

Muddy and crumbling roads and tracks in the next few days cut down the supply of ammunition and expenditure was restricted to 30 r.p.g. For most of the time visibility was poor, and in the period 26—28 December there was very little observed shooting and very few regimental or divisional shoots. In the nights 27—28, 28—29 and 29—30 December the 5th Field, 6th Field and 111th Field respectively fired harassing tasks. On the 29th the skies cleared and several OP shoots were carried out.

By this time, however, it was evident that the war of movement was over and a ‘casa war’ had begun. The CRA conferred with his COs at RHQ of the 6th Field on the 28th and told them they must expect to stay where they were for some time, and the troops were to dig in and make themselves as secure and comfortable as they could. Air photographs had shown that gun and HQ areas were very conspicuous: the muddy tracks leading to them and the bivouac tents around them showed up plainly. All such tents were to be dismantled and replaced by dug-in and roofed quarters. Gunners therefore scoured the countryside to find suitable materials. They collected bricks, tiles and rubble from the brickworks near Castelfrentano, roofing and revetting materials from ruined buildings, railway sleepers from the line which ran through the area, and other materials came from dismantled German dugouts. Those who could live in ‘casas’ were the lucky ones, though some of these houses were badly damaged, with gaping holes in their walls and leaky roofs.

In the morning of 30 December the 4th Field fired 50 propaganda shells into Orsogna, the first of many such shoots. Each shell scattered leaflets designed to undermine the morale of the enemy. Then, in the afternoon, the field guns shelled traffic on a road running north from just west of Orsogna. Both the 4th and 6th Field carried out shoots conducted by air OPs.

The 31st was bitterly cold. In the afternoon F and G Troops of 32 Battery, in the line north of Orsogna in support of 5 Brigade, were heavily mortared. The crew of F2 were living in a dugout and it suffered a direct hit which killed Gunner Earl
[24] and wounded a lance-bombardier. A gunner of G Troop was also wounded. The temperature dropped steadily and late in the evening snow began to fall, soon turning into a blizzard. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart of the 4th Field, who had been visiting his batteries, was caught in this and it got so bad that he had to make the last part of the journey back to RHQ almost on his hands and knees. Many of the remaining ‘bivvies’ collapsed under the weight of snow, and in 25 Battery some gunners were buried for several hours and almost suffocated. Even some of the new dugouts collapsed, and in the morning there were some lively discussions on how they should be constructed. Almost all telephone lines were broken.

Artillery Headquarters had worked out a special task for New Year's Day. The guns were to spell out the words HAPPY NEW YEAR FRITZ in capital letters spread over the main enemy position at Orsogna, the 4th, 5th and 6th Field and the 111th Field all contributing to each letter except the ‘I’ and ‘T’. Because of the difficulty of clearing the guns for action, however, this had to be postponed and it was not fired until the 3rd. In the afternoon of New Year's Day, 1944, the 4th Field fired a round of gun fire to ensure that all guns were in working order.

It was not a happy start to the year. Gunners had to make emergency arrangements for sleeping quarters and then set to work clearing and draining gun positions. In some cases they had to pull or winch guns out of pits and lay a firm platform of bricks and rubble. Signallers had endless back-breaking work mending lines. E Troop of the 4th Field was ready for action at noon and was the first troop on the whole front, including enemy artillery, to open fire this day and year. Underneath the snow was squelching mud and in the afternoon rain came down heavily.

Behind the gun areas the roads and tracks were clogged with mud and slush which only jeeps could negotiate at all confidently. Bringing up and handling ammunition, rations and other stores was arduous and unpleasant work. Off the tracks the thin crust of snow with slush underneath it made walking difficult even for unburdened men; for those with loads to carry it was almost impossible and they had to stick to tracks.

Anti-tankers of 33 and 34 Batteries (less J and K Troops) moved on 3 and 4 January up into the mountains on the left flank, under Divisional Cavalry command, to serve as infantillery. From San Eusanio they carried ammunition, spades and rations for three days and climbed up the snow-covered slopes. O and Q Troops lived for the next fortnight in the little village of Ascigno and mounted pickets there each night. N Troop stationed itself high up on the Bianco feature and P Troop, joined later by a troop of 33 Battery, moved into Bianco village on a track leading to Guardiagrele and about two miles from that place. Another 33 Battery troop occupied Ciommi village, halfway between Bianco and San Eusanio. From these positions the anti-tankers patrolled in white capes and they watched Germans in the Guardiagrele area doing the same. Ascigno could not be reached by road and 16 mules were therefore allotted to 34 Battery on the 5th to supply the anti-tankers there.

Meanwhile 31 Battery, under the command of 2 Independent Parachute Brigade since early December, moved with that formation from this mountain area to the right flank of the Division in the sector which included on its left the village of Poggio- fiorito and the outskirts of Arielli. B Troop was released on 5 January and moved to Lanciano and J and K Troops of 33 Battery replaced it. The enemy was extremely active on this part of the front and shelled Poggiofiorito mercilessly. On the 7th Gunners Hargreaves [25] and Allan
[26] of 31 Battery and Lance-Bombardier Laing
[27] of 33 Battery were killed or fatally wounded, and three others including an officer were wounded. Then on the 11th Gunner Toll
[28] suffered mortal wounds and another gunner of 33 Battery was also hit. It was a thoroughly nasty situation in which the anti-tankers had no chance of replying to the shells and mortar bombs that came their way, and they were glad to see the last of Poggiofiorito. The 33 Battery gun crews withdrew on the 11th and 12th and those of 31 Battery on the 16th, moving right back to Perano station, south of the Sangro.

The guns E3 and E4 of 46 Battery moved to the Poggiofiorito area on the 7th in a sniping role; but the parachute brigade was getting enough attention from enemy guns and mortars already and persuaded the 4th Field men to move into the 21 Battalion area. From there, until they were relieved on the 12th by D1 and D2 of 26 Battery, these two guns were active, firing all night every night at road junctions and other selected targets.

The rest of the field guns, in the first fortnight of January, constantly harassed the enemy, usually under Divisional Artillery arrangements, and did relatively little observed shooting. Conditions at the guns were so disagreeable that batteries kept the numbers of men in the gun positions to a minimum and changed them frequently with others who had been resting in B Echelon areas. Observation post staffs were similarly exchanged. The 6th Field had moved forward in the afternoon of 3 January, but only with the greatest difficulty. Getting the guns out of their existing positions was far more easily said than done. After five hours of violent effort only two guns of 29 Battery had reached the road, and the gunners despaired of getting the others out until the sappers lent a tractor for this purpose. The new gun area was nevertheless a good one—a steep-sided gully just north-west of Lanciano—and there were enough buildings nearby to accommodate all gun crews.

From this area the 6th Field supported 17 Brigade of 5 Division and also the parachute brigade, taking over OPs from the 92nd Field, RA. The patrol reports of the infantry, checked carefully with air photographs, provided the information on which a series of regimental harassing fire tasks were drawn up. FOOs kept in close touch with the infantry to check results and highly effective fire resulted. Most of the targets were buildings and these were engaged with HE ammunition with the cap on.

The 5th Field supported 5 Brigade in similar fashion, keeping in close touch with the infantry. The enemy evidently kept a close watch on movements in the OP areas and on the 7th he scored direct hits with 170-millimetre shells on A and F Troop OPs, wounding an officer lightly and a gunner severely. Next day two D Troop guns moved up just behind E Troop OP in a sniping role, doing the same kind of work as the 4th Field sniping guns. On the 11th Captain Gilbert
[29] took his D Troop OP party to a house in front of 23 Battalion. Shortly after their arrival this house received several direct hits by 170-millimetre shells, and the OP party and a mortar crew had to shelter in underground dugouts. After dark a patrol from the unit flanking the Bianco feature crept close to Guardiagrele and then fired a signal the enemy used to get his troops to stand-to. After allowing him enough time to do this, the New Zealand guns fired concentrations against the positions probably then being occupied in that sector. On the 15th the gun E 3, firing its second round of a concentration just after lunch, suffered a premature at the point where the rifling in the barrel began. The explosion was frightful and blew pieces of the barrel 100 yards or more away. The breech block also blew off. Gunner Pascoe
[30] was killed and two other gunners wounded. Half an hour later a mysterious projectile which gave ample warning of its approach—‘a screaming noise’ was one description—struck five yards from the pit of a medium gun sited 300 yards from RHQ of the 5th Field. It made a crater eight feet across and six feet deep, and in the middle of this a hole two and a half feet across and about 15 feet deep which entered the ground at an angle of 70 degrees.

[24]
Gnr T. H. Earl; born Oamaru, 23 Nov 1919; sheepfarmer; killed in action 31 Dec 1943.

[25] Gur F. A. Hargreaves; born NZ 11 Mar 1916; machine moulder; killed in action 7 Jan 1944.

[26]
Gnr W. M. Allan; born NZ 13 May 1922; farmhand; died of wounds 7 Jan 1944.

[27]
L-Bdr B. Laing; born Milton, 19 Apr 1912; orchard hand; died of wounds 8 Jan 1944.

[28]
Gnr T. J. Toll; born Arrowtown, 1 May 1921; Regular soldier; died of wounds 12 Jan 1944.

[29]
Capt L. de V. Gilbert, MC, ED; Dunedin; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1917; clerk.

[30]
Gnr F. J. Pascoe; born NZ 31 Jul 1921; messenger; killed in action 15 Jan 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Guns Firing Short

Guns Firing Short

In this period and also in the final stages of the fighting that preceded the stalemate at Orsogna, there were many complaints that the field and medium guns were firing short. The CRA and regimental commanders took these very seriously and always investigated them as carefully as they could. One such investigation on 21 December had shown that a 26 Battery gun had a defective range drum which caused it to fire 800 yards short; but shortly before this the same gun had been tested and found accurate. One explanation of ‘short firing’ was that the enemy would fire just beyond a standing barrage which covered the forming-up of New Zealand infantry for an attack and then, when it began to creep forward, he would fire through it so as to strike at the attacking force. In the Sangro- Orsogna fighting in which he had every advantage of observation and knowledge of the ground he could often do this.

Some of the short shooting was due to the configuration of the ground, especially in the area north of Castelfrentano. It was simply unsuitable for predicted shooting. Even so, precautions were taken, when there was plenty of time to plan bombardments, to avoid accidents. In other cases, when emergency calls for fire came in, risks had to be taken, the danger of a few short rounds being less than that which prompted the request for fire support. Nevertheless no cases were substantiated in which casualties were caused to New Zealand or Allied troops from such emergency shooting on this front.

Another cause was the inaccuracy of METEOR information supplied by Corps. Meteor telegrams came from near the coast every four hours and failed to reflect the rapidly changing atmospheric conditions in the vicinity of the vast Maiella massif which towered above the Orsogna front. Often the Meteor information was completely incorrect in this district; mostly it was ‘stale’. The most dramatic case of this was on New Year's Day, when reports of short shooting caused the 6th Field to test the Meteor information and it was found to cause a difference of 600 yards on the ground. The intense cold in the mountains following the blizzard was the cause. Variations of 100–150 yards at a range of 10,000 yards were commonly attributable to this deficiency and it was not until a meteorological section was established near San Eusanio that it was largely overcome.

A further source of error was the grid on the maps. Italian surveys were generally very accurate; but in this tangled mountain country it was easy to slip into error. The maps were poorly printed and it was not easy to read contours or spot heights. When they were checked the northings and eastings were found to be about 50 metres out in the 1: 50,000 series.

A final source of error related to the range-tables. These were compiled for the 25-pounder on the basis of experiments in the United Kingdom, where no such dramatic variations in atmospheric conditions were likely to be met as were experienced in the neighbourhood of the Maiella.

The extreme cold nevertheless affected the guns in other ways. One effect was that crystallisation of the steel at low temperatures caused the stop collar on the firing rod of the 25-pounder to slip from its attachment. Several guns were disabled in this way and were returned for repair to the Gun Bay of 2 Divisional Workshops—a most valuable institution. There the armament artificers overcame this trouble by manufacturing special firing rods in which the collar, originally sweated on, was replaced by a protrusion induced on the rod by heating it and hammering it in a jig until the requisite stop was obtained for the mechanism.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Famous Landmarks

Famous Landmarks

Following the constant movements in November and December, life quickly settled into a routine for the gunners in January 1944. Routines varied, of course, according to local circumstances; but there were some features common to most of them. Except for the anti-tankers in the remote parts of the Bianco–Barone feature, three well-known places exerted a remarkable influence on the lives of gunners on the Orsogna front. One was the Castelfrentano brickworks, which provided essential building and roading materials, but always at the cost of nervous strain; for this was the enemy's favourite ranging mark. Then there was the Mad Mile, a stretch of road west of Castelfrentano which enemy observers in Orsogna had registered carefully and could shell with great accuracy whenever they chose. When Artillery Headquarters moved to Castelfrentano on 4 January the Mad Mile was notorious, and because of its reputation the Headquarters vehicles were despatched in small groups and wide intervals so as not to create congestion on that stretch of road. No drivers liked to linger there. Finally there was the church tower in Orsogna, the thin spire which seemed to gaze with cold, all-seeing eyes on the whole area. It survived countless thousands of shells which fell in the town and many hundreds of bombs. On 9 January the CRA accepted its challenge and, from the top of the Headquarters building in Castelfrentano, he conducted a shoot and scored several hits. On the 12th, after an air raid in which many bombs fell in the middle of Orsogna, the CRA called down a pinpoint concentration—a ‘Murder’—by five regiments, each firing five rounds gun fire, at the church tower. He invited the commander of 4 Indian Division, his CRA, and other visitors to watch, and they all saw the tower emerge from the holocaust of bursting shells to continue its baleful survey of the Divisional area.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Ack-Ack Record

The Ack-Ack Record

Credit for shooting down an Me109F which exploded in the air over Poggiofiorito on the 11th was curiously apportioned. B 1 of 4 1 Battery was awarded a quarter, H6 of 43 Battery also was allowed a quarter, and the other half was credited to an RA regiment. This brought the total account of the 14th Light Ack-Ack since 19 November 1943 to three and a half Me109Fs shot down and four damaged and two FW109s shot down and one damaged, all but the last one being exclusively credited to 41 Battery. Conditions were against the Bofors gunners throughout this period. Only the fast and elusive fighter-bombers came within reach, usually when visibility was poor. Only gunners who maintained a constant alert in instant readiness for action could hope to engage them successfully. Mostly they came over in mid-afternoon; but the pattern was not well enough established for the Bofors crews to relax at other times of the day. They had to keep a close watch from first light until last light in gun positions that were often in a sea of mud.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Survey Work

Survey Work

The surveyors, too, had a hard time in the Sangro– Orsogna operations. They found that methods which had worked well in the desert were no longer effective. It was never possible, for example, to survey in the three field regiments simultaneously with one deployment of the advanced survey section. The survey required for each regiment had been an independent job. The maps were not good. Only one sun azimuth had been used in obtaining a fix by the survey troop since it reached Italy. The sun was never out when it was wanted. Even the task of travelling from place to place as needed was fraught with difficulty.

There were endless traffic blocks and many inaccessible places to which the surveyors had to go.

The flash-spotting troop had had to lay wire by hand over miles of rugged country to establish bases. Then it was found that the enemy seldom fired more than two or three rounds at one time from any particular battery and this naturally made it hard to obtain locations. On the Orsogna front one post was set up in the spire of the church in Castelfrentano and another on a ridge about 1200 yards away. Then a third was established halfway between Castelfrentano and the town of Lanciano and a fourth on the outskirts of the town. A fifth was about two miles along the road to Guardiagrele—a rather poor position. This base was slightly crested by the Orsogna ridge and the enemy gained excellent flash cover from valleys parallel to it. Here for the first time the troop tried out flash-spotting cameras.

The sound-ranging troop operated a base for 11 days from 19 November 1943 in the Atessa area with six microphones and obtained an average of 12 locations per day, with a maximum of 21 on 28 November. Maintenance of lines was difficult, particularly because of the movement of tanks in the area. Hostile batteries, too, were screened by hills to the north-west. The vehicles on issue were hopelessly inadequate and more jeeps and four-wheel-drive trucks were clearly needed. The base on the Castelfrentano– Guardiagrele ridge was opened on 4 December. It had five microphones and in 39 days secured 521 locations. The ridge was constantly shelled and maintenance was heavy. The enemy would bring up self-propelled guns to fire by night and on some occasions a series of locations would be found to line up along a road. When locations could be checked on the ground it was found that they were usually accurate for line and any errors were in range. This suggested that air photographs might be used to check ranges. Stereoscopic examination would indicate the most likely battery positions along the given line. When the snow came it broke the lines many times and moisture penetrated the insulation. A 25-pounder battery which established itself near troop headquarters ‘made things rather noisy’, according to a troop report.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Withdrawing from the Orsogna Front

Withdrawing from the Orsogna Front

The New Zealand guns began to withdraw from the Orsogna front on 11 January. The Division was to move across Italy to join the American Fifth Army. The Adriatic front was unpromising and the main weight was to shift to the Tyrrhenian front, which was anchored to the mountain backbone of Italy by the fortress of Cassino. When the gunners began to withdraw, however, they knew nothing of this and the guessing game was still very much alive. Most of them expected a period of rest in southern Italy, after two months in the mud and snow.

Getting the guns out, however, was even harder than getting them in. The 4th Field managed it in one day, 16 January, but only with the help of a bulldozer lent by the sappers. The 5th Field pulled 47 Battery out on the 16th and it drove to an assembly area south of the Sangro. The other two batteries came out on the 17th. When the regiment set out at 4 a.m. on the 19th for San Severo north of Foggia it soon struck trouble. The A 2 quad stuck in a ditch and held up the rest of the regiment for over an hour. The 6th Field came out on the 16th and then spent a long wet evening in Lanciano before they moved off in pitch blackness at 10.25 p.m. Once clear of the town, however, they were allowed to use headlights; for they were moving not along the much-frequented and much-shelled road through Castelfrentano, but along a road at right-angles to this which headed for the mouth of the Sangro. Of the 7th Anti Tank, 33 Battery moved with 6 Brigade and 31 Battery with the 4th Field, while 34 Battery went with the Divisional Cavalry.

The 14th Light Ack-Ack also split up for the move. Tactical HQ and H Troop of 43 Battery went with 6 Brigade Headquarters in the night 15-16 January and Main HQ and G Troop followed later, joining H Troop on the way and travelling in close formation on the road throughout the night. In the morning they struck a heavy hailstorm. Then 42 Battery moved the next night, except for E6, which was hopelessly bogged and could not be pulled out even by the combined efforts of a Diamond T lorry and a heavy Scammell. It was left to the Workshop Section to get it out later. At 5 a.m. on the 19th 41 Battery, less the Right Section of B Troop, moved from its Castelfrentano positions through Lanciano and then towards the mouth of the Sangro. Headquarters moved from Castelfrentano on the 17th.

By this time it was almost a routine to have New Zealand markings removed from vehicles and flashes and cap badges from uniforms when the Division was on the move. When it was ordered for this occasion it therefore aroused no attention. San Severo, however, turned out to be no more than a staging area and, since the next part of the journey was over the Apennines, the guessing game was over. In the next few days the Division reassembled its various components in the pretty valley of the Volturno in an area centred on the little town of Alife. Within a day or two several of the senior officers of the field regiments had visited American artillery units facing Cassino, and it was no secret that that was where the Division would next see action—and in the near future. [31]

[31] Casualties in the Sangro- Orsogna fighting were:

| Killed and Died of Wounds | Wounded | Prisoner of War | Total
HQ NZA | — | 1 | — | 1
4th Field | 10 | 9 | — | 19
5th Field | 7 | 31 | — | 38
6th Field | 3 | 13 | — | 16
7th Anti-Tank | 6 | 17 | 1 | 24
14th Light Ack-Ack | 1 | 6 | — | 7
36 Svy Bty | — | 6 | — | 6
| 27 | 83 | 1 | 111

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 17 — The New Zealand Attacks at Cassino

Contents

- [section]
p. 550

- The Maoris Attack the Railway Station p. 557

- Operation dickens p. 567

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE same political conceptions or misconceptions which prompted the fruitless and expensive efforts to push past Orsogna and Ortona in the depth of an Italian winter were behind the switch of effort to the Fifth Army front. Here, too, the ground, the mud and the weather favoured the enemy. What sensible military opinion on the Adriatic front called a stalemate, political opinion called ‘stagnation’ and described it as ‘scandalous’. [1] This cruel description was applied equally to the Fifth Army fighting, which had been severe, costly and parsimoniously rewarded in terms of ground gained. Each successive yard was now costing more in effort and blood. Overwhelming political pressure, moreover, added a new hostage to fortune on this front and compelled an even greater increase of effort than the most sanguine military opinion would support. When the newly-arrived NZA units were holding church parades near Alife on 23 January they heard of a landing at Anzio by an American division and a British brigade. This was 60 miles beyond the left flank of Fifth Army on the Gulf of Gaeta, inevitably it attracted counter-attacks, and each of the many crises it faced caused demands for increased Fifth Army pressure to draw German strength away from the threatened beach-head. This was the situation when more troops, the New Zealanders among them, already sorely tested in the mountains and mud of the Eighth Army front and with little or no time for rest and recuperation, were committed to the cauldron of Cassino. [2]

In the Volturno valley the days passed all too quickly. The first few of them were taken up in cleaning vehicles, equipment and uniforms for a Divisional Artillery parade and march-past on 26 January at which General Freyberg presented some of the decorations awarded since the Alamein fighting. It was a smart turn-out and earned congratulations; but it was chiefly remembered by the gunners for an incident relating to the flag which was bundled on the pole ready to be unfurled when the GOC arrived. When Freyberg appeared the band struck up the General Salute, the troops presented arms, but the flag, instead of unfurling, fell in a bundle to the foot of the pole. Steve Weir, who had previously addressed the gunners over a loudspeaker system which was still switched on, growled ‘God Almighty’. His words thundered across the parade ground and a ripple of amusement ran through the assembled gunners. [3]

Two other glowing memories of the Alife
[4] days were of leave to Pompeii and of the American army shower baths at Piedmonte d' Alife, the old and the new and both in their way luxurious. ‘These are super showers’, the 46 Battery diary for 29 January says of the latter, ‘everything being organised to perfection.’ After the visit to the baths, the diary adds, there was the ‘Usual plonk session in B Tp’. Though the nights were cold, with heavy frosts, the weather at Alife was milder than in the foothills of the Maiella and the area was agreeable—a huge valley in which the units camped among croplands and orchards, with here and there a level stretch of ground on which football posts appeared as if by magic. The training carried out there was as mild as the weather, though there were mutterings about spit-and-polish.

Headquarters staff and senior regimental officers, however, had other and more serious matters on their minds. Another New Zealand Corps was being formed and officially came into existence on 3 February. Divisional Headquarters served also as Corps Headquarters, with Colonel Queree as BGS and Lieutenent-Colonel Thornton as GSO I. [5] Besides 2 New Zealand Division it included 4 Indian Division with its normal artillery, 2 AGRA, three field regiments (one of them equipped with self-propelled guns and therefore earmarked to support 4 Armoured Brigade), five medium regiments, a light ack-ack battery, and in due course five American field artillery battalions, as well as American ack-ack artillery of various kinds. Of this great weight of artillery, three field regiments were to come directly under the CRA's command and the SP regiment, the 98th Field, came under 4 Armoured Brigade.

5 brigade positions, 8 february 1944

The need for such a mass of guns was painfully clear when the CRA and his regimental, battery and troop officers reconnoitred gun positions and OPs at the end of January and the first few days of February. They had to emplace their guns in a muddy river flat facing mainly north-westwards across the River Rapido towards the 5500-foot Monte Cairo. The abbey of Montecassino, on a spur running down from the mountain towards them, a colossus astride a 1700-foot height, seemed at a distance of four miles or so from the gun areas to be so close that they could reach out and touch it. Despite its long and august connection with the Benedictine Order and the treasury of art and archives it sheltered, it was hard not to think of it as a gigantic and evil barracks with Germans at every window. Putting guns in below it was like undressing in Piccadilly Circus or Times Square—ludicrously open to a public and hostile gaze, an improper act certain to bring down on those who perpetrated it a dire punishment. It was a feeling that did not diminish with the passage of time.

The only consolation, when the field guns went into action on 5 February south-east of Monte Trocchio, with 41 Battery guarding the gun areas, was that there were many partners in sin. The neighbourhood bristled with guns and the 25-pounders seemed puny alongside the 8-inch and 155-millimetre American howitzers already in position. It was a clear day after rain which made the mountains seem dangerously close, and all but 29 Battery and A Troop of 41 Battery were in position before dark. The guns were south of the main road to Cassino, Route 6, between M. Trocchio and the smaller M. Porchia, with the 4th Field astride the Rome– Naples railway. The 26 Battery gun crews struggled with drag ropes for four hours to get their guns into the muddy position and they were extremely lucky that the enemy did not shell the regimental area. The 5th Field area was crowded with vehicles as the guns deployed and two 105-millimetre gun-howitzers shelled it all afternoon, wounding a sergeant of RHQ and a gunner of 47 Battery. The 6th Field attracted even more attention, a reconnaissance party suffering one killed—Gunner Grant
[6] —and four wounded. In the evening all access roads were shelled quite heavily and 29 Battery was lucky to get through unharmed.

The journey forward took the gunners through a land more obviously affected by war than any they had previously seen. Indeed it was reminiscent of photographs of the Western Front in the First World War. Leafless and mangled trees were everywhere, farmhouses lay in ruins, shell holes (some of them of monstrous size) scarred the land like an ugly rash, filled with water and edged with mud, and as the incessant gun fire grew louder there were many refugees to be seen—‘Some pitiful sights—old women and children with no shoes’, the Survey Battery diarist noted. The first guns to be seen—those farthest from the front—were huge American 240-millimetre ‘widow-makers’.

Major Drummond of the Survey Battery had left the Adriatic sector as early as 14 January with an advanced party, and on the 16th he consulted the artillery GSO III of the Fifth Army at Caserta. From there he went on to Mignano, on the main road and railway 15 miles from Cassino, to learn what he could from 2 American Observation Battalion. He camped there with his party for the night, near a regiment of 8-inch guns which, as he noted, ‘made a lot of noise’. On the 17th the party had a look at American flash-spotting and sound-ranging bases. The flash-spotting equipment was better than their own, but the sound-ranging recorder was of an older type. On lofty Monte Camino they studied what the 8th Survey, RA, were doing.

After careful study of the New Zealand front, the flash-spotting troop established three posts, one on the crest of Trocchio, one to the north-east and a third to the south. The sound-ranging troop had more condenser trouble and did not open for business until 9 February. The survey troop had so many units to survey in that there seemed no end to its work. The meteoro-logical section began on the 6th what became a routine of supplying six meteor telegrams per day, at first to the New Zealand units only, later to other artillery in the neighbourhood. The weather conditions, however, made the work extremely difficult. Apart from rain and low cloud there were very high winds from many different quarters and some curious and erratic air flows near the mountains.

The OPs of the field regiments were almost all on or near Trocchio. There was hardly anywhere else to go. That of 26 Battery had been constructed for the commander of 2 United States Corps. Gun positions were good or bad according to two criteria: whether they were on sloping ground or flat and whether there were casas (houses) that could be used for com- mand posts and living quarters. Sloping ground was highly valued for drainage. The casas varied greatly in the protection they gave from the weather and shellfire. The protection Trocchio gave to the guns was dubious. They clustered tightly behind that feature, but all the positions were overlooked from the mountains to the right front and some of them were clearly visible from Montecassino. The gun crews of 26 Battery thought they were out of sight of that baleful spur; but they were quite mistaken, as they learned when some of them looked back later from the monastery ruins.

The field regiments were forbidden to carry out predicted shoots in the night 5–6 February for fear of warning the enemy, through their distinctive methods, of the New Zealanders' presence. But at 10.30 a.m. on the 6th the CRA gave permission for FOOs to register their zones and engage likely targets. This they duly did. In the 5th Field it was 28 Battery that opened fire first, at 12.33 p.m., against a group of buildings that looked like a headquarters. All afternoon the 105s replied, wounding an officer and a gunner of 47 Battery. In the night 6–7 February the field guns fired a harassing programme to the west-south-west of the gun areas, mainly at road junctions on a road leading from Cassino to the Liri and then westwards, and also at points on the northern bank of the Liri itself. All three regiments fired until 9 p.m. and the 4th Field carried on all night. But only one of the tasks was a stonk.

At that time 5 Brigade was holding the front between the gun areas and Cassino itself and this harassing fire therefore did not support the New Zealand infantry. But it was on an area that was thick with nebelwerfers. Next night 21 Battalion called for DF fire and it fell on the Rapido crossing used by German patrols. The three regiments took turns at all-night duty on HF tasks. On the 8th several ‘murders’ were fired on the CRA's orders at nebelwerfers; but by this time the enemy was well aware that he was facing New Zealanders. [7]

The 2nd US Corps was all the time attacking in an effort to capture the vital Montecassino, an absolute pre-requisite for an advance up the Liri Valley, and NZ Corps was poised to exploit success by staging that advance. The New Zealand gunners did what they could to help the Americans. Early on the 8th the 4th Field fired a two-hour CB bombardment. [8] Then on the 11th all three field regiments fired to neutralise hostile batteries while the Americans attacked. (The American artillery, of course, was also active and this day it shelled Montecassino heavily and spectacularly.) But two months of very hard fighting and heavy loss had weakened the two American divisions greatly, whereas the enemy in his enormously strong positions, though shaken and weakened, was far from beaten. At the same time the Anzio beach-head was under heavy pressure and the call for countervailing pressure on the Cassino front was irresistible. On the 12th the Germans overran much-weakened American units on Monte Castellone, halfway between Cassino and the top of Monte Cairo, but were driven back by a tornado of shellfire. When the Indian division climbed laboriously to the scene and then began working its way down the mountainside towards the abbey, the guns could do little to help. Friend and foe were too close and the front meandered in the hills as the Rapido and its southern extension, the Gari, did below them.

Artillery Headquarters worked out details of its part of a dual attack by the Indians and New Zealanders, the former downwards to Montecassino abbey, the latter to establish a bridgehead across the Rapido in front of Cassino, the town that nestled into the eastern side of the Montecassino spur. To aid both, the abbey itself was to be bombed and its immensely thick walls shattered. To co-ordinate these operations was a formidable task.

Meanwhile on the 13th the 5th Field fired a concentration on Monastery Hill (to give Montecassino its current nickname) and a heavy explosion followed. [9] Next morning from 8 to 11 an armistice was observed in the ‘ Monastery Hill sector’ to allow the enemy to collect his dead. This was arranged through the Americans, but the New Zealand guns doubtless had some- thing to do with the need for it. On the 14th and early 15th F Troop of the 4th Field and perhaps other New Zealand guns as well fired leaflets into the abbey and its environs warning of the impending bombing, but the warning was ignored by civilians too frightened or sceptical to act on it.

Every known hostile ack-ack gun was the target of a CB series on the 15th, the day of the bombing, and the mediums and heavies fired into the abbey itself. To the gunners watching from the Trocchio–Porchia area the bombing was awe-inspiring. It covered the hill with smoke and dust, made the ground tremble for hours on end, and filled the air with noise. About 2 p.m. those gazing through field glasses to study the effects saw the great west wall cave in. The great blue flashes of the bombs as they struck the hillside will live on in the memories of those who saw them. All guns within reach, about 340, also fired on Montecassino and the medium and heavy guns shelled the abbey all night.

‘The results of yesterday's bombing and last night's arty battering of the Monastery were visible this morning’, the 5th Field diary says on the 16th, ‘when the building was seen to be nearly wrecked. The roof doesn't exist and the walls are levelled nearly all round.’ But the ground attacks which were to have hammered home whatever advantage the bombing and shelling gained were critically delayed. The Indians tried desperately hard to seize Hill 593, higher up the spur, which dominated the approaches from above; but only that small part of the strength of the division which could be deployed at the end of a long and difficult approach was available for its formidable tasks and it was not enough. The same day 43 Battery provided a working party to help the 76th Medium several miles behind Porchia. The area was heavily shelled and nine of the party, including the officer in charge, were wounded. Next day one of these, Gunner Humphries, [10] died of his wounds.

[1] Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V, Closing the Ring, p. 380.

[2] The reinforcing of failure is always unpromising. To do it with troops who had failed in a similar enterprise on another front and had scarcely been refreshed was asking for trouble. The military authorities well knew this; but their hands were forced.

[3] Another version of this incident, in the 5th Field war diary, is that the CRA's comment was on the clumsiness of Freyberg's driver in striking a large pothole on the way to the saluting base, and the diarist comments that ‘it goes well for the discipline of the NZA that no one laughed’.

[4] There were several Alifes and the NZA were camped between Alife proper and S. Angelo d' Alife. To the north-east were Castello d' Alife and Piedmonte d' Alife.

[5] Senior New Zealand staff officers then and at many other times were predominantly gunners.

Brigadier Weir's position was awkward. He was responsible for the command of the whole NZ Corps artillery, but he shared the detailed command of it with the commander of 2 AGRA.

[6]
Gnr C. A. Grant; born Wellington, 2 Nov 1919; painter; killed in action 5 Feb 1944.

[7] The nebelwerfer crews would fire, then move their weapon under cover before the CB fire came down. When the New Zealand units grasped this they kept a gun laid full-time on each of the most troublesome positions and were thus able to hit the crew before they got under cover. Then the Germans took to firing from a different position each time. It was a battle of wits.

The flat ground to the west, at the entrance to the Liri Valley, was the chief source of mortar and nebelwerfer fire and Captain K. J. White won an MC for establishing an OP under heavy fire on this flank—having done much the same thing in the Arielli area on 23 December 1943, when he spent three days in front of the infantry.

[8] A2 of 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery was heavily shelled this day and Lance-Bombardier E. R. Wilson was fatally wounded.

[9] This day 41 Battery fired briefly at two FW 190s. The American heavy and light ack-ack fired profusely, but it looked more like an area barrage than aimed fire. A6 was later shelled and a gunner wounded.

Many miles farther from the front, 43 Battery suffered the loss of Gunner W. L. Alder killed and another gunner wounded when an S-mine exploded.

[10]
Gnr H. A. Humphries; born Woodend, 28 Dec 1920; glass beveller and fitter; died of wounds 17 Feb 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Maoris Attack the Railway Station

The Maoris Attack the Railway Station

The New Zealand attack in the night 17–18 February was by the Maoris in close conjunction with the sappers. To say the plan was curious would be putting it mildly. Two companies had to cross the Rapido by the railway line on a very narrow front indeed, seize the railway station and one or two key points near it, and then with the rest of the battalion hold this bridgehead while armour and other mobile forces swept through it laterally and then swung round to the left rear into the boggy misery of the Liri Valley. The sappers would have to work like supermen to fill or bridge the gaps in the railway embankment and allow supporting arms across the river. But the whole area was under water, as well as being heavily mined and booby-trapped and covered by a powerful arc of defences in the town and hills. (After the March attack, when the ground was drier, the New Zealanders gained these objectives and the bridges behind them were secure; but even then the notion of edging sideways through the bridgehead and out into the Liri Valley was utopian.)

the maoris attack cassino railway station, 17–18 february 1944

How could the artillery give effective support to this operation? A creeping barrage would be like a steamroller in a swamp. The arc of defences could be shelled, but in what depth? They extended right up the steep slopes of Montecassino and an Indian conquest of the ruined abbey in the same night was certainly not to be counted on. The 25-pounders were virtually useless against the buildings of Cassino itself and there were not nearly enough medium and heavy guns to neutralise this source of trouble. In the event two batteries of heavies and two medium regiments began the softening-up of the enemy in and around the bridgehead area, then the mediums and at least four field regiments fired in direct support of the Maori attack. They fired concentrations, among them several ‘murders’, and then HF and CB tasks. One or two tasks continued into the night, but most of the gunners rested and waited for dawn. The programme had so far entailed from 200 to 400 r.p.g. ‘A very noisy night’, the 47 Battery diary remarks, ‘with the sky lit up by flashes for hours on end.’

Dawn disclosed, as several of the senior gunner officers expected, a sea of troubles. For the 4th Field it began their busiest day of the war. Two companies of Maoris only were across the river and no supporting arms could get through to them. They were perilously exposed to enemy eyes and were certain to be counter-attacked. Only the gunners could now help them.

Murderous fire was pouring into the Maori positions from three sides and the first steps were to fire heavy concentrations into enemy forming up to attack and also to blind the enemy or obscure his observation. The 4th Field therefore began to fire smoke—mainly 25 Battery, with 26 Battery joining in from time to time. Brigadier Weir advised General Kippenberger, the acting Divisional commander, that it was out of the question to keep the smoke going all day long—there were not nearly enough smoke shells in the whole of his command. Ammunition company lorries drove 25 miles to Teano to get more smoke shells. Meanwhile the 4th Field went on firing and the B Echelon gunners drew further supplies from an ammunition point four miles back. At the start and for a long time afterwards 25 Battery was firing at three rounds per minute—the so-called ‘normal’ rate, but exhausting to keep up for hours on end. It entailed firing a three-tonner full of ammunition every eight minutes. The screen was controlled and the rate varied; but for most of the time it was all that the 25 Battery gun crews could do to maintain it. From 11 a.m. to 5.45 p.m. 46 Battery also fired smoke, starting at two rounds a minute and later slowing down to one round. D Troop of the 5th Field was also put on this work towards noon, the 6th Field had some part in it, and at some stage the American artillery helped. Besides this, 26 Battery fired nine DF tasks of either five or 10 rounds per gun during the day, as well as other shoots.

In the early hours, when there was a thick mist over the gun area, some American ack-ack gun crews came across and helped 25 Battery handle the ammunition. Enemy guns opened heavy fire and in this case unlucky 25 Battery was the obvious target, its regular and ceaseless firing making it easy to pinpoint. C3 received three shells in its pit and all but Gunner White
[11] were wounded. White carried on single-handed, firing the gun regardless of the heavy return fire—a feat for which he was later awarded an MM. In the end most of his crew returned from the RAP with their wounds dressed and continued as before.

The smoke screen was controlled by Majors Robertson
[12] of 25 Battery and Spring of 26 Battery from the latter's OP. The flat ground where the points of origin had to be chosen was waterlogged and the points had to be changed several times because of changing air conditions. For most of the time, however, the wind blew south along the Rapido at 15–20 miles per hour. In the early afternoon wind conditions made it hard to screen the Maori positions and the rate of fire had to increase. The guns became grossly overheated and almost all the gunners serving them suffered burns and blisters.

For the gun crews and ammunition parties behind them there were no spells at all throughout the day. Bombardier Kennedy, [13] who was in charge of ammunition for 25 Battery, had eight three-tonners and 20 men working and he says there were ‘no growls when [they were] told that they wouldn't stop for breakfast or lunch and for 14 hours all they had was one cup of tea and nothing to eat…. Practically every truck that came in [to the gun position] was met by heavy shell fire’.

Several times trucks arrived just as a gun was firing its last rounds, and many times lorries were splattered with dirt and stones and shell fragments as they were being unloaded. The conditions were miserable and the ammunition parties had sometimes to struggle to keep their vehicles moving on the muddy tracks. Kennedy intercepted a road convoy carrying ammunition from Naples and got it to by-pass the ammunition point and drive straight to the gun positions.

The A Troop command post had been set up in a rather shaky house (the inside walls of which had been attractively decorated by a German artist). Many heavy-calibre shells began landing in the area, 170s and bigger, and some huge craters appeared. The command post then received a direct hit. Normally it was full of gunners taking a breather; but this day all were working and only five were wounded, including an officer.

Despite all efforts on the part of the gunners to screen them with smoke and HE, the Maoris lost their bridgehead over the Rapido to a tank and infantry counter-attack in mid-afternoon. Artillery concentrations briefly checked the tanks, but the Maoris were too close. When the tanks came on again the foremost Maori platoon had to surrender and the rest of the two companies did their best to get back across the river and surprisingly many succeeded. The smoke screen had originally been ordered from 6 to 9 a.m.; the time was extended to midday and again to 5 p.m., and then it was expected to go on until dark. When the CRA heard that the struggle at Cassino station was over he ended the smoke shoot. It was 5.30 p.m.

At the end of the day 46 Battery had fired 2129 rounds of HE (including those fired by night in support of the attack) and 3902 rounds of smoke. For the same period 26 Battery fired about 3300 rounds of HE and over 3000 rounds of smoke. For 25 Battery the figures were 1600 HE and a phenomenal 10,056 rounds of smoke, of which A Troop fired 5864 smoke rounds and C Troop 4192. One 25 Battery gun fired in this time a total of 1700 rounds. A Troop's performance was almost certainly a record for one day's firing. [14]

Including cartridge cases, 25 Battery had fired well over 150 tons of ammunition in less than 12 hours. Each smoke shell had to have its fuse cap removed and its time fuse set by hand.

Three firing rods broke and two of them were replaced. Gun crews had been utterly dedicated to their task of shielding the embattled Maoris. When night fell they were weary to the bone and covered with the grime of battle. The whole area was littered with empty charge cases, ammunition boxes and fuse caps. Around the 25 Battery guns the cratered ground looked like the surface of the moon.

Enemy artillery was most active on the 19th, shelling American 8-inch guns behind Trocchio with remarkable accuracy and hitting two of them. The New Zealand guns had fired harassing tasks until 2.30 a.m. except for the ‘duty battery’, the 5th Field, which fired all night. Then more smoke was called for from the 4th Field and expenditure for the day was 3158 rounds, besides 1119 of HE. In the morning the crew of E2 suffered from a particularly nasty kind of premature: a faulty round apparently struck the breech block when being loaded and exploded practically in the loader's hand. It killed three gunners instantly and the No. 1 died on his way back to hospital. [15] The 5th Field had much trouble from nebelwerfers and there were several narrow escapes, especially when one rocket landed just outside E Troop command post.

From these unpredictable rockets and from constant and accurate fire on the New Zealand gun areas, the next few days are ones the gunners concerned would like to forget. The 6th Field suffered the attention of several self-propelled guns in the night 19–20 and then came the rockets. Gunner Wise
[16] was killed on the 20th and Gunner Swords
[17] next day. Lance-Sergeant Hollis
[18] of the 4th Field, who had already displayed great determination in the Orsogna fighting, was out every day mending breaks in the telephone lines to the OP on Trocchio, always under fire. On the 20th he carried on in the same fashion, mending six breaks at one critical stage in complete disregard of the heavy shellfire landing all around him. For this he earned an MM. On the 21st it was the turn of the 5th Field, after a busy night of HF and CB tasks to which the enemy replied with rockets and the fire of three 170s. A high velocity

170 took up the bombardment in the afternoon, rocking with its huge shells the RAP, then the command post of 47 Battery, then the 27 Battery gun area, where it killed a signaller, Gunner Milne, [19] and finally RHQ. A nearby gun of the 23rd Field, RA, suffered a direct hit. In the morning of the 22nd a nebelwerfer rocket exploded in some trees in front of E2 of the 4th Field, killing Gunner Elliott, [20] and in the afternoon the B Echelon area of RHQ was heavily shelled, killing the padre, the Rev. A. C. K. Harper, [21] and Gunner Ferguson
[22] and wounding four others. The padre had just returned from burying Gunner Elliott. (When the hostile battery that seemed responsible was engaged by the regiment the 46 Battery OP reported a fire and clouds of smoke in the target area.)

Lance-Bombardier Armstrong [23] at once rushed to the scene of the shelling and helped the wounded from the dugout to the shelter of a house. Another shell then hit the house. Armstrong had telephoned for an ambulance car and he now carried the wounded, by this time five men, out of the area that was being shelled. He went back to the house to look for any others who might have been buried in the rubble and began to clear it away. The shelling continued, and in the end Armstrong had to be ordered away from the position. His persistence in caring for the wounded regardless of his own safety earned him an MM.

The final fatality in this uncomfortable and unhappy period was Lance-Sergeant Johnson
[24] of the 6th Field, who died of wounds on 24 February. The day before this the ammunition dump of 27 Battery was set on fire and the fire spread to a nearby vehicle. Bombardiers Somerville
[25] and McIntyre
[26] immediately set about putting out the fire regardless of the danger of exploding shells and brought both fires under control. Other men then arrived on the scene and helped them to extinguish the fires completely. In the course of this McIntyre also drove a truck out of danger. Such acts were almost expected of the gunners at this period, when injury or sudden death was a constant threat to all who served the guns, and neither of these bombardiers was decorated.

Though every day saw a long list of DF and CB tasks issued from Artillery Headquarters and RHQ, there was still scope for individual prowess in bringing down observed fire. Almost all the OPs were on or very near Trocchio, but 46 Battery operated one for a time on the left flank, in a group of three ruined houses looking across the Gari towards S. Angelo. It gave good command over the river flat and up the Liri Valley, and at nights the OP parties could usually hear and bring down fire on vehicles or working parties ahead. For some time the OP parties spent the daylight hours there ahead of the infantry, though the latter would come forward by night to protect them against incoming patrols. Captain Vivian [27] of the 4th Field at one stage set up an OP on a solid rock by the simple process of installing a chair on it and then surrounding this with smaller rocks to give some slight protection. It could not be reached by day, so the FOO had to be prepared for a long, lonely and cramped vigil—and an extremely cold one on those days when a sleety rain fell.

One of the first tasks for FOOs in the morning was usually to study all the houses on the enemy side and note those which had smoke rising from their chimneys. These were then engaged, usually with one gun. Towards the end of February targets became scarce, the enemy taking good care not to move by day if he could possibly avoid it. For want of better targets, therefore, some FOOs undertook a systematic ‘house-busting’ programme, in the certain knowledge that all but the worst-damaged houses facing them—except in Cassino itself—were enemy-occupied. As an experiment smoke candles were burnt along Route 6 to screen the much-shelled gun areas behind Trocchio; but FOOs reported such poor visibility as a result that the practice ceased. But in late February and early March continual rain and frequent mist had almost the same effect.

Throughout February and March most of the 7th Anti-Tank and 14th Light Ack-Ack had little or nothing to do in their proper roles and much to do in the less attractive tasks of road- making, digging gun pits, bringing up ammunition [28] and suchlike—tasks which invariably had them floundering around with mud over their ankles and hatred in their hearts for the Italian winter. The conditions were so bad that many gunners were taken ill with high temperatures, and of these an increasing proportion contracted pneumonia. In the 7th Anti-Tank this almost became an epidemic. In 34 Battery alone 41 men out of 172 went to hospital with pneumonia.

The 34th was nevertheless able to provide an infantillery force of 51 men under Second-Lieutenants Dickey
[29] and Stevenson
[30] to serve with 3 Company of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion in positions vacated by Americans north of Route 6 on the outskirts of Cassino, with the anti-tankers on the right. They manned three posts facing the Rapido, one behind a brick wall, one in a slit trench, and the third in the room of a house. Four men manned each post from 6 p.m. to midnight and then four more took over until 6 a.m., with two more as daytime lookouts. The enemy was so close and dominated the scene so completely by fire and observation that movement by day was sternly restricted, there were no fires and no hot drinks, and even personal hygiene had to conform to the exigencies of the situation. [31]

Two patrols went out on 22 February to inspect the Rapido and the pontoon bridge across it and find fords for tanks. Dickey led one of them, crossed the river, climbed a high stone wall beyond it, and moved towards the town. The patrol came upon barbed wire and moved along it to the right until it reached the Pasquale road; it then returned across the pontoon bridge. Next day the 17-pounder guns Q2 and Q3 were brought forward to be deployed in the area, but only one of them, Q3, was emplaced, about 1000 yards from the town in a flat stretch of ground that gave no cover.

guns on the cassino front, 11 march 1944
A trace from an Official Archives Section field report

[11]
Gnr F. C. White, MM; born Templeton, Christchurch, 4 Dec 1909; freezing works hand; killed in action 17 Mar 1944.

Sergeant F. M. Diver of the 4th Field won an MM for a similar action this day and for another quite like it in the Florence campaign of July 1944.

[12]
Maj D. J. Robertson; Auckland; born Balclutha, 17 Dec 1906; manufacturer's representative.

[13]
Bdr G. G. P. Kennedy; Wellington; born Wellington, 13 Apr 1908; bank clerk; wounded 2 Jul 1942.

[14] These figures do not tally with those of the war diary, which gives 7035 HE and 9660 smoke as the day's output. But Bombardier Kennedy kept his own records, he collected ammunition without reference to RHQ, and his figures are certainly more reliable.

[15] The gunners were A. J. Blythe, T. M. Moore and L. Miller, and the No. 1 was Lance-Sergeant N. Franks.

[16]
Gnr G. H. Wise; born Wellington, 11 Jun 1921; farmhand; killed in action 20 Feb 1944.

[17]
Gnr W. M. Swords; born NZ 8 Jun 1921; porter; died of wounds 21 Feb 1944.

[18]
L-Sgt R. J. H. Hollis, MM; born Wanganui, 23 Jul 1906; clerk; three times wounded.

[19]
Gnr C. V. Milne; born NZ 1 Oct 1911; benchman; killed in action 21 Feb 1944.

[20]
Gnr H. H. Elliott; born Wellington, 15 Jul 1921; audit clerk; killed in action 22 Feb 1944.

[21]
Rev. A. C. K. Harper; born England, 15 Sep 1904; Anglican minister; killed in action 22 Feb 1944.

[22]
Gnr R. A. B. Ferguson; born England, 11 Apr 1912; farmer; killed in action 22 Feb 1944.

[23] L-Sgt J. C. Armstrong, MM; Masterton; born Masterton, 19 Oct 1913; farm labourer.

[24]
L-Sgt M. H. Johnson; born Wellington, 17 Oct 1918; labourer; died of wounds 24 Feb 1944.

[25]
Bdr N. T. Somerville; Tauranga; born Upper Hutt, 25 Dec 1915; transport driver.

[26]
Sgt J. B. McIntyre; Napier; born Dunedin, 12 Dec 1907; clerk.

[27] Maj H. G. Vivian, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 4 Nov 1912; bank officer.

[28] The ammunition party of the 7th Anti-Tank in the period 8–20 February brought forward the following rounds of ammunition and charges:

| HE | Smoke | Supercharge
25-pounder | 148,000 | 24,680 | 17,080
4.5-inch | 21,684 | |
5.5-inch | 15,680 | |
105-millimetre | 7,080 | |

[29]
Capt S. D. V. Dickey; Christchurch; born Wanganui, 27 Jan 1914; clerk.

[30]
Lt D. G. Stevenson; Te Kuiti; born NZ 3 Jun 1920; warehouseman.

[31] The Italian owner of the house and his daughter were still there and became very popular. Whenever a stonk came down on the German positions he would appear with a bottle and glass to celebrate and to urge the gunners to tell their colleagues not to stop firing.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Operation dickens

Operation dickens

The next attack on the Cassino front was the much-postponed Operation dickens and it opened in the morning of 15 March with a tremendous bombing of Cassino itself. The medium bombers began it and the heavies completed it, so as to end with a crescendo. This was a mistake, as the mediums obscured the target with smoke and dust and the heavies, which were in any case relatively inaccurate, were made even more so.

The gunners who knew this best were those of 34 Battery. Bombs from the third wave fell all round them. Four P Troop 6-pounders had come forward to undertake indirect fire with HE ammunition when the bombing ceased. The crew of the forward 17-pounder, Q3, also intended to engage targets in Cassino. When the bombs began landing all round this gun the crew hastily withdrew; but they returned quickly and opened fire at 12.15 p.m., firing nine rounds at possible machine-gun posts near the Continental Hotel. The 6-pounders fired 101 rounds at posts below Hangman's Hill at about 4700 yards.

To the gunners farther back the scene was more majestic; but even for them the bombing was not without danger. The 6th Field lost Gunner McGuire
[32] killed and another man wounded by stray bombs. Then, at noon, the guns came to life. There were more of them supporting the 6 Brigade attack through the ruins of Cassino and the concurrent Indian operations above Montecassino than had ever been assembled before for a New Zealand operation, [33] and there was a far greater variety of them. They included huge American 240-millimetre howitzers, some of the new 155s, and even three Italian 160-millimetre railway guns.

The New Zealand field gunners and the ack-ack gunners who had supported them had for a long time been aware that the Fifth Army artillery was very thick on the ground in front of Cassino. But none of them were quite prepared for the way, from midday onwards, the ground all round them seemed to be flashing fire and puffing up clouds of smoke as though it had suddenly turned into a vast and highly active volcanic region. Looking farther afield they saw Montecassino flashing and puffing in quite a different way until it was smothered with smoke and dust and the town became a blur that was jagged with fragments flung into the air, spotted here and there with hollow buildings, walls of irregular shape, and empty window-spaces like unseeing eyes. The violence of the bombardment was frightening to behold even from a safe distance and, as events were soon to prove, it was too much and the damage it did was more hindrance than help to the 6 Brigade infantry fighting their arduous way through the ruins. To the tanks that were supposed to be with them it was altogether too much, and most of them ended up facing impassable mountains of rubble or vast uncrossable chasms. The whole thing was grossly overdone.

cassino

The programme began with a creeping barrage and timed concentrations. The barrage, fired on an 800-yard front by 88 guns including 6th Field and some mediums, was the thickest creeping barrage ever fired under New Zealand control—a gun to every nine yards. It lasted from noon until 2.10 p.m., allowing for 15 minutes on the first line and another 15 minutes on the finishing line. But even though its lifts were of 100 yards every 10 minutes, this proved far too fast for the conditions and the infantry were soon left far behind. The barrage was extended on the final line until 3.30 p.m., but still there was no sign of infantry there. The concentrations and other supporting fire covered every conceivable source of trouble and included harassing fire for six hours by the 4th Field on the slopes of Montecassino and CB fire by the 5th Field until 12.20 p.m., followed by opportunity targets interspersed with more CB fire. The final line of the barrage was repeated from 5.30 to 6 p.m. Much of the 4th Field fire on Montecassino was smoke, to blind the defence, but the wind kept lifting it from the hillside and allowing the enemy there to fire down into the attacking infantry. When nebelwerfers opened heavy fire on the north-eastern part of the town in the late afternoon the corps artillery came down on them with crushing force, guided by the invaluable air OPs, and the few German guns that fired attracted tremendous attention to themselves. Only German guns far away in the mountains to the north, in the sector of the French Expeditionary Corps, continued to fire into Cassino. These were tucked into inaccessible folds of the mountains and could not be silenced, but there were not many of them.

The weight and vigour of the artillery was not matched by the weight of the infantry attack. All this tremendous supporting power was exerted on behalf of a mere two battalions of infantry, climbing steadily through the ruins, meeting resistance here and there, coming under strong flanking fire in places, and finding in the course of their advance that they were outnumbered at key points such as the convent. The defending paratroops fought bravely and skilfully; but there was no need to present them with opposition on the ground commensurate with their own strength. They could and should have been overwhelmed with numbers. When the tanks were denied passage through streets blocked with rubble—and this was soon apparent—there was only one answer: more infantry. But none came and the enemy was allowed to recover and consolidate and convert the battle from a swift assault to a series of slowly resolving encounters between clusters of determined men yard by yard through the rubble and wreckage of Cassino. As the outcome of weeks of preparation and a gigantic air and artillery effort it was vastly disappointing.

Next morning 25 and 26 Batteries found themselves on the familiar task of firing smoke, this time with all points of origin in the southern half of the town. At 11 a.m. 26 Battery began another series to screen the area of the railway station and the road junction where Route 6 entered the town. Other targets were nebelwerfers, and by the end of the day the 4th Field had fired the considerable total of 5746 rounds of HE and 5003 of smoke. [34] After dark the 5th Field joined in a concentration designed to punish nebelwerfer crews and it caused several heavy explosions and some fires.

Things seemed to be looking up on the 17th. New Zealand tanks picked their way towards the railway station despite strong opposition. At one stage some of them were attacked by paratroops with anti-tank support and 26 Battery brought down fire all round the tanks—even over them. When the smoke cleared the paratroops had disappeared and the tanks were unharmed. With considerable difficulty the infantry followed and occupied the station. A further effort won the hummock 200 yards beyond the station; but that was all.

On the 17th, however, the enemy artillery showed renewed interest in the gun areas and the 4th Field suffered a sad loss. Unlucky 25 Battery was again the target and in the afternoon

Gunner White, who had won an MM a month before, was killed and two others were wounded. In 46 Battery B2 suffered a premature in the barrel, but the crew escaped harm. Two FW190s bombed and strafed the gun areas and 42 Battery was credited with one of them as a ‘probable’.

Next day the guns fired more smoke, most of it around the Continental Hotel and the Baron's Palace. By this time the interweaving of friend and enemy in the ruined town and various points outside—the Colosseum, Hangman's Hill, the abbey, Castle Hill and the rest—made close artillery support hard to provide. The effects of frequent massive concentrations on selected targets such as the Colosseum were usually disappointing. The heavy work, moreover, particularly the smoke, caused much wear and tear on the guns.

a bearing picket prepared by x (survey) troop for the 4th field at cassino

This day, 18 March, for example, one of the guns of A Troop, 29 Battery, broke its firing rod. This would usually have caused much delay awaiting a replacement rod; but the troop mechanic, Gunner Mathieson, [35] with the few tools at hand, set about making a firing rod from a length of salvaged steel. Within a few hours he succeeded and for the next five days the gun was in action with its home-made firing rod and fired more than 1000 rounds.

The German artillery was ominously reviving and infantry calls for anti- nebelwerfer fire were also becoming more frequent.

Areas apparently cleared of German infantry seemed to fill up again by some unfathomable sleight of hand. The enemy in Cassino seemed, if anything, to be growing stronger.

The 4th Field fired almost as many smoke shells on 21 March as on the unforgettable 18th of February when the lives of the Maoris depended on them. The war diary gives the total for this day as 10,105 smoke (as well as 1178 HE). Most of the smoke was fired to screen the amphitheatre near the Colosseum and Monastery Hill to hamper the enemy there in his efforts to make the station and the hummock untenable for the New Zealand infantry. Smoke was also used to blind enemy mortars in an area known as ring contour 55, south of the railway line. Infantry had captured most of the town, with what aid the tanks could give them; but they were overlooked in most places by enemy on higher ground and they continued to have need of lavish smoke screens. This need continued even after the 23rd, when the offensive was officially halted, and the gunners therefore could not relax.

By this time both gunners and guns were feeling the strain. The 4th Field crews had worked themselves to the point of exhaustion, and on the 22nd 33 Anti-Tank Battery sent 33 men to help at the 4th Field guns. In the next few days the crews had to work harder still in some ways as the enemy was allowed to regroup and recover his confidence.

How the guns responded to this continued over-exertion is illustrated by the 4th Field experience. The gun F1 blew its packings on the 18th. On the 22nd C3 did the same and C2 was under repair for two hours. D3 blew its packings on the 23rd. Next day F3 had its piece condemned and the gun had to be evacuated to the Gun Bay of Divisional Workshops. D3 sprang oil leaks in the buffer cylinder on the 25th. Wear and tear on the rifling of gun barrels from the constant firing of smoke was also a source of worry. And so the story went on. Before the end of the month the field regiments began a rest scheme, sending selected men to the wagon lines for four days.

Early in March 43 Battery had relieved 41 Battery in defence of the field gun areas. A3 and A4 were too hard to move and remained in position, and their detachments took over H3 and H4 from the incoming gun detachments. Even this changeover was an ordeal because of the mud. The tractor of G4 broke an axle in trying to leave the reserve area and the G1 tractor developed faulty steering. Then on the 8th B Troop of 41 Battery relieved E Troop of 42 at Divisional Headquarters and

A Troop went into position covering heavy American guns. So there was no rest. In turn 42 Battery moved forward to relieve 71 US Anti-Aircraft Brigade and deployed between Trocchio and Porchia and northwards almost to Cervaro.

Steve Weir addresses his officers in the Volturno Valley

A major repair of a 25-pounder in the Volturno Valley

Looking north and north-east from Monte Trocchio. In April 1944 most guns were sited between A ( Vallerotonda) and B. Terelle is distant left. In the foreground Route 6 leads to Cassino, off the picture to the left

Smoke-screening 26 Battalion near the Cassino railway station—taken from a 36 Survey Battery post on Trocchio

Smoke canisters screening Route 6 as it enters Cassino

C Troop, 5th Field, on upper-register shooting behind Trocchio

A 36 Survey Battery post on Trocchio, overlooking Route 6

Jack Mitchell conducts the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser on an inspection of some of the 7th Anti-Tank after the Cassino battle. The RQMS, Darky Smith, is in the foreground

K. J. Retter using a director on the Cassino front

Field and medium guns on the Cassino front

Montecassino abbey dominates the guns as they shell Cassino

I. E. Gilbert and W. S. Tuck at a 6th Field artillery board near Sora

D. J. Ryan at a flash-spotting post near Sora

R. T. Stewart of the 6th Field hands washing to children near Sora, two days before the trouble starts

A ‘stonk’ falls on the hills above San Michele in the Florence battle. Taken from Tac HQ of the 6th Field, with Cerbaia in the foreground

A sound-ranging microphone being sited by N. Hansen in the Florence battle

L. N. Richards operating sound-ranging equipment in front of Florence

An Mio at San Casciano

The Bofors which sank a German motor launch off Rimini, October 1944

A 5th Field jeep at Riccione: W. O. Duncan, A. E. Davis, I. O. Little and D. H. Pachnatz

A waterlogged 5th Field gun pit near Forli

Empty 25-pounder cartridge cases at Faenza look a bit like a church organ

J. D. McGregor of the 4th Field on a causeway of ammunition boxes at Faenza

A 17-pounder in front of Faenza covers the Via Emilia

On the final advance: approaching the Idice River

A 17-pounder crossing the Po

The 4.2-inch mortar J2 in action

The CRAs

Reggie Miles

Steve Weir

Ike Parkinson

Ray Queree

Bill Thornton

Air activity in the first fortnight of the month was almost exclusively friendly. A fleeting target presented itself on 17 March to D6 of 42 Battery, and Sergeant Thomson's [36] detachment engaged the two FW1905 which flew over at a mere 500 feet. A shell hit amidships and the plane seemed to be thrown over and to fall slightly, but it recovered and flew off. It crashed beyond Trocchio, however, and D6 got full credit for it (though this was later challenged). On the 22nd there was a sudden increase in enemy air activity and 41 and 43 Batteries both found targets. This occasioned special interest because several guns had recently been fitted with new correctional sights popularly called Stiffkey Sticks—by the end of the month 28 guns had them—and everyone was anxious to see how well they worked. Over 20 Me109Fs and FW1905 came over at 1 p.m. to dive-bomb the rear areas and both batteries engaged them vigorously, 41 Battery firing 135 rounds and 43 Battery 675 rounds. The result was a headache for Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen when he had to adjudicate on the various claims. A3 under Sergeant Kerr
[37] claimed a hit on a plane that passed overhead. It was already smoking, but a flash came from the engine and it departed smoking profusely. Then Kerr fired two bursts at the leading one of another group of these planes and scored two hits, causing flashes. Bombardier Ujdur
[38] of A4 saw one of 24 shots strike forward of the cockpit of an FW190 and it was trailing smoke when it disappeared. Sergeant Hare
[39] of A5 fired 20 rounds and scored hits on one plane. This was smoking badly when it vanished behind the hills. Sergeant Kenah
[40] of A6 saw one of his rounds strike a fuselage. Sergeant Mortland
[41] of B6 engaging with predictor control saw ‘one definite hit by naked eye and also through telescopes’. Finally Sergeant Healey
[42] of G6 watched a Spitfire chase a plane, and when it broke off the engagement he opened fire and a hit on the fuselage caused smoke to come from the enemy aircraft. The battery commander, Captain Hollis, [43] pointed out that G6 was in a particularly good position to engage this aircraft and that, as it was seen to crash, he thought Healey's detachment should get the credit. Sprosen scratched his head and in the end awarded one Category 1 (aircraft destroyed for certain) to the regiment as a whole; but opinion in the unit was that at least two other aircraft were damaged. The Stiffikey Sticks passed their first test with honour. [44]

The smoke tasks continued and the regularity of this fire gave the enemy all the information he needed to bring down extremely accurate fire on the New Zealand gun areas. The 6th Field suffered most, losing Bombardier Rashleigh
[45] on the 22nd, Lance-Bombardier Tullock
[46] on the 24th, and Bombardier H. R. Brown
[47] next day, and then, on the 27th, in a fierce onslaught by hostile guns on the 30 Battery area, a sergeant and two gunners. [48] The 5th Field received 20 170-millimetre shells in quick succession in the afternoon of 25 March and Sergeant Fulford
[49] was mortally wounded. The 4th Field had its turn on the 27th and again it was unlucky E2 that suffered, Gunner Warnock
[50] being killed.

In the 14th Light Ack-Ack the death of Sergeant Mortland on the 27th upset his many friends. [51] It occurred as his gun was being taken into a forward position vacated by American guns guarding bridges at Cassino. Gunner F. G. Smith, [52] who was helping him, was seriously wounded and died next day; three others were badly wounded and two more lightly wounded.

The only consolation about this unhappy episode was the selfless devotion of Gunner Lee
[53] to his comrades when this trouble struck them. Lee, a driver, was wounded on the way into the position when he passed through shell and mortar fire. He received first aid and then continued until his gun was in position. When the others were wounded he did all he could for them and then drove some of them and two wounded infantrymen back to an ADS. There his own wound was dressed and the staff wanted him to stay for further treatment; but he refused. On the way back to the wagon lines he drove his tractor over a demolished bridge which was not barricaded and the tractor overturned. Some Americans rescued him and helped him to an MDS, where he spent the night. Next morning, at his own request, he returned to his unit. In due course he was awarded an MM.

In the period that the New Zealand Corps was in existence—it was disbanded on 26 May—the 14th Light Ack-Ack was associated with the following units for the ack-ack defence of the corps area:

The 49th Light Ack-Ack, RA, of 78 Division: 26 guns

The 57th Light Ack-Ack, RA, of 4 Indian Division: 15 guns

The 167th Light Ack-Ack, RA, relieved by the 39th Light Ack-Ack, RA: 15 guns

The 5th US Army Ack-Ack Group: 27 guns.

The success of A1 on the 29th brought the regiment's total of aircraft destroyed to 67½, not counting the score for October 1942, on which there was no agreement.

The enemy was evidently infiltrating reinforcements into Cassino along Route 6, past the Colosseum and the Baron's Palace, to the Hotel des Roses and beyond. This area was a source of much trouble to 6 Brigade and the New Zealand tanks, and the Hotel des Roses in particular seemed to resist all kinds of fire. A heavy ‘murder’ on it on the 25th seemed to leave it almost unscathed. Medium guns did a little better. Then on the 26th Brigadier Weir, in his last few hours as CCRA, went to a vantage point near Cervaro with the commander of the American 936 Field Artillery Battalion, and personally conducted a shoot with a 240-millimetre gun on the Hotel des Roses, scoring many hits and doing a good deal of damage to it. Several hits were described in reports from the New Zealand infantry, some of whom were excited spectators at no great distance, as being ‘dead centre’ and airbursts immediately following them caught enemy fleeing from the building.

As a change from the continual CB and counter-mortar tasks and the frequent long spells of firing smoke—and putting up with the almost inevitable retaliation from the enemy artillery—the most interesting feature of the field gunnery towards the end of March was an essay in ‘upper-register’ shooting. This was a method based on experiments carried out by the 166th ( Newfoundland) Field, RA, and it entailed digging the gun trails down and securing them safely so that the gun could fire at a very acute angle. This enabled the guns to reach hostile batteries tucked in closely behind high ground and similar targets. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart personally conducted the first shoot by D Troop of the 4th Field. Several targets were engaged with some success and the enemy showed his concern by searching the area with 170-millimetre fire and putting down a very heavy concentration which was evidently meant for D Troop, but which actually landed about 200 yards away. C Troop of the 5th Field engaged hostile batteries this way with some success. It was interesting and instructive; but the idea did not catch on. The method was slow and difficult. FOOs, for example, had to use stopwatches because of the long time of flight of the shell—about one minute—and the consequent difficulty of knowing when to expect the fall of shot. There was also a fear that equipment might be damaged.

The anti-tankers, little-needed in their normal role, showed their versatility and made themselves useful in many ways. [54] A troop of 32 Battery was deployed and remained thus in the Sant' Angelo sector facing west. Two more guns of this battery were deployed between the railway yards and Route 6 and these were relieved by 33 Battery and, late in March, strengthened by three 17-pounders. The 33rd at the same time deployed J Troop as infantillery, taking over two posts from the Buffs 100 yards south of the railway station. N1 and N3 of 34 Battery were emplaced at the northern end of Cassino, where the rest of the battery remained in its infantillery role. Another task, carried out by a party from 32 Battery, was to maintain a beacon near Venafro in the upper Volturno valley. This was to guide night bombers and was in the shape of the letter Z. It seemed an easy job until the party discovered that the beacon burned more than 200 gallons of diesel oil each night.

By far the most arduous task of the anti-tankers, however, was that of the ‘smoke party’ of 31 Battery under Major Tipping, [55] numbering in the end well over 40 men. They had to place and light smoke canisters to screen the five Bailey bridges on Route 6 and the entrance to Cassino. Early types of canister weighed 45 pounds, and one account points out that this meant a man could carry ‘only three of them’. The work was dangerous and disagreeable. Machine guns fired on fixed lines through the smoke to make the task hazardous and mortars frequently fired furiously into the area. Slit trenches and even dugouts had to be close at hand. Gunners serving the six posts on the right or northern side of the road slept in a casa some distance away and came forward by jeep in the morning. They started their smoke at first light and then spent two hours bringing more canisters forward. On the left of the road, however, the canisters had to be carried forward by night, the six posts on that side being too near the enemy for much daytime activity.

The wind was for the most part kind and blew the smoke towards the enemy; but it could be fitful, and when it dropped or veered the smoke would pour sideways or backwards, filling the slit trenches and dugouts and almost choking the gunners even when they wore gasmasks—as they did much of the time. Several gunners were badly ‘gassed’ and had to be evacuated for medical treatment. When the smoke persisted in its waywardness the party would telephone the field gunners and they would send over smoke shells which often burst over the heads of the smoke parties and cascaded shell casings around them. Basuto troops took over this task on 4 April, but they performed it so badly that the 31 Battery men were at once called back to carry on, which they did until the night 8-9 April, by which time all the rest of the regiment, in company with all Divisional Artillery units, had withdrawn to a rest area near Venafro.

The most important task of the Survey Battery in March was flash-spotting to calibrate field and medium guns, and this continued throughout the month. All the New Zealand field guns were thus checked and all the guns of the 5th Medium, RA, as well as many other guns. One particularly interesting check was on different charge lots. The 76th Medium fired five groups of three rounds at a certain target, each group from a different lot. In each case the three rounds fell close to each other and three of the groups were close together. The fourth was 400 yards short and the fifth was even worse. This showed, as the flash-spotting diary says, ‘that differences in charges may affect gunnery greatly and reduce accuracy’. It could explain, for example, the failure of a number of rounds to clear Trocchio when the barrage and timed concentrations were fired on the 15th. It could also explain some of the authenticated cases of short shooting in support of the infantry. At all events, the variation between charge lots was ominously large.

The flash-spotting base centred on Trocchio was manned for a total of 52 days and nights. Lance-Sergeant Keppell
[56] was in command of one OP at the southern end of this feature and he did not leave it once. It was shelled almost every day and on 29 March the enemy scored a direct hit, wounding two men and causing much damage to equipment. Keppell had the wounded attended to and then arranged for a reserve instrument to be brought forward. In a very short time the post was in full operation. In the Orsogna operations he had similarly kept a post in action for 40 days. For this and his work at Trocchio he won an immediate MM. When the battery withdrew to Venafro its record of flash-spotting and sound-ranging locations throughout the period of 52 days was excellent. Flash-spotting locations averaged seven per day and sound-ranging 7.4 per day. Moreover, they were to a considerable extent complementary rather than repetitive, since most flash-spotting locations were obtained when Fifth Army guns were extremely active and no sound-ranging locations could be obtained, while most sound-ranging locations were of guns using flashless powder or in positions with good flash cover.

‘Never were visitors to the position more kindly received or welcomed’, a 4th Field man remarked of the occasion when officers of the 2nd RHA inspected the positions preparatory to taking them over. The 4th Field fired their last ‘Nebel Blitz’ at 1.46 a.m. on 3 April, their last morepork counter-mortar programmes—four of them—in the morning, their last HF and CB tasks, and then the guns came out, after a struggle, and bounced and lurched behind the quads on the way to Venafro.

The 5th and 6th Field were less lucky. On the 4th they both suffered accurate attention from enemy guns. A party of the 5th Field went out mending telephone lines after the first bombardment and two were killed, Lance-Sergeant Reeves
[57] and Gunner Hart, [58] and a third man was wounded. On 5 April the 5th Field moved by night to Venafro. The 6th Field spent another fortnight behind Trocchio and then withdrew swiftly and gladly to Isernia, higher up the Volturno valley than Venafro, to what the regimental diary calls a ‘Pleasant area beside swift cold river’.

Thus ended the greatest artillery battle of the war so far as the New Zealand gunners were concerned. For most of them it was as if the cares of the world had suddenly dropped from their shoulders and Venafro or Isernia were other names for paradise. The dark brooding menace of Montecassino with its myriads of gimlet eyes boring into hiding places, the black hills above and beyond the ruined town, the leafless trees, the pitted and muddy landscape, the cramped gun positions, the never-ending crack and boom of the guns, and the sound of shells in the air (everything from a gentle rustling to a suddenly expanding heart-stopping shriek)—all these were of the past. For the 6th Field that past had lasted 74 days, one after the other, plodding slowly and heavily by in the cold and the mud. The present was short and must be enjoyed. Already in the first morning beside the ‘swift cold river’ reconnaissance parties were leaving for a new area, a new battle—but surely not a battle like Cassino!

For Artillery Headquarters it was as if a town council had for two months been managing the affairs of a great city and was now back in its own town. Captain Myers, for example, the Staff Captain, had had to administer seven different groups of artillery, at least 12 natures of guns and their gunners. He had had to see they had ammunition enough and of the right kinds. He had had to concern himself with their vehicles and weapons. There were countless instances in which he had had to attend to what the army calls ‘A’ matters relating to British units under the command of the New Zealand Corps. All this he had done without extra staff. Twice daily he had been able to furnish a detailed account of ammunition stocks and expenditure for all the different guns. He had done all this cheerfully, so that people enjoyed dealing with him, and underneath this cheerfulness were organising ability and driving energy. He too had had to work in the mud and under shellfire. For it all, from 5 February onwards, he was awarded an MBE. Higher up the scale, Colonel Queree for what he did as BGS of the New Zealand Corps—and he was calm, able, modest and profound—earned the CBE. [59]

For gunners of the 5th Reinforcements, many ‘old originals’ of the 14th Light Ack-Ack among them, 7 April was a big day. It marked the end of their third year overseas and therefore made them eligible for furlough. Soon afterwards the three field regiments and the 7th Anti-Tank welcomed men who were back from furlough—the relatively few Ruapehu men who returned from New Zealand. In the 4th Field they numbered 21 and in the 7th Anti-Tank they included the popular RSM, WO I ‘Les’ Auty. [60] All were bombarded with questions about home. [61]

[32]
Gnr G. D. McGuire; born NZ 24 Jan 1913; waterside worker; killed in action 15 Mar 1944.

[33] How many guns all told took part is not clear. Weir in one account gives the figure of 890 guns, but does not specify whether he includes antitank and ack-ack guns other than the few which had a role in the huge programme of supporting fire. Another careful estimate is 610 guns. But both of these probably include guns far from the Cassino battlefield, either deep in the mountains to the north or among the Aurunci Mountains to the south-west. In more or less direct support of the Indian and New Zealand attacks the following seem to have been committed:

192 | 25-pounders
80 | 4.55 and 5.5s
130 | US guns—105s, 155s, 8-inch and 240-millimetre
12 | French 155s
4 | French 8-inch
3 | Italian railway guns, 160-millimetre
—— |
421 | Total
—— |

Also there were some American 90-millimetre heavy ack-ack guns and some others, among them 10 6-pounders firing HE and four 17-pounders of the 7th Anti-Tank.

[34] Lance-Sergeant G. A. Ravenwood of the 4th Field mended over 50 breaks in the telephone lines of his battery this day, always under fire, and in due course was awarded an MM.

[35] S- Sgt H. F. Mathieson, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 24 Apr 1907; plasterer.

[36]
Sgt A. D. Thomson; Auckland; born Warkworth, 3 Aug 1902; civil servant.

[37]
Sgt A. H. Kerr; Auckland; born Ashburton, 4 Jun 1912; bank clerk.

[38]
Sgt B. Ujdur; born NZ 5 Jan 1917; labourer, P.W.D.; died on active service 13 Jan 1945.

[39]
Sgt J. C. Hare; Tauranga; born Napier, 13 Oct 1913; law student.

[40]
Sgt A. R. Kenah; Te Puke; born Nelson, 29 May 1909; grocer's assistant.

[41]
Sgt J. P. Mortland; born Taihape, 16 Jul 1910; accountant; killed in action 27 Mar 1944.

[42]
Sgt J. M. Healey; Milton; born Milton, 11 Jan 1919; labourer; wounded 22 Sep 1944.

[43]
Maj R. A. C. Hollis, MC; Masterton; born Wellington, 12 Mar 1910; public accountant.

[44] The final claim of the month, duly allowed, was by Sergeant J. R. Allen of A1, who engaged three aircraft on the 29th and saw the last of them explode violently and scatter wreckage widely.

[45]
Bdr G. A. Rashleigh; born NZ 7 Apr 1915; sharemilker; died of wounds 22 Mar 1944.

[46]
L-Bdr L. H. Tullock; born NZ 4 May 1910; motor mechanic; killed in action 24 Mar 1944.

[47]
Bdr H. R. Brown; born Auckland, 12 May 1912; milk vendor; killed in action 25 Mar 1944.

[48] Those killed were Sergeant L. J. D. Brown and Gunners R. E. Scott and K. R. Shaw. These men, with three others, were in a building in which the telephone exchange of 30 Battery Command Post was installed. A heavy shell struck the building and it collapsed, burying the occupants. All six men would almost certainly have died had it not been for a party of Americans of C Battery, 985 Field Artillery Battalion, who rushed over from their own guns and worked to the point of exhaustion clearing the rubble and moving heavy beams and masonry to rescue survivors. This they did regardless of the shelling, which continued intermittently throughout the afternoon.

[49]
Sgt G. H. Fulford; born Napier, 6 Jun 1911; accounts clerk; died of wounds 25 Mar 1944.

When shelling set an ammunition trailer of 27 Battery on fire WO II B. K. Bassett rushed up and tried to extinguish it. The shelling continued; but Bassett worked on regardless of it and managed to localise the blaze and overcome the danger to nearby dumps of ammunition. This was typical of Bassett's actions throughout the campaign and for it he was awarded an MM.

[50]
Gnr D. W. Warnock; born NZ 14 Jun 1921; patternmaker; killed in action 27 Mar 1944.

[51] Jack Mortland was an original member of 41 Battery and popular throughout the regiment. He had been New Zealand foursomes champion at golf for three years running.

[52]
Gnr F. G. Smith; born Blackball, 25 Oct 1918; goldminer; wounded 1 Sep 1942; died of wounds 28 Mar 1944.

[53]
Gnr F. W. Lee, MM; Waipawa; born Bulls, 10 Aug 1918; labourer; twice wounded.

[54] The 7th Anti-Tank had been commanded by temporary Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Dawe; but on 18 March Lieutenant-Colonel Lambourn arrived (after a nine-month tour of duty in command of the training regiment at Base) to take over and Major Dawe became second-in-command.

[55]
Maj J. R. Tipping; Wellington; born Hastings, 5 Oct 1909; bank clerk; wounded 21 May 1941.

[56]
L-Sgt M. A. Keppell, MM; Invercargill; born NZ 15 Mar 1919; chainman.

[57]
L-Sgt C. Reeves, MM, m.i.d.; born England, 29 Jun 1919; petrol station attendant; killed in action 4 Apr 1944.

[58]
Gnr M. K. Hart; born NZ 18 Sep 1921; farmhand; killed in action 4 Apr 1944.

[59] At the regimental level Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, who had been recommended for an immediate DSO for conspicuous gallantry at Medenine, at last was awarded one for his tireless efforts with the 6th Field in support of 6 Brigade. While the infantry were locked in their bitter struggle among the ruins Gilbert did not relax his efforts to locate and overcome with his guns enemy posts, mortars and anti-tank guns which opposed them.

[60] WOIL. J. Auty, MBE; Auckland; born Timaru, 11 May 1916; Regular soldier.

[61] Artillery casualties in the battle for Cassino were:

| Killed or Died of Wounds | Wounded | Prisoner of War | Total
4th Field | 11 | 30 | — | 41
5th Field | 4 | 11 | — | 15
6th Field | 12 | 45 | — | 57
7th Anti-Tank | — | 21 | 2 | 23
14th Light Ack-Ack | 7 | 25 | — | 32
| — | — | — | —
| 34 | 132 | 2 | 168

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 18 — The Mountains above Cassino and the Action at Sora—Balsorano

Contents

- [section]
p. 581

- Anti-Tankers Form 39 Mortar Battery p. 590

- The Pursuit Begins p. 592

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE idyll of Venafro was beautiful but short. Spring was at hand, the grass was green and soft, peach trees were in delicate blossom, lizards sunned themselves on the rocks, frogs croaked near the river, and the song of the birds was not interrupted by the thunder of the guns. The evenings passed pleasantly under the trees, talking or singing round kegs of ‘plonk’, cleaning the Cassino mud from personal gear, or writing letters home. Venafro itself was out of bounds, but there were villages higher in the hills. South Africans camped nearby provided stern opposition on the Rugby field.

Brigadier Weir had not handed over command on the Cassino front to the CRA of 6 Armoured Division until 8 April. On the 10th he dined at Montaquila, some miles higher up the Volturno valley, with the GOC and GSO I of 5 Kresowa Division of the Polish Corps. Next day, with Lieutenant-Colonels Stewart, Lambourn and Sprosen, and a few others, he drove over a road that climbed ever more steeply into the mountains north of Cassino.

The party drove through Pozzilli, Casale and Acquafondata and then over the Inferno Track, an unforgettable route. It was carved into solid rock of a dazzling whiteness and had grades in places of one in four. Traffic was strictly controlled and special passes were needed. Only jeeps and pick-ups could drive westwards and only four-wheel-drive vehicles eastwards. It was one of several routes which had been constructed or improved to allow a mechanised army to move into the lofty and contorted land which rose northwards towards the Abruzzo national park, a scenic wonderland, and north-westwards on to one of the main ridges of the Apennines, the backbone of Italy. From Acquafondata, a picturesque village with a clear stream running through it, three such routes led generally westwards. The northernmost, the Ancina Track, was fit only for jeeps. The North Road, the middle route, was also under observation and by day only special jeeps, ambulances and signal trucks were allowed on it. From dusk until midnight only westbound traffic was allowed and from midnight onwards only eastbound traffic. In many parts the mountainside dropped away precipitously for 1000 feet or more and there were more than 40 hairpin bends, at some of which lorries had to back once or twice before they could get round. Perhaps the greatest danger, however, was that the North Road and Inferno Track were much used by Polish and Indian drivers who seemed to be in bitter competition for the title of World's Worst Driver.

mountain sector north-east of cassino

The 5th Field [1] had already reconnoitred forward on the 9th and next day 28 and 47 Batteries and Tac RHQ drove as far as they could by day and then deployed by night in the mountains north-east of Acquafondata. The night drive was difficult and at times hair-raising; but at the end of it the gunners put their guns into positions already dug by the Poles and took over the existing DF tasks and other records. The CPO with whom 47 Battery had to deal spoke good English and was most helpful. Captains Haslett and Morpeth established C and F OPs about 2500 feet up in mountains which looked down on Acquafondata. Pack mules had to be used to reach them. Ammunition was restricted: 30 r.p.g. for registration of zones and then 15 r.p.g. per day. Very little counter-battery work was to be done. The policy, according to the 47 Battery diary, was ‘retribution only’. It was a popular policy among gunners who felt that their respite in the Venafro area had been rudely interrupted; and they were further mollified to learn that day leave to Naples was to continue, longer leave to Bari also, and that the periodic four-day rest at the wagon lines, instituted towards the end of the period on the Cassino front, was to remain in force.

In the night 11–12 April 27 and 43 Batteries moved forward, the 25-pounders and H Troop of the Bofors north of Mennella and a few miles east of the rest of the 5th Field, and G Troop Bofors to the existing gun areas near Cerre Grosso. J Troop of 33 Battery drove past the 5th Field positions on the 12th and established its 6-pounders covering the road to Cardito, and 60 members of the battery formed an infantillery company which was posted in the same area. The ground in front of them sheltered the source of the River Rapido.

These positions, in support of 6 Brigade, covered the road from Cardito to Atina, high in the mountains to the west. Another route led down from Atina to S. Elia, west of Acqua- fondata, and the 4th Field (less 46 Battery) drove over the Inferno Track or North Road in the nights 13–14 and 14–15 April to take over positions from a British regiment guarding this route. As the columns reached Acquafondata they became parts of an ever-lengthening queue of vehicles waiting for nightfall, when they could begin the drive—‘crawl’ might be a better term, for it was seldom in any other gear than bottom. Below them in the great valley which opened out past Cassino, the gunners could see gun flashes and tracers and white flares dropped by aircraft. It was a spectacle doubly impressive for the memories it evoked; but the drivers could not enjoy it, for they could never for one moment allow their attention to stray from the narrow road with its endless contortions.

The gun positions in the Cerreto area east of S. Elia were in a bowl surrounded by hills and were well-protected. Next night 46 Battery arrived and 41 Battery soon took over ack-ack defence.

All routes forward, either to 6 Brigade or to the 4th Field area, were narrow and difficult and there was almost no ground off the roads on which B Echelons could be established. The main B Echelon areas were therefore 30 miles back in the Isernia area—the farthest back they had ever been from the gun positions. A Echelons—smaller groups of more essential services—were therefore set up at various points between Isernia and the front. This greatly affected the cooking arrangements, the equipment on issue being insufficient to cope with such a wide dispersion of units.

The front remained quiet and what little firing there was was usually against mortars. Polish artillery began moving into the 4th Field area after a few days. On 20 April, to make room, 26 Battery manhandled its guns up a 45-degree slope to a little cup on the crest of a hill planted with olive trees—a position comparable only with that which D Troop of the 5th Field had first taken up in the Olympus Pass in Greece. [2] Somehow D and F Troops wedged their guns into the tiny and dusty cup, after cutting down dozens of olive trees, and when some of the D Troop guns fired the rounds seemed to pass just over the heads of F Troop gunners in front. Far below a narrow valley used as a supply centre and known as the Hove Dump was filling up rapidly with supplies and ammunition. On the 23rd 25 Battery moved to a position just off the Inferno Track, a beautiful spot among pine trees, made all the more attractive by the arrival of a Canadian bulldozer to help dig the gun pits. Lieutenant Moffat
[3] in a rear OP above Portella was incensed at the sight of a German flag flying defiantly from the crest of Monte Cairo and he did his best to shoot it down; but the guns could not quite reach it.

The days were sunny and hot, but the nights were cold. Then rain came on the 26th and at the end of the month snow fell lightly in the area. The 6th Field briefly took up positions east of those of the 5th Field and 29 Battery stayed under the command of the 5th Field. From the B Echelon area the other two batteries and RHQ of the 6th Field then moved along the North Road to positions in the Cerreto area not far north of the 4th Field. [4] The 32nd Battery had meanwhile gone forward with 5 Brigade and 34 Battery with their old friends of the Orsogna front, 2 Independent Parachute Brigade. The latter took over from 6 Brigade and 32 Battery drove past the Hove Dump, through the village of Cairo, where the smell of the dead from earlier fighting still hung nauseatingly in the air, and then along the road leading north-west to Terelle. BHQ halted three miles from Terelle and three infantillery posts were set up at the foot of a series of long zig-zags leading steeply upwards to the town. The 32nd infantillery began patrolling at once and suffered two casualties from mortar fire.

A great offensive was brewing in the Aurunci Mountains, the Liri Valley (but not the muddy Liri Valley the New Zealanders had known), and the mountains above Cassino. The Poles operated in the mountain sector, and building up supplies for them left little room on the roads and tracks for New Zealand supplies. All movement had to be planned and controlled, not only because of the heavy demands on the roads and tracks, but because of the tightness of the situation throughout the area and the proximity of the enemy. In daylight from Monte Cairo Germans had a grandstand view of the whole area and many points and stretches of road or track became notorious —like the Mad Mile near Castelfrentano—for the attention the enemy paid them.

One place that was thought safe was the Hove Dump, because of the steep face of the valley on the enemy's side. But on 7 May, after a night of shelling by heavy guns throughout the S. Elia area, a shell fell into the dump late in the morning and started a fire. Other shells followed, and when the fire grew the enemy added to it with more shells. The blaze got quite out of hand as the afternoon wore on and exploding shells sprayed the areas of 46 Battery and the 4th Field RHQ. The battery cookhouse was destroyed. WO II Quigan, [5] the BSM, risked his life to get transport away from the flames and to move supplies that were threatened. For this and for later work beyond Sora Quigan was awarded an MM. Several other men of 46 Battery including Gunners Halke
[6] and Davis, [7] also rescued vehicles from the vicinity of the fire while the enemy was still shelling the valley. The fire blazed all through the night and the Hove Dump was completely burnt out. It was replaced by another dump which began to grow near Acquafondata.

Zero hour for a great offensive by Fifth and Eighth Armies was 11 p.m. on 11 May. The New Zealand gunners had only a small part in it, though it kept the 4th and 6th Field busy. From the New Zealand sector the guns of 2 AGRA also supported the Poles and, since they included the medium guns which had sufficient range to reach any part of the Montecassino spur with ease, their fire must have been more effective. The programme included a ‘Chinese attack’ northwards from the extreme right of the Divisional area by 2 Parachute Brigade with the 5th Field, a battery of the 1st/6th South African Field, and a troop of the 16th/67th South African Medium all firing tasks for about two and a half hours—almost all of them ‘murders’: area concentrations in that close and broken country would have little effect. This was a simulated attack to draw enemy reserves, if possible, away from the main battle area; but it failed to provoke much response.

The 5th Field guns were too far away to help the Poles, who were attacking across the Montecassino spur above the ruined abbey. The 4th Field and a battery of the 6th Field fired a three-hour programme of tasks, all but three of which were ‘murders’. A third of the rounds were airburst—fuse 222. The pinpoint targets were in an arc from west of Monte Castellone through Villa S. Lucia and S. Angelo hill to Albaneta Farm and the hillside just south of it. A long string of ‘murders’ was aimed at the Farm itself in final preparation for the Polish assault on that vital link in the German defences. Then, in the hope that the attack would succeed and to help the consolidation, there followed a dozen stonks [8] just west of it and a final one to the south-east, to discourage a counter-attack from the Montecassino area. Another battery of the 6th Field fired a smaller programme of timed concentrations on the Farm and the hill just north of it, S. Angelo, followed by harassing fire on suspected OPs on Monte Cifalco, a 3150-foot feature northeast of Terelle, and on other points south-east of Terelle and west of the serpentine road guarded by the New Zealand infantillery. The 6th Field received long lists of targets and tasks in Polish with English translations of some of the main items, and in them one word stands out boldly to the New Zealand eye: stonk. It did service in both languages. The programme for both the 4th and 6th Field called for about 400 r.p.g.

All went according to plan until 5 a.m. on the 12th, when the 4th Field was asked to repeat for a whole hour the ‘murder’ on a point north-west of Albaneta Farm. Fire was also directed at every active mortar position that might fire on the Poles. Much other defensive fire fell on the Poles and the two New Zealand regiments answered many calls to neutralise guns, mortars and machine-gun posts. Nearly all the firing was at very long range, on supercharge. In 46 Battery, for example, B2, B4, E1, E2 and E3 were the only guns to engage; but E3 did by far the most firing—over 800 rounds. The 4th Field fired a total of 10,414 rounds and the 6th Field 6250, 30 Battery firing 530 r.p.g.

The opening of the programme in the great valley to the south—for those who were able to see it—was a thrilling spectacle from the high ground the New Zealand gunners occupied. Some 2000 guns opened fire from the Gulf of Gaeta through the Aurunci Mountains, on the front looking across the River Gari and up the Liri Valley, on the Cassino front, and in the mountains above it. Gun flashes lit up the sky brilliantly and at times the ground to the south, towards the entrance to the Liri Valley, seemed to be ablaze with twinkling and flashing lights.

Next day it was followed up by further heavy gun fire to the south and by ceaseless air activity. For the FOOs, however, the view was less satisfactory. Montecassino and Monte Cairo were ‘completely enveloped in smoke’, according to the 6th Field diary. Ammunition parties toiled up steep hillsides to replenish the 4th and 6th Field stocks. In the evening of the 12th a solitary shell was fired towards 46 Battery and it landed in the gun pit of B2, seriously wounding a gunner.

Though the offensive went well at other points, the Poles continued for the next week to meet strong opposition on the Montecassino spur. The Germans and their ancient enemies fought bitterly and at times ferociously for key points on this vital feature, and there were many calls for supporting fire from the New Zealand guns. Only the 4th and 6th Field could answer these calls—and not all of their guns could reach far enough, even with supercharge. In the night 16–17 May the 4th Field and 30 Battery of the 6th Field fired a series of ‘murders’ to help the Poles gain Phantom Ridge, near the abbey. C2 of the 4th Field had to drop out of this programme because of a broken sight bracket. Then fog came down and visibility became very poor. The Poles struck much trouble and the main part of the programme was delayed for several hours. At 5.25 a.m. on the 17th it began again in full force. F4 of the 4th Field went out of action with a blown packing after an hour and a half. Then, in mid-morning, the guns carried out a series of crushing bombardments on mortar positions which were causing trouble to the Poles. A battalion of German infantry in the open on the slopes of Monte Cairo attracted a heavy stonk. Then the guns repeated the fire programme, 30 Battery contributing only one troop to it. At the end of it the 4th Field gunners were weary indeed. Their ammunition expenditure for 24 hours had grown to the impressive total of 11,883 rounds of HE.

The morning of the 17th was marred by a premature in A1 of 25 Battery. A cartridge exploded before the breech closed. Though bad enough, this was not normally such a nasty kind of premature as when the shell detonated. But in this case it wounded three gunners, one critically, and caused the loss of the piece. The shell stuck two-thirds of the way up the bore, and in the end the Ordnance officer decided that the only way to deal with this was to remove the piece—very gently—and bury it.

FOOs complained throughout this period that they could see little or nothing from their OPs. This was frustrating, because the Poles were known to be having a hard time and it was seldom possible to bring down observed fire to help them. It did, however, please the drivers, because the Inferno Track was so shrouded by mists and the smoke of battle that they could often drive along it in daylight unobserved.

On the 18th the Poles gained what was left of the abbey and the end was in sight.

Much of the firing at this stage was smoke, to blind enemy observers on Monte Cifalco in particular, and in the morning of the 20th 26 Battery did this at the request of the Poles until all smoke shells were fired. Some heavy counter-mortar concentrations were also called for.

The last fire in support of the Polish corps was on the 21st. Two days later Major D. J. Robertson of the 4th Field, who had been liaison officer with 5 Kresowa Division throughout, returned. The division was advised, according to the 4th Field diary, ‘that a total of 28,621 HE and 2020 smk had been fired in their support’ since the offensive began on 11 May. From this time onwards nearly all tasks fired were in support of 5 Brigade facing Terelle. The Poles were too far away, though on the 25th the 4th Field fired on mortars thought to be harassing them.

Cassino fell not to direct assault, but to the blocking of Route 6 in the Liri Valley and the Polish conquest of most of the Montecassino spur above the town. The choking process in the Liri Valley was possible because the ground there had dried out and a mechanised army could operate in it. The utter futility of the earlier efforts when the valley was a sea of mud was now painfully clear to all concerned. Even now, on firm going, the operations were far from easy.

Enemy guns and mortars in the mountains above the New Zealand sector became extremely active, probably to use up ammunition at hand and cover a withdrawal. The New Zealand FOOs were much impressed by the use the enemy made of mortars, and it was evident that their own methods of countering this fire were far from satisfactory. On the 25th, therefore, Captain Vivian of the 4th Field marched out to Artillery

Headquarters to become the first Counter Mortar Officer and to establish an organisation and train a staff. Early in June he was joined by Lieutenant Harvey
[9] of the 6th Field and Second-Lieutenants Maxwell [10] (5th Field) and Naylor
[11] (from Advanced Base), who were to become brigade counter-mortar officers.

Infantry of 5 Brigade entered Terelle in the early hours of 26 May and later in the day infantillery of 32 Battery (who had taken over from 33 Battery) occupied the little town while the infantry moved on. When Belmonte fell next day the infantillery were recommissioned as anti-tankers and told to await the arrival of their guns and then follow the infantry towards Atina.

[1] Commanded once more by Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton, who returned on 6 April, having finished his temporary appointment as GSO I, NZ Division, during the existence of NZ Corps.

[2] See p. 33.

[3]
Capt R. D. J. C. Moffat; born Milton, 5 Jan 1907; advertising manager; died Lower Hutt, 22 May 1962.

[4] At the end of the month Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert went on furlough and Lieutenant-Colonel Kensington of the 5th Field replaced him.

[5]
WO II V. N. Quigan, MM, m.i.d.; Woodville; born Palmerston North, 25 Dec 1911; labourer.

[6]
L-Bdr G. T. Halke; Whangarei; born NZ 22 Jul 1911; farmer.

[7]
L-Bdr H. W. Davis; Kyeburn, Central Otago; born NZ 26 Feb 1919; mechanic; wounded Apr 1943.

[8] In an instruction of 16 April, Artillery Headquarters advised the three New Zealand field regiments, the 22nd Field, RA, and the 17th Canadian Field that the New Zealand standard concentrations would be altered to conform with those of other formations. The Murder was unchanged so far as the New Zealand units were concerned, all troop guns concentrating their fire as before; but it acknowledged that the RA and Canadian troops would fire, as before, with troop guns parallel. The Regimental Method ‘B’ was, as before, a method of bringing down fire on a target 200 yards square. The Stonk was now similar to what the New Zealand gunners had formerly called the Divisional Artillery Method ‘B’, a linear target 600 yards long. A new name was the Rumpus, which applied only to the New Zealand regiments; but it was an old method, the former Stonk—a target 1200 yards long and 300 wide.

There would not be much call for the Rumpus method in the tangled mountain country; but in flat terrain it could be expected to regain the popularity it had when it was called a Stonk. In the event it not only regained its popularity: it regained its proper name, Stonk.

[9]
Lt A. T. Harvey; Taradale; born NZ 10 Oct 1910; schoolteacher.

[10] Capt W. P. Maxwell; Auckland; born NZ 21 Oct 1918; storeman.

[11]
Lt J. L. Naylor; Auckland; born Wellington, 31 May 1920; architect's assistant.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Anti-Tankers Form 39 Mortar Battery

Anti-Tankers Form 39 Mortar Battery

But the anti-tankers had another element in the battle, a newly-formed battery which would allow them to strike at the enemy and not merely wait until he attacked. This was 35 Mortar Battery, equipped with 4.2-inch mortars which could fire a 20-pound bomb 4100 yards with Charge 2. These mortars had been issued to infantry battalions since the early days in Italy and the infantry continued to employ them; but it is no discredit to the infantry to say that they did not make really effective use of these powerful weapons. For one thing they were chronically short of manpower, especially officers. Moreover, they had insufficient signals equipment and the wrong kind of training and experience. In any case the 4.2 mortars needed to be operated in a way that would make their fire complementary to that of the guns, not independent of it. Artillery methods of controlling their fire would be far more satisfactory, with FOOs, GPOs, the usual range of CB, DF, HF and counter-mortar tasks, and with the mortars surveyed in like guns to enable them, among other things, to bring down accurate predicted fire. The War Office had been strangely remiss about the way it had had these weapons produced and issued without serious thought about who should use them or how they should be used. One of the first things done by the New Zealand gunners, for example, when these mortars were handed over to them, was to prepare a range table. This was ably done by Second-Lieutenant Menendez, [12] formerly of the 14th Light Ack-Ack; but it should have been done long before.

The battery was formed at Venafro in April, under Captain E. C. W. Nathan, by extracting a troop from each of the existing batteries of the 7th Anti-Tank—C, G, L and P Troops. These came with all their existing transport, small arms, and other equipment. Certain specialist officers from field regiments were transferred, together with an experienced NCO to be in charge of signals—far more important to the mortar battery than to an anti-tank battery.

Brigadier Weir told Nathan the battery was to be ready for action in about six weeks and it moved to the Isernia area to train. At that stage it did not even have cooking gear and nobody in the battery had seen a 4.2 mortar. Nathan conferred with Lieutenant-Colonel Lambourn and Ordnance officers. The CRA had laid it down that training and organisation should make it possible for all 16 mortars in the battery to be brought to bear on one target.

Plenty of signals equipment was available and the battery received eight 4.2-inch mortars on 22 April. An officer and two sergeants from 6 Brigade also arrived to guide training. A heavy mortar company had meanwhile been training at Maadi and, at a higher level, it was decided that this company, less its officers, should join the battery. All members of it had received a good basic training on the mortars.

Drill was modelled on that of the 25-pounder, even though the sights were graduated 180 degrees right and left and the directors received—the latest type—were graduated o to 360 degrees. X (Survey) Troop put in a bearing picket for a practice range and on 18 May Major Drummond and two officers of the Survey Battery climbed a nearby mountain overlooking the range and took sound bearings on the mortars as they fired. But the war did not wait for the battery.

Before this practice C Troop had already been called forward to deploy north of Acquafondata. On 20 May the troop was in position and ready to fire. A nearby 3-inch mortar platoon had been firing all day and the enemy replied at night with heavy shelling. The line to Artillery Headquarters kept getting cut and the NCO in charge of signals, Lance-Bombardier Nicol, [13] took two men out to mend it. They found a break and mended it and then another and another—more than 30 breaks all told. It was their first time in action and Nicol's leadership and encouragement under heavy fire earned for him an MM.

G Troop deployed in the same area, off the Ancina Track, on 21 May and on the 26th P Troop also came forward. By the 29th the whole battery was concentrated in the Vallerotonda area and the B Echelon was moving up to join it. By this time C and G Troops had carried out several shoots and were quickly gaining confidence. L Troop, not yet fully equipped, stayed with B Echelon. The rest of the battery hastened to take its place at the forefront of the Division in its pursuit of the enemy. [14] In due course word came from New Zealand that there were already batteries numbered 35, 37 and 38 and the heavy mortar battery was therefore renumbered the 39th.

[12]
Lt R. R. Menendez, EM, m.i.d.; Pakuranga, Auckland; born Palmerston North, 18 Dec 1917; meteorologist.

[13]
Bdr G. J. Nicol, MM; Elstow, Te Aroha; born Te Aroha, 7 Aug 1921; farmhand; wounded 26 Jul 1944.

[14] Though the 4th Field and a battery of the 6th Field had been kept busy in their positions above the Hove Dump, the rest of the Divisional Artillery had had relatively little to do in the mountain sector. On the 26th they held a sports meeting near Montaquila and, as usual, the 14th Light Ack-Ack won. The Survey Battery and Artillery Headquarters tied for second place.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Pursuit Begins

The Pursuit Begins

This pursuit took the Division north-westwards through the mountains towards Avezzano on the road from Rome to Pescara. It was a bracing experience, the first time in Italy that the New Zealanders had to deal with a beaten enemy in full retreat, and it reminded many of them of the excitement of the advance through Tunisia a year before. But Italy was a very different land, as they were soon to learn.

After the seizure of Terelle, in a cul-de-sac on the northern slopes of Monte Cairo, the objective was Atina, reached by various routes, all of them coming together in the Belmonte valley. Some guns travelled along the North Road, some along the Inferno Track. Most of them passed S. Elia and from it the gunners gazed in fascination south-westwards across the plain at Cassino and the ruined abbey. The foreground was ablaze with poppies.

Brigadier Weir had visited Cassino in company with General Freyberg as early as 22 May and in the next week, officially or unofficially, many other gunners also climbed through the ruins. The Hotel Continental, the Baron's Palace, the Hotel des Roses, the Colosseum, the Castle, the Botanical Gardens and the Railway Station became for them something more than names; but the menace that had formerly resided in them had been extracted and what was left encouraged feelings of sadness and pity rather than triumph. Cassino was not even the skeleton of a town—only the pulverised bones, smelling like a knackery, its air caustic with powdered bricks and mortar and plaster. After such a visit a swim in the icy Rapido above the town was like an act of absolution, necessary and profoundly refreshing.

Under the poplars near the river the 4th Field and many men of the 7th Anti-Tank and 36 Survey Battery paraded for the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser, on the 29th. Later in the day Mr Fraser met small parties from the 6th Field in the square of Atina, five miles short of where the batteries were digging in on the road to Sora, with the medium guns of 2 AGRA behind them. The guns were in green vineyards or fields of ripening grain, with cherry trees among them laden with ripe fruit. It was a pretty valley, a land unscarred by war except for the blown bridges and road demolitions which were the main obstacles to progress.

The CRA conferred with his regimental commanders a few miles beyond Atina on 1 June. The two infantry brigades, he said, were moving along the upper Liri valley beyond Sora towards Balsorano, with 5 Brigade on the high ground to the right and 6 Brigade in the valley and on the high ground to the left. The 5th and 6th Field were to advance in close contact with the infantry, each with three OPs forward. The 4th Field was to cover the whole Divisional front, maintaining liaison with the tank squadrons. A liaison officer from 2 AGRA would travel with each infantry brigade. Air OPs would be under the command of 2 AGRA and six artillery reconnaissance sorties per day would be under 2 AGRA control. The mortar battery would deploy three troops east of Sora with one OP per troop. Ammunition for the field guns was restricted to 30 r.p.g. per day, though this could be exceeded if a good opportunity target presented itself. A large force of paratroops would be dropped at the northern end of the Liri Valley that night. There was no sense in dropping them unless the Division expected to reach them in a very few days. Current maps marked successive infantry objectives running across the valley for miles past Sora and Balsorano like a series of stepping stones. Avezzano seemed very close.

The first glimpse of Sora was daunting: its situation was so like that of Cassino. It nestled into a steep spur like Monte-cassino and almost precisely as high, topped by a castle, and beyond it squatted another Monte Cairo, or so it seemed. It was reassuring to learn that the infantry had occupied it with little trouble. In the night 1-2 June, however, a strong enemy patrol approached the 6th Field gun area a few miles east- south-east of Sora, and Major Frechtling
[15] of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery hastily organised the field and ack-ack gunners in the neighbourhood into a defensive perimeter. The patrol, as a result, instead of taking a prisoner, left one behind. All regiments doubled their pickets. On 2 June 31 Battery came forward as infantillery to guard the 6th Field gun lines—95 men in three platoons, all on the right flank where the ground rose steeply to form a lofty massif. The enemy was slowly withdrawing up the valley towards Balsorano, closely followed by tanks and infantry. A stonk and harassing fire on a target just south-east of Balsorano on the 2nd started a fire and caused a heavy explosion, evidently of ammunition. Slight fire came back from enemy guns; but neither the flash-spotters and sound-rangers of 36 Survey Battery nor those of the 8th Survey, RA, who were forward in support of 2 AGRA, could obtain satisfactory bearings. The 4th Field, advancing on the western side of the River Liri, had a busy day, firing 813 HE rounds, 139 of supercharge, and 210 with airburst fuses, and at the end of it the enemy was out of range even of supercharge.

in front of balsorano, june 1944

On the eastern bank of the Liri the 5th Field already had 47 Battery forward several miles beyond Sora and the 6th Field had 29 Battery nearby, just south of a village called Lanna. It was a narrow valley, and just south of Balsorano it narrowed still further and a rocky escarpment guarded the approaches to the little town. On either side were precipitous and narrow-crested ridges, and above them the mountains rose 6000 feet or more.

It was an ideal place for an ambush; but the gunners were anxious only to keep within range of the enemy and gave little thought to what he might do to them. Their own strength, they felt, was overwhelming and could scarcely be challenged by a beaten enemy. Through force of habit most gun crews of 29 Battery nevertheless dug gun pits and slit trenches during the night, between spells of firing—and pauses to admire thousands of fireflies with their flickering luminescence. Spasmodic enemy shelling from the right flank gave some encouragement to the diggers.

In the forward area where the armoured car and jeep of the 47 Battery OP were stationed the enemy began shelling and mortaring in the evening of 2 June. A nearby 15-cwt pick-up loaded with mortar bombs and small-arms ammunition caught on fire and the ammunition began to explode. A driver at the OP, Gunner Elsworth, [16] at once rushed to his jeep and began to drive it to safety. This proved hard to do, as there was little room to spare. After some manoeuvring he managed to drive clear; but by this time gear on the jeep was burning. He put out the flames and then drove the jeep to a safe distance. His load included much valuable signalling equipment and by his skill and determination he saved it all.

G and P Troops of the mortar battery moved forward at first light on 3 June to good positions half a mile or so in front of the two field batteries, and C Troop deployed on the other side of the river in close support of 24 Battalion. Behind them the little valley began to fill with guns. Two medium regiments and a heavy battery (of massive 7.2-inch howitzers) of 2 AGRA arrived on the scene. Along the dusty road, too, came the 4th Field guns, raising clouds of white powder, and they went into positions north of Sora and west of the river. It was an audacious deployment of the guns, the foremost of them within 2000 yards of the infantry FDLs.

The German gunners had plenty of targets and could pick and choose and bide their time. They did not take much notice of 29 and 47 Batteries in their forward positions and, across the river, they let F Troop of 26 Battery fire for some time until D Troop arrived on the scene. Then, when D Troop was unlimbering its guns, the Germans began to bombard the 4th Field with deadly accuracy. D Troop was the first target and salvos landed in its midst. Direct hits on D2 and the troop command post and near misses of the other three guns made a shambles of the troop area. Five men were killed and 11 wounded, most of them in D Troop, and the troop gun crews were reduced to about two men each. [17] These were told to dig in where they were and the troop did not open fire before dark.

The rest of the 4th Field, however, was undaunted by this terrible blow and fired vigorously throughout the day. The 46 Battery positions were just as exposed as those of 26 Battery; but there was good cover near them when the men were not needed at the guns. There were several houses and a railway culvert nearby and the battery command post was set up in a palatial and most substantial casa'. Seldom had the guns been so far forward. A machine-gun officer wrote in his diary that night: [18]

‘A troop of guns is about 100 yards behind us and nearly stun us when they fire.’

One troop was able to shell a mortar position on the slopes of Monte Cornacchia across the river over open sights. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart engaged other mortars, using his RHQ as an OP. By the end of the day the 4th Field, with only four troops firing, had expended 1669 rounds of HE (835 with supercharge) and 51 of smoke (as compared with 1004 rounds fired by the 5th Field). And all the time the gunners were aware that the enemy had direct and close observation of the gun positions from the lofty hills beside them. They felt as if enemy eyes were boring into the backs of their necks as they served their guns.

The 5th and 6th Field drove forward steadily in the early afternoon, the quads and trailers white with dust. They reached the areas of 47 and 29 Batteries without mishap. Then, after a pause, shells started to scream down on them from the hills. Gunners were bowled over like ninepins, but the bombardment continued and their rescuers had to work regardless of the bursting shells. C Troop of 47 Battery became the target of a troop of guns directed with great precision and C3 was soon wrecked, its muzzle brake broken off and its tyres, shield and toolbox all holed. Sergeant Oliphant
[19] was seriously wounded and there were nine other casualties, four of them in C Troop. The fire seemed to be coming from self-propelled guns ‘just over the ridge’. Temporary Sergeant Whiting
[20] and Gunner McKinna
[21] of C Troop both distinguished themselves by the fearless dedication with which they tended the wounded and helped to get them to a place of safety.

In the 6th Field area things were even worse. Lieutenant-Colonel Kensington had strolled back from RHQ, a quarter of a mile in front of the guns; he spoke briefly to a battery captain and advised him to get his guns dug in and thoroughly protected, and then he returned. No sooner had he got back to RHQ than the shells began to come down. A dozen gunners fell in the first few minutes, and those who went to help them were splattered by shells bursting in the olive trees around them. Smoke and flames from burning petrol and ammunition and the dust raised by vehicles hastily departing from the target area, and jeeps driven into it on errands of mercy, thickened the air and made it hard to know what was going on. Neither of the newly-arrived batteries, 30 and 48, had had time to dig in properly and some gun crews had not even started to dig.

Sergeant Burke
[22] of 48 Battery had to deal with burning charges and exploding ammunition beside his gun, a burning camouflage net over it, and a thatched roof on fire in a building alongside. He did not hesitate, regardless of the continued shelling, and his strenuous efforts to put out the fires inspired his gun crew to do the same. Between them they put out all fires and saved the gun.

In 29 Battery a B Troop quad was hit and the smoke from it drew even heavier shellfire. Bombardier Luscombe
[23] and Gunner Walker
[24] at once set about evacuating all transport in the vicinity, driving several quads and various other vehicles out of danger. They then returned and tried unavailingly to quench the fire in the quad, though by this time ammunition in it was exploding violently.

Many similar desperate episodes were enacted at the gun positions. Twenty men were wounded all told, including Lieutenant Broadway, [25] GPO of E Troop, 30 Battery. To get help to them under the circumstances called for iron nerves. In 48 Battery three gunners, McCarthy
[26] and Greenwood
[27] among them, rose gallantly to the occasion, acting as stretcher bearers and driving jeeps to evacuate the wounded to the RAP. It was at least partly due to their efforts that none of the 6th Field wounded died. [28]

The wagon lines were as much exposed to the shellfire as the gun positions and there, too, there were instances of exceptional bravery as men tried to save vehicles and equipment from the many fires which broke out. A truck of the machine-gun battalion was one which caught on fire and its small-arms ammunition began to explode like deadly firecrackers. Gunner Streater
[29] of 29 Battery drove his own quad out of danger, although he was slightly wounded by a shellburst. Another quad was blazing and the HE ammunition in it was in grave danger of exploding. Streater disregarded this and the shelling of the area and went back to collect another quad and drive it to safety. Gunner Nuttall [30] and at least two others did much the same, and Nuttall wrapped himself in a blanket and tried to drive the blazing quad away. In this he failed, but he succeeded in salvaging some personal belongings from it, suffering burns himself in so doing. Then he carried on driving other vehicles away.

The 31 Battery infantillery were also in the 6 Field area and their headquarters was a large house between the field guns and the hills to the east. A battery truck near the house was being used for a game of cards while the anti-tankers awaited orders for their night pickets. One of the first shells in the area hit the petrol tank of this truck and blew the card-players over the tailboard. A spectator of the game, Gunner Redstone, [31] was killed; but the others were unhurt. The truck was destroyed. The infantillery sheltered in the house; but one of them was later wounded.

The Left Section of E Troop, 42 Battery, had gone forward with 46 Battery on 2 June. B Troop of 41 Battery also deployed in defence of the 4th Field while A Troop guarded the medium artillery and Divisional Headquarters. The Right Sections of D and E Troops deployed under intense shell and mortar fire in defence of the 5th and 6th Field. Major Frechtling intended to deploy the Left Section of D Troop as well; but the fire had increased to the point that it would have been almost suicidal to site more Bofors in the already overcrowded flat stretch beyond Sora in full view of the enemy. On the 4th Lance-Bombardier Lichtwark
[32] of 42 Battery was killed and two others wounded. The RAF was active over Balsorano; but no enemy aircraft appeared and the Bofors gunners had to put up with a good deal of shot and shell without a chance of replying.

The mortar battery had a busy day and suffered no losses from the shelling except for a signaller wounded on the road when mending a line. Lieutenant Stevenson [33] of P Troop carried out some effective shooting, mainly on targets indicated by the infantry. He used G Troop as well for many of them, and on at least one task he got C Troop across the river to engage a target out of reach of the other two. Fire orders were sent back by wireless, all troops being on the one link. Lieutenant McSkimming
[34] of C Troop had arranged to go forward with an FOO of the 5th Field in support of a night attack by 24 Battalion. But orders came from Artillery Headquarters for the three troops to fire concentrations as part of the artillery programme in support of a major attack on Balsorano. This caused much working out of tasks, and ammunition had to be collected on the other side of Sora and prepared. When all was nearly ready word came that the attack was cancelled.

It was exasperating not to know the source of the fire which caused the trouble on 3 June. Some 6th Field officers thought that heavy mortars were the chief culprits—and certainly they did do some damage. Self-propelled guns also were involved and they could, of course, easily change position if they were located. A few long-range guns, well beyond the reach of supercharge, were able to fire over the New Zealand field guns into Sora and even south of it. But the bombardment of the field guns which caused most of the casualties was carried out with a control and accuracy far beyond the capabilities of mortars and was evidently the work of guns fairly close at hand and with excellent observation of the gun areas. [35] The location of these guns and their observers was an urgent task.

The infantillery of the 7th Anti-Tank became mountaineers on 4 June in efforts to locate these troublemakers. Two volunteer platoons of 31 Battery, under Captain Helean
[36] and Second-

Lieutenant
Colpman, [37] marched a little to the north of the 6th Field area and then began a long climb to the top of Monte Cornacchia, well over 6000 feet high. It took them six and a half strenuous hours to get to the top, searching all likely spots on the way. The crest was open and gave wonderful observation; but there was no sign of enemy observers. A sudden thunderstorm soaked the anti-tankers to the skin in a matter of seconds.

In the early hours of the morning 34 Battery had hurried forward also as infantillery. Three patrols climbed the same mountain from south of the 6th Field area. Each had a different objective. Two of them duly reached their appointed destinations and found no sign of enemy observers, though they found recent German newspapers in one place. The third patrol, directed to the highest point, came under fire from the 6th Field when high on the mountainside. One or two shells came fairly close, but no one was hurt and the patrol continued its climb. Approaching darkness, however, caused it to turn back before reaching the mountain top. Trying to find OPs in the rugged mountain mass on either side of the river was like looking for needles in a haystack.

For 47 Battery, deployed near the road, the night 3-4 June had been most uncomfortable. A troop of German guns fired up and down the road frequently all night long. After dawn the hostile batteries turned their attentions once more to the 6th Field and to 27 Battery of the 5th Field. The New Zealand field guns were by now fairly well dug in; but they were kept busy—even the thinly manned guns of D Troop of the 4th Field—and shelling of the gun positions inevitably caused casualties while the men were manning the guns. Of three men wounded this day in 27 Battery, one of them, Sergeant Martin, [38] later died. One was a member of Martin's A4 gun crew and the third was the A Troop artificer. They were sheltering in a drain when a 105 burst in a tree above them.

In the 4th Field it was the turn of 46 Battery, which was heavily bombarded. When charges caught on fire at his gun position Sergeant Thorne
[39] was badly burnt, another sergeant suffered head wounds, and a bombardier was hit in the chest.

The ordeal of 27 and 46 Batteries, however, was trifling compared with what the 6th Field had to endure this day. On the 3rd the 6th Field had had 20 men wounded. This day, 4 June, when there was far better protection for the gun crews, at least 28 men were wounded, including half a dozen sergeants. Almost all of them were serving their guns when they were hit.

Again there were many instances of gallantry in caring for the wounded under fire. Conspicuous among them was the work of Gunner Hamilton
[40] of 30 Battery. He was himself wounded, but he dressed the wounds of others and helped them to safety. When all the wounded in the open had been attended to he went through shellfire to a building in which they had been collected and gave them further first-aid attention. Only when all others were treated did he allow his own wounds to be dressed.

The heavy and accurate counter-battery fire made little or no difference to the carrying out of the many shoots ordered this day. In 46 Battery, for example, when the No. 1 of Bombardier Milne's [41] gun was wounded, Milne took command, and put out the fires which had started in the charges and had spread to the gun tyres. His gun was ranging and Milne manned it himself. The BSM, WO II Quigan, carried on as he had done the day before, leading ammunition lorries forward regardless of the shelling.

The foremost OP of the 4th Field was that of E Troop, on the hillside west of the river and looking down on Balsorano. From it the hills to the east were earnestly studied for signs of the guns which were bombarding the 5th and 6th Field; but nothing could be seen of them, even when Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart went forward later in the morning to the E Troop OP. There were other guns, however, in the valley north-west of Balsorano, and Italians reported at first light that there were some near the railway station. From various sources hostile battery locations in the valley were confirmed and several concentrations were fired on them. One of these concentrations seemed from the OP of C Troop of the 5th Field to be ragged, though many rounds fell on the target. When it was repeated, however, it fell thickly right on the enemy guns. These did not fire again. Later in the morning a concentration a mile up the valley beyond Balsorano caused a large explosion.

Another OP well forward on the left had been established the day before by Lieutenant MacKay
[42] of C Troop, 47 Battery. He had spent the night forward with the infantry and had then begun registering hostile batteries. This day and the next he registered five four-gun batteries and brought down extremely accurate and effective fire on them, as escaping British prisoners of war were able to confirm. They claimed that direct hits were scored on 10 guns, heavy losses were inflicted on their crews, and an ammunition dump was blown up.

Not all of this, of course, was achieved solely by the fire of the 5th Field. By this time 2 AGRA had three medium regiments and a heavy battery in action on this front and their fire was particularly effective against enemy-occupied buildings. One of these, on the hillside north-east of Balsorano and marked on the map as S. Francesco, was evidently a centre of much activity. Troops from it were seen to relieve others on the escarpment facing the New Zealand infantry every four hours. But the walls were very thick indeed, and on the advice of Major Stone, [43] of 29 Battery, who was liaison officer with 5 Brigade, a 7.2-inch heavy howitzer was brought forward to engage it. To the infantry who were watching the explosions of its massive shells, they seemed to cover half an acre and German activity in the area of S. Francesco dwindled rapidly.

The fall of Rome on 4 June caused a sudden change of plan. Instead of forcing its way by frontal assault up the narrow Liri Valley towards Avezzano, the Division was to withdraw and become part of a pursuit force on a front that allowed it to develop its full manoeuvrability. The immediate task therefore was to disengage. For the field regiments the first step was taken in the night 4-5 June, when 25 and 26 Batteries of the 4th Field and 30 and 48 Batteries of the 6th Field withdrew south of Sora. Gunners of these four batteries went almost gaily about their preparations to move, they drove happily through Sora, and did not mind in the least when they were required to fire HF tasks on supercharge for the rest of the night. Anything was better than that shell-torn valley in front of Balsorano.

For the gunners who stayed behind it was a very different story. They could expect to receive the concentrated attention of the German gunners in the morning and it was not a happy thought. When morning came no shells were wasted on the areas vacated by 30 and 48 Batteries; but for a short time the 46 Battery gunners were encouraged by seeing shells landing in the former areas of 25 and 26 Batteries. It was not long, however, before the enemy realised his mistake and gave his undivided attention, so far as the 4th Field were concerned, to the 46 Battery positions. All firing by 46 Battery brought in return a heavy concentration on the battery and RHQ. The gun E4 had its range cone holed, its dial sight broken, and one tyre burst. Soon after midday B 3 had its recuperator punctured, and when charges caught on fire in the B 1 gun pit the dial sight of B 1 was damaged and both tyres were burnt. Gunners hastened to repair the damage and by 1 p.m. B 1 and B 3 were back in action. Then another bombardment of 46 Battery began and in it Second-Lieutenant Cook, [44] while giving out fire orders, was killed instantly and a sergeant was wounded. Bombardier Milne was again at hand, and he carried the wounded man out of the area and saw him evacuated to the RAP. Then he went back and started to put out several fires caused by the shelling.

By this time, however, the New Zealand guns and those of 2 AGRA—and particularly the mediums and heavies, which were active on the 5th—had Balsorano and the valley beyond it well registered and were able to bring down crushingly effective fire. Several large explosions resulted, and at 4 p.m. the FOO of C Troop of the 5th Field reported that the concentration he had just witnessed was

‘best seen from this O.P. yet. 1 explosion so far. 1 fire still burning. Could not observe airburst because of dust from earlier rds.’ [45]

After careful study Major Dyson of 46 Battery concluded that the hostile battery which had been shelling his guns with deadly accuracy was at the head of one of the many gullies on the upper slopes of Monte Cornacchia and very near the top. This was well inside the New Zealand right flank and at least one of the infantillery patrols had passed close to it. As the crow flies it was about a mile to the right rear of the foremost 6th Field OP (though much higher). It seemed both an impossible site for 75-millimetre guns and impossible that they could have fired from it with impunity for over three days. But Dyson was confident (and in the light of German records probably correct)

and Artillery Headquarters at once ordered a ‘murder’ of 10 rounds gun fire by every available gun. This crashed on to the target just after 1 p.m. on 5 June and the hostile battery did not fire again. The enemy was already thinning out, however, and the mountain guns might have been dismantled and removed before the ‘murder’ was fired.

In any case these German gunners had earned respect for skilful gunnery. Combined with the natural advantages of their position, it allowed them to achieve an effect out of all proportion to their numbers or weight. For the more thoughtful of the New Zealand gunners it was a reminder that over-indulgence in massive concentrations of predicted fire could work like a disease, eating away at fundamental gunnery skills.

The remainder of the 4th and 6th Field withdrew after dark on 5 April. It was, if anything, a more welcome move even than that from the Trocchio area to Venafro. What had promised, when they first arrived, to be a step in a joyous procession through a warm and welcoming Italian countryside, had turned out for the gunners to be a four-day ordeal of an intensity far beyond any other they experienced in Italy. For the field gunners the order ‘Take Post’ had come to be dreaded. It had acquired a fateful significance: it would be followed almost infallibly when they opened fire by shells bursting savagely close around their gun pits, or by heavy mortar bombs whistling gently and then exploding on the ground around them or in the trees above. While they were there the dwindling gun crews always responded to the order and did what they had to—or more. But to get away from this hateful valley with its all-seeing eyes in the heights above was for most of them the apex of their ambition. The drive back along the dusty road through Sora was sheer joy.

This left only the 5th Field, and its three batteries fired until midnight and then from 4 a.m. on 6 April. Dawn was awaited with mixed feelings: would the 5th Field guns receive the undivided attention of the hostile guns and mortars? But dawn came quietly, and soon afterwards OPs began to report a series of gigantic explosions beyond Balsorano which filled the steep-sided valley with dust and smoke. At 9.21 a.m. the C Troop OP reported briefly: ‘Think Jerry has gone’. The explosions continued all day as the enemy demolished whatever he could to delay his pursuers. Early in the afternoon Italians were seen moving down the mountainsides and into villages beyond Balsorano. The Germans had evidently gone.

The pursuit role originally allotted the Division had been dropped and the object now was to open the route to Avezzano. A special force, Wilder Force, formed for this purpose, included the 5th Field but no other gunners. Demolitions, mines and booby traps were all that impeded the advance; but they proved formidable obstacles. Captain Mears
[46] of the 5th Field entered Avezzano with some sappers on 9 June; but much engineering work was still needed to open the road for a mechanised force. The 5th Field guns had to stay in the valley between Sora and Balsorano, and on the 11th the FOOs and the LO with 6 Brigade rejoined them. On the 14th the 5th Field drove back through Sora and along Route 82 to Arce, a town in the lower Liri valley some miles west of Monte Cairo. It was a journey in the right direction: most of the gun crews felt that they never wanted to see the upper Liri valley again.

The Sora– Balsorano fighting caused 106 casualties among the New Zealand gunners, 10 of them killed. It was the only major episode since Crete in which gunners lost more heavily than the infantry they were supporting. More than half the losses were suffered by the 6th Field; yet not a single 6th Field man was killed. A dozen or so suffered from minor wounds or injuries—such as burns from flaring cordite charges—for which they refused to be evacuated. Many had lost cherished personal possessions in vehicle fires. The fighting in front of Balsorano was like many of the cherry trees in the upper valley: temptingly laden with luscious fruit, but booby-trapped by the Germans. [47]

| Killed or Died of Wounds | Wounded | Total
HQ NZA | —— | 1 | 1
4th Field | 8 | 27 | 35
5th Field | 1 | 13 | 14
6th Field | 1 | 65 | 66
7th Anti-Tank | 1 | 18 | 19
14th Light Ack-Ack | 2 | 2 | 4
36 Survey Battery | —— | 2 | 2
| —— | —— | ——
Total | 13 | 128 | 141

They included the following incurred in four days in the Sora area, 2-5 June:

| Killed or Died of Wounds | Wounded | Total
4th Field | 7 | 15 | 22
5th Field | 1 | 12 | 3
6th Field | —— | 61 | 61
7th Anti-Tank | 1 | 5 | 6
14th Light Ack-Ack | 1 | 2 | 3
36 Survey Battery | —— | 1 | 1
| —— | —— | ——
Total | 10 | 96 | 106

[15]
Maj K. Frechtling, MC; Blenheim; born Wellington, 11 Dec 1909; cabinetmaker.

[16]
Gnr H. Elsworth, m.i.d.; Hamilton; born England, 16 Oct 1918; butcher; p.w. 4 Aug 1944.

[17] Those killed were Lieutenant J. D. Wyatt, the GPO, and Gunners H. J. Andrews, H. J. Benson, A. R. Hawthorne and F. J. Shaw. The wounded included Second-Lieutenant A. M. Smith, a sergeant and two lance-sergeants.

[18] Second-Lieutenant B. C. H. Moss.

[19]
Sgt G. N. Oliphant; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 12 Sep 1916; warehouseman; wounded 3 Jun 1944.

[20]
Sgt M. J. Whiting; Timaru; born Taumarunui, 12 Aug 1921; dyer and dry-cleaner.

[21]
Gnr P. H. McKinna; born Gore, 15 Feb 1903; merchandise manager; died 22 Sep 1960.

[22]
Sgt F. B. Burke, MM; Tuakau; born Cambridge, 5 Jul 1918; farmhand; wounded 13 Aug 1942.

[23]
Sgt F. H. Luscombe; Makotuku, Dannevirke; born Waipukurau, 19 May 1919; farmhand.

[24]
L-Bdr D. A. K. Walker; Manaia; born Manaia, 29 Oct 1915; farmhand; wounded 3 Jun 1944.

[25]
Capt T. G. Broadway; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 19 Jun 1911; commercial traveller; twice wounded.

[26]
Gnr D. McCarthy, m.i.d.; Auckland; born NZ 22 Jan 1922; plasterer.

[27]
Gnr W. A. Greenwood, m.i.d.; born Aust., 25 Feb 1922; clerk and cashier.

[28] The total of 61 men of the 6th Field wounded in the Sora action and yet none killed was truly remarkable.

[29]
Gnr K. Streater, MM; born Dannevirke, 18 Dec 1918; labourer; twice wounded.

[30] Bdr J. C. Nuttall; Auckland; born England, 6 Oct 1920; salesman.

[31]
Gnr O. B. Redstone; born NZ 10 Mar 1920; shepherd; killed in action 3 Jun 1944.

[32]
L-Bdr R. J. Lichtwark; born NZ 5 Sep 1915; truck driver; killed in action 4 Jun 1944.

[33] Later appointed Reconnaissance Captain. See p. 609, note 3.

[34]
Capt J. W. McSkimming; Palmerston North; born Gisborne, 24 Feb 1914; salesman.

[35] The German records indicate that Schrank Battle Group of 5 Mountain Division had carried 75-millimetre mountain guns high into the hills and there reassembled and emplaced them in positions from which they could fire with impunity on the valley between Sora and Balsorano. It was a well-planned rearguard action.

[36]
Maj W. B. Helean, m.i.d.; Dunedin; born Wellington, 16 Aug 1917; clerk.

[37]
Lt A. T. Colpman; Marton; born Reikorangi, 25 Mar 1915; research assistant, Massey College; wounded 31 Mar 1944.

[38]
Sgt J. O. Martin; born Mangonui, 1 Jun 1918; labourer; wounded 24 May 1941; died of wounds 4 Jun 1944.

[39]
Sgt S. L. Thorne; Masterton; born Darfield, 7 Jun 1917; baker; wounded 4 Jun 1944.

[40]
Gnr M. R. T. Hamilton, MM; Dunedin; born England, 16 Nov 1911; bricklayer; wounded 4 Jun 1944.

[41]
Sgt R. A. Milne, MM; Rangiora; born Rangiora, 23 Sep 1918; civil servant; wounded 23 Mar 1943.

[42]
Capt A. F. MacKay, MC; Mombasa, Kenya; born Auckland, 20 Aug 1916; insurance clerk.

[43] Lt-Col J. R. Stone, ED; Brisbane; born Auckland, 15 Jan 1911; civil servant; Bty Comd, 6 Fd Regt; United Nations military observer, Kashmir, 1954-55.

[44]
2 Lt G. E. Cook; born NZ 4 May 1909; alpine guide; twice wounded; killed in action 5 Jun 1944.

[45] Log Book of the 5th Field, 11 April to 17 July 1944.

[46]
Capt I. D. Mears; Hamilton; born Hamilton, 13 Jan 1915; solicitor.

[47] Casualties in the period April-June 1944 were:

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 19 — Arezzo and Florence

Contents

- [section]
p. 607

- Infantry and M10 Training for Anti-Tankers p. 608

- A Hasty Move to the Arezzo Front p. 609

- Infantry Complaints about Short-shooting p. 612

- Taupo Furlough Scheme p. 617
- Committed to Florence Battle
- M10s in Action p. 620
- San Michele p. 623
- Tragedy at La Romola p. 625
- The Final Attacks p. 627
- The Fall of Florence p. 632
- The Montelupo–Empoli Front p. 634
- A Brief Rest near Siena p. 637

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

BEFORE the move to Arce, most gunners spent an agreeable week or more resting by the Liri between Sora and the delightful Isola del Liri, a few miles to the south-west. The anti-tankers, many of them billeted in Isola itself, were the luckiest. But even Sora, once the fighting receded, made the gunners welcome and 25 Battery organised a highly successful dance there, with music provided by the excellent orchestra of the 14th Light Ack-Ack.

The following three weeks or so in the area between Arce and Fontana Liri, though they included a good deal of training, were equally enjoyable, with plenty of swimming for the adventurous ones in the swift-flowing Liri, much sporting activity, and day leave to Rome. [1] The regiments arranged picnics to beautiful Lake Albano, near Rome. Artillery Headquarters, though captained by the New Zealand representative cricketer, H. G. Vivian, lost a series of cricket matches with H Section, Divisional Signals, but redeemed its reputation by organising the best of all the race meetings held in the Arce area. Other leave resorts were the Isle of Ischia, San Spirito, Bari and Sorrento and, for the other ranks and some officers of the 4th Reinforcements, there was the promise that they would soon go home.

Major Drummond of the Survey Battery took flash-spotters and sound-rangers on a tour of the hostile battery areas in the Liri Valley. They found some dummy gun positions and some well-protected gun and nebelwerfer positions. But the most startling discovery was the excellence of the view of the Trocchio gun area from high ground above S. Apollinare (south of Cassino). This was a vantage point held by the enemy throughout February, March and April. ‘Observation just about perfect over gun area and roads’, the survey diary states. ‘A wonder far more damage was not done to our guns.’

On 16 June Steve Weir handed over his command to Ike Parkinson and prepared to take over the appointment of CCRA 10 Corps. Next day Weir addressed NZA officers at Artillery

Headquarters. It was a momentous occasion and for many present a sad one. The two and a half years he had spent as CRA had seen immense improvement in the handling of the guns, particularly at Divisional level. Field artillery methods, at first tentative and experimental, had been perfected in all kinds of action and boldly employed. It had been partly at Weir's insistence that AGRAs had been formed. One way and another Steve Weir had made an indelible imprint on artillery command and organisation. But he had also made friends at all levels and his powerful personality would be missed. It was appropriate, however, that the new CRA should be Ike Parkinson, who had commanded the RNZA at the start of the war and had been the first commander of the 4th Field. Since then he had held various appointments in many different countries, and it was as if, after a long journey, he had at last come home. Colonel Queree, after a long spell of staff work, took command of the 5th Field and Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton replaced him as GSO I of the Division.

[1] For officers there was overnight leave after the splendid New Zealand Forces Club opened in Rome on 23 June. Allied Headquarters, however, would not allow other ranks to stay overnight.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Infantry and M10 Training for Anti-Tankers

Infantry and M10 Training for Anti-Tankers

The training of the 7th Anti-Tank included two novelties. Because of diminishing need for anti-tank 6-pounders and the likelihood of further infantillery tasks in the future, 33 Battery had the valuable services of Captain Turbott
[2] and four NCOs of 24 Battalion and for a fortnight trained under them. ‘Infantry in defence’ was the theme and it included deployment, patrolling, the use of the Piat mortar, the 2-inch mortar and the bazooka (an anti-tank rocket projector), as well as signalling (two men per platoon trained with No. 18 and No. 38 wireless sets) and instruction in enemy methods.

The second novelty was training in 31 Battery to operate M10 ‘tank destroyers’. Nine of these 3-inch American naval guns mounted on Sherman chassis were made available on 26 June. They were makeshift weapons which looked like tanks with large turrets. The turrets, however, were hand-traversed and therefore slow to turn and they were open at the top. Their plating was relatively thin and only the gun mantle in the front could resist AP shot. The gun fired a 15¼-pound AP shot at just over 2600 feet per second muzzle velocity—about the same as that of the 2-pounder, but well below that of the 17-pounder—or a 12¾-pound HE shell at a higher muzzle velocity, but a lower remaining velocity after a few hundred yards. The claims made for the penetrative powers of the standard AP shot in relation to Tiger tanks—the only relation that mattered—were exaggerated; but small supplies of a superior ammunition with AP cap and superimposed ballistic cap and an HE charge were obtained a little later. The telescopic sight, with triple magnification, was excellent. The secondary armament was a .5-inch Browning heavy machine gun, mounted at the back of the turret and fired by the layer. There was no provision for indirect fire—no way to lay the gun for line. But the 31 Battery officers decided to mark the inside of the base of the turrets with a 360-degree scale, with a vernier scale for subdivisions. As with the 4.2-inch mortars, expert foresight on the part of those who issued these weapons was lacking.

The M10s, therefore, were cruder and more clumsy than tanks and much more vulnerable. But they required of their crews all the skills demanded of tank crews: driving, maintenance, wireless communications, and gunnery. Tactically their crews needed even greater skill to compensate for the greater vulnerability of the M10 as compared with the Sherman tank, which was the standard equipment of the armoured regiments. But all the specialised training the M10 crews could get was what the armoured brigade could provide in brief courses—and it had no special knowledge of M10s. It had taken a year to convert 4 Brigade into an armoured brigade. Three weeks after the men of 31 Battery first set eyes on an M10 they were in action with their ‘tank destroyers’. A and D Troops of 31 Battery were thus converted to M10 troops. Concurrently 32, 33 and 34 Batteries zeroed their 6-pounders and 17-pounders and 39 Battery had a two-day practice shoot with its mortars. [3] The 7th Anti-Tank also provided 25 lorries with drivers and spare drivers for long-distance transport duties.

[2]
Maj G. G. Turbott, MC, m.i.d.; Christchurch; born Auckland, 4 Oct 1919; schoolteacher; wounded 20 Apr 1943.

[3] Experience had shown that it was hard at times for the mortar battery commander to control even three troops in action and a new position was therefore created, that of Reconnaissance Captain, and Lieutenant Stevenson was appointed to it. Henceforth, unless it was necessary to co-ordinate the fire of all four troops, the battery would operate as two two-troop sub-batteries, with the battery commander in charge of one of them and the reconnaissance captain in charge of the other.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Hasty Move to the Arezzo Front

A Hasty Move to the Arezzo Front

An unexpected order in the evening of 7 July for the Division to concentrate near Lake Trasimene for an operational role caused a rush of activity, including the usual and useless removing of New Zealand markings and insignia—particularly useless since the route was marked with the well-known black diamond signs. The Division covered the 200 miles in two stages by way of Valmontone and Rome to Civita Castellana and then, over rough, dusty roads past the pretty town of Narni to the lakeside. The M10s travelled on tank transporters.

Artillery Headquarters moved to just west of the ancient walled city of Cortona, picturesquely overlooking Route 71, on 12 July and the 6th Field moved through in the night to positions around the town of Castiglion Fiorentino. The 4th and 5th Field followed next day and the 14th Light Ack-Ack deployed to defend the gun areas and other possible targets of the Luftwaffe between them and Cortona. Two troops of 39 Battery, under fairly heavy shell and mortar fire, relieved a British mortar battery three miles farther along Route 71.

A line of scrub-covered heights rising sharply to 3000 feet or more and linked by a series of narrow saddles ran diagonally from the right rear to the left front, barring the way to Arezzo. On the right was Monte Maggio, in the centre Monte Camurcina, and on the left Monte Lignano. The intention was that 6 Brigade should stage a quick attack to seize these peaks and hasten the enemy's evacuation of the city of Arezzo, the home of Petrarch and now an important communications centre.

In broiling heat on the 14th the field gunners prepared ammunition, when not registering zones. There was little other firing, though an air OP controlled 29 Battery shoots against five selected points. FOOs were well forward and found the ground extraordinarily difficult. To support an infantry advance over the network of saddles and crests would be something like firing on the intricate battlements of Le Quesnoy, but with the added complication of a profusion of crest-clearance problems, some of them very awkward indeed. These could all be resolved, given time; but Operation Order No. 1 of 14 July was not signed until 1.30 p.m. and then had to be reproduced and distributed. It specified that ‘Care will be taken in computing correct Angle of Sight for individual guns during fire plan’; but by the time it reached CPOs there was little time left. The programme began at 1 a.m. on the 15th. Long lists of DF tasks were issued in the interim and these, too, had to be processed at command posts and gun positions. All computations were nevertheless carefully made and checked. At the command post of 26 Battery, for example, Lieutenant Black, [4] in checking DF tasks, discovered that two of them could not be fired safely because of double crest-clearance trouble, and he reported accordingly at 10 minutes past midnight on 14-15 July.

The sound-ranging troop of 36 Survey Battery had established a base on the slopes of Monte S. Savino, some miles to the west on the other side of the valley which opens out southwards from Arezzo, and hostile batteries located by the troop were dive-bombed on the 13th. No suitable positions could be found, however, for the flash-spotters and this turned out to be unfortunate in more ways than one.

action in front of arezzo

Castiglion Fiorentino is on Route 71 due south of M. Camurcina

The only additional artillery was 20/21 Battery of the 5th Medium, RA, sited just south of the field guns with an OP well forward on the slopes of Monte Lignano and ready for business at 9.15 a.m. on the 14th. By this time all three field regiments had FOOs forward. One of them, Captain Wallis
[5] of D Troop, was with a company of 26 Battalion facing Monte Opino, well advanced on the right, and was with the leading platoon in an attack on that feature in the evening of the 14th. Approaching the nearer of two crests, he called down fire, the enemy ran down the reverse slope, and the platoon occupied a house at the top. Then, in a sudden and unexpected counter-thrust, the enemy recaptured the crest. Wallis called for fire around the house and as it was falling he and his ‘acks’ escaped through a window. Either this fire, however, or simultaneous fire from hostile artillery caused four casualties in the company, including two killed.

[4]
Maj M. J. Black; Paremata; born London, 23 Aug 1919; warehouseman.

[5]
Maj K. P. Wallis; Auckland; born Auckland, 24 Jan 1919; clerk.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Infantry Complaints about Short-shooting

Infantry Complaints about Short-shooting

This was the first of several incidents which bedevilled the Arezzo action from the point of view of the New Zealand gunners. The possibility that enemy guns joined in and caused some or all of the losses was much greater than the infantry realised. The German artillery had the area well surveyed. Some 88s were established only 2000 yards to the north and two medium batteries were within 4000 yards to the north-east and easily able to bring down fire on the ground over which the New Zealanders attacked. [6]

The next of the incidents was at 9.15 p.m. on the 14th when a company of 25 Battalion reported being mortared. The battalion, however, reported to 6 Brigade on the 17th that 25-pounders were responsible and gave the bearing to the guns allegedly concerned. The 5th Field fired a DF task beginning at 9.30 p.m., and it is pertinent that this was a task the CPO of 26 Battery refused to accept because of crest-clearance trouble. It was not fired, however, until after the company reported the mortaring. Moreover, the commander of 20/21 Medium Battery was at that very time close to the infantry company and even farther forward. CB work was, of course, the main concern of the medium guns, and this officer was far more expert than the infantry in estimating the source and judging the nature of shell or mortar fire. Artillery Headquarters signalled at 8.40 p.m. on the 15th to the 5th Field in relation to this and later incidents that this battery commander was ‘sure that shelling in fact came from enemy’.

The fire plan began at 1 a.m. on the 15th with seven stonks fired by the field regiments until either 2 a.m. or 3.30 and two ‘murders’ fired for an hour by the medium battery, together with two concentrations by the two troops of heavy mortars. The 4th and 6th Field fired 150 r.p.g. and the 5th Field 100 r.p.g., while the mortars fired 600 rounds all told. Seven specific incidents of alleged shelling of the infantry by the New Zealand 25-pounders in this period of two and a half hours formed part of a later report by the battalion to 6 Brigade, the bearing in all cases being the same. This bearing ran through the gun area of the 4th Field; but this regiment was not firing at the time of the first incident and it was in any case meticulously careful, as the regimental log (a minute-by-minute original record) proves, to calculate crest clearances.

The battalion commander, hearing from the company that made the first complaint, made repeated efforts to have the shelling of Lignano lifted; but shells continued to fall on his men. The detailed account of this in the 25 Battalion history states that ‘direct communication between the FOOs accompanying the infantry and their respective artillery regiments could not be established’; [7] but this might not be correct. Lieutenant MacKay of the 5th Field was well forward with 25 Battalion and in constant touch with his regiment. He reported at 2.47 a.m. (as the Log Book records), asking that the current DF task be raised 300 yards (though it was not fired), and again at five past three that it be raised a total of 500 yards. Twenty minutes later he reported again. At 5 a.m. he was far enough forward to see that the Guards Brigade on the left had captured its objective two miles north-west of Lignano and at 5.47 a.m.—for the first time—he called for defensive fire. Had MacKay thought the New Zealand guns were shelling 25 Battalion he would certainly have reported accordingly. He was a most determined FOO, always to the forefront of an action, and a highly skilful gunner. [8]

Either through MacKay or some other FOO, Artillery Headquarters also kept abreast of events and at 3.15 a.m. signalled to the 4th Field to treat one of the items of the fire plan as a DF task, but to raise it 500 yards. It was not, of course, to be fired unless called for. There are several mentions in infantry records of requests for the ‘barrage’ to be lifted 300 yards or 500 yards; but the only orders actually given to the field regiments related not to the fire plan, but to subsequent DF tasks which were prepared but not fired.

The bearing cited by 25 Battalion as the source of the ‘25-pounder fire’, if it is extended in the opposite direction, passes through the site of a hostile battery just west of Arezzo. The sound of gun fire at night in the Italian mountains often seemed to come from the direction opposite to that of the guns. Either this battery or some other German long-range guns were active this night; for the 6th Field lost Gunner Blair
[9] of 29 Battery killed and another gunner wounded. [10] The 25 Battalion men knew that their predecessors on the Lignano front had suffered many casualties from shelling and mortaring, and in daylight on the 14th both 24 and 25 Battalions sustained losses from the same cause. It seems highly likely that this damaging fire was repeated while the Lignano attack was in progress, and that at least some of it was wrongly attributed to the New Zealand field guns.

The complaints from the infantry, however, did not end with the night's action. Another from 25 Battalion related to shelling at 5.50 a.m. on the 15th. The 5th Field fired two DF tasks at that time just north-west of Lignano at the request of the infantry. The two tasks had been specified during the night and were urgently requested. In such a situation the risk of failing to clear crests would be accepted rather than the alternative of refusing support to the infantry in a crisis. But the map strongly suggests that the risk in this case was a serious one and that the complaint might have been justified. It is some consolation, if this time the 5th Field did fail to clear the crests, that the infantry suffered no loss as a result.

The next complaint related to firing on Lignano between 1 and 2 p.m. on the 15th. It was referred to Artillery Headquarters and, despite this, ‘one gun continued to offend’, according to the battalion diary. The 4th Field was asked and denied firing anywhere near Lignano at that time. The 5th Field was firing on Monte Camurcina in support of 24 Battalion. The 6th Field was preparing to move. [11] At 12.26 p.m., in response to a request for a DF task near Lignano, 26 Battery signalled ‘cannot engage due to Angle of Descent’. The OPs of A and B Troops of the 4th Field were on Lignano and their staffs would certainly have protested had they been shelled by their own guns. The OP of B Troop on Lignano at 3.30 p.m. was ‘Pinned down by shell and mortar fire’ and the infantry did not complain about this; but there were three more instances of alleged short shooting between 4 and 5 p.m. At 5.12 p.m. the B Troop OP reported that the enemy mortaring of Lignano was ‘continuing’.

Artillery Headquarters had meanwhile taken up the suggestion that one gun was firing short and asked the field regiments to make a check. In the case of 25 Battery there was no need, as it had fired only one round all morning, while 26 Battery had fired only a shoot conducted by an Air OP. The targets of 46 Battery were also well away from Lignano. Every single gun of the 5th Field was checked to ensure that it was not firing short, and at 5.45 p.m., 5.52 and 6.35 p.m. 27, 28 and 47 Batteries respectively reported that all guns were working properly. A further inquiry from Artillery Headquarters at 5.30 drew another chorus of denial that the New Zealand guns had erred.

The mystery deepened with a further report just before 10 p.m. on the 15th of shelling on Lignano. The CRA instructed the 5th Field at 10.09 p.m. that 6 Brigade had taken a second bearing on the source of the fire and that it came from the regimental area. All guns were therefore to cease fire until the brigade major, McCredie, [12] and the ‘REME’, Captain McWha, [13] arrived and checked the sights. All were duly found to be correct and the 5th Field was allowed to take its part in the fire plan in support of a 24 Battalion attack on Monte Camurcina, starting at 2 a.m. on the 16th.

The fire plan for this was much like the earlier one, a series of five stonks and four ‘murders’ fired for not more than two hours mainly at a very slow rate. The medium battery did not take part.

This time the trouble was narrowed to one task, fired by 27 Battery only at a very slow rate. It was on the western end of Monte Camurcina and was to continue until 3.30 a.m. At 3.15 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Kensington of the 6th Field sig- nalled to the 5th Field to ‘Stop firing on BARDIA’ and 27 Battery was notified. Thus the battery task was curtailed by a quarter of an hour. But infantry complained of being ‘heavily shelled by 25-pounders’, [14] a description which, if it related in fact to the shelling by one battery at a very slow rate of an area of the rugged extremity of a steep mountain, could only be regarded as grossly exaggerated. It soon became evident to the gunners, however, that 27 Battery was not the culprit. The battery ceased fire, asked at 3.24 a.m. for permission to empty guns, and did so. But the shelling continued. The OP of A Troop, 27 Battery, on Monte Cavadenti, south of Camurcina, reported at 3.42 that rounds were ‘falling short’ on Cavadenti, near the OP. At 3.51 the OP stated that ‘Shells are clearing the objective now, they were not before’; but at 4 a.m. the last report was: ‘Shells still falling on objective’. By this time none of the 27 Battery guns was firing. A later report clarified that shelling near the OP started at 3.30 and went on until 3.48 a.m., and it was then that the infantry reported rounds falling on their objective.

The 5th Field as a whole was largely exonerated when, at 3.40 p.m. on 17 April, it was able to report that all batteries ‘have checked MV on scale and found them correct’. The regiment could scarcely do more to prove its innocence: guns checked individually by firing, sights tested by the BM and NZEME, and muzzle velocities found correct.

The 6th Field fired two ‘murders’—pinpoint targets—in the Camurcina area and then for the final 25 minutes a stonk. The ‘murders’ were an unlikely source of trouble and were still being fired when Kensington asked the 5th Field to cease firing BARDIA, which he would scarcely have done without first satisfying himself that his own guns were not to blame. The 6th Field could not conceivably have corrected its firing of the stonk and then gone back to firing short.

The ‘two medium batteries’ of German artillery known to be about five miles north-east of Lignano on the 14th were excellently placed to fire not only on Camurcina but on Cavadenti, where the 27 Battery OP was stationed. They would have had no crest-clearance troubles and they could have judged from the New Zealand shelling just how the attack was progressing and where to place their own fire to best advantage. In the scrub-covered mountains in the dark who could have distinguished with certainty the fire of 25-pounders from that of German 105s?

The evidence does not allow a firm decision on whether or not the New Zealand guns fired on some of these occasions on their own infantry. In that sharp-peaked mountain mass in hastily-arranged operations it was likely that at times some rounds failed to clear crests. But the chief suspect, the 5th Field, was certainly not guilty of consistently firing short, though it might have fired one emergency task short on the 15th. [15] The 4th Field was not firing on the first occasion and this regiment, too, checked its guns, as well as crest clearances, and in fact refused to fire certain tasks because of danger to the infantry. The 6th Field, like the other two regiments, was asked to check carefully and did so. Its firing programme cannot be closely reconciled with the reports of short firing and it could not have been to blame on most of the occasions when the infantry complained.

The verdict, then, must be that the charge that the New Zealand field guns kept firing short in these operations is at worst Not Proven. The enemy seems a far more likely culprit and it is less than generous not to give him credit for exploiting a situation which from his point of view was made to measure. It allowed him to make effective use of his guns in opposing an advance through the mountains against which he committed very few infantry—an economical kind of rearguard action.

The second attack met very little opposition from infantry—a fact attributed in many New Zealand infantry accounts to the effectiveness of the field artillery preparation. In the morning of the 17th it was soon seen that the enemy had departed and was blowing demolitions on the road north of Arezzo.

[6] These circumstances must modify the account of this incident given by Frazer D. Norton in 26 Battalion ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1952), P. 413.

[7] Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Puttick, 25 Battalion ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1960), P. 453. Pages 450– 60 deal with this episode. The author is not entirely uncritical of infantry versions of what happened.

[8] Both points are amply borne out in the citation to MacKay's MC, awarded for the actions in front of Balsorano, Arezzo and Florence, and in the Romagna.

[9]
Gnr J. W. Blair; born NZ 25 May 1921; farm labourer; killed in action 15 Jul 1944.

[10] The 6th Field narrowly escaped further loss when the gun A1 had a ‘premature’. The No. 1 received slight injuries.

D 3 of the 4th Field gave trouble 20 minutes after the fire plan opened; but it was soon repaired. In the 5th Field B 3 could not take part as its dial sight had been damaged in travelling and could not be illuminated.

[11] The regiment was asked to take over from the 30th Field, RA, and was preparing to do so when the move was cancelled. This afternoon RHQ and 30 Battery moved forward, the latter to gun positions a mile north-west of Castiglion Fiorentino.

[12]
Maj J. M. D. McCredie, m.i.d.; Gisborne; born Gisborne, 10 May 1916; stock buyer; wounded 12 Apr 1943.

[13]
Lt-Col F. D. McWha, MBE, m.i.d.; Lower Hutt; born Westport, 23 Nov 1915; engineer; Director, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Army HQ, 1960-65.

[14] Norton, 26 Battalion, p. 414. Both Norton and Puttick ( 25 Battalion, P. 460) state that the New Zealand guns fired short in this attack and that they quickly remedied this when the infantry reported it. Neither of these assertions can be accepted without serious reservations. See below.

[15] The 5th Field also fired an HF task near Lignano in the evening of the 16th and at 10.37 a.m. on the 17th Artillery Headquarters signalled as follows: ‘Line range and A/S [Angle of Sight] required from 28 Bty for their R sect on yesterday's harassing task’. This was duly reported and it was pointed out that all subsequent corrections increased the range and angle of sight. Everyone was anxious to get to the bottom of the mystery; but in all such checks as this the New Zealand field gunners could not be faulted and nor could their guns.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Taupo Furlough Scheme

Taupo Furlough Scheme

For the next four days the gunners rested between Castiglion and Lake Trasimene, in idyllic country. ‘The weather was exceptionally fine and warm’, the 4th Field diarist noted, ‘and the Regt was encamped in delightful surroundings.’ The diary does not mention that it was here that the 4th Field lost all three of its battery commanders, Robertson, Dyson and Spring, and many other members of long standing. Other units suffered similarly; for the Taupo furlough scheme took away nearly all 4th Reinforcement other ranks and a great many officers. In 36 Survey Battery, for example, 75 men out of 260-odd departed. The 4th Reinforcements had seen more action than any other members of the Division, many of them having served in Greece and Crete and all subsequent campaigns. Their skill and experience provided the hard core of the Division. The 4th Reinforcement gunners were warmly farewelled; as the 46 Battery diary says, ‘the occasion called for a huge celebration throughout the Div and plonk flowed freely’. The consequent reshuffling of appointments throughout the Divisional Artillery gave a new look to many batteries. No regimental commanders went in the first instance, but in the 7th Anti-Tank two former COs, Majors Lambourn and Dawe, were included in the Taupo scheme.

the advance to florence

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Committed to Florence Battle

Committed to Florence Battle

The Division was now asked to repeat on a larger scale what it had done before Arezzo; it was to add its weight to the already considerable pressure on the Florence sector and help to drive the enemy there back over the River Arno. Florence itself had already been declared an open city and there was reason to hope that the enemy would quickly and cheaply give ground and retire to the strong Gothic Line in the mountains north of the city. This hope was not realised.

From the Cortona–Trasimene area the gunners drove to the mediaeval city of Siena, a gem even in the rich treasury of Italian art and architecture. Then they carried on northwards along a secondary road to Castellina in Chianti. On the way a 46 Battery gun tractor with two trailers went over a bank and was wrecked and three gunners were taken to hospital. The 14th Light Ack-Ack fared even worse. The E5 tractor overturned, two gunners were killed and six injured, and the gun and tractor were wrecked. Chianti was wine-growing country par excellence and the grapes were nearly ripe; but the 4th and 5th Field, as they deployed on 21 and 22 July, were much more interested in the great clouds of white dust which rose high in the air, marking their progress to the watching enemy. To their surprise their entry on the scene was not challenged.

Near San Donato in Poggio (one of many San Donatos in the Florence region) 5 Brigade began to push forward towards the much-bombed town of Tavarnelle, a smaller place called Strada, and then, on the main road to Florence, towards San Casciano. With an armoured regiment (with D Troop of Mios under its command) and powerful artillery support the brigade soon made progress. The mortar battery was in close support of the infantry, and besides the two New Zealand field regiments there were the 142nd Army Field (with self-propelled armoured 105 howitzers) and the 70th and 75th Medium, with B Flight of 655 Air OP Squadron in support.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

M10s in Action

M10s in Action

The M10 troop, in its first action, helped the infantry to seize Strada, oblivious of the fact that the Shermans of the armoured regiment nearby were striking much trouble and suffering loss from one or two powerful Tiger tanks. The FOOs of the field and medium regiments found it hard to gain good observation and needed to be well forward. One of them, Major Paterson
[16] of 25 Battery, went forward near San Donato when the infantry were held up by intense shell, mortar and machine-gun fire. In full view of the enemy he pushed on 200 yards ahead of the infantry FDLs and set up an OP. The enemy reacted with even heavier shell and mortar fire; but by skilful control of his guns he managed to neutralise this fire and allow the infantry to resume their advance. He, too, moved forward and was wounded in the leg by a machine gun at a range of about 60 yards. But he refused to be evacuated and kept his OP operating until relieved next day.

The M10 crews, ill-trained though they were, managed to bring down indirect fire as well as direct fire to overcome opposition from a large castle near Strada. While forward on foot observing this fire Second-Lieutenant Reeves
[17] was killed by a shell splinter. It was a hot fight and the New Zealanders pushed forward with tremendous zest, which was fully matched by that of the OP parties of the Royal Artillery serving with them. It meant a lot of hard work, however, for the heavy mortar crews and the field gunners—firing, moving forward, deploying again, firing, moving forward and so on. The 5th Field fired 2000 rounds in the first 24 hours and the 4th Field fired 1310 on the 23rd.

Approaching San Casciano on the 25th the M10 troop was in the forefront of a special force, Armcav, together with the OP parties of the 4th Field and 75th Medium. The 4th Field fired stonks and other concentrations incessantly and with good results.

Return fire in the forward area was heavy and an OP party of the mortar battery was pinned down for a considerable period. Next day A Sub-battery of mortars went into an excellent position below the road near the village of Lucignano. Though it was well forward, all vehicles could reach this position by a covered route; OPs went ahead, and by noon the mortars had fired hundreds of rounds. In so doing G3 suffered a near miss which set many charges on fire and caused two bombs to explode. The crew miraculously escaped harm; but the smoke and flames attracted attention and in the afternoon the troop position was heavily bombarded. Many shells hit pine trees forward of the position and exploded, showering the mortar pits with fragments of casing. Gunners Herries
[18] and Toovey
[19] were killed and three others were wounded.

It soon became clear that the enemy proposed defending San Casciano in considerable strength. The left section of A Troop M10s came up against strongpoints in two large houses covering a crossroads north of Montefiridolfi. With an anxious eye open for mines, the crew of A3 went into action in a field to the right of the road and engaged with slightly delayed-action HE at 1200 yards; A4 did the same from farther back. After firing about 20 rounds A3 drove farther forward to a well-chosen position to engage the second of the two houses. Three Shermans then appeared to the left of the road and they and A3 fired over 100 rounds at the house. By this time night was falling, the tanks and M10s had no infantry cover, and they therefore pulled back a little.

The first fire plan of the Florence campaign was fired on the 26th in support of a 5 Brigade attack towards Cerbaia, northwest of San Casciano. It included eight stonks by the 4th and 5th Field, the 142nd Army Field (SP), and the 70th and 75th Medium, starting at 9.50 p.m. The mortar battery also contributed, by a last-minute arrangement with the infantry. The BSM, WO II Kilmore, [20] worked prodigiously with the troop sergeants to get enough ammunition forward and the battery fired some 800 rounds. With this support the attack succeeded.

Next day the 6th Field went into action for the first time on the Florence front. The action was warming up and ammunition expenditure was rising all the time. The 5th and 6th Field fired a programme starting at 1 a.m. on the 28th to help 6 Brigade cross the Pesa River by Cerbaia, and the 70th and 75th Medium fired HF tasks. The enemy began a series of fierce counterattacks and calls for DF multiplied rapidly. The 46 Battery diary for the 28th is typical:

‘Extremely busy day and night with no rest for anyone at the gun position. OPs flat out 24 hrs a day and doing a good job. Excellent shoot by Bty on A/Tk gun in house. Harassing fire all night. Florence in sight of OPs.’

The 142nd Field with its 105-millimetre howitzers on tank chassis was in close support of the New Zealand armour, and on the 28th Captain R. M. Clarke of that regiment was FOO with a squadron of 19 Armoured Regiment in the crossing of the River Pesa near Cerbaia. In the morning a company of infantry, a few tanks, and Clarke's OP were in and around a farmhouse under intense fire from mortars, SP guns and German tanks. Several of the New Zealand tanks were knocked out and the rest withdrew; but Clarke volunteered to stay with the infantry. He had been directing fire against many targets and helped to break up many counter-attacks. Clarke's wireless operator, Lance-Bombardier W. Gray, transmitted the fire orders calmly and kept open the vital communications regardless of the storm of fire directed at the farmhouse and its environs. Towards dusk the enemy directed heavy concentrations of shell-fire at the farmhouse and moved tanks and infantry close to it. After firing AP shot through the walls the enemy tried to overrun the position with infantry. Clarke continued to bring down shellfire on the enemy to within 200 yards of the farmhouse. Then a rifle grenade set his tank on fire and wrecked the wireless set. When this happened Clarke and Gray joined the infantry and helped to drive off the Germans with small-arms fire. It was one of many such gallant performances by the Royal Artillery gunners with whom the New Zealand gunners were associated throughout the Italian campaign.

The surveyors had had a hard time laying telephone cables and maintaining them. With so much fire falling throughout the area and so many tracked vehicles on the move, this work was never-ending. The flash-spotting troop did reasonably well from the start, obtaining many useful locations. But the sound-ranging troop had some frustrating days with very few locations of hostile batteries. On the 26th, however, on a new base in front of Fabbrica and a few miles short of San Casciano, the sound-ranging improved and next day nine locations were obtained. On the 28th Gunner Crossman
[21] of the sound-rangers was killed while lifting mines. The flash-spotters in their plotting centre in a mineral water factory on the road to Casciano were much shelled; but they worked busily throughout the night.

[16]
Maj K. W. Paterson, MC; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 14 Nov 1918; survey cadet; twice wounded.

[17]
2 Lt C. S. Reeves; born NZ 10 Jul 1911; sharebroker; killed in action 24 Jul 1944.

[18]
Gnr E. W. Herries; born NZ 10 Nov 1905; fellmonger; killed in action 26 Jul 1944.

[19]
Gnr A. C. Toovey; born NZ 3 Mar 1906; farmer; killed in action 26 Jul 1944.

[20]
WO II C. A. Kilmore; born NZ 23 Jan 1915; Regular soldier.

[21]
Gnr T. A. Crossman; born Blenheim, 26 Aug 1921; theological student; killed in action 28 Jul 1944.

Next day three anti-tankers seeking fresh vegetables for 31 Battery were caught on an anti-personnel minefield and Gunner W. W. Hodgkinson was killed and Gunners C. J. Causer and L. G. Bradley badly wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

San Michele

San Michele

The 5th and 6th Field fired for an hour and a half from 1 a.m. on the 29th to help 6 Brigade seize the little town of San Michele, north of Cerbaia, and then prepared to fire the inevitable DF tasks as the enemy counter-attacked. Within 10 minutes of the start of the programme the infantry reported that shells were falling short, and Artillery Headquarters signalled to the 5th Field as follows at 1.10 a.m.:

‘695 607. Inf report shells landing at the above Map Ref. Please check up. Do not think they are ours.’

The reference point was between the right-hand infantry company and its objective. Only 27 and 28 Batteries of the 5th Field were firing at that time and a check found them firing correctly. [22] Captain French, [23] commander of E Troop of the 6th Field, drove forward with 26 Battalion; but an anti-tank gun disabled his armoured car, luckily without harming the crew.

When the 5th Field fired concentrations at breakfast time 26 Battalion was ‘very pleased’ in the first case and described the second as ‘Just perfect’. The 5th Field, however, suffered a serious loss when Major Carson was taking the newly-appointed commander of F Troop forward to the OP. A shell struck the scout car and killed the troop commander, Lieutenant Graves, [24] and mortally wounded Gunner Henry. [25] Carson himself had to be evacuated. (Bill Carson had been one of the stalwarts of the NZA from the earliest days and his wounds on this occasion and a consequent sickness later caused his death.)

The right section of A Troop M10s was deployed in San Casciano on the 29th and D Troop was also forward, but with three of its four M10s temporarily out of action. In San Michele the 6-pounder J3 of 33 Battery was stationed outside the church, having followed the infantry along a narrow and winding road in the pitch dark. German infantry, working their way back through the buildings of this vital hilltop village, made the position very hot and an SP gun out of sight of the anti-tankers shelled the company headquarters. In the end Sergeant McKnight, [26] who stopped a bullet in the shoulder, had to disable his gun and join the surviving infantry at the last possible moment.

Next night J1 and J4 of 33 Battery went forward with tanks and a relieving company of infantry to re-establish the position in San Michele. They followed the same dark, narrow route and the tanks attracted machine-gun and mortar fire. Dead Germans lay on the cobblestones and a burning building lit up the road for some distance. A disabled Sherman blocked the route and it took two hours under fire to find another route into the village, along a way so narrow that the portées could not avoid driving over the bodies. Level with the church the J4 portée broke down. J1 went on to a position 300 yards past the church, beside a large building, and its portée truck returned for J4. The building turned out on closer inspection to be a Chianti wine store.

The 4th Field OPs had an excellent view of hastily arranged supporting fire for an infantry-and-tank attack on Sant' Andrea, on the extreme right of the Divisional sector north of Casciano, at dawn on the 30th. ‘ stonk falling very well’, the A Troop OP reported at 6.15. Several DF tasks were fired to help the consolidation, and at 7.50 the 26 Battery OP reported that infantry had claimed that one gun on the first task had fired 300 yards short.

[22] In R. M. Burdon, 24 Battalion ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1953)' p. 271, it is stated that the infantry ‘moved forward close behind the barrage until obliged by one of the guns firing short to stop for a time under cover’. There was, of course, no creeping or lifting barrage, as this account implies.

[23]
Capt C. N. B. French; Invercargill; born Dunedin, 25 Dec 1912; solicitor.

[24]
Lt B. B. Graves; born Wellington, 14 Jan 1918; clerk; killed in action 29 Jul 1944.

[25]
Gnr I. H. Henry; born Christchurch, 23 Nov 1921; electrician; died of wounds 29 Jul 1944.

[26]
Sgt N. L. McKnight, MM, m.i.d.; Invercargill; born Invercargill, 22 Dec 1912; contractor; twice wounded.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Tragedy at La Romola

Tragedy at La Romola

That night, in support of a major attack to seize the spur on which the small town of La Romola sat and which dominated the centre of the New Zealand front, the guns fired the first creeping barrage of the campaign. It was of 17 lifts and the 4th, 5th and 6th Field and the newly-arrived 57th Field provided it, starting at 10 p.m. on the 30th. At the same time the 4th Field and the 70th and 75th Medium fired concentrations. The 142nd Army Field (SP) was in close support of the New Zealand armour. On the left all went well and La Romola fell; but the Maoris on the right lost the barrage from the start, and there was much talk while it was still being fired that the right-hand part of it might have to be repeated. The concurrent CB fire was effective and the armour reported no shelling during the advance.

A Sub-battery of mortars had also fired in conjunction with the barrage. When the Maoris were still short of their objective in the morning of 31 July, the battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart of the 4th Field, and Major Nathan of 39 Mortar Battery arranged supporting fire for a further Maori thrust in the afternoon. Later 80 rounds of medium ammunition were allocated. With this help the Maoris easily gained their objective; but there was much stern fighting ahead.

What induced caution in the course of the Maori advance in the night 30–31 July and in daylight on the 31st was the presence of German tanks on the front, including Tigers. The 17-pounder H2 of 32 Battery was in support of 21 Battalion; but its crew did not restrict their attention to their immediate front. They saw a Tiger facing the Maoris near Faltignano, south-east of La Romola, and H2 at once went into action at 2400 yards and scored three hits in six shots. The Tiger hastily withdrew. A 4th Field observer thought its turret was jammed.

At La Romola early on the 31st Q Troop 17-pounders drove into the little town, picking up a bewildered German on the way. Q1 and Q3 were sited in the town and Q4 went into position alongside a wall 300 yards farther along the road to Florence. The crew of Q4 were sniped at, and half an hour later they were mortared intensely and forced to take cover. The infantry had been in an arc some distance in front of the gun when it went into position; but they withdrew later without advising the anti-tankers. After more mortar fire in the evening a German patrol reached Q4, disabled it, and drove off the half-tracked tower. But this was only the beginning of the misfortune of the anti-tankers in this area.

B Troop of 31 Battery had also brought its 6-pounder guns into La Romola and the reserve gun of Q Troop, Q2, also came forward in the night 31 July/1 August. Q2 was sited in the outskirts and the gun crew, together with the crew of a B Troop 6-pounder, tired out, bedded down in a building in the town in the early hours of 1 August. Soon afterwards a violent explosion brought much of the building down and buried them in three feet of masonry and rubble. Nine of them were killed instantly and a tenth died later. [27] Two others in another room survived, one of them unharmed. The probable cause was a booby trap similar to one found in a nearby building.

This was the worst disaster experienced by the gunners in Italy; but it was not the end of the anti-tank misfortunes this day. D3 of 31 Battery, an M10 deployed near La Romola, suffered a direct hit by a mortar bomb in the open turret which set it on fire. Sergeant Foley [28] and Gunner Chapman
[29] were killed and another gunner very badly wounded. E Troop 6-pounders were with 23 Battalion on the right and were shelled and mortared all day. E4 and its portée suffered a direct hit and both were destroyed; but the crew were safely under cover. E1 was damaged slightly and a gunner wounded. K Troop 6-pounders and M Troop 17-pounders of 33 Battery were with 6 Brigade on the left, the 6-pounders being towed by tanks and their crews crouching uncomfortably on the back of the tank hulls. The battery had two sergeants wounded by shellfire, but K and M Troops duly went into position covering the infantry.

In all this fighting the OP parties of the field regiments had to keep very far forward if they were to keep in touch with the rapidly changing situation and bring down fire where it was needed. In the course of it they all had hair-raising experiences.

At San Michele on 29 July, for example, Major Maxwell, [30] commander of 48 Battery, brought down effective defensive fire time and time again and helped to smash a series of determined counter-attacks. Then, in the evening, he drove to the left flank, the source of much trouble, and his tank was hit and set on fire. This did not deter him, however, and on 31 July and 1 August he was with the foremost infantry, within 100 yards of the enemy FDLs, and was able to call down DF tasks and aid the infantry when they attacked. When 25 Battalion attacked on the left he was able to shoot at any enemy movement on the exposed left flank of the battalion.

Similarly Major Hollis, the new commander of 46 Battery, showed outstanding skill and determination on 30 July. When the leading infantry were halted by machine-gun and mortar fire he went forward on foot to the next ridge with a No. 38 wireless set and directed the fire of 48 Battery to such good effect that the position was taken with relatively few casualties. OPAs and drivers who had to be in attendance on such FOOs needed iron nerves; but there was no lack of volunteers for this work. Between them they were able to sway many a situation in favour of the New Zealand armour and infantry; but it was never easy. The enemy resisted bitterly and counter-attacked with almost religious fervour. But for the repeated and devastating DF concentrations by nearly 150 field and medium guns and the close-range support of the self-propelled field howitzers of the 142nd Regiment, the New Zealand infantry must have suffered very heavy loss. Many a counterthrust was flattened by a torrent of shells before it could do any harm.

The ammunition needed for this profusion of tasks, however, was far more than Corps had allowed for. Towards the end of July it amounted to 18,000 rounds per day for the three New Zealand field regiments alone, to say nothing of the many other units under the CRA's command. Corps offered serious objections, and on one occasion General Freyberg overcame a refusal to supply him with more ammunition by asserting flatly, ‘No ammunition, no attack!’

[27] Those killed were Sergeant W. J. Foley, Bombardier F. J. H. White-horn, and Gunners R. J. Clark, W. F. S. Craine, B. R. Curry, W. M. Lennane, J. H. F. Reid, S. G. Shrimpton and K. W. Telfar. Gunner R. V. Davies died of his injuries. A 6-pounder and the M14 tractor of a 17-pounder alongside the building were buried in rubble.

Next day 34 Battery sent a working party forward to recover the bodies. By a coincidence three of the four men who carried the body of ‘Lofty’ Whitehorn out on a stretcher were, like himself, original members of 34 Battery who had been on furlough in the United Kingdom and had returned to the battery in Italy.

[28]
Sgt W. J. Foley; born NZ 10 Nov 1920; hardware assistant; killed in action 1 Aug 1944.

[29]
Gnr A. S. Chapman; born NZ 24 Oct 1920; timber worker; killed in action 1 Aug 1944.

[30]
Lt-Col E. H. L. Maxwell, OBE, MC; Wellington; born Christchurch, 28 Jul 1917; Regular soldier; wounded 6 Apr 1943; Military Secretary, Army HQ (retired May 1966).

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Final Attacks

The Final Attacks

As the enemy was pushed back beyond San Michele and La Romola to the Pian dei Cerri hills, the last high ground before Florence, he gathered all his resources, including many SP guns, for a last stand. Only a ‘set-piece attack’ could be expected to dislodge him from these positions and drive him back across the River Arno, which flows through the city. Planning for such an attack therefore went ahead rapidly.

barrage trace for night attack on la romola, 30-31 july 1944

The 6th Field had begun to move forward to positions two miles south of La Romola on 31 July and completed the move next day. On 1 August the 4th Field and 27 Battery of the 5th Field also advanced, and in the new positions 26 Battery was well forward, within 1000 yards of Faltignano on the right, and 46 Battery (‘for a change’, according to the battery diary) was in the rear. These moves had to be fitted into heavy programmes of HF and DF tasks, in the course of which the 4th Field lost Second-Lieutenant Stephenson
[31] killed and Gunner Swaney
[32] mortally wounded by a mortar bomb.

No sooner had the gunners settled into their new positions than they received details of the fire plan for the night 1-2 August. Both 26 and 27 Batteries were behind steep ridges and it became clear that their part in the fire plan would have to be severely curtailed because of local crest-clearance troubles. At first it seemed that 27 Battery could not engage targets closer than 5600 yards with Charge II; but when Meteor corrections were made and the details fully worked out, the minimum ranges were found to be between 4550 and 5450 yards. The various guns were therefore phased into the plan when the creeping barrage, which was the main feature, was sufficiently advanced. In 26 Battery, however, D Troop was found to be even worse placed and could take no part at all in the barrage.

The fire plan was one of the most complicated ever devised by the NZA. It included three separate creeping barrages. The first, of 29 lifts fired by the 6th Field with a battery of the 57th Field in support of 6 Brigade on the left, began at 11 p.m. on 1 August. The second, of 21 lifts fired by the 5th Field and another battery of the 57th Field in support of 4 Armoured Brigade, began at 11.35 p.m. The last, of 12 lifts fired by the 4th Field and the remaining battery of the 57th Field in support of 5 Brigade on the right, did not begin until 2.15 a.m. on 2 August. The lifts were all of 100 yards every five minutes. The first and second barrages were reinforced by ‘murders’ fired by the 75th and 70th Medium respectively. Concurrently 1 AGRA fired at all hostile batteries within reach. The 142nd

Field was in close support of the armour and the mortar battery supported 21 Battalion. For the field gunners it meant four and a half hours of back-breaking work. Then, when it was all over, any one of 35 DF tasks might be called for, and many of them were in fact fired in the night or early morning.

The tangled hills and the constant changes in the reported locations of friendly and enemy troops caused many changes in the plan, some of them after it began. Some lifts had to be repeated to allow the infantry to catch up. The barrage on the right—the last one—started too far forward, probably because the enemy followed up a preliminary withdrawal of the New Zealand infantry, and 21 Battalion at the outset had to overcome enemy almost untouched by the mighty artillery preparation. In the centre 22 Battalion reported at 1.30 a.m. that one gun was firing 400 yards short. It was on the part of the front covered by 28 Battery and each gun of that battery was therefore checked and all details of its programme rechecked. All were found correct. Then a shell landed in the pit of A3 of 27 Battery, putting the gun out of action, killing Gunner Baker, [33] and seriously wounding two other gunners. There was a suggestion that this was a 25-pounder shell fired short, and 47 Battery checked all its guns in relation to this and the earlier incident. As with 28 Battery, all were proved correct, though 47 Battery added 200 yards to the remaining lifts for safety's sake.

The 6th Field had an FOO forward with each 6 Brigade battalion [34] and they reported good progress. While the infantry consolidated their positions on their final objective the guns fired smoke to screen the flanks. Reports of Tiger tanks had created a lively demand for 17-pounder support, and the gun M2 of 33 Battery was well forward with C Company of 25 Battalion halfway between Pian dei Cerri and La Poggiona. When machine-gun and mortar fire in the area became intense the crew of M2 took shelter in a house, with their gun sited beside a wall and not dug in. What looked like a Tiger tank appeared on the road ahead and drove to within 400 yards. Then it stopped and began to back away. Two of the gun crew then dashed out of the house and fired one shot at the tank, striking it just below the turret. The result was spectacular.

The turret went six feet into the air, the tank burst into flames, and ammunition soon began to explode. None of the tank crew survived. This tank turned out on closer inspection to be a Pzkw IV altered to look like a Tiger. It was the one and only tank destroyed by the 7th Anti-Tank in Italy. The enemy soon avenged its loss by putting M2 out of action with mortar fire. The New Zealand field guns then brought down a curtain of fire in front of 25 Battalion and discouraged all further menacing enemy movements.

The hill known as La Poggiona proved an elusive objective for 22 Battalion in the centre. The high ground to the southeast of it, Poggio delle Monache, remained beyond the reach of 21 Battalion on the right. Both had to be won to open the way to Florence. Each called for another creeping barrage. The 5th and 6th Field fired a quick barrage of six lifts with much smoke at 6 p.m. on 2 August to cover the move of 22 Battalion to the start line and the 75th Medium fired concentrations. At 10.30 p.m. the 4th and 57th Field began a more elaborate barrage of 14 lifts, again with concentrations by the 75th Medium, to help 21 Battalion reach its objective. Both attacks were successful; but both were marred so far as the gunners were concerned by infantry complaints that their own guns were shelling them.

But these complaints were not unexpected. FOOs had seen enemy artillery ranging during the day with airbursts. Several allegations that 25-pounders were firing short had been investigated and no evidence had been found to support them. The 4th Field, for example, suspected of firing just east of San Michele, checked each gun one by one and reported all correct. The mediums carried out an accurate shoot on a Tiger tank on the right in mid-afternoon and drove it back.

From the OPs of B and D Troops of the 5th Field the quick barrage in support of 22 Battalion looked impressive. The opening line was well covered and at 6.37 p.m. B Troop OP reported, ‘Barrage falling very well’. The enemy in the target area sent up several flares with red stars, evidently to call for DF, and enemy guns began to shell east of La Romola. More ranging airbursts came over, one of them exploding right over the 27 Battery gun area. It was clear that, as darkness was falling, the enemy was preparing to shell and mortar the attacking infantry. Between the end of the quick barrage and nightfall the 5th and 6th Field fired several concentrations and D Troop OP of the 5th Field signalled that the last two ‘fell very well’.

In the case of the barrage on the right, fired by the 4th and 57th Field, there were repeated complaints that one 25-pounder was firing short. Maoris reported this, for example, at 11 p.m. In another case the 4th Field was accused at 1.30 a.m. on the 3rd of having ‘one gun continually firing short’ of a certain road target; but the regiment began to engage that target precisely at 1.30 a.m. On the slopes of Poggio delle Monache, however, the infantry found plenty of evidence of shells that did not fall short. In weapon pits and sites of dug-in tanks which had opposed the advance there were Germans killed by shellfire. In the morning, though a mist clouded much of the immediate front, it soon became evident that the enemy had gone, though he continued to shell the forward slopes as the New Zealanders pushed forward.

[31]
2 Lt N. A. Stephenson; born Auckland, 21 May 1908; civil servant; killed in action 1 Aug 1944.

[32]
Gnr T. J. S. Swaney; born Temuka, 9 Apr 1922; railway porter; died of wounds 2 Aug 1944.

[33]
Gnr R. J. Baker; born NZ 9 Sep 1909; carrier; killed in action 2 Aug 1944.

[34] The FOOs with 24, 25 and 26 Battalions were, respectively, Major Maxwell of 48 Battery, Captain C. N. B. French of 30 Battery, and Lieutenant C. N. Johnson of 29 Battery.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Fall of Florence

The Fall of Florence

The 5th and 6th Field found very few targets within range on 3 August; but the 4th Field was active, engaging at very long range transport to the front, towards Florence, and also targets on the front of 6 South African Armoured Division on the right. At 11.35 a.m., for example, the South Africans asked for a ‘murder’ on some anti-tank and machine guns, and A Troop OP of the 4th Field reported that it ‘fell exceedingly well’. In 46 Battery the gun E4 engaged a bridge near the River Arno at the extraordinary range of 14,150 yards. It was a case where the textbook phrase ‘fleeting opportunity targets’ came vividly to life, and the FOOs were firm in their resolve that not one of them should escape unscathed.

The various reports of Tiger tanks had made the infantry sensitive to the danger they presented and the anti-tank 17-pounders and M1os were warmly regarded as they pushed forward on the 3rd. A3 and A4 of 31 Battery, for example, drove up a slope in the morning to a grove of pines stripped of their branches by the 25-pounder barrage. The Maoris followed through 21 Battalion and these two M1os accompanied them. The enemy was still resisting from several vantage points, and the M1os put half a dozen shells each into a stone house from which machine guns were still firing. Then, after passing through the grounds of one of the many large mansions in the region and traversing a valley of olive trees on the way to the main Florence road, A3 and A4 were forced to draw back a little. A Tiger by a large house had fired on the Sherman tanks which led the advance and knocked out one of them. A3 fired five shots into the building; but a shot from the Tiger caused the M1o to burst into flames, killing two gunners and wounding the No. 1 and a third gunner. [35] The Tiger was not visible and A4 was ordered to withdraw.

OP parties of the mortar battery, following through on the right, came upon dismal evidence of the effectiveness of the 4.2-inch mortar fire the previous night. Some 400 rounds had been fired on a feature south-east of La Poggiona—the only fire directed at it. The enemy had been defending a hillside covered with flat-topped trees, and the mortar bombs, exploding in the branches, had killed 67 Germans in their trenches. The battery moved close to this area in the morning of the 4th and some of the mortarmen, when they surveyed their handiwork, felt what gunners have often felt: a sense of grim satisfaction that they had saved their infantry from danger, but a contrary and sorrowful awareness, too, of what it must have been like at the receiving end. The quietness of the morning in surroundings which, but for the marks and memories of battle, would have been idyllic prompted such sombre reflections.

For FOOs who pressed forward with their OP parties over the hills, paused to gather in the splendour of the view over Florence and the misty mountains beyond, and then drove across the pretty valley of the Arno, the war soon came closer. In or near the southern suburbs they came under fire. All bridges but the Ponte Vecchio were demolished, and the approaches to this bridge (famous for its goldsmiths' booths) were blocked by mountains of rubble from buildings almost as precious. The Brunelleschi dome of the great cathedral was intact, but, like all the other treasures north of the river, it was tantalisingly out of reach.

The 4th and 5th Field moved forward on 4 August, along roads tightly packed with vehicles. Once again, in the hills above the city, they dug gun positions and wearily prepared for action. Five times in 13 days the 4th and 5th Field had dug positions. All three field regiments had fired night and day, and the long spells of harassing fire in particular had robbed the gun crews of their sleep. They were feeling the strain and were badly in need of a rest.

The sight of Florence, however, was a tonic and the knowledge that they had contributed handsomely to its capture was a source of satisfaction. The countryside, though dusty from the passage of lorries and tracked vehicles, was smiling and everywhere there was ripe fruit. Not only headquarters staffs, but those of command posts and many gun crews were able to take up residence in some of the magnificent houses in the neighbourhood. When rain fell heavily in the evening of 4 August there was no question of digging desperately to channel rainwater away from threatened tents or dugouts: most gunners relaxed in carpeted luxury.

It was too good to last. The New Zealanders had to take over from Indians west of Florence and cover the deployment there of Americans preparing to cross the Arno. The diary of 46 Battery for 5 August states baldly: ‘Rather rocked when news came through at 0900 hrs for the Regt to be ready to move at 1500 hrs’. But there was less need for haste than at first appeared. On the way to the new positions the 4th and 5th Field paused for two days in the battered countryside near Cerbaia and the 6th Field came out of action and stayed where it was. All round them was abundant evidence of their efforts in the battle for Florence.

[35] Gunners B. Goodwin and J. T. Hitchcock were killed. The No. 1 was Bombardier E. H. Smith, who later became the historian of the 7th Anti-Tank.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Montelupo–Empoli Front

The Montelupo–Empoli Front

The new positions, stretching south-westwards from a point eight miles west of Florence, were worse in every respect than the former ones. The hills north of the Arno gave splendid observation over them and all routes leading to them. The roads were narrow, and even heavy showers did not interrupt for long the great clouds of white dust which marked the passage of vehicles. By day shiny black flies bit gunners through their shirts or socks and by night mosquitoes tormented them. Even many of the local Italians were unfriendly if not downright hostile, and there were several instances of sabotage of telephone cables.

It was supposed to be a quiet sector and there were sardonic comments when the 4th Field gun positions suffered their heaviest shelling of the war (according to the 5th Reinforcements). All other gun areas, too, were shelled or mortared and sometimes single vehicles moving by day attracted heavy concentrations of fire. Ammunition restrictions did not permit the usual massive retaliation and much of this fire had to go unanswered. Such was the shortage of 25-pounder ammunition that, when the New Zealanders took over the sector, Sherman tanks of the armoured brigade were deployed for indirect fire and were given some of the existing artillery tasks.

the montelupo–empoli sector west of florence

The enemy was still clinging to ground south of the river, especially in the Empoli area, and the New Zealand FDLs were from half a mile to two miles from the Arno. C and G Troops of the mortar battery were well forward on the right, a mile and a half from the riverbank. In the centre, from 8 August, two companies each of three 30-man platoons of infantillery from 32, 33 and 34 Batteries of the 7th Anti-Tank held the front as part of ‘Steelforce’. They faced across the river near Montelupo, did their best to keep out of sight by day, and were sharply alert at night to guard against enemy patrols. P Troop heavy mortars supported them. The 17-pounder troops, H, M and Q, supported the infantry and the two M1o troops, A and D, stayed in the rear for further training, which they badly needed.

The routine for the field guns was to fire 10 r.p.g. per day on observed shooting or HF tasks and 10 r.p.g. per night on HF tasks detailed by Artillery Headquarters. It was a quiet routine indeed after the enormous exertions of the advance on Florence.

The 5th Field registered six targets on the 9th under the control of B Flight of 655 Air OP Squadron. They were all road junctions and were incorporated into the HF programmes. On the 10th the OP staff of A Troop of the 6th Field was enthralled by an officer of 1 AGRA who engaged targets from their OP with 7.2-inch howitzers.

By this time the New Zealand infantry had begun to clear enemy from the Empoli area and the field guns fired in support. The enemy was reluctant to go, and as the pressure on him increased the hostile batteries across the river reacted with intense shelling of the New Zealand gun areas, including those of G Troop of the 14th Light Ack-Ack in the Montagnana area. This fire reached a crescendo on 12 August and at lunch time two gunners of F3 of the 4th Field were killed. [36] Several fires were started at gun positions and three or four men suffered cordite burns. In the afternoon the OP of E Troop of the 4th Field was so heavily engaged by enemy artillery that it had to be evacuated. A Troop of the 4th Field came under a heavy bombardment the following night and lost a good deal of ammunition. The propaganda shells which all three field regiments fired across the river in this period seemed to some of the dazed and shaken field gunners to be carrying Christianity a little too far. The heavy mortar battery had a more generous allotment of ammunition than the field batteries and responded vigorously, causing much loss to enemy posted south of the river.

With enemy artillery, mortar and nebelwerfer activity increasing in weight and accuracy, the preliminaries to the relief by the Americans were welcome. One of the infantillery platoons, of 34 Battery men under Lieutenant Champtaloup, [37] had manned positions around a farmhouse and by keeping out of sight had escaped harm. The nearest shot was a solitary 88 which burst a quarter of a mile away. These 28 men were relieved on the 14th by 42 Americans, new to battle and keyed up to a high pitch of excitement. The New Zealanders assured them that this was a quiet sector indeed and that they might maintain it so by a policy of silent watchfulness and a minimum of daylight movement. As the infantillery marched off into the night they could hear plainly the jingling of accoutrements around the farmhouse, and when they had gone less than half a mile they heard mortar bombs exploding in great profusion on their former position. The surviving Americans must have wondered what would count among New Zealanders as a noisy sector.

[36] Gunners W. E. Hitchon and D. McGregor.

[37]
Capt D. S. Champtaloup; Auckland; born NZ 26 Aug 1921; warehouseman.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Brief Rest near Siena

A Brief Rest near Siena

The same night gunners were reassured to see many 155-millimetre guns drive past and next day they handed over to Americans. On the 15th and 16th they dispersed in a rest area between Castellina in Chianti and Siena. There, under oak trees in pleasant surroundings, they washed off the dust of the journey, maintained guns and vehicles, and relaxed. There was leave to Siena and Rome and also for almost everybody a happy two-day spell at the little resort of Follonica on the coast south of Leghorn. A few gunners hitch-hiked to Florence, the main part of which was officially open only to AMGOT [38] personnel, by some subterfuge managed to cross the Ponte Vecchio, and spent fascinating hours wandering through a great city that was still part of no-man's land, its northern outskirts occupied by Germans.

Those who had the best opportunity to see Florence were members of the flash-spotting and sound-ranging troops of 36 Survey Battery. They had stayed on the Florence front in support of a Canadian division until 22 August and some of them had even managed to do some shopping in the city. Flash-spotting had not been easy and it was evident that the enemy was going to great lengths to confuse the flash-spotters. But the sound-ranging troop did extremely well, averaging more than a dozen locations per day. The two troops handed over to Americans and rejoined their battery near Castellina on the 22nd. They were in time to see Mr Winston Churchill when he drove past on the 24th; but they missed their leave to Follonica.

[38] Allied Military Government in Occupied Territory.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 20 — Back to the Adriatic

Contents

- [section]
p. 638

- Attack on the Gothic Line
- The Coriano Ridge p. 641
- The Rimini Front p. 643

- Rivers, Canals and Ditches of the Romagna p. 647

- Viserba and Bellaria

- Rain Delays the Offensive p. 654

- Anti-Tankers Support the Greek Brigade p. 656

- Thrusting Along the Foothills p. 658

- Across the Savio River p. 660

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

CENTRAL ITALY offers the attacker from the south a cheerless choice: one damned mountain after another in the Apennines or one damned river after another in the coastal plain. In their next choice of heartbreaks after the fall of Florence the Allied Armies in Italy were guided by the departure for the south of France of the French Expeditionary Corps with the one and only mountain division in the theatre. So, for the New Zealand Division, it was back to the Adriatic, where the rivers are flanked by ridges and the canals by stopbanks. If 25-pounders had minds their muzzles would have drooped at the thought of it.

Well before the end of August leave ceased and the ritual of painting out New Zealand markings and pocketing shoulder titles and badges was observed with a solemnity which many of the gunners found hard to sustain: the local villagers knew where they were going. The night-time journey was eerie. Drivers needed intuition as much as eyesight as they fought steering wheels and gears, aiming for the most part at the thickest of the dusty fog ahead. When they halted at Foligno they and all they owned were dressed in a clownish dust—not for the Divine Comedy first issued there, but for some profane variation whose last act it was now their task to improvise. The next night took them over dizzy heights on a better-surfaced road—except for the many deviations round demolitions—past waterfalls and into a rugged dawn with glimpses of the sea. The assembly area was near Iesi, eight miles from the Adriatic. [1]

[1] It was a new CRA who brought the gunners there. Ike Parkinson went back to 6 Brigade and Brigadier Queree succeeded him. Ray Queree was replaced in the 5th Field by ‘Huck’ Sawyers. Trevor Kensington left on the Taupo furlough scheme and Bill Philp took over the 6th Field.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Attack on the Gothic Line

Attack on the Gothic Line

Always on the Adriatic front the gunners were the first to go into action and the last to come out of it. On 30 August Artillery Headquarters and the three field regiments came under the command of 1 Canadian Corps for an impending attack by Eighth Army on the Adriatic sector of the Gothic Line, a powerful set of defences which had been under construction for more than a year. The same day the field gunners drove 40–50 miles over narrow and congested roads in a fog of dust to the village of Saltara, 11 miles south of Pesaro, the coastal anchor of the Gothic Line. Guns were booming in the distance; but in the vineyards around the village the grapes were ripe and the New Zealand gunners relaxed.

breaking through the gothic line, september 1944

The 4th Field came under the command of the British 46 Division on the left and the 5th and 6th Field under 1 Canadian Division in the centre; but the three regiments had no part in the initial attack, no barrage to fire, and the forward positions of the Gothic Line were shattered before they were fully committed. It was a queer situation at first. Brigadier Queree took Sawyers and Philp forward on the 31st to select gun positions. The Canadians they were supposed to support knew nothing of them. ‘No provision for gun areas’, Philp noted later, ‘and damned little help from anyone.’ For the 4th Field it was equally uncertain, as Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart realised when he reported to 46 Division. Both groups were told that there was no need for OPs. There was evidently a superabundance of artillery for the operation.

The 5th and 6th Field positions, near the villages of Monteciccardo and S. Angelo, were in countryside criss-crossed with deep ravines and suitable ground was extremely scarce. A task called for at 6.15 a.m. on the 1st proved out of range of the 5th Field and no more fire orders arrived until mid-afternoon. For an hour from 4 p.m. the 5th Field fired 20 r.p.g. at irregular intervals on the Monteluro feature, 10,500 yards to the north-north-west. The capture of this would make the enemy's left flank at Pesaro untenable and the Canadians attacked strongly, supported by fighter-bombers and a tremendous weight of shells. From vantage points handy to their gun positions New Zealand gun crews watched huge concentrations of artillery fire and could just see in the distance Canadian tanks advancing until they disappeared behind dense curtains of dust and smoke as the attack reached its climax in the late afternoon. At 6 p.m. the 6th Field began to add to the swirling, ever-thickening cloud over Monteluro. At breakfast time on the and both regiments were told to cease fire. The Canadians had succeeded.

To Philp it was mystifiying. So far as he could judge the Canadians just picked likely looking centres of resistance and fired on them for long periods, stopping and starting in what seemed an eccentric fashion. They had very different ideas about gunnery and had apparently not fired a single creeping barrage. The weary hours on a dusty and difficult road and the heavy labour of getting the guns into position did not seem to have been warranted by the small amount of long-range shooting carried out by the 5th and 6th Field.

The 4th Field had dug pits and then waited for fire orders. Then they were told that 46 Division was through the Gothic Line. The only tasks ordered required supercharge and the ammunition available was all Charge III. [2] In the evening of the 2nd the 5th and 6th Field returned to Saltara, and the following morning the 4th Field climbed up from its positions in the bed of the River Apsa and in heavy rain also drove back to that village. It was a Sunday, the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of war, and special church services marked the occasion.

The rest of the artillery had been resting near Iesi, sending swimming parties to the beach at Fano, and listening to radio news of successes by Allied armies in France, Belgium and Holland. With the breaking of the Gothic Line it seemed as though the end of the war was in sight. Another source of pleasure for the gunners on the 4th was the appointment of Steve Weir as temporary commander of the Division, General Freyberg having been injured in an aircraft accident.

By 6 September all regiments were stationed near the coast road south-east of Fano, the 7th Anti-Tank being farthest inland near the village of San Costanzo. The region was rich with purple grapes and for the moment the war seemed far away. A party of 43 Battery under Second-Lieutenant Harvey had the worst task: sweeping mines in an area close to Fano to be occupied by 6 Brigade. They found that tempting tomato patches in the area were booby-trapped like the cherry trees near Sora. [3]

[2] Charge III could be reduced to Charge II or Charge I by taking out either one or two bags of propellant explosive. It could not, however, be increased to supercharge.

[3] New self-propelled Bofors guns were tried out by the 14th Light Ack-Ack, with the help of flash-spotters from the Survey Battery. A and B Troops were equipped with these guns and the results were satisfactory.

The 4th Field received six new OP armoured cars called Foxes in place of Honey tanks.

The 7th Anti-Tank practised loading 6-pounders and jeeps into the amphibious craft called DUKWs (or Ducks) with a possible crossing in mind of the River Po. The trial was ‘most successful’ according to 33 Battery; but RHQ reported otherwise. In any case the River Po was many more months away than anyone then cared to think.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Coriano Ridge

The Coriano Ridge

By 11 September the guns were back in the line under the Canadian Corps. This time the 14th Light Ack-Ack and the Survey Battery were included and the 7th Anti-Tank provided 31 Battery, some members of which were far from pleased to be detailed for a smoke-screening task on the lines of the one they had undertaken at Cassino. The 654th Air OP Squadron (less two flights) was also under the CRA's command and the New Zealand sappers provided a special grader to go forward with the 4th Field to help construct landing strips for the Air OP aircraft. [4]

The guns drove through Fano, past the elaborate concrete defence works of Pesaro, staged at Gradara, and deployed halfway between the fishing village of Cattolica and the little seaside town of Riccione. Behind them 6 Brigade, with 33 Battery and B Sub-battery of heavy mortars, went into reserve by Gradara.

advancing towards rimini, 11–24 september 1944

Gun crews worked hard on the 12th on pits and camouflage and preparing ammunition. They were not allowed to fire until 6 p.m. and they were still forbidden to wear cap badges or shoulder titles. Their presence on the Canadian front was to be kept secret. Then they began a programme in support of 1 Armoured Division. It was of the same kind of fire at irregular intervals as that which the 5th and 6th Field had provided for the Gothic Line attack. It was not until 1 a.m. on the 13th that they began to fire stonks and ‘murders’—in support of a Canadian attack on a ridge running southwards from Coriano. The attack succeeded and after it they were allowed to resume wearing New Zealand insignia. Evidently the stonks and ‘murders’—very different from Canadian methods—were regarded as trademarks of the NZA. Ammunition expenditure all told averaged about 250 r.p.g.

The capture of the Coriano ridge did not, however, open the way into the Romagna as had been hoped. It led instead to a week of severe fighting. The next phase began with a series of tasks starting at 5.45 p.m. on the 13th; but the infantry failed to reach their starting line and after 15 minutes the tasks were cancelled. They were resumed again at 6.30 a.m. on the 14th— a series of ‘murders’ on both side of the River Marano. The enemy still resisted and in the afternoon the field gunners found they were once more supporting New Zealand infantry—22 (Motor) Battalion, which had gone through to support 3 Greek Brigade. The 4th Field sent two FOOs up to this battalion, Captain Robinson
[5] and Lieutenant Eccleton, [6] and they found themselves in the thick of a fierce struggle for Rimini airfield, concurrent with a Canadian onslaught on the ridge of San Fortunato, which was the key to the battle.

All of the 14th Light Ack-Ack but 43 Battery had gone back into reserve. In the night 13–14 September a shell hit H5, and wounded four of its crew, none of them seriously, as well as doing minor damage to the gun. Enemy aircraft had made a few quick raids by night; but by day the RAF monopolised the skies and the Bofors gunners found no targets.

The smoke party of 31 Battery had stayed close to the fighting inland, ready to carry out their disagreeable and dangerous task. They were shelled on the 14th near Coriano; but after dark machine-gunners relieved them and they gladly returned to their battery lines. On the return journey, however, they suffered a nasty accident. A dozen of them were trapped in the back of a lorry when it overturned in the darkness. Petrol drained into their little prison and several of them suffered so badly from fumes before they could be released that they had to be evacuated for medical attention. ‘It was just like a very bad morning after’, one of them said later, ‘with none of the pleasure of the night before.’ [7]

[4] Landing strips were as close as possible to the guns. They were operated by a joint army- RAF team, the pilots being RA officers. The weather and the tempo of operations decided the type of strip. If time allowed and the ground was boggy, matting or perforated steel plates (PSP) would be laid.

By this time Air OPs were highly expert and the enemy was most respectful of them. The sight of a little Auster in the air was often enough to keep all HBs [hostile batteries] in sight quiet.

[5]
Capt L. H. Robinson; Auckland; born NZ 26 Jun 1918; insurance inspector.

[6]
Capt J. H. Eccleton; Whangarei; born Levin, 15 Jun 1914; salesman.

[7] Back at San Costanzo the 7th Anti-Tank organised a most successful dance on the 16th, with lighting supplied by LAD generators, music by the village orchestra, and supper by 34 Battery. Some hundreds of tins of foot powder from Patriotic parcels helped to make the floor suitably slippery.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Rimini Front

The Rimini Front

The field regiments moved forward again late on the 15th, this time to flat areas in the outskirts of Riccione. The 4th Field was packed and ready to move when 10 rounds gun fire were called for. The gun crews rushed back into action, fired this ‘murder’ on a point less than three miles from their new gun area, and then occupied their new positions. Twice in the night the 5th Field fired on orders from Major Angell of the 6th Field. Angell had been forward for several days with the Royal Canadian Dragoons. His own regiment was not available after dark and, as pre-arranged, he called on the 6th Field. Four armoured SP guns had come forward and were shelling the Canadians. The 5th Field fired four more ‘murders’ at each of these troublesome guns in the morning and then the 6th Field joined in, firing heavy concentrations. But the SP guns went on firing at the Canadians and the New Zealand fire (as the 6th Field diary remarks) had ‘No visible effects’.

Armoured SP guns, plentiful on the Rimini front, could do much damage and were hard to deal with. The enemy had also emplaced several Panther turrets, with long-barrelled 75s of exceptional velocity and accuracy, in concrete posts flush with the ground and hard to hit. Many thousands of 25-pounder rounds were fired at them in often-unavailing efforts to keep them quiet. Tank attacks with close artillery support would have been better; but the Shermans were not suitable for this—hence the frequent requests for ‘murders’.

It was already painfully clear that the high hopes of rapidly exploiting a breach of the Gothic Line were not to be fulfilled. With subtle anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and powerful mobile weapons to impose delay, the enemy could strengthen a succession of defensive lines and make each step towards the Romagna arduous and costly. The British, Canadian, Polish and Greek infantry were enmeshed in a bitter struggle. To lighten the human cost of the advance Eighth Army had to pay in metal and high explosive. Air and artillery support were lavish. Guns crowded in wherever they could. There were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 11th and 17th Canadian Field, the 8th Canadian Field (SP), the 24th Army Field (SP), the 4th, 5th and 6th Kresowa Field, the 3rd Greek Field, the 1st Canadian Medium, the 3rd and 10th Medium, RA, the 57th Heavy Ack-Ack, the 32nd Heavy, RA, and many other guns besides the New Zealand ones. All were feverishly active. Their OP parties pushed compulsively forward at the heels of the infantry—even, on occasions, in front of them. Artillery boards sprouted like mushrooms in the lee of buildings. Artillery transmitters crowded the wireless waves. Artillery telephone cables thickly draped the roadsides. Ammunition lorries congested the roads and proliferating tracks. Shells whined and shrieked incessantly, turning walls into rubble and making ugly gashes in the ground. But to infantry who had need of them they made the sweetest music on earth.

The enemy counter-attacked strongly on the San Fortunato ridge and held grimly to the western edge of the Rimini airfield.

Canadians praised the 5th Field for a smoke screen maintained on the ridge on the 16th. The 4th Field fired a small programme in support of a Canadian attack and the 6th Field did likewise for the Greeks. Enemy artillery replied strongly, wounding a 5th Field officer and killing a Canadian LO and a member of the Royal Corps of Signals attached to the 6th Field. On the 17th a shell struck F2 of the 5th Field and damaged the barrel. The 4th Field lost B2, wrecked by a premature, and next day the 5th Field, still on a heavy smoke programme, also suffered a premature—a smoke shell which wounded one man.

The 5th Field smoke tasks continued until late on the 20th and the 4th and 6th Field concurrently fired heavily in support of further attacks on the San Fortunato ridge. Between them they fired 24,281 rounds on the 18th. By night ‘artificial moonlight’ created by searchlight batteries cast a strange light on the battlefield and the clouds above it. Supplies of both smoke and HE ammunition began to run low on the 19th, so heavy was the programme. The 6th Field surpassed their previous record for 24 hours by firing 13,301 rounds, the 5th Field fired 11,026 rounds, and the three regiments fired over 35,000 rounds all told. By the time the ridge was firmly in Canadian hands on the 20th and the firing eased, the gun crews were robot-like in their actions as they served their guns. They richly deserved a rest; but the weather conspired with a resolute defence to rob them of one.

In the afternoon and evening they moved forward, and as they did so the skies suddenly began to release the rain that had been threatening for days and soon turned the loamy soil into a morass. Even reconnaissance parties had trouble getting forward. When hundreds of other vehicles followed, the going became even worse and there was endless trouble. For gunners already bone-weary from heavy fire programmes the struggle with clinging mud made the night of 20–21 September an unforgettable ordeal. The 4th Field was sited near the Ausa River in ploughed fields and one quad after another as it turned off the road went down to its axles. The crews had to get out, unlimber guns and trailers, and winch everything slowly through the quagmire. The rain continued as they laboured to get the guns ready for action and, in the 5th Field, 47 Battery was further upset to learn that Gunner Dorreen, [8] who had been wounded in the Florence campaign, had died.

Rimini fell on the 21st, a battered treasury of Roman and Renaissance art, its Ponte d'Augusto unbroken, but its Tempio Malatestiano severely damaged. The drunken walls and jagged masonry of this ancient city conveyed no welcome to the Romagna—a region muddily criss-crossed with rivers and canals guarded by stopbanks. The 5th Field moved forward again through the mud, using tyre chains, to the south-western out-skirts of the town late on the 21st and the 4th and 6th Field followed next day, digging in close to the enemy. At midnight they fired a barrage of 225 r.p.g. in support of a 5 Brigade attack, the first of many such programmes for the crossing of rivers or streams in the Romagna. All went well; but the enemy shelled the gun areas quite heavily. One shell struck a house in the B Echelon area of 46 Battery and killed Gunner Louden
[9] and wounded three others.

Meanwhile on the 22nd the Eighth Army commander, General Leese, signalled to Brigadier E. C. Plow, CCRA of 1 Canadian Corps, as follows:

‘I congratulate you and all ranks of the Royal Canadian Artillery, Royal Artillery, New Zealand Artillery and Greek Artillery fighting under your comd on the fine performance of their guns throughout our recent operations. Your supporting fire for the infantry attacks was on a high level. Its effectiveness is further shown by the numbers of enemy dead found and the demoralisation of prisoners captured. The shooting of the AGRAs was accurate and most effective. The Divisional Artilleries achieved a high degree of flexibility and worked well together. The general efficiency reflects great credit on the gun drill and calibration of all regiments. Please convey to all ranks my congratulations on a notable achievement.’

This arrived on the 23rd. [10] It related mainly to the fighting from 8 September to the 21st in which the guns fired 1,470,000 rounds, weighing all told 14,000 tons—1,200,000 of them 25-pounder rounds. [11]

[8]
Gnr I. W. Dorreen, m.i.d.; born Hamilton, 22 Jan 1916; farmer; wounded 1 Dec 1941; died of wounds 16 Sep 1944.

[9]
Gnr E. T. Louden; born NZ 1 Aug 1918; labourer; killed in action 23 Sep 1944.

[10] A similar message was doubtless sent to the CCPA, the artillery commander of the Polish corps.

[11] These figures are cited in the Eighth Army News of 3 October 1944. They might be compared with the 1,000,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition and 200,000 medium rounds fired in 10 days in the Alamein offensive and 500,000 rounds fired in the first three days of the final Cassino offensive.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Rivers, Canals and Ditches of the Romagna

Rivers, Canals and Ditches of the Romagna

It was now assumed that a decisive phase of the Italian fighting was over and that the fall of Rimini would constitute a breakthrough something like that of Alamein, to be followed by a more or less rapid advance to the River Po. No such expectation was to be fulfilled. In the event the fighting from Rimini onwards was much like that which had gone before. Nothing remotely like a breakthrough had occurred. The enemy was still able to offer stern resistance on each successive ridge in the inland hills and there were dozens of lines of ridges. In the widening plain north-west of Rimini he was equally able to defend each river and each fosso or scolo—and again there were dozens of rivers and hundreds of minor watercourses. When the enemy could continue to offer a coherent defence from the sea to the peaks of the Apennines, it was idle to think of an easy passage to the River Po and the Plain of Lombardy. But the promise of such a passage had spurred men on in their assaults on the more dramatic defensive lines in the south. It was as if the donkey had finally grabbed the carrot dangled in front only to find that it was made of plaster of paris.

the advance to the fontanaccia, 23–24 september 1944

Already on the 23rd the New Zealand Division was across the wide bed of the Marecchia River (beyond the Ausa) and then over the Fossa Turchetta, the Canale dei Molini, the Scolo Brancona, the Scolo Cavallaccio, the Scolo Valentina and several other unnamed watercourses and was up against defences in front of the River Fontanaccia. Beyond this there were three rivers each with supporters claiming it was the ancient Rubicon: the Uso, the Fiumicino and the Pisciatello. [12] For the soldiers who had to cross them, each demanded as much personal resolution as that which prompted Caesar's fateful decision and the help that the gunners could give them was warmly welcomed. Without it each river and minor watercourse could have become a dreadful blood bath.

It is no exaggeration to say that by this time the Air OP aircraft—tiny Austers or Piper Cubs—had become members of the family so cherished that they could never overstay their welcome. If one or other of them was not overhead in the forward area there was something palpably missing. The skill of the Air OP pilots, especially in bringing down destructive fire on hostile batteries, was a source of pride and it was a joy to work with them. In the afternoon of the 23rd the men of 47 Battery were therefore horrified to see an Air OP aircraft crash in flames about 1000 yards ahead. There was no sign of ack-ack fire and it seemed that one of the thousands of shells fired at ground targets must have struck the plane. The pilot, Captain R. M. Farrer, DFC, well known and much admired by those New Zealand gunners who had dealings with him, was killed.

[12] Italian officialdom had decided in 1932 in favour of the Fiumicino and an announcement on the Via Emilia bridge in Savignano proudly proclaimed this. But local sentiment remained staunchly partisan and the army maps favoured the Uso.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Viserba and Bellaria

Viserba and Bellaria

The anti-tankers pushing forward in support of the infantry had meanwhile endured a good deal of fire from guns, mortars and tanks. The Mios of A and D Troops, 31 Battery, had crossed the Ponte d'Augusto and then D Troop advanced with the Maoris to the Scolo Brancona. A Troop moved inland along Route 9, the Via Emilia, and then two Mios were detached to cover a gap between the two forward battalions. In this position they were shelled relentlessly and Gunner Corkill
[13] was killed.

from the fontanaccia to the uso, 24–26 september

It was a busy day for the field gunners, who fired over 20,000 rounds. Next day, the 24th, they fired less than half this amount; but they had plenty to do preparing for a night attack across the Fontanaccia. From new positions west of Rimini, with the 5th Field forward, north of Viserba in agreeable surroundings handy to the beach, the New Zealand field regiments and the 17th Canadian Field fired a 320 r.p.g. barrage to help 6 Brigade across that river, and the 24th (SP) Field, RA, and the 4th

Medium fired concentrations, while 1 Canadian AGRA carried out a CB programme. E Troop of 42 Light Ack-Ack Battery, after trouble getting into suitable fire positions under shellfire, marked the boundary lanes with Bofors tracer. The flat country allowed the gunners to revive tactics hitherto unused since the desert days.

The SP regiment gave close support to 22 Battalion on the coast and the other field regiments fired as FOOs required. A Sub-battery of heavy mortars bombarded the coast road for an hour and then fired on call. By night and in daylight on the 25th C Troop alone fired three tons of mortar bombs in support of 22 Battalion.

The attack was not a complete success; but it gained valuable ground and, with this as a lever, the enemy was forced back to a new line based on the River Uso. For Captain Donaldson, [14] commander of F Troop of the 5th Field, and his jeep driver, Gunner Haste, [15] the attack was the beginning of a two-day ordeal. They drove at the heels of the infantry in the only unarmoured vehicle in the attack. Several times the jeep got off the track in the dark, but Haste's good driving and his disregard of the heavy machine-gun and mortar fire through which he had to pass enabled the OP to give timely support to 25 Battalion. Donaldson brought down fire several times in the night and next day was aggressive and skilful in helping the infantry to consolidate their gains. Haste also operated the wireless set and therefore, like Donaldson, had to be on the alert 24 hours a day. They made a splendid team and Donaldson was awarded an MC and Haste an MM, both of them ‘immediate’.

Other OP parties also met trouble. Captain Franks
[16] of E Troop of the 6th Field, for example, was stranded with his party when his wireless vehicle was disabled by shell splinters. He tried to get forward on foot with a portable wireless set, but ran into heavy machine-gun and sniper fire. With only tommy guns and rifles his party engaged the enemy, overcame the opposition at dawn on the 26th, and captured several prisoners. Then Franks advanced on foot, passed through the FDLs, and established his OP in front of them, bringing down battery and regimental concentrations from there with good effect.

The 4th and 6th Field moved forward on the 25th alongside the 5th Field north of Viserba. Next day the 4th Field advanced again, this time to the outskirts of the long, straggling village of Bellaria, the northern end of which still harboured Germans. In the evening Captain MacKay of the 5th Field crossed the Uso with a Divisional Cavalry patrol and established an OP so far forward in the town that for a day or two it was some 200 yards in front of the infantry. For the 4th Field most targets were extremely close and the gun crews could not help feeling uneasy about the many night tasks, knowing that their guns could easily be located by flash-spotting and were well within range of enemy mortars. For several days and nights they were heavily shelled and mortared. After a time, however, 26 Battery took over a local café as a cookhouse and the gunners enjoyed the almost forgotten luxury of sitting down at tables for meals and being waited on.

Major Angell of the 6th Field had his OP in a house south of Bellaria and on the 26th it received a direct hit from a heavy shell. Angell was wounded in the head and suffered concussion; but he insisted on evacuating wounded infantry in his OP vehicle. He had his wounds treated at the RAP of 25 Battalion and then set off back to his OP. On the way he came under heavy fire and had to crawl along a series of drains; but he reached the OP and for the next two days provided excellent support for the infantry. Then he consented to being relieved. It was typical of Angell's performance throughout the campaign and for it he earned an MC.

On the 27th Gunner Scorgie
[17] of E Troop of the 5th Field was left in charge of the OP wireless vehicle while the FOO reconnoitred forward. While Scorgie was passing fire orders the vehicle came under heavy fire which lasted for two hours. He carried on in that exposed position, remaining at the wireless set so as not to break contact with the troop, and did not move to the protection of a nearby house until the orders were complete, by which time the firing had died down. Lance-Sergeant Ennis, [18] also of the 5th Field, a most experienced line maintenance signaller, connected his OP by telephone on the 27th three hours before the Greek infantry arrived on the scene. To the casual observer the field artillery seemed to operate like a well-oiled machine; but it took such efforts as these to create that appearance. Again on the 29th it was only because of the disregard of Gunner Jones
[19] of the same regiment for his own safety that the line communications to E Troop OP were maintained despite many breaks caused by heavy and persistent fire.

For a brief period it looked as if the defence might be crumbling. The Division was well on the way to the Fiumicino and Artillery Headquarters worked hard on a fire plan for a setpiece attack across the river on the night 28–29 September. But the weather exercised a veto and all was cancelled. Rain filled gun pits, communications became haphazard as tanks and other vehicles picked up telephone lines in the mud and broke them, and those 4.2 mortars not flooded out had to double their rate of fire to complete the tasks allotted. The 5th Field were scheduled to move near Bellaria; but only 27 and 28 Batteries managed to do so. Both were shelled and mortared with exceptional violence and accuracy and 28 Battery lost two men killed and four wounded. [20] After dark on the 29th this battery moved back to its former position. The 6th Field claim in their diary to have ‘knocked out a Tiger tank’; but all that is certain is that, after medium and field guns engaged it, the tank stopped firing at houses on the 5 Brigade front.

An operation instruction of the 30th stated hopefully that it was ‘considered likely that the enemy will be forced to withdraw North of R. Po shortly’; but Captain MacKay of the 5th Field had been told by Italian partisans two days before that the Germans had been working for three months on the Fiumicino positions and the next few days provided no indication that they proposed to abandon the river line without a hard fight. The softness of the ground greatly favoured the defence, obstructing the forward movement of bridging equipment and reducing activity on the front mainly to patrolling and artillery and mortar fire. The 5 Brigade diary mentions ‘artillery househunting duels’ and there were many ‘murders’ on SP guns across the river and on concrete pillboxes in the coast sector, now occupied by 3 Greek Mountain Brigade.

The 6-pounder troops of 34 Battery supporting the Greeks reported several bombardments more violent than any they had previously experienced and it seemed that the Germans greatly resented the presence of the Greek brigade. It was an ominous feature of the fighting that enemy artillery was very strong in this sector and was using much-improved methods of bringing down concentrations of fire. The New Zealand guns fired more than 200,000 rounds in September and the heavy mortar battery also kept the NZASC ammunition lorries busy in the last week of the month. [21] October seemed likely to be just as busy.

In the last night of September there was a full moon in a clear sky. Much Luftwaffe activity had been reported on forward airfields and trouble was expected. All ack-ack guns in the forward area, including those of the 14th Light Ack-Ack, were therefore combined for barrage firing at night. When two bombers came over in brilliant moonlight the result was highly spectacular. Almost every ack-ack gun on the front opened fire. For a few brief minutes the moon and stars paled and the sky was full of leaping tracers and bursting shells. The bombers dropped a few HE bombs and many butterfly ‘baskets’ and then hurried off. The 14th Light Ack-Ack fired 2180 rounds—the first fired at aircraft since May. It all seemed fun until it was learned that two men had been wounded in the bombing and that one of them, Bombardier Arnold, [22] later had to have a foot amputated. The tractor D1 was slightly damaged.

The next action of the 14th Light Ack-Ack was unique: it was a naval engagement. A K-Boot, a fast 14-foot motorboat designed to carry and launch radio-controlled torpedoes of a primitive kind, was heading up the coast past Rimini 1000 yards off shore on 1 October. A Field Security sergeant asked Major Patterson, second-in-command of the ack-ack regiment, to fire across the bows of this suspicious-looking craft. G1 and G2 of 43 Battery were sited by the coast road north-west of Rimini and Patterson ordered G1 under Bombardier Alexander
[23] to do so. G1 fired 11 Bofors rounds at 2000 yards. The boat stopped and seemed to be drifting towards the shore. G2 under Bombardier Willis
[24] fired a magazine of Bren bullets across the bows and the boat turned seawards. G2 therefore followed up with three Bofors rounds, one of which seemed to disable the motor. The boat began to drift southwards; but the crew continued to tempt fate and made no attempt to come ashore. Willis therefore fired 11 more rounds at intervals and compelled the Germans to abandon their craft, which afterwards sank. There had been three occupants, but only two landed and the third, who was wounded, was presumed drowned. After a considerable quantity of the Adriatic was emptied out of the two prisoners, they gave valuable information to the Canadian Intelligence staff.

In the afternoon the 4th Field discovered two Germans in a dugout under a haystack in C Troop area. They refused a call to surrender and a gunner therefore fired a tommy gun into the hole. Both Germans were wounded and one of them died. The incident was small in itself; but it gave rise to apprehension about possible enemy infiltration and prompted a thorough search of the whole regimental area.

[13]
Gnr R. J. Corkill; born Wellington, 21 Sep 1916; schoolteacher; killed in action 23 Sep 1944.

[14]
Capt J. W. Donaldson, MC; England; born Wellington, 29 Aug 1918; civil servant; now serving in British Army.

[15] Sgt R. V. Haste, MM; Petone; born Lower Hutt, 21 Jun 1921; foreman.

[16]
Capt L. Franks, m.i.d.; Auckland; born NZ 25 Aug 1916; salesman.

[17]
Gnr R. G. Scorgie, m.i.d.; Greymouth; born England, 8 Sep 1921; porter.

[18]
L-Sgt D. Ennis; Auckland; born England, 6 Feb 1913; painter.

[19]
Gnr W. J. Jones; Waipawa; born NZ 21 Jan 1920; porter; wounded 4 Jan 1944.

[20] Sergeant D. McKenzie was killed and Gunner F. R. Stent died of wounds.

[21] NZASC deliveries in September included 228,446 rounds of HE and 19,580 of smoke.

[22] 2Lt J. R. C. Arnold; Christchurch; born Dunedin, 2 Dec 1917; leadlight worker; wounded 30 Sep 1944.

[23]
Sgt J. C. Alexander; Waerenga, Te Kauwhata; born Dunedin, 16 Jun 1918; warehouseman.

[24]
Sgt A. M. Willis; Geraldine; born Geraldine, 23 Aug 1914; labourer.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Rain Delays the Offensive

Rain Delays the Offensive

Rain came pouring down again on the 2nd, converting soft tracks into impassable morasses and delaying a resumption of the offensive. For the field gunners the main task was to develop effective responses to the harassing fire from enemy guns and mortars which plagued the defence on the coast and in the central sector. A CB programme worked out by the CBO's staff served this purpose well, though its effect was as a rule shortlived. On receipt of the code words ‘Mustard Red’ all known hostile batteries were heavily engaged. For a week or more on this front and afterwards on other New Zealand fronts, ‘Mustard Red’ was frequently signalled. When the sound-rangers located two heavy guns on 3 October at least five field and three medium regiments and two heavy batteries fired so that their shells began landing simultaneously in a devastating pinpoint concentration, the Time on Target (TOT) being 2.45 p.m. [25] It was an event that any surviving members of the German gun crews are not likely to forget. They did not fire again from that position.

Despite such measures as this, the German guns and mortars remained formidable, prompting many NZA gun crews to go to extraordinary lengths to protect their gun pits and living quarters. The most exposed of the 4th Field gun pits were reinforced and built up above the ground with heavy timber and other materials, and some of the gunners copied the German trick of digging sleeping accommodation under the floors of the casas they occupied. It was a lot of trouble to go to for what was understood to be a temporary position; but it kept casualties low in a period which for weight and accuracy of fire on the gun positions was reminiscent of the worst days of the desert war.

Two ammunition limbers, an ammunition dump, and two haystacks in the 29 Battery area were set on fire by shelling in the night 2–3 October and Bombardier Buchanan's gun was gravely endangered. He tried to save it by manhandling it out of the front of the pit, but the heat of the fire and the frequent explosions of ammunition drove his gun crew back. For the next three hours Buchanan and his crew laboured, regardless of harassing fire and occasional heavy concentrations of shelling, to remove all the ammunition they could get at. In the end they got the fire under control and saved hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Buchanan's leadership and determination were rewarded with an MM. At the battery wagon lines two men were wounded, and next night two more were wounded by shelling at the 6th Field RHQ.

For men of the Survey Battery the task of maintaining line communications was almost too much and the No. 22 wireless sets just received by the flash-spotters were most useful. Two trucks and the equipment for one sound-ranging post were destroyed by shelling on the 2nd. Two days later a flash-spotting post was shelled out and its instruments destroyed. Sound-ranging was difficult because of the weather and the profusion of friendly guns, and also because the enemy's policy was to fire salvoes from guns of different calibres in widely-scattered positions.

Shelling of the 4th Field caused 25 Battery to ask to be excused firing HF tasks at night—an extraordinary request—and E Troop of 46 Battery withdrew 800 yards after getting two men wounded in fierce shelling by Bellaria. The Left Section of H Troop of 43 Light Ack-Ack Battery was severely shelled on the 3rd, a truck was damaged, and the gun H5 suffered a direct hit which damaged the barrel, automatic loader and Stiffkey Stick. On the 4th three more men of 29 Battery were wounded and several vehicles were hit, one of them being destroyed by fire. The barrel of F1 of the 5th Field was damaged on the 3rd by a shell splinter.

There was trouble, too, from the sodden ground conditions and overworked guns. The rain and mud caused some charges to become damp, which could cause short-shooting, and charges had to be examined carefully to guard against this. Many 25-pounder barrels were badly worn. ‘Gun C1 has now fired 9700 EFCs’, [26] 47 Battery reported on the 4th. ‘GPO thinks barrel will not stand up to a barrage. Can EME look in?’ Another worrying feature was a series of prematures, though no deaths resulted. A3 of 27 Battery, for example, had one four feet in front of the barrel on the 4th. Nobody was injured and the gun remained in action; but the jarring ugliness of it was not easily forgotten by the crew. Then, early on the 6th, a shell burst two feet from the muzzle of A4, putting the gun out of action. Again there were no casualties; but the gunners of A Troop might have been forgiven if their handwriting was a little shaky for the next few days.

[25] A TOT shoot required the shells from all guns engaged to start bursting on the target simultaneously—or as nearly so as could be arranged. When mediums and heavies were included this, of course, had the effect of delaying the engagement of the target by the 25-pounders. For HB shoots, however, the TOT method could be most damaging.

[26] EFCs = effective full charges—the total rounds fired with various charges, reduced to the equivalent number (in terms of wear and tear in the barrel) fired with full charges.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Anti-Tankers Support the Greek Brigade

Anti-Tankers Support the Greek Brigade

O and N Troops of 34 Battery were well forward in support of the Greeks and were shelled night and day. The 6-pounder crews of O Troop were housed in animal stalls. On the 4th a Canadian sound-ranging post was established in the house by O1. Two N Troop men were injured by flying debris next day. A few days later O1 had its sight bracket damaged by a splinter. Then, in the evening of the 9th, N Troop was warned that an enemy patrol was approaching. Sergeant Carson
[27] had two guns forward and posted his men in prepared positions to defend them. They came under fierce fire, but Carson controlled and co-ordinated their response and they were able to beat off the threat in conjunction with Greek infantry. Later in the night two haystacks close to one of the guns were set on fire, endangering much ammunition. The flames lit up the area and attracted intensified machine-gun and mortar fire; but Carson got his men to remove the ammunition to a place of safety. It was a novel action for the anti-tankers and for his coolness and leadership in it Carson won an MM.

The Canadian sound-rangers counted 800 shells that exploded within 150 yards of their house in a period of two days, the heaviest concentration they had so far recorded. N and O Troops were to be relieved by Canadians on the 11th and the thought cheered them greatly. But when the time came they could not get away. N Troop was held up by phosphorus bombs dropped on the road and O Troop by a towing vehicle bogged on the way forward, completely blocking the route. Next night, when they did get out, they had to leave two N Troop guns and at least two O Troop ones in position, to be taken over temporarily by the Canadians. It was too muddy to get them out without enormous effort, and constant machine-gunning of the position made this impossible. All in all, this was the most trying position occupied by 34 Battery since Miteiriya Ridge and the anti-tankers were glad to see the last of it. Nobody then knew that this was to be the last action of the war for 34 Anti-Tank Battery, the ‘Pommy Battery’.

The 33rd Battery had meanwhile provided an infantillery company of 93 men and held a front of about 400 yards on the Fiumicino south-west of Bellaria. This proved to be the most exacting infantillery task since Crete and it included patrolling under machine-gun, mortar and shell fire in areas thoroughly mined and booby-trapped. The infantry training at Arce, however, came in handy and fortune also favoured these antitankers. Despite many near-misses they escaped harm. The Divisional Cavalry relieved them on the 13th, under heavy mortar fire, and they returned safely to the B Echelon area. [28]

An elaborate fire plan to support an attack across the river had to be postponed and then cancelled because of the weather, but a dummy version of it lasting 20 minutes tested the enemy's reactions in the night 6–7 October. It provoked only a slight increase in enemy fire. It was beginning to look as though the sodden plain bordering the Adriatic offered little or no scope for offensive action and, to troops who had been constantly assured for more than a year what good tank-country the Romagna was, this realisation was bitterly disappointing. The only alternative—and this was much more promising, as it turned out—was to push along the foothills astride the Via Emilia, towards Cesena, Forli and Faenza. The flooding of 4th and 5th Field gun pits when the Fiumicino rose on 8 October underlined the futility of trying to push along the coast in the muddy winter.

[27]
S-Sgt J. D. Carson, MM; born NZ 4 Jul 1912; clerk.

[28] The 33rd infantillery were called back into the line suddenly on the 16th with ‘Wilderforce’ on the north bank of the Fiumicino. They crossed the Scolo Rigossa next day and in occupying houses 800 yards beyond it they met machine-gun and mortar fire which Canadian tanks helped them to overcome. The following day J Troop as a fighting patrol entered Castellaccio (south of Cesenatico) and there had a brisk fight with small arms and hand grenades in which Gunner A. Danby was wounded. Four Germans were killed. M Troop gave support on the right; but the enemy in the village was much too strong. When ammunition began to run low the fighting patrol withdrew.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Thrusting Along the Foothills

Thrusting Along the Foothills

The enemy was already responding to advances in the foothills and pulling back from the strong Fiumicino position. A river crossing was therefore effected with little effort and no artillery fire plan, and the New Zealand Division began to veer to the left from San Mauro towards Gatteo and Gambettola. This, too, was flat land criss-crossed with watercourses and would have been as hard to conquer as the coastal region but for outflanking pressure exerted by the British and Canadians to the south-west.

the advance to the savio, october 1944

Opposition on this new thrust line began at the village of Sant' Angelo, north of Gatteo, in the early hours of 13 October. The 5th Field (now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson, Huck Sawyers having gone to hospital) had gone into position west of the Fiumicino and very close to the infantry the day before, in positions so soft that guns had to be protected by barricades instead of pits. A brief programme and several additional tasks failed to overcome the defence and a company thrust failed. The 4th Field moved up on the 13th north-east of Gatteo and both regiments fired briefly at night in support of a Canadian thrust. Before this, however, all field and medium guns in the corps fired one round to mark the capture of Athens, the New Zealand target being the little town of Gambettola.

In mid-afternoon of the 14th the enemy suddenly began to throw everything he had at 46 Battery and a neighbouring RA regiment—shells of various calibres, mortar bombs and nebelwerfer rockets. For 25 minutes the ground shook and the casas trembled violently. BHQ of 26 Battery was shaken when a shell hit the roof of its casa. Few of the gunners had experienced anything nearly so concentrated as this bombardment. All that resulted, however, was that two sergeants of B Troop were wounded, B2 was put out of action for several days, and two other guns were slightly damaged, while the RA regiment had two ammunition lorries hit. The 5th Field and 1 Canadian AGRA at once replied; but strict limitations on 25-pounder ammunition expenditure prohibited the kind of response the gunners would have liked to make.

Sant' Angelo fell to an attack in the night 14–15 October under the cover of concentrations from the 5th and 6th Field, two Canadian field regiments and a Canadian medium regiment. For the 25-pounders the tasks consumed 100 r.p.g. in 90 minutes. The 4.2 mortars also supported the attack and it soon gained ground. More ground was gained in the next few days without formal attacks and the artillery, chafing under ammunition restrictions, could give little help. The 4th and 5th Field moved across the Scolo Rigossa on the 17th to positions near Gambettola. Captain MacKay's E Troop OP of the 5th Field came under intense shelling in the early afternoon which killed his assistant, Bombardier Miller, [29] and wrecked his jeep.

The next step, in the night 18–19 October, was a thrust northwards across the River Pisciatello, to widen the right flank and prepare for a subsequent Canadian assault along the Via Emilia to Cesena. It was a major step—a full-scale river crossing—and the fire plan was impressive. It began with a 10-minute counter-mortar programme by the three New Zealand field regiments. Then they joined two Canadian field regiments in firing a creeping barrage, the right, centre and left boundaries of which were marked by A Troop of 41 Light Ack-Ack Battery.

The 4.2 mortars of 39 Battery fired in direct support of 6 Brigade. A battery of SP guns took up the counter-mortar programme for 75 minutes. An SP regiment and a medium regiment fired concentrations. Finally six medium regiments and two 155-millimetre batteries brought down a crushing weight of CB fire.

In the event it seemed like using a sledgehammer to kill a mouse. The attacking infantry met negligible opposition and were chiefly worried by mines and by what they thought were barrage shells falling short. But there is no knowing what it would have been like with a more modest fire plan. What was unusual about the operation was that the enemy did not shell or mortar bridge sites or otherwise hamper the movement of supporting arms and supplies into the bridgehead, and the tremendous CB programme surely had something to do with that. When 4 Armoured Brigade tried to carry on in daylight on the 19th towards the River Savio it soon struck trouble from a rapidly stiffening defence. On the same day 39 Battery, close on the heels of the infantry, ran into strong opposition and Gunner Williams
[30] was killed.

[29]
Bdr C. H. Miller; born Waipawa, 24 Feb 1912; clerk; killed in action 17 Oct 1944.

[30]
Gnr W. N. Williams; born Wellington, 6 Apr 1920; clerk; wounded 26 Jul 1944; killed in action 19 Oct 1944.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Across the Savio River

Across the Savio River

The aftermath of the assault nevertheless brought the Division to the eastern bank of the River Savio on the 21st and the next step was to support a Canadian crossing of that considerable obstacle. This took place in the night 21–22 October and, in pelting rain, the New Zealand field guns fired more than 13,000 rounds in concentrations and DF tasks and the heavy mortar battery helped to cover the right flank of the assaulting force. Conditions were utterly miserable, the river was rising, and it seemed likely that no secure bridge could be put across the river for some time. In such a situation DF tasks tend to proliferate and the morning of the 22nd was a busy one; but the afternoon was unexpectedly quiet.

It was all the more so for the field gunners because almost all the rest of the Division was on the way to a rest area in the Apennines well to the rear. When the field gunners would be able to follow was highly uncertain. Much depended on whether the enemy chose to stay and fight it out on the Savio or withdraw to the next river line.

The Survey Battery had meanwhile spent a busy 10 days between San Mauro and Cesena. X Troop had bearing pickets to fix, under very difficult conditions, for each of the many moves the field regiments made on the way to the Savio. The flash-spotters established a base first at San Mauro and from it located more than 20 nebelwerfers and eight hostile batteries, despite conditions that were unfavourable in the extreme. Then, from the Cesena base, centred on Gambettola, they located more nebelwerfers and a few HBs, as well as many demolitions. The Savio base did not open until the 21st, but from it S (Flash-Spotting) Troop obtained the locations of two nebelwerfers and three HBs. The troop closed down in the afternoon of the 22nd and prepared to move back. Similarly R (Sound-Ranging) Troop worked first from a base running through Savignano and San Mauro on the 12th, obtaining dozens of locations of varying accuracies. Then on the 18th the troop tried out a new style of triangular base, ‘evolved by officers, past and present, of the Troop, proved by experiments and put into practice here at Gambettola’, according to the troop diary. It was found highly effective, but required ‘thoroughly trained and capable personnel’. The final base on the 21st ran north-eastwards from Cesena. The barrage that night made sound-ranging impossible until the early hours of the 22nd, but the troop obtained one good-to-excellent location and six fairly good ones. When the three troops closed down on the 22nd little did they realise that it was for the last time and that in the rest area the battery would be disbanded.

Q Troop meanwhile, in its reserve positions near Rimini, had been busy modifying a 17-pounder and succeeded superbly. The gun sat lower on the ground, a foot was cut off the top of the shield, it was easier to conceal in action and the crew were less vulnerable. All this was plain when Q Troop demonstrated it on 22 October to important Eighth Army officers, comparing Q1, the modified gun, with Q2. All agreed that the modification was a great improvement. Not to be beaten, 33 Battery did the same thing with a 6-pounder, with equal effect.

RHQ and 41 Battery of the 14th Light Ack-Ack stayed behind when the other two ack-ack batteries departed early on the 22nd. Captain Chance, an original member of the regiment, had been put in command of 41 Battery early in the month. When he ordered the battery out of action at 4 p.m. it was the end of the active service of the 14th Light Ack-Ack and there only remained the formalities of disbanding. The Division—and particularly its artillery—was changing.

The three field regiments in their positions north-east of Cesena and Artillery Headquarters a few miles back at the village of Macerone on the Cesena— Cesenatico road were meanwhile plagued by indecision on the part of the higher authorities. The possibilities of effectively bridging the Savio depended on the weather and the enemy, and what either of them was going to do was highly uncertain. Changes of plan were therefore to be expected. The burning question for the New Zealand gunners was whether their detached role would be brief or prolonged and to this, for an anxious day or more, they could get no answer.

The 23rd was a cold, bleak day and during it they prepared to support a night attack by two Canadian divisions. Then the project was cancelled and in its place there was to be an attack in the early morning of the 24th by the British 4th Division. The programme was ready by midnight and at 5.30 a.m., after busy hours of preparation, the guns opened fire in drizzling rain. [31] For 42 minutes they engaged hostile batteries with concentrations and then for an hour carried out HF tasks on other HBs and nebelwerfers—a total of about 150 r.p.g. The attack soon gained ground and it was evident that the enemy had pulled back to a shorter defensive line between Cesena and Forli. All OPs had withdrawn earlier and there was none of the usual observed fire to follow up the fire plan. Artillery Headquarters signalled at 8.35 a.m. that the regiments would remain where they were under Canadian command until about the 27th. This was depressing news and there was no indication of what they would do after that. The hours passed uneasily until at 1.30 p.m. the BM, Major Nolan, [32] passed on the welcome message, ‘Guns can come out of action 1700 hrs’. The evening was given over to parties, some of them pretty wild.

All ammunition above the G1098 scale—the normal holding—was dumped and in the afternoon of the 25th the artillery group began a long drive back on crowded roads and tracks. Heavy and at times torrential rain began in the evening, there were many delays on the treacherous roads, and for the early hours of the 26th the regiments bivouacked—comfortably in the case of those, like the 5th Field, who found houses handy; damply and miserably for the others. They set off again early and drove on through the rain to their various destinations. All but a few of the drivers found billets in houses and they spent a relaxed evening, many of them drinking the raw new-season's wine with its promise of later stomach upsets. Artillery Headquarters settled in a huge seminary high above the little town of Esanatoglia, where the 7th Anti-Tank were already established; the 4th Field were in the Piane-Colferraio–Rastia area south of Fabriano, the 5th Field at Macere and the 6th Field at Cerreto d'Esi. The 14th Light Ack-Ack had already established themselves in various places south of Fabriano—Collamato, Castiglione, Acquatina and neighbouring hamlets and farmhouses [33]—and 36 Survey Battery were in houses in or near the little town of Matelica.

[31] In a task fired during the night the gun A4 of the 5th Field had its second premature within a month. Again there were no casualties; but gunners easily become superstitious about such conjunctions of near-disasters.

[32]
Lt-Col H. T. W. Nolan, DSO, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 23 Jul 1915; sheepfarmer; Adjutant, 5 Fd Regt, Dec 1940-Jun 1941; Bty Comd, 6 Fd Regt, Sep 1942-Dec 1943; BM NZA, Aug-Nov 1944; CO 4 Fd Regt Mar-Dec 1945; wounded 26 Feb 1942.

[33] The 14th Light Ack-Ack had a bad journey. H1 struck a mine, injuring a sergeant and wrecking the tractor, though the gun was not damaged. Then a jeep became sandwiched between two lorries and was badly damaged.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 21 — Winter in the Romagna

CHAPTER 21
Winter in the Romagna

AS a rest area, apart from the weather, the Apennines south of Fabriano approached perfection. Gunners who had lived for a year or more in Italy in the midst of battle or in its wake had become accustomed to the entrails of towns rather than their living hearts. Here they found towns and villages miraculously untouched by high-explosive violence and uncorrupted by waves of soldiers and the jetsam they leave behind. After an hour or two of cautious appraisal from both sides the gunners and their hosts and hostesses began to turn their compulsory acquaintance into many a voluntary friendship. With the little children it was, as always, a case of love at first sight. Except for the most persistent tipplers, the raw wine was put aside in favour of more mellow vintages.

Even in the rain the countryside looked lovely. ‘The valley in which the regiment is situated is surrounded by high bush clad hills’, the 5th Field diarist noted. ‘The leaves are now in their autumn tints and give a colourful atmosphere to the area.’ A mountain of war diaries yields few such remarks as these. ‘BHQ held dance in Padrone's house in evening’, the 42 Battery diary says of 23 October. It was one of many dances, all of them richly enjoyable.

There was much to celebrate and there were also some sad farewells. Gunners had been wondering for some time when the next stage of the furlough scheme would begin. They learned that it was now a replacement scheme and that the 5th Reinforcements and those who had returned from furlough were next on the list—to the bitter disappointment of the ‘Coconut Bombers’ who had served in Fiji. They were also told that the Division would now reorganise.

Some Units are Disbanded

Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen visited each of his troops on the 24th to tell them that the 14th Light Ack-Ack was now to be disbanded. Each troop held a party that evening; but for the ‘old hands’ memories were apt to flick shadows across the gaiety. Next day batteries and then the regiment as a whole practised for a farewell parade. A generous disbursement of regimental funds for entertainment enlivened battery parties and dances held on the 25th. Then came an inspection and march-past led by the 5 Brigade band on the 26th near Collamato. General Freyberg took the salute [1] and then called the gunners round him and spoke impromptu, recalling incidents of the desert days and the early fighting in Italy and praising the record of the regiment. It was a moving occasion. Then, after the parade was dismissed, Freyberg personally met every officer, warrant officer and sergeant. The original members had been mainly 5th Reinforcements and so a great many had taken part in the first as well as the last parade of the regiment and their stern appearance on this occasion disguised a welter of feeling. In his diary Freyberg noted that he had never seen a finer parade.

There was much to do. Guns, transport and equipment had to be inspected and disposed of. Free beer and free canteen goods to the value of 3s. 6d. per man on the 27th further reduced regimental funds. Padre West
[2] conducted his final church services for the batteries on Sunday the 29th. Major Duignan
[3] joined RHQ to act as second-in-command for a day or two and then to command what was left after the regiment formally dissolved on the 31st. Sprosen and his adjutant, Captain Beresford, [4] both left on the 28th to take over as commanding officer and adjutant respectively of the 7th Anti-Tank. [5] For a day or two Sprosen was in the novel position of commanding two regiments at once—his final routine orders to the 14th Light Ack-Ack were dated 1 November. [6] The regimental orchestra under the baton of Gunner Brown
[7] was much in demand for the parties and dances that followed. When officers of the regiment were entertained to a buffet dinner at RHQ on the 30th the Marsala flowed freely and, in the words of the sober war diary, ‘joy was unconfined’. Brigadier Queree spoke briefly and appropriately.

For ack-ack gunners and those of 34 Anti-Tank and 36 Survey Batteries, also due to be disbanded, the first question was what was to happen to them. The few who had returned from furlough and those of the 5th Reinforcements, due to leave in the replacement scheme, were to go to Advanced Base. Of the remaining ack-ack men, 157 bombardiers and gunners picked by ballot went to serve as infantry in the newly formed Divisional Cavalry Battalion—and the gunners liked this no more than the troopers did. [8] It was in fact an even harder wrench for the ack-ack men; for they not only had to lose their identity as gunners and members of a regiment in which they felt at home: they had to take over the black berets and nomenclature of the cavalry— squadrons, troops and so on. The troopers retained at least these morsels of their individuality and corporate existence. The same also applied to men of N Troop and a few of O Troop of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, who joined the cavalry battalion when their battery disbanded. It made them sick at heart.

The rest of O Troop reinforced Q Troop of 34 Battery and this 17-pounder troop became B Troop of 31 Battery. The 7th Anti-Tank ended up with the following components:

31 Battery | A Troop | M1os
| B Troop | 17-pounders
32 Battery | C Troop | M1os
| D Troop | 17-pounders
33 Battery | E Troop | M1os
| F Troop | 17-pounders
39 Battery, redesignated 34 Battery | G, H, J and K Troops | 4.2-inch mortars 5 Survey Troop

The 6-pounder troops were dropped from the establishment and each battery had one M10 troop and one 17-pounder troop. [9] The survey troop—two officers [10] and 23 others—was all that survived of 36 Survey Battery, 115 members of which went to

Advanced Base and the other 67 to artillery units as reinforcements. The inspecting and transferring of vehicles and equipment, the drawing or handing in of other equipment, the re-locating and billeting of gunners affected by the various changes, and the start of extensive retraining programmes filled the last days of October and the early ones of November. On the 31st the ack-ack contingent for the Divisional Cavalry Battalion paraded in the piazza at Collamato and then was driven to the San Severino area to join the battalion. For most of the men it was a miserable journey.

However hard these changes were on gunners who had served well and deserved well of the Division, it had been plain for many months that the enemy in Italy had so few aircraft at his disposal that the ack-ack regiment had become an expensive luxury. Its record of at least 67 ½ aircraft shot down had not been added to since the Cassino days and its only notable subsequent success had been the K-Boot sunk off Rimini. Similarly, the anti-tank regiment had fired only twice at tanks throughout the Italian campaign and the only tanks it was now likely to meet were too heavily armoured for 6-pounders even with sabot ammunition. The 17-pounders (which were now also going to get sabot ammunition) could be used for many other tasks on the battlefield and the M10 crews, by developing their ability to bring down indirect fire, were making themselves more and more useful. The heavy mortars were invaluable. More could be said for retaining the flash-spotting and sound-ranging troops of the Survey Battery, which had done valuable work in Italy and could continue to do so. But there were several survey regiments on the Adriatic front and many other means, also, of locating hostile batteries. The New Zealand gunners much preferred to work with their own surveyors and would continue to do so for ordinary surveying—fixing bearing pickets and suchlike. But they would have to do without their own flash-spotters and sound-rangers. Besides these changes, the remaining regiments replaced all their 8-cwt pick-ups with 15-cwt trucks and made many other changes in their establishment of vehicles.

The 7th Anti-Tank were also sorry to lose Jack Mitchell, who was going to become the second-in-command at Maadi Base Camp with the rank of colonel. He had commanded the regiment, except when on furlough, since December 1941 and had endeared himself to everyone by his bravery, selflessness and fairmindedness. Nothing that was likely to help his men was ever too much trouble for him to undertake and the general opinion among the gunners was that he was ‘one of Nature's gentlemen’.

the forli–faenza sector, 18 november–16 december 1944

Mitchell turned up at the break-up party of 34 Battery in the municipal theatre at Esanatoglia on the 31st, to which all former members of the battery were also invited. It was wellorganised, with great piles of sandwiches, scones and sausage rolls, free wine and cigarettes, and an Italian orchestra. A handful of ‘old originals’ who had joined up in England in 1939 were present, including at least one who was in the battery to the end. [11] Jack Mitchell addressed them warmly and modestly, saying that all he knew about anti-tank gunnery was what Jimmy Hall-Kenney of the 34th had taught him. Like the farewell parties of the ack-ack regiment, it was a bitter-sweet occasion. The old hands let their memories run riot and some of the new ones cast their thoughts forward unhappily to their forthcoming conversion to infantry.

Leave from the rest area to Rome, Florence and other places was generous and for those who stayed behind there were many organised entertainments—the Kiwi Concert Party (still with three 34 Battery ‘originals’), a Canadian concert party, an ENSA show, mobile cinemas, and even orchestral concerts. In a series of rugby matches to decide which artillery team should contest the Freyberg Cup, the 5th Field won. Training for most troops took place in the morning only; but for those who had to learn new roles and become used to new weapons—the new M10 crews in particular—a solid programme of training was essential. The weather remained unsettled and on 10 November the countryside was white with snow. When the time came to leave, towards the end of November, there were many tearful farewells.

Return to the Front

The CRA and a small party moved on the 16th, to take over from the artillery of 56 Infantry Division of 5 Corps in the Forli area. Another major river line had been crossed while the Division was resting; but there were many more to come. The next were the Montone and then the Lamone River with terraced stopbanks of soft earth. Beyond them was Faenza, and beyond that the Senio River. And winter was fast approaching. As a 4th Field man noted, ‘conversation was not exactly sparkling’ as the field regiments drove forward on the 17th.

Artillery Headquarters opened in Forli itself and the 5th, 6th and 4th Field were respectively north, north-west and west of the city, the 4th practically in the suburbs. Good casas were plentiful, no OPs were called for at first, and for three days there was little to do. Early on 21 November the 4th and 6th Field and the 77th Field fired a 200 r.p.g. barrage, and the 5th Field fired concentrations to help 4 Division across the River Cosina and the 5th Field followed up with HF tasks. The attack failed and was repeated with variations the next night. This time the 4th Field followed with counter-mortar tasks and the 6th Field with HF, and in the morning they fired smoke briefly to screen the crossing of the river by tanks. This crossing succeeded and the enemy began to fall back to the line of the Lamone.

The New Zealand Division was needed for the next stage and came forward from the rest area. The field guns crossed the Cosina–Montone canal and got into cramped positions mainly north of the straight Route 9, entering into strong competition with other units for the few suitable casas in the area. Heavy rain in the afternoon emphasised the importance of shelter. The approach roads to the gun areas were narrow and had deep ditches on both sides and the fields were seas of mud. When lorries broke up the roads and in places filled the ditches, the water banked up and made the gun areas so soft that even hens bogged down in the ooze.

Here the guns remained for three wet weeks, with the gunners constantly battling against mud and the signallers having endless trouble keeping communications open. There was, however, one consolation: across Route 9, no more than a mile from the 4th Field, there was what soon became widely known as the vermouth factory. The quality of the vermouth was very good and the quantity, until the MPs mounted a guard over it, was virtually unlimited. It had to be rationed at the gun positions; but large stocks accumulated in the B Echelons. Members of gun crews were frequently sent back for spells and they found the B Echelons highly convivial.

The proximity of the gun areas to Route 9 occasioned many misgivings on the part of those who could foresee trouble from enemy artillery harassing the road. The 5th Field suffered late on the 27th and WO II Hobbs
[12] and a gunner were seriously wounded. On the 29th the 6th Field RHQ and battery areas received some 170-millimetre shells, more 150s, and many 88s; but they did little more than splash the mud around. There was considerable fire in support of 10 Indian Division at the end of the month and some very effective observed shooting by the 5th Field, as well as DFs by the 4th Field, in support of 5 Brigade thrusts. Meanwhile several B Echelons had to be moved because they were outside the divisional zone and it was far from easy at that late stage to find casas or, in fact, any shelter at all.

Discrepancies had been discovered between map references of targets and their corrected co-ordinates deduced from observed shooting. On 2 December, therefore, Air OPs shot all the NZA regiments on certain targets to try to overcome this problem. The 4th and 6th Field fired a ‘Chinese barrage’ in the evening of the 3rd to distract attention from an attack by 46 Division, and next morning continued the deception with smoke screens at the approaches to Faenza. The enemy was taken in and reacted violently. Meanwhile the 5th Field directly supported the attack to the extent of 2800 rounds. A further smoke screen in the late afternoon drew further heavy DF from the enemy which fell mainly on empty ground. The M10s of C Troop, 32 Battery, also fired in this deception plan. At the end of it all 46 Division had its bridgehead south-west of Faenza. When the enemy counter-attacked it on the 8th and 9th the NZA regiments fired DF tasks.

One 6th Field OP was a mile and a half east of Faenza and 200 yards from the southern bank of a loop in the Lamone River. Lance-Sergeant Ralston
[13] reached there with a signals maintenance party in the afternoon of the 7th to relieve the existing party. A heavy mortar bombardment coincided with his arrival and the driver of his jeep was wounded. He left the safety of the OP building and helped the man to cover. Then he saw that urgent medical attention was needed and at once drove the man back along the road to an RAP, regardless of the heavy fire that was still falling. Then he returned and repaired a damaged line under fire and quickly re-established communications to the guns. For this he earned an immediate MM. Back at the guns Sergeant Melville
[14] of B Troop set a good example of steadfastness under fire when the gun position was shelled heavily on the 9th and again on the 11th, in the neighbourhood of the hamlet of Corleto, and his inspiring influence spread far beyond the members of his own gun team.

the faenza front, 14-17 december 1944

The next step was to relieve 46 Division in its cramped bridgehead. Accordingly 5 Brigade, by means of tracks as muddy as any of those in use on the Cassino front the previous winter, moved into the bridgehead on 10 December with A Sub-battery of heavy mortars and aided by four half-tracked M14s from the 7th Anti-Tank which towed the infantry 6-pounders into position. The 6th Field next day occupied gun positions perilously close to Faenza—so close that night firing was forbidden until the big attack to capture the city. The M10s of C Troop, 32 Battery, came forward with the supporting armour; but the 17-pounder troop, which was extremely hard to move even with M14 half-tracks, was held in reserve.

Surprise Attack West of Faenza

For the attack on the night 14–15 December, which was directed on the key village of Celle west of Faenza, 5 Brigade and associated armour had the support of 256 guns, including a heavy battery, a heavy ack-ack battery and three medium regiments. In addition four medium regiments and three 155-millimetre batteries fired CB tasks on the New Zealand and 10 Indian Division fronts.

The essence of the plan was to give the enemy no reason to suppose that anything special was afoot until the guns crashed into action at 11 p.m. on the 14th and the tanks and infantry surged forward. The three NZA field regiments and a field regiment of 46 Division fired a 400 r.p.g. barrage lasting three and a half hours and RA Bofors marked the boundaries. All other field guns and the mediums and heavies fired concentrations, and many DF tasks were prepared in the certain knowledge that the enemy would fight back vigorously. Both heavy mortar sub-batteries fired concentrations and, in so doing, B Sub-battery, which was in 6 Brigade area, attracted return fire which killed three men and wounded a fourth. [15]

The surprise that was sought was fully achieved and, under the hammer blows of the artillery, the enemy soon yielded ground to the infantry, advancing under artificial moonlight M10s of C Troop harassed the bridge on Route 9 over the Senio across which the enemy would have to pass any reinforcements he cared to commit. By the evening of the 16th, however, the M10s had reached Casale and were close enough to the bridge to deny the enemy the use of it. By that time there was serious talk of effecting an immediate crossing of the Senio as well.

After firing in support of the initial attack, A Sub-battery of heavy mortars pushed forward behind the infantry and responded quickly and effectively to every call for fire. Lieutenant McCliskie, [16] the GPO, reconnoitred difficult terrain twice under enemy observation and selected gun positions well forward. To occupy them without suffering heavy casualties seemed impossible. He nevertheless managed to deploy the two troops and they fired heavily from both positions without suffering casualties or damage to their equipment. McCliskie thereby demonstrated that he had a good eye for ground—an invaluable attribute in such circumstances. But he also demonstrated, in this action and later, driving energy and powers of leadership and in due course he was awarded an MC.

Laying lines from OPs to gun positions under such circumstances is one of the most demanding tasks of all. Lance-Sergeant Pulford
[17] of B Troop of the 6th Field and his men laid a line in the wake of this attack through an area not fully cleared of enemy. It passed over the only bridge completed, which was under severe shell and mortar fire. For their own safety he ordered his men back to the battery and for several hours stayed forward to maintain the line himself regardless of the heavy fire. Another B Troop man who showed unusual courage in this attack was Gunner McCardle, [18] a jeep driver of the OP party. He delivered equipment to the OP under heavy shell and small-arms fire and seemed heedless of his own safety.

In the 5th Field Captain Horrocks, [19] of A Troop, appointed as representative at the headquarters of 22 Battalion, volunteered instead for the more hazardous task of FOO. The advance was over two miles of open country on foot, carrying a heavy No. 22 wireless set. The battalion met strong resistance and took seven hours to capture its objective. Just past the start line Horrocks saw some wounded infantry on a minefield and, regardless of the danger, rendered assistance to them, saving the life of at least one of them. With Horrocks were Bombardier

Liggins
[20] and Gunner Nicol, [21] and between them they carried heavy batteries and sections of the wireless set over muddy hill-country in the dark in very bad weather. They came under fire; but pushed on regardless of it and had the OP working and communications established within a quarter of an hour of the capture of the objective. The infantry advanced again, towards the Senio, on the 16th, and this OP party kept up with them. Horrocks set up his OP in a church tower among the foremost infantry in the Casale area. The tower was heavily shelled, but the OP remained there until the church was almost completely destroyed. Then Horrocks carried on from a nearby house until relieved on 18 December. In a letter of 4 January 1945 to Huck Sawyers, the battalion commander ended up thus:

‘At all times, Capt Horrocks was cheerful and unflurried. He made a very great impression on my men and under conditions which were often most difficult, he proved to be reliable, conscientious and co-operative. I am grateful to you for the services of so excellent an officer.’

Horrocks won an immediate MC.

The 4th Field had reconnoitred positions south-west of Faenza before the attack and occupied them on the 16th, with RHQ to the west in what appeared to be the house of the Count of Faenza. It was a good area, with sandy ground for the gun pits and plenty of good casas at hand.

The M10s of E Troop were called forward on the 17th to support a thrust across the river by Route 9 and they destroyed a sandbagged house which an enemy rearguard was holding. Before noon the Lamone was bridged. Artillery Headquarters had meanwhile sent a reconnaissance party into Faenza as early as the 16th; but the town was not cleared. Early on the 17th the reconnaissance continued and a location near the railway station was chosen for Artillery Headquarters, which drove into the town in the afternoon. It proved a more exciting move than expected. Snipers were still abroad, especially after dark, the new area was mortared at intervals throughout the night, and a machine gun firing along the street past the entrance to Headquarters caused visitors to step very lively indeed on occasions. Headquarters staff were astonished when Gurkhas, on a house-to-house search of the neighbourhood, routed out a number of

Germans from buildings close at hand. In the afternoon of the 18th a heavy concentration of 105-millimetre fire scored a direct hit on the clerks' truck, set a scout car of the Indian division on fire, wounded Gunner Peddie
[22] and killed Signalman Scott
[23] of the attached Signals section.

night attack north of faenza, 19-20 december 1944

The 5th Field had meanwhile moved to positions in the western outskirts of Faenza on the 17th. A heavy mist hampered the survey, however. The enemy was some distance away to the west; but to the north he was close at hand—900 yards from 27 Battery—and the nearest DFs were at a range of 1200 yards. The CRA therefore laid it down that the regiment would not answer calls except in an emergency. A Gurkha-manned Vickers gun was no more than 10 yards from D Troop.

The policy of silence, however, did not last long. Another impressive fire plan was drawn up to support a 6 Brigade and Gurkha attack northwards in the night 19-20 December. It included a huge creeping barrage on a very wide front fired by the 4th and 6th Field, the 1st RHA, the 23rd Army Field, and two regiments each from the 10 Indian Division and the 56 London Division. In addition the 5th Field and four medium regiments and a battery fired concentrations and the third field regiment of 56 Division fired a counter-mortar programme. The heavy-mortar battery also had a role and the C Troop M10s carried out HF tasks. Again RA Bofors marked the boundaries, as well as indicating the times the barrage lifted or paused. To cover the final objective 21 stonks were drawn up.

The opening of this huge fire plan, with well over 300 field and medium guns firing, was impressive indeed and the infantry followed close behind the barrage. The enemy reacted quickly and strongly with shell and mortar fire and nebelwerfers were active. The Gurkhas on the right were ahead of 6 Brigade and the barrage on their part of the front started on the pause line. They therefore had to be silent spectators for the first 16 lifts until it came time for them to join in the advance and the barrage extended to cover their front.

The main objectives were taken; but there was no sign of an enemy collapse and no possibility of forcing the Senio line. The strength of this line became plain when 26 Battalion put in a small thrust at 6.45 a.m. on Christmas Eve with the 4th and 6th Field and the heavy mortars in support. The infantry gained the stopbank but soon found their situation hazardous and were recalled.

A White Christmas on the Senio

The weather was now bitterly cold, snow was lying thinly on the ground, and an attack by flanking formations on the left had to be postponed. There was little likelihood of a major move until early January and the gunners settled down as well as they could to enjoy the festive season.

The 5th Field had already arranged to have batteries successively ‘off duty’ for 24 hours, and 27 Battery therefore had a Christmas celebration on Christmas Eve, 28 Battery had one on Christmas Day, and 47 Battery on Boxing Day. Christmas dinner, however, was served on the proper day. The 27th Battery, for example, was allowed from 1 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. for what the diary describes as ‘a first-class Xmas dinner of chicken, potatoes, peas, cabbage and carrots followed by plum pudding, oranges and nuts’. The 4th Field also spread the hours for dinner so that two batteries were always on call for emergencies. In the afternoon they fired two regimental tasks. The 6th Field expected to move forward on Christmas Day and therefore had Christmas dinner the day before. It was a wasted precaution: the move kept getting postponed and a month later the guns were still in the same position.

The 7th Anti-Tank gathered as many of its members as it could into the various B Echelons in Faenza or Forli for Christmas Day and they celebrated royally. The M10 crews of A Troop were with the 5th Field just west of the town and they, too, dined and wined appropriately, though with rather more reserve. The 17-pounder crews of F Troop (which missed its Christmas dinner) and the four 4.2 mortar troops of 34 Battery were deployed well forward north-west of the town. They sent all who could be spared, particularly those most in need of a rest, to Faenza. Those who had to stay on duty also celebrated, but much less noisily, though the G Troop casa attracted enemy attention somehow or other, for it sustained a direct hit and several near misses during dinner, much to the disgust of the mortar crews. [24] None of them, however, was hurt.

Artillery Headquarters, after the early upsets, was most comfortably ensconced in Faenza and the officers' mess was luxurious. The CRA held a small reception on Christmas Eve attended by General Freyberg and representatives of the various regiments in the area. In the morning of Christmas Day he visited the 4th Field, the 1st RHA and the 4th Medium. Except for the shelling of G Troop of the mortar battery and a few bombs dropped in the night on Faenza, the enemy did not interfere with the festivities and the gunners enjoyed what was for many of them their first white Christmas.

The policy was still to force the Senio line; but it was unsound and unrealistic. Artillery ammunition was in almost desperately short supply all along the front. This was reason enough for a change of policy. The infantry were too few and too tired. The weather was already severe in the mountain sectors. For one reason or another more and more thought was given to the establishment of a winter line. Brigadier Queree engaged in earnest debate on this subject between Christmas and the New Year, emphasising the ammunition requirements for any major move and the restrictions imposed by the mud on the handling of guns. General Freyberg thought the enemy would shell Faenza with heavy guns and withdrew his headquarters some miles back towards Forli. Artillery Headquarters conformed, to the disgust of the B Echelon of 46 Battery, which had to move out of its spacious quarters in the Villa Archi, three miles back along Route 9, when the CRA's staff returned there on the 29th.

The past fortnight had brought its expected crop of complaints about guns firing short. One way of checking this, when the weather permitted, was by means of shoots conducted by Air OPs. One such shoot on the 27th by all the 4th Field batteries ‘to see how the guns were shooting’ (as the regimental diary puts it) gave ‘very satisfactory’ results. The 5th and 6th Field guns were checked in the same way. ‘AOP co-operation watching the fall of shot has not found any gun guilty’, the 6th Field diary states, ‘and as yet no offender has been tracked down in this area. The continual checking of work between Bty and Tp CPs obviated any error in mathematical gunnery and the daily checking of sights and the frequent measuring of bores have kept the guns as accurate as is humanly possible’.

The enemy still held the high stopbanks of the Senio and had not yet been pushed back to the near bank in the north and north-west of Faenza. He therefore held ground on which he could easily assemble for a counter-attack on the bridgehead over the Lamone. To guard against this the Division prepared to retreat behind the Lamone if this became necessary and also, on the other hand, staged a thrust to reach the stopbank on the 6 Brigade front and thereby minimise the danger of a surprise attack. Both caused the gunners work—the first in returning ammunition from gun positions to B Echelons, preparing alternative positions, and reconnoitring withdrawal routes; the second in firing a supporting programme with guns and heavy mortars. The thrust to the stopbank failed; but by degrees Canadians and 56 Division edged forward to a more secure line.

The New Year came in quietly on the Faenza side of the river; but on the other side there was much evidence of high spirits and gaiety. This time the New Zealand gunners were the spoilsports, checking the noise of celebration with a few well-directed rounds. On 1 January 1945 a sniping 17-pounder of D Troop, carefully emplaced well forward by the little village of Casale, fired seven APC [25] rounds into a culvert 1800 yards to the north-east, just across the river. Infantry had reported two tanks sheltering there and an early-morning reconnaissance confirmed that they had not moved. Five rounds were seen to go under the culvert.

C Troop of 214 Battery of the 57th Heavy Ack-Ack came under the command of the 5th Field and went into position in front of the 25-pounders for ‘ground shooting’. The 3.75, properly handled, could engage mortars, nebelwerfers and the new German rocket guns rapidly and effectively with airbursts and there were more than enough guns in an ack-ack role to deal with the very few hit-and-run raiders which the Luftwaffe sent over.

The counter-mortar organisation was by this time highly efficient and worked closely with the infantry to locate targets and with the 3.7s to destroy them. Captain Vivian had an assistant CMO with him at Artillery Headquarters and an ACMO with each of the three New Zealand brigades. The infantry were delighted with the prompt and effective fire Vivian's organisation and the heavy ack-ack gunners produced against mortar and nebelwerfer locations and they co-operated eagerly.

Manning a Winter Line

For all but the OP parties, the heavy mortar crews, and a few of the 17-pounder and 25-pounder crews—those who were well forward on the Senio front, within reach of hostile machine guns and mortars—the days passed quietly and the men did all they could to make themselves comfortable on what had evidently become the winter line of Eighth Army. Ammunition restrictions were severe and gunners were allowed frequent spells, battery by battery or troop by troop. Several cinemas were running in Forli, many other organised entertainments were provided there, and even in Faenza (which did not get heavily shelled as Freyberg expected) a good deal of amusement could be had. Leave for Florence, Rome and other centres had been available by roster throughout the fighting and it still continued. The Divisional Artillery had acquired a pipe band, first seen in the forward area when members of it piped in the New Year at various points. What attracted most attention, however, was the recurrent problem of keeping out the winter cold and many ingenious solutions of this were worked out. The drip-feed oil heater was perhaps the most efficient; but it was too noisy for casas close to the enemy. Coal, coke and charcoal could be found in Faenza, but there was keen competition for them.

the winter line as at 21 january 1945

The 4th Field moved to positions 1000-2000 yards south of Faenza and on 28 January the 6th Field made their long-delayed move—to positions north-east of the town vacated by the 113th Field. The 5th Field remained well forward west of the town. All regiments, however, maintained a ‘duty battery’ which occupied an alternative position for a week at a time, and as a rule only this battery fired. There was therefore little or no firing from the main battle positions and no encouragement, accordingly, for the enemy to trouble them. The 6th Field positions seemed good, but a gradual thaw towards the end of the month (after several fairly heavy falls of snow) made them very muddy and access routes to some troops became quite impassable. The 7th Anti-Tank deployed an M10 troop in an indirect-fire role with the 5th Field, another in anti-tank reserve with 5 Brigade and the third in a similar role with 6 Brigade. One 17-pounder troop deployed with each of the two infantry brigades and the third troop was part of the local anti-tank defence of Faenza. The mortar battery remained as an entity under the CRA's control, its tasks tied in with those of the field artillery.

These bald details explain in general terms what the gunners were doing in the winter line. A change of focus is needed to view the strange, intense little world of those who were at the tip of the ‘sharp end’, observing the enemy on the Senio and directing the fire of the guns and mortars. Casas there were in short supply, most of them were in poor shape, and they kept getting hit by shells or mortar bombs'. ‘Spandau Pete’ delighted in machine-gunning their windows and environs at odd hours. The unnerving shriek of rocket missiles was liable at any moment to destroy the peace of mind of their occupants—and all these casas were overcrowded. By night white-coated patrols might raid them, squirting them with tommy-gun fire and tossing in grenades. By day the frozen landscape with its farmyard foreground, the dim outlines of the stopbank, the black trees and scattered casas, and in the background the buildings of Castel Bolognese, Felisio or some other village across the river, could claim a quiet beauty—though observers seldom had an eye for this. But no night was truly peaceful. Voices carried clearly in the still, cold air and the sounds of working parties commanded attention. Even by day the calm might be broken by the sudden emergence of an SP gun from some hiding place to make a quick bombardment and then disappear. When the days were clear and sunny the shimmering snow played tricks on the eyes. When mist or fog came down as they often did, all kinds of sounds could be heard and observers would strive to attain an acute state of sensitivity trying to resolve their nature and to peer through the gloom.

The OP party of G Troop, 34 Battery, had typical experiences. In the night of 28 December it was sharing a casa with a 5th Field party in support of the Maoris when a 105-millimetre shell came through the roof and finished up on the floor between Lieutenant McSkimming and a 5th Field officer. It failed to explode. When the other officer carried it into the next room, where some gunners were talking to two Maoris, and began scraping it to ascertain the data, the Maoris made off rapidly. Then, on 9 January, another shell blew in more of the roof, bringing beams and rubble down on the occupants—they were then supporting the newly-arrived 21 Battalion. A 5th Field signaller, Gunner Miles, [26] of C Troop, was smothered and suffocated by the powdery debris. A mortar gunner sustained a glancing blow from a falling beam and two other men escaped with scratches.

The previous night Lance-Bombardier McGowan
[27] of 34 Battery was out repairing a telephone line broken by an enemy concentration. He was not one of the lucky ones who had been issued with white duffel coats and his battledress showed dark against the snow. While searching for the break he was suddenly fired on by an enemy patrol and dived for cover in a ditch full of water topped with ice. He was pinned there for a short time and then he continued to trace the line through the snow and ice until he found a break and repaired it. He then went back and reported to his officer, who told him to wait until the patrol was driven off. But McGowan knew the mortars could not fire until the line was mended and so he crawled back along it, still under fire from the enemy, until he repaired two more breaks and re-established communications. For this he earned an MM.

Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson had taken over command of the 7th Anti-Tank on 13 December [28] (when Sprosen went on leave) and, having served as a battery commander under Jack Mitchell, he was imbued like his former CO with a burning desire to visit all his gun crews as often as he could—daily if possible. But the mortar troops were sited well forward northwest of Faenza, near the 31 Battery 17-pounders, and the route—a jeep track through Celle—was absolutely restricted by day and by night was limited to vehicles carrying essential supplies. So his visits to these guns and mortars were far less frequent than he would have liked.

In mid-January an M10c arrived in 32 Battery—an M10 with a 17-pounder gun, far more powerful than the 3-inch of the normal M10. It was taken out on the 18th for a practice shoot with HE ammunition. The gun behaved very well, but the bursts were hard to observe in the snow. The same trouble occurred at the end of the month when an Air OP tried to direct the fire of a 4.2 mortar. Early in February the 17-pounders of B, D and F Troops began to take over a new range of duties. A purely anti-tank role in the Senio line was almost no role at all. But HE ammunition with reduced charges and the addition to the gun carriages of graduating arcs and vernier scales allowed the 17-pounders to undertake indirect fire tasks, which added greatly to the usefulness of the guns and the morale of their crews. At Esanatoglia defects in the 4.2 mortar baseplates had been remedied by strengthening them at the LAD. New skirtings arrived from the United Kingdom in February; but even these did not work well until modified according to suggestions made by the EME, Lieutenant Pounsett. [29] The higher echelons of the RA and REME evinced enormous interest in these simple but effective New Zealand adaptations.

January ended in a flurry of activity when a platoon of 25 Battalion, as part of a series of small actions to test the enemy's Senio defences, gained a stretch of the stopbank only to be heavily counter-attacked and cut off. The guns fired about 1000 rounds in the night, which, as the diary of Artillery Headquarters remarked, ‘is exceptional under present conditions’; but to no avail. The platoon was lost. A platoon from 26 Battalion also reached the stopbank but withdrew safely.

Departures and Replacements

February 1945 was the quietest month the artillery spent in action throughout the war, and for some of the gunners it scarcely seemed like war at all. The chief event was the departure for home of the ‘Tongariro’ men in the replacement scheme—all drafts up to the 5th Reinforcements, plus the ‘Coconut Bombers’. A camera calibration of one field gun per troop (in conjunction with No. 2 Calibration Troop, RA) was followed by a calibration of all 25-pounders at Bellaria—absolute for one gun per troop and comparative for the rest. For the three men per gun who were allowed to go this was an agreeable change for about a week and for those who stayed behind it was at least a rest. Several ‘Chinese attacks’ were mounted, the main one in support of 23 Battalion, to simulate serious attacks and provoke the enemy into wasteful response. The law of diminishing returns decreed that the enemy would tend to take them less seriously as time went by and he might in the end fail to respond when it was the ‘real thing’. Towards the end of the month artillery officers who had served with 3 New Zealand Division in the Pacific arrived as reinforcements— including the first senior officers to do so for a long time. They included Major McKinnon, [30] who went to the 4th Field, and the Rev. W. Harford, [31] who replaced the Rev. W. J. Thompson, [32] padre of the 7th Anti-Tank since January 1943.

Many other replacements had meanwhile arrived for the Tongariro men and there were new faces everywhere. For the newcomers there was much to learn. Men who had served under very different circumstances in the Solomon Islands had to change many of their ideas and get used to new ways. The regiments conducted various informal courses of instruction. Huck Sawyers, for example, and his staff devised an exercise which a 27 Battery diary describes as follows:

‘Our spell as duty Bty ended and as things were pretty quiet the powers that be concocted a full-scale exercise, mainly to give as realistic training as possible to recently acquired sigs and to generally check up on Regimental, Battery and Troop routine. Nearly all R/T sets were on the air on Regt or Bty frequency. O.P.s passed down fire-orders and sitreps and Acks and G.P.O.s plotted and relayed the tasks to the guns—the gunners doing everything but send the rounds away. Exercise “BALONEY” was quite successful and many useful lessons were learned. Baloney messages, Baloney leave, Baloney fire-orders and Baloney advances on a lavish scale were reported. It is intended to repeat the experiment in the near future—a gunner's suggestion is to start the day off with a Baloney reveille. One Tommy officer at least is firmly convinced of the incurable insanity of all Kiwis. He happened to be passing when the Tannoys [33] blared the orders for “Five rounds gun fire. Stand by. Fire.” He took up a crouching attitude, hands over ears, prepared for the worst, only to be greeted by a profound silence. Last seen he was hurrying away, muttering to himself, making for the nearest bottle of whisky.’

In the first week of March the artillery of 5 Kresowa Division took over the positions in front of Faenza and the New Zealand regiments came out of the line. The 6th Field did not get away unscathed. The enemy on the front became very lively after dark on 5 March and nebelwerfers harassed the area on an unusual scale. One rocket hit a casa occupied by a 6th Field OP and wounded two gunners; one of them, Gunner Masters, [34] died soon afterwards.

The route was the familiar one through Forli and Cesena to Rimini and then along the coast and inland to the same region of hills in which the Division rested after the Gothic Line battle in October. The 5th Field went to the same place as before, Cerreto d'Esi. The 6th Field went to where the 4th Field had been before—Piane, Colferraio and Rastia. The 4th Field went to Castel Raimondo. The 7th Anti-Tank, like the 4th Field, was billeted in a village, Pioraco, which had been favourably impressed by other New Zealanders before and welcomed the gunners with open arms. There one of the first tasks was to see that F Troop received its long-delayed Christmas dinner. To the 5th Field it was a kind of homecoming. Artillery Headquarters, however, was in unfamiliar ground at Gagliole. It was rather small and the villagers needed some persuasion to find enough room; but they soon mellowed.

This time no artillery units or sub-units were to have the heartbreak of disbanding while the war continued; but there was to be less rest and more training. The object was to absorb the reinforcements fully and to polish up or recover the old skills in mobile warfare in the hope that the next offensive would lead to a breakthrough and a war of movement. This time, at long last and after much more hard fighting, the hope was to be fulfilled.

[1]
Freyberg had returned to the Division on 14 October and officially resumed command on the 17th. Steve Weir did not return to the Artillery, however; on 4 November he was appointed to command the British 46th Infantry Division, which wondered for a while what had struck it. Once it became known that, like Carlisle's heroes, Weir was in deadly earnest, however, and that his orders were not to be argued about but to be obeyed, the dust settled and all was well.

[2]
Rev. H. W. West; born NZ 6 May 1909; Presbyterian minister; died 1 Mar 1959.

[3]
Maj C. V. Duignan; Cambridge; born Auckland, 19 Jul 1918; insurance clerk.

[4]
Capt G. D. Beresford, ED and bar; Auckland; born Auckland, 18 May 1915; clerk; later CO 9 Coast Regt, RNZA.

[5] Jack Mitchell of the 7th Anti-Tank was leaving on promotion and the adjutant, Captain R. M. Smith, had gone to hospital.

[6] ‘As C.O. I wish to express my appreciation of the loyal co-operation of all ranks at all times’, Roy Sprosen wrote in his last routine order. ‘Wherever you go I wish you God speed.’

[7]
Gnr K. D. Brown; Christchurch; born NZ 26 Feb 1915; clerk; wounded Nov 1942.

[8]
R. J. Loughnan in Divisional Cavalry ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1963), pages 381-3, is outspoken about the reactions of the troopers to this unpopular change.

[9] The strength of the reorganised 7th Anti-Tank was 589 men and the total number of vehicles 255.

[10] Lieutenants B. L. Officer and N. S. Sutherland. The officer commanding 36 Survey Battery when it was disbanded was Captain B. H. Brown.

[11] Gunner W. B. Thompson, regimental number 617.

[12]
WO II H. S. Hobbs; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 21 Jun 1906; carpenter and joiner; p.w. ( Bardia) 27 Nov 1941-2 Jan 1942; wounded 27 Nov 1944.

[13]
L-Sgt J. A. Ralston, MM; Auckland; born Auckland, 24 Feb 1915; linesman, P and T Dept.

[14]
Sgt A. E. Melville, m.i.d.; born NZ 3 Oct 1905; Regular soldier.

[15] Lance-Bombardier A. E. Fitzgerald and Gunner J. A. Christison were killed, Bombardier B. Dean died of wounds, and Gunner A. G. Doughty was wounded.

[16]
Capt P. K. McCliskie, MC; Redwoods Valley, Nelson; born NZ 23 May 1922; schoolteacher.

[17]
L-Sgt D. H. Pulford, MM; Hastings; born Clive, 4 Jun 1919; farmer.

[18]
Gnr A. P. McCardle; Raglan; born Pahiatua, 18 Mar 1914; farmer.

[19]
Capt J. B. Horrocks, MC; Auckland; born Auckland, 7 Jun 1920; law clerk.

[20]
L-Sgt W. D. Liggins, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Thames, 28 Feb 1923; clerk.

[21]
Gnr J. E. Nicol; Allanton, Otago; born Dunedin, 16 Jun 1918; plasterer.

[22]
Gnr J. R. Peddie; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 21 Feb 1914; car painter and truck driver; wounded 18 Dec 1944.

[23]
Sigmn F. A. Scott; born Napier, 25 Oct 1915; butcher; killed in action 18 Dec 1944.

[24]
Turkey could be bought in limited quantities through the NAAFI; but G Troop had no knowledge of this and took steps to ensure that there would be no shortage of poultry for Christmas dinner. A raid on trees and bushes in the grounds of a farmhouse near the Senio, interrupted for some time by machine-gun fire, yielded in the end 17 fowls. Pork also appeared on several battery menus, some of it paid for.

[25] APC = armour piercing, cap—the cap being of specially hardened steel.

[26]
Gnr W. A. Miles; born NZ 23 Oct 1917; farmhand; killed in action 9 Jan 1945.

The name Miles cropped up a good deal at the 5th Field RHQ for a day or two. A South African general hospital reported on the 7th that Bombardier F. Miles of 28 Battery had died of injuries received in a motor accident. Then, on the 10th, Captain C. M. Ward of 27 Battery cited Gunner S. E. Miles, a driver of a B Troop maintenance jeep, for a mention in despatches because of devotion to duty over a long period of difficult and dangerous work.

[27]
L-Sgt N. J. McGowan, MM; Auckland; born Auckland, 18 Jun 1920; farmer.

[28] Nicholson had commanded the 5th Field from 11 October, when Sawyers went to hospital, until 1 December, when he returned. On 6 February the 6th Field held a farewell dinner for Bill Philp, who was returning to New Zealand. Lieutenant-Colonel Cade, who had served under Philp at Maleme in Crete, took over from him. Several times in this period Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart took over as acting CRA in the absence of Brigadier Queree and Major Harding temporarily commanded the 4th Field.

[29]
Capt B. Pounsett, MM; Auckland; born NZ 1 Dec 1918; mechanic.

[30]
Maj-Gen W. S. McKinnon, CB, CBE, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Invercargill, 8 Jul 1910; Regular soldier; CO 29 Lt AA Regt, 3 NZ Div; 2 i/c 6 and 4 Fd Regts, Italy, 1945; CAO J Force, 1945-46; Chief of the General Staff, 1 Apr 1965–

The other majors from 3 Division were R. K. G. Macindoe and G. W. Waddell (4th Field), D. O. Watson and R. G. Bannister (5th Field), W. A. Bryden and E. H. Carew (6th Field) and E. I. Henton (7th Anti-Tank).

[31] Rev. W. Harford; Lower Hutt; born Nelson, 11 Sep 1910; Church of Christ minister; served as chaplain with 3 NZ Div, 1942-44, and 2 NZ Div, 1944-46; Senior Chaplain, RNZAF, May 1962–

[32] Maj W. J. Thompson, m.i.d.; Christchurch; born Waihi, 22 Feb 1903; Salvation Army officer.

[33] The Tannoy loudspeaker system at gun positions.

[34]
Gnr H. L. G. Masters; born Wellington, 12 Oct 1915; clerk; killed in action 6 Mar 1945.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

AS a rest area, apart from the weather, the Apennines south of Fabriano approached perfection. Gunners who had lived for a year or more in Italy in the midst of battle or in its wake had become accustomed to the entrails of towns rather than their living hearts. Here they found towns and villages miraculously untouched by high-explosive violence and uncorrupted by waves of soldiers and the jetsam they leave behind. After an hour or two of cautious appraisal from both sides the gunners and their hosts and hostesses began to turn their compulsory acquaintance into many a voluntary friendship. With the little children it was, as always, a case of love at first sight. Except for the most persistent tipplers, the raw wine was put aside in favour of more mellow vintages.

Even in the rain the countryside looked lovely. ‘The valley in which the regiment is situated is surrounded by high bush clad hills’, the 5th Field diarist noted. ‘The leaves are now in their autumn tints and give a colourful atmosphere to the area.’ A mountain of war diaries yields few such remarks as these. ‘BHQ held dance in Padrone's house in evening’, the 42 Battery diary says of 23 October. It was one of many dances, all of them richly enjoyable.

There was much to celebrate and there were also some sad farewells. Gunners had been wondering for some time when the next stage of the furlough scheme would begin. They learned that it was now a replacement scheme and that the 5th Reinforcements and those who had returned from furlough were next on the list—to the bitter disappointment of the ‘Coconut Bombers’ who had served in Fiji. They were also told that the Division would now reorganise.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Some Units are Disbanded

Some Units are Disbanded

Lieutenant-Colonel Sprosen visited each of his troops on the 24th to tell them that the 14th Light Ack-Ack was now to be disbanded. Each troop held a party that evening; but for the ‘old hands’ memories were apt to flick shadows across the gaiety. Next day batteries and then the regiment as a whole practised for a farewell parade. A generous disbursement of regimental funds for entertainment enlivened battery parties and dances held on the 25th. Then came an inspection and march-past led by the 5 Brigade band on the 26th near Collamato. General Freyberg took the salute [1] and then called the gunners round him and spoke impromptu, recalling incidents of the desert days and the early fighting in Italy and praising the record of the regiment. It was a moving occasion. Then, after the parade was dismissed, Freyberg personally met every officer, warrant officer and sergeant. The original members had been mainly 5th Reinforcements and so a great many had taken part in the first as well as the last parade of the regiment and their stern appearance on this occasion disguised a welter of feeling. In his diary Freyberg noted that he had never seen a finer parade.

There was much to do. Guns, transport and equipment had to be inspected and disposed of. Free beer and free canteen goods to the value of 3s. 6d. per man on the 27th further reduced regimental funds. Padre West
[2] conducted his final church services for the batteries on Sunday the 29th. Major Duignan
[3] joined RHQ to act as second-in-command for a day or two and then to command what was left after the regiment formally dissolved on the 31st. Sprosen and his adjutant, Captain Beresford, [4] both left on the 28th to take over as commanding officer and adjutant respectively of the 7th Anti-Tank. [5] For a day or two Sprosen was in the novel position of commanding two regiments at once—his final routine orders to the 14th Light Ack-Ack were dated 1 November. [6] The regimental orchestra under the baton of Gunner Brown
[7] was much in demand for the parties and dances that followed. When officers of the regiment were entertained to a buffet dinner at RHQ on the 30th the Marsala flowed freely and, in the words of the sober war diary, ‘joy was unconfined’. Brigadier Queree spoke briefly and appropriately.

For ack-ack gunners and those of 34 Anti-Tank and 36 Survey Batteries, also due to be disbanded, the first question was what was to happen to them. The few who had returned from furlough and those of the 5th Reinforcements, due to leave in the replacement scheme, were to go to Advanced Base. Of the remaining ack-ack men, 157 bombardiers and gunners picked by ballot went to serve as infantry in the newly formed Divisional Cavalry Battalion—and the gunners liked this no more than the troopers did. [8] It was in fact an even harder wrench for the ack-ack men; for they not only had to lose their identity as gunners and members of a regiment in which they felt at home: they had to take over the black berets and nomenclature of the cavalry— squadrons, troops and so on. The troopers retained at least these morsels of their individuality and corporate existence. The same also applied to men of N Troop and a few of O Troop of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, who joined the cavalry battalion when their battery disbanded. It made them sick at heart.

The rest of O Troop reinforced Q Troop of 34 Battery and this 17-pounder troop became B Troop of 31 Battery. The 7th Anti-Tank ended up with the following components:

31 Battery | A Troop | M1os
| B Troop | 17-pounders
32 Battery | C Troop | M1os
| D Troop | 17-pounders
33 Battery | E Troop | M1os
| F Troop | 17-pounders
39 Battery, redesignated 34 Battery | G, H, J and K Troops | 4.2-inch mortars 5 Survey Troop

The 6-pounder troops were dropped from the establishment and each battery had one M10 troop and one 17-pounder troop. [9] The survey troop—two officers [10] and 23 others—was all that survived of 36 Survey Battery, 115 members of which went to

Advanced Base and the other 67 to artillery units as reinforcements. The inspecting and transferring of vehicles and equipment, the drawing or handing in of other equipment, the re-locating and billeting of gunners affected by the various changes, and the start of extensive retraining programmes filled the last days of October and the early ones of November. On the 31st the ack-ack contingent for the Divisional Cavalry Battalion paraded in the piazza at Collamato and then was driven to the San Severino area to join the battalion. For most of the men it was a miserable journey.

However hard these changes were on gunners who had served well and deserved well of the Division, it had been plain for many months that the enemy in Italy had so few aircraft at his disposal that the ack-ack regiment had become an expensive luxury. Its record of at least 67 ½ aircraft shot down had not been added to since the Cassino days and its only notable subsequent success had been the K-Boot sunk off Rimini. Similarly, the anti-tank regiment had fired only twice at tanks throughout the Italian campaign and the only tanks it was now likely to meet were too heavily armoured for 6-pounders even with sabot ammunition. The 17-pounders (which were now also going to get sabot ammunition) could be used for many other tasks on the battlefield and the M10 crews, by developing their ability to bring down indirect fire, were making themselves more and more useful. The heavy mortars were invaluable. More could be said for retaining the flash-spotting and sound-ranging troops of the Survey Battery, which had done valuable work in Italy and could continue to do so. But there were several survey regiments on the Adriatic front and many other means, also, of locating hostile batteries. The New Zealand gunners much preferred to work with their own surveyors and would continue to do so for ordinary surveying—fixing bearing pickets and suchlike. But they would have to do without their own flash-spotters and sound-rangers. Besides these changes, the remaining regiments replaced all their 8-cwt pick-ups with 15-cwt trucks and made many other changes in their establishment of vehicles.

The 7th Anti-Tank were also sorry to lose Jack Mitchell, who was going to become the second-in-command at Maadi Base Camp with the rank of colonel. He had commanded the regiment, except when on furlough, since December 1941 and had endeared himself to everyone by his bravery, selflessness and fairmindedness. Nothing that was likely to help his men was ever too much trouble for him to undertake and the general opinion among the gunners was that he was ‘one of Nature's gentlemen’.

the forli–faenza sector, 18 november–16 december 1944

Mitchell turned up at the break-up party of 34 Battery in the municipal theatre at Esanatoglia on the 31st, to which all former members of the battery were also invited. It was wellorganised, with great piles of sandwiches, scones and sausage rolls, free wine and cigarettes, and an Italian orchestra. A handful of ‘old originals’ who had joined up in England in 1939 were present, including at least one who was in the battery to the end. [11] Jack Mitchell addressed them warmly and modestly, saying that all he knew about anti-tank gunnery was what Jimmy Hall-Kenney of the 34th had taught him. Like the farewell parties of the ack-ack regiment, it was a bitter-sweet occasion. The old hands let their memories run riot and some of the new ones cast their thoughts forward unhappily to their forthcoming conversion to infantry.

Leave from the rest area to Rome, Florence and other places was generous and for those who stayed behind there were many organised entertainments—the Kiwi Concert Party (still with three 34 Battery ‘originals’), a Canadian concert party, an ENSA show, mobile cinemas, and even orchestral concerts. In a series of rugby matches to decide which artillery team should contest the Freyberg Cup, the 5th Field won. Training for most troops took place in the morning only; but for those who had to learn new roles and become used to new weapons—the new M10 crews in particular—a solid programme of training was essential. The weather remained unsettled and on 10 November the countryside was white with snow. When the time came to leave, towards the end of November, there were many tearful farewells.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Return to the Front

Return to the Front

The CRA and a small party moved on the 16th, to take over from the artillery of 56 Infantry Division of 5 Corps in the Forli area. Another major river line had been crossed while the Division was resting; but there were many more to come. The next were the Montone and then the Lamone River with terraced stopbanks of soft earth. Beyond them was Faenza, and beyond that the Senio River. And winter was fast approaching. As a 4th Field man noted, ‘conversation was not exactly sparkling’ as the field regiments drove forward on the 17th.

Artillery Headquarters opened in Forli itself and the 5th, 6th and 4th Field were respectively north, north-west and west of the city, the 4th practically in the suburbs. Good casas were plentiful, no OPs were called for at first, and for three days there was little to do. Early on 21 November the 4th and 6th Field and the 77th Field fired a 200 r.p.g. barrage, and the 5th Field fired concentrations to help 4 Division across the River Cosina and the 5th Field followed up with HF tasks. The attack failed and was repeated with variations the next night. This time the 4th Field followed with counter-mortar tasks and the 6th Field with HF, and in the morning they fired smoke briefly to screen the crossing of the river by tanks. This crossing succeeded and the enemy began to fall back to the line of the Lamone.

The New Zealand Division was needed for the next stage and came forward from the rest area. The field guns crossed the Cosina–Montone canal and got into cramped positions mainly north of the straight Route 9, entering into strong competition with other units for the few suitable casas in the area. Heavy rain in the afternoon emphasised the importance of shelter. The approach roads to the gun areas were narrow and had deep ditches on both sides and the fields were seas of mud. When lorries broke up the roads and in places filled the ditches, the water banked up and made the gun areas so soft that even hens bogged down in the ooze.

Here the guns remained for three wet weeks, with the gunners constantly battling against mud and the signallers having endless trouble keeping communications open. There was, however, one consolation: across Route 9, no more than a mile from the 4th Field, there was what soon became widely known as the vermouth factory. The quality of the vermouth was very good and the quantity, until the MPs mounted a guard over it, was virtually unlimited. It had to be rationed at the gun positions; but large stocks accumulated in the B Echelons. Members of gun crews were frequently sent back for spells and they found the B Echelons highly convivial.

The proximity of the gun areas to Route 9 occasioned many misgivings on the part of those who could foresee trouble from enemy artillery harassing the road. The 5th Field suffered late on the 27th and WO II Hobbs
[12] and a gunner were seriously wounded. On the 29th the 6th Field RHQ and battery areas received some 170-millimetre shells, more 150s, and many 88s; but they did little more than splash the mud around. There was considerable fire in support of 10 Indian Division at the end of the month and some very effective observed shooting by the 5th Field, as well as DFs by the 4th Field, in support of 5 Brigade thrusts. Meanwhile several B Echelons had to be moved because they were outside the divisional zone and it was far from easy at that late stage to find casas or, in fact, any shelter at all.

Discrepancies had been discovered between map references of targets and their corrected co-ordinates deduced from observed shooting. On 2 December, therefore, Air OPs shot all the NZA regiments on certain targets to try to overcome this problem. The 4th and 6th Field fired a ‘Chinese barrage’ in the evening of the 3rd to distract attention from an attack by 46 Division, and next morning continued the deception with smoke screens at the approaches to Faenza. The enemy was taken in and reacted violently. Meanwhile the 5th Field directly supported the attack to the extent of 2800 rounds. A further smoke screen in the late afternoon drew further heavy DF from the enemy which fell mainly on empty ground. The M10s of C Troop, 32 Battery, also fired in this deception plan. At the end of it all 46 Division had its bridgehead south-west of Faenza. When the enemy counter-attacked it on the 8th and 9th the NZA regiments fired DF tasks.

One 6th Field OP was a mile and a half east of Faenza and 200 yards from the southern bank of a loop in the Lamone River. Lance-Sergeant Ralston
[13] reached there with a signals maintenance party in the afternoon of the 7th to relieve the existing party. A heavy mortar bombardment coincided with his arrival and the driver of his jeep was wounded. He left the safety of the OP building and helped the man to cover. Then he saw that urgent medical attention was needed and at once drove the man back along the road to an RAP, regardless of the heavy fire that was still falling. Then he returned and repaired a damaged line under fire and quickly re-established communications to the guns. For this he earned an immediate MM. Back at the guns Sergeant Melville
[14] of B Troop set a good example of steadfastness under fire when the gun position was shelled heavily on the 9th and again on the 11th, in the neighbourhood of the hamlet of Corleto, and his inspiring influence spread far beyond the members of his own gun team.

the faenza front, 14-17 december 1944

The next step was to relieve 46 Division in its cramped bridgehead. Accordingly 5 Brigade, by means of tracks as muddy as any of those in use on the Cassino front the previous winter, moved into the bridgehead on 10 December with A Sub-battery of heavy mortars and aided by four half-tracked M14s from the 7th Anti-Tank which towed the infantry 6-pounders into position. The 6th Field next day occupied gun positions perilously close to Faenza—so close that night firing was forbidden until the big attack to capture the city. The M10s of C Troop, 32 Battery, came forward with the supporting armour; but the 17-pounder troop, which was extremely hard to move even with M14 half-tracks, was held in reserve.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Surprise Attack West of Faenza

Surprise Attack West of Faenza

For the attack on the night 14–15 December, which was directed on the key village of Celle west of Faenza, 5 Brigade and associated armour had the support of 256 guns, including a heavy battery, a heavy ack-ack battery and three medium regiments. In addition four medium regiments and three 155-millimetre batteries fired CB tasks on the New Zealand and 10 Indian Division fronts.

The essence of the plan was to give the enemy no reason to suppose that anything special was afoot until the guns crashed into action at 11 p.m. on the 14th and the tanks and infantry surged forward. The three NZA field regiments and a field regiment of 46 Division fired a 400 r.p.g. barrage lasting three and a half hours and RA Bofors marked the boundaries. All other field guns and the mediums and heavies fired concentrations, and many DF tasks were prepared in the certain knowledge that the enemy would fight back vigorously. Both heavy mortar sub-batteries fired concentrations and, in so doing, B Sub-battery, which was in 6 Brigade area, attracted return fire which killed three men and wounded a fourth. [15]

The surprise that was sought was fully achieved and, under the hammer blows of the artillery, the enemy soon yielded ground to the infantry, advancing under artificial moonlight M10s of C Troop harassed the bridge on Route 9 over the Senio across which the enemy would have to pass any reinforcements he cared to commit. By the evening of the 16th, however, the M10s had reached Casale and were close enough to the bridge to deny the enemy the use of it. By that time there was serious talk of effecting an immediate crossing of the Senio as well.

After firing in support of the initial attack, A Sub-battery of heavy mortars pushed forward behind the infantry and responded quickly and effectively to every call for fire. Lieutenant McCliskie, [16] the GPO, reconnoitred difficult terrain twice under enemy observation and selected gun positions well forward. To occupy them without suffering heavy casualties seemed impossible. He nevertheless managed to deploy the two troops and they fired heavily from both positions without suffering casualties or damage to their equipment. McCliskie thereby demonstrated that he had a good eye for ground—an invaluable attribute in such circumstances. But he also demonstrated, in this action and later, driving energy and powers of leadership and in due course he was awarded an MC.

Laying lines from OPs to gun positions under such circumstances is one of the most demanding tasks of all. Lance-Sergeant Pulford
[17] of B Troop of the 6th Field and his men laid a line in the wake of this attack through an area not fully cleared of enemy. It passed over the only bridge completed, which was under severe shell and mortar fire. For their own safety he ordered his men back to the battery and for several hours stayed forward to maintain the line himself regardless of the heavy fire. Another B Troop man who showed unusual courage in this attack was Gunner McCardle, [18] a jeep driver of the OP party. He delivered equipment to the OP under heavy shell and small-arms fire and seemed heedless of his own safety.

In the 5th Field Captain Horrocks, [19] of A Troop, appointed as representative at the headquarters of 22 Battalion, volunteered instead for the more hazardous task of FOO. The advance was over two miles of open country on foot, carrying a heavy No. 22 wireless set. The battalion met strong resistance and took seven hours to capture its objective. Just past the start line Horrocks saw some wounded infantry on a minefield and, regardless of the danger, rendered assistance to them, saving the life of at least one of them. With Horrocks were Bombardier

Liggins
[20] and Gunner Nicol, [21] and between them they carried heavy batteries and sections of the wireless set over muddy hill-country in the dark in very bad weather. They came under fire; but pushed on regardless of it and had the OP working and communications established within a quarter of an hour of the capture of the objective. The infantry advanced again, towards the Senio, on the 16th, and this OP party kept up with them. Horrocks set up his OP in a church tower among the foremost infantry in the Casale area. The tower was heavily shelled, but the OP remained there until the church was almost completely destroyed. Then Horrocks carried on from a nearby house until relieved on 18 December. In a letter of 4 January 1945 to Huck Sawyers, the battalion commander ended up thus:

‘At all times, Capt Horrocks was cheerful and unflurried. He made a very great impression on my men and under conditions which were often most difficult, he proved to be reliable, conscientious and co-operative. I am grateful to you for the services of so excellent an officer.’

Horrocks won an immediate MC.

The 4th Field had reconnoitred positions south-west of Faenza before the attack and occupied them on the 16th, with RHQ to the west in what appeared to be the house of the Count of Faenza. It was a good area, with sandy ground for the gun pits and plenty of good casas at hand.

The M10s of E Troop were called forward on the 17th to support a thrust across the river by Route 9 and they destroyed a sandbagged house which an enemy rearguard was holding. Before noon the Lamone was bridged. Artillery Headquarters had meanwhile sent a reconnaissance party into Faenza as early as the 16th; but the town was not cleared. Early on the 17th the reconnaissance continued and a location near the railway station was chosen for Artillery Headquarters, which drove into the town in the afternoon. It proved a more exciting move than expected. Snipers were still abroad, especially after dark, the new area was mortared at intervals throughout the night, and a machine gun firing along the street past the entrance to Headquarters caused visitors to step very lively indeed on occasions. Headquarters staff were astonished when Gurkhas, on a house-to-house search of the neighbourhood, routed out a number of

Germans from buildings close at hand. In the afternoon of the 18th a heavy concentration of 105-millimetre fire scored a direct hit on the clerks' truck, set a scout car of the Indian division on fire, wounded Gunner Peddie
[22] and killed Signalman Scott
[23] of the attached Signals section.

night attack north of faenza, 19-20 december 1944

The 5th Field had meanwhile moved to positions in the western outskirts of Faenza on the 17th. A heavy mist hampered the survey, however. The enemy was some distance away to the west; but to the north he was close at hand—900 yards from 27 Battery—and the nearest DFs were at a range of 1200 yards. The CRA therefore laid it down that the regiment would not answer calls except in an emergency. A Gurkha-manned Vickers gun was no more than 10 yards from D Troop.

The policy of silence, however, did not last long. Another impressive fire plan was drawn up to support a 6 Brigade and Gurkha attack northwards in the night 19-20 December. It included a huge creeping barrage on a very wide front fired by the 4th and 6th Field, the 1st RHA, the 23rd Army Field, and two regiments each from the 10 Indian Division and the 56 London Division. In addition the 5th Field and four medium regiments and a battery fired concentrations and the third field regiment of 56 Division fired a counter-mortar programme. The heavy-mortar battery also had a role and the C Troop M10s carried out HF tasks. Again RA Bofors marked the boundaries, as well as indicating the times the barrage lifted or paused. To cover the final objective 21 stonks were drawn up.

The opening of this huge fire plan, with well over 300 field and medium guns firing, was impressive indeed and the infantry followed close behind the barrage. The enemy reacted quickly and strongly with shell and mortar fire and nebelwerfers were active. The Gurkhas on the right were ahead of 6 Brigade and the barrage on their part of the front started on the pause line. They therefore had to be silent spectators for the first 16 lifts until it came time for them to join in the advance and the barrage extended to cover their front.

The main objectives were taken; but there was no sign of an enemy collapse and no possibility of forcing the Senio line. The strength of this line became plain when 26 Battalion put in a small thrust at 6.45 a.m. on Christmas Eve with the 4th and 6th Field and the heavy mortars in support. The infantry gained the stopbank but soon found their situation hazardous and were recalled.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A White Christmas on the Senio

A White Christmas on the Senio

The weather was now bitterly cold, snow was lying thinly on the ground, and an attack by flanking formations on the left had to be postponed. There was little likelihood of a major move until early January and the gunners settled down as well as they could to enjoy the festive season.

The 5th Field had already arranged to have batteries successively ‘off duty’ for 24 hours, and 27 Battery therefore had a Christmas celebration on Christmas Eve, 28 Battery had one on Christmas Day, and 47 Battery on Boxing Day. Christmas dinner, however, was served on the proper day. The 27th Battery, for example, was allowed from 1 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. for what the diary describes as ‘a first-class Xmas dinner of chicken, potatoes, peas, cabbage and carrots followed by plum pudding, oranges and nuts’. The 4th Field also spread the hours for dinner so that two batteries were always on call for emergencies. In the afternoon they fired two regimental tasks. The 6th Field expected to move forward on Christmas Day and therefore had Christmas dinner the day before. It was a wasted precaution: the move kept getting postponed and a month later the guns were still in the same position.

The 7th Anti-Tank gathered as many of its members as it could into the various B Echelons in Faenza or Forli for Christmas Day and they celebrated royally. The M10 crews of A Troop were with the 5th Field just west of the town and they, too, dined and wined appropriately, though with rather more reserve. The 17-pounder crews of F Troop (which missed its Christmas dinner) and the four 4.2 mortar troops of 34 Battery were deployed well forward north-west of the town. They sent all who could be spared, particularly those most in need of a rest, to Faenza. Those who had to stay on duty also celebrated, but much less noisily, though the G Troop casa attracted enemy attention somehow or other, for it sustained a direct hit and several near misses during dinner, much to the disgust of the mortar crews. [24] None of them, however, was hurt.

Artillery Headquarters, after the early upsets, was most comfortably ensconced in Faenza and the officers' mess was luxurious. The CRA held a small reception on Christmas Eve attended by General Freyberg and representatives of the various regiments in the area. In the morning of Christmas Day he visited the 4th Field, the 1st RHA and the 4th Medium. Except for the shelling of G Troop of the mortar battery and a few bombs dropped in the night on Faenza, the enemy did not interfere with the festivities and the gunners enjoyed what was for many of them their first white Christmas.

The policy was still to force the Senio line; but it was unsound and unrealistic. Artillery ammunition was in almost desperately short supply all along the front. This was reason enough for a change of policy. The infantry were too few and too tired. The weather was already severe in the mountain sectors. For one reason or another more and more thought was given to the establishment of a winter line. Brigadier Queree engaged in earnest debate on this subject between Christmas and the New Year, emphasising the ammunition requirements for any major move and the restrictions imposed by the mud on the handling of guns. General Freyberg thought the enemy would shell Faenza with heavy guns and withdrew his headquarters some miles back towards Forli. Artillery Headquarters conformed, to the disgust of the B Echelon of 46 Battery, which had to move out of its spacious quarters in the Villa Archi, three miles back along Route 9, when the CRA's staff returned there on the 29th.

The past fortnight had brought its expected crop of complaints about guns firing short. One way of checking this, when the weather permitted, was by means of shoots conducted by Air OPs. One such shoot on the 27th by all the 4th Field batteries ‘to see how the guns were shooting’ (as the regimental diary puts it) gave ‘very satisfactory’ results. The 5th and 6th Field guns were checked in the same way. ‘AOP co-operation watching the fall of shot has not found any gun guilty’, the 6th Field diary states, ‘and as yet no offender has been tracked down in this area. The continual checking of work between Bty and Tp CPs obviated any error in mathematical gunnery and the daily checking of sights and the frequent measuring of bores have kept the guns as accurate as is humanly possible’.

The enemy still held the high stopbanks of the Senio and had not yet been pushed back to the near bank in the north and north-west of Faenza. He therefore held ground on which he could easily assemble for a counter-attack on the bridgehead over the Lamone. To guard against this the Division prepared to retreat behind the Lamone if this became necessary and also, on the other hand, staged a thrust to reach the stopbank on the 6 Brigade front and thereby minimise the danger of a surprise attack. Both caused the gunners work—the first in returning ammunition from gun positions to B Echelons, preparing alternative positions, and reconnoitring withdrawal routes; the second in firing a supporting programme with guns and heavy mortars. The thrust to the stopbank failed; but by degrees Canadians and 56 Division edged forward to a more secure line.

The New Year came in quietly on the Faenza side of the river; but on the other side there was much evidence of high spirits and gaiety. This time the New Zealand gunners were the spoilsports, checking the noise of celebration with a few well-directed rounds. On 1 January 1945 a sniping 17-pounder of D Troop, carefully emplaced well forward by the little village of Casale, fired seven APC [25] rounds into a culvert 1800 yards to the north-east, just across the river. Infantry had reported two tanks sheltering there and an early-morning reconnaissance confirmed that they had not moved. Five rounds were seen to go under the culvert.

C Troop of 214 Battery of the 57th Heavy Ack-Ack came under the command of the 5th Field and went into position in front of the 25-pounders for ‘ground shooting’. The 3.75, properly handled, could engage mortars, nebelwerfers and the new German rocket guns rapidly and effectively with airbursts and there were more than enough guns in an ack-ack role to deal with the very few hit-and-run raiders which the Luftwaffe sent over.

The counter-mortar organisation was by this time highly efficient and worked closely with the infantry to locate targets and with the 3.7s to destroy them. Captain Vivian had an assistant CMO with him at Artillery Headquarters and an ACMO with each of the three New Zealand brigades. The infantry were delighted with the prompt and effective fire Vivian's organisation and the heavy ack-ack gunners produced against mortar and nebelwerfer locations and they co-operated eagerly.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Manning a Winter Line

Manning a Winter Line

For all but the OP parties, the heavy mortar crews, and a few of the 17-pounder and 25-pounder crews—those who were well forward on the Senio front, within reach of hostile machine guns and mortars—the days passed quietly and the men did all they could to make themselves comfortable on what had evidently become the winter line of Eighth Army. Ammunition restrictions were severe and gunners were allowed frequent spells, battery by battery or troop by troop. Several cinemas were running in Forli, many other organised entertainments were provided there, and even in Faenza (which did not get heavily shelled as Freyberg expected) a good deal of amusement could be had. Leave for Florence, Rome and other centres had been available by roster throughout the fighting and it still continued. The Divisional Artillery had acquired a pipe band, first seen in the forward area when members of it piped in the New Year at various points. What attracted most attention, however, was the recurrent problem of keeping out the winter cold and many ingenious solutions of this were worked out. The drip-feed oil heater was perhaps the most efficient; but it was too noisy for casas close to the enemy. Coal, coke and charcoal could be found in Faenza, but there was keen competition for them.

the winter line as at 21 january 1945

The 4th Field moved to positions 1000-2000 yards south of Faenza and on 28 January the 6th Field made their long-delayed move—to positions north-east of the town vacated by the 113th Field. The 5th Field remained well forward west of the town. All regiments, however, maintained a ‘duty battery’ which occupied an alternative position for a week at a time, and as a rule only this battery fired. There was therefore little or no firing from the main battle positions and no encouragement, accordingly, for the enemy to trouble them. The 6th Field positions seemed good, but a gradual thaw towards the end of the month (after several fairly heavy falls of snow) made them very muddy and access routes to some troops became quite impassable. The 7th Anti-Tank deployed an M10 troop in an indirect-fire role with the 5th Field, another in anti-tank reserve with 5 Brigade and the third in a similar role with 6 Brigade. One 17-pounder troop deployed with each of the two infantry brigades and the third troop was part of the local anti-tank defence of Faenza. The mortar battery remained as an entity under the CRA's control, its tasks tied in with those of the field artillery.

These bald details explain in general terms what the gunners were doing in the winter line. A change of focus is needed to view the strange, intense little world of those who were at the tip of the ‘sharp end’, observing the enemy on the Senio and directing the fire of the guns and mortars. Casas there were in short supply, most of them were in poor shape, and they kept getting hit by shells or mortar bombs'. ‘Spandau Pete’ delighted in machine-gunning their windows and environs at odd hours. The unnerving shriek of rocket missiles was liable at any moment to destroy the peace of mind of their occupants—and all these casas were overcrowded. By night white-coated patrols might raid them, squirting them with tommy-gun fire and tossing in grenades. By day the frozen landscape with its farmyard foreground, the dim outlines of the stopbank, the black trees and scattered casas, and in the background the buildings of Castel Bolognese, Felisio or some other village across the river, could claim a quiet beauty—though observers seldom had an eye for this. But no night was truly peaceful. Voices carried clearly in the still, cold air and the sounds of working parties commanded attention. Even by day the calm might be broken by the sudden emergence of an SP gun from some hiding place to make a quick bombardment and then disappear. When the days were clear and sunny the shimmering snow played tricks on the eyes. When mist or fog came down as they often did, all kinds of sounds could be heard and observers would strive to attain an acute state of sensitivity trying to resolve their nature and to peer through the gloom.

The OP party of G Troop, 34 Battery, had typical experiences. In the night of 28 December it was sharing a casa with a 5th Field party in support of the Maoris when a 105-millimetre shell came through the roof and finished up on the floor between Lieutenant McSkimming and a 5th Field officer. It failed to explode. When the other officer carried it into the next room, where some gunners were talking to two Maoris, and began scraping it to ascertain the data, the Maoris made off rapidly. Then, on 9 January, another shell blew in more of the roof, bringing beams and rubble down on the occupants—they were then supporting the newly-arrived 21 Battalion. A 5th Field signaller, Gunner Miles, [26] of C Troop, was smothered and suffocated by the powdery debris. A mortar gunner sustained a glancing blow from a falling beam and two other men escaped with scratches.

The previous night Lance-Bombardier McGowan
[27] of 34 Battery was out repairing a telephone line broken by an enemy concentration. He was not one of the lucky ones who had been issued with white duffel coats and his battledress showed dark against the snow. While searching for the break he was suddenly fired on by an enemy patrol and dived for cover in a ditch full of water topped with ice. He was pinned there for a short time and then he continued to trace the line through the snow and ice until he found a break and repaired it. He then went back and reported to his officer, who told him to wait until the patrol was driven off. But McGowan knew the mortars could not fire until the line was mended and so he crawled back along it, still under fire from the enemy, until he repaired two more breaks and re-established communications. For this he earned an MM.

Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson had taken over command of the 7th Anti-Tank on 13 December [28] (when Sprosen went on leave) and, having served as a battery commander under Jack Mitchell, he was imbued like his former CO with a burning desire to visit all his gun crews as often as he could—daily if possible. But the mortar troops were sited well forward northwest of Faenza, near the 31 Battery 17-pounders, and the route—a jeep track through Celle—was absolutely restricted by day and by night was limited to vehicles carrying essential supplies. So his visits to these guns and mortars were far less frequent than he would have liked.

In mid-January an M10c arrived in 32 Battery—an M10 with a 17-pounder gun, far more powerful than the 3-inch of the normal M10. It was taken out on the 18th for a practice shoot with HE ammunition. The gun behaved very well, but the bursts were hard to observe in the snow. The same trouble occurred at the end of the month when an Air OP tried to direct the fire of a 4.2 mortar. Early in February the 17-pounders of B, D and F Troops began to take over a new range of duties. A purely anti-tank role in the Senio line was almost no role at all. But HE ammunition with reduced charges and the addition to the gun carriages of graduating arcs and vernier scales allowed the 17-pounders to undertake indirect fire tasks, which added greatly to the usefulness of the guns and the morale of their crews. At Esanatoglia defects in the 4.2 mortar baseplates had been remedied by strengthening them at the LAD. New skirtings arrived from the United Kingdom in February; but even these did not work well until modified according to suggestions made by the EME, Lieutenant Pounsett. [29] The higher echelons of the RA and REME evinced enormous interest in these simple but effective New Zealand adaptations.

January ended in a flurry of activity when a platoon of 25 Battalion, as part of a series of small actions to test the enemy's Senio defences, gained a stretch of the stopbank only to be heavily counter-attacked and cut off. The guns fired about 1000 rounds in the night, which, as the diary of Artillery Headquarters remarked, ‘is exceptional under present conditions’; but to no avail. The platoon was lost. A platoon from 26 Battalion also reached the stopbank but withdrew safely.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Departures and Replacements

Departures and Replacements

February 1945 was the quietest month the artillery spent in action throughout the war, and for some of the gunners it scarcely seemed like war at all. The chief event was the departure for home of the ‘Tongariro’ men in the replacement scheme—all drafts up to the 5th Reinforcements, plus the ‘Coconut Bombers’. A camera calibration of one field gun per troop (in conjunction with No. 2 Calibration Troop, RA) was followed by a calibration of all 25-pounders at Bellaria—absolute for one gun per troop and comparative for the rest. For the three men per gun who were allowed to go this was an agreeable change for about a week and for those who stayed behind it was at least a rest. Several ‘Chinese attacks’ were mounted, the main one in support of 23 Battalion, to simulate serious attacks and provoke the enemy into wasteful response. The law of diminishing returns decreed that the enemy would tend to take them less seriously as time went by and he might in the end fail to respond when it was the ‘real thing’. Towards the end of the month artillery officers who had served with 3 New Zealand Division in the Pacific arrived as reinforcements— including the first senior officers to do so for a long time. They included Major McKinnon, [30] who went to the 4th Field, and the Rev. W. Harford, [31] who replaced the Rev. W. J. Thompson, [32] padre of the 7th Anti-Tank since January 1943.

Many other replacements had meanwhile arrived for the Tongariro men and there were new faces everywhere. For the newcomers there was much to learn. Men who had served under very different circumstances in the Solomon Islands had to change many of their ideas and get used to new ways. The regiments conducted various informal courses of instruction. Huck Sawyers, for example, and his staff devised an exercise which a 27 Battery diary describes as follows:

‘Our spell as duty Bty ended and as things were pretty quiet the powers that be concocted a full-scale exercise, mainly to give as realistic training as possible to recently acquired sigs and to generally check up on Regimental, Battery and Troop routine. Nearly all R/T sets were on the air on Regt or Bty frequency. O.P.s passed down fire-orders and sitreps and Acks and G.P.O.s plotted and relayed the tasks to the guns—the gunners doing everything but send the rounds away. Exercise “BALONEY” was quite successful and many useful lessons were learned. Baloney messages, Baloney leave, Baloney fire-orders and Baloney advances on a lavish scale were reported. It is intended to repeat the experiment in the near future—a gunner's suggestion is to start the day off with a Baloney reveille. One Tommy officer at least is firmly convinced of the incurable insanity of all Kiwis. He happened to be passing when the Tannoys [33] blared the orders for “Five rounds gun fire. Stand by. Fire.” He took up a crouching attitude, hands over ears, prepared for the worst, only to be greeted by a profound silence. Last seen he was hurrying away, muttering to himself, making for the nearest bottle of whisky.’

In the first week of March the artillery of 5 Kresowa Division took over the positions in front of Faenza and the New Zealand regiments came out of the line. The 6th Field did not get away unscathed. The enemy on the front became very lively after dark on 5 March and nebelwerfers harassed the area on an unusual scale. One rocket hit a casa occupied by a 6th Field OP and wounded two gunners; one of them, Gunner Masters, [34] died soon afterwards.

The route was the familiar one through Forli and Cesena to Rimini and then along the coast and inland to the same region of hills in which the Division rested after the Gothic Line battle in October. The 5th Field went to the same place as before, Cerreto d'Esi. The 6th Field went to where the 4th Field had been before—Piane, Colferraio and Rastia. The 4th Field went to Castel Raimondo. The 7th Anti-Tank, like the 4th Field, was billeted in a village, Pioraco, which had been favourably impressed by other New Zealanders before and welcomed the gunners with open arms. There one of the first tasks was to see that F Troop received its long-delayed Christmas dinner. To the 5th Field it was a kind of homecoming. Artillery Headquarters, however, was in unfamiliar ground at Gagliole. It was rather small and the villagers needed some persuasion to find enough room; but they soon mellowed.

This time no artillery units or sub-units were to have the heartbreak of disbanding while the war continued; but there was to be less rest and more training. The object was to absorb the reinforcements fully and to polish up or recover the old skills in mobile warfare in the hope that the next offensive would lead to a breakthrough and a war of movement. This time, at long last and after much more hard fighting, the hope was to be fulfilled.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 22 — The Senio to Trieste: the Triumphant Advance

Contents

- [section]
p. 688

- A Sudden Move to the Front p. 690
- The Forthcoming Offensive p. 692
- Changes in Equipment and Methods p. 694
- Changes in Personnel p. 695
- The Artillery Plan p. 696
- The Senio Crossing p. 699
- Pushing on to the Santerno p. 703
- Near Massa Lombarda p. 708
- The Sillaro p. 709

- Spaniel: a Masterpiece of Planning and Administration p. 711

- Gruesome Effects of Artillery Fire p. 714
- The Gaiana Canal p. 716
- Across the Idice p. 718
- A Rapid Advance towards the Po p. 720
- Crossing the Po and the Adige p. 721
- The Race to Padua p. 724
- From Venice to the Piave p. 727
- On to Trieste p. 728
- Tension after VE Day p. 729
- General Freyberg Sums Up p. 730

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

WAS the second visit to the smiling valleys of the Apennines to be for training or for rest and fun? Higher authority said training; gunners said rest and fun. It was an amiable contest and ended in a draw, though for the first three days the gunners looked like winning all hands down. Smart parades were demanded, but, as a battery diary says, ‘TSMs tended to be increasily harassed with cunning and varied reasons why parades should not be attended’. Goalposts sprouted everywhere and there was much football and a little hockey. In 46 Battery Lance-Bombardier Boyes
[1] and Gunner Henderson
[2] painted attractive murals to decorate a troop bar and arranged for the services of an Italian orchestra. In Pioraco some anti-tankers were too warmly welcomed and a battery diary for 9 March says baldly, ‘Good weather. Many umbriaco soldati.’ The equivalent of ‘umbriaco’ in current rhyming slang was ‘out the monk’. Evenings were nearly all gay.

The 5th Field were billeted if possible with families they already knew. They were supposed to move to the new Lanciano Barracks south of Castel Raimondo, but Lieutenant-Colonel Sawyers thought these unfit for occupation and his gunners heartily agreed. The 6th Field, after several reprieves, moved to the barracks in the middle of March and found barrack life not as bad as they feared.

The 17th, St. Patrick's Day, started seriously with a full-dress rehearsal for a Divisional Artillery parade. The marching was for the first time to the music of the artillery pipe band. Brigadier Queree then lectured officers on the history of the Divisional Artillery. The afternoon was free and gunners made the best of it. At Headquarters there were the Gagliole Gambols, which included the Gagliole Gallops (complete with ‘tote’), a tug-o'-war, a tenniquoit match between gunners and signalmen, and a smoke concert. The ceremonial parade on the 22nd went off well. Generals Freyberg and Kippenberger were there, with the Rt. Hon. W. J. Jordan. Decorations presented included an MC won in the Solomons by Captain Blundell, [3] who had joined the 4th Field. Concerts and parties followed.

Freyberg had briefed ‘lieutenant-colonels and above’ at San Severino on 18 March for the forthcoming crossing of the Senio. [4] Training for this task with the newly-formed 9 Brigade [5] was the main feature of the curriculum. After meticulous checking of every detail under their control that could lead to inaccuracy, the field gunners demonstrated the firing of divisional stonks and ‘murders’. They fell with remarkable precision. Then the 5th Field fired a regimental ‘murder’ with the seldom-used Charge 1 and it attracted much attention. This, too, fell very well. B Troop of 31 Battery with new DS 17-pounder ammunition [6] penetrated the thick front glacis plate of a German Panther tank at 800 yards. [7] The assembled 9 Brigade saw all this and was impressed. Then each battalion advanced behind a brief creeping barrage. Two of them, the Divisional Cavalry Battalion and 27 Battalion, had not previously done this and the gunners were on tenterhooks. But no shells fell short and the whole series of demonstrations was highly successful, inspiring confidence among the inexperienced infantry.

Doubts had been cast, before these demonstrations, on the accuracy of the gun B4 of the 5th Field, however, and B Troop was incensed. What is described in the 5th Field war diary as ‘an extremely accurate observed shoot’ took place again on the 29th; but it had a special point. Huck Sawyers had challenged the B Troop officers and they agreed that B4 should fire 20 rounds at a large but distant cross on the top of a mountain above RHQ. Large bets were taken by B Troop on whether or not one of the 20 rounds would land within 100 yards of the cross. When the verifying committee climbed the mountain and ascertained the results it reported that no fewer than 11 rounds had fallen within that distance, so B Troop won handsomely. It was lucky for them that the cross survived undamaged.

The expectation of a breakthrough followed by mobile warfare delighted the 7th Anti-Tank. It meant that 31, 32 and 33

Batteries would become real anti-tankers again. The M10s would advance in close support of the tanks and the 17-pounders would take over at every pause. The crews of both trained for direct fire. They conducted several reconnaissances and occupations of positions and carried out live shoots. The heavy mortar crews practised to increase their speed into and out of action and they, too, did much range firing. The survey troop worked hard for all the artillery and their surveying was swift and accurate.

Before Brigadier Queree got back from leave, Colonel Stewart had to visit 5 Corps at the front and a signal of 13 March stated that ‘Any matters arising at NZA are to be referred to Col Sawyers’. So in effect Sawyers was acting CRA for two or three days. Soon after Queree got back, however, he had to enter hospital and was there until 1 April. Stewart became acting CRA again for a week. After that Stewart went on to the New Zealand Roll. Major Nolan had returned from furlough on 28 March. He became CO of the 4th Field, and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel.

The 4th Field would miss Gordon Stewart. He had been longer as a battery commander with his unit and then CO than any other regimental commander. The others had mostly served in more than one regiment; but Stewart had been with the 4th Field throughout. Stern on formal occasions, inspiring in action, he could be agreeably relaxed at other times. His instructions to Tongariro men who had been celebrating and then learned that they had to parade before the GOC in Forli were that they were not to leave their trucks if they did not feel up to it. When Stewart himself farewelled them he said, ‘You seem to have the makings of first-class civilians. If you see me in Queen Street or Lambton Quay, don't forget to buy me a beer. I'll probably be selling shoe-laces.’

The 6th Field and 7th Anti-Tank also changed their commanders. George Cade was medically graded and thereby robbed of the distinction of leading the 6th Field in their final campaign. Shirley Nicholson replaced him on 30 March and Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Savage, an anti-tanker from the earliest days, took over the 7th Anti-Tank.

[1]
L-Bdr J. R. Boyes; Birmingham, England; born NZ 20 Aug 1904; commercial traveller.

[2]
Gnr R. Henderson; Te Awamutu; born NZ 20 Dec 1913; dairy farmhand.

[3]
Capt P. M. Blundell, MC; born Wellington, 10 May 1919; trainee newspaper administrator; killed in action 16 Apr 1945.

[4] See Geoffrey Cox, The Road to Trieste (Heinemann, 1947), pp. 11-15.

[5] The machine-gunners had been converted into 27 Battalion and were brigaded with 22 Battalion and the Divisional Cavalry Battalion.

[6] DS = discarding sabot. The light sabot and the not-so-light base-plate fell off after leaving the barrel and the tungsten-carbide core with its hardened cap and ballistic cap carried on towards the target at a tremendous velocity.

[7] Another type of anti-tank ammunition then available was APCBCHE—armour-piercing cap, ballistic cap, with delayed-action HE charge.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Sudden Move to the Front

A Sudden Move to the Front

The women of the villages worked hard as the end of the month approached, ‘cleaning up their casas and baking feverishly for the big fiesta of Easter Sunday’, the G Troop diary explains,

‘and most of us had been invited to dine with various families on that day’. Easter fairs at Castel Raimondo and other places brought country people into town with their bullock carts. Eggs went up in price from 16 to 20 lire each. Preparations for a grand 4th Field dance on Easter Monday were far advanced. A wonderful weekend was in the offing. But all the schemes suddenly fell flat.

Church parades were held on Good Friday, but COs did not attend. Instead they went to Artillery Headquarters and learned of an immediate move to the front. Reconnaissance parties left in the afternoon or evening. Batteries followed in the next two days. Secrecy was vital and elaborate deception plans had been drawn up. But neither the villagers nor the enemy were deceived. Tearful farewells showed how little credence the villagers placed on the story they were told of a temporary move to Ancona. The coincidence of the departure with the Easter gatherings in the villages made what were meant to be hush-hush moves something more like carnival processions. A mortar battery diarist describes it thus:

‘Just on midday, as we were deeply immersed in thoughts of the fun ahead of us, Clicker [Lieutenant McCliskie] stalked in with a stricken look and the news that we were moving pronto. This rocked us … but we didn't have time to moan…. Much scurrying about ensued as we scattered in all directions to collect our washing and cancel our Easter engagements.’

Vehicle markings disappeared under a washable distemper issued for the purpose; but Italians along the route could tell at a glance that the men were New Zealanders. The columns of vehicles did not strike Route 9 until after dark and at their destinations north-east of Faenza the gunners had to keep out of sight.

The countryside had put on its spring clothes and wore them well except for one detail. Dust had replaced mud and roadside notices warned drivers that ‘Dust Brings Shells—Shells Bring Death’. But this was only faintly jarring. The front, on a loop of the Senio north and north-east of Faenza, had a peaceful air. Artillery of 78 Division on the right carried out normal firing tasks and only one battery each of the 5th and 6th Field and none of the 4th Field were allowed to join in. They would all have plenty to do when the time came. Meanwhile the gunners competed with the infantry—and on the left the Poles—for the few available casas.

History was in a sense repeating itself. The 2nd New Zealand Division, like its predecessor of 1918, was the strongest division in the theatre. It had three infantry brigades and an armoured brigade and they were all up to strength. It had a unanimity of tactical doctrine achieved through long, shared experience and a confident co-operation of all arms. There was a high level of self-sufficiency in transport and rear services, the knowledge of solid support from home, and enormous esprit de corps.

In 1945, in addition, there was the incalculable advantage of being led by the most experienced divisional commander in the world and one who remained young in mind and adaptable. Freyberg's personal graciousness, moreover, permeated his headquarters, predisposing those who worked there or came and went on their various affairs to be considerate of other points of view. In Colonel Gilbert the Division had a chief staff officer who had shown gallantry in action at Medenine and over a long period at Cassino, and whose experience of operational staff work dated back to the time when he was BM of the Divisional Artillery in 1941. In Major Cox [8] it had an intelligence officer with a penetrating insight into German intentions. The main land fighting resources other than its own on which the Division had to depend for the forthcoming battle were those of the Royal Artillery, which Freyberg had always regarded as the best-trained and best-led part of the British Army (a judgment with which the New Zealand gunners warmly concurred).

[8] Maj Sir Geoffrey Cox, CBE, m.i.d.; London; born Palmerston North, 7 Apr 1910; journalist; editor, Independent Television News, London.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Forthcoming Offensive

The Forthcoming Offensive

The outcome of the operation was not a foregone conclusion. Eighth Army, with resources little greater—except in artillery and air support—than those it had had for the Alamein offensive, now proposed to deliver the coup de grace to a far stronger army than Rommel's. The German Tenth Army had more than nine divisions and there were two more in reserve behind it. News of a succession of military disasters on other fronts had not robbed the German Army in Italy and its allies of their resolution and resilience, and they still numbered over 600,000 men (all but 100,000 of them reliable) and had more than 2000 guns. An Indian division on the right, the New Zealand Division in the centre and a Polish division on the left were to attack across the Senio and then the Santerno, if possible in such a way as to keep the enemy unbalanced so that the front could not again crystallise and no more costly set-piece attacks would be needed. Success on the Eighth Army front would allow the Fifth Army to stream down from the mountains and overrun the western part of the Po Valley and the Plain of Lombardy.

The New Zealanders could see this grand panorama only through their imaginations. All their eyes showed them, on the two miles they held up-river from south of Cotignola, was the near stopbank, in places some way off, and the tops of a few casas and other buildings beyond it. The infantry therefore spent the first few days of April pushing forward through the vineyards which stretched like bowling alleys towards the stop-bank, infested with trip-wires and mines and covered by ‘Span-dau Pete’, until they reached it—not without loss. In this the gunners could give little help, though the 6th Field fired DF and counter-mortar tasks. The four troops of heavy mortars, deployed 1000 yards from the river, were strictly forbidden to fire. The stopbank and enemy-held buildings beyond the river could easily be seen from the upper windows of their casas. Nebelwerfer rockets and mortar bombs landed all round them from 3 April onwards and they had four men wounded; but they could not reply.

The same silence was imposed on the M10s and 17-pounders of the 7th Anti-Tank. Though this irked the anti-tankers, it turned to their advantage when the enemy staged his heaviest bombardment for many months in the night 6–7 April. Most of it was directed at known gun positions, and the New Zealand guns, as yet unlocated by the enemy, attracted no attention. The M10s of C Troop, however, stationed under trees well behind the 4th Field, were in one of the target areas. A shell, striking a tree above C2, burst downwards into it and set it on fire. Sergeant Hill
[9] at once climbed down into the open turret, grabbed the fire extinguishers, and tried to put out the fire. Small-arms ammunition was exploding around him as he did so, the air was filled with choking fumes, and there was grave danger that the charges of the 3-inch ammunition would ignite. The extinguishers were not enough and Hill called for water to be handed down to him. With it he managed to quench the fire. While he was doing so another shell exploded under the gun. Had Hill not acted so promptly and persisted as he did the M10 would undoubtedly have become a total wreck. For his efforts he was awarded an MM.

[9]
Sgt W. A. Hill, MM; Greymouth; born Greymouth, 27 Sep 1920; carpenter.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Changes in Equipment and Methods

Changes in Equipment and Methods

Brigadier Queree and his staff [10] had been waiting to start work on the programme for the Senio crossing. They had complete confidence in the instrument at their disposal, the Divisional Artillery. Its years of campaigning had rubbed off all the rough edges. In the Florence campaign the artillery staff work had stood the test of a fast-moving and complicated operation. Time-wasting procedures had been eliminated. Lengthy operation orders, for example, had been reduced to a few lines stating the bare intention and the starting time—H-hour—of the fire plan, followed by the barrage trace incorporating all related instructions and the various tables of concentrations, together with the DF tasks covering the infantry objective. The long period with the Canadian corps, with its very different artillery methods, gave a new perspective from which to criticise and improve NZA methods. One of Queree's own contributions was to see that divisional control rested more lightly on his regimental commanders. In quickly-changing situations he wanted them to use their own initiative and not place too much reliance on massive divisional concentrations.

Recent operations had led to several improvements. If the pace of the advance past the many water obstacles beyond the Senio was to be maintained, reconnaissance, surveying and occupation of new field-gun positions would have to be carried out at high speed. Queree had evolved a drill for this which in the weeks to come was to pay golden dividends. When the question first arose of moving forward he would make up his mind which of his field regiments would move first and issue a preliminary warning. He and his staff would study maps and photographs and select an area. Then, if possible, Queree would fly over in an Air OP Auster and study the ground and approaches. If all looked right he would then advise the regiment, and the officers concerned would know that everything possible had already been done to ensure that the new gun position was suitable. Reconnaissance parties, cut down to bare essentials and mounted in jeeps, with the surveyors, would then go forward and lay out the new positions. When the gun groups moved forward their positions were taken by the regimental B Echelons. Unexpended ammunition left on the gun positions would then be picked up as a matter of course. There was no need to waste time and obstruct road traffic reconnoitring B Echelon areas. Drivers always knew where to find their B Echelon.

Another drill that had an important bearing on operations related to the so-called H net of wireless communications. This linked about 16 stations within a field regiment, plus the Air OP and the CRA, on one frequency. Over this net, linking the CO, his battery and troop commanders, and others, passed orders for regimental fire and moves and intelligence reports, as well as many other operational messages. All were recorded by all receivers, avoiding repetition. [11]

The changes in vehicle establishments which took place in the rest area in November and again in March greatly increased the efficiency of the transport. The most important was the replacement of section quads and trailers with three-tonners. It gave rise to nostalgic reflections; for the quads with their three trailers carrying ammunition had been a familiar sight whenever the field artillery was on the move. But they were slow and clogged the roads and gun areas. The three-tonners could dump their ammunition on the gun position and then be off to collect more. They were more easily handled and took up much less room on the road.

[10] The chief staff appointments were:

Maj S. F. Catchpole | BM
Capt R. J. H. Webb | Staff Captain
Capt F. H. Mullins | CMO
Capt R. D. J. C. Moffat | CBO
Capt R. D. P. Hassett | GSO III
Capt C. E. H. Pledger | IO

Capt J. W. Sternberg commanded H Section, Divisional Signals, Lt M. E. Wilson was the NZEME at Artillery HQ, and the Rev. O. R. Marlowe was the padre.

[11] The H net usually worked well; but for the first few days of the Senio battle Poles transmitting on frequencies too close to the NZA ones caused much interference with all wireless communications.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Changes in Personnel

Changes in Personnel

There had been an infusion of new blood, too, in the reinforcements recently absorbed. Many of these were ‘dehydrated officers’ or gunners who had served in the Pacific, contagiously enthusiastic. The departure of the Tongariro men, among them many senior NCOs, led to the promotion of men who had long deserved this recognition and who were now intensely anxious to prove themselves as troop sergeant-majors (TSMs) or Nos. 1 on the guns or in other appointments. In the 4th Field, for example, the Tongariro men numbered 118 and they included a major, a captain and three lieutenants, all of them from the 1st, 2nd or 3rd Echelons. They also included 11 warrant officers class two, of whom seven were ‘old originals’ of the regiment.

There were 35 staff-sergeants, sergeants and lance-sergeants, eight of them ‘originals’. The sergeants were nearly all Nos. 1 or in charge of signals detachments. The lance-sergeants were evenly divided between signals and ‘acks’—OPAs, CPOAs and GPOAs. Between them they embodied enormous experience and skill; but they had eager ‘understudies’. Some of the Tongariro men, moreover, after the desert campaigns and the long-drawn-out fighting in Italy, were showing signs of strain. A handful of ‘originals’ volunteered to stay with their units.

The regimental commanders, Nolan of the 4th Field, Sawyers of the 5th Field, Nicholson of the 6th Field and Savage of the 7th Anti-Tank, were all 1st, 2nd or 3rd Echelon men; but Savage was the only one who commanded the regiment in which he had sailed from New Zealand.

The second-in-command of a regiment had to have on the tip of his tongue answers to a wide range of operational and administrative questions. The ‘2 i/cs’ were therefore all old hands: Reed in the 4th Field, Angell in the 5th, Harrowell in the 6th and Spring in the 7th Anti-Tank. Half the battery commanders were old hands and half newcomers. In the 4th Field all were newcomers. In the 5th there were two old hands, Majors Dillon
[12] and Caughley. [13] In the 6th Major Hanna was the only old hand. In the 7th Anti-Tank there were three old hands, Majors Lund, Butcher and M. M. Robertson, and one newcomer, Major Henton. [14] It was a nice blend of freshness and experience.

[12]
Maj G. F. L. Dillon, m.i.d.; Blenheim; born Blenheim, 30 Apr 1917; sheepfarmer; wounded 8 Sep 1942.

[13]
Maj J. E. Caughley, m.i.d.; Wanganui; born Christchurch, 16 Feb 1919; insurance clerk; Bty Comd, 5 Fd Regt, 1945.

[14]
Maj E. I. Henton; Singapore; born NZ 4 Sep 1910; insurance manager.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Artillery Plan

The Artillery Plan

When General Freyberg, the CRA and the brigade commanders [15] and their staffs studied the Senio line they knew from bitter experience that the undramatic landscape could conceal great defensive strength. [16] Higher authority, too, at Corps and Army had concluded that the crossing of the river and the many water obstacles beyond it up to and including the Santerno would call for an unprecedented weight and variety of preparatory and supporting fire and they had gone to extraordinary lengths to provide this. When 5 Corps Operation Order No. 48 arrived late on 3 April it heralded the greatest assault ever staged by Eighth Army: Operation buckland.

At Artillery Headquarters discussions and preliminary work on the programme took up the 4th. Then, next day, with most points at issue settled, the staff began their huge task. The BM did the barrage traces from the outlines given by the CRA and three teams of two officers each superimposed the barrage outlines on overprinted 1: 25,000 maps and worked out timed concentrations for the medium guns, the heavies, and any other guns not used in the barrage. Each type of gun had to fire not less than a specific distance ahead of the barrage and this called for careful checking. The plotting was checked and also the application of the grid constant correction. The CRA satisfied himself that all desired areas were included in the concentrations and that the assaulting troops would not be endangered.

Then all was put on stencils and the first prints were run off. These were examined minutely, checked and rechecked. Each concentration had to be passed as ‘safe for our own troops’. Then 45 numbered copies of ‘2 NZ Div Arty Operation Order No. 15’ were printed and distributed, together with copies of the 29 appendices. Only one copy of the operation order went to most recipients, but as many as 42 copies of certain appendices went to some of them, in accordance with their requirements. The order, signed at 9.25 p.m. on 6 April by Major Catchpole, was by far the most complicated of the NZA operation orders of the Second World War and the number of appendices was easily a record. [17] Early on the 8th command post staffs went to work converting their part of the programme into zero switches, elevations, ranges and timings. For the heavies and super-heavies there were some intricate calculations. Finally the programme reached down to gun crews, who had to compile their own records and prepare their ammunition. At every stage on the journey down from 5 Corps the programme entailed checking and checking again. Carelessness could cost the wrong lives, and there was not a man from the CCRA downwards who could view that with equanimity.

A novel feature of the NZA order was a series of ‘dragnet’ barrages. The 5 Corps order provided for five ‘gun attacks’—‘First Gun Attack’, ‘Second Gun Attack’ and so on—on the Senio defences, but left the details of them to the two assaulting divisions. They were to be part of a four-hour softening-up process in the afternoon, before the infantry assault. The NZA ‘gun attacks’ took the form of creeping barrages of up to eight lifts to be fired by the three NZA field regiments, the 1st RHA, the 17th and 158th Field, and the 5th and 75th Medium. These would roll over the stopbanks and on into the countryside beyond. Then they would suddenly shorten and hit the river line again, in the hope of catching the enemy off his guard. Each one of the five had a different sequence of lifts. Some such stratagem was called for: the enemy had had many months in which to strengthen his posts on the stopbanks to withstand artillery fire. Too much could not be expected of a standing barrage on the river line. The 25-pounders would be far more effective if they could catch the enemy in the open.

Each ‘gun attack’ was to be followed by a 10-minute silence from all guns and mortars, during which the fighter-bombers would strafe the river line. Then the rest of the interval between gun attacks would be filled with enfilade fire to strike the enemy side of the stopbanks, in conjunction with HF tasks by two field regiments on the river line. The enfilade fire was to be by a medium battery and a field battery (of 78 Division) and a squadron of New Zealand tanks. The HF tasks were to be shared between the 5th and 6th Field, the 1st RHA and the 17th and 138th Field.

Concurrently with the gun attacks, the 142nd Army Field (SP) and a heavy ack-ack battery would fire a mortar neutralisation programme; mediums, heavies and super-heavies of 2 AGRA would fire CB tasks or concentrations, all of them linear concentrations or ‘murders’; and 34 Battery and eight American 4.2-inch mortars of the 1st Kensingtons (from 78 Division) would fire linear concentrations and ‘murders’ close to the river.

These are the bare bones of the programme; but they give some idea of the seriousness with which Eighth Army faced up to its last great set-piece attack and of the work that was put in to ensure that not a single infantryman or assault engineer would go in unsupported—that each would have all the help that the various artillery staffs could provide and that every known or foreseeable source of trouble would receive attention from guns or mortars. Even in the great battles of the First World War which took months to prepare there was never more thorough planning than this. For attention to detail—and each ‘detail’ was the whole of life for those whose lives were being risked—the artillery programme of Operation buckland was a masterpiece. Never was there a more imaginative and meticulous artillery plan—and never a finer instrument for its execution.

D-day was 9 April, a day which dawned bright and clear with not a cloud in the sky. The 4th Field gunners became axemen and cleared away trees which affected their crest clearances, ruining the careful camouflage of the gun positions. In the 5th Field 47 Battery moved forward at 5.30 a.m., 27 Battery at 7 and 28 Battery at 7.30. By 9.20 a.m. all three had recorded zero lines in their advanced barrage positions. Battery and troop command post staffs surrounded themselves with sheaves of paper as they made their final preparations. All field regiments and the mortar battery made last-minute meteor corrections. Ammunition was already stacked and prepared. All figures were checked and checked again. [18]

[15] Colonel T. C. Campbell ( 4 Armd Bde), Brigadiers I. L. Bonifant ( 5 Bde), Ike Parkinson (6 Bde), and W. G. Gentry ( 9 Bde).

[16] No doubt they recalled that from the south-east Point 175 was hard to discern on the ground, or that Ruweisat exercised a dominance over the surrounding desert out of all proportion to its mere 20 feet or so of elevation. On the other hand, dramatic topography like that of the Vale of Tempe could be weaker tactically than it looked.

[17] See Appendix II, pp. 743- 8.

[18] A late change, signalled to the 5th Field at 2 p.m. and the 4th Field not until 3.55, was that each lane of the opening line of the main barrage was to be regarded as a separate DF task and each regiment was to be ready to fire on any one of the six. This caused much extra work; but no such DFs were called for.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Senio Crossing

The Senio Crossing

H-hour was 7.20 p.m., and the programme was to open at H-hour minus 240—3.20 p.m. By noon all was ready and, as the 4th Field diary states, ‘an air of expectation settled over the front’. Then heavy ack-ack guns began to fire a line of airbursts, high in the sky, to mark targets for the 500 heavy bombers, Flying Fortresses and Liberators, which began to drop 20-pound fragmentation bombs in the enemy's rear areas. The line of airbursts passed directly above 34 Battery, fragments of shell casings began to fall like rain, and the mortarmen had to put on their steel helmets. This they did not like. But their attention was soon caught up with a throbbing in the air and the glinting silver high overhead of the heavy bombers, awe-inspiring but uncomfortably reminiscent. Those who had served at Cassino kept within a handy distance of their slit trenches. A few bombs fell behind them; but none came near. Medium bombers dropped patterns of bombs as they had done in the desert campaigns. Fighter-bombers dive-bombed and machine-gunned closer at hand and some of them fired rockets. The heavies reappeared and a solitary parachutist descended, having fallen out of his rear turret. Along the whole front the ground erupted into brown dust which rose like a fog.

All that could be had from the ground was a limited and local view; but from the air all the many pieces of the com- plicated supporting programme fitted together like a huge jigsaw puzzle and the picture they made was dramatic indeed. A New Zealand pilot ‘saw a dense mass of dust arising from the heart of the defensive positions across the Senio. Stretching right back to the coast was a double line of white smoke flares, the final of the two just on our side of the river being orange, with Lugo a mile or so beyond…. Flame-throwers … leaning against the Senio stop-banks, poured a grim barrage of flame at the hapless enemy in dugouts. All along the line, little flashes of flame flickered through the evening haze…. It was awe inspiring….’ [19]

the opening attack across the senio
Dotted lines show the brigade boundaries and the area covered by the barrage

The last meteor telegram did not arrive until quite late and caused last-minute scribblings and corrections. Then the first of the gun attacks began, together with CB and CM tasks and timed concentrations fired by all natures of equipments up to the huge 240-millimetre guns of the 54th Super Heavy, as well as two kinds of 4.2-inch mortars. The heavy mortar company of the 1st Kensingtons of 78 Division, with eight American 4.2s, had come under the command of 34 Battery for this purpose. The noise of the guns going off, of the shells and mortar bombs in the air, and of the explosions on the stopbanks and beyond, the shuddering of the ground, and the thickening of the curtain of smoke and dust over the river, though not nearly so spectacular as the bombing and shelling of Cassino, were impressive in other ways and far more effective.

The mediums as well as the 25-pounders in the gun attack opened on the line of the river and picked it out, as a Divisional report says, ‘With superb accuracy’ and ‘with an intensity which came as an appalling shock to the enemy troops manning the F.D.Ls’. For 27 minutes the ground and air vibrated as a greater weight of shells fell on the Divisional front than along the whole of the Eighth Army front in the Alamein bombardment. An equal weight was at the same time falling on the front of 8 Indian Division to the right and also on that of 3 Carpathian Division to the left. [20]

The end was not quite so abrupt as the beginning. One or two guns fired after the rest and their shells seemed to swish lazily overhead and there was a pause until the sound of the bursts came back. Then, for 10 minutes, every gun was silent and the fighter-bombers and rocket-firing aircraft wheeled— slowly as it seemed—and strafed the stopbanks. For the watching gunners this was a dramatic interlude. A medium and a field battery and a squadron of tanks then began to enfilade the river defences, picking out in particular targets such as dug-in tanks, previously located.

The same pattern followed for the four remaining gun attacks (though each was in detail different) and the intervals between them. The last one ended with smoke from one gun per troop, a signal to the waiting flame-throwers—‘Crocodiles’ and ‘Wasps’ —and infantry. Then, after four hours, the guns paused and for two minutes the fighter-bombers made dummy runs to keep the heads of the defenders down.

This was at 7.20 p.m., just before dark. ‘By this time Jerry's lines presented an awesome spectacle’, according to the 27 Battery diary. ‘Against a great high wall of smoke glowed a line of “brew ups”, the red flashes of air bursts and the streaming smoke canisters.’ The infantry were moving forward with their various burdens—boats and kapok bridges—and in front of them the Crocodiles and Wasps. It was the climax of the assault. ‘Finally as the fighters made their dummy runs and the guns commenced to hammer away in earnest, the great gushes of flame from the flame-throwers added the last wrathful touch to a panorama of destruction.’ So the diarist and many others with him saw it. They saw the sun sink quickly and the pinpoints of flame get brighter. They saw the searchlights create artificial moonlight. On the field guns they saw the flickering of the layer's torch, they heard the oddly musical sound of empty cartridge cases, and they smelled pungent burnt cordite—all familiar to old hands, but in combination a powerful drama to the newcomers.

The flame-throwers could not curl their flames down to the far side of the stopbank and they did not disable many of the enemy. But with the shelling they demoralised him and there was negligible opposition. Prisoners were soon filing through the vineyards towards the guns. The heavy mortars fired for 90 minutes after H-hour, mainly at points in the village of Cotignola on the right flank. Then G Troop of 34 Battery ‘stood at the gate for a while’ and were pleased to see ‘large bunches of Jerry prisoners already beginning to come in’.

Eight field regiments fired the 24-lift barrage on a frontage of 3000 yards, a 25-pounder to every 15 yards, and their fire was thunderously augmented by concentrations from five medium regiments and a heavy regiment, as well as by a 25-pounder regiment, a 105-millimetre SP regiment and two troops of 3.7 heavy ack-ack guns all on CM tasks. Very few shells came back; but F1 of 47 Battery suffered a bad premature which blew away the muzzle brake and the end of the piece, though no crew member was badly hurt. By 11 p.m. it was all over. Not a single DF or any other task was called for in the night, and that in itself was testimony to the extraordinary effectiveness of the artillery support.

For some hours FOOs and LOs with the infantry worried about tanks reported at various points on the front; but the infantry dealt with them, the sappers bridged the river, and tanks crossed in the early hours, with the M10 and the 17-pounder troops of 32 Battery. The M10s of 33 Battery crossed at 6 a.m. on the 10th and the 17-pounders followed. A and B Sub-batteries of heavy mortars established themselves well forward across the river by 8 a.m. in support of 5 and 6 Brigades respectively. [21] The SP 105s of the 142nd Field were also across the river and the 4th Field prepared to follow, though they did not get across until the late afternoon. By nightfall another field regiment, the 1st RHA, with SP 25-pounders, was also across. The New Zealand sappers had done their work well and their bridges carried not only New Zealand traffic but also Polish fighting vehicles on the left. The Indian division on the right and the Polish one on the left had a much harder time. They first had to reach the stopbank. The Poles failed at the outset to effect a river crossing and the Indians, though they succeeded, lost many men in bitter fire fights.

[19] Quoted by Wing Commander H. L. Thompson, New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, Vol. III, Mediterranean and Middle East; South-east Asia ( War History Branch, Wellington, 1959), p. 238.
The coloured smoke was used to mark targets for aircraft. Some were opportunity targets engaged by the ‘cab-rank’ of fighter-bombers called by ‘Rover Paddy’, ‘Rover Jack’, etc. Some were ‘Timothy targets’—areas marked by coloured smoke at prearranged times to coincide with the scheduled arrival of fighter-bombers or medium bombers. Some were nighttime targets for medium or heavy bombers.

[20] The corps plan allowed a maximum of 400 r.p.g. for field guns for the five gun attacks and for the barrage at night there was no restriction at all. But the NZA field guns fired between 550 and 650 r.p.g. all told and it proved ample.

[21] The heavy mortars fired 3072 rounds in two hours to cover the river crossing. The 4th Field fired 13,480 rounds in 24 hours, the 5th 14,897, and the 6th 14,509 (a new record for the regiment). The total of 42,886 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition was easily the largest number ever fired by the three NZA field regiments in a 24-hour period.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Pushing on to the Santerno

Pushing on to the Santerno

A 13-lift barrage by six field regiments had been intended to cover an advance in the afternoon of the 10th to a canal line well on the way to the Santerno; but it was not needed. Instead the field regiments brought down observed fire as the infantry pushed on. The 4th Field had recorded zero lines by 4.35 p.m. and began to fire at once. The 5th Field pushed 27 and 47 Batteries forward to the lee of the stopbank at noon; but 28 Battery had so many fire orders it could not move until late afternoon. The 6th Field had to cope with a fluid situation on the 6 Brigade front and to alter DF tasks to conform not only with the infantry advance, but with the movements of 20

Armoured Regiment. The front had stabilised sufficiently by nightfall, however, for the 6th Field to fire many DF and HF tasks after dark.

from the senio to the gaiana, 9–17 april 1945

The 10th was another clear day and the air force was again active. ‘Tin hats were worn for a while’, the 27 Battery diary remarks, ‘as the heavies were over again and the ack-ack markers were dropping their shrap in the gun area.’ OP parties had to be careful not to get too far forward and get caught in the showers of fragmentation bombs. Captain Thomson
[22] of 47 Battery was one who had a very lively time. He was guarding the right flank against counter-thrusts from the direction of Lugo and his OP vehicle, a Sherman tank, was frequently under fire. Several times his wireless operator, Gunner Barrett, [23] had to take his radio set out of the tank and set it up in various buildings from which Thomson was observing. Invariably this had to be done under mortar and machine-gun fire. At 5 p.m., for example, near Lugo, when the tank was under direct small-arms fire, Barrett got out with his set and began operating in the open. He established contact with 47 Battery and Thomson called down fire which fell no more than 100 yards away. This overcame a stubborn centre of opposition and enabled the advance to continue. For this and similar efforts Barrett won an immediate MM.

Reconnaissance parties of the 5th and 6th Field were across the Senio soon after dawn on the 11th. After a busy night of DF and HF tasks the batteries followed. They and the 4th Field and anti-tankers before them were profoundly impressed by what they saw as they crossed the Senio and entered the belt of land which had been the target of the guns and aircraft on the 9th. ‘Great scenes of destruction’, the 27 Battery diary says; ‘trees, houses, etc. destroyed—dead animals everywhere.’ The blackened stretches of stopbank scorched by the flame-throwers, the little muddy stream, and then in the fields beyond thousands of black shell holes with jagged edges, mutilated trees, damaged casas, and the enemy weapons and gear scattered everywhere gave the newcomers a vivid insight into the violence required to dislodge a determined enemy from well prepared positions. Even so, the tempest of fire had left many deep-dug positions in the stopbank intact.

A kind of feed-back action now operated against those who caused this destruction; for many of the casas used by OP parties, gun or mortar crews, and others farther back were anything but safe and the tremendous blast of nebelwerfer rockets or 170s brought several of them down on top of their occupants. Many FOOs would have felt far safer in the open; but they had to work from the upper storeys of buildings in order to get useful observation in that flat countryside.

The New Zealand infantry were the spearhead of the Eighth Army and they carried the line of the Santerno without a formal attack. But it was a wider river than the Senio and there was a critical period before it was bridged and tanks and other supporting arms could get across. The enemy counter-attacked strongly and in the afternoon of the 11th the guns fired many urgent DFs. The ‘cab-ranks’ of fighter-bombers were kept busy and the Air OPs directed many shoots against tanks and other targets. The 6th Field were very busy indeed towards evening and the 5th Medium, who this day came under the direct command of the CRA, were in action near them. Even the huge 7.2s were firing at targets not far from the New Zealand FDLs. The 4th Field fired a quick barrage with the 1st RHA to help the Maoris across the river. Both the 4th and the 6th Field fired coloured smoke to mark targets for the fighter-bombers. The 4th Field fired just under 3000 rounds all told, the 5th Field over 2000, and the 6th Field nearly 10,000. Between them they did much to discourage enemy counter-attacks on the Santerno bridgehead.

A Sub-battery of heavy mortars, in close support of 5 Brigade, and B Sub-battery with 6 Brigade, had an arduous and unpleasant day. A shell landing beside a signals jeep of K Troop wounded a bombardier and gunner in the afternoon, and in the evening a direct hit on a casa occupied by K Troop fatally wounded Lance-Bombardier Dow
[24] and injured a gunner.

At the height of the action in the afternoon, when enemy fire at the Santerno bridgeheads was heavy, the maintenance of communications called for courageous effort on the part of signallers of the mortar battery and the field regiments. In the 6th Field, for example, Major Hanna pushed his 29 Battery OP well forward to a house 400 yards from the enemy to bring down neutralising fire on weapons holding up the advance of 24 Battalion on the left. Fire on the neighbourhood became so heavy that nearby tanks withdrew. This seemed to attract attention to the house itself and at least seven direct hits were scored on it by shells and mortars. Hanna's OP vehicle was a Honey tank chassis with no ‘top cover’ against this fire. It was parked against the house, and in it Lance-Bombardier Roberts
[25] ‘cheerfully and without complaint’ (as Hanna later wrote) transmitted vital fire orders until the enemy fire was subdued. Roberts gained an immediate MM.

Radio communications were becoming increasingly difficult, however, because of overloaded wireless nets, a surfeit of high-priority signals, and interference. No effort was therefore spared to establish and maintain telephone lines wherever possible. Lance-Sergeant Mullin
[26] of F Troop, 47 Battery, was one of the many signals NCOs involved. In the night 11–12 April he was ordered to lay a line to the future Tac HQ of 23 Battalion, a location chosen from the map and then occupied by the foremost company. His only guide was a map reference. He set out at once and had the line working by the time the first HQ officer of the battalion arrived. But then he had to maintain it. Every time it was cut he went out and repaired it. New Zealand tanks were almost as bad in this respect as enemy guns and mortars, and Mullin saw that he had to follow their movements closely so as to be able to repair the line when they broke it. For three hours in the night he was in the open under fire. Next day under sniper fire he laid a line by hand across the Santerno to a village not fully cleared of enemy. Mullin had been through most of the desert fighting and had served in all the Italian actions. He was overdue for a decoration and at last won an immediate MM. Bombardier Transom
[27] of C Troop, 47 Battery, was another who did essential work cheerfully and efficiently. He was in charge of the maintenance of the troop transport and worked long hours under difficult conditions to keep it roadworthy. At the same time, by his good example, he encouraged all the troop drivers to do their work well.

The 12th was another bad day for 34 Battery. G and H Troops were both across the Santerno early in the morning and they were heavily shelled. The signals exchange house of A Sub-battery suffered several direct hits in the afternoon and part of it collapsed. Sergeant Walker
[28] and Gunner Redward
[29] suffered mortal injuries and two others were badly hurt. All the anti-tank batteries crossed the river and they captured several Germans.

[22]
Maj P. S. Thomson, ED; Auckland; born Christchurch, 26 Mar 1915; warehouseman; troop commander, 17 Fd Regt, 3 NZ Div, 1942-44; Bty Comd, 5 Fd Regt, 1945.

[23]
Gnr R. C. Barrett, MM; Wellington; born Auckland, 12 Jun 1922; draughtsman.

[24]
L-Bdr W. G. Dow; born NZ 29 Feb 1916; labourer; died of wounds 11 Apr 1945.

[25]
Bdr W. Roberts, MM; Auckland; born Auckland, 31 May 1921; nurseryman.

[26]
L-Sgt E. J. Mullin, MM; Dunedin; born Balclutha, 27 Oct 1914; insurance inspector.

[27]
Bdr C. Transom; Napier; born Pio Pio, 26 May 1914; tractor driver.

[28]
Sgt L. Walker; born Dunedin, 30 May 1915; Regular soldier; died of wounds 12 Apr 1945.

[29]
Gnr H. W. Redward; born Napier, 14 Jan 1917; barman-porter; died of wounds 13 Apr 1945.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Near Massa Lombarda

Near Massa Lombarda

For the field regiments it was a very busy day indeed. It started for the 5th Field with a quick barrage to cover a dawn attack by the Maoris, followed immediately by a ‘murder’ and then a stonk. Then a Tiger tank attracted several ‘murders’ before it departed. From the quick barrage onwards it was a brilliant demonstration of field artillery skilfully controlled to ease the burden of the infantry.

By mid-morning it was evident that the enemy needed a rather harder push than he was getting from the local pressure applied at various points along the front. Brigadier Queree therefore arranged a fire plan called kettle in which, for 68 minutes from 3 p.m., the 4th, 5th and 6th Field and the 1st RHA fired a 12-lift quick barrage covering an advance in the Massa Lombarda area to the right front. No sooner was this under way, however, than further orders came for an even heavier programme, carpet, which included a barrage by five field regiments (including the 142nd SP). Command posts and gun positions were the scenes of almost frenzied activity as staffs tried to keep pace with demands.

kettle caused or prompted explosions near Massa Lombarda and then Air OPs reported a general enemy withdrawal and much congestion of traffic, including horse-drawn artillery, near that nondescript village. A 10 r.p.g. corps concentration was brought down and then the 5th Field and medium and heavy guns fired on three targets indicated by the Air OPs. It was impossible to report that these shoots were carried out, because the wireless waves were hopelessly jammed by high-priority signals. Four Air OPs at once were calling for artillery fire and dive-bombing attacks, and one such message was recorded by 47 Battery as follows:

‘Tell dive bombers to bomb any road near Massa Lombarda—they couldn't miss—really good targets.’

For an hour before dark wonderful targets were offering and the 5th Field took full advantage of them, firing 10,576 rounds this day—far more than the other regiments.

carpet was replaced by doormat, a much smaller programme by the 4th and 6th Field, fired from 2 a.m. on the 13th, and with its help the infantry entered Massa Lombarda at dawn. OP and reconnaissance parties had a warm welcome from civilians and came upon dozens of partisans ‘running around with guns of all sorts mopping up the odd Ted [ Tedescho = German]’, as the 5th Field diary puts it.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Sillaro

The Sillaro

The guns had to compete with masses of other transport as they pushed forward towards the next river obstacle, the Sillaro, and dust rose in great choking clouds. By a prodigious feat of administration Artillery Headquarters nevertheless got five field regiments and two medium regiments across the Santerno and provided them with enough ammunition for another set-piece attack. In the evening Brigadier Queree reported to General Freyberg: ‘Every gun I own is now on the ground here and in action…. The amn is up and the fire programme is out’. Heavy and light ack-ack guns were also forward.

The excitement engendered by the sudden collapse of resistance the previous afternoon was now dampened by the hardening of opposition and the discovery that fresh troops had been put in against the Division. The 6th Field gun positions outside Massa Lombarda were on the fringe of an area heavily shelled by 105s and RHQ was inside this area. Tactical Headquarters of the Division nearby was hard hit and the 6th Field RHQ moved to escape the worst of the shelling. [30]

Lieutenant-Colonel Sawyers asked for and received permission to rest the 5th Field on the 13th and they did no firing. But they moved up to new positions so far forward that the infantry in the neighbourhood were startled. They were not used to sharing their foremost casas with members of 25-pounder gun crews. The 6th Field also moved well forward, into a flat, exposed area with many enemy dead in it and three burnt-out tanks. The 4th Field moved 26 and 46 Batteries forward, but

25 Battery, which was engaging targets, did not move until after dark. At 2 a.m. on the 14th all three regiments plus the 1st RHA and 142nd Field (SP) fired a 300 r.p.g. quick barrage, codenamed Foxy, to help the infantry up to and across the Sillaro below the village of Sesto Imolese.

the division's route to the adige, 9-27 april 1945

The attack went well; but the infantry claimed that one gun was firing short. About 3 a.m. 46 Battery reported that one gun was ‘making a screaming noise’. To be on the safe side DF tasks were raised 100 yards. But a 4th Field battery commander reported at 7.38 a.m. that one DF ‘fell in own F.D.Ls’ and the regiment added 200 yards to the DF tasks. All fire orders were checked and no errors found. No further infantry complaints were logged until 15 April, but NZA observers kept reporting tasks falling short, though other tasks fell perfectly. In this region, flat as a billiard table, it was extremely hard to establish accurate bearing pickets or to find suitably distant aiming points. Enemy 105s, plentiful on this front, might have been responsible. One or two guns could have been faulty: many of them had been overworked. But even a brand-new gun, F1 of the 5th Field (replacing the one which suffered a premature), was found to be crimping its cartridge cases. All kinds of possibilities were investigated; but the mystery remained unsolved.

[30] The move was notable for one of many examples of devotion to duty by members of signals sections attached to NZA units. Lance-Sergeant J. W. Johnston of G Section, Divisional Signals, held open wireless commanications under fire until the last possible moment and then supervised the move of his detachment. He was later awarded a BEM.
In the ceremonial parade of the NZA in March Corporal L. J. Bartlett of H Section, attached to HQ NZA, had been decorated with the MM. Signalman L. A. Lyon of F Section, attached to the 5th Field, had been awarded an MM for the Sangro crossing.
The gunners were greatly indebted to these and other brave members of the attached signals sections.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Spaniel: a Masterpiece of Planning and Administration

Spaniel: a Masterpiece of Planning and Administration

The Division passed from 5 Corps to 13 Corps on 14 April and 2 AGRA stayed with the former. A great weight of artillery consequently came directly under the CRA's command, straining his resources and those of the Divisional Signals, particularly H Section. At the same time the Division was attracting enemy reserves away from the Argenta Gap to the north-east and from the Bologna front. This clearly meant more heavy fighting, and both the CRA and General Freyberg called for even more artillery. The CCRA of 5 Corps responded vaguely to their requests at lunch on the 14th. Queree therefore took the matter up directly with Eighth Army Headquarters, asking for the 75th Medium, the 2nd RHA, a survey battery and a meteorological section. To Freyberg he reported that he hoped to have a heavy battery of 7·2s and another of 155s by nightfall.

Infantry losses were already considerable (though remarkably light in relation to the strength of opposition overcome) and 9 Brigade therefore came into the line on the left as 6 Brigade sidestepped into 5 Brigade positions, 5 Brigade going into reserve. Freyberg had hoped to stage a set-piece attack—Operation Spaniel—to crack the Sillaro line in the night 14-15 April. When he learned that the 75th Medium and 2nd RHA would not arrive until next day he postponed Spaniel for 24 hours: ‘… we are not competing for a prize’, he remarked.

The inexperienced infantry of 9 Brigade were heartened by the confident deployment of A Sub-battery of heavy mortars in their support. Major M. M. Robertson reconnoitred under small-arms and shell fire in front of the leading tanks and got his mortars into action on the forming-up line of the infantry. His gunners were able to give support over the full distance of the attack—the first staged by 9 Brigade—and the infantry were greatly reassured. For this and similar efforts Robertson gained an immediate MC.

In Sesto Imolese a church tower gave excellent observation over the left of the Divisional front and A Troop of 31 Battery was called forward to deal with it. The M1os fired 17 rounds and scored 17 hits, breaking down one side of the tower and rendering it useless as an OP. On the 14th, too, Major Macindoe, [31] 25 Battery commander, who had served with 3 Division in the Pacific, was slightly wounded. Another shell struck the window of a room in which he was awaiting medical attention, however, and mortally wounded him. The 5th Medium fired at very close range into Sesto Imolese and its 5·5-inch shells did enormous damage and helped to destroy six tanks.

The CRA's staff had meanwhile been working very hard indeed on the fire programme for Spaniel. H Section Signals were reinforced, but they had to lay lines to 15 units now under the CRA's command and to many sub-units. Even with an extra line detachment from 4 Signals Squadron and a maintenance detachment from 13 Corps, it was as much as H Section could do to keep up with demands. Telephone exchanges were overloaded. Wireless worked well though there were 25 stations on ‘forward control’ and 25 more on ‘stagger net’. Despatch riders had their busiest time of the war.

To the new corps commander, Lieutenant-General A. F. Harding, and his CCRA, Brigadier V. C. Green, it seemed impossible that Queree's staff could complete in just over 24 hours a programme very nearly as heavy as that of Operation Buckland, which had taken a far larger staff weeks to prepare and promulgate. Harding had told Freyberg by telephone the previous evening that he would supply all the additional artillery the Division needed and was sending forward the 152nd and 154th Field, the 75th and 78th Medium, a survey battery and a meteorological section. But at lunch with Freyberg and Queree on the 15th Harding and Green urged a further postponement of Spaniel. Queree would not hear of it. Everything was well under control, he assured them, and all would be ready in good time. Even Brigadier Parkinson had misgivings. ‘It will be an

“amateurish” shoot because the regiments are just getting into position now’, he pointed out to Freyberg after 3 p.m. in relation to flanking fire from the Indian division on the right. But by 6 p.m. the last ‘t’ was crossed, the last ‘i’ dotted, and all was ready. As a feat of planning, administration and signalling it was superb, and probably, of its kind, equalled only by Austin which followed three nights later.

spaniel began at 9 p.m. on the 15th with a barrage fired by the three NZA field regiments, the 1st and 12th RHA and the 104th and 152nd Field; concentrations fired by the 142nd Field (SP), the 5th and 75th Medium and a Polish medium regiment; a CB programme by the 76th Medium and 61 Battery (155s) of the 32nd Heavy; and a CM programme by a battery each of the 142nd Field and the 55th Heavy Ack-Ack. Bofors guns marked the boundaries and also make-believe boundaries beyond the flanks to make the enemy think the attack was on a wider front than the 3000-odd yards covered by the barrage. Everything went like clockwork. It was a flawless performance. The infantry nevertheless had a hard fight in places, especially on the left flank, and they were not surprised to find out in the morning that they were up against the still-formidable 4 Parachute Division. Several DF tasks were called for after the barrage ceased at 11.50 p.m.

Captain Bain
[32] of 26 Battery was with 22 Battalion, and when the infantry struck heavy opposition he quickly established an OP. From this he controlled the fire of the 4th Field and also of other regiments and did much to break down resistance. About 100 prisoners were taken. Then Bain moved on and after dawn he again brought down accurate fire which helped the infantry to capture about 50 more paratroops. For this and for later work at the Gaiana canal Bain earned an immediate MC.

Another 4th Field decoration earned in this period was that of Gunner Anderson
[33] of 25 Battery. He was a wireless operator in an OP also in support of 22 Battalion. For three days he worked his set in an open troop-carrier, passing not only fire orders but messages for the infantry when their own communications failed. Most of this time he was under shell and mortar fire. Anderson gained an immediate MM.

The 4th Field began to move forward at first light on the 16th to positions just behind the Sillaro, in a heavy ground mist which delayed the survey for a short time. The 5th Field followed a little later, crossing the river and deploying in a large field much obstructed by ditches. The 6th Field moved in the afternoon to gun positions also near Sesto Imolese across the river.

[31]
Maj R. K. G. Macindoe; born Auckland, 21 Sep 1912; factory manager; died of wounds 14 Apr 1945.

[32]
Capt T. M. V. Bain, MC; Whangarei; born Christchurch, 14 Mar 1915; insurance officer.

[33]
L-Bdr C. A. Anderson, MM; Wellington; born Feilding, 28 Dec 1919; civil servant.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Gruesome Effects of Artillery Fire

Gruesome Effects of Artillery Fire

Roads were jammed with vehicles and these moves were slow and dusty. The 5th Field were in what had been their own barrage lane and they were at once thrilled and appalled to see their own handiwork. Enemy machine guns and mortars were still in position. A group of houses in the 27 Battery area had been in course of preparation as a strongpoint when the barrage hit them like the wrath of a tribal god. Dead were lying in all directions, with wounded here and there among them and equipment scattered in utter confusion. The gunners formed burial parties and worked hard to clear the area. The wounded were cared for and evacuated. The casas were, as the war diary says, ‘heavily knocked’. A German SP gun fired a few rounds but did no harm, and for the rest of the day there was little firing. The 6th Field found the village of Sesto Imolese in ruins, with many dead among them. There were several knocked-out tanks or armoured SP guns in the neighbourhood; but they had fallen victim either to medium guns directed by Air OPs before the attack or to the infantry in the course of it.

The 4th Field relieved OPs in the afternoon and in so doing found that Captain Blundell was missing. Only a few weeks before he had paraded at Castel Raimondo to receive his MC for bravery at Vella Lavella in the Solomons. In the end a search party found his body on the bank of a canal. He had been killed by a stray shell. The 25th Battery was much upset and several members attended his burial at Massa Lombarda.

The heavy mortars were well forward, as usual, and lost three men wounded on the 16th by mortar fire. The survey troop of the 7th Anti-Tank had a busy time indeed, establishing bearing pickets this day not only for the NZA regiments, but for the 1st RHA, the 5th and 76th Medium and 61 Heavy Battery. In flat land with visibility restricted by vines and hedges this was not easy work.

The 5th Brigade now relieved the 6th and 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade of Gurkhas joined the Division. [34] Together with the attached artillery and strong air support, this gave Freyberg a force of great power and mobility. But the profusion of canals and ditches defended by a stubborn enemy did not permit rapid movement. Eighth Army, moreover, placed a restriction on the supply of ammunition until Freyberg objected strongly. He sensed that there would be at least one more sharp fight before he could break through into open country.

The little town of Medicina on the left had already fallen to the Gurkhas and on the 17th the guns moved forward again, the 6th Field to the town, the 5th Field a little to the north-east, and the 4th Field farther back at Crocetta, short of the Scolo Sillaro. Artillery Headquarters was in front of the 4th Field and across the Scolo. The infantry were lining up facing the Gaiana, an insignificant canal feeding a tributary of the Idice some miles to the north. But it was to prove a nasty obstacle.

These moves took the gunners through scenes of even greater destruction than before. They passed many German paratroops dead in their weapon pits. Equipment had been abandoned in great quantities, especially in and around the town. The 6th Field saw some gruesome sights in the battered streets, and the enemy was adding to them by long-range shelling with heavy guns. In the 5th Field area were many destroyed SP guns, and the office of 27 Battery was beside three 150s disabled by bombing.

The infantry were having a sticky time and many calls reached the 6th Field for supporting fire. It was therefore vital to get communications established and to maintain them. Throughout the afternoon 48 Battery was harassed by shells and mortar bombs. But Lance-Sergeant Farthing, [35] in charge of the battery signals, mended many breaks in the lines regardless of the fire and inspired his men to do likewise. A signals sergeant of the 5th Field ‘cut a magnificent figure’, according to a battery diary, as he did his rounds on horseback.

One of the astonishing features of the situation at this stage was the liveliness of the enemy artillery despite the serious losses inflicted on it in the past few days. ‘We must get CB going’, Freyberg remarked in a conference on the 17th; ‘they have a lot of guns.’ He asked for even more guns. Then, to the CRA, he said,

‘Anything we can do in the next four hours to discourage this fellow opposite us is all to the good. They are fresh from the mountains and haven't been shelled for some time. We will have to educate them.’

This was at 10.30 p.m. A quick barrage had already been planned to support a thrust across the Gaiana and all was ready when it was cancelled. DF tasks had already been drawn up and were being fired; but more were now provided on the Gurkha front.

[34] Artillery specially attached for Spaniel had departed. The arrival of 43 Brigade brought the field artillery up to six regiments and a battery: the NZA regiments, the 23rd Army Field, the 1st RHA (SP 25-pounders), the 142nd Field (SP 105s) and a battery of the 15th Field. Besides these there were a regiment of 4·5s, five regiments and a battery of 5·55, a battery each of 7·25 and 155s, and the 307th Heavy Ack-Ack (3·7s). It was a formidable array.

[35]
L-Sgt J. R. Farthing, m.i.d.; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 19 Aug 1908; accountant.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Gaiana Canal

The Gaiana Canal

Next day, 18 April, Artillery Headquarters prepared a far heavier programme and a much deeper barrage for a night attack, and the 4th Field moved forward to Medicina so as to be able to reach the finishing line. [36] The commander of the Gurkha brigade wanted a slightly slower rate of advance than usual. ‘My fellows have very short legs’, he said. ‘They have short legs but they move them mighty fast’, General Freyberg replied. ‘They'll keep up all right.’ At Corps Headquarters there was some anxiety that Freyberg might be too extravagant with artillery ammunition. But, after first underestimating the importance of the Gaiana position, he now felt that the enemy, by posting his troops well forward on this line, had exposed himself to what might prove to be a knockout blow. At lunch he remarked, ‘This will be the most important battle we have fought in Italy’. There were two worries. The stubborn and skilful paratroops, fanatical Nazis to a man, even under a holocaust of shells might inflict heavy loss on the attacking infantry. Or they might slip away and the shells would explode on empty ground.

Guns and programmes were checked and rechecked. A special late Meteor telegram went out at 8 p.m. Corrections were made. Then at 9.30 one of the greatest of the NZA bombardments began and the enemy was there to receive it. The barrage started with the equivalent of six field regiments (including 105s) and two medium regiments on a frontage of 3600 yards along the Gaiana stream. After a jump of 500 yards and then a half-hour pause, it began the first of 31 lifts to a depth of over 3000 yards, in conjunction with a CB bombardment of 18 hostile batteries, a CM programme, and many timed concentrations, all ending at 1·40 a.m. on the 19th. A field battery, four medium regiments, a heavy battery and a heavy ack-ack battery fired the concentrations and a light ack-ack battery marked the boundaries, including dummy ones on both flanks. [37] It was about the same number of guns as in Spaniel, but they fired 60 per cent more shells.

The barrage, as Nicholson of the 6th Field says, ‘opened with a mighty roar and for 30 mins blotted out the line of the canal’. The moon was up and there were no searchlights to start with. When the medium guns lifted their fire the infantry began to move up to the stopbanks, led by the flame-throwers. As the 25-pounder fire lifted, Nicholson continues, ‘we could see from RHQ the Crocodiles and Wasps going in to make the night sky lurid with their fierce tongues of flame…. It was a fascinating and appalling sight that made even the Senio show seem tame. Apart from the few who got away, little over 200 dazed and horrified prisoners survived that murderous attack.’

This was true of the enemy on the stopbanks and their immediate environs; but the enemy was posted in greater depth than had been bargained for. Well-dispersed and well dug in, paratroops survived and fought on. But their fighting spirit was ‘badly impaired’ by the barrage and they found the flamethrowers ‘very alarming’, according to an intelligence summary next day. The commander of a paratroop battalion deserted, an unparalleled occurrence, and he claimed that the barrage was the worst he had experienced—worse than at Velletri in the break-out from the Anzio beach-head. The 5th Field diary, on the other hand, remarks that the stiffening of resistance by the paratroops as compared with the German infantry previously encountered was ‘very noticeable’, and that their use of guns and mortars ‘is far more aggressive’. The 6th Field diary mentions ‘very heavy opposition’ and says that the enemy ‘fired many DFs with arty, nebels and mortars in FDLs and fired airburst shells back at gun areas’. What the enemy fired, however, was a mere bagatelle compared with the 72,491 rounds fired under NZA auspices in Operation Austin—nearly 30,000 of them by the three NZA regiments.

The enemy retreated slowly before 9 Brigade on the 19th and there were many calls for support from the 4th Field. Lieutenant-Colonel Nolan had personally deployed his OPs, and he skilfully controlled the fire of his own regiment and at times of other regiments. He was later awarded a DSO and, though the citation mentions 18 April, it was clearly this day that was chiefly intended.

The 5th Field moved to near the large village of Villa Fontana and did not like their new surroundings. There were the familiar vineyards and orchards with knee-high corn between the trees; but there were also stretches of open, bare country, unfenced and with very few casas and even more canals, streams and ditches than before. The casas and the crossroads (often close to each other) attracted much fire. The digging was hard and some troops used explosives to make holes for gun pits. They soon found, however, that the enemy was watching and was quick to bombard the scene of such an explosion.

The 4th and 6th Field both moved very early on the 20th to the same general area, close to or astride the Gaiana, and they were shocked by what they saw of the battlefield contested by the Gurkhas and paratroops. The green uniform of the paratroops identified many bloated bodies beside the muddy stream. The banks were blackened by flame-throwers. Here and there dead Gurkhas and enemy lay side by side. Some of the German bodies, as the 5th Field diary says, ‘had been ground into the road by the advancing tanks’. ‘Even in the fading light the destructive effect of that fierce barrage was evident on the ground’, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson says, ‘but it was not till I passed over the canal next day with Bde HQ that the full devastation struck home. At no other time in this war had I seen such evidence of massed dead in the wake of an attack.’

[36] This fire plan, like all others from Operation Buckland onwards, provided for DF tasks on both flanks as well as the front after the barrage was fired. The Division was out in front and its flanks were never properly covered.

[37] The medium regiments were the 5th, 75th, 76th and 78th, the heavy battery was 61 of the 32nd Heavy, and there were 307 Battery of the 55th Heavy Ack-Ack and 195 Battery of the 52nd Light Ack-Ack, as well as the 1st RHA, the 23rd and 142nd Field, and all but a battery of the 15th Field. The flash-spotters and sound-rangers of 46 Survey Battery helped to provide the HB locations, and 5 Survey Troop of the 7th Anti-Tank did much of the surveying-in of regiments.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Across the Idice

Across the Idice

Again 5 and 6 Brigades were in the lead. The 6th carried the Idice on the left by seizing a ford. The 5th crossed on the right on a frontage of 800 yards under a 15-line quick barrage fired at very short notice indeed by the 5th Field, starting at 1 p.m. In the afternoon all three field regiments moved again, this time to far more attractive areas near Budrio. Again the 4th

Field was the unlucky one, getting shelled and losing one man killed [38] and seven men wounded.

Another fire programme began at midnight on the 20th. It contained all the usual features. From their Idice bridgehead 5 Brigade infantry advanced 1000 yards north-westwards on a frontage of 2000 yards. To cover them the 4th and 5th Field and the 23rd Field fired a 200 r.p.g. 15-line barrage, standing half an hour on the starting and finishing lines. Two field batteries concurrently fired concentrations on the right flank, another field and a heavy ack-ack battery fired CM tasks, a battery of 4·5s and one of 155s fired CB tasks, and a battery of 5·5s and one of 7·2s fired concentrations in depth. All other available guns harassed the flanks from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. on the 21st.

It was standard practice; but it was arranged with lightning speed, as the 5th Field timings show. The first word reached the regiment at 6·53 p.m, giving just the starting time and the number of rounds per gun. The batteries had moved forward and it was more than a quarter of an hour later that 27 Battery recorded zero lines. Then Lieutenant-Colonel Sawyers telephoned at 8·45 p.m. the details of the attack and the artillery programme, and these had to be passed on to batteries. The troops had barely three hours in which each had to work out its part of the barrage and prepare 800 rounds. Before midnight, however, the 5th Field fired two regimental ‘murders’, a troop ‘murder’, and possibly other tasks not recorded in the regimental logs. (At 11.50 p.m. Sawyers reported that the last of the ‘murders’ caused 35 paratroops to surrender.) But this was not all. Between 9 and 10 p.m. 13 DF tasks were ordered in support of 5 and 6 Brigades and they were to come into force as soon as the barrage ended. They were all stonks and they, too, had to be prepared in advance. If they were needed at all it would be in a great hurry. Then, at 1·55 a.m. on the 21st, while the barrage was being fired, Sawyers ordered four HF tasks, each lasting an hour.

The barrage and other artillery fire raised dense clouds of dust and smoke in a night that was already misty. It was not easy to see how the infantry were progressing. Enemy seemed active on the Scolo Fiumicello a mile and a half beyond the Idice, and the guns shelled that watercourse. Between 2·30 a.m. and 3·15 the 5th Field fired six DF tasks, and one of them, according to a report at 3 a.m., ‘completely demolished’ an enemy concentration. If Huck Sawyers was pleased he kept it to himself. At 3·30 a.m. he signalled testily, ‘DFs not going off fast enough. Gunners to be more awake.’ In the end all was well. The infantry gained their objectives, the sappers in due course bridged the Idice, and the chase was on. By the evening of the 21st the Division was four miles past the Idice.

[38] Gunner F. J. Green.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

A Rapid Advance towards the Po

A Rapid Advance towards the Po

The infantry did not push on fast enough on the 21st for the reconnaissance party of 34 Battery, Major M. M. Robertson and Lieutenant Bates, [39] and they took nine Germans prisoner when they entered a house in the early afternoon. They handed them over to a rather surprised infantry platoon when in due course it reached the scene. Next day the heavy mortars travelled nearly 15 miles and went into action on the banks of the Reno, a much bigger river even than the Idice, and the 4th Field were not far behind. The M10s of 31 Battery deployed on the flank of 9 Brigade and the 17-pounders dug in. The 32nd Battery reached the Reno at 2 a.m. on the 23rd. The M10s of 33 Battery clashed briefly with paratroops at S. Giorgio, killed 10 of them and captured five, and then moved on. Infantry clung to both the M10s and the tractors of the 17-pounders as they drove on.

It was a triumphal march, the like of which had not been seen before in Italy. ‘The countryside was virtually untouched by the war and was a pleasure to look at’, the 4th Field diary says. ‘The Casas are getting bigger and better…. The people are obviously glad to see us and stood in groups with flowers and Vino ready to regale any who were fortunate to halt near them.’ G Troop of 34 Battery were astounded to find tables set out and a meal waiting when they reached their deployment area. The villagers had learned from the reconnaissance party how many men were in the troop and had catered accordingly. By the time the mortars [40] were set up all was ready and the troop sat down to a feast of eggs, bread and wine.

The Division, now moving in brigade groups, [41] did not cross the Reno where the gunners first struck the river; it turned northwards and put across two bridges south of the town of

Bondeno on the 23rd. ‘There is much impatience by everyone to chase Jerry a little further and a little harder’, the 5th Field diary says this day. Next day the guns and heavy mortars crossed the river and drove towards the Po. The mortars went into action about 1000 yards from this great river, and the 5th and 6th Field moved into gun positions east or north-east of Bondeno on the 24th. The 5th Field found that the British 6 Armoured Division was already in the area and that another armoured brigade was moving in. By a rapid occupation of a gun position the 5th Field ‘squeezed 7 Armd out presto’, as the diary puts it.

In the course of these moves the regiments had run ‘off their maps’ and were in urgent need of sheets covering the Po and the Adige beyond it. The CRA, in discussing fire support for a crossing of the Po, thought he could supply just enough maps for regimental use; but the map situation was serious until maps were flown forward on the 25th.

[39]
Capt J. C. Bates; Auckland; born Christchurch, 23 Jul 1915; company director.

[40] The 34 Battery gunners always called them guns.

[41] The 4th Field and 31 Battery supported 9 Brigade, the 5th Field and 32 Battery 5 Brigade, the 1st RHA and 33 Battery 6 Brigade, and presumably the 23rd Army Field supported 43 Brigade (of Gurkhas). A and B Sub-batteries of 34 Battery would support whichever of the brigades were forward. The 6th Field remained with a gun group directly under the CRA. This included the 5th Medium and various other units and sub-units.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Crossing the Po and the Adige

Crossing the Po and the Adige

South of the River Po the countryside was littered with abandoned equipment and transport, and many horses, left behind by the Germans when they retreated across the river, roamed through the gun positions. Bondeno itself, a clean little provincial town, was largely deserted.

In a variety of boats, rafts and amphibious transport 6 Brigade crossed the Po silently in the night 24-25 April and 5 Brigade crossed under a hastily arranged artillery programme—the last NZA programme of the war. This was simplicity itself. Just before midnight [42] Artillery Headquarters ordered four stonks to be prepared. The 142nd Field (SP) was to prepare Fox, the 1st RHA Wolf, the 5th Field Lion and the 6th Field Tiger. The four reference points were spaced along the northern bank of the river between the villages of Stienta and Gaiba north-west of Ferrara. From H-20 (20 minutes before H-hour) to H-16 they were to fire on the stonk line, from H-16 to H-12 100 yards beyond it, from H-12 to H-8 200 yards beyond, from H-8 to H-4 300 yards, and then from H-4 to H-hour they would fire back on the stonk line. From H to H + 5 they would fire 400 yards beyond.

This was reminiscent of the ‘dragnet’ barrages forming the gun attacks which started the Senio offensive. H-hour was to be 1 a.m. on the 25th, which meant starting at 12·40 a.m. and left very little time indeed. But at 12.10 a.m. Artillery Head- quarters signalled that H-hour was changed to 1.30 a.m. At the same time a further series of 200-yard lifts was added as follows:

H+5 to H+15 | up 600 yards
H+15 to H+20 | up 800 yards
H+20 to H+30 | up 1000 yards

Six DF tasks in support of 5 Brigade were also announced and in due course several of them were fired, with modifications ordered by FOOs. The 34th Battery fired 300 rounds per troop across the river.

The dragnet barrage, the four-lift creeping barrage (if it could be called that) and the subsequent tasks—totalling about 75 r.p.g.—worked like charms and the infantry struck very little trouble. The gunners then had only two things to worry about: getting across the river and obtaining maps of the ground northwards to the Adige and beyond. The maps arrived at noon; but the gunners spent the rest of Anzac Day anxiously awaiting word to cross the river. Reconnaissance parties crossed the pontoon bridge in the evening, the 5th Field followed and recorded zero lines by 10.15 p.m. in positions near the large village of Ficarolo, the 6th Field crossed at midnight, and the 4th Field had to wait until the late afternoon of 26 April.

The crossing of the Po seemed highly symbolic, and as the pontoon bridge bobbed up and down under the weight of their vehicles gunners tingled with excitement. Two 17-pounders of 33 Battery crossed by pontoon raft. The 34th Battery used the bridge and ‘Fantail’ ferries, and A Sub-battery deployed in positions halfway to the Adige in the late evening of Anzac Day. The chase had begun and only the M10 crews were left out. They had to wait for a stronger bridge and could not cross until the end of the month.

Ammunition could not easily be replaced until the P0 was adequately bridged, and there was a strong possibility that the crossing of the Adige would require a fire programme. Shirley Nicholson was therefore in a quandary when his FOOs reported enemy in large numbers in and around Badia Polesine and near the river. ‘With my fingers crossed I gave orders for heavy concentrations to be put down among them’, he wrote later. ‘Joyfully the OPs went to work while I fearfully tallied the rounds expended.’ The enemy was soon demoralised and began to surrender in hundreds.

By the end of the 26th all three NZA field regiments were deployed near Badia Polesine to cover a crossing of the Adige, a fairly wide and very fast-flowing river. OPs had orders to be as aggressive as possible, and 48 Battery did several shoots with Air OPs, scoring hits on vehicles and starting several fires. Captain Smythe, [43] the commander of E Troop, 30 Battery, had reached the area with the leading company of 25 Battalion. When the company met opposition he occupied an exposed OP and, heedless of fire directed at him, brought down accurate shellfire on the enemy and ended resistance south of the river. He at once directed fire across the river and effectively covered infantry and sappers as they reconnoitred crossing places. Smythe was with the leading infantry when they crossed.

An LO from medium and heavy artillery—4.5s and 155s—reported to the headquarters of 6 Brigade and explained that the guns were south of the P0 and had no prospects of crossing for some time. They had plenty of ammunition and wanted to get some shooting in before the enemy passed out of range. Nicholson found out that these guns could reach 5000 yards beyond the Adige. Good OPs were by this time established in Badia Polesine and were calling for fire. The 6th Field had closed down and were moving forward, and Nicholson therefore gladly relayed the fire orders back to the mediums and heavies. For three hours the gunners south of the P0 laboured happily and their shells did much to shatter the already waning morale of the enemy across the River Adige.

Bombardier Hampson
[44] of 28 Battery of the 5th Field was also among the leading infantry—in his case 21 Battalion—when they crossed the Adige. He was OPA to Captain Christie, [45] and as Christie says, ‘he was always keen to do a little more than his position required’. The infantry were almost inundated with prisoners and had to provide guards and escorts for them. While these were away an infantry sergeant reported enemy in a nearby house. Hampson and the sergeant then rushed the house and Hampson killed two Germans. After clearing the house, Hampson continued to advance with a reserve platoon which came forward and helped to mop up several other pockets of resistance. For this he earned an MM.

Next afternoon Smythe and his OP party, including his OPA, Lance-Sergeant Walsh, [46] joined a patrol of 25 Battalion to find out the condition of bridges beyond the Adige. The patrol removed the detonators from charges attached to one bridge and then, after further investigation, the patrol leader was killed and Smythe assumed command. He found that fire was coming in from all sides and several more men had been hit. Walsh volunteered to make his way through to infantry half a mile away to get help and, with great difficulty, he got through, crawling part of the way along ditches or hedges and coming under fire several times. Meanwhile Smythe himself calmly reported back by radio and then skilfully extricated the survivors of the patrol and the 19 prisoners they had taken and brought them back to the battalion without further loss. Smythe was awarded an immediate MC and Walsh the US Bronze Star.

[42] The 5th Field were advised at 11.50 p.m. on the 24th.

[43]
Capt E. R. Smythe, MC; Invercargill; born Christchurch, 21 Aug 1916; warehouseman.

[44]
Bdr G. J. Hampson, MM; born NZ 8 Jul 1922; student; died Christchurch, 18 Nov 1947.

[45]
Capt M. Christie; Brighton, Otago; born Hawarden, 25 Dec 1911; clerk.

[46]
S-Sgt R. T. Walsh, Bronze Star (US); born Wellington, 20 Jan 1922; insurance clerk.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Race to Padua

The Race to Padua

The 12th Lancers, under New Zealand command and with the OP of D Troop of the 6th Field, made fast progress on the 28th, and 9 Brigade and the Gurkhas followed as fast as they could. Rain came on quite heavily, but it did nothing to dampen the enthusiasm of the welcome accorded the ‘liberators’ as they passed through villages and towns. ‘We reckon the field [gunners] can have their quads, the tankies their Shermans and the infantry their 3 tonners’, the diarist of G Troop, 34 Battery, remarks; ‘when it comes to “liberating” there is only one vehicle and that is the good old jeep.’

Gunner Guthrie
[47] had driven the OP vehicle of D Troop of the 6th Field from the Senio. It was out in front with the 12th Lancers approaching Padua on the 29th when it suddenly came under heavy machine-gun fire and the OP party quickly dismounted and took cover. The fire intensified and it seemed likely that the vehicle would be destroyed, thereby breaking contact with the guns. Guthrie therefore climbed back into the vehicle under fire and drove it to a place of safety. For this and similar efforts during the advance he was awarded an MM.

The field gunners, and especially the surveyors, were already getting tired of occupying positions from which the guns did no firing. The 4th Field did this again on the 28th before Este, then pushed on through the town in the evening, intending to stay the night halfway between there and Padua. But partisans now claimed to have seized control of that ancient city and called for help. On went the tanks and guns, therefore, in bright moonlight. Nicholson of the 6th Field describes it thus:

‘Tension was very high now and at 2200 hrs we started out on an eerie move to join the great column racing through the night for Padua. It was a weird thrill to see enemy signal flares, red, orange and green, going up in the hills to our left, some ahead, some close by and others far behind. But the great mass of transport, tanks and guns roared steadily on. Away twelve miles or more to the south the glow of searchlights and flashes of guns from 5 Corps sector showed where the Adige and the main front still lay. Ahead stretched the straight road to Padua and by midnight we knew that our forward elements had reached the town.’

At midnight the moon disappeared and the rain poured down. At 3 a.m. in pitch darkness the 4th Field entered the city. They were vaguely aware of arcaded streets, and in them an exultant populace was still very much awake. At the outskirts 25 Battery deployed.

from padua to the piave

Next morning the 4th Field prepared to move on; but the remnants of a panzer division, rumours and reports had it, were approaching from the south-east. Lieutenant-Colonel Nolan deployed 46 Battery in an anti-tank role covering the road.

After hours of exuberant celebrations and processions and bonfires and whispered greetings in the dark streets of Padua, the gunners had to wrench themselves back into a more warlike mood. The guns of 25 and 26 Batteries went down on their platforms and their crews began hastily to dig trenches, aided by the ubiquitous partisans. A few shells whistled overhead and the 4th Field replied with scarcely a pause for a full hour. The approaching column broke up, three tanks caught fire, and the threat was removed. But in the course of the action some men of 25 Battery set about cutting down trees which affected the field of fire of their guns. When one of the guns, A4, had a premature in front of the barrel it killed one of these men, Gunner Dawber, [48] and wounded three others.

Through cheering crowds the 4th Field moved on in the afternoon along a fine road towards Mestre. The civilian population was effervescent with joy at all places along the road. Venice was no more than a tantalising vision to the right. The oncoming traffic was mainly of prisoners, walking or driving, escorted by partisans, or unescorted. On beyond Mestre the columns hastened and at nightfall the regiment went into action by Musile di Piave, ready to aid a crossing of the Piave River. There the gunners learned that strafing fighters had mistakenly attacked 46 Battery transport and killed Second-Lieutenant Coleman
[49] and wounded two others. The 4th Field was living up to its reputation for bad luck: neither of the other two field regiments had so far had even one man killed since the crossing of the Senio. In 24 hours the 4th Field had advanced 80 miles from the Adige, including the pause at Padua in which they fired off 337 rounds.

The 6th Field had deployed by Battaglia when the 4th Field engaged the enemy at Padua; but no targets appeared. Then there was delay in getting through the city, but the regiment made good progress in the evening, passing through the defences of the Venetian Line—the strongest of all the German fortifications in Italy—and halted at the River Sile, eight miles short of the Piave. The D Troop OP entered Venice with the 12th Lancers and next day 6th Field gunners were allowed there on leave while they awaited the bridging of the Piave.

[47]
Gnr L. F. Guthrie, MM; Napier; born NZ 20 Feb 1916; farmer.

[48]
Gnr C. Dawber; born Greytown, 18 Jan 1922; labourer; killed in action 29 Apr 1945.
Another 4th Field gunner, S. J. Wendleborn, disappeared in the course of the advance and was presumed dead.

[49]
2 Lt R. H. Coleman; born NZ 6 Jun 1914; insurance clerk; killed in action 29 Apr 1945.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

From Venice to the Piave

From Venice to the Piave

In such a situation the irrepressible Huck Sawyers of the 5th Field, who had been following the 6th, could be expected to be out in front looking for trouble. He had reconnaissance parties well forward to find out what was happening and to prepare for deployment. When he found that this was not called for, however, he pushed on into Venice and was the first Allied soldier to enter the city, beating the D Troop FOO of the 6th Field (as the diary of that unit admits). It was 1.50 p.m. on the 29th when he signalled that he was there, and Major Angell, Second-Lieutenant Thompson
[50] (the IO) and Second-Lieutenant Stewart
[51] (the regimental survey officer) soon joined him. ‘The reception was tremendous’, the 5th Field diary states, ‘as we had passed the tanks by many hours.’ The regiment spent the night at Marcello, a few miles beyond Mestre. On 1 May Sawyers left the 5th Field for well-deserved leave home and Lieutenant-Colonel Hanna replaced him.

The various parts of the 7th Anti-Tank (other than the crews of the M10s who were biting their fingernails as they waited to get across the P0) shared these experiences. On the 30th, however, the heavy mortar battery—with its jeeps by far the most mobile of the Divisional Artillery—took the lead when A Sub-battery crossed the Piave by ferry and spent the night at San Dona di Piave. In the late afternoon 26 Battery of the 4th Field also crossed; but 25 and 46 Batteries became engaged in a sharp clash with enemy counter-attacking 9 Brigade from the south-east. For nearly two hours both batteries fired vigorously, using up 1486 rounds. During this time Bombardier Mercer, [52] the radio operator for the 46 Battery FOO, Captain Davis, [53] came under small-arms and mortar fire; but he continued calmly and efficiently to work his set from the back of a jeep. The fire called down by Davis undoubtedly helped to keep down casualties in 27 Battalion. It was a splendid example of observed shooting by night. Davis, for this and earlier work, gained an MC and Mercer was in due course awarded an MM. The transport of the 4th Field had meanwhile continued to cross the Piave and at the end of their action 25 and 46 Batteries followed, about 2 a.m. on 1 May.

The destination was now Trieste and there were several river lines in between of great natural strength which might yet be defended as they had been in the First World War. On 1 May, however, it soon became evident that only isolated pockets of enemy remained and that, except for mopping up, the war in that part of Italy was over. The advance continued at high speed. The bridges on the main road were intact except that across the River Stella, where there was a 12-mile detour. A Sub-battery of heavy mortars were the leading gunners, with 31 Battery less the M10 troop, followed by the 4th Field. It was a flat land at first of vineyards and olive groves with riotously happy inhabitants at every township or group of buildings. Hundreds of Italians conscripted to work in Germany were trudging back home, however, weak and ill-clad. At Monfalcone, well on the way to Trieste, Italian flags gave way to red-starred flags, and the welcome from the local people dropped from boiling point to lukewarm. Tito was the hero there and next to him Stalin. It began to rain.

On 1 May 47 Battery was attached to 21 Battalion to help round up prisoners. But they first had to be persuaded to surrender and some of them were prepared to argue about this. The first task was near the Piave, not far from where the 4th Field had been engaged the day before. Some 4000 prisoners were taken and then, on 2 May, the battalion went to investigate the landing from naval craft at Lignano, near the mouth of the River Tagliamento, of 6000 or more Germans. These were very argumentative indeed until they saw 47 Battery deploy. The field gunners clearly meant business. When New Zealand tanks also appeared there was no further argument. [54]

[50]
Lt R. W. Thompson; born Feilding, 3 Jun 1922; bank clerk.

[51]
Lt J. A. Stewart; born NZ 30 Jul 1917; bank clerk; died 18 May 1960.

[52]
Bdr F. Mercer, MM; England; born Blackburn, England, 25 Jan 1913; plasterer and tiler.

[53]
Capt O. P. Davis, MC; born Greymouth, 17 Mar 1920; civil servant.

[54] An ‘original’ of the 5th Field, WO II Nicholass, who had been the TSM of F Troop, 47 Battery, for the past year and had performed his many duties splendidly throughout, was largely responsible for the timely arrival of the guns. He was acting as battery leader and appreciated the urgency of the situation while the battery was still waiting to cross the Piave. He therefore got the priority for the guns in the crossing of the river raised and shepherded them across quickly, regardless of harassing fire which was falling in the area. Then he deployed them at high speed near the mouth of the Tagliamento. This was mentioned in the citation for his MBE. Nicholass had been in almost every action of the 5th Field except for a brief furlough in England and was one of the few who had volunteered to stay with his unit when the ‘echelon men’ went home under the replacement scheme.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

On to Trieste

On to Trieste

Beyond Monfalcone 9 Brigade deployed and the guns also. It was not until noon on 2 May that they moved on. A few miles past the town the road branched into two, RHQ and

46 Battery of the 4th Field taking the lower and 25 and 26 Batteries the upper one. Enemy in various pockets were still aggressive and the 4th Field leapfrogged 25 and 26 Batteries forward on the inland route. The second-in-command, Major Reed, was ordered to deploy a battery against enemy at Prosecco in the hills above the beautiful promontory and palace of Miramare. The 12th Lancers were held up and Reed drove forward in a jeep. It was the only unarmoured vehicle in the forward area, and in taking it there under shell and small-arms fire Reed showed more initiative than artillery FOOs and LOs, some of whom were in Sherman tanks. Sizing up the situation quickly, Reed called down accurate fire and disposed of the opposition. After 20 minutes the Germans surrendered. This was one of many such incidents in Reed's wartime career and it figured prominently in the citation for his DSO. These were the last NZA rounds of the war.

The 5th Medium also had a series of swift deployments and sharp actions on 2 May. Four times they fired until opposition ceased and then they moved on, determined to make up for the fighting they had missed through a temporary shortage of 5.5-inch ammunition. Their gunnery was superb. ‘We were proud of this great Regt who had fought so long and so hard at our side’, Nicholson says. ‘We had long since come to regard them as our own.’

When 25 and 26 Batteries gained from Prosecco their first glimpse of Trieste the light was already fading. In pitch darkness on slippery hillsides they drove on and then deployed in the open above the city. ‘Everyone in a very bad mood’, one gunner wrote in his diary. ‘Wet ground, wet tents…. Firing in the hills to the west.’ RHQ and 46 Battery were much better off. They drove along the dramatic coast road, through tunnels in the rock, past Miramare. In the city the Italians welcomed them not only as ‘liberators’ but also as protectors from the Yugoslav army and their local sympathisers, the Slovenes who lived in the surrounding hills. The battery deployed in the railway yards.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Tension after VE Day

Tension after VE Day

West of the Isonzo the war in Italy was over—or so said the BBC. Marshal Kesselring's forces had indeed surrendered; but what was going on in and around Trieste? At the Hotel Impero 31 Battery with two 17-pounder crews and A Sub-Battery of 34 Battery slept in luxury, too tired to care. Thirty miles back along the coast 27 Battery danced until the early hours in charming company. Yet within a day or two the following message went on its secret way round the regiments:

‘Corps plan is to hold a bridgehead over the Isonzo with 2 NZ Division on the right, 56 London Division centre, and 91 US Division left.’

At one minute past midnight on 7–8 May the war in Europe officially ended; but this plan remained very much in force. Was another war about to begin? A war against the unkempt, footsore and evidently war-weary Yugoslav partisans who straggled towards the Isonzo for several days?

Even General Freyberg could not answer this. He tried to sort things out with a Yugoslav corps commander, but found him ‘very frightened’ of Marshal Tito, unable to decide anything, and reduced to writing notes on a pad ‘like a London policeman taking down evidence’. As late as 23 May the CRA and his staff were working on operational plans and instructions and nobody liked doing this. The NZA units, the 5th Medium, A Battery of 346 US Field Artillery Battalion, and later the 1st RHA and 120 Battery of the 30th Light Ack-Ack had deployment areas allotted and had to maintain a state of readiness for action. To officers in responsible positions it seemed an awkward and disappointing ending to a campaign as brilliant as any in the long annals of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

General Freyberg Sums Up

General Freyberg Sums Up

Freyberg sketched the outlines of this campaign to a high-level conference on VE Day, 8 May, as follows:

‘The plan behind the original battles was to smash him and not simply to drive him back. That necessitated great speed of planning and we worked with the maximum amount of arty in the quickest possible time and I want to congratulate the gunners including 5 Medium on the most excellent work they did. In the big attacks we averaged only 40 to 50 casualties per brigade due to the flexibility and great accuracy of the artillery.

‘The most careful intelligence is kept, as a matter of course, regarding every position which we are going to attack—this is done by the “I” Branch at Div working together with MAIU (West) [55] and also by the gunners. While in main outline the arty programmes are settled at Div Orders Group conferences, yet you must remember that within that outline all the detailed work has to go on of fixing individual targets—and all this in the middle of planning and a lot of movement. You owe the fact that you have had relatively few casualties to the work of the “I” section and the whole set-up of the Div Arty. I want Brig Queree to tell his people that we do realise the value of what they have done—and also 5 Medium whom we look on as very old friends. 5 Medium in the whole of the African campaign fired 40,000 rounds: during these 23 days [9 April to 2 May] they have fired 20,000. In all we have fired over 500,000 rounds.’

If anything, this understated the performance of the 5th Medium. From the 9th to the 11th of April, under 2 AGRA in support of the New Zealand Division, and then from the 11th to the 24th under the CRA's command, this magnificent regular regiment fired 20,258 rounds. Often in this period the NZA gunners found the 5.5s breathing hotly down their necks. The mobility of the 5.5s was astonishing. The effect of their 100-pound shells on enemy morale was greater than that of bombing and, directed by the ubiquitous Air OPs, they caused the crews of German Panther and Tiger tanks to have many a nightmare. But the regiment suffered four prematures from 9 April onwards and two gunners were killed as a result. From the 24th to the 29th a shortage of 5.5-inch ammunition kept them out of the battle. Then the 5th Medium came storming back into the fray and its performance in firing from four successive positions on the last day of fighting, 2 May, must surely be a record for medium artillery. The NZA loved working with them and the feeling was mutual. ‘Working with the 2nd N.Z. Division is being in a gunner's paradise’, the regimental war diary remarks.

When Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Hayes of the 5th Medium, following up an NZA suggestion, asked permission to ‘wear the New Zealand fernleaf’—to paint it on the regimental vehicles—it was gladly given. The 12th Lancers were also granted permission. Then a Lieutenant-Colonel Grey of the 76th Medium, a very fine Territorial regiment (the Shropshire Yeomanry) of the Royal Artillery, made the same request. Freyberg wrote on 30 May, ‘We are very proud and glad to establish this connection with your Regiment…. I would like also … to express … our appreciation of the most valuable support which you have given to 2 NZ Division at Cassino, Faenza and during the advance to the P0. Wearing the Fernleaf is a happy conclusion to our long associations.’

There were, of course, other regiments the NZA gunners held in equal esteem. Could they think less, for example, of the 7th and 64th Medium with whom they served in Greece and North Africa? But there were two regiments with whom they had recently had particularly close and warm associations: the 142nd Army Field with their SP 105s, from Florence to the P0, and the 1st RHA, old friends of Greece and North Africa, whose SP 25-pounders had been invaluable from the Senio onwards. With these two they had fired their last artillery programme of the war, with almost ridiculous ease at little more than an hour's notice, to cover the crossing of the P0.

The great weight, flexibility and mobility of the artillery from the Senio onwards gave well-trained and resolute infantry attacking by night an advantage over the defence. This was an enormous achievement. The defenders had naturally strong and well-prepared positions. They had machine guns that could fire 3000 rounds per minute, a deadly and terrifying torrent of bullets. They had anti-tank and anti-personnel mines which defied mine-detectors or flail tanks or rollers. They had rocket-projectors like the Panzerfaust and other sophisticated weapons. But the fierce preparation and the rolling barrage defeated them. Skilful and spirited infantry, in close co-operation with the guns through a network of LOs and FOOs, showed they could take such positions without crippling losses. In this campaign they stormed the Senio defences, bullied the enemy out of the Santerno positions, and worried him into a disorderly retreat from Massa Lombarda with the help of kettle and doormat. Under cover of foxy and spaniel they seized the Sillaro, then with austin they thrashed the cream of the Wehrmacht on the Gaiana, with quick barrages they crossed the Idice and broke out from a bridgehead beyond it, and then they were out in the open on the way to the P0. Each of these positions could have been another Alamein. Between each of them the Tigers and Panthers, with their formidable armour and guns, did their best to hold up the advance; but the fighter-bombers and the medium guns controlled by Air OPs defeated them.

At the end of the campaign Queree was awarded a DSO. But anyone who thought this was for attending a succession of conferences, stooping over maps and plans, and spending hours on the end of a telephone in positions seldom exposed to enemy fire would have been wide of the mark. The CRA's headquarters was likely to be forward of the field guns and Queree spent much of his time farther forward still. Despite his long experience of staff work, he was no ‘office soldier’. His bold aerial reconnaissances to select gun areas had a lot to do with the extraordinary mobility of the artillery, which was never once out of supporting distance of the leading infantry. Queree was utterly lacking in ‘outside show’. He was quiet and reserved, though not too proud even when CRA to turn out on the wing for the ‘Div Arty’ Rugby team against their perennial opponents, H Section of Divisional Signals. He had one obsession: efficiency. To the incompetents and the bunglers he displayed a ruthless streak. To the others he was sparing in his praise. He expected his gunners to be competent. In this final campaign his expectation was amply fulfilled.

The 7th Anti-Tank earned another award for this final advance. Lieutenant-Colonel Savage earned a DSO for bold reconnaissances for the mortar battery, and for skilful deployment which kept the whole front continuously covered. Savage had held almost every appointment in the regiment from subaltern to CO and it was fitting that his long and valuable service should be recognised in this way.

In their final advance the gunners' casualties were:

| Killed | Wounded | Total
4th Field | 6 | 15 | 21
5th Field | — | 2 | 2
6th Field | — | 4 | 4
7th Anti-Tank | 4 | 22 | 26
Total | 10 | 43 | 53

In April and May the NZA regiments fired the following totals of rounds:

4th Field | 82,594
5th Field | 62,195
6th Field | 77,654
Total | 222,443 25-pounder shells
34 Battery | 12,000 4.2-inch mortar bombs

Statistics do not favour the mortar gunners; but their extreme mobility ensured that they were always close on the heels of the infantry and ready with immediate, close-range support when it was needed. Their value was reflected in the up-grading of their priority for river-crossing facilities as the campaign advanced. [56]

[55] Mediterranean Air Interpretation Unit (West), a designation close enough to the name of a certain provocative film star to provoke ribald comment.

[56] The 5th Survey Troop fixed 122 bearing pickets and 16 subsidiary pickets for a total of 21 artillery regiments.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

CHAPTER 23 — The End of the Story

CHAPTER 23
The End of the Story

THE gunners stayed three months in the Trieste area and the tortuous and intrusive politics of the region only mildly affected their enjoyment of their Adriatic paradise. Many of them had spent 18 months in Italy serving their guns in anger and anxiety. They had no wish for more trouble with the ‘partisans’ and saw no need for it. Their personal contacts with them were in the main friendly. Some 5th Field gunners carefully surveyed-in Yugoslav guns and other likely targets and were ready if required to engage them with speed and accuracy. But they were much more interested in the many attractions of the city and coast and took full advantage of them.

The 7th Anti-Tank gathered round bonfires at dusk on VE Day ‘singing songs and passing the plonk bottles at frequent intervals’. The 4th Field soon opened a rest centre, and then came another for all the gunners. The 34th Battery built an open-air theatre. The weather was perfect, the coast beautiful and the beaches alluring. There were swimming, boating, yachting, horse-racing and dances almost nightly. There was leave to Venice, where the New Zealand Forces Club was the splendid Hotel Danieli, to Florence or Rome, and to many other cities and resorts. Unofficial leave took some gunners far afield.

Shirley Nicholson had left the 6th Field early in May and Lieutenant-Colonel Angell replaced him. In June General Freyberg held a memorable ball in the magnificent palace at Miramare, to the music of the Kiwi Concert Party orchestra, whose excellence owed much to Terry Vaughan, [1] an ‘original’ of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, and the CRA was there. Then, on the 27th, Queree departed for the Staff College at Camberley as an instructor and Brigadier Thornton, who had just returned from furlough, became CRA.

On the 12th the Yugoslav army had moved out of Trieste, to the delight of the Italians there—an episode described by the 27 Battery diarist in the following words:

‘As the last of Tito's men pulled out the various political parties commenced to express their feelings in true Balkan fashion. Their main ambition appears to be to wave some sort of flag, shout, sing and beat hell out of anyone they dislike and who happens to be in a minority of at least 10 to 1.’

For the gunners this was the real VE Day and they gladly relaxed and enjoyed it. They warmly farewelled the 7th Reinforcements on 15 June, and the 8th Reinforcements who had joined the Division at Tripoli then became the ‘grim digs’.

By this time, as one diarist noted, ‘most ranks have … jacked themselves up pretty well in one way or another and disappear in their “posh mockers” [2] frequently’. When they moved back from Trieste on 28 and 29 July they did so with heavy hearts. Even for those to whom it was a step nearer home —the 8th Reinforcements for certain, the 9ths almost so, and then, in diminishing degrees of confidence, the ‘trembling tenths’ and ‘uneasy elevenths’—it was no pleasure to leave. ‘All ranks appear to be “multi dispiache” at the thought of leaving such a fine area’, the 5th Field diary states. ‘There is little doubt that this area has been one of the most pleasant ever occupied by the Div.’ There were anguished looks and tearstained faces at the roadsides as the gunners said goodbye to Trieste and the Triestini.

The Disbandment

The journey was to Mestre the first day and then to Bologna for a glimpse of a famous city personally unknown to most of the gunners—' a fine city little damaged by war'. The next stage was along the Via Emilia through Faenza, Forli, Cesena and Rimini, and then along Route 16 to Fano. This was not at all like the retracing of steps in 1942 past the desert battlefields of 1941, which had been nothing but a heartbreak. These places had revived in six or nine months to an extent which seemed to some gunners to be almost an affront to their memories of a dark wartime Italian winter. From Fano—a halt for lunch—the route lay through twice-remembered country to Fabriano. From there gunners renewed warm acquaintances in villages they had known in March and the preceding November and there were more tearful farewells. Next day they ended up near Lake Trasimene and found it disappointing.

Following the rigours of Cassino and the horrors of the shelltorn Sora- Balsorano valley, Lake Trasimene had been a warmly-remembered staging area. Now it was in the grip of a five-month drought and it had to stand comparison with the enchantments of Trieste. But the 8th Reinforcements enjoyed it: they departed for home on 5 August.

The next weeks and months were full of pathos. A great fighting force and the powerful loyalties surrounding it slowly disintegrated, and even the thought of going home could not make this process agreeable. The 7th Anti-Tank paraded as such for the last time on 7th August and then Pat Savage said goodbye. He was the last of the original officers to depart and had served longer in a single regiment than any other NZA officer. He had a soft spot for anti-tankers, and even the ‘hard cases’ generally reciprocated. Major Spring, one of the most widely experienced of all the NZA officers and popular wherever he went, succeeded Savage.

The news of the Japanese surrender on 15 August abruptly ended negotiations to send a division to the Pacific or the Asian mainland and it made home seem much closer. Regimental funds paid for a little vermouth and there was a two-day holiday; but only the 7th Anti-Tank seem to have marked the occasion with appropriate vigour.

The numbers dwindled fast. It was as much as the units could do to sort out a handful of men who had served in Crete and send them there on 25 September to attend a memorial service. Lieutenant-Colonel Nolan of the 4th Field went with his RSM. The 5th Field supplied Major Dyson (who had worked wonders to supply the gunners on Crete with ammunition), the RSM, WO I Shepherd, [3] and the perennial WO II Nicholass. The 7th Anti-Tank provided WO II Gibson, [4] and that was all. A few others under Ike Parkinson went from Egypt. They were a select band, by seniority the élite, of the élite, and the Cretans treated them hospitably and with a respect amounting to reverence.

The 9ths departed and the remaining gunners moved into winter quarters at Siena—the regiments in barracks near the outskirts and Headquarters in hotels in the fine central square. Men were chosen by ballot to go on leave to the United Kingdom from 10 October onwards, and the lucky ones received a warm welcome. Most of them stayed at the Milestone Hotel in

London, managed by Geoff Sloan
[5] of 34 Anti-Tank Battery and Ian Cooper
[6] of the 6th Field.

Near Florence 9 Brigade gradually turned into Jayforce, which was to be the New Zealand contribution to the occupation force in Japan. The BM was Major Maxwell, until then BM of the Divisional Artillery, and the artillery component was 25 Field Battery, commanded by Major Spring. One of the few remaining ‘originals’ of the 7th Anti-Tank, WO I Gilmer, marched out to Jayforce on 2 November. A party of gunners attended a memorial service at Alamein later in the month. The CRA went with them and Angell became temporary CRA. Then Angell followed and Spring became temporary CRA. It was like musical chairs; but a rapid turnover in appointments was typical of this phase.

Though clean and prosperous, Siena with its beautiful cathedral and other fine mediaeval and Renaissance buildings seemed to be a place where time stood still. There, in the little courtyard of the 6th Field barracks on 14 November the Divisional Artillery mustered no more than about 400 men for a farewell parade to General Freyberg—pathetically fewer than the 4000-odd who had paraded by the Volturno early in 1944. The General, designated to become the next Governor-General of New Zealand, spoke movingly. The record of the 2nd NZ Divisional Artillery, he said, had never been surpassed. No other divisional artillery had fired such a great weight of shells. In technical efficiency, speed in action and sustained effort, he said, the NZA regiments stood supreme.

By 1 December the 4th Field and 7th Anti-Tank amalgamated and also the 5th and 6th Field. Then the 4th Field absorbed the 5th and before December ended the 4th Field, too, had ceased to exist. [7] The remnants of these regiments made their way north on 17 December to barracks near Florence to await, with other vestiges of the 2nd New Zealand Division, the ships which would take them home. The prospects of an early voyage were not bright, but more shipping was somehow provided and by Christmas Day the gunners reached Taranto, a scene of lively activity. From there they sailed in various ships, including the Dominion Monarch and the Durban Castle. The last of them embarked on 27 January 1946 in the Stirling Castle.

Jayforce

Mount Vesuvius hid itself behind a mist when 25 Field Battery sailed past from Naples in the Strathmore on 21 February. On 1 March the gunners saw the last of Africa—Cape Gardafui. They called at Colombo and later at Singapore, and then on 15 March they had a long run up the channel in a misty morning to Hong Kong. They caught their first glimpse of Japan in the afternoon of the 18th and next morning had the Duke of York to escort them into Kure Harbour. They disembarked on the 22nd, travelled by train through Hiroshima, and settled in barracks at Yamaguchi.

Thus they began their service in the occupation force. They shared it with 150 Field Battery, RA, under Major Roscoe Turner, A Australian Field Battery under Major Tim Rodriguez, and 30 Indian Field Battery under Major Andrew George. With these three independent batteries, 25 Battery carried out manoeuvres and live shoots. These were rare occasions, however, and for the most part the gunners picketed various places or mounted formal guards or searched for black-market operators. They drilled to keep fit and maintain their gunnery skills. In their spare time they studied or went sightseeing or perhaps to the races at Ozuki.

At the end of the year Jack Spring departed and Major Archibald
[8] took his place, and in due course Archibald was replaced by a veteran of veterans, Major Langevad, who had been decorated in the First World War and had been the original RSM of the 5th Field. It was Bill Langevad's task at Ube in the Yamaguchi prefecture on 22 May 1947 to begin to disband the battery. Almost all the original Jayforce gunners had by this time been replaced by men direct from New Zealand. Some of these transferred to other elements of Jayforce. The remainder returned home and the guns came with them.

The End and the Continuation

And so the story ends. It had a sequel in Korea in the 195 OS, [9] and a further sequel is at present (February 1966) unfolding in Vietnam.

Men who once belonged to the 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery assemble from time to time for reunions. When they do their memories revive the drama of the parachute landings in Crete, or Bofors fire on diving Stukas at Alam Nayil, or the tense vividness of an anti-tank action—the all-consuming concentration of effort when every shot must count. Their memories paint cameos of men in various postures serving the guns by night as the streaking flashes exposed them. They reawaken the lightning and thunder of the Alamein barrage, the echoing and re-echoing of guns going off and shells exploding in the shadow of Olympus or Montecassino, and the deafening, earth-shaking hours of the great bombardments on the way to the Po. Peacetime seems quieter to gunners than it does to other people.

[1]
Capt T. Vaughan, MBE; Melbourne; born Whangarei, 26 May 1915; musician.

[2] An old hand would have written ‘Groppi mocker’—the smart clothes worn to Groppi's cabaret or garden restaurant in Cairo or to similar places.

[3]
WO I P. N. H. Shepherd; born Dunedin, 4 Jun 1917; Regular soldier; wounded 28 Mar 1943.

[4]
WO II D. Gibson, m.i.d.; Lower Hutt; born NZ 3 Dec 1915; electrician.

[5]
Maj R. G. Sloan; Bray, Eire; born Timaru, 15 Oct 1913; caterer.

[6]
Capt I. Cooper, m.i.d.; born NZ 22 Oct 1916; draper.

[7] The official disbandment dates were:

7th Anti-Tank | 15 December 1945
Divisional Artillery Headquarters | 28 January 1946
RHQ and 26 and 46 Batteries, 4th Field | 28 January 1946
5th Field | 28 January 1946
6th Field | 28 January 1946
9th LAD (4th Field) | 15 December 1945
15th LAD (7th Anti-Tank) | 22 December 1945
16th LAD (5th Field) | 15, December 1945
18th LAD (6th Field) | 15, December 1945

H Section, Divisional Signals, absorbed E, F and G Sections in October 1945. On 24 November 2 Lt J. Livingston issued the last ‘HQ NZ Div Arty Line Diagram’. The remnants of these four sections merged with the rest of 2 NZ Divisional Signals, which disbanded on 23 February 1946.

[8]
Maj W. P. Archibald; born Napier, 14 Jun 1920; clerk; Bty Comd, 25 Bty, J Force, 1947.

[9] For an account of the 16th NZ Field Regiment in Korea see the author's article, ‘Wars—Korean’, in An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, edited by A. H. McLintock (Government Printer, Wellington, 1966), Vol. III.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[section]

THE gunners stayed three months in the Trieste area and the tortuous and intrusive politics of the region only mildly affected their enjoyment of their Adriatic paradise. Many of them had spent 18 months in Italy serving their guns in anger and anxiety. They had no wish for more trouble with the ‘partisans’ and saw no need for it. Their personal contacts with them were in the main friendly. Some 5th Field gunners carefully surveyed-in Yugoslav guns and other likely targets and were ready if required to engage them with speed and accuracy. But they were much more interested in the many attractions of the city and coast and took full advantage of them.

The 7th Anti-Tank gathered round bonfires at dusk on VE Day ‘singing songs and passing the plonk bottles at frequent intervals’. The 4th Field soon opened a rest centre, and then came another for all the gunners. The 34th Battery built an open-air theatre. The weather was perfect, the coast beautiful and the beaches alluring. There were swimming, boating, yachting, horse-racing and dances almost nightly. There was leave to Venice, where the New Zealand Forces Club was the splendid Hotel Danieli, to Florence or Rome, and to many other cities and resorts. Unofficial leave took some gunners far afield.

Shirley Nicholson had left the 6th Field early in May and Lieutenant-Colonel Angell replaced him. In June General Freyberg held a memorable ball in the magnificent palace at Miramare, to the music of the Kiwi Concert Party orchestra, whose excellence owed much to Terry Vaughan, [1] an ‘original’ of 34 Anti-Tank Battery, and the CRA was there. Then, on the 27th, Queree departed for the Staff College at Camberley as an instructor and Brigadier Thornton, who had just returned from furlough, became CRA.

On the 12th the Yugoslav army had moved out of Trieste, to the delight of the Italians there—an episode described by the 27 Battery diarist in the following words:

‘As the last of Tito's men pulled out the various political parties commenced to express their feelings in true Balkan fashion. Their main ambition appears to be to wave some sort of flag, shout, sing and beat hell out of anyone they dislike and who happens to be in a minority of at least 10 to 1.’

For the gunners this was the real VE Day and they gladly relaxed and enjoyed it. They warmly farewelled the 7th Reinforcements on 15 June, and the 8th Reinforcements who had joined the Division at Tripoli then became the ‘grim digs’.

By this time, as one diarist noted, ‘most ranks have … jacked themselves up pretty well in one way or another and disappear in their “posh mockers” [2] frequently’. When they moved back from Trieste on 28 and 29 July they did so with heavy hearts. Even for those to whom it was a step nearer home —the 8th Reinforcements for certain, the 9ths almost so, and then, in diminishing degrees of confidence, the ‘trembling tenths’ and ‘uneasy elevenths’—it was no pleasure to leave. ‘All ranks appear to be “multi dispiache” at the thought of leaving such a fine area’, the 5th Field diary states. ‘There is little doubt that this area has been one of the most pleasant ever occupied by the Div.’ There were anguished looks and tearstained faces at the roadsides as the gunners said goodbye to Trieste and the Triestini.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The Disbandment

The Disbandment

The journey was to Mestre the first day and then to Bologna for a glimpse of a famous city personally unknown to most of the gunners—' a fine city little damaged by war'. The next stage was along the Via Emilia through Faenza, Forli, Cesena and Rimini, and then along Route 16 to Fano. This was not at all like the retracing of steps in 1942 past the desert battlefields of 1941, which had been nothing but a heartbreak. These places had revived in six or nine months to an extent which seemed to some gunners to be almost an affront to their memories of a dark wartime Italian winter. From Fano—a halt for lunch—the route lay through twice-remembered country to Fabriano. From there gunners renewed warm acquaintances in villages they had known in March and the preceding November and there were more tearful farewells. Next day they ended up near Lake Trasimene and found it disappointing.

Following the rigours of Cassino and the horrors of the shelltorn Sora- Balsorano valley, Lake Trasimene had been a warmly-remembered staging area. Now it was in the grip of a five-month drought and it had to stand comparison with the enchantments of Trieste. But the 8th Reinforcements enjoyed it: they departed for home on 5 August.

The next weeks and months were full of pathos. A great fighting force and the powerful loyalties surrounding it slowly disintegrated, and even the thought of going home could not make this process agreeable. The 7th Anti-Tank paraded as such for the last time on 7th August and then Pat Savage said goodbye. He was the last of the original officers to depart and had served longer in a single regiment than any other NZA officer. He had a soft spot for anti-tankers, and even the ‘hard cases’ generally reciprocated. Major Spring, one of the most widely experienced of all the NZA officers and popular wherever he went, succeeded Savage.

The news of the Japanese surrender on 15 August abruptly ended negotiations to send a division to the Pacific or the Asian mainland and it made home seem much closer. Regimental funds paid for a little vermouth and there was a two-day holiday; but only the 7th Anti-Tank seem to have marked the occasion with appropriate vigour.

The numbers dwindled fast. It was as much as the units could do to sort out a handful of men who had served in Crete and send them there on 25 September to attend a memorial service. Lieutenant-Colonel Nolan of the 4th Field went with his RSM. The 5th Field supplied Major Dyson (who had worked wonders to supply the gunners on Crete with ammunition), the RSM, WO I Shepherd, [3] and the perennial WO II Nicholass. The 7th Anti-Tank provided WO II Gibson, [4] and that was all. A few others under Ike Parkinson went from Egypt. They were a select band, by seniority the élite, of the élite, and the Cretans treated them hospitably and with a respect amounting to reverence.

The 9ths departed and the remaining gunners moved into winter quarters at Siena—the regiments in barracks near the outskirts and Headquarters in hotels in the fine central square. Men were chosen by ballot to go on leave to the United Kingdom from 10 October onwards, and the lucky ones received a warm welcome. Most of them stayed at the Milestone Hotel in

London, managed by Geoff Sloan
[5] of 34 Anti-Tank Battery and Ian Cooper
[6] of the 6th Field.

Near Florence 9 Brigade gradually turned into Jayforce, which was to be the New Zealand contribution to the occupation force in Japan. The BM was Major Maxwell, until then BM of the Divisional Artillery, and the artillery component was 25 Field Battery, commanded by Major Spring. One of the few remaining ‘originals’ of the 7th Anti-Tank, WO I Gilmer, marched out to Jayforce on 2 November. A party of gunners attended a memorial service at Alamein later in the month. The CRA went with them and Angell became temporary CRA. Then Angell followed and Spring became temporary CRA. It was like musical chairs; but a rapid turnover in appointments was typical of this phase.

Though clean and prosperous, Siena with its beautiful cathedral and other fine mediaeval and Renaissance buildings seemed to be a place where time stood still. There, in the little courtyard of the 6th Field barracks on 14 November the Divisional Artillery mustered no more than about 400 men for a farewell parade to General Freyberg—pathetically fewer than the 4000-odd who had paraded by the Volturno early in 1944. The General, designated to become the next Governor-General of New Zealand, spoke movingly. The record of the 2nd NZ Divisional Artillery, he said, had never been surpassed. No other divisional artillery had fired such a great weight of shells. In technical efficiency, speed in action and sustained effort, he said, the NZA regiments stood supreme.

By 1 December the 4th Field and 7th Anti-Tank amalgamated and also the 5th and 6th Field. Then the 4th Field absorbed the 5th and before December ended the 4th Field, too, had ceased to exist. [7] The remnants of these regiments made their way north on 17 December to barracks near Florence to await, with other vestiges of the 2nd New Zealand Division, the ships which would take them home. The prospects of an early voyage were not bright, but more shipping was somehow provided and by Christmas Day the gunners reached Taranto, a scene of lively activity. From there they sailed in various ships, including the Dominion Monarch and the Durban Castle. The last of them embarked on 27 January 1946 in the Stirling Castle.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Jayforce

Jayforce

Mount Vesuvius hid itself behind a mist when 25 Field Battery sailed past from Naples in the Strathmore on 21 February. On 1 March the gunners saw the last of Africa—Cape Gardafui. They called at Colombo and later at Singapore, and then on 15 March they had a long run up the channel in a misty morning to Hong Kong. They caught their first glimpse of Japan in the afternoon of the 18th and next morning had the Duke of York to escort them into Kure Harbour. They disembarked on the 22nd, travelled by train through Hiroshima, and settled in barracks at Yamaguchi.

Thus they began their service in the occupation force. They shared it with 150 Field Battery, RA, under Major Roscoe Turner, A Australian Field Battery under Major Tim Rodriguez, and 30 Indian Field Battery under Major Andrew George. With these three independent batteries, 25 Battery carried out manoeuvres and live shoots. These were rare occasions, however, and for the most part the gunners picketed various places or mounted formal guards or searched for black-market operators. They drilled to keep fit and maintain their gunnery skills. In their spare time they studied or went sightseeing or perhaps to the races at Ozuki.

At the end of the year Jack Spring departed and Major Archibald
[8] took his place, and in due course Archibald was replaced by a veteran of veterans, Major Langevad, who had been decorated in the First World War and had been the original RSM of the 5th Field. It was Bill Langevad's task at Ube in the Yamaguchi prefecture on 22 May 1947 to begin to disband the battery. Almost all the original Jayforce gunners had by this time been replaced by men direct from New Zealand. Some of these transferred to other elements of Jayforce. The remainder returned home and the guns came with them.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

The End and the Continuation

The End and the Continuation

And so the story ends. It had a sequel in Korea in the 195 OS, [9] and a further sequel is at present (February 1966) unfolding in Vietnam.

Men who once belonged to the 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery assemble from time to time for reunions. When they do their memories revive the drama of the parachute landings in Crete, or Bofors fire on diving Stukas at Alam Nayil, or the tense vividness of an anti-tank action—the all-consuming concentration of effort when every shot must count. Their memories paint cameos of men in various postures serving the guns by night as the streaking flashes exposed them. They reawaken the lightning and thunder of the Alamein barrage, the echoing and re-echoing of guns going off and shells exploding in the shadow of Olympus or Montecassino, and the deafening, earth-shaking hours of the great bombardments on the way to the Po. Peacetime seems quieter to gunners than it does to other people.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Appendix I

Appendix I

MOST SECRET

Subject: Training Directive 2 NZ DIV ARTY

—8 Aug–31 Aug 43

HQ 2 NZ DIV ARTY
BM 1/5
1 Aug 43.

- 4 NZ FD REGT

- 5 NZ FD REGT

- 6 NZ FD REGT

- 7 NZ A TK REGT

- 14 NZ LT AA REGT

- 36 NZ SVY BTY

- 32 NZ FD REGT

- G 2 NZ DIV for information.

- RA GHQ) for information.

- CRA 6 S.A. ARMD DIV for information.

1. The following is issued as a general training directive for the period of the practice camp.

2. Routine:—

- Reveille — 0530 hrs.

- Roll Call — 0545 hrs.

- Breakfast — 0645 hrs.

- Parade — 0730 hrs.

- Lights Out — 2230 hrs.

No other hours are laid down as in general work will cease when the task is completed.

3. The practice Camp will be divided into three periods each of one week.

- 1st Week — Bty Training.

- 2nd Week — Regtl Training.

- 3rd Week — Div Arty Training.

4. Basis of Training.

The following is promulgated as a basis of training for the respective branches:

fd arty:

(a) | Deployment and manoeuvre.
(b) | Observation and control of fire.
(c) | Exercise of all Commanders in the control of their command in the field.
(d) | Applied gunnery.

A TK ARTY:

(a) | Deployment and manoeuvre up to Regtl basis.
(b) | Establishment of A Tk screens by day and by night, special reference to digging, camouflage and concealment.
(c) | Control of fire.
(d) | Exercise of all Commanders in the control of their command in the field.

AA ARTY:

(a) | Deployment and manoeuvre up to Regtl basis.
(b) | Protection of V.P.s, defiles and moving columns.
(c) | Exercise of all Comds in the handling of their commands in the field.
(d) | Open sight shooting.

5. Training directive in detail.

(a)

Bty Training.

(i) | Deployment.
(ii) | Advance of a Bty as a whole.
(iii) | Advance of a Bty stepping up troops.
(iv) | Withdrawal of a Bty as a whole.
(v) | Withdrawal of a Bty by Tps.
(vi) | Night deployment.
(vii) | Fire with movement.
(viii) | Digging, camouflage and concealment.

(b)

Regtl Training.

(i) | Deployment.
(ii) | Advance of a Regt as a whole carrying survey forward.
(iii) | Stepping up a Regt by Btys.
(iv) | Withdrawal of a Regt as a whole.
(v) | Withdrawal of a Regt by Btys.
(vi) | Fire with movement.
(vii) | Quick barrage.
(viii) | Concentrations. Method A B C.
(ix) | Static gunnery two days. (For range allotment see Appx ‘A’.) [1]
(x) | Compilation and issue of gun programmes.

(c)

Div Arty Training.

(i) | Preliminary Recce.
(ii) | Deployment under dark.
(iii) | Issue of Barrage Trace and compilation of gun programme.
(iv) | Digging, camouflage and concealment.

(v)

Gunnery exercises:

(1) | Air Burst Ranging.
(2) | Meteor from Air Bursts.
(3) | Concentrations. Methods A B. STONK.
(4) | Sound Ranging and FS exercise.

(vi) | Firing time programme by dark.
(vii) | Rapid advance for second punch.
(viii) | Passage of minefields.
(ix) | Quick barrage.
(x) | Break through.
(xi) | Rapid deployment and meteor by air burst ranging.
(xii) | Registration and recording of targets. Quick fire plan.
(xiii) | Smoke screens predicted and observed.
(xiv) | D.F., C.B., and harassing fire tasks.
(xv) | Relief under dark.
(xvi) | Dumping ammunition.

6. Deployment.

For the purpose of the forthcoming exercises desert formations will be dropped and deployment will be done off the existing roads and tracks on the range. Careful attention will be paid to march discipline, training, timings, etc., on roads.

7. Static Gunnery.

During the periods of static gunnery allotted to Regts Regtl Comds will pay every attention to the correct editing and passage of fire orders, strict signal discipline and adherence to the correct rules of gunnery. The maximum instructional value is to be secured from the rounds expended.

8. Ammunition Allotment.

The following provisional allotment is made:—

Fd Regts: | Observed shooting | — | 20 r.p.g.
| Bty Training | — | 15 r.p.g.
| Regtl Training | — | 20 r.p.g.
| div arty Training | — | 50 r.p.g.
A Tk Regt: | 6-pdr AP | — | 3072.
| 17-pdr AP | — | 1024.
AA Regt: | To be notified later. | |

[Signed] J. McCredie, Capt.

B.M. HQ 2 NZ DIV ARTY.

[1] Not reproduced.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Appendix II

Appendix II

SECRET

Copy No.

6 Apr 45

2 N.Z. Div Arty Operation Order No. 15

Ref. Maps: 1/25,000 lugo Sheet 88/II SE
massa lombarda Sheet 88/II NE

NO CHANGE FROM VERBAL ORDERS

INFORMATION

1. ENEMY.

See 2 NZ Div Intelligence Summaries issued separately.

2. OWN TPS.

(a)

eighth army is to break through the enemy's senio defences by attacking on a two corps front.

- RIGHT: 5 CORPS

- LEFT: 2 POLCORPS

(b) | Main axes: bagnacavallo–lugo–massa lombarda to r santerno.

(c)

2 polcorps is to assault as follows in conjunction with 5 corps:—

(i)

3 carp div is to est a br-head across r senio on a three bn front between excl s severo 3233 and incl felisio 2931 and to cross r santerno to incl mordano 2536.

(ii) | H hr is same as 5 corps.

(iii)

43 gurkha lor inf bde is to be prepared to subsequently thrust either along axes s bartolomeo 2637–la ringhiera 227397–fantazza 184447–medicina 1245, or along axes s bartolomeo–la ringhiera–castel guelfo 1540–poggio piccolo 1042.

(iv)

5 kres div is to be prepared to pursue along axis bagnara di romagna 2635–sasso morelli 1938–casola canina 1536–castel s pietro 0837.

(d)

5 corps is to capture br-head over santerno in massa lombarda area in three phases:—

- PHASE I:—The crossing of r senio an hr before dark on D Day on a two div front,

- right 8 ind div—north of lugo

- left 2 nz div—south of lugo

- PHASE II:—8 ind div and 2 nz div to cross r santerno.

- PHASE III:—The adv from r santerno.

3. AIR SUPPORT.

The air effort in sp 5 Corps for ops is as follows:—

Aircraft available

D Day

D plus 1

D plus 2
D plus 3

Hy bombers | 500 | 350 | Depends on higher policy
Med bombers | 48(1) | 48(1) | 200
Fighter bombers | 470 | 700 | 700

(i) This number may be increased by 150. Timings for bombing as follows:—

apple | 1350 — 1520 | Hy Bombers
(D Day) | 1545 — 1615 | Med bombers
BAKER | |
(D plus 1) | | Hy bombers

On account of the need for safety no adv by main body fwd of canale di lugo can be made before 1230 hrs on D plus 1.

Arrangements have been made to cancel the tgts early on D plus 1 if the situation is particularly favourable and a quick adv is certain.

A similar programme is being provided for 2 Polcorps. Timings for med bombers for pm D plus 1 are being decided later.

Fighter bombers will be used in conjunction with arty on

(a) | Hostile btys, enemy HQs and res bn and coy areas.

(b)

To strafe enemy flood-bank on r senio between times at which all guns on the Corps front are silent and from H–H plus 2 min to do a dummy strafe along the river.

(c) | To provide continuous cab-rank for both CB and normal close sp controlled by Rover.

Night bombing targets are as follows:—

(a) | Engagement of HBs.
(b) | Harassing of HBs astride r santerno.
(c) | Harassing enemy mov west of santerno.
(d) | mordano 2536 and s agata 2941.

4. Additional Arty for Phases I and II:

(a) Under comd:—

HQ RA 78 Brit Inf Div
with under comd four fd regts
1 RHA
142 (RDY) Fd Regt

(b) In sp:—

2 AGRA
with under comd: Three med regts (5.5)
Two med regts (4.5). One hy regt and in sp: B/654 Air OP Sqn
307/55 HAA Bty
195/52 LAA Bty
C/654 Air OP Sqn
8-81mm Mortars 1 Sp Gp Kensingtons

(c) | 74 Med 2 AGRA will sp 5 NZ Inf Bde
| 5 Med 2 AGRA will sp 6 NZ Inf Bde

INTENTION

5. 2 NZ Div Arty will sp Operation ‘ buckland’.

METHOD

6. Fire plan in sp 2 NZ Div Operation ‘ buckland’:—

(a)

Barrages:

(i) | Preliminary bombardment (Appx ‘A’ Part I–IV att) [1]
(ii) | First barrage in sp Operation ‘ buckland’ on D Day 1 (Appx ‘B’ Part I–II att).

(iii)

second Barrage in sp Operation ‘ buckland’ on D plus 1 (Appx ‘C’ att)
All fired by: three NZ Fd Regts two Regts 78 Div RA. 1 RHA

(b) | Enfilade and HF during preliminary bombardment (Appx ‘D’ att)

(c)

Concs:

(i)

During preliminary bombardment:

Fired by:— | 11 RHA (Appx ‘E’ att)
| one 5.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘F’ att)
| one Hy Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘G’ att)
| one 4.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘H’ att)

(ii)

During main barrage on D Day:

Fired by:— | 5 Med Regt (Appx ‘K’ att)
| 74 Med Regt (Appx ‘L’ att)
| one 5.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘M’ att)
| one 4.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘N’ att)
| one 4.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘O’ att)
| one Hy Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘P’ Part I–7.2s Part II–155s att)
| 4.2 Mortars (Appx ‘R’ Part I–V att)

(iii)

During barrage on D plus 1:

Fired by:— | 5 Med Regt (Appx ‘V’ att)
| 74 Med Regt (Appx ‘W’ att)
| one Hy Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘X’ att)
| one 5.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘Y’ att)
| one 4.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘Z’ att)
| one 4.5 Med Regt 2 AGRA (Appx ‘A’ att)
| 4.2 Mortars (Appx ‘R’ att)

(d)

Counter Mortar:

(i)

During preliminary bombardment:

Fired by:— | 142 (RDY) A Fd Regt (Appx ‘J’ att) two Tps 307/55 HAA

(ii)

During main barrage on D Day:

Fired by:— | 11 RHA
| 142 (RDY) A Fd Regt (Appx ‘Q’ att) two Tps 307/55 HAA

(e)

Concs in sp 9 NZ Inf Bde Operation:

Fired by:— | 4 NZ Fd Regt and one med tp (Appx ‘S’ att)
| one 5.5 Med Regt (Appx ‘T’ att)

(f)

Predicted Smk Screen for operation ‘ buckland’ D plus 1

Fired by:— | 11 RHA)
| 132 Fd RA) (Appx ‘AB’ att)

(g)

Prearranged DFs

(i) | In sp 2 NZ Div on completion operation ‘ buckland’ D Day (Appx ‘U’ att)
(ii) | In sp 2 NZ Div on completion operation ‘ buckland’ (Appx ‘AC’ att)

7. One Regt of 78 Div will be firing on stretch of river on their front during preliminary bombardment.

8. CB:

A Counter Battery programme will be laid on by 2 AGRA at following times:—

- D Day: H minus 240 to H minus 213 (27 min)

- H minus 200 to H minus 185 (15 min)

- H minus 181 to H minus 161 (20 min)

- H minus 140 to H minus 109 (31 min)

- H minus 79 to H minus 54 (25 min)

- H minus 30 to H (30 min)

- H plus 2 to H plus 60 (58 min)

- D plus 1: H to H plus 10 (10 min)

9. A Tk:

Under comd 5 NZ Inf Bde | 32 Bty 7 NZ A Tk Regt
Under comd 6 NZ Inf Bde | 33 Bty 7 NZ A Tk Regt
Under comd 9 NZ Inf Bde | 31 Bty 7 NZ A Tk Regt

10. Marking of Bdys:

See Appx ‘B’ Part II.

11. Visual Markers for Bombers:

HAA will be used to provide a line of bursts in the sky at 15,000 ft along line of the road bagnacavallo–faenza as visual markers for bombers.

12. OP and LO commitments:

(a) 5 NZ Inf Bde: |
(i) 5 NZ Fd Regt— | one LO each Bn
| one OP each attacking Bn
| CO at 5 Bde HQ
(ii) 1 RHA— | one OP per Sqn of 18 NZ Armd Regt
| LO at 18 NZ Armd Regt HQ
(iii) 74 Med Regt— | LO with each fwd Bn
| LO at 5 Bde HQ
(b) 6 NZ Inf Bde: |
(i) 6 NZ Fd Regt— | one LO each Bn
| one OP each attacking Bn
| CO at 6 Bde HQ
(ii) 142 SP— | one OP per Sqn of 20 NZ Armd Regt
| LO at 20 NZ Armd Regt HQ
(iii) 5 Med Regt— | LO with each fwd Bn
| LO at 6 Bde HQ
(c) 9 NZ Inf Bde: |
(i) 4 NZ Fd Regt— | Two OPs with 27 Bn
| LO with 27 Bn HQ
| LO(BC) at 9 NZ Inf Bde HQ
(d) LOs to flank fmns: |
4 NZ Fd Regt— | LO to 3 Carp Div PA
6 NZ Fd Regt— | LO to 8 Ind Div RA
(e) LOs are being provided at HQ 2 NZ Div Arty from flank fmns as under:— |
2 AGRA | —one LO
78 Div RA | —one LO
3 Carp Div PA | —one LO
8 Ind Div | —one LO

13. Fwd Moves:

5 NZ Fd Regt and 6 NZ Fd Regt will be prepared to leap-frog btys fwd on D plus 1 after programme.

142 (RDY) A Fd Regt will be prepared to move early D plus 1.

Remaining regts—as battle progresses.

14. All times given in appxs are times at which guns will commence or cease firing.

INTERCOMM

15. HQ 2 NZ Div Arty remains present locn 405295.

16. Routes:

Trace showing existing traffic circuits east of r senio and projected routes across river (see Appx ‘AD’ att).

17. TC:

Initially brs and routes will be allotted to fwd bdes as follows:—

- UP—5 NZ Inf Bde— red route

- 6 NZ Inf Bde— blue route

- DOWN—common route— white route.

18. Wireless:

At H minus 30 min all nets will be est and netted. After netting sets will assume listening watch and until H hr will only transmit in an emergency.

18, 38, 48 sets may be used without restriction after H minus 30 min.

19. Synchronisation:

By BBC Time Signal.

20. H hr—1920B hrs.

21. Codewords:

- ‘ bulldog’ plus time—H hr for barrage on D plus 1.

- ‘ goose’ Predicted smk screens on D plus 1.

- ‘ condor’ Predicted smk screens on D plus 1.

- ‘ rook’ Predicted smk screens on D plus 1.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of Signature 2125 hrs.

Method of issue LO

[Sgd] S. F. Catchpole, Major

BM RA 2 NZ Division

DISTRIBUTION LIST

[Copies of operation order and appendices to: 4 Fd Regt, 5 Fd Regt, 6 Fd Regt, 7 A Tk Regt (including 34 Mortar Bty and 1 Sp Gp Kensingtons), 1 RHA, 142 (RDY) A Fd Regt, 5 Med Regt, 74 Med Regt, 307/55 HAA Bty, 195/52 LAA Bty, C Flt 654 AOP Sqn, P RADAR Bty, F Tp 49 Bty 5 Svy Regt, 2 AGRA, AGPA, 78 Brit Div RA, 8 Ind Div RA, 3 Carp Div RA, 5 Corps, 2 Polcorps, RA Eighth Army, Main 2 NZ Div, 4 NZ Armd Bde, 5 NZ Inf Bde, 6 NZ Inf Bde, 9 NZ Inf Bde, CRA, BM, IO, LO, SC, CBO, CMO, Sigs, Reps, file, war diary, spare]

[1] These appendices are not reproduced here.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Roll of Honour

Roll of Honour

HQ 2 NZ Divisional Artillery

killed in action

Gnr J. Booth

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr H. W. Dooley | 18 December 1944

died on active service

Brig R. Miles, CBE, DSO, MC | 20 October 1943
Gnr B. E. Andrewes | 10 June 1945
Gnr W. F. Whiteman | 17 August 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

4 Field Regiment

killed in action

Maj J. B. Stevens-Jordan | 7 September 1942
Capt C. D. Bell | 24 October 1942
Capt P. M. Blundell, MC | 16 April 1945
Capt F. J. Cook | 27 June 1942
Capt R. J. McElroy | 17 July 1942
Lt G. McB. Brandon | 28 June 1942
Lt A. H. Madden | 9 July 1942
Lt J. D. Wyatt | 3 June 1944

2 Lt J. O. Burnett

5 December 1941

[*]

2 Lt R. H. Coleman | 29 April 1945
2 Lt G. E. Cook | 5 June 1944
2 Lt R. S. Herrick | 25 My 1941
2 Lt D. G. McM. Reid | 25 March 1943
2 Lt N. A. Stephenson | 1 August 1944
2 Lt F. A. H. Varian | 1 December 1941
2 Lt T. B. Wright | 25 May 1941
S-Sgt D. C. Perkins, m.i.d. | 25 February 1944

Sgt M. J. Buchanan, MM

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt H. F. Cuthbertson

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt K. J. Moses | 25 May 1941
Sgt J. W. G. Pickett | 25 May 1941
Sgt D. J. L. Power | 5 December 1943
Sgt A. G. Willis, m.i.d. | 17 July 1942
L-Sgt J. D. W. Cardno | 18 April 1941
L-Sgt E. P. H. Cotton | 5 July 1942
L-Sgt W. R. A. Hill | 23 March 1943
L-Sgt D. E. Jacobson | 1 December 1941
L-Sgt N. F Johnson | 17 April 1941

L-Sgt H. J. Ludemann

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Sgt K. C. Shugar

17 April 1941

[*]

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Bdr W. Barnett | 17 January 1943
Bdr H. N. Boyd | 5 December 1943
Bdr R. Dalzell | 1 December 1941
Bdr V. T. Hitchings | 18 April 1941
Bdr A. R. King | 23 March 1943
Bdr E. A. Mills | 1 December 1941
Bdr W. R. Mountfield | 24 October 1942
Bdr F. H. Neill | 25 May 1941
Bdr R. F. Organ | 25 November 1941
Bdr R. B. Starky | 23 March 1943

L-Bdr W. K. Andrews

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Bdr P. V. Burlace | 5 December 1943
L-Bdr W. S. A. Cummock | 31 October 1942
L-Bdr J. P. Lowry | 24 October 1942
Gnr W. H. B. Aitken | 29 November 1941
Gnr C. E. Anderson | 7 December 1943
Gnr H. J. Andrews | 3 June 1944
Gnr G. McG. Bankier | 25 May 1941
Gnr G. Bell | 25 May 1941
Gnr H. J. Benson | 3 June 1944
Gnr A. A. Biggs | 29 Novembr 1941
Gnr A. J. Blythe | 19 February 1944
Gnr G. R. Bremner | 25 May 1941
Gnr G. A. Brewster | 24 October 1942
Gnr S. R. Broadbent | 24 October 1942
Gnr E. S. Browell | 5 July 1942
Gnr E. C. Browne | 31 October 1942
Gnr V. A. B. Cameron | 5 December 1943
Gnr T. K. Chalmer, m.i.d. | 31 October 1942
Gnr R. H. K. Clarke | 27 June 1942
Gnr A. P. Cobden | 24 October 1942
Gnr A. J. Copland | 25 November 1941
Gnr C. Dawber | 29 April 1945
Gnr D. N. Eden | 18 July 1942
Gnr J. B. Elliot | 5 December 1943
Gnr H. H. Elliott | 22 February 1944
Gnr R. A. B. Ferguson | 22 February 1944
Gnr P. H. Ford | 27 June 1942
Gnr F. R. Foster | 24 October 1942
Gnr G. A. Gatfield | 15 January 1943

Gnr J. L. Gerrard

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr R. E. A. Gill | 24 October 1942
Gnr F. J. Green | 20 April 1945
Gnr T. L. Growden | 8 August 1942
Gnr A. R. Hawthorne | 3 June 1944
Gnr R. Hayes | 4 March 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr D. J. Hewitt | 28 July 1944
Gnr W. E. Hitchon | 12 August 1944
Gnr C. D. Horn | 2 June 1941
Gnr R. H. Hughes | 5 December 1943
Gnr N. Hulme | 26 June 1942
Gnr C. Ingram | 30 November 1941
Gnr H. L. Kinzett | 7 December 1943
Gnr J. H. S. Kyle | 25 May 1941
Gnr A. R. Laird | 7 December 1943
Gnr E. T. Louden | 23 September 1944
Gnr D. McGregor | 12 August 1944
Gnr A. J. McKay | 9 September 1942
Gnr P. Mackay | 6 September 1942
Gnr T. H. Mayne | 29 November 1941
Gnr L. Miller, m.i.d. | 19 February 1944
Gnr D. E. Moore | 4 March 1944
Gnr T. M. Moore | 19 February 1944
Gnr R. M. O'Brien | 17 January 1943
Gnr N. C. Oliver | 29 November 1941
Gnr W. A. Read | 29 November 1941
Gnr H. A. Reynolds | 24 October 1942
Gnr A. E. Savage | 7 December 1943

Gnr H. F. Seymour

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr F. J. Shaw | 3 June 1944
Gnr J. W. Smyth | 25 May 1941
Gnr W. J. Tozer | 24 October 1942
Gnr J. E. Walker | 2 June 1941
Gnr D. W. Warnock | 27 March 1944
Gnr J. A. Watson | 4 March 1944
Gnr S. J. Wendleborn | 30 April 1945
Gnr D. W. Whitaker | 22 July 1942
Gnr F. C. White, M | 17 March 1944
Gnr W. A. Woods | 26 May 1941

died of wounds

Maj P. B. Levy, m.i.d. | 24 July 1942
Maj R. K. G. Macindoe | 14 April 1945
Lt J. P. Dill, m.i.d. | 2 June 1941
Lt N. H. McMillan | 16 July 1942
Lt R. J. S. Rabone | 25 October 1942
WO II L. A. Harding, m.i.d. | 25 May 1941
WO II O. G. Lyons | 5 July 1942
WO II G. O. Wheeler | 29 June 1942
Sgt C. W. O. Erwood | 30 November 1941
Sgt E. J. McIntyre | 1 November 1942
L-Sgt N. Franks | 19 February 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Bdr W. G. Baker | 5 July 1942
Bdr W. J. Byrne | 26 July 1942
Bdr O. B. Magrath | 30 November 1941
Bdr B. D. Neal | 25 July 1944
Bdr E. D. Perkis | 27 June 1942
Bdr A. S. Wiles | 15 July 1942
L-Bdr W. R. Corser | 8 August 1944
L-Bdr B. M. Lake | 4 September 1942
L-Bdr W. B. Moulin | 14 July 1942
Gnr C. P. Anderson | 27 June 1942
Gnr E. W. Appleyard | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. H. Bannerman | 8 December 1941
Gnr J. C. Bissett | 2 May 1941
Gnr A. P. Bowler | 27 June 1942
Gnr H. E. Brown | 13 November 1942
Gnr K. A. Clarke | 22 July 1942
Gnr J. A. Collier | 22 July 1942
Gnr J. S. Craig | 26 June 1942
Gnr E. Croy | 17 January 1943
Gnr G. H. Duncan | 5 December 1941
Gnr C. E. Fechney | 6 June 1944
Gnr C. W. Haydon | 14 July 1942
Gnr M. H. Heath | 28 April 1941
Gnr K. F. L. Hodge | 18 January 1943
Gnr W. J. McCann | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. E. J. McCourt | 29 November 1941
Gnr C. McGregor | 3 May 1944
Gnr G. T. Mitchell | 12 July 1942
Gnr I. Moir | 14 July 1942
Gnr N. W. Paterson | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. J. Rich | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. W. Savage | 29 March 1943
Gnr H. T. Storrs | 3 November 1942
Gnr T. J. S. Swaney | 2 August 1944
Gnr R. S. V. Thwaites | 30 November 1941

died while prisoner of war

Bdr E. A. Riddell | 19 July 1941
L-Bdr W. R. Jourdain | 28 July 1941
Gnr R. W. Burgis | Date unknown
Gnr D. J. Dixon | 5 October 1941
Gnr P. G. Lovelock | 5 June 1941
Gnr E. Whyte | 1 September 1944
Gnr C. M. E. Wilson | 1 November 1942

died on active service

Lt J. L. R. J. Tait | 10 May 1941
Gnr H. C. Alexander | 14 December 1940
Gnr A. Chadderton | 29 March 1942
Gnr L. S. Churchill | 21 November 1941
Gnr L. G. H. Cooke | 5 April 1944
Gnr T. H. Flynn | 21 September 1941
Gnr W. Fulton | 21 September 1941
Gnr A. C. Gill | 29 December 1944
Gnr H. A. Hamblin | 28 August 1940
Gnr A. W. Henderson | 3 March 1943
Gnr T. L. Kennedy | 14 February 1940
Gnr O. J. Muir | 21 September 1941
Gnr H. G. Rose | 27 November 1940
Gnr R. Watty | 28 August 1940

5 Field Regiment

killed in action

Maj A. N. Grigg, MC, m.i.d. | 29 November 1941
Capt H. R. Hume | 1 December 1941
Capt E. P. Ombler | 27 November 1941
Capt H. K. Parkes | 24 October 1942
Lt B. B. Graves | 29 July 1944
2 Lt L. H. Hume | 21 May 1941
Sgt V. C. Cooke | 1 December 1941
Sgt J. H. Cooper | 1 December 1941
Sgt R. R. Devine | 27 November 1941

Sgt J. B. Dolomore

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt D. G. Duncan | 1 December 1941
Sgt J. B. Kroupa | 29 May 1941
Sgt D. McKenzie | 29 September 1944

Sgt K. A. McLeay, MM

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt E. A. Robinson | 26 June 1942
Sgt A. A. Sinclair | 1 December 1941
L-Sgt R. H. B. Bond | 27 November 1941
L-Sgt L. C. Dunn | 4 January 1942
L-Sgt B. Hughes | 27 June 1942
L-Sgt F. H. Lancaster | 27 November 1941
L-Sgt C. Reeves, MM, m.i.d. | 4 April 1944
L-Sgt G. G. Stanley | 27 November 1941
Bdr J. G. Beard, MM | 2 November 1942
Bdr C. V. W. Cater | 28 March 1943
Bdr R. E. Foothead | 1 December 1941
Bdr W. C. Gray | 20 May 1941
Bdr J. K. McDell | 4 July 1942

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Bdr C. H. Miller | 17 October 1944
Bdr T. J. Ramsay | 5 May 1943
Bdr T. N. Rhodes | 27 November 1941
Bdr E. W. Santi, DCM | 20 May 1941
Bdr J. M. Taylor | 24 October 1942
Bdr S. C. Tyler | 18 April 1943
L-Bdr A. H. Browne | 1 December 1941
L-Bdr A. Duder | 2 June 1941
L-Bdr F. T. Evans | 1 December 1941
L-Bdr C. A. Irons | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. J. Baker | 2 August 1944
Gnr L. A. Bird | 2 June 1941
Gnr F. E. V. Boddington | 27 June 1942
Gnr C. Bonner | 26 June 1942
Gnr L. B. Burgess | 26 October 1942
Gnr C. W. Cook | 2 June 1941
Gnr W. A. Cooke | 1 December 1941

Gnr L. C. C. Fletcher

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr W. Fyles | 26 May 1941
Gnr A. C. Gordon | 29 November 1943
Gnr A. E. Hall | 6 April 1943
Gnr J. C. Hallam | 26 June 1942
Gnr M. K. Hart | 4 April 1944
Gnr R. C. Hemmings | 27 November 1941
Gnr W. E. Higgins | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. Hodgson | 2 June 1941
Gnr J. M. Horrell | 26 June 1942
Gnr S. N. Jones | 20 May 1941
Gnr R. J. Kidd | 26 October 1942
Gnr F. R. Le Comte | 4 November 1942
Gnr L. E. Livingston | 29 May 1941
Gnr W. L. J. Lloydd | 22 July 1942
Gnr A. S. Ludwig | 27 June 1942
Gnr G. D. McGillivray | 14 February 1942
Gnr L. D. McKechnie | 29 November 1943
Gnr J. A. McLaren | 2 November 1942
Gnr A. D. McPherson | 29 November 1943
Gnr O. C. Martin | 7 December 1943
Gnr P. C. Martin | 20 May 1941
Gnr R. J. Mathews | 25 May 1941
Gnr S. L. Matthews | 27 November 1941
Gnr M. H. Meek | 27 November 1941
Gnr W. A. Miles | 9 January 1945
Gnr D. A. Miller | 27 November 1941
Gnr C. V. Milne | 21 February 1944
Gnr K. S. Morpeth | 1 December 1941

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr M. J. Morrison | 24 October 1942
Gnr M. G. Nelson | 27 November 1941
Gnr K. R. Osborn | 25 November 1943
Gnr H. F. Page | 27 November 1941
Gnr F. J. Pascoe | 15 January 1944
Gnr E. W. Perry | 2 June 1941
Gnr E. Phillis | 31 August 1942
Gnr G. L. Potts | 27 June 1942
Gnr S. S. Preedy | 27 November 1941
Gnr T. J. Ramsay | 5 May 1943
Gnr J. Reid | 1 December 1941
Gnr E. S. Reynolds | 27 November 1941

Gnr K. A. Scott

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr C. S. Sheldon | 27 June 1942
Gnr V. B. Silbery | 26 February 1942
Gnr R. J. Smith | 22 July 1942
Gnr D. H. Smyth | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. H. Sutherland | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. H. Thompson | 1 December 1941
Gnr G. C. Vercoe | 26 June 1942
Gnr J. P. Walsh | 20 May 1941
Gnr E. J. Warner | 1 December 1941
Gnr D. L. Wilson | 26 February 1942
Gnr J. G. Wilson | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. G. Wilson | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. A. Woodroofe | 2 June 1941
Gnr A. K. Worthington | 15 April 1941

died of wounds

Maj W. N. Carson, MC, m.i.d. | 8 October 1944
Capt F. E. Smith, m.i.d. | 24 October 1942
2 Lt G. G. Bailey | 5 July 1942
Sgt G. H. Fulford | 25 March 1944
Sgt W. F. McCarthy | 21 May 1941
Sgt J. O. Martin | 4 June 1944
Bdr R. H. Butler | 1 December 1941
Bdr L. N. Gibson | 3 August 1942
L-Bdr E. W. Brown | 9 December 1941
Gnr V. W. Benjamin | 15 July 1942
Gnr D. A. E. Brown | 22 April 1941
Gnr M. J. D. Byford | 21 May 1941
Gnr J. B. Cairns | 27 November 1941
Gnr R. E. Cammell | 3 December 1941
Gnr A. J. Cammock | 30 November 1941
Gnr K. A. Chittock | 25 May 1941
Gnr D. Cooper | 8 January 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr R. J. Croft | 13 December 1941
Gnr H. A. Day | 3 August 1944
Gnr I. W. Dorreen, m.i.d. | 16 September 1944
Gnr M. L. Gilbert | 6 May 1943
Gnr I. H. Henry | 29 July 1944
Gnr W. J. H. Hill | 14 April 1943
Gnr W. C. Kimbell | 30 May 1941
Gnr A. K. Lempriere | 28 November 1941
Gnr J. R. Skinner | 14 February 1942
Gnr D. H. Smith | 27 June 1942
Gnr F. R. Stent | 29 September 1944
Gnr G. H. Stephenson | 28 June 1942
Gnr W. J. Telfer | 27 June 1942
Gnr R. J. Wilson | 27 June 1942
Gnr C. S. Wylds | 2 December 1941

killed while prisoner of war

L-Sgt W. J. Kirkley | 9 May 1945
Gnr C. M. Broderson | 12 May 1944
Gnr O. Cole | c. 4 September 1941

died while prisoner of war

Capt B. Hardy | 1 June 1941
Gnr T. Conroy | 3 July 1941
Gnr W. V. Cook | 6 January 1944
Gnr G. K. Jackson | 12 September 1943
Gnr J. J. Leach, m.i.d. | 24 April 1942

died on active service

2 Lt O. G. Evans | 23 October 1941
WO II D. A. Body | 15 January 1942
L-Sgt W. F. Cantlon | 20 August 1943
Bdr R. P. G. Graham | 22 January 1942
L-Bdr F. Miles | 7 January 1945
Gnr J. A. Allbon | 21 December 1941
Gnr C. S. Cockburn | 8 September 1941
Gnr M. Hannam | 11 December 1941
Gnr P. Hoey | 26 April 1941
Gnr F. Hull | 29 March 1941
Gnr A. J. Nattrass | 15 September 1943
Gnr F. J. Nicholls | 2 January 1943
Gnr S. J. Smiley | 14 January 1943

6 Field Regiment

killed in action

Maj A. Marbeck, m.i.d. | 24 April 1943
Capt R. D. Sellars | 25 November 1941
Lt D. C. D'Arcy | 24 October 1942
Lt E. R. Grose | 27 June 1942
Lt H. S. Richardson | 1 December 1941
2 Lt A. J. Edwards | 1 December 1941
2 Lt J. V. Masefield | 1 December 1941
2 Lt P. E. Sefton | 1 December 1941
S-Sgt E. W. Hughes | 5 April 1943
Sgt L. J. D. Brown | 27 March 1944
Sgt J. W. C. Isbister | 1 December 1941
Sgt J. R. Prisk | 1 December 1941
Sgt E. A. Robinson | 26 June 1942
Sgt I. D. Robinson | 7 July 1942
Sgt H. N. Stewart | 4 August 1942
Sgt E. S. Talboys | 7 July 1942
L-Sgt L. G. Dickens | 4 May 1943
Bdr H. R. Brown | 25 March 1944
Bdr L. A. Carr | 17 July 1942
Bdr C. K. Hansen | 15 July 1942
Bdr W. J. Hayles | 1 December 1941
Bdr M. G. Oliver | 1 December 1941
Bdr R. T. Orr | 25 October 1942

Bdr R. S. Wilson

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Bdr H. W. James | 8 May 1943
L-Bdr L. H. Tullock | 24 March 1944
Gnr R. V. Aberhart | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. Ainsworth | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. D. S. Andrews | 15 December 1942
Gnr J. S. S. Armstrong | 1 December 1941
Gnr C. N. Barnes | 30 May 1944
Gnr N. C. Bilderbeck | 25 October 1942
Gnr J. W. Blair | 15 July 1944
Gnr C. H. Brown | 5 December 1941
Gnr G. Cairns | 25 October 1942
Gnr C. V. Clery | 17 January 1943
Gnr J. P. Coutts | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. C. Crook | 17 January 1943
Gnr J. P. Cross | 27 June 1942

Gnr B. G. Dickens

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr W. J. Dunlevy | 24 April 1941
Gnr G. E. J. Durham | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. Ferguson | 25 October 1942
Gnr L. A. Fuller | April 1941
Gnr J. Goffin | 24 November 1941
Gnr W. Goodwin | 28 June 1942
Gnr C. A. Grant | 5 February 1944

Gnr A. R. Haigh

5 December 1941

[*]

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr N. F. Hamon | 1 December 1941
Gnr J. B. Hardcastle | 22 March 1943
Gnr W. E. W. Henson | 1 November 1942

Gnr R. S. Husley

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr H. H. Hunt | 15 July 1942
Gnr L. V. Jones | 27 June 1942
Gnr E. E. J. Kee | 5 July 1942
Gnr A. J. Kelly | 1 December 1941
Gnr J. G. Kilgour | 5 December 1941
Gnr H. F. King | 30 August 1942
Gnr E. R. Langman | 1 December 1941

Gnr A. J. Lister

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr H. Little | 30 July 1942

Gnr H. J. Logan

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr A. J. McFarlane | 1 December 1941
Gnr E. J. McGreevy | 1 December 1941
Gnr G. D. McGuire | 15 March 1944
Gnr I. A. MacKechnie | 15 April 1943
Gnr S. H. MacKintosh | 3 August 1942
Gnr H. L. G. Masters | 6 March 1945
Gnr G. E. Miller | 29 July 1942
Gnr L. D. Mills | 1 December 1941
Gnr C. W. Minchington | 4 August 1942
Gnr J. D. Mitchell | 28 November 1943
Gnr R. J. Newland | 1 December 1941
Gnr L. C. O'Connor | 27 June 1942
Gnr C. P. Pearson | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. H. Pearson | 6 March 1944

Gnr F. K. Petersen

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr A. O. Phillips | 25 October 1942
Gnr T. K. Pollock | 4 July 1942
Gnr A. W. Pugh | 1 December 1941
Gnr C. R. Rae | 28 June 1942

Gnr J. H. Reid

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr J. A. Rider | 4 July 1942
Gnr R. M. Robertson | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. J. Rush | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. E. Scott | 27 March 1944
Gnr K. R. Shaw | 27 March 1944
Gnr S. L. Snelling | 1 December 1941

Gnr H. B. Stimpson

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr T. O. Stott | 15 July 1942
Gnr A. R. Thompson | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. E. Thurston | 17 January 1943
Gnr C. R. Tilly | 22 July 1942
Gnr R. Townhill | 22 March 1943

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr A. G. Trevor | 26 November 1941
Gnr C. J. Watts | 1 December 1941
Gnr A. A. Wilkie | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. Wilkin | 15 April 1943
Gnr G. H. Wise | 20 February 1944
Gnr G. M. Wyeth | 1 December 1941
Gnr H. R. Zaninovich | 17 January 1943

died of wounds

Maj A. T. Rawle, m.i.d | 3 December 1941
Capt J. T. Molloy | 30 November 1941
Capt R. B. Symon | 2 December 1941
Lt R. J. Couper | 15 July 1942
Sgt J. K. Paul | 31 August 1942
Sgt J. C. Riddle | 7 November 1942
Sgt R. E. Schultz | 27 June 1942
L-Sgt M. H. Johnson | 24 February 1944
L-Sgt R. D. Murray | 3 December 1943
Bdr G. A. Rashleigh | 22 march 1944
Bdr E. W. Roberts | 19 January 1942
L-Bdr M. A. Cullen | 11 December 1941
L-Bdr A. C. R. Fenn | 24 July 1942
L-Bdr J. F. Mitchell | 28 June 1942
Gnr S. F. Ahier | 7 December 1941
Gnr J. H. Bowmar | 28 July 1942
Gnr C. A. Briggs | 29 June 1942
Gnr P. C. Edwards | 21 July 1943
Gnr W. B. Green | 5 December 1941
Gnr R. H. Harding | 22 July 1942
Gnr N. E. D. Mathewson | 30 November 1941
Gnr W. I. L. Mavitty | 3 December 1941
Gnr L. G. Metcalfe | 24 December 1943
Gnr J. P. Perry | 27 June 1943
Gnr E. E. Peterson | 23 July 1942
Gnr M. R. Pilbrow | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. L. Rae | 2 January 1942
Gnr G. G. L. Scott | 8 July 1942
Gnr J. I. Sheridan | 5 January 1942
Gnr W. W. Stringer | 26 November 1941
Gnr W. M. Swords | 21 February 1944
Gnr R. A. C. J. Thomas | 16 April 1943
Gnr C. H. A. Thomson | 26 October 1942
Gnr H. J. Tipling | 28 June 1942
Gnr H. T. Wilkie | 5 August 1942

died on active service

Gnr J. A. Carney | 7 April 1941
Gnr L. D. E. Cordes | 19 February 1941
Gnr S. Jones | 7 December 1942
Gnr R. C. Lee | 12 October 1940
Gnr W. E. Lee | 12 October 1940
Gnr W. J. Lumsden | 12 March 1943
Gnr D. J. Robertson | 8 July 1944
Gnr S. W. Roos | 28 June 1941
Gnr T. Tolerton | 4 July 1944
Gnr D. C. Trevethick | 12 February 1945

died while prisoner of war

Gnr W. Harris | 2 June 1941
Gnr W. H. Howlett | 16 January 1945
Gnr C. Hudson | 26 October 1941
Gnr E. W. W. Loney | 10 January 1942

7 Anti-Tank Regiment

killed in action

Lt-Col T. H. E. Oakes, m.i.d. | 30 November 1941
Lt D. Baker | 26 March 1943
Lt R. R. W. McBride | 25 November 1941
Lt A. J. Wren | 15 July 1942
2 Lt W. A. Allan | 12 July 1942
2 Lt A. G. Bloore | 28 June 1942
2 Lt J. F. Fagan | 17 December 1941
2 Lt W. Foubister | 27 November 1941
2 Lt M. C. Hill, MC | 25 November 1941
2 Lt C. S. Reeves | 24 July 1944
2 Lt J. M. de Schryver | 2 November 1942
Sgt L. C. Clews | 14 April 1941
Sgt W. H. Cossey | 2 November 1942
Sgt W. J. Foley | 1 August 1944
Sgt W. L. Kane | 22 July 1942
Sgt L. B. McCaffery | 15 July 1942
Sgt H. G. E. Maffey | 25 November 1941
L-Sgt E. W. J. Clark | 18 April 1941
L-Sgt L. B. Easton | 2 November 1942
L-Sgt P. L. Scannell | 1 August 1944
L-Sgt C. R. Simpson | 27 November 1941
L-Sgt R. H. Watson | 21 August 1942
Bdr T. C. Bellringer | 18 April 1941
Bdr G. C. Bendall | 30 November 1941
Bdr R. J. Bettle | 1 December 1941
Bdr W. S. Dalgety | 9 April 1943
Bdr W. D. Toogood | 2 November 1942
Bdr F. J. H. Whitehorn | 1 August 1944
L-Bdr J. R. Calder | 27 June 1942
L-Bdr A. E. Fitzgerald | 14 December 1944
L-Bdr J. D. Kennedy | 15 July 1942
L-Bdr S. M. Kerr | April 1941
L-Bdr A. D. Logan | 30 July 1944
L-Bdr E. A. Luks | 18 April 1941
L-Bdr F. S. Marshall | 1 December 1941
Gnr J. T. Allen | 27 November 1941
Gnr V. T. Bailey | 28 November 1941
Gnr W. H. Booker | 2 November 1942
Gnr H. F. Brown | 1 December 1941
Gnr D. McL. Burke-Kennedy | 30 November 1941
Gnr C. Campbell | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. H. F. Carr | 21 April 1941
Gnr A. S. Chapman | 1 August 1944

Gnr A. D. Chrisp

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr J. A. Christison | 14 December 1944
Gnr R. J. Clark | 1 August 1944
Gnr W. R. Clarke | 15 April 1941
Gnr R. J. Corkill | 23 September 1944
Gnr J. H. Cosson | 14 April 1941
Gnr W. F. S. Craine | 1 August 1944
Gnr B. R. Curry | 1 August 1944

Gnr T. J. Cursons

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr B. Davis | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. A. Dean | 18 April 1941
Gnr G. Downes | 18 April 1941
Gnr S. S. Draffin | 4 September 1942
Gnr F. H. Dustin | 18 July 1942
Gnr T. H. Earl | 31 December 1943
Gnr F. C. Finlay | 20 July 1942
Gnr R. A. Fromenton | 18 April 1941
Gnr A. A. Goldfinch | 2 January 1944
Gnr B. Goodwin | 3 August 1944
Gnr D. M. Goodwin | 29 October 1942
Gnr J. E. Gould | 27 November 1941
Gnr R. A. Gustafson | 16 July 1942
Gnr F. A. Hargreaves | 7 January 1944
Gnr W. N. Harris | 15 July 1942
Gnr S. B. Head | 26 November 1941
Gnr L. G. L. Hemmings | 22 July 1942
Gnr C. M. Hennessy | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. W. Herries | 26 July 1944
Gnr S. F. Hill | 27 November 1941

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr J. T. Hitchcock | 3 August 1944
Gnr W. W. Hodgkinson | 29 July 1944
Gnr W. D. Hodson | 2 November 1942
Gnr N. R. Holdaway | 22 July 1942
Gnr R. P. Hutton | 15 July 1942
Gnr L. G. Jackson | 4 July 1942
Gnr G. A. Johnston | 13 December 1941
Gnr E. H. Keswick | 24 November 1941
Gnr A. Lamb | 22 July 1942
Gnr S. A. Leabourn | 25 November 1941
Gnr W. M. Lennane | 1 August 1944
Gnr A. MacDonald | 22 March 1943
Gnr J. McKay | 27 November 1941
Gnr J. A. McKinnon | 28 November 1941
Gnr J. D. McMillan | 18 April 1941
Gnr L. Mangnall | 14 July 1942
Gnr A. G. Manning | 30 November 1941
Gnr M. May | 22 July 1942
Gnr F. D. Nicholson | 23 November 1941
Gnr L. J. Petersen | 14 April 1941

Gnr W. Pritchard

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr O. B. Redstone | 3 June 1944
Gnr W. J. A. Regan | 27 November 1941
Gnr J. H. F. Reid | 1 August 1944
Gnr B. H. Richardson | 22 July 1942
Gnr J. N. Richardson | 18 April 1941
Gnr R. B. Richardson | 27 November 1941
Gnr J. M. Rogers | 28 November 1941
Gnr R. L. Sharplin | 27 November 1941
Gnr S. G. Shrimpton | 1 August 1944
Gnr D. J. Stewart | 25 November 1941
Gnr F. C. Sweetman | 25 November 1941
Gnr K. W. Telfar | 1 August 1944
Gnr R. M. Thorne | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. C. Toovey | 26 July 1944
Gnr R. T. Voss | 9 April 1943
Gnr M. M. Wiley | 18 April 1941
Gnr W. N. Williams | 19 October 1944
Gnr J. Wright | 2 November 1942
Gnr R. Wyllie | 27 November 1941

died of wounds

Maj A. V. Jenkins | 26 April 1941
Lt I. G. Laurenson | 22 July 1942
Sgt C. H. Harper, MM | 30 November 1941
Sgt J. E. Olver | 16 December 1941

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Sgt L. Walker | 12 April 1945
Sgt I. M. Wells | 2 November 1942
L-Sgt C. J. Cummings | 16 July 1942
L-Sgt J. E. Prisk | 23 November 1941
Bdr G. N. Beaumont | 22 July 1944
Bdr B. Dean | 14 December 1944
Bdr F. E. A. Fauchelle | 28 November 1941
Bdr R. G. Simpson | 22 July 1942
L-Bdr A. D. Anderson | 18 July 1942
L-Bdr F. H. Baylis | 2 November 1942
L-Bdr M. R. Boyce | 22 July 1942
L-Bdr G. Clark | 30 October 1942
L-Bdr W. G. Dow | 11 April 1945
L-Bdr B. Laing | 8 January 1944
L-Bdr J. G. Mullane | 9 January 1942
L-Bdr F. E. Sievert | 18 January 1942
Gnr W. M. Allan | 7 January 1944
Gnr P. J. Bennett | 17 December 1941
Gnr C. W. Burt | 26 November 1941
Gnr C. W. Corner | 29 April 1941
Gnr J. F. Crowther | 3 July 1942
Gnr R. V. Davies | 1 August 1944
Gnr L. H. J. Donkin | 28 October 1942
Gnr R. Eastman | 24 April 1941
Gnr J. M. Hunter | 25 April 1945
Gnr G. A. Laughton | 16 July 1942
Gnr D. Lynch | 13 September 1942
Gnr I. R. MacIntosh | 8 December 1941
Gnr N. Mackay | 18 April 1941
Gnr I. J. Pearce | 27 November 1941
Gnr R. C. M. Perrett | 2 November 1942
Gnr H. W. Redward | 13 April 1945
Gnr J. Seymour | 14 December 1941
Gnr C. R. F. Speck | 27 March 1943
Gnr T. J. Toll | 12 January 1944
Gnr W. P. Walsh | 15 July 1942
Gnr R. M. Williams | 28 June 1942
Gnr D. T. E. Wright | 4 November 1942

killed while prisoner of war

Gnr W. H. Needham | 17 August 1942

died while prisoner of war

Gnr R. A. Ansell | 27 September 1944
Gnr C. W. Appleyard | 29 November 1941
Gnr H. T. Brook | 27 January 1945
Gnr J. F. Corlett | 9 September 1943
Gnr R. H. Jones | 4 February 1945
Gnr C. L. Louisson | 18 April 1945
Gnr B. McBeth | 26 January 1945
Gnr J. D. Rendall | 17 August 1942
Gnr J. Tucker | 17 August 1942
Gnr T. W. M. Tudhope | 17 August 1942
Gnr E. Wilde | 17 August 1942

died on active service

Capt B. G. Craig | 12 June 1945
Capt W. N. Wood | 28 March 1944
Sgt J. T. Allen | 22 March 1944
Bdr R. Riddell | 10 August 1945
Gnr D. Beattie | 26 June 1942
Gnr R. Brunnell | 20 July 1944
Gnr L. W. Cook | 15 June 1943
Gnr N. R. K. Goodley | 24 June 1945
Gnr C. F. Leckie | 18 October 1941
Gnr D. J. McDougall | 14 October 1943
Gnr J. Miller | 20 September 1941
Gnr E. R. Scott | 8 October 1942

14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment

killed in action

Lt J. B. Aimers

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt S. C. Burge | 24 March 1943
Sgt R. O. G. Gross | 28 June 1942
Sgt J. P. Mortland | 27 March 1944
Sgt D. P. Patterson | 16 July 1942
Bdr E. J. McAlpine | 16 July 1942
Bdr C. A. Walker | 16 July 1942

Bdr J. I. Wilson

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Bdr F. Harper | 27 November 1941
L-Bdr R. J. Lichtwark | 4 June 1944
Gnr J. B. Aird | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. L. Alder | 13 February 1944
Gnr W. W. Barclay | 27 June 1942
Gnr J. F. Beccard | 25 November 1941
Gnr R. Bevan | 27 June 1942
Gnr S. W. Bracken | 16 July 1942
Gnr G. B. Casey | 25 November 1941
Gnr D. A. Claridge | 1 December 1941
Gnr D. E. W. Clark | 27 November 1941
Gnr G. F. Deighton | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. H. Dryden | 14 July 1942

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr D. I. Elliot | 5 July 1942
Gnr S. W. Evans | 4 July 1942
Gnr P. A. Freeman | 8 December 1943
Gnr H. R. Goldthorpe | 24 October 1942
Gnr F. J. Halpin | 7 March 1943

Gnr H. Halsey

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr F. B. Heerdegen

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr W. W. Hooper | 16 July 1942
Gnr A. W. Large | 27 November 1941
Gnr D. L. Logan | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. W. Longman | 24 March 1943
Gnr J. F. Lynn | 16 July 1942
Gnr I. R. A. Marshall | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. G. Martin | 3 September 1942
Gnr G. H. Newman | 6 January 1943
Gnr H. F. Preston | 16 July 1942
Gnr G. J. Price | 27 October 1942
Gnr G. W. Ralph | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. J. Ring | 27 November 1941
Gnr L. Smith | 4 July 1942
Gnr M. G. Smith | 16 July 1942
Gnr L. B. Walker | 1 December 1941

died of wounds

Sgt D. H. Lockyer | 2 March 1944
Bdr W. P. Lee | 5 July 1942
L-Bdr B. J. Neill | 1 November 1942
L-Bdr E. R. Wilson | 9 February 1944
Gnr C. E. Askew | 1 July 1942
Gnr M. G. E. Barnett | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. G. Carter | 11 July 1942
Gnr T. E. L. Clark | 14 May 1944
Gnr G. Fewtrell | 17 December 1941
Gnr C. H. Fuller | 27 June 1942
Gnr H. A. Humphries | 17 February 1944
Gnr J. Hutchin | 7 September 1942
Gnr T. L. Joseph | 16 July 1942
Gnr J. F. Kenn | 31 March 1944
Gnr M. J. McKinlay | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. Moore | 16 August 1942
Gnr R. D. Roberts | 14 July 1942
Gnr R. G. Roberts | 5 July 1942
Gnr A. G. Sim | 10 April 1943
Gnr F. G. Smith | 28 March 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr R. P. Stead | 4 July 1942
Gnr J. J. Summers | 5 July 1942
Gnr N. J. Thurlow | 16 July 1942

killed while prisoner of war

Gnr L. G. Batt | 24 April 1944

died on active service

Sgt B. Ujdur | 13 January 1945
L-Bdr D. G. Gibson | 29 June 1944
Gnr P. C. Doney | 23 July 1944
Gnr L. A. Fleete | 23 July 1944
Gnr E. W. Lockett | 5 June 1943
Gnr F. M. Logan | 1 February 1942
Gnr N. J. W. Smith | 15 August 1941

36 Survey Battery

killed in action

Gnr T. A. Crossman | 28 July 1944

died on active service

L-Sgt J. J. Green | 2 October 1941
Gnr G. Duston | 16 June 1941

I Survey Troop

killed in action

Sgt K. J. H. Snell | 4 July 1942
Bdr F. Thomas | 4 July 1942
Gnr C. M. Clarke | 27 November 1941
Gnr N. B. Mills | 4 July 1942

died of wounds

Gnr R. W. Glendinning | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. A. Leyland | 4 July 1942
Gnr T. P. Norton | 4 July 1942

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

HQ 2 NZ Divisional Artillery

HQ 2 NZ Divisional Artillery

killed in action

Gnr J. Booth

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr H. W. Dooley | 18 December 1944

died on active service

Brig R. Miles, CBE, DSO, MC | 20 October 1943
Gnr B. E. Andrewes | 10 June 1945
Gnr W. F. Whiteman | 17 August 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

4 Field Regiment

4 Field Regiment

killed in action

Maj J. B. Stevens-Jordan | 7 September 1942
Capt C. D. Bell | 24 October 1942
Capt P. M. Blundell, MC | 16 April 1945
Capt F. J. Cook | 27 June 1942
Capt R. J. McElroy | 17 July 1942
Lt G. McB. Brandon | 28 June 1942
Lt A. H. Madden | 9 July 1942
Lt J. D. Wyatt | 3 June 1944

2 Lt J. O. Burnett

5 December 1941

[*]

2 Lt R. H. Coleman | 29 April 1945
2 Lt G. E. Cook | 5 June 1944
2 Lt R. S. Herrick | 25 My 1941
2 Lt D. G. McM. Reid | 25 March 1943
2 Lt N. A. Stephenson | 1 August 1944
2 Lt F. A. H. Varian | 1 December 1941
2 Lt T. B. Wright | 25 May 1941
S-Sgt D. C. Perkins, m.i.d. | 25 February 1944

Sgt M. J. Buchanan, MM

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt H. F. Cuthbertson

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt K. J. Moses | 25 May 1941
Sgt J. W. G. Pickett | 25 May 1941
Sgt D. J. L. Power | 5 December 1943
Sgt A. G. Willis, m.i.d. | 17 July 1942
L-Sgt J. D. W. Cardno | 18 April 1941
L-Sgt E. P. H. Cotton | 5 July 1942
L-Sgt W. R. A. Hill | 23 March 1943
L-Sgt D. E. Jacobson | 1 December 1941
L-Sgt N. F Johnson | 17 April 1941

L-Sgt H. J. Ludemann

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Sgt K. C. Shugar

17 April 1941

[*]

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Bdr W. Barnett | 17 January 1943
Bdr H. N. Boyd | 5 December 1943
Bdr R. Dalzell | 1 December 1941
Bdr V. T. Hitchings | 18 April 1941
Bdr A. R. King | 23 March 1943
Bdr E. A. Mills | 1 December 1941
Bdr W. R. Mountfield | 24 October 1942
Bdr F. H. Neill | 25 May 1941
Bdr R. F. Organ | 25 November 1941
Bdr R. B. Starky | 23 March 1943

L-Bdr W. K. Andrews

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Bdr P. V. Burlace | 5 December 1943
L-Bdr W. S. A. Cummock | 31 October 1942
L-Bdr J. P. Lowry | 24 October 1942
Gnr W. H. B. Aitken | 29 November 1941
Gnr C. E. Anderson | 7 December 1943
Gnr H. J. Andrews | 3 June 1944
Gnr G. McG. Bankier | 25 May 1941
Gnr G. Bell | 25 May 1941
Gnr H. J. Benson | 3 June 1944
Gnr A. A. Biggs | 29 Novembr 1941
Gnr A. J. Blythe | 19 February 1944
Gnr G. R. Bremner | 25 May 1941
Gnr G. A. Brewster | 24 October 1942
Gnr S. R. Broadbent | 24 October 1942
Gnr E. S. Browell | 5 July 1942
Gnr E. C. Browne | 31 October 1942
Gnr V. A. B. Cameron | 5 December 1943
Gnr T. K. Chalmer, m.i.d. | 31 October 1942
Gnr R. H. K. Clarke | 27 June 1942
Gnr A. P. Cobden | 24 October 1942
Gnr A. J. Copland | 25 November 1941
Gnr C. Dawber | 29 April 1945
Gnr D. N. Eden | 18 July 1942
Gnr J. B. Elliot | 5 December 1943
Gnr H. H. Elliott | 22 February 1944
Gnr R. A. B. Ferguson | 22 February 1944
Gnr P. H. Ford | 27 June 1942
Gnr F. R. Foster | 24 October 1942
Gnr G. A. Gatfield | 15 January 1943

Gnr J. L. Gerrard

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr R. E. A. Gill | 24 October 1942
Gnr F. J. Green | 20 April 1945
Gnr T. L. Growden | 8 August 1942
Gnr A. R. Hawthorne | 3 June 1944
Gnr R. Hayes | 4 March 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr D. J. Hewitt | 28 July 1944
Gnr W. E. Hitchon | 12 August 1944
Gnr C. D. Horn | 2 June 1941
Gnr R. H. Hughes | 5 December 1943
Gnr N. Hulme | 26 June 1942
Gnr C. Ingram | 30 November 1941
Gnr H. L. Kinzett | 7 December 1943
Gnr J. H. S. Kyle | 25 May 1941
Gnr A. R. Laird | 7 December 1943
Gnr E. T. Louden | 23 September 1944
Gnr D. McGregor | 12 August 1944
Gnr A. J. McKay | 9 September 1942
Gnr P. Mackay | 6 September 1942
Gnr T. H. Mayne | 29 November 1941
Gnr L. Miller, m.i.d. | 19 February 1944
Gnr D. E. Moore | 4 March 1944
Gnr T. M. Moore | 19 February 1944
Gnr R. M. O'Brien | 17 January 1943
Gnr N. C. Oliver | 29 November 1941
Gnr W. A. Read | 29 November 1941
Gnr H. A. Reynolds | 24 October 1942
Gnr A. E. Savage | 7 December 1943

Gnr H. F. Seymour

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr F. J. Shaw | 3 June 1944
Gnr J. W. Smyth | 25 May 1941
Gnr W. J. Tozer | 24 October 1942
Gnr J. E. Walker | 2 June 1941
Gnr D. W. Warnock | 27 March 1944
Gnr J. A. Watson | 4 March 1944
Gnr S. J. Wendleborn | 30 April 1945
Gnr D. W. Whitaker | 22 July 1942
Gnr F. C. White, M | 17 March 1944
Gnr W. A. Woods | 26 May 1941

died of wounds

Maj P. B. Levy, m.i.d. | 24 July 1942
Maj R. K. G. Macindoe | 14 April 1945
Lt J. P. Dill, m.i.d. | 2 June 1941
Lt N. H. McMillan | 16 July 1942
Lt R. J. S. Rabone | 25 October 1942
WO II L. A. Harding, m.i.d. | 25 May 1941
WO II O. G. Lyons | 5 July 1942
WO II G. O. Wheeler | 29 June 1942
Sgt C. W. O. Erwood | 30 November 1941
Sgt E. J. McIntyre | 1 November 1942
L-Sgt N. Franks | 19 February 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Bdr W. G. Baker | 5 July 1942
Bdr W. J. Byrne | 26 July 1942
Bdr O. B. Magrath | 30 November 1941
Bdr B. D. Neal | 25 July 1944
Bdr E. D. Perkis | 27 June 1942
Bdr A. S. Wiles | 15 July 1942
L-Bdr W. R. Corser | 8 August 1944
L-Bdr B. M. Lake | 4 September 1942
L-Bdr W. B. Moulin | 14 July 1942
Gnr C. P. Anderson | 27 June 1942
Gnr E. W. Appleyard | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. H. Bannerman | 8 December 1941
Gnr J. C. Bissett | 2 May 1941
Gnr A. P. Bowler | 27 June 1942
Gnr H. E. Brown | 13 November 1942
Gnr K. A. Clarke | 22 July 1942
Gnr J. A. Collier | 22 July 1942
Gnr J. S. Craig | 26 June 1942
Gnr E. Croy | 17 January 1943
Gnr G. H. Duncan | 5 December 1941
Gnr C. E. Fechney | 6 June 1944
Gnr C. W. Haydon | 14 July 1942
Gnr M. H. Heath | 28 April 1941
Gnr K. F. L. Hodge | 18 January 1943
Gnr W. J. McCann | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. E. J. McCourt | 29 November 1941
Gnr C. McGregor | 3 May 1944
Gnr G. T. Mitchell | 12 July 1942
Gnr I. Moir | 14 July 1942
Gnr N. W. Paterson | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. J. Rich | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. W. Savage | 29 March 1943
Gnr H. T. Storrs | 3 November 1942
Gnr T. J. S. Swaney | 2 August 1944
Gnr R. S. V. Thwaites | 30 November 1941

died while prisoner of war

Bdr E. A. Riddell | 19 July 1941
L-Bdr W. R. Jourdain | 28 July 1941
Gnr R. W. Burgis | Date unknown
Gnr D. J. Dixon | 5 October 1941
Gnr P. G. Lovelock | 5 June 1941
Gnr E. Whyte | 1 September 1944
Gnr C. M. E. Wilson | 1 November 1942

died on active service

Lt J. L. R. J. Tait | 10 May 1941
Gnr H. C. Alexander | 14 December 1940
Gnr A. Chadderton | 29 March 1942
Gnr L. S. Churchill | 21 November 1941
Gnr L. G. H. Cooke | 5 April 1944
Gnr T. H. Flynn | 21 September 1941
Gnr W. Fulton | 21 September 1941
Gnr A. C. Gill | 29 December 1944
Gnr H. A. Hamblin | 28 August 1940
Gnr A. W. Henderson | 3 March 1943
Gnr T. L. Kennedy | 14 February 1940
Gnr O. J. Muir | 21 September 1941
Gnr H. G. Rose | 27 November 1940
Gnr R. Watty | 28 August 1940

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

5 Field Regiment

5 Field Regiment

killed in action

Maj A. N. Grigg, MC, m.i.d. | 29 November 1941
Capt H. R. Hume | 1 December 1941
Capt E. P. Ombler | 27 November 1941
Capt H. K. Parkes | 24 October 1942
Lt B. B. Graves | 29 July 1944
2 Lt L. H. Hume | 21 May 1941
Sgt V. C. Cooke | 1 December 1941
Sgt J. H. Cooper | 1 December 1941
Sgt R. R. Devine | 27 November 1941

Sgt J. B. Dolomore

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt D. G. Duncan | 1 December 1941
Sgt J. B. Kroupa | 29 May 1941
Sgt D. McKenzie | 29 September 1944

Sgt K. A. McLeay, MM

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt E. A. Robinson | 26 June 1942
Sgt A. A. Sinclair | 1 December 1941
L-Sgt R. H. B. Bond | 27 November 1941
L-Sgt L. C. Dunn | 4 January 1942
L-Sgt B. Hughes | 27 June 1942
L-Sgt F. H. Lancaster | 27 November 1941
L-Sgt C. Reeves, MM, m.i.d. | 4 April 1944
L-Sgt G. G. Stanley | 27 November 1941
Bdr J. G. Beard, MM | 2 November 1942
Bdr C. V. W. Cater | 28 March 1943
Bdr R. E. Foothead | 1 December 1941
Bdr W. C. Gray | 20 May 1941
Bdr J. K. McDell | 4 July 1942

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Bdr C. H. Miller | 17 October 1944
Bdr T. J. Ramsay | 5 May 1943
Bdr T. N. Rhodes | 27 November 1941
Bdr E. W. Santi, DCM | 20 May 1941
Bdr J. M. Taylor | 24 October 1942
Bdr S. C. Tyler | 18 April 1943
L-Bdr A. H. Browne | 1 December 1941
L-Bdr A. Duder | 2 June 1941
L-Bdr F. T. Evans | 1 December 1941
L-Bdr C. A. Irons | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. J. Baker | 2 August 1944
Gnr L. A. Bird | 2 June 1941
Gnr F. E. V. Boddington | 27 June 1942
Gnr C. Bonner | 26 June 1942
Gnr L. B. Burgess | 26 October 1942
Gnr C. W. Cook | 2 June 1941
Gnr W. A. Cooke | 1 December 1941

Gnr L. C. C. Fletcher

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr W. Fyles | 26 May 1941
Gnr A. C. Gordon | 29 November 1943
Gnr A. E. Hall | 6 April 1943
Gnr J. C. Hallam | 26 June 1942
Gnr M. K. Hart | 4 April 1944
Gnr R. C. Hemmings | 27 November 1941
Gnr W. E. Higgins | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. Hodgson | 2 June 1941
Gnr J. M. Horrell | 26 June 1942
Gnr S. N. Jones | 20 May 1941
Gnr R. J. Kidd | 26 October 1942
Gnr F. R. Le Comte | 4 November 1942
Gnr L. E. Livingston | 29 May 1941
Gnr W. L. J. Lloydd | 22 July 1942
Gnr A. S. Ludwig | 27 June 1942
Gnr G. D. McGillivray | 14 February 1942
Gnr L. D. McKechnie | 29 November 1943
Gnr J. A. McLaren | 2 November 1942
Gnr A. D. McPherson | 29 November 1943
Gnr O. C. Martin | 7 December 1943
Gnr P. C. Martin | 20 May 1941
Gnr R. J. Mathews | 25 May 1941
Gnr S. L. Matthews | 27 November 1941
Gnr M. H. Meek | 27 November 1941
Gnr W. A. Miles | 9 January 1945
Gnr D. A. Miller | 27 November 1941
Gnr C. V. Milne | 21 February 1944
Gnr K. S. Morpeth | 1 December 1941

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr M. J. Morrison | 24 October 1942
Gnr M. G. Nelson | 27 November 1941
Gnr K. R. Osborn | 25 November 1943
Gnr H. F. Page | 27 November 1941
Gnr F. J. Pascoe | 15 January 1944
Gnr E. W. Perry | 2 June 1941
Gnr E. Phillis | 31 August 1942
Gnr G. L. Potts | 27 June 1942
Gnr S. S. Preedy | 27 November 1941
Gnr T. J. Ramsay | 5 May 1943
Gnr J. Reid | 1 December 1941
Gnr E. S. Reynolds | 27 November 1941

Gnr K. A. Scott

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr C. S. Sheldon | 27 June 1942
Gnr V. B. Silbery | 26 February 1942
Gnr R. J. Smith | 22 July 1942
Gnr D. H. Smyth | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. H. Sutherland | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. H. Thompson | 1 December 1941
Gnr G. C. Vercoe | 26 June 1942
Gnr J. P. Walsh | 20 May 1941
Gnr E. J. Warner | 1 December 1941
Gnr D. L. Wilson | 26 February 1942
Gnr J. G. Wilson | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. G. Wilson | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. A. Woodroofe | 2 June 1941
Gnr A. K. Worthington | 15 April 1941

died of wounds

Maj W. N. Carson, MC, m.i.d. | 8 October 1944
Capt F. E. Smith, m.i.d. | 24 October 1942
2 Lt G. G. Bailey | 5 July 1942
Sgt G. H. Fulford | 25 March 1944
Sgt W. F. McCarthy | 21 May 1941
Sgt J. O. Martin | 4 June 1944
Bdr R. H. Butler | 1 December 1941
Bdr L. N. Gibson | 3 August 1942
L-Bdr E. W. Brown | 9 December 1941
Gnr V. W. Benjamin | 15 July 1942
Gnr D. A. E. Brown | 22 April 1941
Gnr M. J. D. Byford | 21 May 1941
Gnr J. B. Cairns | 27 November 1941
Gnr R. E. Cammell | 3 December 1941
Gnr A. J. Cammock | 30 November 1941
Gnr K. A. Chittock | 25 May 1941
Gnr D. Cooper | 8 January 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr R. J. Croft | 13 December 1941
Gnr H. A. Day | 3 August 1944
Gnr I. W. Dorreen, m.i.d. | 16 September 1944
Gnr M. L. Gilbert | 6 May 1943
Gnr I. H. Henry | 29 July 1944
Gnr W. J. H. Hill | 14 April 1943
Gnr W. C. Kimbell | 30 May 1941
Gnr A. K. Lempriere | 28 November 1941
Gnr J. R. Skinner | 14 February 1942
Gnr D. H. Smith | 27 June 1942
Gnr F. R. Stent | 29 September 1944
Gnr G. H. Stephenson | 28 June 1942
Gnr W. J. Telfer | 27 June 1942
Gnr R. J. Wilson | 27 June 1942
Gnr C. S. Wylds | 2 December 1941

killed while prisoner of war

L-Sgt W. J. Kirkley | 9 May 1945
Gnr C. M. Broderson | 12 May 1944
Gnr O. Cole | c. 4 September 1941

died while prisoner of war

Capt B. Hardy | 1 June 1941
Gnr T. Conroy | 3 July 1941
Gnr W. V. Cook | 6 January 1944
Gnr G. K. Jackson | 12 September 1943
Gnr J. J. Leach, m.i.d. | 24 April 1942

died on active service

2 Lt O. G. Evans | 23 October 1941
WO II D. A. Body | 15 January 1942
L-Sgt W. F. Cantlon | 20 August 1943
Bdr R. P. G. Graham | 22 January 1942
L-Bdr F. Miles | 7 January 1945
Gnr J. A. Allbon | 21 December 1941
Gnr C. S. Cockburn | 8 September 1941
Gnr M. Hannam | 11 December 1941
Gnr P. Hoey | 26 April 1941
Gnr F. Hull | 29 March 1941
Gnr A. J. Nattrass | 15 September 1943
Gnr F. J. Nicholls | 2 January 1943
Gnr S. J. Smiley | 14 January 1943

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

6 Field Regiment

6 Field Regiment

killed in action

Maj A. Marbeck, m.i.d. | 24 April 1943
Capt R. D. Sellars | 25 November 1941
Lt D. C. D'Arcy | 24 October 1942
Lt E. R. Grose | 27 June 1942
Lt H. S. Richardson | 1 December 1941
2 Lt A. J. Edwards | 1 December 1941
2 Lt J. V. Masefield | 1 December 1941
2 Lt P. E. Sefton | 1 December 1941
S-Sgt E. W. Hughes | 5 April 1943
Sgt L. J. D. Brown | 27 March 1944
Sgt J. W. C. Isbister | 1 December 1941
Sgt J. R. Prisk | 1 December 1941
Sgt E. A. Robinson | 26 June 1942
Sgt I. D. Robinson | 7 July 1942
Sgt H. N. Stewart | 4 August 1942
Sgt E. S. Talboys | 7 July 1942
L-Sgt L. G. Dickens | 4 May 1943
Bdr H. R. Brown | 25 March 1944
Bdr L. A. Carr | 17 July 1942
Bdr C. K. Hansen | 15 July 1942
Bdr W. J. Hayles | 1 December 1941
Bdr M. G. Oliver | 1 December 1941
Bdr R. T. Orr | 25 October 1942

Bdr R. S. Wilson

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Bdr H. W. James | 8 May 1943
L-Bdr L. H. Tullock | 24 March 1944
Gnr R. V. Aberhart | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. Ainsworth | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. D. S. Andrews | 15 December 1942
Gnr J. S. S. Armstrong | 1 December 1941
Gnr C. N. Barnes | 30 May 1944
Gnr N. C. Bilderbeck | 25 October 1942
Gnr J. W. Blair | 15 July 1944
Gnr C. H. Brown | 5 December 1941
Gnr G. Cairns | 25 October 1942
Gnr C. V. Clery | 17 January 1943
Gnr J. P. Coutts | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. C. Crook | 17 January 1943
Gnr J. P. Cross | 27 June 1942

Gnr B. G. Dickens

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr W. J. Dunlevy | 24 April 1941
Gnr G. E. J. Durham | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. Ferguson | 25 October 1942
Gnr L. A. Fuller | April 1941
Gnr J. Goffin | 24 November 1941
Gnr W. Goodwin | 28 June 1942
Gnr C. A. Grant | 5 February 1944

Gnr A. R. Haigh

5 December 1941

[*]

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr N. F. Hamon | 1 December 1941
Gnr J. B. Hardcastle | 22 March 1943
Gnr W. E. W. Henson | 1 November 1942

Gnr R. S. Husley

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr H. H. Hunt | 15 July 1942
Gnr L. V. Jones | 27 June 1942
Gnr E. E. J. Kee | 5 July 1942
Gnr A. J. Kelly | 1 December 1941
Gnr J. G. Kilgour | 5 December 1941
Gnr H. F. King | 30 August 1942
Gnr E. R. Langman | 1 December 1941

Gnr A. J. Lister

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr H. Little | 30 July 1942

Gnr H. J. Logan

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr A. J. McFarlane | 1 December 1941
Gnr E. J. McGreevy | 1 December 1941
Gnr G. D. McGuire | 15 March 1944
Gnr I. A. MacKechnie | 15 April 1943
Gnr S. H. MacKintosh | 3 August 1942
Gnr H. L. G. Masters | 6 March 1945
Gnr G. E. Miller | 29 July 1942
Gnr L. D. Mills | 1 December 1941
Gnr C. W. Minchington | 4 August 1942
Gnr J. D. Mitchell | 28 November 1943
Gnr R. J. Newland | 1 December 1941
Gnr L. C. O'Connor | 27 June 1942
Gnr C. P. Pearson | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. H. Pearson | 6 March 1944

Gnr F. K. Petersen

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr A. O. Phillips | 25 October 1942
Gnr T. K. Pollock | 4 July 1942
Gnr A. W. Pugh | 1 December 1941
Gnr C. R. Rae | 28 June 1942

Gnr J. H. Reid

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr J. A. Rider | 4 July 1942
Gnr R. M. Robertson | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. J. Rush | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. E. Scott | 27 March 1944
Gnr K. R. Shaw | 27 March 1944
Gnr S. L. Snelling | 1 December 1941

Gnr H. B. Stimpson

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr T. O. Stott | 15 July 1942
Gnr A. R. Thompson | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. E. Thurston | 17 January 1943
Gnr C. R. Tilly | 22 July 1942
Gnr R. Townhill | 22 March 1943

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr A. G. Trevor | 26 November 1941
Gnr C. J. Watts | 1 December 1941
Gnr A. A. Wilkie | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. Wilkin | 15 April 1943
Gnr G. H. Wise | 20 February 1944
Gnr G. M. Wyeth | 1 December 1941
Gnr H. R. Zaninovich | 17 January 1943

died of wounds

Maj A. T. Rawle, m.i.d | 3 December 1941
Capt J. T. Molloy | 30 November 1941
Capt R. B. Symon | 2 December 1941
Lt R. J. Couper | 15 July 1942
Sgt J. K. Paul | 31 August 1942
Sgt J. C. Riddle | 7 November 1942
Sgt R. E. Schultz | 27 June 1942
L-Sgt M. H. Johnson | 24 February 1944
L-Sgt R. D. Murray | 3 December 1943
Bdr G. A. Rashleigh | 22 march 1944
Bdr E. W. Roberts | 19 January 1942
L-Bdr M. A. Cullen | 11 December 1941
L-Bdr A. C. R. Fenn | 24 July 1942
L-Bdr J. F. Mitchell | 28 June 1942
Gnr S. F. Ahier | 7 December 1941
Gnr J. H. Bowmar | 28 July 1942
Gnr C. A. Briggs | 29 June 1942
Gnr P. C. Edwards | 21 July 1943
Gnr W. B. Green | 5 December 1941
Gnr R. H. Harding | 22 July 1942
Gnr N. E. D. Mathewson | 30 November 1941
Gnr W. I. L. Mavitty | 3 December 1941
Gnr L. G. Metcalfe | 24 December 1943
Gnr J. P. Perry | 27 June 1943
Gnr E. E. Peterson | 23 July 1942
Gnr M. R. Pilbrow | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. L. Rae | 2 January 1942
Gnr G. G. L. Scott | 8 July 1942
Gnr J. I. Sheridan | 5 January 1942
Gnr W. W. Stringer | 26 November 1941
Gnr W. M. Swords | 21 February 1944
Gnr R. A. C. J. Thomas | 16 April 1943
Gnr C. H. A. Thomson | 26 October 1942
Gnr H. J. Tipling | 28 June 1942
Gnr H. T. Wilkie | 5 August 1942

died on active service

Gnr J. A. Carney | 7 April 1941
Gnr L. D. E. Cordes | 19 February 1941
Gnr S. Jones | 7 December 1942
Gnr R. C. Lee | 12 October 1940
Gnr W. E. Lee | 12 October 1940
Gnr W. J. Lumsden | 12 March 1943
Gnr D. J. Robertson | 8 July 1944
Gnr S. W. Roos | 28 June 1941
Gnr T. Tolerton | 4 July 1944
Gnr D. C. Trevethick | 12 February 1945

died while prisoner of war

Gnr W. Harris | 2 June 1941
Gnr W. H. Howlett | 16 January 1945
Gnr C. Hudson | 26 October 1941
Gnr E. W. W. Loney | 10 January 1942

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

7 Anti-Tank Regiment

7 Anti-Tank Regiment

killed in action

Lt-Col T. H. E. Oakes, m.i.d. | 30 November 1941
Lt D. Baker | 26 March 1943
Lt R. R. W. McBride | 25 November 1941
Lt A. J. Wren | 15 July 1942
2 Lt W. A. Allan | 12 July 1942
2 Lt A. G. Bloore | 28 June 1942
2 Lt J. F. Fagan | 17 December 1941
2 Lt W. Foubister | 27 November 1941
2 Lt M. C. Hill, MC | 25 November 1941
2 Lt C. S. Reeves | 24 July 1944
2 Lt J. M. de Schryver | 2 November 1942
Sgt L. C. Clews | 14 April 1941
Sgt W. H. Cossey | 2 November 1942
Sgt W. J. Foley | 1 August 1944
Sgt W. L. Kane | 22 July 1942
Sgt L. B. McCaffery | 15 July 1942
Sgt H. G. E. Maffey | 25 November 1941
L-Sgt E. W. J. Clark | 18 April 1941
L-Sgt L. B. Easton | 2 November 1942
L-Sgt P. L. Scannell | 1 August 1944
L-Sgt C. R. Simpson | 27 November 1941
L-Sgt R. H. Watson | 21 August 1942
Bdr T. C. Bellringer | 18 April 1941
Bdr G. C. Bendall | 30 November 1941
Bdr R. J. Bettle | 1 December 1941
Bdr W. S. Dalgety | 9 April 1943
Bdr W. D. Toogood | 2 November 1942
Bdr F. J. H. Whitehorn | 1 August 1944
L-Bdr J. R. Calder | 27 June 1942
L-Bdr A. E. Fitzgerald | 14 December 1944
L-Bdr J. D. Kennedy | 15 July 1942
L-Bdr S. M. Kerr | April 1941
L-Bdr A. D. Logan | 30 July 1944
L-Bdr E. A. Luks | 18 April 1941
L-Bdr F. S. Marshall | 1 December 1941
Gnr J. T. Allen | 27 November 1941
Gnr V. T. Bailey | 28 November 1941
Gnr W. H. Booker | 2 November 1942
Gnr H. F. Brown | 1 December 1941
Gnr D. McL. Burke-Kennedy | 30 November 1941
Gnr C. Campbell | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. H. F. Carr | 21 April 1941
Gnr A. S. Chapman | 1 August 1944

Gnr A. D. Chrisp

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr J. A. Christison | 14 December 1944
Gnr R. J. Clark | 1 August 1944
Gnr W. R. Clarke | 15 April 1941
Gnr R. J. Corkill | 23 September 1944
Gnr J. H. Cosson | 14 April 1941
Gnr W. F. S. Craine | 1 August 1944
Gnr B. R. Curry | 1 August 1944

Gnr T. J. Cursons

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr B. Davis | 1 December 1941
Gnr R. A. Dean | 18 April 1941
Gnr G. Downes | 18 April 1941
Gnr S. S. Draffin | 4 September 1942
Gnr F. H. Dustin | 18 July 1942
Gnr T. H. Earl | 31 December 1943
Gnr F. C. Finlay | 20 July 1942
Gnr R. A. Fromenton | 18 April 1941
Gnr A. A. Goldfinch | 2 January 1944
Gnr B. Goodwin | 3 August 1944
Gnr D. M. Goodwin | 29 October 1942
Gnr J. E. Gould | 27 November 1941
Gnr R. A. Gustafson | 16 July 1942
Gnr F. A. Hargreaves | 7 January 1944
Gnr W. N. Harris | 15 July 1942
Gnr S. B. Head | 26 November 1941
Gnr L. G. L. Hemmings | 22 July 1942
Gnr C. M. Hennessy | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. W. Herries | 26 July 1944
Gnr S. F. Hill | 27 November 1941

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr J. T. Hitchcock | 3 August 1944
Gnr W. W. Hodgkinson | 29 July 1944
Gnr W. D. Hodson | 2 November 1942
Gnr N. R. Holdaway | 22 July 1942
Gnr R. P. Hutton | 15 July 1942
Gnr L. G. Jackson | 4 July 1942
Gnr G. A. Johnston | 13 December 1941
Gnr E. H. Keswick | 24 November 1941
Gnr A. Lamb | 22 July 1942
Gnr S. A. Leabourn | 25 November 1941
Gnr W. M. Lennane | 1 August 1944
Gnr A. MacDonald | 22 March 1943
Gnr J. McKay | 27 November 1941
Gnr J. A. McKinnon | 28 November 1941
Gnr J. D. McMillan | 18 April 1941
Gnr L. Mangnall | 14 July 1942
Gnr A. G. Manning | 30 November 1941
Gnr M. May | 22 July 1942
Gnr F. D. Nicholson | 23 November 1941
Gnr L. J. Petersen | 14 April 1941

Gnr W. Pritchard

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr O. B. Redstone | 3 June 1944
Gnr W. J. A. Regan | 27 November 1941
Gnr J. H. F. Reid | 1 August 1944
Gnr B. H. Richardson | 22 July 1942
Gnr J. N. Richardson | 18 April 1941
Gnr R. B. Richardson | 27 November 1941
Gnr J. M. Rogers | 28 November 1941
Gnr R. L. Sharplin | 27 November 1941
Gnr S. G. Shrimpton | 1 August 1944
Gnr D. J. Stewart | 25 November 1941
Gnr F. C. Sweetman | 25 November 1941
Gnr K. W. Telfar | 1 August 1944
Gnr R. M. Thorne | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. C. Toovey | 26 July 1944
Gnr R. T. Voss | 9 April 1943
Gnr M. M. Wiley | 18 April 1941
Gnr W. N. Williams | 19 October 1944
Gnr J. Wright | 2 November 1942
Gnr R. Wyllie | 27 November 1941

died of wounds

Maj A. V. Jenkins | 26 April 1941
Lt I. G. Laurenson | 22 July 1942
Sgt C. H. Harper, MM | 30 November 1941
Sgt J. E. Olver | 16 December 1941

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Sgt L. Walker | 12 April 1945
Sgt I. M. Wells | 2 November 1942
L-Sgt C. J. Cummings | 16 July 1942
L-Sgt J. E. Prisk | 23 November 1941
Bdr G. N. Beaumont | 22 July 1944
Bdr B. Dean | 14 December 1944
Bdr F. E. A. Fauchelle | 28 November 1941
Bdr R. G. Simpson | 22 July 1942
L-Bdr A. D. Anderson | 18 July 1942
L-Bdr F. H. Baylis | 2 November 1942
L-Bdr M. R. Boyce | 22 July 1942
L-Bdr G. Clark | 30 October 1942
L-Bdr W. G. Dow | 11 April 1945
L-Bdr B. Laing | 8 January 1944
L-Bdr J. G. Mullane | 9 January 1942
L-Bdr F. E. Sievert | 18 January 1942
Gnr W. M. Allan | 7 January 1944
Gnr P. J. Bennett | 17 December 1941
Gnr C. W. Burt | 26 November 1941
Gnr C. W. Corner | 29 April 1941
Gnr J. F. Crowther | 3 July 1942
Gnr R. V. Davies | 1 August 1944
Gnr L. H. J. Donkin | 28 October 1942
Gnr R. Eastman | 24 April 1941
Gnr J. M. Hunter | 25 April 1945
Gnr G. A. Laughton | 16 July 1942
Gnr D. Lynch | 13 September 1942
Gnr I. R. MacIntosh | 8 December 1941
Gnr N. Mackay | 18 April 1941
Gnr I. J. Pearce | 27 November 1941
Gnr R. C. M. Perrett | 2 November 1942
Gnr H. W. Redward | 13 April 1945
Gnr J. Seymour | 14 December 1941
Gnr C. R. F. Speck | 27 March 1943
Gnr T. J. Toll | 12 January 1944
Gnr W. P. Walsh | 15 July 1942
Gnr R. M. Williams | 28 June 1942
Gnr D. T. E. Wright | 4 November 1942

killed while prisoner of war

Gnr W. H. Needham | 17 August 1942

died while prisoner of war

Gnr R. A. Ansell | 27 September 1944
Gnr C. W. Appleyard | 29 November 1941
Gnr H. T. Brook | 27 January 1945
Gnr J. F. Corlett | 9 September 1943
Gnr R. H. Jones | 4 February 1945
Gnr C. L. Louisson | 18 April 1945
Gnr B. McBeth | 26 January 1945
Gnr J. D. Rendall | 17 August 1942
Gnr J. Tucker | 17 August 1942
Gnr T. W. M. Tudhope | 17 August 1942
Gnr E. Wilde | 17 August 1942

died on active service

Capt B. G. Craig | 12 June 1945
Capt W. N. Wood | 28 March 1944
Sgt J. T. Allen | 22 March 1944
Bdr R. Riddell | 10 August 1945
Gnr D. Beattie | 26 June 1942
Gnr R. Brunnell | 20 July 1944
Gnr L. W. Cook | 15 June 1943
Gnr N. R. K. Goodley | 24 June 1945
Gnr C. F. Leckie | 18 October 1941
Gnr D. J. McDougall | 14 October 1943
Gnr J. Miller | 20 September 1941
Gnr E. R. Scott | 8 October 1942

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment

14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment

killed in action

Lt J. B. Aimers

5 December 1941

[*]

Sgt S. C. Burge | 24 March 1943
Sgt R. O. G. Gross | 28 June 1942
Sgt J. P. Mortland | 27 March 1944
Sgt D. P. Patterson | 16 July 1942
Bdr E. J. McAlpine | 16 July 1942
Bdr C. A. Walker | 16 July 1942

Bdr J. I. Wilson

5 December 1941

[*]

L-Bdr F. Harper | 27 November 1941
L-Bdr R. J. Lichtwark | 4 June 1944
Gnr J. B. Aird | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. L. Alder | 13 February 1944
Gnr W. W. Barclay | 27 June 1942
Gnr J. F. Beccard | 25 November 1941
Gnr R. Bevan | 27 June 1942
Gnr S. W. Bracken | 16 July 1942
Gnr G. B. Casey | 25 November 1941
Gnr D. A. Claridge | 1 December 1941
Gnr D. E. W. Clark | 27 November 1941
Gnr G. F. Deighton | 27 June 1942
Gnr W. H. Dryden | 14 July 1942

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr D. I. Elliot | 5 July 1942
Gnr S. W. Evans | 4 July 1942
Gnr P. A. Freeman | 8 December 1943
Gnr H. R. Goldthorpe | 24 October 1942
Gnr F. J. Halpin | 7 March 1943

Gnr H. Halsey

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr F. B. Heerdegen

5 December 1941

[*]

Gnr W. W. Hooper | 16 July 1942
Gnr A. W. Large | 27 November 1941
Gnr D. L. Logan | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. W. Longman | 24 March 1943
Gnr J. F. Lynn | 16 July 1942
Gnr I. R. A. Marshall | 27 November 1941
Gnr E. G. Martin | 3 September 1942
Gnr G. H. Newman | 6 January 1943
Gnr H. F. Preston | 16 July 1942
Gnr G. J. Price | 27 October 1942
Gnr G. W. Ralph | 27 November 1941
Gnr A. J. Ring | 27 November 1941
Gnr L. Smith | 4 July 1942
Gnr M. G. Smith | 16 July 1942
Gnr L. B. Walker | 1 December 1941

died of wounds

Sgt D. H. Lockyer | 2 March 1944
Bdr W. P. Lee | 5 July 1942
L-Bdr B. J. Neill | 1 November 1942
L-Bdr E. R. Wilson | 9 February 1944
Gnr C. E. Askew | 1 July 1942
Gnr M. G. E. Barnett | 1 December 1941
Gnr W. G. Carter | 11 July 1942
Gnr T. E. L. Clark | 14 May 1944
Gnr G. Fewtrell | 17 December 1941
Gnr C. H. Fuller | 27 June 1942
Gnr H. A. Humphries | 17 February 1944
Gnr J. Hutchin | 7 September 1942
Gnr T. L. Joseph | 16 July 1942
Gnr J. F. Kenn | 31 March 1944
Gnr M. J. McKinlay | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. Moore | 16 August 1942
Gnr R. D. Roberts | 14 July 1942
Gnr R. G. Roberts | 5 July 1942
Gnr A. G. Sim | 10 April 1943
Gnr F. G. Smith | 28 March 1944

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

[*] Drowned off Tobruk in sinking of Chakdina.

Gnr R. P. Stead | 4 July 1942
Gnr J. J. Summers | 5 July 1942
Gnr N. J. Thurlow | 16 July 1942

killed while prisoner of war

Gnr L. G. Batt | 24 April 1944

died on active service

Sgt B. Ujdur | 13 January 1945
L-Bdr D. G. Gibson | 29 June 1944
Gnr P. C. Doney | 23 July 1944
Gnr L. A. Fleete | 23 July 1944
Gnr E. W. Lockett | 5 June 1943
Gnr F. M. Logan | 1 February 1942
Gnr N. J. W. Smith | 15 August 1941

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

36 Survey Battery

36 Survey Battery

killed in action

Gnr T. A. Crossman | 28 July 1944

died on active service

L-Sgt J. J. Green | 2 October 1941
Gnr G. Duston | 16 June 1941

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

I Survey Troop

I Survey Troop

killed in action

Sgt K. J. H. Snell | 4 July 1942
Bdr F. Thomas | 4 July 1942
Gnr C. M. Clarke | 27 November 1941
Gnr N. B. Mills | 4 July 1942

died of wounds

Gnr R. W. Glendinning | 4 July 1942
Gnr W. A. Leyland | 4 July 1942
Gnr T. P. Norton | 4 July 1942

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES — (ALL REGIMENTS)

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES
(ALL REGIMENTS)

| Killed or Died of Wounds | | Wounded | | Prisoners of War [*] | | Wounded and PW | | Died on Active Service | | total
| offrs | ORs | Offrs | ORs | Offrs | ORs | Offrs | ORs | Offrs | ORs |
Western Desert, 1940 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1
Greece | 1 | 28 | 5 | 52 | 9 | 159 | 2 | 20 | — | — | 276
Crete | 4 | 32 | 7 | 64 | 20 | 237 | 1 | 33 | — | — | 398
Libya, 1941 | 19 | 179 | 29 | 297 | 29 | 154 | 4 | 35 | — | — | 746
Egypt, 1942 | 20 | 195 | 50 | 669 | 12 | 51 | 1 | 15 | — | — | 1,013
Tripolitania and Tunisia | 3 | 38 | 14 | 190 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | 246
Western Desert (miscellaneous) | — | 2 | 1 | 4 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7
Italy | 9 | 121 | 43 | 532 | — | 6 | — | — | — | — | 711
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5 | 55 | 60
| 56 | 596 | 149 | 1,808 | 70 | 608 | 8 | 103 | 5 | 55 | 3,458

The above figures are compiled from 2 NZEF official casualty lists. In some cases they vary slightly from the figures given in the text, largely due to differences in the classification of casualties by dates and campaigns.

[*] 1 officer and 31 other ranks died or were killed while prisoners of war.

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Honours and Awards

Honours and Awards

COMMANDER OF THE ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

- Brig R. Miles, DSO, MC

- Brig G. B. Parkinson, DSO

- Brig R. C. Queree

- Brig C. E. Weir, DSO and bar

BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

- Brig G. B. Parkinson, DSO

- Brig C. E. Weir, DSO

- Capt D. J. Stott, DSO

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

- Brig G. B. Parkinson

- Brig R. C. Queree, CBE

- Brig C. E. Weir

- Lt-Col C. S. J. Duff ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Lt-Col H. E. Gilbert (6 Fd Regt)

- Lt- Col K. W. R. Glasgow (5 Fd Regt)

- Lt-Col J. M. Mitchell (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt-Col S. W. Nicholson (6 Fd Regt)

- Lt-Col H. T. W. Nolan ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Lt-Col W. D. Philp (6 Fd Regt)

- Lt-Col W. C. Savage (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt-Col J. F. R. Sprosen (5 Fd Regt)

- Lt-Col C. L. Walter (6 Fd Regt)

- Maj F. A. Aldridge (5 Fd Regt)

- Maj T. H. Bevan ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Maj G. P. Cade (5 Fd Regt)

- Maj A. E. Lambourn (6 Fd Regt)

- Maj C. K. Reed ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Maj C. H. Sawyers (6 Fd Regt)

- Maj G. J. O. Stewart ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt D. J. Stott

OFFICER OF THE ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

- Col R. C. Queree

- Col L. W. Thornton

- Lt-Col K. W. Fraser

- Maj G. P. Hanna

MEMBER OF THE ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

- Maj E. G. Lewis

- Maj V. M. Rowland

- Maj G. H. Thomson ( NZMC attached 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt J. Burns (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Capt R. B. Corlett (NZEME attached 6 Fd Regt)

- Capt H. Y. Gray (6 Fd Regt)

- Capt N. B. Mitchell

- Capt K. B. Myers (HQ 2 NZ Div Arty)

- Lt H. F. King (NZEME attached 5 Fd Regt)

- Lt J. D. McKerchar ( 4 Fd Regt)

- WO I W. Langevad (5 Fd Regt)

- WO I J. R. Spence (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- WO II C. W. Nicholass (5 Fd Regt)

MILITARY CROSS

- Maj A. A. Angell (6 Fd Regt)

- Maj K. Frechtling (14 Lt AA Regt)

- Maj R. A. C. Hollis ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Maj E. H. L. Maxwell (6 Fd Regt)

- Maj M. M. Robertson (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Capt T. M. V. Bain ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt F. D. Barry (15 LAD, attached)

- Capt A. L. Bryant ( NZMC attached 5 Fd Regt)

- Capt W. N. Carson ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt S. F. Catchpole (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt A. M. Caughley (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt O. P. Davis ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt J. W. Donaldson (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt P. Gilchrist (6 Fd Regt)

- Capt A. F. Harding (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt J. B. Horrocks (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt A. F. MacKay (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt J. C. Muirhead (5 Fd Regt)

- Capt K. W. Paterson ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt D. J. Riddiford (6 Fd Regt)

- Capt E. R. Smythe (6 Fd Regt)

- Capt J. P. Snadden ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Capt K. J. White ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Lt S. H. Abel (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt L. de V. Gilbert (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt D. L. Holt (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt P. K. McCliskie (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt C. S. Pepper (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt F. F. E. Polhill (6 Fd Regt)

- Lt J. S. Rutherfurd (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Lt M. B. Trower (5 Fd Regt)

- 2 Lt M. C. Hill (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

- WO I J. R. Spence (15 LAD, attached)

- WO II R. L. L. Brooks ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Sgt W. Batty (6 Fd Regt)

- Sgt H. L. Geoffic (14 Lt AA Regt)

- Sgt J. A. Laing (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Sgt T. Moir ( 4 Fd Regt)

- Sgt R. McD. Morton

- L-Sgt R. L. Burk (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- L-Sgt A. B. Stewart (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Bdr A. O. Keating (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

- Bdr E. W. Santi (5 Fd Regt)

- Gnr C. J. Winthrop (6 Fd Regt)

- Gnr O. Worsdale ( 4 Fd Regt)

MILITARY MEDAL

WO II B. K. Bassett (5 Fd Regt)

WO II P. George ( 4 Fd Regt)

WO II S. V. W. Nicol (6 Fd Regt)

WO II V. N. Quigan ( 4 Fd Regt)

WO II N. C. Tasker ( 4 Fd Regt)

Sgt F. B. Burke (6 Fd Regt)

Sgt J. D. Carson (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Sgt F. M. Diver ( 4 Fd Regt)

Sgt A. V. Doak ( 4 Fd Regt)

Sgt J. H. Franklin (5 Fd Regt)

Sgt W. A. Hill (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Sgt H. R. Hoare (5 Fd Regt)

Sgt A. S. Logan (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Sgt T. Moir ( 4 Fd Regt)

Sgt C. H. Parks (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Sgt R. J. Trail (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

L-Sgt S. Conway (6 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt E. E. Cutforth (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

L- Sgt C. H. Harper (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

L-Sgt A. W. Hewson ( 4 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt R. J. H. Hollis ( 4 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt M. A. Keppell (36 Survey Bty)

L-Sgt L. C. W. Knox (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

L- Sgt K. A. McLeay (5 Fd Regt)

L- Sgt P. I. Mantle (5 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt E. J. Mullin (5 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt D. H. Pulford (6 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt J. A. Ralston (6 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt G. A. Ravenwood ( 4 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt A. F. C. Timms (5 Fd Regt)

L-Sgt E. A. Williams (5 Fd Regt)

Bdr J. C. Armstrong ( 4 Fd Regt)

Bdr J. G. Beard (5 Fd Regt)

Bdr G. E. Buchanan (6 Fd Regt)

Bdr M. J. Buchanan ( 4 Fd Regt)

Bdr G. E. J. Farquhar ( 4 Fd Regt)

Bdr G. J. Hampson (5 Fd Regt)

Bdr T. M. Hutchinson ( 4 Fd Regt)

Bdr F. Mercer ( 4 Fd Regt)

Bdr R. A. Milne ( 4 Fd Regt)

Bdr J. H. Paris (5 Fd Regt)

Bdr G. F. Scoltock (6 Fd Regt)

L-Bdr C. C. Daniell (5 Fd Regt)

L-Bdr B. W. Johnston (5 Fd Regt)

L-Bdr N. J. McGowan (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

L-Bdr N. L. McKnight (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

L-Bdr A. G. Peterson (5 Fd Regt)

L- Bdr W. Roberts (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr C. A. Anderson ( 4 Fd Regt)

Gnr R. C. Barrett (5 Fd Regt)

Gnr K. Browne (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Gnr R. W. Bunton (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr C. P. Carew (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr W. F. Davies (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Gnr W. A. Derrett (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr G. R. Dobson (14 Lt AA Regt)

Gnr H. R. Drinkwater ( 4 Fd Regt)

Gnr L. F. Guthrie (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr M. R. T. Hamilton (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr R. V. Haste (5 Fd Regt)

Gnr F. W. Lee (14 Lt AA Regt)

Gnr G. J. Nicol (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Gnr A. D. Paulger (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Gnr C. Reeves (5 Fd Regt)

Gnr E. Sanders (7 Anti-Tank Regt attached LRDG)

Gnr C. N. Schultz (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

Gnr K. Streater (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr T. W. J. Tombleson (6 Fd Regt)

Gnr F. C. White ( 4 Fd Regt)

Gnr R. Wixon (7 Anti-Tank Regt)

BRITISH EMPIRE MEDAL

- WO II E. A. Turner

- L-Sgt R. W. Hodgson (6 Fd Regt)

UNITED STATES BRONZE STAR

- L-Sgt R. T. Walsh (6 Fd Regt)

GREEK MILITARY CROSS

- Brig R. Miles, DSO, MC

GREEK MEDAL FOR OUTSTANDING SERVICES

- Sgt S. W. Fleming (7 Anti-Tank)

- Sgt D. F. MacMaster ( 4 Fd Regt)

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

Index

Index

Abbassia, 167, 175, 307

Abdiel, HMS, 163

Abel, Lt S. H., 392, 409

Acquafondata, 581, 583– 4, 586

Acroma, 289, 291– 2, 437

Adem, El, 238, 300, 301, 438

- Box, 301, 303

- Landing Ground, 301

Adige R., 721– 6

Africa Corps. See

German Forces

Agedabia, 440, 448

Agheila, El, 299, 437, 440, 441, 448

Ainslie, Maj A., 23n

Ainsworth, Gnr W., 198

Ajax, HMS, 99– 100

Akarit, Wadi, 487– 90, 492

Alamanas Bridge, 76, 79– 80, 84, 87

Alamein, el, 18, 19, 176, 180, 315, 322, 326, 331– 3, 375, 396, 402, 423, 464n, 487, 516, 550, 646, 701, 732, 737, 739

Alamein Box, 335

Alamein Line, 360, 402, 419, 434, 451, 501

Alamein Offensive, 438, 646n, 692

Alamein Station, 379, 401

Alam Halfa, 358, 372

Alam Nayil, 335– 6, 340– 1, 346, 358, 362, 371, 374, 380n, 739

Albaneta Farm, 586– 7

Alder, Gnr W. L., 556n

Aldershot, 8, 10– 11

Aldridge, Maj F. A., 168, 450

Aleppo, 302, 304– 5, 308, 310, 433– 5

Alexander, Fd Mshl Earl, 355

Alexander, Sgt J. C., 653

Alexandria, 18, 19, 21, 98, 109, 165, 167, 174, 178, 290, 310n, 312, 371, 374, 420, 423, 516, 520

Aliakmon Line, 28, 31

Aliakmon R., 27, 30– 1, 33– 4, 36, 45– 6, 49, 128, 523

Alife, 549– 51

Alinda, Deir, 338, 340, 360, 371

Allan, Gnr W. M., 542

Allen, Brig A. S. (AIF), 58, 63 ( See also
Allen's Force)

Allen, Lt-Col J. M., 192– 3

Allen, Sgt J. R., 574n

Allen, Gnr J. T., 242

Allen's Force, 58, 59, 64, 66

Allison, Capt D. C., 164

Allison, Capt H. T. M., 462

Almaza, 167, 302, 308n, 312, 373, 435, 462

American Forces. See
US Forces

Ames, Sgt K. S., 43, 131, 132

Amiriya (Transit Camp), 21, 312, 314n, 333– 4, 423, 440, 517– 18

Amman, 424– 5, 427, 429– 30

Ancina Track, 581, 592

Anderson, L-Bdr C. A., 713

Anderson, Gnr C. E., 534n

Andrews, Gnr H. J., 596n

Andrews, Gnr W. D. S., 441

Angar, Deir el, 358, 364, 370

Angell, Lt-Col A. A., 298– 9, 643, 651, 696, 727, 734, 737

Anzac Corps, 40– 1, 48– 9, 57, 67

Anzio, 550, 556, 717

Aqaba, 424, 426, 429

Aquitania, 9– 10, 169

Arab Legion, 424– 5, 430

Arce, 606– 7, 657

Archibald, Maj W. P., 738

Arezzo, 610– 12, 613n, 614, 617, 619

Argenta Gap, 711

Arielli, 536– 7, 542, 555n

Armstrong, Bdr J. C., 563

Arno R., 619, 629, 632– 5

Arnold, Sgt J. R. C., 653

Arthurs, Maj J. P., 429, 433, 434n

Ashby, Gnr E., 248

Askifou Plain, 158, 160, 161

Atchley, Capt T. R., 189, 190

Atessa, 523, 526, 547

Athens, 24, 71, 83, 96– 101

Atina, 583, 585, 590, 592– 3

Auchinleck, Fd Mshl Sir C., 299, 303, 314, 315n, 322, 333, 348; relieved as 8 Army Commander, 355

Aurunci Mountains, 567n, 585, 588

Ausa R., 645, 648

Australian Forces—

- 9 Div, 378, 396

- 16 Inf Bde, 57

- 17 Inf Bde, 48, 49

- 19 Inf Bde, 19, 146, 155

- 2/2 Bn, 57– 8, 60– 3, 65

- 2/3 Bn, 61, 65

- 3/13 Bn, 286– 7

- 1 A-Tk Regt, 57, 97

- 2/1 Fd Regt, 72

- 2/2 Fd Regt, 16

- 2/3 Fd Regt, 47, 55– 6, 67, 97, 132, 135, 146– 7, 151– 4, 157, 161

- 2/7 Fd Regt, 396

- 7 Lt AA Bty, 117

Auty, WOI L. J., 580

Avezzano, 592, 593, 603, 606

Ay Dhimitrios, 29, 33, 43– 4

Ay Marina, 104– 5, 107, 109, 125, 138, 140, 142

Ay Trias, 76– 8, 84

Ayton, Capt J. J., 281

Azizia, 459– 61, 467

Baalbek, 302, 304, 308, 435

Baggush, 17– 19, 175– 6, 178– 80, 182, 289, 291, 295, 297– 9, 313, 416, 418, 421

Baggush Box, 176, 418

Bain, Capt T. M. V., 713

Baker, Lt D., 485

Baker, Lt Col F., 131

Baker, Gnr R. J., 630

Balsorano, 593, 595, 600, 602– 6, 613n, 736

Bannister, Maj R. G., 686n

Bardia, 19, 189, 192, 194– 6, 210, 212, 236– 7, 239– 41, 243n, 246– 7, 285, 291, 296, 421, 437– 8, 447

Bari, 520, 583, 607

Barker, WO II F. C., 207

Barnaby, Gnr G., 90n

Barnett, Bdr W., 456n

Barrett, Gnr R. C., 705

Barrowclough, Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir H., in Greece, 27, 55, 90, 92, 96; in crusader campaign, 198, 223, 225, 230, 252, 255, 264– 5, 278

Barry, Capt F. D., 351, 357

Bartlett, Cpl L. J., 709n

Bartley, Maj F. R., 327, 445, 470, 488

Bassett, WO II B. K., 316n, 574n

Bates, Capt J. C., 720

Batta, Bir Abu, 315, 322

Batty, WO I W., 274

Bauchop, Lt H. A., 23n, 66

Beard, Bdr J. G., 325

Beattie, Lt-Col R. R., 193, 223– 4, 269, 271– 2, 281

Beaumont, Capt G. M., 98n, 110, 115, 129, 146, 152, 154

Beirut, 302, 308, 310, 431, 433– 4

Bekaa Valley, 302, 308, 310

Belhamed, 181, 219– 20, 222, 224– 30, 232– 3, 249, 252, 255, 260, 268– 9, 274– 5, 277– 82, 286– 7, 290– 1, 296, 300, 303, 309

Bell, Capt C. D., 387

Bellringer, Bdr T. C., 53

Belmonte, 590, 592

Ben Gardane, 468, 479, 513

Benghazi, 299, 437, 462, 513

Beni Ulid, 456– 8

Benrinnes, 11

Benson, Gnr H. J., 596n

Bent, Maj W. S., 295

Beresford, Capt G. D., 665

Betts, Capt B. F., 225– 6

Bevan, Maj T. H., in Greece, 34– 7; in Crete, 134, 143– 4, 153, 155; in crusader campaign, 191, 213, 252, 265– 7; in Syria, 309n; at Alamein, 365, 367; wounded at Nofilia, 446

Bevin, 2 Lt R. O., 273

Bianco, Colle, 541, 543, 545

Bissett, WO I A. H., 128

Black, Maj M. J., 610

Blair, Gnr J. W., 614

Blamey, Fd Mshl Sir T., 57

Bliss, Maj H. C., 59– 60, 63, 111– 12, 139, 145, 147, 154, 158, 162– 3, 319, 350

Bloore, 2 Lt A. G., 327

Blundell, Capt P. M., 689, 714

Blythe, Gnr A. J., 562n

Bologna (front), 711, 735

‘Bombay Mutiny’, 14– 16

Bonifant, Brig I. L., 696n

Boomerang Track, 416

Booth, Sgt E., 343

Bou Chemma, 487– 8

Bourke, Capt H. J., 280

Boyce, Capt A. H., 111, 140– 1, 143, 152, 154– 5, 157– 8

Boyd, Bdr H. N., 532n

Boyes, L-Bdr J. R., 688

Bracken, Gnr S. W., 347n

Bradley, Gnr L. G., 623n

Brallos Pass, 25, 68, 74, 76, 80, 84

Brattdal, 21

Bretherton, Maj J. A., 209, 219, 289, 314n, 375, 437, 491, 504, 507

Britain, Battle of, 10

British Forces—

1 Army, 500

8 Army, its formation, 177; in crusader campaign, 260, 287, 300; at Gazala, 309; at Minqar Qaim, 312, 314, 315n, 322– 3; Gen Montgomery commands, 356n; at Alamein, 333, 335, 340, 352– 3, 361, 368, 372– 3, 391; in Operation supercharge, 405, 421; advance to Tripoli, 437, 452, 462– 3; in Tunisia, 468, 492, 504, 506, 510; in Italy, 520, 522, 550, 586, 638, 644, 646, 661, 682, 692– 3, 697– 8, 706, 711, 715

- Mentioned, 179, 180, 181, 701

9 Army, 302, 304, 435

5 Corps, 669, 690, 697, 711, 725

10 Corps, 323, 484, 510, 512, 607

13 Corps, 177, 181, 186, 257, 260n, 268, 277n, 295, 323, 340, 355, 711, 712.

30 Corps, 177, 185, 195, 196, 268, 340, 378, 383, 401, 414

Air OP Squadrons, 523, 620, 636, 641

Armour—

1 Armd Div, 322– 3, 378, 412, 415, 484, 642

6 Armd Div, 581, 721

7 Armd Div, 195, 299, 455– 8, 470, 474– 5, 721

- Support Group, 195

10 Armd Div, 377n, 378, 390, 392– 4, 403

1 Armd Bde, 48– 50, 77, 97– 8

4 Armd Bde, 187, 209

8 Armd Bde, 479– 80, 489, 492– 5, 504

9 Armd Bde, 372, 374, 377, 381, 386, 388, 390– 1, 393, 396, 404, 406– 7, 409, 412– 13, 415– 18, 420, 421

22 Armd Bde, 471, 491

1 Army Tank Bde, 181, 210, 213, 216, 221

- V/AA Bty, 210– 12, 215, 251, 266, 279

4 Lt Armd Bde, 416, 440– 1, 470– 1, 477

8 Royal Tanks, 200, 226, 278

44 Royal Tanks, 215, 219, 224– 6, 232– 3, 251, 257, 278

46 Royal Tanks, 356

Artillery—

(Unless otherwise indicated, all the following units belong to the Royal Artillery.)

1 AGRA, 629, 636

2 AGRA, 551, 586, 593, 595– 6, 603– 4, 698, 711, 731

5 AGRA, 471, 475, 503, 509, 537

6 AGRA, 531, 536– 7

2 AA Bde, 464, 473

1 Air-Landing Light Regt, 531, 533

23 Army Field, 563, 677, 715n, 717, 719, 720n

24 Army Field (SP), 644, 649– 50

142 Army Field (SP), 620– 2, 625, 627, 629– 30, 698, 703, 708, 710, 713, 715n, 717, 721, 732

Army Group, Royal Artillery. See
AGRA

65 A-Tk Regt, 216, 221, 230, 252, 255, 257– 9, 262– 3, 278, 280, 285

73 A-Tk Regt, 471– 2, 474

102 A-Tk Regt, Northumberland Hussars, 77– 8, 81, 88, 91, 94– 5, 97

149 A-Tk Regt, 232, 363

50 A-Tk Training Regt, 10

4 (Durham) Survey Regt, 77, 436, 471n

1 Fd Regt, 8, 16, 286, 364, 370

3 Fd Regt, 523, 525, 527– 8

4 Fd Regt, 370, 403, 510

8 Fd Regt, 210, 215– 16, 221, 224, 228, 232– 3, 250, 256– 7, 260, 266– 7, 279– 80, 284

- W/X Bty, 216, 221, 257, 280, 283

15 Fd Regt, 715n, 717

57 Fd Regt, 625, 629, 631– 2

58 Fd Regt, 357– 8, 362, 364, 368– 70, 475

65 Fd Regt, 500, 501, 503

78 Fd Regt, 378, 403, 507

98 Fd Regt, 378, 553

111 Fd Regt, 480– 1, 485, 494, 501, 511, 531, 533, 536– 7, 539– 40

124 Fd Regt, 489, 491, 501

51 Heavy AA Regt, 532
152 Bty, 531, 534

55 Heavy AA Regt, 713, 717n

57 Heavy AA Regt, 644, 680

32 Heavy Regt, 644, 713– 14, 717n

13 Lt AA Regt, 78– 9

30 Lt AA Regt, 466, 730

39 Lt AA Regt, 289, 575

106 Lt AA Bty, RHA, 78, 80, 97, 132, 140

155 Lt AA Bty, 81, 94

156 Lt AA Bty, 117, 140

1 Lt Troop, 110, 116, 126

1 Medium Regt, 510

3 Medium Regt, 644

4 Medium Regt, 649– 50, 679

5 Medium Regt, 578, 611, 698, 706, 712– 13, 717n, 720n, 729– 31 20/21 Bty, 611, 612

7 Medium Regt, 31, 45– 6, 111, 182, 363– 4, 368– 70, 471n, 475, 732

- 107 Bty, 368– 70 (Also called 426/7 Bty)

64 Medium Regt, 47– 8, 55, 77, 79– 82, 84, 87, 91, 98, 333, 338– 9, 347– 8, 353– 5, 357, 359– 60, 362– 3, 367– 70, 403, 416, 441, 471n, 477, 480– 1, 485, 491, 494– 5, 503, 732
211 Bty, 82n, 306, 416, 445– 6, 455, 459– 60

234 Bty, 82n

68 Medium Regt, 182, 388

69 Medium Regt, 378, 403, 471n, 485, 489, 491, 503

70 Medium Regt, 620– 2, 625, 629

75 Medium Regt, 620– 2, 625, 629, 631, 698, 711– 13, 717n

76 Medium Regt, 557, 578, 713– 14, 717n, 731

78 Medium Regt, 712, 717n

80 Medium Regt, 524, 527

166 Newfoundland Fd Regt, RA, 576

1 RHA, 233, 292– 4, 677, 679, 698, 703, 706, 708, 710, 713, 714, 715n, 717n, 720n, 721, 730, 732 Chestnut Troop, 292– 4

2 RHA, 77, 79– 82, 87, 90– 2, 94, 97, 348, 485, 491, 579, 711

3 RHA, 406n, 416, 441, 511n

4 RHA, 16, 205– 6, 484– 5

5 RHA, 403

11 RHA (Honourable Artillery Company), 412

12 RHA, 713

104 RHA, 403

Royal Artillery, 429, 435– 6, 444, 451, 464, 620, 622, 692

Royal Regiment of Artillery, 730– 1

54 Super Heavy Regt, 701

8 Svy Regt, 554, 595

46 Svy Bty, 717n

Infantry—

4 Div, 662, 670

5 Div, 537, 543

44 Div, 371, 380n

46 Div, 639– 40, 665n, 671, 673

50 Div, 364, 402, 491, 500

51 (Highland) Div, 378, 390, 402, 415, 461, 470, 474

56 (London) Div, 506– 7, 509– 10, 669, 677, 680, 730

70 Div, 182

78 Div, 575, 691, 698, 701

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 356

9 Bn (1 Rangers), KRRC, 96, 98

4 County of London Yeomanry, 491

8 Durham Light Infantry, 406, 408

9 Durham Light Infantry, 406

Essex Regt, 232, 233, 523

- Essex Bn, 229

201 Guards Bde, 470, 613

8 Hussars, 199– 200

11 Hussars, 509

2 Independent Parachute Bde, 536, 541, 585– 6

- 6 Para Bn, 539

69 Inf Bde, 490, 493n

131 Inf Bde, 472

132 Inf Bde, 356, 358, 364, 367, 369

151 Inf Bde, 370, 405, 413

1 Kensingtons, 698, 701

King's Dragoon Guards (KDGs), 479– 80, 485– 6, 488, 493– 4, 496– 8

12 Lancers, 724, 726, 729, 731

Northumberland Hussars, 174

Northumbrians. See
50 Div

Nottingham Yeomanry, 493

Royal Scots Greys, 453, 455, 459– 61, 463

Royal Warwickshire Yeomanry, 392, 409– 10

Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, 392, 410

Sherwood Foresters, 407, 409, 416n

Shropshire Yeomanry, 731

Staffordshire Yeomanry, 475

Welsh Regiment, 106, 108

Other Services—

7 Gen Hosp ( Crete), 105, 107, 156

RASC, 492, 518

Royal Air Force, 13, 18, 107, 121, 132, 135, 173, 176, 180, 186– 7, 222, 229, 261, 282, 315, 347, 353, 359, 394, 402, 420, 424– 6, 436– 7, 445, 448, 452, 465, 468, 476, 480, 484, 489, 507, 511, 513, 525, 600, 641n, 643

Royal Corps of Signals, 645

Royal Engineers, 429– 32, 435

Royal Field Artillery (1914–18), 2

Royal Navy, 13, 99, 102, 135, 427

Royal Regt of Artillery (1914–18), 1

Special Air Service, 449

British Troops in Egypt, Headquarters, 174– 5, 429

Broadway, Capt T. G., 598

Brown, L-Bdr A. D., 243

Brown, Capt B. H., 666n

Brown, L-Bdr C. V., 191

Brown, Bdr H. R., 574

Brown, 2 Lt J. C., 60, 64, 128

Brown, Gnr K. D., 665

Brown, Sgt L. J. D., 574n

Browne, Gnr F. R., 90n

Browne, Gnr K., 505n

Bryden, Maj W. A., 686n

Buchanan, Sgt G. E., 271, 655

Buchanan, Sgt M. J., 141, 290

Bryant, Maj A. L., 331

Buck, Rev. F. H., 513

Bull, Maj M. A., 23n, 91, 102, 109, 112, 115, 134, 146, 152– 3, 158, 163– 4

Bunton, Gnr R. W., 48

Burden, Sgt E. W. R., 525

Burdon, R. M., 623n

Burge, Sgt S. C., 484n

Burg el Arab, 19, 371, 516– 20

Burke, Sgt F. B., 598

Burlace, Bdr P. V., 532n

Butcher, Maj E., 290, 318, 696

Bylray, 109

Byrne, J. R., 1, 3

Cade, Brig G. P., in Crete, 115, 117– 19, 121, 129, 133, 136; in crusader campaign, 271– 2; at Alamein, 388; in Italy, 522, 684, 690

Cairo, 8, 11, 16, 19, 21, 167, 172, 175– 6, 178– 9, 302, 307, 311, 371, 429, 433, 435, 514– 15, 735n

Calcutta, HMS, 96

Calvert, S-Sgt L. H., 320

Cameron, Gnr V. A. B., 532n

Cameronia, 21

Cammell, 2 Lt D. H., 534

Campbell, Col T. C., 696n

Campion, Sgt H. J., 357

Canadian Forces—

- 1 AGRA, 650, 659

- 1 Corps, 638, 641, 646

- 1 Div, 639

- Fd Arty Regts, 587n, 644, 649

- Royal Dragoons, 643

Canal Zone, 167, 171, 173– 5, 298, 302, 423

Canea, 103– 6, 110, 116– 17, 134, 154– 5

Cantlon, L-Sgt W. F., 118

Capuzzo, Fort, 19, 189, 192, 194, 210, 235– 6, 239, 247, 249, 285, 292

Capuzzo, Trigh, 196, 213, 215– 16, 221, 223, 226, 240, 256– 7, 261, 266, 296, 438

Cardno, L-Sgt J. D. W., 67n

Carew, Sgt C. P., 358

Carew, Maj E. H., 686n

Carlisle, HMS, 98, 102

Carmichael, L-Sgt W. E., 526

Carson, S-Sgt J. D., 656

Carson, Maj W. N., in Greece, 60, 63; in Crete, 108, 111, 125– 6, 134, 150– 1; on Ruweisat, 346; in Tunisia, 486, 488n, 491, 493n, 504; wounded in Italy, 623– 4

Cartwright, Maj D. F. (RA), 225

Carty, Lt-Col D. A., 169, 297, 314n

Cassino, 520, 548– 607, 641– 6, 667, 673, 692, 699– 701, 731, 736

Castelfrentano, 529, 533, 540, 544– 8, 585

Castellina in Chianti, 619, 637

Castiglion Fiorentino, 610, 614n, 617

Catchpole, Maj S. F., 503, 694n, 697

Casale, 674– 5, 680

Caughley, Maj A. M., 128, 155, 353, 394– 5

Caughley, Maj J. E., 696

Causer, Gnr C. J., 623n

Cavanagh, Sgt D. E., 61

Castel Raimondo, 687– 8, 691, 714

Celle, 673, 684

Cemetery Hill, 116, 126, 128, 134

Cerbaia, 621– 3, 634

Cerreto, 584, 585

Cerreto d'Esi, 663, 687

Cesena, 659, 661– 2, 687, 735

Cesenatico, 657n, 662

Chakdina, SS, 290

Champtaloup, Capt D. S., 636

Chance, Capt G. R., 248– 9, 661

Channings, Gnr W. T., 39n

Chapman, Gnr A. S., 626

Charing Cross, 180, 313

Charlesworth, Gnr T. L., 142n

Chilton, Lt-Col F. O. (AIF), 58, 64

Chleta, Bir el, 195– 6, 210, 213, 249, 329

Christian, Capt A. E., 424, 426

Christie, Capt M., 723

Christison, Gnr J. A., 673n

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir W., 355, 463, 550n, 637

City of London, 11

Clark, Lt-Col C., 429

Clark, L-Sgt D. S., 493n

Clark, Capt J. S., 60, 63, 65, 108, 137– 8, 144, 146– 7, 153

Clark, Gnr R. J., 626n

Clark, Sgt W. J., 43

Clarke, Capt R. M. (RA), 622

Clery, Gnr C. V., 456n

Clews, Sgt L. C., 46n

Clifton, Brig G. H., 257– 8

Clifton Force, 81, 97

Close, Sgt M. H., 207

Clowes, Brig C. A. (AIF), 40, 57

Coleman, 2 Lt R. H., 726

Colpman, Lt A. T., 601

Composite Bn, 111– 12, 124, 126, 134, 143, 145– 6, 149, 151, 154 ( See also
Oakes Force)

Connell, John, 315

Conroy, Gnr T., 141n

Conway, Lt S., 347

Cook, Sgt A. L., 225n, 264

Cook, 2 Lt A. W., 237, 244– 5

Cook, 2 Lt G. E., 604

Cook, Maj W. G., 23n, 83

Cooper, Capt E. F., 23n, 109

Cooper, Capt I., 737

Cooper, Sgt J. H., 272

Copland, Gnr A. J., 220

Corkill, Lt R. J., 649

Cornwell, Maj L. J., 313, 318, 319

Cossey, Sgt W. H., 409– 10

Cosson, Gnr J. H., 46n

Costa Rica, 11

Cotignola, 693, 702

Cowan, Sgt J. L., 276

Cowie, Capt G. R., 108, 153– 4, 156, 158

Cox, Maj G. S. (Sir G.), 689n, 692

Craig, Gnr J. S., 316n

Craine, Gnr W. F. S., 626n

Crawford, Gnr G., 443n

Crawford-Smith (Crawford) Maj H. O., 269, 271

Creforce, 111, 123, 132

Creforce Headquarters, 105, 109, 166n

Crete, 64n, 96, 98– 100, 102– 6, 108– 9, 117, 120, 130, 137, 141, 163– 7, 170– 1, 181, 220– 1, 290, 309, 388, 606, 619, 657, 684n, 736, 739

Crompton, Gnr B. D., 63, 155, 156, 157

Crook, Gnr R. C., 456n

Cropper, Capt J. W., 92

Crossman, Gnr T. A., 623

Cruewell, Lt-Gen L., 236

CRUSADER campaign, 180– 296, 300, 303, 307, 314, 315n, 386n

Cunningham, Lt-Gen Sir A., 195

Currie, Brig J. C. ( 9 Armd Bde), 377, 386, 388, 391, 394, 410– 12, 414, 421, 477

Curry, Gnr B. R., 626n

Cutbush, Sgt W. J., 53, 416

Cutforth, L-Sgt E. E., 495

Cyprus, 424, 426, 432

Cyrenaica, 167, 180, 436– 7

Daba, El, 18, 312

Dalgety, Bdr W. S., 495

Danby, Gnr A., 657n

Daniell, L-Bdr C. C., 505n

D'Arcy, Lt D. C., 389

Davies, Gnr R. V., 626n

Davies, L-Bdr W. F., 343– 4

Davin, D. M., 166n

Davis, L-Bdr H. W., 586

Davis, Capt O. P., 727

Dawber, Gnr C., 726

Dawe, Lt-Col S. H., 184n, 357, 367, 435, 576n, 619

Dawnay, Capt J. (RA), 110, 116, 126, 128

Dean, Bdr B., 673n

Derrett, Sgt W. A., 358

de Schryver, 2 Lt J. M., 405, 408

Devis, 21

Devonshire, HMT, 8, 98

Dhomokos, 68– 9, 71– 2

Dhomokos Pass, 47, 67, 72– 3

Dickens, L-Sgt L. G., 510

Dickey, Capt S. D. V., 565

Dill, Lt J. P., 126, 138– 9, 144, 147, 150– 1, 154

Dillon, Maj G. F. L., 696

Dilly, Sgt C. W., 392

Djebebina, 509

Djedeide Fortress, 302, 304– 6, 309

Dobbs, Gnr W. H., 444

Dobson, Gnr G. R., 246

Doig, Capt R. T., 393, 396

Dolomore, Sgt J. B., 43, 131

Dominion Monarch, 738

Donaldson, Capt J. W., 650

Dorne, Sgt C. H., 458

Dorreen, Gnr I. W., 645

Dougan, L-Bdr N., 46n

Doughty, Gnr A. G., 673n

Douglas, Maj (RA), 444

Dow, L-Bdr W. G., 706

Downing, Capt (RA), 473, 532

Drinkwater, Sgt H. R., 65

Drummond, Maj R. G., 432, 434n, 435, 536, 554, 591, 607

Duda, Ed, 216, 222– 3, 225, 229– 30, 232– 3, 235, 259– 60, 267– 8, 287– 8, 291

Duff, Brig C. S. J., 7; commands 34 A-Tk Bty, 8; 7 A-Tk Regt, 17, 23n; in Greece, 21, 31, 78, 83– 4, 86; returns to Egypt, 104; commands Artillery Training Regt, Maadi, 167; commands 4 Fd Regt in CRUSADER campaign, 184, 186, 190, 211– 12, 215, 220, 224, 227– 8, 234, 250– 2, 279, 281– 2; in Syria, 297; appointed CRA, 3 NZ Div, 308– 9

Duff Force, 52

Duigan, Maj J. L., 98n, 110, 116, 128, 134, 138, 154, 161

Duignan, Maj C. V., 665

Duke of York, 738

Dunkirk, 10, 103

Dunlevy, Gnr W. J., 95n

Dunottar Castle, 519

Durban Castle, 738

Durham, L-Bdr J. B., 90

Dyson, Col R. H., 135, 604, 619, 736

Earl, Gnr T. H., 540

Eccleton, Capt J. H., 643

Eden, Rt. Hon. Sir A. (now Earl of Avon), 7

Edgar, Capt D. G., 529

Egypt, 7, 10, 11, 14– 15, 24, 99, 100, 102– 6, 109, 111, 157, 165, 167– 8, 171, 173, 186, 305, 307, 312, 335, 380, 421, 424, 434, 513– 14, 520, 736

Elasson, 29– 30, 41, 47– 8, 50, 52– 6, 67– 70, 97

Elevtherokhorion, 52, 69

El Gubbi airfield, 289

Elliot, Gnr J. B., 532n

Elliott, Gnr H. H., 563

Ellis, Gnr T. N., 126n

Elsworth, Gnr H., 596

Empoli, 635, 636

Empress of Canada, 7

Enfidaville, 497– 8, 500– 1, 506, 509– 10, 513

Ennis, L-Sgt D., 651

Euboea Is, 74, 79, 96

Fabriano, 663– 4, 735

Fabbrica, 623

Faenza, 657, 669, 671, 673, 675, 677– 80, 682, 684, 687, 691, 731, 735

Fagan, 2 Lt J. F., 236

Fano, 640– 1, 735

Farquhar, Bdr G. E. J., 511

Farrer, Capt R. M., 648

Farthing, L-Sgt J. R., 715

Fenton, Sgt F. T., 100n

Ferguson, Gnr R. A. B., 563

Finlay, Gnr R. H., 388

Fisher, Maj F. M., 197, 201– 4, 274, 329, 515, 525

Fitzgerald, L-Bdr A. E., 673n

Fitzgerald, Capt W. J., 5

Fiumicino R., 648, 652, 658

Fleet Air Arm, 107, 121

Florence, 613n, 619– 22, 625, 627, 631– 5, 637– 8, 645, 669, 682, 694, 732, 734, 737

Foggia, 522, 548

Foley, Sgt W. J., 626

Fontanaccia R., 648– 9

Fordyce, Capt G., 172

Forli, 662, 669, 678– 9, 682, 687, 690, 735

Foubister, 2 Lt W., 249

Foum Tatahouine, 479

Fourka Pass, 67, 72– 3

Fowler, Lt A. C., 53, 191

Fowler, Sgt N. X., 95n

Francis, Capt B. W., 118, 122, 146, 151– 2

Franklin, Lt J. H., 64

Franks, Capt L., 650

Franks, L-Sgt N., 562n

Fraser, Lt-Col K. W., commands 5 Fd Regt, 9, 23n; in Greece, 41– 2, 91; returns to Egypt, 104; in CRUSADER campaign, 184n, 244; taken prisoner, 245– 6, 296

Fraser, Rt. Hon P., 593

Frechtling, Maj K., 595, 599

Freeman, Gnr P. A., 534

French, Capt C. N. B., 623, 630n

French Forces—

- 19 Bde, 507

- Expeditionary Corps, 509, 569, 638

- Free French Forces, 475, 479– 80, 488n, 511

Freyberg, Lt-Gen Lord, GOC 2 NZEF, 7, 8, 11, 15; prepares for Greece, 20, 24; in Greece, 28, 44, 64, 68, 79, 85, 96; in Crete, 105– 6, 134, 142, 156; discussions with Brig Miles, 168, 170, 172– 3, 175, 179– 82, 184; in Libya, 183; in CRUSADER campaign, 185, 187, 195, 200, 210, 216, 251, 261, 267– 8, 275, 277– 8, 281, 288; confers with Brig Weir, 303– 4, 306; at Minqar Qaim, 314, 318, 323– 4; wounded, 325; at Alamein, 355, 358, 360, 362, 369, 372– 4, 377– 8, 386, 388, 391; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 402, 405, 412, 415– 16; at El Agheila, 441, 443, 445; on to Tripoli, 453, 456, 458, 460; in Tunisia, 473, 475, 483, 503, 510; in Italy, 519, 550– 1, 592, 627, 641, 665, 679, 682, 688– 9, 692, 709, 711– 13, 715– 16, 730– 1, 734, 737 Mentioned, 308

Fromenton, Gnr R. A., 54n

Frowen, Col J. H. (RA), 111

Fuka, 18, 180, 333, 416– 18

Fulford, Sgt G. H., 574

Fullarton, Capt J. H., 452

Gabes, 477, 486– 8, 513

Gaeta, Gulf of, 520, 550, 587

Gaiana Canal, 713, 715– 18, 732

Galatas, 107– 8, 110, 112, 116, 124– 6, 128, 133, 137– 9, 142– 7, 150– 5, 161n, 165, 220n

Gallagher, Lt C. V., 452

Gambettola, 658– 9, 661

Gambut, 195, 211, 213

Gambut airfield, 210– 11, 215

Gapes, Capt B. G., 279, 528

Gari R., 556, 564, 588

Gaskin, Gnr R. L., 39n

Gasr el-Arid, 196, 210– 11

Gatteo, 658– 9

Gauntlett, Bdr S. K., 448– 9

Gay, L-Bdr K., 284

Gazala, 289, 292, 299– 300, 309

Gazala Line, 293, 294– 5

Gentry, Maj-Gen Sir W., 195, 373, 377, 696n

George, Maj A. (Indian Army), 738

Georgeoupolis, 132, 135

Gerard, Rt. Rev. G. V., 272

German Forces—

4 Air Fleet, 117

Africa Corps, 172, 197– 8, 212, 215, 224, 228, 235– 6, 238– 9, 246, 249, 252, 256, 339, 443

10 Army, 692

90 Light Division, 332, 339, 512

Luftwaffe, 28, 45, 47, 49, 67, 70, 77– 9, 82, 95– 6, 109, 113, 116, 121, 129, 135– 8, 146– 7, 155, 282, 420, 610, 653, 680

5 Mountain Div, 600n

Panzer Army Africa, 360, 372

15 Panzer Div, 238, 259, 280, 285, 339, 438

21 Panzer Div, 247, 296, 323, 327

4 Parachute Div, 713

Wehrmacht, 8, 17, 24, 79, 732

Schrank Battle Group, 600n

Germany, 28, 728

Ghirba, Bir, 192, 193, 213

Gibbon, Maj ‘Stump’, 251

Gibson, WO II D., 736

Gibson, Capt N. McK. F., 118, 129, 146, 151– 2, 165

Gilberd, Capt J. G., 9, 256

Gilbert, Brig H. E., in CRUSADER campaign, 184n; in Tunisia, 470, 475, 493; wins DSO, 580n; in Italy, 585n, 692

Gilbert, Capt L. de V., 495n, 543

Gilbert, Gnr M. L., 509

Gilchrist, Maj P., 372, 505n

Gilmer, Capt B. K., 89, 737

Glasgow, Col K. W. R., 169, 175; in CRUSADER campaign, 184n, 189, 287; commands 5 Fd Regt, 295, 297, 437; at Minqar Qaim, 324, 327, 329– 31; at Alamein, 334, 349, 371; in Tunisia, 468, 474, 489n, 498n, 504, 513; assumes command Base Camp, 513

Glendinning, Gnr R. W., 338n

Glengyle, HMS, 96, 99, 102

Gloucester, HRH Duke of, 306

Godwin-Austen, Lt-Gen A. R. (Sir A.), 183, 187

Goeffic, Sgt H. L., 387

Goodwin, Gnr B., 633n

Goodwin, Gnr D. M., 400

Gordon, Lt A. B., 395

Gothic Line, 619, 638– 40, 642, 644, 687

Gott, Lt-Gen W. H. E., 323

Graham, Cpl A., 524

Graham, Capt J. B., 329– 30

Grant, Gnr C. A., 553

Graves, Lt B. B., 624

Gray, Brig J. R., 149, 161

Gray, L-Bdr W. (RA), 622

Graziani, Fd-Mshl, 18

Greece, campaign in, 20– 1, 24– 103, 110, 117, 155, 166– 8, 170, 172– 3, 176n, 178, 181, 220– 1, 276, 290n, 298, 303, 308– 9, 315, 423, 455, 470, 487, 518, 520, 523, 584, 619, 732

Greek Forces—

- 3 Mountain Bde, 643, 652

- 3 Fd Regt, 644

- 6 Regt, 124, 128

Green, Gnr F. J., 719n

Green, L-Sgt J. J., 426n

Green, Gnr R. V., 294n

Green, Brig V. C. (RA), 712

Greenwood, Gnr W. A., 598

Grey, Lt-Col (RA), 731

Grigg, Maj A. N., 244– 6

Growden, Gnr T. L., 354

Guardiagrele, 529, 541, 543, 547

Gunn, 2 Lt A. D. J., 43

Gunn, Capt J. R. A., 60, 64

Guthrie, Gnr L. F., 724

Hacheim, Bir, 438

Halfaya Pass, 19, 194, 236, 238– 9, 421, 437

Halford, Capt W., 298

Halke, L-Bdr G. T., 586

Hall, Gnr A. E., 492

Hall, Maj G. F. T., 258

Hall-Kenney, Maj J. H., 185, 210, 308, 356n, 398, 400, 406– 8, 422, 669

Hamilton, Gnr M. R. T., 602

Hamma, El, 485– 6

Hampson, Bdr G. J., 723

Hangman's Hill, 567, 571

Hanna, Lt-Col G. P., 60, 63, 355, 444, 475, 696, 706– 7, 727

Harding, Maj A. F., 52, 100, 219– 20, 505, 684n

Harding, Fd Mshl Sir J., 712

Harding, WO II L. A., 150

Hardy, Capt B., 147, 154, 158

Hare, Sgt J. C., 573

Harford, Sqn Ldr Rev. W., 686

Hargest, Brig J., 132, 142, 164, 238, 240– 3, 245– 6

Hargreaves, Gnr F. A., 542

Harper, Rev. A. C. K., 563

Harper, Sgt C. H., 73, 220

Harper, Capt J., 271– 2

Harris, Sgt A. N., 450

Harrowell, Maj E. S., 495, 696

Hart Detachment, 80– 1, 83– 4

Hart, Gnr M. K., 579

Harvey, Lt A. T., 590, 641

Haseiat, El, 439, 448, 514

Haste, Gnr R. V., 650

Haslett, Maj G. L., 509, 583

Hassett, Capt R. D. P., 694n

Hastie, Sgt W. R., 406, 408

Havock, HMS, 99, 102

Hawkins, Bdr R. J., 197

Hawthorne, Gnr A. R., 596n

Hay, Lt B. M., 23n

Hayes, Lt-Col H. A. (RA), 731

Hayman, Gnr P. A., 426

Healey, Sgt J. M., 573– 4

Heenay, Gnr J., 294n

Helean, Maj W. B., 600

Heliopolis, 17, 436

Hellas, 21, 24

Helwan Camp, 11, 17, 19– 21, 165, 167, 173, 176, 516

Henderson, L-Bdr J. H., 273

Henderson, Gnr R., 688

Henry, Gnr I. H., 624

Henton, Maj E. I., 686n, 696

Herrick, 2 Lt R. S., 150

Herries, Gnr E. W., 621

Hill, 2 Lt M. C., 73, 190, 212, 220

Hill, Sgt N. H. R., 150– 1

Hill, Sgt W. A., 693

Hill, L-Sgt W. R. A., 482n

Hitchcock, Gnr J. T., 633n

Hitchen, S-Sgt M. K., 400

Hitchings, Bdr T., 64n

Hitchon, Gnr W. E., 636n

Hoare, 2 Lt H. R., 325

Hobbs, WO II H. S., 670

Hobbs, Lt-Col W. P. (RA), 511

Hodge, Capt J. G., 282

Hodgetts, Gnr W. G., 100n

Hodgkinson, Gnr W. W., 623n

Holland, Maj A. J., 170

Hollis, Maj R. A. C., 574, 627

Hollis, L-Sgt R. J. H., 562

Holman, Gnr R. C., 497n

Holt, Lt D. L., 350– 1, 396, 486, 487n

Hooper, Gnr W. W., 347n

Hopu Hopu, 4, 11

Horrocks, Capt J. B., 674– 5

Hotspur, HMS, 163

Hove Dump, 584– 6, 592n

Hughes, S-Sgt E. W., 440

Hughes, Gnr R. H., 532n

Hulme, Gnr N., 316n

Hume, Capt H. R., 271

Hume, 2 Lt L. H., 132

Humphries, Gnr H. A., 557

Hutchins, Gnr F. W. G., 220

Hutchinson, Sgt T. M., 266

Hynes, Gnr A. D., 243

Idice, R., 715, 718– 20, 732

Iesi, 638, 640

Ikingi Maryut, 174, 518

Indian Forces—

- 4 Div, 181– 2, 501, 506, 546, 551, 575

- 8 Div, 523, 701 to Div, 671, 673, 677

- 43 (Gurkha) Lorried Inf Bde, 715, 720n, 724

- Punjab Rifles, 523

Indrapoera, 423

Inferno Track, 581, 583– 4, 589, 592

Ingham, L-Bdr G. T. W., 142n

Inglis, Maj-Gen L. M., 161– 2, 228– 9, 252, 279, 328– 9, 339

Isernia, 579, 584, 591

Ismailia, 171, 174– 5

Isonzo R., 729– 30

Italian Forces—

- Ariete Armoured Div, 264, 309, 336– 7

Italy, 17, 243n, 246, 290n, 309, 500; campaign in, 515– 738

Jackal, HMS, 163

Jackson, Gnr, 272

Jackson, WO II R. E., 477

James, L-Bdr H. W., 510

Jamieson, Capt A. S., 254, 262

Jantzen, 290n

Japan, 737– 8

Jardine, Lt J. E., 367

Jayforce, 737– 9

Jenkins, Maj A. V., 17, 53– 4, 95

Jerusalem, 425– 6, 429– 3

Johns, Capt F. D., 474

Johnson, Lt C. N., 630n

Johnson, Bdr H. E., 145

Johnson, L-Sgt M. H., 563

Johnston, L-Bdr B. W., 165

Johnston, Capt I. T. Y., 162

Johnston, L-Sgt J. W., 709n

Johnston, Gnr M., 142n

Jones, Hon. F., 507

Jones, Lt-Col H. S., 83

Jones, Gnr W. J., 652

Jordan, Rt. Hon. W. J. (Sir W.), 688

Jordan Valley, 425, 427, 429– 30

Joseph, Gnr T. L., 347n

Kabrit, 174, 176, 298, 302

Kairouan, 507, 513

Kalabaka, 41, 48– 50

Kalamata, 99– 101

Kandahar, HMS, 98, 102

Kaponga ( Qattara) Box (Fortress A), 333– 40, 353, 360, 370

Karatsos, 116, 125, 154

Katerini, 24– 5, 28– 31, 33, 36

Kavanagh, Sgt F. J., 341, 350– 1

Kay, Maj (RA), 117

Keating, S-Sgt A. O., 495

Kelly, Gnr J., 64

Kenah, Sgt A. R., 573

Kennedy, Bdr G. G. P., 560– 1

Kennedy, Sgt J. A., 326n, 356n

Kensington, Lt-Col E. T., commands 1 Svy Tp, 13, 23n, 77; in CRUSADER campaign, 190, 266, 279, 282; commands 36 Svy Bty, 434; in Tunisia, 498n; commands 14 Lt AA Regt, 516n; in Italy, 525, 585n, 597, 615– 16; leaves on furlough, 638n

Keppell, L-Sgt M. A., 578

Kerr, Sgt A. H., 573

Kesselring, Fd Mshl A., 729

Khalda, Bir, 315– 16, 331

Khalkis, 78, 81, 95, 97– 8

Khull, Bdr E. M., 153

Kidd, WO II K. M., 525

Kilmore, WO II C. A., 621

Kimberley, HMS, 99, 163

King, Bdr A. R., 482n

Kingston, HMS, 99

Kinzett, Gnr H. L., 534n

Kippenberger, Maj-Gen Sir H., 56, 111, 126, 143, 277n, 318, 373, 516n, 559, 688

Kirk, Maj G. C., 161

Kissel, Capt L. M., 105, 108, 126, 154

Knightsbridge (Battlefield), 438

Kokkinoplos, 34, 43– 5

Korea, 739

Korinthia, 21– 2

Kriekouki, 83, 96– 7, 102

Kroupa, Sgt J. B., 142n

Kyle, WO II A. H., 150, 154

Laing, L-Bdr B., 542

Laing, WO II J. A., 393, 396

Laird, Gnr A. R., 534n

Laird, Gnr R. B., 142n

Lambourn, Lt-Col A. E., in Greece, 46, 98n; in Crete, 107; at Minqar Qaim, 317; in Italy, 576n, 581, 591, 619

Lamia, 25, 67, 70, 72– 5, 77, 81

Lamone R., 669, 671, 675, 680

Lampson, Sir M. (Lord Killearn), British Ambassador in Egypt, 8

Lanciano, 542– 3, 547– 8

Langevad, Maj W., 9, 738

Larisa, 24– 5, 48, 50, 54– 5, 57– 9, 64, 66– 8

Latham, Brig H. B., 277

Latta, Lt G. C., 328

Laugesen, Capt N. W., 23n, 279

Laurenson, Lt I. G., 351

Lawrence, T. E., 425

Laybourne-Smith, Capt G. (AIF), 146, 161

Leander, HMS, 169

Leclerc, Gen J., 480

Lee, Brig E. A. (AIF), 72

Lee, Gnr F. W., 575

Lee Force, 68, 72

Leese, Lt-Gen Sir O., 373, 646

Leggat, Lt-Col J., 121

Lennane, Gnr W. M., 626n

Lepine, Sgt D. J., 92

Letitia, 519

Levy, Maj P. B., 86– 7, 90, 191, 227, 271, 276

Lewis, Lt-Col E. G., 53

Lewis, Maj H. M., 48– 50, 107, 111, 143, 147

Leyland, Gnr W. A., 338n

Libya, 19, 167, 185– 6, 309, 357, 380

Lichtwark, Gnr J. W., 64n

Lichtwark, L-Bdr R. J., 64, 599

Liggins, L-Sgt W. D., 674– 5

Lindsay, WO II H. C., 283

Liri R., 555, 595, 607

Liri Valley, 555n, 556, 558, 559, 564, 585, 588– 9, 593, 603, 606– 7

Livingston, 2 Lt J., 737n

Llangibby Castle, 519

Llewellyn, S. P., 379n

Loehr, Gen, 117

Logan, Sgt A. S., 493

Lombardy, Plain of, 648, 693

Longman, Gnr E. W., 484n

Longmore, Capt K. A., 58

Longos, 67, 79, 87

Long Range Desert Group, 8n, 185n

Louden, Gnr E. T., 646

Loughnan, Bdr I. H., 262, 269– 70

Loughnan, R. J., 666n

Louisson, Gnr C. L., 73n

Louisson, Capt N. M., 411

Low, Maj T., 96

Lucera, 521– 2

Luks, L-Bdr E. A., 71

Lumsden, Lt-Gen H., 355

Lund, Maj W. D., 232, 288, 696

Luscombe, Sgt F. H., 598

Lydster, Sgt N. R., 100n

Lynn, Gnr J. F., 347n

Lyon, Sgmn L. A., 709n

Mcalpine, Bdr E. J., 347n

McBride, Lt R. R. W., 222

McCardle, Gnr A. P., 674

McCarthy, Gnr D., 598

McCarthy, Sgt W. F., 36, 128

McClelland, Maj A. V., 249

McCliskie, Capt P. K., 674, 691

McCluskey, Lt F. H., 277

McClymont, W. G., 27n

McConnell, Lt B. A., 23n

McCowan, Bdr H. W., 271

McCredie, Maj J. M. D., 615

McDonagh, Capt W. G., 111, 126

McDonald, Sgt D. G., 526

McDonald, Gnr I. H., 118

McElroy, Lt-Col H. M., 129

McGillivray, Gnr G. D., 300n

McGowan, L-Sgt N. J., 684

McGregor, Gnr D., 636n

McGuire, Gnr G. D., 567

Macindoe, Maj R. K. G., 686n, 712

McIntyre, Sgt H. K., 43

McIntyre, Sgt J. B., 563– 4

McIntyre, Brig ‘Mad’ (RA), 473

- ‘Mac Troop’ (RA), 473, 476, 481, 488– 9, 491, 493, 501, 511, 532

McIntyre, Capt P., 8n

McIntyre, Sgt T. A. A., 453

Mackay, Maj-Gen I. G. (AIF), 72

Mackay, Gnr N., 54n

MacKay, Capt A. F., 603, 613, 651– 2, 659

McKay, Bdr D. H., 410

McKay, Lt-Col L. N., 23n; in crusader campaign, 200, 209, 219; at Wadi Matratin, 444

MacKechnie, Gnr I. A., 498n

McKechnie, Lt A. C., 356n, 357

Mackenzie, Gnr ‘Butch’, 392n

Mackenzie, Sgt D. G., 279n

McKenzie, Sgt D., 652n

McKenzie, L-Bdr N. G., 100

McKenzie, Maj R. P. H. (RA), 258– 9

McKinna, Gnr P. H., 597

McKinnon, Maj-Gen W. S., 686

McKnight, Sgt N. L., 624

McLaren, L-Bdr H. J., 269

MacLean, Maj G., 126, 133– 4, 138– 9, 147, 149, 220

McLeay, Sgt K. A., 119– 20, 133, 136, 290

McMillan, Gnr D., 338n

McMillan, Gnr J., 54n

McNaught, Lt-Col G. J., 200– 4

McSkimming, Capt J. W., 600, 683

McWha, Lt-Col F. D., 615

Maadi Camp, 8, 11, 16– 18, 19n, 20, 167, 169– 70, 173, 175– 6, 179– 80, 298– 9, 301– 2, 314n, 347, 355, 360, 371, 375, 380, 423– 4, 437n, 511n, 514– 15, 591, 667

Ma'an, 424– 6

Macky, Lt-Col N. L., 38– 40, 58, 62n

Maffey, Sgt H. G. E., 220

Mahfouz Camp, 20– 1, 173, 178

Maiella Massif, 544– 5, 551

Maleme, 105– 7, 112– 13, 115– 17, 123, 129, 131– 5, 137, 139– 40, 142, 165, 338, 684n

Maleme airfield, 104, 112– 13, 116– 18, 123– 4, 129– 34, 136– 7, 140, 142, 155– 6

Malta, 8, 372, 520

Manson, Gnr E. S., 409

Mantle, Sgt P. I., 321

Marbeck, Maj A., 505n

Marble Arch, 448

Marecchia R., 648

Mareth, 479, 489

Mareth Line, 468, 477– 8, 513

Markopoulon, 98– 9

Marlowe, Rev. O. R., 694n

Marsa Brega, 440, 449

Marshall, Sgt D. B., 338n

Marshall, Bdr F. S., 100, 276

Marshall, Gnr H., 118

Martin, Sgt J. O., 601

Martin, Gnr O. C., 534n

Masefield, 2 Lt J. V., 270

Mason, W. W., 290n

Massa Lombarda, 708– 9, 714, 732

Masters, WO I C. S., 283

Masters, Gnr H. L. G., 687

Matapan, Cape, Battle of, 22

Mathews, Gnr S. L., 244

Mathieson, Sgt H. F., 571

Matmata Hills, 482

Matratin, Wadi, 441, 447– 8

Mauretania, 14

Mawson, Capt K. J., 427

Maxwell, Lt-Col E. H. L., 627, 630n, 737

Maxwell, Lt W. P., 590

Mears, Capt I. D., 606

Medenine, 467– 8, 470– 1, 473, 477, 513– 14, 580n, 692

Melone, 529, 532

Melville, Sgt A. E., 671

Mena, 178, 311, 517

Menastir, 189, 235– 8, 240, 246– 7, 285, 291

Meneksos Pass, 54– 7

Menendez, Lt R. R., 590

Mercer, Bdr F., 727

Mersa Matruh, 17, 180, 182, 298n, 300, 309, 312– 15, 333, 419– 20, 422, 443

Merteba, Wadi, 485, 488n

Mestre, 726– 7, 735

Metameur, 471, 475– 6

Middle East Command, 429

Middle East Forces, GHQ, 171

Miles, Bdr F., 683n

Miles, Brig R., CRA, 5– 7, 23n; commands 2 NZEF ( UK), 10– 11; Maadi Camp, 16– 17, 20; to Greece, 21; in Greek campaign, 24– 5, 27– 8, 30, 33, 47, 54– 7, 67– 8, 77– 8, 80– 1, 83, 85– 6, 90– 2, 96; in

Crete, 102; in Egypt, 105– 6, 164, 167– 8, 170– 3, 175– 6, 179– 82; receives Greek MC, 176; in crusader campaign, 184, 186– 7, 195, 216– 17, 221, 223, 234, 250– 1, 261– 2, 267– 8, 272– 3; his capture, 275; 277n; tribute to, 296; dies in Spain, 519

Miles, Gnr S. E., 683n

Miles, Gnr W. A., 683

Miller, Bdr C. H., 659

Miller, Gnr L., 562n

Mills, Gnr N. B., 338n

Milne, Gnr C. V., 563

Milne, Sgt R. A., 602, 604

Minqar Qaim, 314– 15, 317, 320– 1, 324– 6, 331– 2, 334n, 355, 420

Mitchell, Brig J. M., 86; commands 7 Anti-Tank Regt, 297; in Syria, 312; at Minqar Qaim, 325n; at Alamein, 352; in Operation supercharge, 418– 19; at Wadi Matratin, 445; at Nofilia, 451; in Tunisia, 472; in Italy, 665n, 684; appointed 2 i/c Maadi Base Camp, 667, 669

Mitchell, Maj N. B., 226, 229, 320, 329– 30

Miteiriya Ridge, 373– 5, 386– 92, 394– 7, 402, 405, 412, 421, 657

Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation, Royal Marines, 107, 121

Moffat, Capt R. D. J. C., 585, 694n

Moir, Capt J. I., 193

Moir, S-Sgt T., 165

Molloy, Capt J. T., 201– 4, 254

Molos, 25, 67– 9, 74– 6, 78– 84, 86– 7, 89– 91, 94– 6, 98, 170, 303, 315

Monaghan, Capt A. E., 356n

Monfalcone, 728

Montaquila, 581, 592n

Monte Cairo, 553, 556, 585, 592– 3, 606

Monte Camurcina, 610, 614– 16

Montecassino ( Monastery Hill), 553– 4, 556– 7, 559, 567, 569, 572, 579, 586– 9, 593, 739

Monte Cifalco, 587, 589

Monte Lignano, 610– 11, 613– 16, 617n

Monte Porchia, 553, 557, 573, 588

Monte Trocchio, 553– 5, 557, 562, 564, 573, 578– 9, 605, 607

Montgomery, Fd Mshl Viscount, 355, 356n, 371, 374, 463– 4, 483, 489

Montone R., 669– 70

Moodie, Lt-Col J. W., 187, 189, 191, 460, 504

Moon, Maj N. C., 108

Moor, Lt-Col R. J., 239

Moore, Gnr T. M., 562n

Morpeth, Capt G. B., 406, 583

Mortland, Sgt J. P., 573, 575

Moss, 2 Lt B. C. H., 597n

Mossong, Capt L., 11

Mreir, Deir el, 336– 9, 348, 350– 1, 353, 357

Muhafid, Deir el, 340, 359– 60, 368– 9

Muirhead, Maj J. C., 202, 503– 5

Mullin, L-Sgt E. J., 707

Mullins, Capt F. H., 694n

Munassib, Deir el, 333, 336, 340, 360, 364

Murphy, Gnr C. F., 197

Murray, L-Sgt R. D., 531

Murray Hill, 147, 149

Musaid, 235, 239– 40

Myers, Capt K. B., 523, 579

Napier, HMS, 165

Naples, 520, 553, 561, 583, 738

Naqb Ashtar, 426– 7, 429

Nathan, Maj E. C. W., 283– 4, 457, 475, 504n, 591, 625

Nathan, Capt M. J., 108

Natrun, Wadi, 21, 311, 372, 519

Naylor, Lt J. L., 590

Neale, Lt J. W., 23n, 44

Nelson, Maj G. W., 423, 426, 429

Nevins, Gnr G. F., 272

Newman, Gnr G. H., 450

New Zealand Box, 358, 370, 372

2 NZEF Echelons—

- 1st Echelon, 4, 7, 9, 16, 18, 514, 695– 6

- 2nd Echelon, 4, 8, 9, 10, 21, 104, 125, 168, 514, 695– 6

- 3rd Echelon, 4, 14, 16, 514, 695– 6

New Zealand Forces—

- 1 NZEF, 3, 5

- 2 NZEF, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 434

- 2 NZEF ( UK), 8, 10

- New Zealand Corps, 479– 81, 483, 485– 6, 488n, 551, 556, 575, 580, 583n

- 3 NZ Div, 309, 685, 686n, 712

Army Service Corps—

- NZ ASC, 4, 93, 105, 107– 9, 125– 6, 134, 145, 150, 163– 4, 168– 9, 171, 175– 6, 183, 287, 476, 653

- Div Ammunition Coy, 4, 92, 108, 262, 379

- Div Petrol Coy, 111, 125, 128, 137– 9, 144– 5, 147, 149– 51

- Div Supply Coy, 111– 12, 125, 137– 9, 143, 147

- RMT Coy, 107, 111, 125– 6, 137– 8, 142– 3, 147, 151

Artillery—

NZ Artillery, 1 NZEF, 1– 3, 6, 7

Div Arty HQ, formation of, 3, 8– 9, 20; in Greece, 71n, 81; in Crete, 104, 109; training in Egypt, 182; in crusader campaign, 221, 229, 257, 264, 267, 286– 7, 296; in combined operations training in Egypt, 298; in Syria, 302, 306; at Minqar Qaim, 314n, 318, 325n; at Alamein, 362, 371, 375, 380, 386; in advance to Tripoli, 439, 440n, 467; in Tunisia, 468, 475– 7, 480– 2, 492, 494– 7, 513; at Burg el Arab, 517– 18; in Italy, 521– 3, 531, 540, 545– 6, 549n, 556, 564, 579, 587n, 589– 91, 592n, 600, 605, 606n, 607– 8, 610, 612– 15, 617n, 619, 623, 635, 638, 652, 662– 3, 669, 675, 679– 80, 685, 687, 691, 694n, 697, 709, 715– 16, 721– 2, 737n

- Mentioned, 21, 520n

7 Anti-Tank Regt (formerly 2nd), its formation, 4– 5; in Egypt, 8– 9, 17, 20– 2; Lt-Col Duff commands, 8, 23n; in Greece, 27, 58, 61, 68, 71, 74, 77– 9, 81, 83, 88, 98– 9, 101; in Crete, 104– 5, 107, 109– 10; returns to Egypt, 167, 173– 4, 178– 9, 182; Lt-Col Oakes commands, 184n; in crusader campaign, 185– 6, 213, 222, 256, 260, 267, 290, 296; in Syria, 297– 8, 306– 8, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 312, 318, 325n, 332n; at Alamein, 334, 359, 362n, 364– 5, 371, 380– 1, 397; in Operation supercharge, 409, 418, 421; in advance to Tripoli, 438, 441, 447n, 449, 451, 461– 2, 464, 467; in Tunisia, 471– 2, 505n, 514; in Italy, 518, 520n, 522, 539, 548, 549n, 564– 5, 567n, 576n, 580, 591, 593, 600, 606n, 608– 9, 619, 631, 633n, 635, 641, 643n, 663, 665– 7, 673, 678, 682, 684, 686– 7, 689– 90, 693, 696, 714, 717n, 727, 733– 4, 736– 7

- Mentioned, 13

31 A-Tk Bty, 8; in Egypt, 20, 22; in Greece, 27, 30, 46, 68, 72, 74, 85, 88– 9, 92– 3, 100; returns to Egypt, 179, 182; in crusader campaign, 211– 12, 219– 20, 224, 227, 233, 271, 276, 286; in Syria, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 313, 315n, 316n, 318, 322, 326, 328; at Alamein, 335, 338, 343– 4, 350– 1, 356, 367, 381, 386, 389, 391, 392n; in Operation supercharge, 409, 418; in advance to Tripoli, 451, 462, 467; in Tunisia, 471, 489, 494; in Egypt, 516– 18; in Italy, 536, 541– 2, 548, 577, 595, 599– 600, 608– 9, 623n, 626, 632, 641, 643, 648, 666, 684, 689, 712, 720, 728– 9

- Mentioned, 522

32 A-Tk Bty, 8; in Egypt, 20, 22; in Greece, 27, 34, 44– 5, 68, 74, 84; returns to Egypt, 174, 179, 182; in crusader campaign, 194, 235, 238– 9, 249, 286; combined operations training in Egypt, 299– 300; at Minqar Qaim, 315, 319, 321, 330– 2; at Alamein, 334– 6, 338, 341– 2, 350, 352, 357– 8, 367, 381, 389, 392, 396; in Operation supercharge, 409, 416– 17; in advance to Tripoli, 437n, 444, 446, 450– 1, 462, 467; in Tunisia, 471, 485– 6, 505, 509; in Italy, 522, 540, 576– 7, 585, 590, 609, 625, 635, 666, 671, 673, 684, 689, 703, 720

- Mentioned, 516, 518

33 A-Tk Bty, 13; in Egypt, 16, 18, 19n, 20, 22; in Greece, 27, 55, 57, 68– 9, 71– 2, 74, 81, 84, 94; training in Egypt, 176, 179, 183; in crusader campaign, 198– 9, 200, 209, 219, 253, 255, 259, 262; in Syria, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 315, 319, 328– 9; at Alamein, 333n, 335– 6, 342, 353, 356, 367, 381, 390, 395; in Operation supercharge, 402, 420; in advance to Tripoli, 437n, 441, 443– 4, 462; in Tunisia, 471, 477, 482, 485; in Italy, 526, 541– 2, 548, 572, 577, 583, 590, 608– 9, 624, 626, 630, 635, 641, 657, 661, 666, 689, 703, 720, 72234 A-Tk Bty, in Egypt, 8, 16– 18, 20, 22; in Greece, 25, 27, 33, 52– 3, 68– 9, 71, 74, 79, 81, 94– 5, 97– 8, 100; training in Egypt, 174, 178– 9, 182, 184; in crusader campaign, 185, 191, 210– 11, 219, 232, 235, 237, 256, 288; at Alamein, 338, 356– 7, 361– 2, 368, 396; in Operation supercharge, 398, 405, 408– 9, 413, 416n, 420, 422; in advance to Tripoli, 444– 5, 449, 453, 455, 458– 60; in

Tunisia, 471, 477, 487, 489, 493, 495, 498, 500, 511n; in Italy, 526, 541, 548, 565, 567, 577, 585, 601, 609, 626n, 635– 6, 643n, 652, 656– 7, 666, 669

- Mentioned, 307, 308, 312, 517

39 Hvy Mortar Bty (originally 35, renumbered 34 Bty, Nov 1944), in Italy, 590– 2, 600, 609– 10, 620– 1, 625, 630, 633, 635– 6, 660; redesignated 34 Bty, 666, 678– 9, 682– 4, 691, 698– 9, 701– 2, 706– 7, 720, 722, 724, 727, 729, 733– 4, 737

5 Survey Troop, 666, 690, 714, 717n, 733n

4 Fd Regt, its formation, 4– 5; in Egypt, 7– 9, 16– 17, 19– 21; Lt-Col Parkinson commands, 23n; in Greece, 24– 5, 27, 31, 33, 41, 48, 50, 60, 63– 4, 67, 71n, 74, 77, 79– 80, 87, 90– 4, 98, 100– 1; in Crete, 102, 104– 5, 108– 9, 111, 125, 128, 135, 137– 9, 141– 3, 145, 147, 149– 51, 154, 162– 6; returns to Egypt, 171, 173, 177– 8, 180; in Libya, 182– 3; Lt-Col Duff commands, 184; in crusader campaign, 185– 7, 189– 91, 210– 12, 217, 221, 224, 232– 4, 250– 2, 258, 260, 264, 276, 279– 81, 283– 4, 286, 296; in Syria, 297, 298n, 299, 308, 310; Lt-Col Queree commands, 309; at Minqar Qaim, 312– 13, 316n, 317– 18, 322– 3, 326– 7, 332; Lt-Col Stewart commands, 365; at Alamein, 334– 6, 339– 40, 346– 7, 349, 353– 4, 356n, 357– 61, 363, 367– 71, 374– 5, 377– 8, 380– 1, 383– 9, 391, 393– 4, 396– 7; in Operation supercharge, 401– 3, 411– 15, 417– 21; in advance to Tripoli, 437– 8, 453, 455– 7, 459– 60, 462, 466– 7; in Tunisia, 468, 470– 1, 474– 7, 479– 81, 484– 5, 487– 9, 491– 8, 500– 1, 503– 4, 506– 7, 509, 511– 14; in Italy, 522– 5, 527– 9, 532– 4, 536– 7, 540– 3, 548, 549n, 553, 555– 7, 559, 562– 4, 569– 70, 572, 574, 578– 80, 584– 9, 592n, 593, 595– 7, 599, 601– 5, 606n, 608, 610, 612– 15, 617, 619– 21, 624– 5, 629, 631– 4, 636, 639– 41, 643, 645– 6, 651, 654– 5, 657, 659, 663, 669– 71, 675, 677– 9, 682, 684n, 686– 7, 689, 691, 693, 695– 6, 699, 703, 705– 6, 708– 9, 711, 713– 16, 718– 20, 722, 724– 9, 733– 4, 736– 7

- Mentioned, 423, 434, 515, 516, 517, 520n

25 Bty, 5; in Egypt, 20, 22; in Greece, 25, 31, 41, 48– 50, 67, 74, 94; returns to Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 189– 90, 211– 12, 215, 251, 258, 260, 266– 7, 279– 80; in Egypt, 313; at Alamein, 346, 371, 393– 4, 396; in Operation supercharge, 402, 411, 413; Maj Stevens-Jordan commands, 434; advance to Tripoli, 437, 460; in Tunisia, 482, 488, 504, 507, 509– 10; in Italy, 525, 540, 559– 62, 570, 588, 603– 4, 607, 615, 620, 655, 710, 712– 14, 725– 7, 729, 737– 826 Bty, 5; in Egypt, 20, 22; in Greece, 25, 33, 41, 57– 9, 63, 66, 68, 74, 94; returns to Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 190, 205, 211– 12, 221, 224, 251– 2, 258, 280– 1, 285; at Minqar Qaim, 316n; at Alamein, 334, 360, 394; in Operation supercharge, 411, 413; in advance to Tripoli, 446, 453, 455, 459– 60; in Tunisia, 470, 474, 477, 488, 496– 8, 504, 510; in Italy, 532, 542, 544, 553– 5, 559– 61, 570, 584, 589, 596, 603– 4, 610, 612, 615, 624, 629, 651, 659, 709, 713, 726– 7, 729, 737n

46 Bty, in Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 190, 211, 215, 224, 227– 8, 252, 269, 279, 282, 371; in Operation supercharge, 411, 413; in advance to Tripoli, 444, 450, 455, 460; in Tunisia, 471, 474– 5, 482, 488, 495, 510; in Italy, 522, 525, 527– 9, 534, 536, 539, 542, 551, 560– 1, 563– 4, 571, 584, 586– 8, 596, 599, 601– 2, 604, 615, 619, 622, 627, 629, 632

5 Fd Regt, its formation, 4– 5; in Egypt, 8– 10, 20– 2; Lt-Col Fraser commands, 23n; in Greece, 27, 31, 33– 4, 38, 41– 4, 55, 57– 8, 60, 64, 66, 68, 71n, 74, 77– 8, 81, 85– 6, 88– 9, 91– 3, 95, 98, 101; in Crete, 102– 5, 107– 9, 111, 122, 125– 6, 128, 137, 143– 4, 146– 7, 151– 7, 163– 6; returns to Egypt, 171, 173, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184n; in crusader campaign, 192– 4, 235, 237– 40, 243– 4, 246– 7, 291, 294, 296; Lt-Col Glasgow commands, 295; in Syria, 297, 299– 302, 305– 6, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 312, 317, 321– 2, 325, 327,

330– 1, 332n; Lt-Col Sprosen commands, 375; at Alamein, 334, 336, 338– 40, 342, 347, 349, 353, 355, 357– 8, 361, 363– 4, 368– 71, 377, 380– 1, 383– 6, 388, 395– 7; in Operation supercharge, 401, 403, 408, 414– 17, 421; Lt-Col Glasgow commands, 437n; in advance to Tripoli, 441, 443– 5, 448– 50, 461, 467; in Tunisia, 468, 470– 1, 474, 476, 481, 483– 4, 486– 7, 489, 491– 2, 498, 501, 503– 5, 507, 509, 512– 13; in Italy, 515– 17, 519, 520n, 522– 5, 528, 533– 4, 536– 7, 539– 40, 543, 548, 549n, 551n, 553, 555– 7, 560, 562, 569– 70, 574, 576, 579, 580n, 583– 6, 593, 595, 597, 599– 606, 610, 612– 17, 619– 23, 625, 629, 631– 4, 636, 638n, 639– 40, 642– 6, 649– 52, 655, 657– 9, 662n, 663– 4, 669– 71, 674, 677– 80, 682– 3, 684n, 686– 9, 691, 696, 698– 9, 703. 705– 6, 708– 9, 711, 714– 15, 717– 19, 720n, 721– 3, 727, 728n, 733– 827 Bty, in Egypt, 22; in Greece, 42– 3, 55, 68, 74; in Crete, 103, 110, 115n, 122, 129, 132– 3, 135, 137, 139, 141– 2, 146; returns to Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 194, 235– 6, 238, 247, 285, 291, 294– 5; in Egypt, 299– 300; at Minqar Qaim, 315, 317, 331; at Alamein, 349, 374; in Operation supercharge, 417; in Tunisia, 498, 508– 9; in Italy, 523, 528, 563, 574n, 583, 601– 2, 615– 16, 623, 629– 31, 652, 656, 677– 8, 683n, 686, 699, 702– 3, 705, 714– 15, 719, 730, 734

28 Bty, in Egypt, 22; in Greece, 31, 42– 3, 55, 68, 74; in Crete, 110, 158; returns to Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 193, 237, 247, 285, 291, 294– 5; in Egypt, 300; at Minqar Qaim, 325; at Alamein, 335, 340, 353; in advance to Tripoli, 444, 448, 466; in Tunisia, 498, 503, 505, 508– 9; in Italy, 523, 534, 555, 583, 615, 617n, 623, 630, 652, 678, 683n, 699, 703, 723

47 Bty, in Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 192– 3, 196, 213, 216– 17, 219, 223, 230, 255, 259, 264, 268– 9, 271– 3, 275, 287; in Egypt, 299– 300; in Syria, 306; at Alamein, 388; in advance to Tripoli, 444, 447n; in Tunisia, 479, 498, 503– 5, 507– 9; in Italy, 523, 525, 548, 553, 555, 559, 563, 583, 595– 7, 601, 603, 615, 630, 645, 648, 656, 678, 699, 703, 705, 707, 728

Mentioned, 514

6 Fd Regt, its formation, 4– 5, 11– 13; in Egypt, 16, 18, 21– 2, 23n; in Greece, 27, 30– 1, 45, 47, 68, 70, 71n, 74, 77, 79– 84, 86– 8, 90– 3, 95, 98, 100– 1; in Crete, 104, 107, 109; returns to Egypt, 167, 173, 176, 178, 180, 183; Lt- Col Weir commands, 184n; in crusader campaign, 185, 196, 198– 9, 209, 216– 17, 219, 221, 225– 6, 230, 232, 234, 250– 2, 254– 5, 258– 64, 267– 9, 274– 5, 278– 9, 286– 8, 291, 296; Lt-Col Walter commands, 297; in Syria, 298– 9, 304, 306, 309– 10; at Minqar Qaim, 312– 13, 315, 317– 18, 322– 3, 329– 30, 332n; at Alamein, 334– 6, 338– 9, 342, 345– 7, 350, 352– 4, 357, 361– 4, 368– 70, 377, 380– 1, 383– 6, 389, 393– 4, 396– 7; in Operation supercharge, 401– 3, 412, 415– 16, 419– 21; in advance to Tripoli, 437n, 438, 446, 447n, 451– 2, 455– 6, 461– 2, 467; in Tunisia, 471, 475– 6, 479– 81, 483– 7, 489, 491– 2, 498, 500– 1, 503– 4, 505n, 507, 509– 10, 512; in Italy, 516, 518, 520n, 522, 524, 528– 9, 531– 3, 536– 7, 539– 40, 542– 4, 548, 549n, 553, 560, 562– 3, 567, 569, 574, 579, 580n, 585– 8, 590, 592n, 593, 595, 597– 606, 610, 612, 614– 17, 622– 3, 625, 629– 32, 634, 636, 638n, 639– 40, 642– 6, 650– 2, 655, 659, 669– 71, 673– 4, 677– 9, 682, 684n, 686n, 687– 8, 690– 1, 693, 696, 698, 703, 705– 6, 708– 9, 714– 15, 717– 18, 720n, 721– 7, 733– 4, 737

29 Bty, in Egypt, 22; in Greece, 74, 82, 86; returns to Egypt, 178; in crusader campaign, 197– 200, 203– 4, 217, 254, 259, 261– 2, 268– 9, 272, 276, 287; at Alamein, 361– 3, 389, 394; in advance to Tripoli, 452, 457; in Tunisia, 486; in Italy, 542, 553, 571, 585, 595– 9, 603, 610, 614, 630n, 655, 706

30 Bty, in Egypt, 22; in Greece, 74, 77, 88; at Almaza, 167; in crusader campaign, 199– 200, 205– 6, 208, 217, 254– 5, 259, 261,

268, 271– 4; at Minqar Qaim, 317, 322; at Alamein, 358, 361, 394; in advance to Tripoli, 441; in Tunisia, 473, 479, 490, 498, 510; in Italy, 574, 587– 8, 598, 602– 4, 614n, 63on, 723 Mentioned, 178, 299

48 Bty, in Egypt, 178; in CRUSADER campaign, 196, 199– 200, 208– 9, 216– 17, 223, 225, 252, 255, 258– 9, 264, 268, 272, 274– 5, 278, 286; at Minqar Qaim, 313, 329; at Alamein, 335, 345, 363, 393– 4; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 401; in advance to Tripoli, 455n; in Tunisia, 505n, 509; in Italy, 531, 598, 603– 4, 627, 630n, 715, 723

14 Lt AA Regt, its formation, 4, 168– 70; in Egypt, 171, 173– 5, 179, 182, 184n; in CRUSADER campaign, 185– 6, 189, 213, 246, 262, 267, 286– 8, 296; in Syria, 297– 8, 303, 306, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 312– 13, 314n, 329, 332n; at Alamein, 338– 9, 359, 363, 369, 375, 378, 380– 1, 384, 389, 393, 396– 7; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 416– 21; Lt-Col Sprosen commands, 437n; in advance to Tripoli, 441, 447n, 448– 9, 461, 464– 5, 467; in Tunisia, 473, 476, 492n, 506, 514; in Egypt, 515– 16, 518; in Italy, 52on, 521– 2, 524– 5, 532, 539, 546, 548, 549n, 564, 575, 580, 590, 592n, 606n, 607, 610, 619, 636, 641, 643, 653, 661, 663– 5

41 Bty, in Egypt, 169, 174– 5, 179, 182; in CRUSADER campaign, 190, 211, 213, 222, 224, 229; in Kabrit, 302; at Minqar Qaim, 315– 16, 320, 326, 328; at Alamein, 334, 336, 338– 9, 346, 359, 361, 369, 381n, 387, 394, 396; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 401, 413, 418, 420; in advance to Tripoli, 437, 452, 455– 7; in Tunisia, 473, 476, 483; in Egypt, 516; in Italy, 523, 525, 527– 8, 536, 546, 548, 553, 556n, 572– 3, 575n, 584, 599, 659, 661 Mentioned, 297, 298n, 310

42 Bty, in Egypt, 169, 174, 180, 182; in CRUSADER campaign, 186, 192, 235, 238, 243, 247– 8, 291; exercises in Egypt, 299– 301; in Syria, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 313, 316, 320– 1, 327, 331; at Alamein, 334, 336, 338– 9, 342, 346, 352, 359, 361, 369– 70, 381n, 385, 394, 396; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 401– 2, 413, 417; in advance to Tripoli, 437, 441, 450– 2, 467; in Tunisia, 473, 480, 486, 509; returns to Egypt, 516– 17; in Italy, 537, 548, 571, 573, 595, 599, 650, 664

43 Bty, in Egypt, 169, 174– 5, 180, 183; in CRUSADER campaign, 189, 200, 208– 9, 222, 256, 278, 286, 288; at Kabrit, 302; in Syria, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 315, 320, 331; at Alamein, 334, 336, 340, 342, 346– 7, 352, 359, 368, 370, 381n, 389, 394, 396; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 401– 2, 413, 420; in advance to Tripoli, 437n, 455, 462– 3; in Tunisia, 473, 483, 489, 507; in Italy, 539, 546, 548, 556n, 557, 572– 3, 583, 641, 643, 653, 655 Mentioned, 298n, 312, 313

X Bty, 289, 295

36 Survey Bty, 4; in Egypt, 168; in Syria, 304n; in Middle East, 423– 36; in advance to Tripoli, 440, 448, 462, 467; in Tunisia, 471, 480, 484, 489, 492, 504n, 507, 512, 514; in Italy, 520n, 521– 2, 536, 549n, 554, 578, 591, 592n, 593, 595, 606n, 607, 611, 622– 3, 637, 641, 655, 661, 663, 666– 7 Mentioned, 518

1 Survey Tp, 4, 13; in Egypt, 16, 20– 1, 23; in Greece, 31, 55, 69, 71n, 77, 80, 83, 96, 101; in Crete, 102, 104, 107, 109; training in Egypt, 173, 180, 182; in CRUSADER campaign, 185, 215n, 221, 229, 255, 282, 296; at Minqar Qaim, 314n, 324; at Alamein, 333, 338, 355, 372, 380– 1, 394

Mentioned, 310, 435

- See also
36 Survey Bty and, under 7 A-Tk Regt, 5 Survey Troop

Artillery Training Regt, 167, 179, 576n

16 Fd Regt ( Korea), 739n

32 Fd Regt (Arty Training Depot), 515

Royal New Zealand Artillery (Regular Force), 4, 5

Infantry—

Headquarters 2 NZ Div, 132, 144, 171, 182, 185– 7, 189, 210, 213, 215– 16, 221– 2, 250, 256– 7, 262,

265, 278, 306, 322, 327– 9, 336, 348– 9, 356, 359, 391, 419, 437, 445, 448, 551, 572, 599

Div Reserve (Gp), 27, 315– 17, 320, 322, 326– 7, 336, 338, 347, 384, 396, 420, 445, 479

4 Bde, formation of, 4; in Egypt, 17– 18; in Greece, 25, 27, 30, 45, 47– 8, 68, 83, 96– 7, 102; in Crete, 106, 110– 11, 116, 128, 142, 144, 146; returns to Egypt, 176, 180, 182, 184; in CRUSADER campaign, 185– 6, 189– 90, 195, 210– 11, 213, 215, 217, 219, 222, 224– 6, 229– 30, 252, 255– 7, 259, 261, 265, 275, 278– 80; returns to Maadi, 298; in Syria, 302, 304, 306; at Minqar Qaim, 313, 315– 16, 318, 321– 2, 326– 8; at Alamein, 336, 338– 44, 347; becomes Armoured Brigade, 437n, 516; in Italy, 532, 537, 551, 553, 609, 629, 660 Mentioned, 418, 696n5 Bde, formation of, 14; in Greece, 30, 43– 4, 48, 77, 80– 1, 82n, 96; in Crete, 105– 6, 109– 10, 112, 115n, 129, 132, 137, 139– 40, 142, 144, 146, 159; in Egypt, 174, 176, 180, 182, 184; in CRUSADER campaign, 186, 189, 192, 196, 216, 235– 7, 240, 285, 291– 2, 294– 5; at Kabrit, 298– 9; at El Adem, 300– 3; in Syria, 305, 310; at Minqar Qaim, 313, 315– 16, 318, 320– 1, 324– 7, 329, 331; at Alamein, 336– 7, 339– 43, 347, 358– 9, 364, 368, 370, 381, 388– 90, 394; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 415– 17; in advance to Tripoli, 437n, 441, 443, 445, 450, 452, 455n, 458, 460, 462, 464, 467; in Tunisia, 470– 4, 479, 485– 7, 501, 503, 509; in Egypt, 516– 17; in Italy, 522, 536, 540, 543, 555, 585, 589– 90, 593, 603, 619, 621, 629, 646, 652, 665, 673, 682, 703, 706, 711, 715, 718– 19, 720n, 721– 2 Mentioned, 696n6 Bde, formation of, 4; at Helwan, 19; in Greece, 25, 27, 31, 41, 50, 52, 54– 5, 59, 64, 66, 68– 9, 78, 80– 1, 82n, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96– 7; in Egypt, 173, 176, 180, 183; in CRUSADER campaign, 186, 189, 195– 7, 205, 208– 9, 215– 17, 222, 224– 5, 229– 30, 250– 3, 255, 258– 9, 261– 2, 265, 267, 269, 275, 278, 280; at Maadi, 298; in Syria, 302, 304– 5, 310; at Amiriya, 313; at Alamein, 333, 336, 338– 40, 347– 8, 350, 359, 364, 370, 381, 390, 395; in Operation SUPERCHARGE, 402, 413, 415, 419– 20; in advance to Tripoli, 437n, 441, 443, 445– 6, 455n, 457– 8, 462, 464; in Tunisia, 471, 473, 479, 481, 486– 7, 492, 501, 505– 6; in Egypt, 516– 17; in Italy, 530, 548, 567, 569, 575, 58on, 583– 5, 591, 593, 606, 610, 612– 13, 615, 622– 3, 626, 629– 30, 638n, 641, 649, 660, 673, 677, 680, 682, 696n, 703, 706, 711, 718– 19, 72on, 721, 723

9 Bde, 689, 696n, 711– 12, 718, 720, 724, 727– 8, 737

10 Bde, 111, 116, 128, 137, 142, 144

18 Bn, 30, 46, 143– 5, 149, 151,154, 156, 161, 189, 221, 225, 227, 233– 4, 269, 275– 7, 287, 291, 315, 317, 328, 347– 8, 350– 1

18 Armd Regt, 529

19 Bn, 30, 46– 7, 116, 125– 6, 128, 137, 147, 149– 51, 155– 6, 227, 288, 291, 319, 322

19 Armd Regt, 523, 622

20 Bn, 30, 46, 56, 134– 6, 152, 154, 190– 1, 211– 13, 215, 220– 1, 225, 227, 233– 5, 269, 275– 7, 279n, 281, 313, 319

20 Armd Regt, 515, 703

21 Bn, 33, 37– 8, 40, 57– 61, 65, 110, 115n, 123, 129, 136, 192– 4, 196, 213, 216– 17, 219, 223, 226, 253, 258– 9, 331, 390, 445, 484, 486, 504n, 537, 542, 555, 625, 630– 2, 683, 723, 728

22 Bn, 33– 4, 42, 44, 118, 121, 123, 235, 238, 240, 246, 285, 293, 295, 315, 319, 329, 331, 343, 347, 368, 388, 390, 393, 529, 532, 630, 631, 643, 650, 674, 689n, 713

23 Bn, 33– 4, 42– 5, 110, 115, 123, 129– 30, 136, 157, 159– 62, 235, 238– 9, 249, 285, 291– 2, 294, 315, 384, 389, 394, 445, 486, 503, 543, 626, 685, 707

24 Bn, 55– 6, 84, 92, 196, 203– 4, 217, 223, 225– 6, 253– 4, 262– 3, 350, 390, 596, 600, 608, 614– 15, 623n, 630n, 706

25 Bn, 14, 55– 6, 84– 90, 92, 197– 200, 203– 4, 223, 225– 6, 259, 262, 264– 5, 278, 390, 612– 13, 614n, 616n, 627, 630– 1, 650– 1, 685, 723– 4

26 Bn, 52, 92, 199– 200, 217, 219, 323, 225, 254, 262– 3, 265, 364– 5, 367– 8, 390, 505n, 611, 612n, 614, 616n, 623, 630n, 677, 685

27 MG Bn, 235, 420, 565, 599

27 (Inf) Bn, 689, 727

28 (Maori) Bn, 33, 41– 3, 123, 131– 2, 136, 141– 2, 157, 194, 235– 6, 238– 40, 285– 6, 291– 2, 294– 5, 315, 318– 20, 323– 5, 333, 357, 368, 404, 409, 445, 485, 503, 538, 557, 559– 62, 572, 625, 632, 649, 683, 706, 708

Div Cav Regt, 27, 34– 6, 52– 3, 57, 63, 65, 69, 71, 84, 95, 97, 128, 138– 9, 146– 7, 149– 51, 177, 181– 5, 187, 191, 196, 210– 11, 219, 235, 237, 240, 331– 3, 338, 340, 353, 356– 7, 359– 63, 368, 370, 418, 449, 453, 455, 458– 61, 463, 488, 493, 541, 548, 651, 657

Div Cav Bn, 666– 7, 689

Other Services—

Div Engineers, 34, 50, 105, 119, 131– 2, 176, 429, 448, 641, 703, 7 Fd Coy, 112, 119, 155

Div Signals, 22, 31, 169, 268, 275, 279, 287, 607, 694n, 709n, 711– 12, 733, 737n

2 Div Workshops, 545, 548, 572

Kiwi Entertainment Unit ( Kiwi Concert Party), 8n, 513, 669, 734

Light Aid Detachment (Ordnance), 22, 179, 281, 357

- 9 LAD, 57, 66, 280, 737

- 15 LAD, 44, 351, 737

- 16 LAD, 109, 737

- 18 LAD, 737

Non- Div Engineers—

- 18 Army Tps Coy, 132

- 19 Army Tps Coy, 112, 122

New Zealand Forces Club, London, 736

New Zealand Forces Club, Venice, 734

Nfed, Wadi, 455– 6

Ngaruawahia, 4, 168

Nicholass, WO II C. W., 43, 728n, 736

Nicholson, Lt-Col S. W., in Greece, 48, 66, 67n; at Alamein, 344– 5, 351; on advance to Tripoli, 451, 464; in Tunisia, 473; in Italy, 658, 684, 690, 696, 717– 8, 722– 3, 725, 729, 734

Nicol, Bdr G. J., 591

Nicol, Gnr J. E., 675

Nieuw Amsterdam, 169, 519

Nile Delta, 167, 174, 176, 333

Niven, Bdr M. G., 241, 243

Nizam, HMAS, 165

Nofilia, 445– 7, 449, 451– 2, 466, 478

Nolan, Lt-Col H. T. W., 301n; in Italy, 531, 662, 690, 696, 718, 725; attends memorial service in Crete, 736

Nolan, Capt S. T., 33, 41, 59– 60, 62, 65, 105, 108, 125, 138, 147, 150– 1, 154

Norrie, Lt-Gen Lord, 268, 281

North Road, 581, 583– 5, 592

Norton, F. D., 612n, 616n

Norton, Gnr T. P., 338n

Nuttall, Gnr J. C., 599

Oakes, Lt-Col T. H. E., in UK, 10; 2 i/c 7 A-Tk Regt, 23n; in Greece, 44, 83, 98n, 99; in Crete, 105, 107– 8; returns to Egypt, 109, 143; CO 7 A-Tk Regt, 167, 178; in Crusader campaign, 184n, 186– 7, 256– 8; killed in action, 262– 3, 267, 296

Mentioned, 125

Oakes Force, 105, 107– 8, 110 ( See also
Composite Bn)

O'Brien, Gnr R. M., 456n

Officer, Lt B. L., 666n

Oliphant, Sgt G. N., 597

Oliver, Bdr M. G., 270

Ollivier, Capt C. M., 262– 3, 343

Olympus Line, 37

Olympus, Mount, 26, 28, 30, 38, 40, 55, 58, 68, 739

Olympus (Petras) Pass, 24– 31, 33, 37, 41, 43, 45, 48, 52, 107, 584

Omar Forts, 185, 187, 194, 285

Ombler, Capt E. P., 244– 5

Operation Austin, 718, 732

Operation Beresford, 369

Operation Buckland, 697– 8, 712, 716n

Operation Dickens, 567

Operation Lightfoot, 389, 390, 437

Operation Spaniel, 711– 12, 715n, 717, 732

Operation Supercharge, 402, 413, 422, 437, 501

Organ, Bdr R. F., 220

Ormonde, HMT, 14– 16

Oronsay, 11

Orsogna, 529, 531– 3, 536– 40, 544– 7, 550, 562, 578, 585

Ortona, 532, 550

Osborn, Gnr K. R., 525

Padua, 724– 6

Page, Brig J. R., 199, 205

Palmer, Rev C. G., 513

Papakura Camp, 11, 13, 168

Paris, Bdr J. H., 528

Park, Capt F. L., 423, 426– 7

Parkes, Capt H. K., 88– 9, 90, 363, 388

Parkinson, Maj-Gen G. B., commands 4 Fd Regt, 5, 7, 19– 20, 23n, 24; in Greece, 27, 41, 57– 8, 63, 66– 7, 77, 80; returns to Egypt, 104; acting CRA, 170; commands Army Tank Bde in NZ, 173; joins Arty HQ on return from NZ, 453; commands 6 Bde, 506; appointed CRA, 607– 8; in Italy, 615, 627; returns to 6 Bde, 638n, 696n, 712; at memorial service in Crete, 736

Parks, Lt C. H., 323– 4, 327– 8, 345

Pascoe, Gnr F. J., 543

Paterson, Maj K. W., 620

Paterson, Capt N., 38– 40

Paterson, S-Sgt R. A., 131

Paterson, Capt T. M., 23n, 62

Patterson, Lt-Col D. B., 100, 110, 653

Patterson, Sgt D. P., 347n

Paul, Prince, of Greece, 176n

Paulger, Gnr A. D., 344

Pavey, 2 Lt J., 53

Peddie, Gnr J. R., 677

Penk, Lt B. A., 43

Pepper, Lt C. S., 206– 8

Perano, 524, 542

Perivolia, 104– 5, 109, 154– 5

Perkins, S-Sgt D. C., 166

Perrett, Gnr R. C. M., 389

Perth, HMAS, 21

Pesa R., 622

Pesaro, 639– 41

Pescara, 532, 592

Petersen, Gnr L. J., 46n

Peterson, L-Bdr A. G., 388

Pharsala, 48, 50, 67– 71

Philp, Lt-Col W. D., in Crete, 103, 107, 110– 11, 116, 118, 120, 123, 129, 132– 3, 135– 6, 139, 142, 163; in Crusader campaign, 238, 291, 294– 5; at Alamein, 334n, 371; in Tunisia, 470, 485, 487– 8; on furlough, 516n, 534; commands 6 Fd Regt, 638n; in Italy, 639– 40; returns to NZ, 684n

Phoebe, HMS, 163

Pian dei Cerri, 627, 630

Piave R., 726– 8

Pilling, Bdr R. S., 253

Pinios Gorge, 39– 40, 48, 94, 166

Pinios R., 28, 48– 50, 58

Pink Hill, 125– 6, 128, 137– 9, 144– 5, 150– 1, 154, 165

Pisciatello R., 648, 657, 659

Platamon (tunnel), 28, 33, 37– 40, 57, 59, 61

Platanias, 106, 137, 139– 42

Pledger, Capt C. E. H., 694n

Plow, Brig E. C. (Cdn), 646

Poggio delle Monache, 631– 2

Poggiofiorito, 541– 2, 546

Poggiona, La, 630– 1, 633

Point 107 ( Maleme), 115, 118, 121, 129, 133

Point 175, 195– 6, 198, 200, 208– 9, 215– 17, 255, 258, 260– 1, 264– 6, 268– 9, 278, 696n

Point 270 (Edinburgh Castle), 475

Polhill, Capt F. F. E., 322

Polish Forces—

- Polish Corps, 581, 589

- 3 Carpathian Div, 701

- 5 Kresowa Div, 581, 589, 687

- 4, 5, 6 Kresowa Fd Regts, 644

Ponte Vecchio, 633, 637

Po R., 641n, 647– 8, 652, 721– 3, 727, 732, 739

Po Valley, 693

Porter, Capt (AIF), 60

Porto Rafti, 96, 98– 100, 102

Port Said, 15n, 167, 174– 5, 520

Port Tewfik, 7, 11, 16, 423

Pounsett, Capt B., 685

Pountney, Lt-Col J. A., 346

Power, Sgt D. J. L., 532n

Preston, Gnr H. F., 347n

Prison Valley, 106– 8, 110– 11, 116, 134, 138, 143, 145, 151, 155

Pulford, L-Sgt D. H., 674

Puttick, Lt-Gen Sir E., 17, 27, 47, 106, 613n, 616n

Qassassin, 423

Qattara Depression, 332– 3

Qattara Track, 375, 386– 7

Queree, Brig R. C., 9, 21, 23n; in Greece, 24, 81; in Crete, 105, 166n; commands 4 Fd Regt, 309; at Minqar Qaim, 332; at Alamein, 335; appointed GSO I, 365n; appointed BGS in Italy, 551; awarded CBE, 580; commands 5 Fd Regt, 608; appointed CRA, 638n; in Italy, 639, 641, 666, 669, 677, 679, 682, 684n, 688, 690, 694– 7, 706– 9, 711– 12, 716, 720n, 721, 730– 1, 733– 4; awarded DSO, 732

Quigan, WO II V. N., 586, 602

Quinn, Sgt A., 61

Radford, Capt H. J., 108

Rafina, 83, 96, 99– 100, 102

Rahman Track, 404, 413

Rainbow, Capt W. J., 475

Ralston, L-Sgt J. A., 671

Ramb II, 169

Ramsay, Bdr T. J., 508

Rangitiki, 11

Rapido R., 553, 555– 7, 560– 1, 565, 583, 593

Rashleigh, Bdr G. A., 574

Ravenwood, L-Sgt G. A., 570n

Rawle, Maj A. T., 254

Rawle, Maj F. C., 423

Red Hill, 108, 125– 6, 128, 137– 8, 141, 144, 146– 7, 149– 50, 153, 155

Redstone, Gnr O. B., 599

Redward, Gnr H. W., 708

Reed, Maj C. K., 100, 207, 270, 696, 729

Reeves, L-Sgt C., 505n, 579

Reeves, 2 Lt C. S., 620

Reid, 2 Lt D. G. McM., 484

Reid, Gnr J. H. F., 626n

Reina del Pacifico, 519

Reinforcements, 2 NZEF—

- 4th Reinforcements, 168, 423, 514, 607, 619

- 5th Reinforcements, 168, 170, 580, 634, 664– 6, 685

- 6th Reinforcements, 173, 179

- 7th Reinforcements, 735

- 8th Reinforcements, 464, 484, 735– 6

- 9th Reinforcements, 576, 735– 6

- 10th Reinforcements, 516, 735

- 11th Reinforcements, 735

Rennie, Gnr R., 39n

Reno R., 720

Riccione, 641, 643

Rich, Lt-Col E. E., 76

Richardson, Capt J., 59– 60

Richardson, Gnr J. N., 71

Richmond, Maj C. P., 497

Rimini, 644, 646– 7, 649, 653, 661, 667, 687, 735

Rimini Airfield, 643– 4

Robb, Gnr S. R., 207

Roberts, Gnr S. U., 92n

Roberts, Bdr W., 707

Robertshaw, Capt F. D., 509

Robertson, Maj D. J., 560, 589, 619

Robertson, Maj M. M., 486, 696, 711– 12, 720

Robertson, Lt P. M., 207

Robins, Lt H. W., 23n

Robinson, Capt E. L., 440, 448, 504n, 522

Robinson, 2 Lt G. A., 95n

Robinson, Capt L. H., 643

Rodi, 109

Rodriguez, Maj T. (AIF), 738

Roe, Gnr A. S., 338n

Romagna, The, 613n, 642, 644, 646, 657

Rome, 553, 592, 603, 607, 610, 637, 669, 682, 734

Rommel, Fd Mshl E., 215, 236, 247, 400, 692

Romola, La, 625– 7, 629, 631

Rose, Lt A. S. D., 23n

Ross, Sgt J. F. V., 272

Route 6, 553, 564– 5, 570, 575– 7, 589

Route 9, 649, 670, 673, 675, 679, 691

Rowe, Capt H. A., 145

Ruapehu scheme, 514, 516, 580

Rugbet en-Nbeidat, 198, 202– 3, 259, 264, 278

Ruin Hill, 108, 125, 137, 139, 143– 4, 147

Ruin Ridge, 143, 146– 7, 149, 152, 154

Rush, Gnr J. H., 466

Russell, Lt-Col J. T., 65, 128, 139

Russell, Capt N. D., 440n, 507

Rutherfurd, Maj J. S., 330, 350– 1

Ruweisat Ridge, 335, 341– 2, 345– 50, 352, 354– 5, 358– 9, 373, 696n

Ryan, Capt E. L., 203

Safaga, 427, 432

Saltara, 639– 40

Salween, 98, 102

San Casciano, 620– 1, 623– 4

San Costanzo, 641, 643n

San Dona di Piave, 727

San Donato in Poggio, 619– 20

S. Elia, 583– 5, 592

San Eusanio, 541, 544

San Fortunato Ridge, 643– 5

San Michele, 623– 4, 627, 631

San Severo, 522, 548

Sangro R., 520, 523– 6, 528, 532, 536, 542, 544, 546, 548, 709n

Santerno R., 692, 696, 703, 706– 7, 709, 732

Santi, Bdr E. W., 89, 128

Savage, Gnr A. E., 534n

Savage, Gnr R. W., 485n

Savage, Lt-Col W. C., 256, 460n, 690, 696; awarded DSO, 733; returns to NZ, 736

Savige, Brig S. (AIF), 49

Savige Force, 41, 49– 50, 59, 64, 66

Savignano, 648n, 661

Savio R., 660– 2

Sawyers, Lt-Col C. H., in Greece, 30, 86, 90; in Crusader campaign, 208– 9, 252– 3, 255, 275; at Minqar Qaim, 329; at Alamein, 345; in Italy, 532, 539, 638n, 639, 658,

675, 684n, 686, 688– 90, 696, 709, 719; leaves for NZ, 727

Schultz, Sgt C. N., 53

Sciomar, Wadi esc, 198, 200, 252

Sciuearat, Bir, 252, 257– 8, 265, 267– 8, 280, 285

Scolo Brancona, 648– 9

Scolo Fiumicello, 719

Scolo Sillaro, 715

Scoltock, Sgt G. F., 88

Scorgie, Gnr R. G., 651

Scott, Sgt A., 92n

Scott, Sigmn F. A., 677

Scott, Capt I. G., 208

Scott, Gnr R. E., 574n

Scoullar, J. L., 297n, 306

Sellars, Capt R. D., 7

Senio Line, 677, 679, 685, 696

Senio R., 669, 673– 5, 678n, 679, 682– 3, 685, 689, 691– 2, 694, 695n, 697, 700, 705– 6, 717, 721, 724, 726, 732

Servia, 26, 30– 1, 45– 6, 52, 57, 68

Servia Pass, 28, 30, 45, 48, 52

Sesto Imolese, 710, 712, 714

Sfakia, 158, 161– 3

Sfasciata Ridge, 533– 4, 536– 7

Sfax, 494

Shadwell, L-Bdr P. R., 338n

Sharp, Maj R. W., 287

Shaw, Gnr F. J., 596n

Shaw, Gnr K. R., 574n

Shearer, Bdr I. H., 491

Sheargold, Gnr R. F., 126n

Shein, Deir el, 334– 5, 339, 346

Shepherd, WO I P. N. H., 736

Shortt, Maj G. M., 266, 281, 284, 444

Shrimpton, Gnr S. G., 626n

Sicily, 519

Sidey, Capt J. M., 518

Sidi Azeiz, 187, 196, 210, 235, 237– 40, 245– 7, 291, 296, 421– 2, 438

Sidi Barrani, 18– 19, 165, 420, 437n

Sidi bou Ali, 497, 509

Sidi Haneish, 18, 312, 418

Sidi Rezegh, 181, 195, 199, 216, 222– 3, 225– 6, 229– 30, 235, 249, 251, 259– 60, 268, 281, 285, 288, 290, 298

Sidi Rezegh Airfield, 217, 219, 225, 230, 255

Sidi Rezegh Blockhouse, 200, 202, 217, 219, 223, 226, 230, 249, 252, 255, 259, 262, 264

Sidi Rezegh Mosque, 225– 6, 230, 251, 253, 255, 262, 264– 6, 269– 70, 272, 278, 438

Siena, 619, 637, 736, 737

Sievert, L-Bdr F. E., 202

Sile R., 726

Sillaro R., 709– 11, 714, 732

Sim, Bdr G. F., 220

Simpson, Maj R. S. V., 289

Sirte, 449– 50

Sirte, Gulf of, 299, 461

Siwa, 182

Skinner, Gnr J. R., 300n

Sleigh, Lt-Col R. E., 9, 13

Sloan, Maj R. G., 737

Smith, 2 Lt A. M., 596n

Smith, L-Bdr D., 269

Smith, Bdr E. H., 633n

Smith, Capt F. E., 388

Smith, Gnr F. G., 575

Smith, Gnr G. E., 71

Smith, Gnr M. G., 347n

Smith, L-Sgt O. M. (later Turner), 407– 8

Smith, Capt R. M., 350, 665n

Smythe, Capt E. R., 723– 4

Snadden, Maj J. P., in Crete, 107, 110– 13, 116, 119, 123, 131, 133, 140, 142, 157, 159– 60, 162– 3; in crusader campaign, 269, 275– 6, 288– 9, 291, 294; at Alamein, 335, 340, 363; in Tunisia, 509

Snell, Sgt K. J. H., 338n

Sollum, 192, 194, 210, 235– 6, 238– 40, 285, 292, 420

Sollum Barracks, 194, 235

Sollum Pass, 194, 235, 421, 437

Somerville, Bdr N. T., 563

Somme, Battle of, 1– 3, 6

Sora, 586, 593, 595– 6, 598n, 599– 600, 603, 605– 7, 641, 736

Sousse, 496– 7

South African Forces—

- 1 Div, 182, 378

- 6 Armd Div, 632

- 6 Div Arty, 515

- 5 Bde, 199

- 1/6 Fd Regt, 586

- 16/67 Medium Regt, 586

Spence, Lt-Col J. R., 352, 357

Sperkhios R., 74, 76, 78– 9, 84

Spring, Lt-Col J. F., 362, 504, 512, 560, 619, 696, 736– 8

Sprosen, Lt-Col J. F. R., 19; in Crete, 107, 110– 11, 125– 6, 128, 143, 146– 7; in crusader campaign, 291, 295; in Syria, 309n; at Alamein, 371, 377, 414; commands 5 Fd Regt, 375; commands 14 Lt AA Regt, 437n; in Tunisia, 473, 476; returns to NZ, 516n; back in Italy, 539, 573– 4, 581, 664; commands 7 A-Tk Regt, 665, 684

Stalin, Mshl, 728

Stalos, 105, 138, 142– 3

Stanford, Brig H. M. (RA), 359

Stanford, Maj R. J., 42

Stark, Sgt R. C., 487

Starky, Bdr R. B., 482n

Stedman, Capt A. C., 264

‘Steelforce’, 635

Stent, Gnr F. R., 652n

Stephens, Sgt E. R. W., 191

Stephenson, 2 Lt N. A., 629

Sternberg, Capt J. W., 694n

Stevens-Jordan, Maj J. B., 371, 423, 424– 7, 429, 431, 434

Stevenson, Lt D. G., 565, 600, 609n

Stevenson, WO II J. K. P., 131, 141

Stevenson, Sgt R. S., 327

Stewart, Lt A. B., 247

Stewart, Col G. J. O., in Greece, 58– 9, 63– 4; commands 4 Fd Regt, 365n; at Alamein, 371, 375, 386– 7; in Operation supercharge, 411– 12, 417, 421; in advance to Tripoli, 445, 459; at Medenine, 470; at Maadi, 514; returns to NZ on leave, 516n; in Italy, 534, 540, 576, 581, 597, 602, 625, 639, 684n, 690

Stewart, Lt J. A., 727

Stewart, Capt J. T., 206

Stilis, 67, 78, 81

Stilos, 158– 9

Stirling Castle, 738

Stobie, WO II R., 52, 233, 276– 7

Stoddart, Gnr H. C., 52n

Stone, WO II C. H. B., 244– 5

Stone, Capt J. C., 263

Stone, Maj J. R., 603

Storey, Gnr G., 131

Strathmore, 738

Stratton, Maj M. I., 249

Streater, Gnr K., 599

Strutt, Lt-Col H. W. (AIF), 132– 3, 140, 144

Stuart, Gnr G. D., 64n

Stuka Wadi, 346, 352

Stych, Capt K., 253– 4

Suani Ben Adem, 461– 3, 466– 7, 471, 513

Suda, 102– 4, 109, 115– 16, 140, 155– 8, 163

Suda Bay, 100, 159

Suez, 423, 519

Suez Canal, 311, 427

Sunley, Capt H. M., 146

Sutherland, Lt N. S., 666n

Swaney, Gnr T. J. S., 629

Sweetman, Gnr F. C., 220

Sweetzer, Maj D. J., 72, 319, 330, 342, 390

‘Swordfish’ Area, 372, 375

Swords, Gnr W. M., 562

Symon, Capt R. B., 254, 263, 281

Syria, 173, 302– 4, 308, 312n, 356, 373, 434, 451

Tafile, 424, 426

Tagliamento R., 728

Takrouna, 497, 500– 5

Taranto, 519– 20, 522, 738

Tasker, WO II N. C., 63– 4

Taupo scheme, 619, 638n

Tavendale, Capt W. J. S., 43, 122, 149, 155– 6

Tavronitis R., 106, 112, 115, 117, 120

Tebaga Gap, 477, 479– 80, 482, 485, 489, 500

Tebbutt, Sgt R. H., 36

Telfar, Gnr K. W., 626n

Tell el Aqqaqir, 409– 10, 412– 13, 416

Tell el Eisa, 373, 375, 402

Tell el Eisa station, 396

Tempe, 48, 50, 52, 57– 64, 67– 9, 470

Tempe, Battle of, 55, 66

Tempe, Vale of, 39, 40, 696n

Terelle, 585, 587, 589– 90, 592

Thebes, 81, 83, 96

Thermopylae, 25, 66– 9, 74– 7, 80, 90– 1, 128

Thermopylae Line, 79, 81, 83

Thomas, Bdr F., 338n

Thomas, Gnr R. A. C. J., 498n

Thomas, Capt R. J., 241

Thompson, Gnr B. W., 497

Thompson, Wing Cdr H. L., 701n

Thompson, Lt R. W., 727

Thompson, Gnr W. B., 669n

Thompson, Maj ( Salvation Army) W. J., 686

Thomson, Sgt A. D., 573

Thomson, Maj G. H., 23n, 99

Thomson, Gnr J. A., 90n

Thomson, Maj P. S., 705

Thorne, Sgt S. L., 601

Thornton, Lt-Gen L. W., in Greece, 57, 65– 6; at Minqar Qaim, 331; commands 5 Fd Regt, 513; in Italy, 519, 551, 583n; becomes GSO I, 2 NZ Div, 608; appointed CRA, 734; attends memorial service at Alamein, 737

Thurlow, Gnr N. J., 347n

Thurston, Gnr R. E., 456n

Tipping, Maj J. R., 577

Tirnavos, 48, 54– 5, 57, 67– 8

Titley, Bdr K., 52

Tito, Mshl, 728, 730, 735

Tobruk, 167, 180– 1, 185, 189, 195– 6, 210, 213, 216, 232, 234– 5, 249, 257– 8, 262, 267– 9, 274, 277– 8, 286–

91, 294– 5, 298, 300– 1, 309, 312, 437, 464, 473n, 512

Tobruk Corridor, 260, 267– 8, 274– 5, 287– 9

Tobruk Garrison, 177, 182, 196, 222, 229– 30, 232– 5, 252, 259– 60, 267, 277, 285– 6, 288

Toll, Gnr T. J., 542

Tombleson, Gnr T. W. J., 48

Tongariro scheme, 685– 6, 690, 695– 6

Toovey, Gnr A. C., 621

Tosser, Lt (RA), 418

Trace (now Grace), Gnr F., 320, 328

Trail, WO II R. J., 408

Transjordan, 424– 5, 427, 429– 30

Transom, Bdr C., 707

Trasimene, Lake, 609, 617, 619, 735– 6

Trieste, 728– 9, 734– 6

Trikkala, 48– 9

Tripoli, 299, 302, 421, 437, 453, 458– 64, 466, 468, 473, 480, 513, 735

Tristram, Gnr H. J., 407

Trower, Maj M. B., 408

Tullock, L-Bdr L. H., 574

Tunis, 438, 461, 480, 497– 8, 509, 512– 13

Tunisia, 467, 480, 509, 512, 532, 592

Turbott, Maj G. G., 608

Turkey, 101, 165

Turner, Maj R. (RA), 738

Turner, Maj T. A., 93, 251, 363

Tyler, Lt J. M., 23n

Tyler, Bdr S. C., 118, 498

Ujdur, Sgt B., 573

Ulster Prince, 21

US Forces—

- Army Air Force, 448, 480, 489, 492, 507, 513

- 5 Army, 520, 532, 547, 550, 554, 568, 575, 578, 586, 693

- 2 Corps, 554, 556

- 91 Div, 730

- 71 AA Bde, 573

- 346 Fd Arty Bn, 730

- 936 Fd Arty Bn, 576

- 985 Fd Arty Bn, 574n

- 2 Observation Bn, 554

Uso R., 648, 650– 1

Varian, 2 Lt F. A. H., 266, 282

Vaughan, 2 Lt L. E., 314n

Vaughan, Capt T., 734

Veale, Maj L. H., 49, 111, 143

VE Day, 730, 734– 5

Veitch, Capt J., 107

Venafro, 577– 9, 581, 583, 591, 605

Venetian Line, 726

Venice, 726– 7, 734

Via Balbia, 189– 90, 196, 210– 12, 215, 237– 8, 286, 443

Via Emilia, 648n, 649, 657, 659, 735

Vietnam, 739

Villa Fontana, 718

Viserba, 649, 651

Vivian, Capt H. G., 564, 589, 607, 680

Volos, 66– 71

Volturno R., 549– 50, 577, 579, 581, 737

Voss, Gnr R. T., 495

Voula, transit camp, 83, 96

Waddell, Maj G. W., 686n

Wade, Gnr R. A., 39n

Wakatipu scheme, 514, 516

Walker, Bdr C. A., 347n

Walker, L-Bdr D. A. K., 598

Walker, Sgt L., 708

Waller, Lt-Col (RHA), 78

Wallis, Maj K. P., 611

Walsh, S-Sgt R. T., 724

Walter, Lt-Col C. L., 23n; in Syria, 297; at Minqar Qaim, 330; at Alamein, 333n, 337, 350, 389, 401; at Wadi Matratin, 441; in Tunisia, 484

Walton, Lt-Col W. F. (RA), 257

Ward, Capt C. M., 291, 683n

Warnock, Gnr D. W., 574

Watson, Maj D. O., 686

Wavell, Fd Mshl Lord, 7

Webb, 2 Lt F. T., 238

Webb, Capt R. C., 191, 237– 8, 241

Webb, Capt R. J. H., 694n

Weir, Maj-Gen Sir S. (Brig C. E.), 9; commands 6 Fd Regt, 11, 23n, 184n; at Bombay, 14– 15; in Greece, 31, 47, 87; in Egypt, 104, 173, 183; in crusader campaign, 185, 198– 9, 209, 223, 250– 5, 261, 264– 5, 270– 1, 273, 275; promoted CRA, 297– 8, 429; in Syria, 302– 4, 306, 309; on role of artillery, 314– 15, 372– 3, 376– 8, 402– 3, 466– 7, 472– 3, 475– 6, 593; at Minqar Qaim, 318, 323; at Alamein, 335– 6, 339, 341, 347, 350, 353, 355, 358, 362, 364, 369, 371, 381, 384– 6, 388, 391, 396, 398; in Operation supercharge, 401, 405, 412– 17, 420; in advance to Tripoli, 437, 440, 443, 445, 448, 451, 455, 460– 4, 466; in Tunisia, 468, 470, 477, 481, 483– 4, 487– 9, 491– 2, 501, 503– 6, 510, 512– 13; in Egypt, 515– 16; in Italy, 519, 521– 3, 525,

531– 2, 536, 539, 544, 546, 559, 561, 567n, 576, 581, 591– 2; appointed CCRA, 10 Corps, 607– 8; appointed temporary commander, 2 NZ Div, 641; commands 46 Inf Div, 665n

- Mentioned, 423, 434

Wells, Sgt I. M., 407

Wells, Capt V. E. J., 356

Wendleborn, Gnr S. J., 726n

West, Rev. H. W., 665

Western Desert Force, 18, 19

Weston, Maj-Gen C. E. (RM), 107, 164

Wheat Hill, 125– 6, 128, 134, 137– 8, 144– 5, 150, 153– 4

Wheeler, WO II G. O., 266

White, Gnr F. C., 559, 571

White, Maj J. C., 374

White, Capt K. J., 444, 504, 555n

Whitehead, Sgt B. P. K., 284

Whitehorn, Bdr F. J. H., 626n

Whiting, Sgt M. J., 597

Widdup, Maj M., 266

Widness, HMS, 100

Wilder, Maj-Gen A. S., 14

Wilder Force, 606, 657

Wiles, Maj O. G., 108, 411

Wilkin, Gnr R., 498n

Wilkinson, Gnr E. R., 487n

Williams, WO II E. A., 138

Williams, Maj L. G., 38, 58, 115– 17, 119, 121, 129

Williams, Lt M. A. P., 357

Williams, Gnr R. M., 324n

Williams, Gnr W. N., 660

Willis, Sgt A. M., 653

Wilson, Fd Mshl Lord, 7, 24n

Wilson, L-Bdr E. R., 556

Wilson, Maj H. S., 198, 200– 4

Wilson, Lt M. E., 694n

Winthrop, Gnr C. J., 274

Wise, Gnr G. H., 562

W (Lustre) Force, 24– 5, 28, 74, 79

Wood, Capt W. N., 274

Woolley, Maj P., 146

Worsdale, L-Bdr O., 346

Worthington, Gnr A. K., 39n

Wright, Sgt S. N., 343

Wyatt, Lt J. D., 596n

Yates, Sgt B. G., 328

Young, Capt J. H., 162, 271– 2

Younghusband, L-Sgt T., 409– 10

Yugoslavia, 28

Zaafran, 227, 229, 233, 257, 260, 266, 268, 275, 278– 80, 282, 284, 309

Zabboud, 302, 308

Zemzem, Wadi, 455

2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

[backmatter]

This volume was produced and published by the Historical

Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs

Editor-in-Chief | M. C. Fairbrother, cbe, dso, ed
Executive Officer | W. A. Glue
Archives Officer | R. L. Kay

The author, W. E. Murphy, though of a New Zealand family, was brought up in England and enlisted (with his brother) in The New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery (later numbered the 34th) formed at Aldershot in October 1939. He served with this battery until September 1944, and from then until the end of the war was Divisional Artillery Historian. (He had acted as historian of the 7th Anti-Tank since March 1942.) Except for the Sangro and Orsogna fronts, he saw every major battlefield described in this history either just before, at the time, or soon afterwards. After the war he continued work on this history at Army Headquarters, Wellington, and from 1947 in War History Branch. He collaborated with the author, D. M. Davin, in the preparation of the history of the Crete campaign. Then he wrote the campaign history, The Relief of Tobruk. He now lectures in political theory and international relations in the Victoria University of Wellington and edits the journal Political Science.

This book was printed and bound by Coulls Somerville Wilkie Ltd., and distributed by R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand.

Table of Contents
digital title page and colophon
2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery
[covers]
2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery

F Troop, 6th Field, in action at Ruweisat Ridge

[titlePage]
Preface
Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Maps

CHAPTER 1 The Early Days: New Zealand, United Kingdom and Egypt

[section]
Brigadier Miles, the First CRA
The First Echelon
The Second Echelon
The Third Echelon
Maadi and the Western Desert
Getting Ready for Greece
CHAPTER 2 Greece: The Gunners' Campaign
[section]
The Aliakmon Line
Back to the Olympus Line
Rearguard on the Aliakmon
Desperate Fighting at Platamon

Crest Clearance on the Cloudy Slopes of Olympus

A Dominant Position above Servia
26 Battery at Kalabaka
‘Action Front: Tanks!’
Action Overlooking Elasson
Tempe: A Crucial Rearguard
Retreat to Thermopylae
The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka

CHAPTER 3 The Molos Battle and then the Beaches
brallos pass and thermopylae, 24 april 1941
Evacuation Plans and Moves
Molos: The Gunners' Battle
Retreat to the Beaches
CHAPTER 4 Gunners and ‘Infantillery’ in Crete
[section]
Armed and Unarmed Parties
An Odd Assortment of Guns
The Gun Positions
The Airborne Assault on 5 Brigade
The Landing in the Prison Valley
The Second Day at Maleme
Minor Fighting at Galatas
The Counter-attack on the Airfield Fails
A Paratroop Attack on Galatas is Repulsed
5 Brigade Withdraws
The Composite Battalion is Relieved
Difficult Gunnery at Galatas

Desperate Fighting by Gunners and ‘Infantillery’

Retreat from Galatas
Snadden's Gunner Platoon
A Cruel Ending to the Campaign

CHAPTER 5 Recuperation, Training and Reinforcement

[section]
The 14th Light Ack-Ack Arrives
Lessons of Greece
New Equipment but No Medium Guns
Action for the Bofors Gunners
Preparing for Desert Operations
Field and Anti-Tank Batteries are Reorganised
The Battle Plan
The Move to the Libyan Frontier

CHAPTER 6 CRUSADER: Retrieving a Disastrous Start

[section]
The Division Moves North
The Attack on Bir Ghirba
Bad News of the Tank Battle
6 Brigade Overruns Africa Corps Headquarters
Hard Fighting at Point 175
L Troop's Anti-Tank Action
Major Sawyers recaptures a Dozen Tanks
An Anti-Tank Advanced Guard
4 Brigade Captures Gambut
The Blockhouse
The First Attack on Sidi Rezegh
Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda
CHAPTER 7 crusader: A Hard-won Victory
[section]
The Enemy Armour Approaches Bardia
The Guns Fail to Save 5 Brigade Headquarters

The Garrisons of Menastir and Capuzzo Repel Attacks

Mopping Up Near Sidi Rezegh
Pressure on 6 Brigade
Divisional Headquarters under Attack
Point 175 is Lost
Panzers Overwhelm Most of 6 Brigade
A Merciless Bombardment of 25 Battery

The CRA Fails to Clear Up High-level Misunderstandings

The 6th Field is Overrun

Belhamed is Also Lost

The Remnants of the Division Gather at Zaafran

Duff's Gun Group Beats Back All Attacks
The Maori Victory at Menastir
Gunners in Tobruk Fortress
The Sinking of the Chakdina
The Gazala Battle
CHAPTER 8 Interlude in Syria
[section]
Training in Combined Operations
5 Brigade Mans the El Adem Box
Springtime in Syria
Increased Anti-Tank Strength
Key Men Leave for Service in the Pacific

CHAPTER 9 Minqar Qaim: Another Gunners' Battle

[section]
The Minqar Qaim Position
More 6-Pounders Arrive
Vulnerable Transport
Threats from All Quarters
The Break-out After Dark
CHAPTER 10 Summer in the Alamein Line
[section]
The Jock Column Policy Continues
Plenty of Work for the Bofors
The Attack on Ruweisat
El Mreir: Another Costly Failure
Stalemate in August
The Battle of Alam Halfa
The Counter-attack Southwards
CHAPTER 11 The Alamein Offensive
[section]
Moving Up to the Front
The Artillery Plan
A Shortage of Gunners
The Barrage
The 4th Field Moves Up Behind the Armour
OPs Under Fire
Anti-Tankers on Miteiriya Ridge
The Enemy Gun Line Is Not Broken
The End of Operation Lightfoot
CHAPTER 12 Operation SUPERCHARGE
the australian sector, 28–31 october
Planning supercharge
The 192-Gun Creeping Barrage
Trouble for the Anti-Tankers
Breaking the Enemy Gun Line
Another Big Barrage
The End of the Alamein Line
The Pursuit
CHAPTER 13 The Surveyors
CHAPTER 14 The Conquest of Libya
[section]
Crossing Cyrenaica
The First Left Hook
The Action at Wadi Matratin
The Second Left Hook: To Nofilia
Lobs and Others on the Coast Route

Christmas and the New Year by the Gulf of Sirte

The Development of the Stonk
Moving on towards Tripoli
Beni Ulid
The Difficult Approaches to Azizia
Suani Ben Adem
Tripoli
The Parade for Mr Churchill and Other Events
The Bofors Gunners Defend Tripoli Harbour
Preparing for a Divisional Artillery Exercise
CHAPTER 15 Tunisia: The End of a Long Road
medenine, 6 march 1943
Field Regiments under CRA's Command
Enemy Attack is Repulsed
Air Attacks
Outflanking the Mareth Line
The Tebaga Gap
New Zealand Corps Reinforced
The Advance to Gabes
Wadi Akarit
The Pursuit Continues
Takrouna
Operations around Djebibina
Return to Maadi
CHAPTER 16 Italy: The Sangro and Orsogna
[section]
Burg el Arab
The Move to Italy
Marking Time at Taranto
A New Kind of War in Italy
The Journey to the Adriatic Front
Edging Towards the Sangro River
The Crossing of the Sangro
Guardiagrele and Orsogna
The Second Attack on Orsogna
The Third Attack
The Final Attack
The Casa War
Guns Firing Short
Famous Landmarks
The Ack-Ack Record
Survey Work
Withdrawing from the Orsogna Front
CHAPTER 17 The New Zealand Attacks at Cassino
5 brigade positions, 8 february 1944
The Maoris Attack the Railway Station
Operation dickens

CHAPTER 18 The Mountains above Cassino and the Action at Sora—Balsorano
mountain sector north-east of cassino
Anti-Tankers Form 39 Mortar Battery
The Pursuit Begins
CHAPTER 19 Arezzo and Florence
[section]
Infantry and M10 Training for Anti-Tankers
A Hasty Move to the Arezzo Front
Infantry Complaints about Short-shooting
Taupo Furlough Scheme
Committed to Florence Battle
M10s in Action
San Michele
Tragedy at La Romola
The Final Attacks
The Fall of Florence
The Montelupo–Empoli Front
A Brief Rest near Siena
CHAPTER 20 Back to the Adriatic
[section]
Attack on the Gothic Line
The Coriano Ridge
The Rimini Front
Rivers, Canals and Ditches of the Romagna
Viserba and Bellaria
Rain Delays the Offensive
Anti-Tankers Support the Greek Brigade
Thrusting Along the Foothills
Across the Savio River
CHAPTER 21 Winter in the Romagna
[section]
Some Units are Disbanded
Return to the Front
Surprise Attack West of Faenza
A White Christmas on the Senio
Manning a Winter Line
Departures and Replacements

CHAPTER 22 The Senio to Trieste: the Triumphant Advance

[section]
A Sudden Move to the Front
The Forthcoming Offensive
Changes in Equipment and Methods
Changes in Personnel
The Artillery Plan
The Senio Crossing
Pushing on to the Santerno
Near Massa Lombarda
The Sillaro

Spaniel: a Masterpiece of Planning and Administration

Gruesome Effects of Artillery Fire
The Gaiana Canal
Across the Idice
A Rapid Advance towards the Po
Crossing the Po and the Adige
The Race to Padua
From Venice to the Piave
On to Trieste
Tension after VE Day
General Freyberg Sums Up
CHAPTER 23 The End of the Story
[section]
The Disbandment
Jayforce
The End and the Continuation
Appendix I
Appendix II
Roll of Honour
HQ 2 NZ Divisional Artillery
4 Field Regiment
5 Field Regiment
6 Field Regiment
7 Anti-Tank Regiment
14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
36 Survey Battery
I Survey Troop
SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES (ALL REGIMENTS)
Honours and Awards
Index
[untitled]